umi-umd-1397

ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: THE WORLDVIEW OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:

FRANCE, GERMANY, AND UNITED STATES
INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE
Michael S. Bell, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004
Dissertation directed by: Professor Keith W. Olson

Department of History
President Franklin D. Roosevelt operated from a remarkably consistent view of
the world that grew naturally from his experiences. Before he entered the White House,
Roosevelt already possessed a coherent worldview that influenced his thinking and
informed his decisions as president. The product of his background and education, his
experiences, and his exposure to contemporary ideas, Roosevelt’s worldview fully
coalesced by the mid 1920s and provided a durable and coherent foundation for
Roosevelt’s thinking as president and his strategic direction in response to the
deteriorating situation in Europe in the late 1930s and toward the Second World War.
Roosevelt’s “worldview” was his broad perspective and sweeping understanding of the
impact and interplay of states, parties, groups, and individual people on the progressive
advance of world civilization. His background and personal experiences, understanding
of historical events, and ideology shaped Roosevelt’s perspective and enabled him to
formulate and deliberately pursue long-range strategic goals as part of his foreign policy.
The foundation of Roosevelt’s worldview was a progressive, liberal outlook that provided
a durable basis for how he interpreted and responded to events at home and abroad. An
essential aspect of that outlook was Roosevelt’s deep conviction that he had a personal
responsibility to advance civilization and safeguard the cause of liberal reform and
democracy. He believed that he was an agent of progress.
Examining several of Roosevelt’s wartime policies within the context of his overall
perspective allows new insights and a deeper appreciation for the depth and complexity
of his thinking. As wartime leader, he remained focused on his fundamental strategic
goals of defeating Nazi Germany and totalitarianism while crafting and implementing an
enduring peace. As part of the enduring peace, he envisioned a postwar world marked by
continued cooperation between the great powers, the reestablishment of republican
France, and the revitalization of German liberalism.

THE WORLDVIEW OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:
FRANCE, GERMANY,
AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE
by
Michael S. Bell
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the

University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2004
Advisory Committee:
Professor Keith W. Olson, Chair

Professor Herman J. Belz
Professor Rose-Marie Oster
Professor Shu Guang Zhang
Dr. J. Samuel Walker
©Copyright by
Michael S. Bell
2004
Preface
Tales of the exploits of the Second World War have been part of the fabric of my
entire life, and the political story of Franklin D. Roosevelt and United States entry into
the war attracted my interest over twenty years ago. I first encountered Wayne S. Cole’s
masterful Roosevelt and the Isolationists while a cadet at the United States Military
Academy at West Point. Since then, my fascination with Roosevelt and the Second
World War has remained strong. The period offers many insights that are invaluable
today.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, service in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia and Iraq awakened my interest in how prewar perceptions and assumptions
influence United States entry into foreign conflicts. Related to that issue is the extent
those perceptions and assumptions also shape, inform, or limit the manner in which the
United States wages the subsequent war. As a citizen and a soldier, I find these to be vital
issues. Events since 9/11 have served to sustain and reinforce my curiosity concerning the
assumptions underpinning strategic direction and decision-making as the United States
transitions from peace to war.
This study developed out of my master’s thesis at the University of Maryland. Under
the direction of Wayne Cole, my thesis examined United States relations with the French
State between the Fall of France and the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa.
During that study, I came to appreciate three circumstances. The first was the central role
Franklin D. Roosevelt played in the foreign policy and strategic direction of his
administration. The second was the extent to which United States policies derived from
ii
attitudes, perceptions, and influences in the United States that did not always reflect what
was happening overseas. The third was that in Roosevelt’s thinking there seemed to be a
symbiotic relationship between France and Germany. With these as a point of departure, I
began my dissertation research and had the great fortune to return to the Hudson Valley
as a member of the Department of History at West Point. With the assistance of a
generous research grant from the United States Military Academy’s Faculty Development
Research Fund, I began detailed exploration into Roosevelt’s personal direction of policy,
his background, and his experiences in the collection at the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York and at other repositories.
This study could not have succeeded without the kind and professional assistance
provided by the staff at the National Archives and the Roosevelt Library. I would like to
offer my particular appreciation to National Archives staff archivists: John Taylor, from
the modern military record branch, Larry McDonald, in the records of the Office of
Strategic Services, and Rich Boylan, at the Suitland Federal Records Center and College
Park. I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the superb staff of the Roosevelt
Library, especially Raymond Teichman, Robert Parks, Mark Renovitch, Nancy
Schnedecker, and Virginia Lewick. Their character made very visit to Hyde Park a
rewarding one.
Throughout this study I have benefited from the professional advice and helpful
encouragement of colleagues and friends. Historians Wayne Cole, George Herring, and
Mark Stoler encouraged, supported, and inspired my efforts. Herman Belz, Rose-Marie
Oster, and Shu Guang Zhang at the University of Maryland and J. Samuel Walker, the
historian of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided critical analyses and
iii
invaluable feedback. To Keith Olson, who directed my doctoral studies, I owe a lasting
debt of gratitude for his counsel, patience, insight, and commitment. I am deeply grateful
to him.
As always, my greatest acknowledgement is to my wife, Terri, and our wonderful
children: Elise, Michael, and Mary Ellen. They have supported me in every way. What
follows is a testament to their love, inspiration, and encouragement.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: The Development of Roosevelt’s Worldview, 1882-1913 11
Chapter 3: Great War and the Confirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1913-1918

111
Chapter 4: Affirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1919-1928 219
Chapter 5: Implementing his Worldview: France, Germany, and the Second World War
in Europe, 1933-45 288
Chapter 6: Insights and Conclusions 411
References 421
v
Chapter 1: Introduction
He has an amazingly retentive memory and constantly floors his family

with knowledge of events, geography and history, factual concrete
knowledge.
Joseph Lash’s diary description of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19401
Before he entered the White House, Franklin D. Roosevelt already possessed a
coherent and consistent worldview that influenced his thinking and informed his
decisions as president.2 That worldview shaped how he understood and responded to
events in Europe as war threatened and his conduct of the Second World War. As a
result, Roosevelt pursued what he believed was a steady and rational foreign policy and
strategic concept. The consistency in Roosevelt’s major decisions and strategic direction
for waging the war against Nazi Germany and totalitarianism emanated from his
particular worldview.
Roosevelt operated from a remarkably consistent view of the world that grew naturally
from his experiences. His worldview developed over more than forty years and fully
1
Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches
and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library,
Hyde Park, New York (hereafter cited as FDRL).
2
Although Roosevelt has remained a subject of historical scrutiny for over half a century,
there is no scholarly consensus on his actions with regard to World War II. Historians
Justus Doenecke and Gerhard Weinberg assert that previously untapped or classified
sources may lead to a greater understanding of Roosevelt’s actions. With those, Weinberg
suggests, historians may develop a more complete assessment of the influence of
Roosevelt’s experiences, particularly from the Great War and immediate post war era, on
Roosevelt’s perceptions and the impact of those perceptions on some of his most
important decisions and wartime policies. Justus D. Doenecke, “U.S. Policy and the
European War, 1939-1941,” Diplomatic History, Fall 1995, vol. 19, number 4, pp. 673,
696; Gerhard L. Weinberg, “World War II: Comments on the Roundtable,” Diplomatic
History, Summer 2001, vol. 25, number 3, p. 492; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany,
Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (Cambridge,
Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 186-7, 299-301.
1
coalesced by the mid 1920s. As a young man, Roosevelt’s family background and his
boyhood travels, reading, and experiences provided a solid foundation for his emerging
perspective. As he matured during the progressive era, his formal education
complemented those views and his subsequent entry into public life further exposed him
to contemporary attitudes and strategic thinking. In world affairs, he thought the United
States had a responsibility to promote liberty and progress, wielding significant influence
through moral suasion and sea power. As Roosevelt entered public life, his ideas
underwent further refinement, particularly in association with the two presidents and
statesmen whom he admired most: Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Postwar
events affirmed his progressive perspective. His tenure in Woodrow Wilson’s
administration as assistant secretary of the navy proved to be a formative experience
solidifying his strategic views and progressive inclination. By the mid 1920s, the lessons
he derived from the Great War and from the postwar setbacks led Roosevelt to formulate
a remarkably clear strategic blueprint for resolving future conflicts and left him enduring
images of France and Germany that remained powerful frames of reference throughout
his life.3
3
Gerhard L. Weinberg notes, “A significant factor in the understanding of international
relations is the perception of countries and issues by those in position to make policy.”
Weinberg added, “The more policy formulation is restricted to one man or a small group,
the more important this factor becomes.” Weinberg’s study examines the thinking of
Adolph Hitler in order better to understand Hitler and how his views and perceptions
shaped his decisions. Justus Doenecke notes that no similar study has attempted to assess
the views of Roosevelt and that such a work is sorely needed. In this paper, I attempt to
provide an assessment of Roosevelt’s thinking and perceptions with respect to World
War II in Europe. Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler’s Image of the United States,” in World
in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II (Hanover, New Hampshire:
University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 53-74. Justus D. Doenecke, “U.S. Policy
and the European War, 1939-1941,” Diplomatic History, Fall 1995, vol. 19, number 4.
2
For the purposes of this study, I have defined Roosevelt’s “worldview” as his broad
perspective and sweeping understanding of the impact and interplay of states, parties,
groups, and individual people on the progressive advance of world civilization. His
background and personal experiences, understanding of historical events, and ideology
shaped a perspective that encompassed politics, foreign affairs, geography, and military
strategy.4 It enabled Roosevelt to formulate and deliberately pursue long-range strategic
goals as part of his foreign policy. The foundation of Roosevelt’s worldview was a
progressive, liberal outlook that provided a durable basis for how he interpreted and
responded to events at home and abroad. An essential aspect of that outlook was
Roosevelt’s deep conviction that he had a personal responsibility to advance civilization
and safeguard the cause of liberal reform and democracy. He believed that he was an
agent of progress.
Roosevelt’s worldview possessed two salient features, the first being his absolute
confidence that certain nations represented higher expressions of civilizations than others,
with the United States being the highest. From that derived the unshakeable faith in
American exceptionalism that Roosevelt inherited from his grandfather Isaac Roosevelt.
It also reflected contemporary Social Darwinism and the ideas of progressive historians
such as Frederick Jackson Turner that the American experience refined and strengthened
the attributes of superior Anglo-Saxon racial stock. He operated from the conviction that
the United States represented a major moral force in the world for democratic progress.
4
Although he does not elaborate further on Roosevelt’s thinking, Gerhard Weinberg
asserts, “Roosevelt had a view of the world which was indeed geographically global.”
Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German
and World History (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.
301.
3
As an adult, domestic politics held primacy for Roosevelt because of his sense that the
maintenance of democracy in the United States remained the most vital precondition for
the continued advance of civilization in the 20th century.
From Roosevelt’s perspective, the superior civilization that developed in the United
States derived from English, Dutch, and northern European stock; those European nations
represented the next tier of civilization in his thinking. For Roosevelt, Britain possessed
the most advanced form of civilization in the old world, and he deeply respected English
institutions and liberal politicians. Roosevelt considered the Dutch on par with their
English neighbors. Rounding out the most advanced nations were France and Germany,
both on a slightly lower tier due to the inherent tensions that Roosevelt perceived in each.
Roosevelt believed that in both France and Germany reactionary and conservative forces
often set back the course of progress. Roosevelt sensed a tension between liberal,
intellectual, and industrial Germany and the impulses of Prussian militarism and Junker
conservatism. Likewise, he believed that the “true” France, republican, anti-clerical, and
anti-colonial, struggled against the influences of the mixed racial heritage of France, the
Catholic Church, colonial imperialism, and monarchism. Coming of age in the aftermath
of the Franco-Prussian War and German unification and conditioned by the Great War,
throughout his life Roosevelt typically perceived France and Germany in relation to each
other. Ultimately, the conclusions that he reached about both countries fundamentally
shaped his policies as president and the strategic direction he provided for prosecuting
World War II in Europe.
Beyond the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, Roosevelt
saw relatively weaker national expressions of civilization. He believed that the mixed
4
heritage of the Latin states of southern Europe resulted in archaic and heterogeneous
institutions in their countries and in their colonies in the western hemisphere. Beyond
Western Europe, Roosevelt probably placed the greatest faith in the potential of the
Russian people who he believed possessed a democratic character by virtue of their own
frontier experience. Although fascinated with stories of trade with China and his mother’s
time there, there was no particular prominence given East Asia in his thinking about
civilization. Roosevelt, furthermore, seems to have taken little notice of the native and
aboriginal peoples; they remained on the periphery of his world. Although he favored
their independence, he envisioned a period of great power paternalism in order to prepare
them for eventual self-rule.
Despite his primary geographic focus on the United States and Western Europe, the
second feature of Roosevelt’s worldview provided its universal character and gave him a
powerful and compelling sense of mission. Roosevelt perceived states, groups, activities,
and individuals either as the agents of democratic progress or as the reactionary and
conservative opponents of the advance of civilization. Roosevelt’s pervasive outlook
provided the perspective from which he interpreted and understood historical events as
well as contemporary international affairs and conflicts, domestic political struggles, and
the competition between individuals. For Roosevelt, it illuminated the roles that his
kinsmen had played in furthering liberal democratic reforms in his particular version of
the advance of western civilization. An essential product of that was Roosevelt’s faith
that he was an agent of progress and as such had a personal responsibility to further the
cause of progressive civilization.
5
In spite of the fact that the progressive label lost much of its allure by the early 1920s,
Roosevelt’s progressive outlook remained a powerful and all encompassing aspect of his
worldview. In Roosevelt’s thinking, the forces of reaction arrayed against his notion of
progress and democracy were monolithic. He paid little, if any, regard to their ideological
differences. It did not matter to Roosevelt whether the opponents from the so-called
forces of reaction were Republicans in the United States, isolationist critics, industrialists,
politicians of the French Right, Fascists, members of Adolph Hitler’s Nazi Party,
conservative Prussians, or Catholic French générals. From his perspective, they all
belonged to the same group and were united by their opposition to the continued
advancement of a progressive and liberal world. Roosevelt believed that across time, the
forces of reaction worked for complementary, if not for identical, goals. Roosevelt judged
that the reactionary leaders of those groups could not enjoy the popular support of an
informed population and only maintained their hold on power by keeping their subjects in
the dark, misinformed and deceived. In the White House, Roosevelt tended to surround
himself with advisors who viewed the world in a similar manner.
Roosevelt’s worldview had several implications for this thinking. Because of the
gravity of assuming the role as an agent of progress in the 20th century, it is not surprising
that Roosevelt thought seriously about the strategic concepts and the strategic means that
might best accomplish his fundamental goals. By the 1920s, Roosevelt developed a
strategic blueprint for achieving United States objectives while potentially avoiding
formal belligerency. In his thinking, economic sanctions and blockade could complement
the use of public information and moral suasion to deter aggressor states. In the event that
dissuasion failed, he believed the application of naval and air power might achieve
6
victory without having to resort to sending an American Expeditionary Force to fight
overseas. In Roosevelt’s strategic thinking, Britain, France, and Germany figured
prominently. The advance of world civilization required liberal, reform-minded leaders in
each country.
During wartime, however, the consistency of Roosevelt’s thinking was not always
evident from his tactical maneuvering and political methods; instead, it emerges from an
examination of his policies and actions within the larger context of his background, ideas,
and aspirations. Roosevelt’s views and ideas make sense when examined in relation to
contemporary attitudes and culture, his family and experiences, and his sense of world
geography, history, and current events. Those influences shaped particular views of
France and Germany in Roosevelt’s thinking. At the same time, his thinking about
military force and the effectiveness of different elements of national power also coalesced
into lucid strategic concepts well before he became president. The product was a durable
and coherent worldview that provided the foundation of Roosevelt’s thinking and the
strategic direction that his administration took in response to the deteriorating situation in
Europe in the late 1930s and toward the Second World War.
Examining several of Roosevelt’s key policies within the context of his overall
perspective allows new insights and a deeper appreciation for the depth and complexity
of his thinking. In office, he consciously reflected on the experiences of Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and others such as Georges Clemenceau who provided
him with both positive and negative examples of presidential leadership and
statesmanship. As wartime leader, he remained focused on his fundamental strategic
goals of defeating Nazi Germany and totalitarianism while crafting and implementing an
7
enduring peace. As part of the enduring peace, he envisioned a postwar world of
continued cooperation between the great powers, the reestablishment of republican
France, and the revitalization of German liberalism.
During the Second World War, Roosevelt was not the only major figure to possess a
worldview and a vision for the future. The aims and desires of Adolph Hitler and British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill have been well documented.5 Hitler’s racial vision of
German lebensraum did not survive his death and the end of the war in Europe. As the
defeat of Nazi Germany seemed assured, tensions emerged in the Grand Alliance because
of differing views among the Allied leaders that were evident during the summit
conference at Yalta in early 1945. Nonetheless, the war against Nazi totalitarianism also
weakened British power and quickened the spread of national consciousness in Britain’s
colonial populations, hastening the eclipse of Churchill’s Britannic empire. While Soviet
leader Josef Stalin’s vision lasted decades longer than those of Hitler of Churchill, the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the demise of Stalin’s
worldview. In contrast to its wartime alternatives, Roosevelt’s liberal worldview has
endured.
Examination of the influences on Roosevelt’s thinking and the development his
perspective and strategic views produces conclusions that challenge the popular
5
Eberhard Jäckel and Gerhard L. Weinberg provide compelling portrayals of Hitler’s
worldview. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s World View: A Blueprint for Power, translated by
Herbert Arnold (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981) and
Gerhard L. Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II
(Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1981). Concerning
Churchill, see Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (New York: Holt, 1991) and Churchill’s
multi-volume series, Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1949-51). British author David Irving provides controversial accounts
of both Hitler and Churchill in Hitler’s War (New York: Avon Books, 1990) and
Churchill’s War (New York: Avon Books, 1987).
8
interpretations of Roosevelt and his motivations. Historians have tended to portray the
young Roosevelt as a poor student with a shallow intellect who possessed limited
academic interests. Among Roosevelt’s adherents the experiences of his early life are
depicted as preparation for pragmatic political activities and maneuvering as president,
not from the perspective of philosophical pragmatism but in a practical and opportunistic
sense. Rather than influence his thinking or perspective, his experiences, and his bout
with polio in particular, are viewed as honing the traits of his character and refining the
qualities of an adept political operator.6 Roosevelt’s critics have taken a similar approach,
portraying him as a political opportunist whose foreign policy derived from political
expediency rather than out of any coherent or fundamental strategy.7
Although Roosevelt was politically adept, his thinking also reflected a remarkable
coherence. There existed a clear foundation for his thinking, actions, and strategic
policies as president. Research reveals Roosevelt to have been a bright and curious young
man with a sense of optimism and assurance that derived from his inherited station in life
and was reflected in his apparent lack of lasting concern for academic degrees or the
attainment of specific grades. As a student at Harvard, he already had developed a
discernable historical perspective and a sense of family and personal agency that shaped
and informed his view of events. The progressive ferment in the United States further
6
See for instance, James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (San
Diego, California: Harvest, 1984); Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous
With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990); Roy Jenkins, American
Presidents Series: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2003).
7
Historian Frederick Marks characterizes Roosevelt’s foreign policy as “drift and
indecision” without “any clearly defined strategy.” Frederick W. Marks III, Wind Over
Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia
Press, 1988), p. 287.
9
reinforced those inclinations in Roosevelt’s thinking. His tenure in the Wilson
administration also had a major influence on his attitudes, and even before the United
States entered the Great War, he had considered effective strategic options as evidenced
by his advocacy for air power in 1915 or for a policy of armed neutrality in early 1917.
Rather than alter Roosevelt’s character, his struggle with polio in the 1920s was
important because it provided him with a relatively uninterrupted opportunity for
reflection. His strategic thinking coalesced during the mid 1920s as he considered how in
the future to avoid the mistakes of the Great War and its immediate aftermath in order to
advance civilization.
10
Chapter 2: The Development of Roosevelt’s Worldview, 1882-1913
It is wise for us to recur to the history of our ancestors. Those who do not
look upon themselves as a link connecting the past with the future, do not
perform their duty to the world.
Daniel Webster8
By the time he entered Woodrow Wilson’s administration in 1913 at the age of thirty-
one, Franklin D. Roosevelt had developed a durable and consistent perspective of history,
Europe, and the role of the United States in world affairs. That worldview lasted
throughout the remainder of his life. Three complementary influences fundamentally
shaped the development of Roosevelt’s early thinking about Germany, France, and the
nature of American power. Those influences were: his family, their background, and his
fascination with his lineage; his education and exposure to contemporary attitudes and
historical interpretations; and his own travels in Europe.
Because of those key influences four ideas coalesced in Roosevelt’s mind prior to the
outbreak of World War One in Europe. The first was a fundamental belief in American
exceptionalism and in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon civilization over any found on the
continent of Europe. Second, that France, despite its cultural achievements, was a
civilization in decline, that French imperialism was artificial and archaic, that French
politics and society were divided, perhaps hopelessly so, and that French administration
remained old fashioned and obsolescent. Third, that Germany represented a level of
civilization superior to that found in France. Although disdainful of common Germans,
Roosevelt believed that German intellectuals had the potential to liberalize Germany and
8
Quoted on the title page of a pamphlet entitled “The Royal Descent of Your Colonial
Ancestry,” dated 1936, “Genealogy: Delano I,” Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D.
Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde
Park, New York. Hereafter cited as FDRL.
11
advance civilization. Germany was, however, a nation in tension between the influences
of the liberal and intellectual southern German states and militaristic and autocratic
Prussia. Fourth, that the United States exerted significant influence in world affairs,
particularly as a moral force and through its sea power. Therefore, American policy,
Roosevelt believed, had a responsibility to promote liberty and progress.
I.
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s father, James Roosevelt, led the life of a Hudson Valley squire
and gentleman-capitalist.9 Born in his father’s Poughkeepsie home in 1828, James was
well educated, graduating from Union College in 1847 at the age of nineteen. Following
his graduation, James embarked on a two year Grand Tour of Europe.10 The tour began in
England where James Roosevelt mingled with and came to admire Britain’s landed
gentry. One of his relatives later suggested, “He tried to pattern himself on Lord
Landsdowne, sideburns and all.”11 His son, however, reflected that James Roosevelt “was
9
James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a Lonely
Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 19.
10
National Cyclopedia of American Biography pamphlet, “James Roosevelt,” in
Roosevelt II, Genealogy, Box 17, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business
and Personal Papers, FDRL.
11
Allen Churchill, The Roosevelts: American Aristocrats (New York: Harper and Row,
1965), pp. 143-4; Karl Schriftgiesser, The Amazing Roosevelt Family, 1613-1942 (New
York: Wilfred Funk, 1942), p. 188.
12
no snob” and emphasized that “He was the most generous and kindly of men and always
liberal in his outlook.”12
Following his stay in England, James Roosevelt journeyed through France, the German
states, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Italy, Egypt, and the Middle East.13
Perhaps influenced by the spirit of Italian nationalism or caught up in the liberal mood of
Europe in 1848, Roosevelt enlisted in Guiseppe Garibaldi’s red shirts. The red shirts,
however, were between battles, and, after a month, the boredom convinced James to
forsake the legions and continue his tour.14 Upon learning of his son’s exploits, his father
Isaac Roosevelt cautioned, “Do not incur further danger by risking your life amid
revolutionary scenes--”15
Isaac Roosevelt’s letters to his son in 1848 reveal a strong belief in American
exceptionalism and a particular view of French Catholic society that influenced the
thinking of his son and grandson. That summer, glad to learn that his son had left Italy,
Isaac Roosevelt asserted, “Liberty in Europe is far different from the liberty we enjoy in
our country - & I hope you will continue to take no active part in the revolutions which
12
Entry for September 8, 1942 in William D. Hassett, Off the Record with F.D.R., 1942-
1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 124.
13
Passport of James Roosevelt, Box 53, Papers of James (II) Roosevelt, Roosevelt
Family Papers, FDRL.
14
Churchill, The Roosevelts, p. 144. Although in a 1941 memorandum Franklin
Roosevelt heavily embellished the tale of his father joining the Red Shirts, biographer
Geoffrey C. Ward supports the essential facts of the incident as having happened.
Geoffrey C. Ward, Before the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1985), p. 31.
15
Isaac Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, March 31, 1848, Box 52, Papers of James (II)
Roosevelt, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
13
are agitating the old world.”16 Several months later, he praised his son’s ability to
preserve his “moral character” “amid many perils.” He added, “I esteem the morality of
our people far superior to that of any other.” Isaac Roosevelt suggested that “the welfare
and happiness of nations & individuals depends on the strict observance of the laws of
morality & justice - of true religion - not of forms - but of the spirit and affections.”
Contrasting the “true religion” of America with the “forms” of Catholic France, Isaac
Roosevelt further noted that “the French people were without religion, they only had a
religion of forms - not influencing the life or conduct.”17
After returning from his Grand Tour, James Roosevelt resumed the life expected of a
gentleman of his station. He received a degree from Harvard Law School in 1851 and
briefly practiced law in New York City. In 1853, he married his cousin Rebecca Brien
Howland and she bore him a son, James Roosevelt Roosevelt. Almost immediately,
however, his professional interests turned to business, and he became a prominent
financier, serving as president of three railroads and two transportation companies. In
addition to owning mining interests in Appalachia and the Old Northwest, he helped
organize one of the first “holding companies” in the United States and incorporate New
York’s City Trust Company. His philanthropic activities included service on the State
Board of Charities and as director of the State Hospital for the Insane in Poughkeepsie. In
16
Isaac Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, July 10, 1848, Box 52, Papers of James (II)
17
Isaac Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, October 2, 1848, Box 52, Papers of James (II)
14
1893, he was one of the New York State representatives at the World’s Columbian
Exposition.18
James Roosevelt’s first wife died in 1876, and in 1880 he married Sara Delano, the
daughter of a wealthy shipping merchant.19 The two had met at a dinner given by Mrs.
Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. at her home in New York City. He was fifty-six; she was
twenty-six.
Although for several generations the Delanos had been deeply immersed in the China
trade, the family proudly traced its lineage to Phillipe de la Noye, the first Huguenot in
America. Descended from Norman nobility, the de Lannoy family had settled in Leyden
after leaving France at the end of the sixteenth century. Born in 1602, Phillipe grew up
under the teachings of the English Separatists in Leyden and became closely affiliated
with the Pilgrims. In 1621 he reached Plymouth Colony on the companion ship to the
Mayflower, and the name became de la Noye and later Delano.20 The coat of arms of
ancestor Jean de Lannoy, a knight of the Golden Fleece, hung on a shield over the door of
the family house in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.21 Proud of her heritage, Sara Delano
18
19
Ibid.
20
Newspaper clipping “Facts Concerning Your Ancestors,” Delano I, Genealogy,
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers,
FDRL.
21
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937),
p. 119.
15
Roosevelt would often comment to her grandchildren, “Franklin is a Delano, not a
Roosevelt at all.”22
As a child, Sara Delano had lived in Hong-Kong for a year and a half, but the chartered
clipper ship and its crew that took her to Canton seems to have left a deeper impression
on her than did China. The seven-year-old girl who turned eight at sea later recalled that
she and her brother made friends with the crew, “learned the sailors’ songs,” and thrilled
at their “wonderful tales of the sea.” Furthermore, in China, the Delanos lived “much as
we had at home” and had little contact with the Chinese people and their culture. She
recalled that the family rarely ate the Chinese foods that seemed “very strange to us.”23
When Sara Delano’s father Warren Delano decided to send four of his children back to
the United States from China, he chose to send them by way of Egypt and the
Mediterranean. The route avoided the one hundred day journey around either Cape Horn
or the Cape of Good Hope, and also exposed his children to new sights. Returning to the
United States, the Delano children essentially followed the same route that their father
had traveled twenty years earlier, before the completion of the Suez Canal.24 “We
returned by ‘Messagerie Imperiale’ to France,” Sara Delano Roosevelt recounted,
“stopped at Saigon, Singapore, Aden, Suez; thence by train to Cairo for two or three
22
Roosevelt and Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R., p. 17. see also Elliott Roosevelt and
James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 108.
23
Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, pp. 4-7, Delano I, Genealogy,
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Fam
ily, Business, and Personal Papers,
FDRL.
24
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family: An
Account of the Roosevelts and Their Kin as Travelers, from 1613 to 1938 (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 273.
16
days, and to Alexandria; then by steamer to Marseilles and by rail to Paris.” At the age of
ten she got her first glimpse of Paris, spending several weeks there, followed by a week
or two in London prior to finally sailing home.25
In 1866 the Delano family moved to Europe, and Sara Delano lived there until 1870.
Those four years in Europe had a profound impact on her views. During the first year in
Europe her family lived in Paris on the rue de Presbourg.26 Throughout her life, she
remained fascinated with the images of France that she knew as a young woman,
recalling “that happy winter so long ago” in Paris and the glimpses she caught of the
Empress Eugénie and her court.27 The following spring, the Delano family went to
Dresden and spent a year there. In 1868, although most of the family returned to the
United States, Sara Delano, a brother, and a sister remained in Germany with an aunt and
uncle and accompanied them to Hannover. She spent her final year in Europe living with
a German family in Celle and returned to the United States in the summer of 1870,
immediately prior to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.28
25
Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, p. 7, Delano I, Genealogy,
FDRL.
26
FDRL.
27
Sara Delano Roosevelt, Isabel Leighton, and Gabrielle Forbush, My Boy, Franklin
(New York: Ray Long and Richard Smith, 1933), p. 10.
28
Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, pp. 9-10, Delano I, Genealogy,
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers; and
entry for May 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary 1880-1897, Book 1, Papers of Sara
Delano Roosevelt, Box 67, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
17
The four years that Sara Delano Roosevelt spent in France and Germany as a young
woman had a profound impact on how she viewed the two nations. She noted that during
the Franco-Prussian War her “sympathies were thoroughly German,” despite the fact
“that Papa was absolutely French.” Her sympathies, however, reflected the attitudes that
she developed in Saxony, one of the south German states that maintained its
independence from the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation until 1871, and
Hannover, where she noted the people “still clung to their own royal family.” She
recalled that “the attitude against Prussia was very strong” as a result of “the overbearing
behavior of Prussia toward the smaller states of Germany.”29 Those attitudes are not
surprising, however, given the fact that both the Kingdom of Saxony and the Kingdom of
Hannover had been allied to defeated Austria during the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. In
1866, Prussia absorbed defeated Hannover.30
Sara Delano married James Roosevelt on October 7, 1880 in her parent’s home outside
of Newburgh, and in early November, the couple began their honeymoon in Europe.
Toward the end of the ten month long honeymoon, Sara Delano Roosevelt noted in her
diary, “James was wonderful in the way he did it all, and we had such happy days all
along.”31 Throughout the vacation, the couple spent a great deal of their time with
relatives. Kinsman Elliott Roosevelt, the son of Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., was on his way
29
FDRL.
30
Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.), pp. 126-7, 132-3.
31
Undated entry from August 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
18
to India but joined them for the transatlantic passage; at their request he made their rooms
in London his headquarters. Like Sara Delano Roosevelt, Elliott Roosevelt and his
brother Theodore had lived with German families in Dresden, spending 1873 in
Saxony.32 In addition, her sister and brother-in-law, Dora Delano Forbes and husband
Will Forbes, met them in Italy and stayed with them at the Forbes villa in Pegli. The
Forbeses also joined them for three weeks in Rome, almost a month in Paris, and several
days in London. Sara Delano Roosevelt assessed that they “saw a good deal of the
Forbes.” Most of the Delano family, which had been touring Italy, also joined them in
Paris. The couple also found time to visit several of James Roosevelt’s “cousins” from
the Howland side of the family in Italy and Paris.33
The people and the places that the couple visited also reflected their particular interests
and previous travels in Europe. As if retracing much of James Roosevelt’s Grand Tour,
the Roosevelts toured Italy, the Riviera, Spain, Paris, Brussels and Antwerp, the Rhine
Valley and the Black Forest, the resorts of Switzerland, and finally England and Scotland.
Sara Delano Roosevelt noted that they “met a good many friends and acquaintances” in
Paris and during their month at the mineral baths at Bad Homburg, particularly members
of the English upper class who were “old friends of James.” In England, the Roosevelt’s
stayed with “James’ friends Sir Hugh and Lady Cholmeley” at their estate Grantham and
32
Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship, Based on
Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), pp.
6, 11.
33
Undated entry for April 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
19
met others that he had known “years ago.”34 In addition to previous acquaintances of
James Roosevelt, the couple also visited Madame de Stuers, a friend of Sara Delano
Roosevelt from her youth in Dresden. They also spent five and a half days in Hanover
and Celle meeting old friends “who seemed enchanted to see us,” pointing out her “old
school,” and reminiscencing over familiar places.35 Furthermore, it was probably at Sara
Delano Roosevelt’s request that the couple made a special trip to Leyden and to the
“interesting old cathedral” at Ghent that contained the coat of “Arms of Jehan de
Lannoye (knight of the Golden Fleece).”36
II.
In September 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt returned home from her honeymoon
pregnant, apparently having conceived a child in Paris that spring. She gave birth to their
son Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Hyde Park on January 30, 1882.37 James and Sara
Delano Roosevelt had their son christened on March 20, 1882. The godfathers were
34
Undated entry from July 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
35
Undated entry for March 1881 and entry dated May 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt
Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
36
Entry dated May 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
37
Entry by James Roosevelt for January 30, 1882, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary,
Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
20
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s uncle Will Forbes, then living in Paris, and Elliott Roosevelt, the
father of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s future wife.38
At Hyde Park, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s half-brother James Roosevelt Roosevelt, Rosy,
and his wife, the former Helen Astor, lived in the house next door.39 Their children were
James Roosevelt Roosevelt, Jr., Taddy, born in 1879, and Helen Rebecca Roosevelt, born
in the fall of 1881.40 The two children remained Franklin D. Roosevelt’s playmates until
1893 when half-brother Rosy became the first secretary of the United States embassy in
London as a reward for his substantial donation to Grover Cleveland’s campaign.41 Rosy
also remained close to the Oyster Bay Roosevelts, and when Rosy’s wife died while they
were in London, Elliott Roosevelt’s sister Anna, “Cousin Bammie,” went to London to
act as hostess and to care for Taddy and Helen.42
With the exception of three children of neighboring Hyde Park gentry, Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s circle of boyhood friends did not extend beyond his immediate family and an
38
Entry for March 20, 1882, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
39
Entry for September 25, 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
40
Taddy married beneath his social station in 1900, an act that ostracized him from the
family. Helen later married her sixth cousin, Theodore Douglas Robinson, a nephew of
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s godfather Elliott Roosevelt. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, volume 1, Early Years (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947), pp.
vii-ix.
41
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 15.
42
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 224.
21
extended family of aunts, uncles, and “cousins.”43 His future wife recounted that when
she was two, her family visited Hyde Park, and “Franklin rode me around the nursery on
his back.”44 She also recalled attending a party at Hyde Park in which “all the other
guests were mostly his cousins.”45 Nevertheless, distance frequently meant that most of
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s time was spent with his parents.46
From a young age, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s interests mirrored those of his parents, and
the boy received constant exposure to aspects of France and Germany and their
respective cultures. The images that he received, however, whether of his father in
Europe in 1848 or his mother’s life in Paris, Saxony, and Hanover as a young woman,
were highly romanticized. While at Campobello in August 1883, his mother, Sara Delano
Roosevelt, noted that she would “read German or French aloud with several people here
who care for these languages.”47 In addition to its interest in both languages and in
German literature and music, particularly Wagnerian opera, the family also treasured its
genealogy and lore detailing the exploits of many generations of forebears. “I have
always been a great believer in heredity,” Sara Delano Roosevelt confided, and she
43
The three neighbors were Mary Newbold and Archibald and Edmund Rogers. Entry
for January 1, 1887, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
44
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 104.
45
46
Believing that “the sources” of Franklin Roosevelt’s “vivid personality” can be found
“in his youth and young manhood,” Geoffrey Ward credits Franklin Roosevelt’s parents
with “molding their son’s personality and character.” Ward asserts that Roosevelt’s
parents “instilled in him the rudiments of responsibility toward his community” from a
young age. Geoffrey C. Ward, Before the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-
1905 (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. vii-viii, 153.
47
Entry for August 21, 1883, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
22
passed her “own love of ships and distant horizons” on to her son. From her perspective,
however, her son’s “mythical excursions” were more extensive than his physical
travels.48
Throughout his life, Franklin Roosevelt, in particular, remained enamored with his
ancestors and the stories that had grown up around them. Despite the fact that she
considered that Roosevelt was “not a great student,” one member of his cabinet, Frances
Perkins, later characterized him “as one who knows all the old stories and folklore” and
who had “listened eagerly to the tales” spun by his elders. Perkins credited family
influence in awakening Roosevelt’s interest in history.49 His son James later recalled,
“Father was a walking encyclopedia of knowledge of the family tree.”50
Roosevelt painstakingly traced his colonial lineage and never seems to have lost
interest in the exploits of his ancestral cousins. Claus Martenszen, of Roosevelt,
supposedly aided in mapping New Netherlands in 1616, and cousins John Howland and
Isaac Allerton were on the Mayflower.51 The first Huguenot in America, Phillipe de la
Noye, reached Plymouth Colony on the companion ship to the Mayflower in 1621.52
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s great-great-grandfather was “a noted Revolutionary patriot,” a
delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775, and one of the founders of the Bank of
48
Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin, p. 7.
49
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 34.
50
Roosevelt and Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R., p. 18.
51
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 337-8.
52
Newspaper clipping “Facts Concerning Your Ancestors,” Delano I, Genealogy,
FDRL.
23
New York.53 The family tree also boasted Anne Hutchinson, Captain Ephraim Bill who
oversaw the construction of two of the first ships for the American Navy, and Robert
Livingston, the negotiator of the Louisiana Purchase.54 Roosevelt later boasted, “I am
descended from a number of people who came over on the Mayflower but, more than
that, every one of my ancestors, both sides -- . . . without exception, was in this land in
1776. And there was only one Tory among them.”55
Other, more distant, ancestors claimed by the family influenced how Roosevelt came
to view the history of Europe. The list of “Brave leaders of men” included the Frankish
kings Charles Martel and Pepin the Great, the Emperor Charlemagne, King Henry I of
France, Bourbon Huguenot Henry of Navarre who proclaimed the Edict of Nantes,
Norman Earl Robert de Bellmont who accompanied William the Conqueror to England in
1066, and the Earl of Winchester, “one of the insurrectionary barons” who compelled
King John to grant the Magna Carta.56 Another English ancestor opposed Charles I and
became “Cromwell’s right hand” but ultimately placed himself in opposition to Cromwell
too when “Cromwell made himself dictator.”57 It is not surprising, furthermore, that
53
54
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, p. 338.
55
Informal, extemporaneous remarks before the Daughters of the American Revolution
Convention, April 21, 1938, Stenographer’s copy, Master Speech File Number 1131,
FDRL.
56
“Some notable ancestors of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, by his Ancestor Richerd
Lyman,” undated, Roosevelt II, Genealogy, Box 17, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
57
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 131-2.
24
Roosevelt family lore tended to be the story of good cousins and their struggles against
the unenlightened of their day.
With respect to the continent of Europe, however, Roosevelt’s family tree seemed
rather sparse for the period between the Magna Carta and the arrival of his colonial
ancestors to North America in the seventeenth century. Although documentary evidence
of the Roosevelt branch of the family only went back to 1658, family tradition enabled
the Roosevelts to push back their lineage to Claus Martenszen, of Roosevelt, and the year
1616.58 Nevertheless, concerning Dutch ancestors and their fortunes prior to the arrival of
“Roosevelts” to New Netherlands, the family appears to have had no details. To fill the
gap, the family turned to their comparatively well-documented Huguenot ancestors,
particularly the de Lannoy family.
Evidently Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initial exposure to the history of continental Europe
during the later Middle Ages and the Reformation was from the perspective of the
Huguenots. Franklin D. Roosevelt documented his Delano line back to a knight who had
been born in 1267 and settled in Flanders near the town of Lannoy in 1310 or 1312.
Three generations later, Baudoin de Lannoy, “le Bègue,” Seigneur de Molembais,
became one of the original knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1429.59 During
the Reformation the grandson of “le Bègue,” Philippe Comte de Lannoy, Seigneur de
Molembais, became a Calvinist, and to escape religious persecution in France, the family
58
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, p. 337.
59
Untitled genealogy of the de Lannoy line, Delano I, Genealogy, Box 16, Subject File,
Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
25
went to Leyden in the Netherlands during the last half of the sixteenth century.60 Clearly,
from the perspective of the Roosevelts, Calvinists were the true agents of progress and
liberty during the Reformation; arrayed against them were the forces of reaction
embodied in absolutist monarchs and the Catholic Church.
Another group of Huguenots, the de Veaux family, provides one of the few links
between the Roosevelts and ancestors who had settled in the German states for any
appreciable length of time. Around 1651, the de Veaux family and other Huguenots
sought shelter in Mannheim in the Palatinate under the protection of Elector Charles
Lewis. Although their parents remained in Mannheim hoping to someday return to
France and their old estates, the de Veaux sons eventually sailed to America. Two sons
arrived in Harlem in 1675, with one eventually settling in the village of Rhinebeck near
Hyde Park. Another son, Frederick de Veaux, became the Burgomaster of Mannheim
prior to joining his brothers in Harlem. He purchased several “plantations” near
Westchester, New York, and later settled in New Rochelle. Jacob de Veaux remained in
his birthplace longer than his other brothers, sailing to Harlem around 1685 following the
death of their parents. Being a man of “considerable means” and finding the climate in
New York too cold, he went south, becoming prominent around Beaufort in the colony of
South Carolina. Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. married Martha Bullock, a direct descendant of
Jacob de Veaux.61
60
Ibid and newspaper clipping “Facts Concerning Your Ancestors,” Delano I,
Genealogy, Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal
Papers, FDRL.
61
Ida Dudley Dale, “Huguenot Pioneers of America,” The Huguenot, vol. 1, no. 6
(December 1931) and “Theodore Roosevelt’s Huguenot Ancestry: The DeVeaux
Family,” The Huguenot, vol. 2, number 2 (February 1932) in Roosevelt II, Genealogy,
26
In the Roosevelt family lore, the exploits of another cousin, Daniel Ludlow, also hold a
place of prominence. Ludlow had been in Paris during the French Revolution and the
family account of his experiences in 1793 undoubtedly colored how Franklin Roosevelt
came to view that event. According to family lore, soon after his arrival in Paris, Ludlow
soon found himself on a crowded street “lustily” singing “the march of the men of
Marseilles.” Perceiving the existence of a special bond between the United States and the
French, Ludlow observed, “The English are in disfavor here, but Americans need fear no
molestation.” In the family lore the French crowd is purposeful, controlled, and conscious
of how its actions might be perceived overseas; the message received by later generations
of the Roosevelt family was “that the affection of the French for America was too strong
to permit any action which would give offense to every American.” With a red rag tied
around his head, Ludlow reputedly watched as the delegates of the Convention decided
that the king had to be executed.62
Two incidents in the story of Daniel Ludlow’s visit to revolutionary Paris deserve
further attention. After the Convention voted to execute the king, Daniel Ludlow
supposedly contacted the head of the finance committee of the National Assembly and
offered an immediate loan of four hundred thousand francs to the French Republic.
Reputedly, Ludlow was the first foreigner to do so. The assemblyman accepted Ludlow’s
offer in the name of “France.” Family lore also held that Ludlow met a conceited young
artillery captain while in Paris that he dubbed “Captain Cannon,” Napoleon Bonaparte.
FDRL.
62
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 95, 99,
100, 105-6.
27
Roosevelt lore portrayed Bonaparte as a brash, malicious man who was disdainful of
popular sovereignty and advocated power in the hands of a single man. As if to provide a
contrast between Bonaparte and the true French citizens on the crowded streets of Paris,
Bonaparte reputedly told cousin Ludlow, “They are not my countrymen.” The family lore
emphasized that Bonaparte was not French at all but was instead a foreigner, a Corsican,
who wore the French uniform only as only an avenue to power and domination.63
III.
Concerning Franklin Roosevelt’s formal education as the son of an affluent Hudson
valley landowner, gentlemen tutors, a French governess, and a German governess
prepared him to enter Groton boarding school at the age of fourteen in September 1896.64
His parents, however, seem to have chosen his governesses carefully. In accord with their
own preferences, they selected Swiss Protestants to teach their son French and German
governesses from southern Germany and Vienna rather than the Prussian lands.65
Franklin Roosevelt’s mother and father frequently traveled, and at the age of two and a
half, he accompanied them to Europe for the first time.66 Although it seemed probable in
1887 that James Roosevelt might take a foreign appointment, Sara Delano Roosevelt
63
Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 109-
10, 122-3, 126-7, 131-3.
64
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 5.
65
Entries for April 19, 1890, September 2 and October 24, 1891, Sara Delano Roosevelt
Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL; Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin,
p. 23.
66
28
hoped for Vienna, his declining health precluded him from accepting the offers of the
Cleveland administration.67 Because of James Roosevelt’s health, however, the family
began to take annual trips to Europe so that he could “take the cure.” By the time
Franklin Roosevelt was fourteen, he had made seven trips to Europe ranging from two to
nine months in duration.68
Roosevelt’s boyhood experiences on the continent of Europe, however, remained
narrow, exclusive, and largely aristocratic. Outside of Britain, the Europe that he came to
know consisted of sightseeing in Paris, Pau, a resort in the Pyrenees, and the spa town of
Bad Nauheim. Short excursions to Frankfurt, Cologne, Heidelberg, Baden Baden,
Nürnberg, and a five-day visit to see the complete Ring cycle in Bayreuth rounded out his
childhood exposure to Germany.69 Clearly, his travels complemented the romanticized
views of south-central Germany and Paris that he acquired from his parents. Those
romantic excursions, however, had a major impact on Roosevelt’s views. His secretary
later recalled that much of Roosevelt’s conception of Germany seemed “bound up in
Roosevelt’s mind with his own trips to Germany as a boy.”70
It is not clear where the Roosevelt family traveled in Europe when their son was two,
and the trip seems to have left no impression on Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s direct
67
Entry for April 12, 1887 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
68
Six of FDR’s first seven trips to Europe can be followed in the Sara Delano Roosevelt
Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
69
Entries for May 20 and 21, 1891, July 3, 1891, July 4, 1895, July 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
and 31, 1896, August 17, 1896, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
70
Grace Tully, F.D.R., My Boss (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), p. 70.
29
exposure to France as a boy came exclusively during his second trip to Europe between
October 1889 and April 1890. His family spent nearly five months in Pau that winter. His
mother noted, “We have been very busy with dinners, races, hunt breakfasts, . . . golf,
lovely drives, etc.”71 At the resort, the socially active Roosevelts mingled with the upper
class of Europe. Sara Roosevelt noted that her husband “knew many Pau people
before.”72 Nevertheless, with the exception of two other American families at Pau, the
friends of the Roosevelt family were British aristocrats, the Duke and Duchess of
Rutland, Sir Cameron and Lady Gull, Sir Hugh and Lady Cholmeley, and the Earl and
Countess of Clanwilliam.73
The Roosevelt’s also spent approximately two weeks visiting Paris in the autumn of
1889 and spring of 1890. Although the family spent most of its time in the French capital
at various lunches, teas, or dinners, Sara Delano Roosevelt observed that her eight-year-
old son “enjoys seeing something of Paris.” 74 A variety of Forbes and Howland aunts,
uncles, and “cousins” lived in the French capital, and James Roosevelt even provided the
funds to support the lifestyle of “cousin Hortense,” Madame Meredith Howland, in
Parisian society. Among the circle of her Paris salon was novelist Marcel Proust.75 In
71
Entry for April 10, 1890 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
72
Entry for November 15, 1889 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
73
Rita Halle Kleeman, Gracious Lady: The Life of Sara Delano Roosevelt (New York:
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935), pp. 156-9.
74
Entries for March 3, April 10, April 16, April 17, April 19, April 20, April 21, 1890 in
the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
75
Marcel Proust to Robert de Billy, June 9, 1893 in Philip Kolb, ed., Marcel Proust:
Selected Letters, vol. 1, 1880-1903, Trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, New York:
30
addition to visiting relatives, Franklin Roosevelt spent two days sightseeing at the Jardin
des Tuileries, the Champs-Elysées, and the Eiffel Tower.76
In the summer of 1891, James Roosevelt took his family to Bad Nauheim for what
became an annual event for a month or two each summer until his death in 1900. The
Roosevelts arrived at Bad Nauheim on May 20, 1891, and several weeks later, Sara
Delano Roosevelt lamented the fact that “There are hardly any English or Americans
here.”77 Nevertheless, Bad Nauheim quickly became comfortable and familiar for the
Roosevelts. Sir Cameron and Lady Gull, two of their friends from Pau, did join them in
Bad Nauheim, and the Cholmeleys and the Duke and Duchess of Rutland were in nearby
Bad Homburg.78 After 1895, Lord Clanwilliam also joined them at Bad Nauheim.79
Additionally, Delano relatives regularly visited the Roosevelts in Bad Nauheim, so the
family had little need to socialize with any local German commoners.80 The Roosevelts
quickly settled into a routine at Bad Nauheim, even to the point of occupying the same
Doubleday and Company, 1983), pp. 47-8. Also, I. H. E. Dunlop, “Proust and Painting,”
in Peter Quennell, ed., Marcel Proust: A Centennial Volume, 1871-1922 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 112.
76
Entries for March 3, April 10, April 16, April 17, April 19, April 20, April 21, 1890 in
the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
77
Entry for June 25, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
78
Entries for June 16, 25, and 28, and July 19, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary,
79
Entries for June 14, 1895 and July 17, 1896 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary,
80
Entries for July 15, 19, 27, and 29, and August 1, 11, 14, and 17, 1891 in the Sara
Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
31
hotel rooms year after year.81 By 1892, the German church in Bad Nauheim began
offering a service in English, and two years later, the Roosevelts were part of a group
pushing to build “an Anglo-American Church here.”82
Soon after his arrival in Bad Nauheim in 1891, nine-year-old Franklin Roosevelt wrote
to his cousins, “I go to the public school with a lot of little mickies and we have German
reading, German dictation, the history of Siegfried, and arithmetic.”83 His mother
reflected, “Franklin goes daily to the ‘Volkschule’, it is rather amusing but I doubt if he
learns much.”84 Roosevelt, however, only remained in the school less than one month
before the family left Bad Nauheim to spend nearly a month at Badenweiler. When they
returned, Franklin received “a daily German lesson” rather than return to the German
school.85 Although he enjoyed the town of Bad Nauheim, Roosevelt remained disdainful
81
Entries for August 21, 1893, May 22, 1895, July 17, 1896 in the Sara Delano
Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
82
Entries for June 5, 1892 and June 24, 1894 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary,
83
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Muriel Delano Roosevelt and Warren Delano Robbins, May
30, 1891 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 20.
84
Entry for June 16, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
85
Entry for August 8, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL. Historians have paid scant attention to Roosevelt’s boyhood experiences
in Germany, assessing them as having little impact on the future president. Frank Freidel
characterizes the annual visits as “interludes in Europe” during which the sheltered,
privileged boy would have had “no awareness of the tensions and arms race quarrels over
empire were generating.” Freidel places Roosevelt in the school at Bad Nauheim for six
weeks, but Sara Delano Roosevelt’s diary reflects a period of only three weeks. James
MacGregor Burns glosses over Roosevelt’s annual visits to what he incorrectly refers to
as “Nauheim” and notes that Roosevelt attended the local public school for “one
summer.” Political scientist, John Lamberton Harper, however, finds root in Roosevelt’s
boyhood of the deep-seated ideas and principles that ultimately gave logic and
consistency to his dealings with the Old World. One of those ideas, Harper mentions, was
32
of the common Germans he encountered there, referring to them as “dirty” or by
derogatory nicknames such as “mickies” or “Frau Juggernaut.”86
Franklin Roosevelt’s disdain for Hessian commoners was in sharp contrast to his
family’s enthusiasm to meet German aristocracy. His mother noted the “great
excitement” over the visit of the “much loved” Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden. At
Bad Nauheim, James and Sara Delano Roosevelt befriended Baron von Falkenberg and
his wife in addition to their friends from the English gentry. With apparent pride, Sara
Delano Roosevelt recorded in her diary that she had “been presented to Princess Helena
(Christian of Schleswig Holstein).”87
With the exception of short sightseeing trips with his mother, the Germany that
Franklin Roosevelt experienced as a boy was largely confined to the Wetterau valley
north of Frankfurt-am-Main in the Grand Duchy of Hesse.88 Far removed from
Brandenberg-Prussia, the Hessian towns that Franklin Roosevelt came to know, Bad
the emerging difference in Roosevelt’ thinking “between the benevolent old and the
misguided new Germany.” Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With
Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 7; James MacGregor Burns,
Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harvest, 1984), pp.
9-10. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt,
George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1994), pp. 12-3, 18.
86
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Dora Delano Forbes, September 10, 1892, Folder 16,
“Forbes, Dora Delano, 1892-1940,” Box 17, Roosevelt Family Papers Donated By the
Children, FDRL; Franklin D. Roosevelt to his father and mother, May 18, 1897 in
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 100.
87
Entries for July 4, 1894, May 30 and June 5, 1897, and September 14, 1893 in the Sara
Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
88
I visited Hessen briefly in 1985 and again in 1986. In 1997, I moved to Friedberg and
lived there for two years. The following three paragraphs are an interpretation drawn
from my incursions into the local history of the Wetterau region.
33
Nauheim, Friedberg, Bad Homburg, and Frankfurt itself, boasted rich Roman,
Carolingian, and medieval histories, a tradition of independence, and persistent anti-
Prussian attitudes. About eighteen miles north of Frankfurt, the waters of Bad Nauheim
had attracted bathers since Roman times, and by the 1890s, the fashionable town and its
park had become a place for the wealthy to take the “cure” for circulatory problems and
heart conditions. Until the Romans withdrew west of the Rhine by 260 A.D., the valley
around Bad Nauheim constituted the most northern extent of the Roman occupation of
Germania east of the river. The Limes, the Roman palisade separating Germania from the
barbarian tribes, ran along the hills to the west, north, and east of Bad Nauheim. It is
likely that Roosevelt visited the archeological excavations at one of the Roman legion
forts that he passed on family trips to Bad Homburg.
The history of Wetterau, the region around Bad Nauheim, would certainly have held
Roosevelt’s interest. Scarcely a mile from Bad Nauheim, Friedberg, where Franklin
Roosevelt took swimming lessons, featured an imperial town built by Emperor Frederick
Barbarrosa, partially dominated by a picturesque fortress tower from the fourteenth
century. In Friedberg, the imposing evangelical church provided the focal point for the
other half of the old town; nearby stood a ceremonial Jewish bath from the thirteenth
century. Since the Reformation, the predominant religion in Hesse north of Frankfurt had
been the Reformed faith. Marburg, fifty-eight miles north of Frankfurt, possessed the
world’s first Protestant university and, in 1529, was the site of an unsuccessful meeting
between Martin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli intended to reconcile the two reformers.
Eleven miles north of Frankfurt, Bad Homburg, where James and Sara Delano Roosevelt
had spent a month of their honeymoon, was a fashionable spa and casino town and the
34
residence of the popular Landgraves of Hesse-Homburg prior to the incorporation of the
Electorate of Hesse into the Kingdom of Prussia in 1866.
Frankfurt, likewise, would have held a personal and historic charm for young
Roosevelt. As a boy, Roosevelt had been in the city at least half a dozen times to see
visiting Delano relatives and to tour museums.89 The Emperor Charlemange, a kinsman
claimed in Delano family lore, held court in Frankfurt in the eighth century. Certainly,
Franklin Roosevelt’s visits to the museums of Frankfurt led him past the ruins of the
Römerberg, a fort built by Charlemange and later destroyed in World War II. Starting in
the twelfth century, Frankfurt had provided the venue for the election of German
emperors. Declared a Free Imperial City in 1530, Frankfurt hosted imperial coronations
as well until the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. The Frankfurt that Franklin
Roosevelt visited was a vibrant bustling town of technological innovation and liberal
ideas. It had been the birthplace of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and the scene of the
German Constituent National Assembly in 1848-9.
The German states, to include the Electorate of Hesse and the Free City of Frankfurt,
allied themselves with Austria against Prussia and a few small principalities in 1866.
During the three-week long Austro-Prussian War in the summer of 1866, three Prussian
armies successfully attacked the Austrians and their Saxon allies while other Prussian
troops forced the capitulation of Hannover and advanced through Hesse toward
Frankfurt, the capital of the German Confederation. Prussian battlefield success at
Sadowa and subsequent diplomatic triumphs resulted in the abolishment of the German
Confederation and the Prussian annexation of the Kingdom of Hannover, Electoral

89
See entries for August 11, 14, 17 and 26, 1891, June 20, 1892, August 9 and 31, 1896
in Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
35
Hesse, and Frankfurt.90 It is not surprising that independent attitudes and liberal, anti-
Prussian sentiments persisted in Frankfurt through the turn of the twentieth century.91
Clearly, the nascent anti-Prussian attitudes that he took from Frankfurt and the Wetterau
region laid a deep foundation for Franklin Roosevelt’s perspective of Germany in his
emerging worldview.
IV.
Sparked by travels to Europe and the interests of his family, Franklin Roosevelt
developed an avid curiosity for history and sea power at a young age. The Delanos were a
family with a deep maritime tradition of ships and overseas trade, and his mother
believed that she had passed her “own love of ships” on to her son.92 His father, however,
also had a fondness for the sea and sailing.93 At Pau, Roosevelt had listened intently to
his father’s long conversations with Richard James Earl, the fourth Earl of Clanwilliam, a
career officer in the Royal Navy who had risen to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet.94
90
Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.), pp. 126-7; Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian
Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964 paperback edition), pp. 196-8,
203; Larry H. Addington, Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994, second edition), pp. 94-7.
91
On anti-Prussian sentiments, see for example, Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (New
York: Meridian, 1991 paperback edition), pp. 26-7.
92
93
Tully, F.D.R., My Boss, pp. 2-3.
94
Kleeman, Gracious Lady, p. 156. Nearly nine and a half years later, Roosevelt wrote
to his parents in Europe, “hope you will be able to dine with the Clanwilliams. Give Mr.
36
Franklin Roosevelt reveled in the liners that took him across the Atlantic, and while in
England in 1891, his parents took him to a naval exhibition.95
Closer to home, uncle James Russell Soley served as assistant secretary of the navy
from 1890 to 1893 and had taught at the United States Naval Academy. Convinced of the
value of history, Soley strongly encouraged its pursuit. He was one of the original
members of the American Historical Association, and his prodding persuaded Rear
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan to publish his monumental book, The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History. No stranger to Franklin Roosevelt, Soley also recognized and
encouraged the interests of his nephew. He prompted Roosevelt to consider attending the
United States Naval Academy and forwarded to Groton his book about the Navy in the
Civil War.96 Soley’s ideas certainly resonated with a young nephew enamored with
history and his lineage. As if addressing Roosevelt, Soley wrote, “It is part of wisdom to
study the lessons of the past, and to learn what we may from the successes or failures of
our fathers.”97
Encouragement also came from the Oyster Bay branch of the Roosevelt family.
Franklin Roosevelt and his mother were no strangers to their Oyster Bay cousins, and the
C., I mean Lord, my kind regards.” Letter dated June 10, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 1, pp. 324-7.
95
Entry for May 15, 1891, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
96
Soley’s book included the activities of kinsman Captain James D. Bulloch in London
as an agent of the Confederate government. The inscribed copy of Soley’s book is in the
library at Hyde Park. James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898 edition); letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother
and father, September 25, 1898, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 207-8.
97
James Russell Soley, “Our Naval Policy—A Lesson From 1861,” Scribner’s Magazine,
vol. 1, issue 2, February 1887, p. 235.
37
two visited Theodore Roosevelt’s family in the summer of 1896.98 Franklin Roosevelt’s
visits to Oyster Bay certainly included a substantial dose of history. Theodore Roosevelt,
a president of the American Historical Association and the author of a naval history of
the War of 1812, had a talent for sparking the historical curiosity of the children at Oyster
Bay. His daughter Alice recalled that “history was made vivid to us by father.”99 History,
as Theodore Roosevelt saw it, contained definite heroes, and he celebrated the exploits of
citizen-soldier statesmen such as Timoleon, John Hampden, and George Washington.100
That same year, Theodore Roosevelt published the fourth and final volume of his history
entitled The Winning of the West. It is not surprising that those volumes, as well as his
earlier Naval War of 1812, found their way to the collection at Hyde Park.101
In The Winning of the West, Theodore Roosevelt presented a sweeping interpretation
of “the spread of the English- speaking peoples,” an event that he considered “the most
striking feature in the world’s history.” Roosevelt traced the “perfectly continuous
history” of Anglo-American progress and exceptionalism back to “the Germanic peoples”
98
Entries for June 12-3, 1896, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL.
99
Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1933), p. 12.
100
Timoleon was a Greek statesman and general who was sent to aid the Greek city
states in Sicily against the tyrants of Syracuse. John Hampden was a member of
England’s Short Parliament in 1640 who led the opposition to the king. Impeached in
1642, he escaped arrest, raised an infantry regiment for the Parliamentary Army, and was
mortally wounded leading it in battle the next year. Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir
George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, page 84, Series 4A, Reel 416, Theodore Roosevelt
Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as LCMD.
101
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, 4 volumes (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1894-1896) and The Naval War of 1812; or, The History of the United
States During the Last War with Great Britain (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1882).
38
of the Roman era and their success over “the all-conquering Roman power” during the
battle of the Teutoberger Wald. During the feudal period, Roosevelt argued that “the
Germanic tribes conquered Europe” and strengthened “the mixed races of the south--the
Latin nations” with an infusion of their vigorous blood. Nevertheless, greater than any
success of the Germanic peoples on the continent of Europe was the spread of “Germanic
stock” to England, an event that enabled that branch of the Germanic race “in the end to
grasp almost literally world-wide power.” In England, he argued, the Germanic race
developed into a distinct nationality that differed not only from that found in the
Germanic countries but also from all other nationalities on the continent of Europe.
Roosevelt attributed much of the success of the United States to its Germanic stock; he
asserted, “The Germanic strain is dominant in the blood of the average Englishman,
exactly as the English strain is dominant in the blood of the average American.” Besides
Germanic stock, Roosevelt believed that the only “new blood” of “importance” to
America came from Dutch, Scandinavian, Irish, and French Huguenot sources.102
Consistent with Herbert Spencer’s theory of Social Darwinism, Theodore Roosevelt
established a clear hierarchy of the races of European descent. He considered the English-
speaking peoples the most advanced, followed by the Germanic race on the continent of
Europe. He placed the “Latin” races of southern Europe at the bottom of the European
scale; because of their “mixed blood,” Roosevelt believed that the people of those races
developed into more heterogeneous and less coherent nations than their Teutonic
counterparts. Roosevelt viewed France and Spain, “the so-called Latin nations,” as a
hopeless mixture of races and cultures. In his way of thinking, the medieval successes of
102
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, From the Alleghenies to the
Mississippi, 1769-1776 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), pp. 1-7, 12, 20-1.
39
France, Normandy, Lombardy, and Burgundy were due to an infusion of Germanic rulers
and systems on the remnants of archaic Roman practices. Nevertheless, despite an
occasional infusion of Teutonic blood, fundamental divisions in France and Spain
doomed those nations to a lower tier in the hierarchy of races. Roosevelt saw the ancestry
of “the modern Frenchman or Spaniard” particularly confusing because they derived
“portions of their governmental system and general policy from one race, most of their
blood from another, and their language, law, and culture from a third.”103
That mixed heritage had proven particularly disastrous for the French. In North
America, the French had been able to prolong their struggle with their English neighbors
only by resorting to the use of Indian allies.104 To Roosevelt the French were “utterly
unsuited for liberty.”105 As colonists the French had failed because they “were not very
industrious” and “were often lazy and improvident.” Under a system of “ancient
customs,” a religion of superstitious practices, and priests that possessed “unquestioned
rule” over their congregations, their Catholic, patriarchal society left the French
“unacquainted with what the Americans called liberty.” As if echoing kinsman Isaac
Roosevelt’s comments from 1848, Theodore Roosevelt observed that the “average”
Frenchman “though often loose in his morals, was very religious.”106
In his study The Naval War of 1812, Theodore Roosevelt also came to several
conclusions about United States military power and preparedness. Roosevelt asserted that
103
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, pp. 3, 5.
104
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, p. 17.
105
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 2, From the Alleghenies to the
Mississippi, 1777-1783 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), p. 169.
106
Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, pp. 41-5.
40
the “striking and unexpected successes” of the U.S. Navy against the British was due to
excellent training, particularly in seamanship and marksmanship, and to the fact that the
“few vessels” in the U.S. Navy during the war were qualitatively superior to any other
ships in their class. Roosevelt found that the excellence of American seamen had been a
result of the conditions in which the American merchant fleet had operated while the
Napoleonic Wars raged in Europe. He believed that the conditions of the day produced
men of “resolute and hardy character” who relied on themselves for protection. Unlike
British merchantmen that moved in large convoys guarded by the Royal Navy, Roosevelt
observed that American commercial vessels typically sailed alone and were forced to
defend themselves with both cannon and musket against pirates and privateers around the
globe or run the blockades of Europe. Roosevelt praised the product of those armed
merchantmen, and he labeled them “as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy.”
Naval service, Roosevelt conjectured, also strengthened the American race and developed
vital “habits of independent thought and action.”107
As he considered the contemporary state of readiness of the U.S. Navy, Theodore
Roosevelt observed “that our navy in 1812 was the exact reverse of what our navy is
now, in 1882.” In 1882, as the Civil War-era ships of the U.S. Navy rotted, Roosevelt
conjectured that the United States wasted more money trying “to patch up a hundred
antiquated hulks” than if it constructed “half a dozen ships on the most effective model.”
Over the years, he argued, lack of “Congressional forethought” and “political short-
sightedness” had prevented the U.S. Navy from maintaining a state of readiness during
107
Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 reprinted in Mario R. DiNuzio, ed.,
Theodore Roosevelt: An American Mind: Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Books,
1994), pp. 80-2 and 84.
41
years of peace. Although he doubted that political realities would ever allow the United
States “to have a navy that is first-class in point of size,” Roosevelt advocated that the
ships of the U.S. Navy “be of the very best quality.” Peacetime readiness, Roosevelt
asserted, would enable the U.S. Navy to “produce results of weight” upon the outbreak of
war. Those results could be significant either materially or morally. While militarily
inconsequential, Roosevelt noted that American victories against the Royal Navy during
the War of 1812 produced a moral result of “inestimable benefit to the United States” by
raising American spirits and enhancing the reputation of the United States overseas.108
V.
In the fall of 1896 Franklin Roosevelt entered Groton, and although he seems to have
studied diligently, his overall grades suggest that he was not a particularly remarkable
student.109 For example, in March 1898 he reported his monthly grades with the
comment, “I, as usual got a B.”110 His specific grades, however, demonstrated an interest
in, and perhaps a talent for, political economy, French, German, and history. Although
his average grade in nine subjects during his first term at Groton was 81, a B-, he scored
108
Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 reprinted in Mario R. DiNunzio, ed.,
1994), pp. 84, 92.
109
Entry for October 25, 1896 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
110
Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, March 2, 1898 in F.D.R.:
His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 182.
42
95 and 90, respectively, in French and political economy.111 Consistent in his letters from
Groton was his confidence that he “easily” passed his French examinations or that he had
done so well in the course that he was not required to take them.112 Roosevelt did even
better in the German courses that he took during his third and fourth years at the boarding
school. He confided to his parents during his third year that “so far” German “is awfully
easy.” At the start of his final year at Groton, he expressed his fear that the “tyrannical”
rector might not let him take German because he “could easily pass it.”113 Ultimately, he
scored high B’s and A’s in the language and “led the form all right in German.”114 In
addition to languages, Roosevelt consistently “got through my History all right” with
high B’s, and based on his professed interest in the subject, it is not surprising that he
completed his 1898 Easter examinations with only a single A, in history.115
111
Xmas Exams 1896, “Classroom Papers, Third Form,” Box 17, Groton School,
Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
112
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, December 15, 1897, March 18,
1898, September 22, 1898, and September 27, 1898 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol.
1, pp. 151, 188, 205, 209.
113
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, September 25, 1898 and June
7, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 207, 323. Italics in the originals.
114
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, October 19, 1898, December
20, 1898, and April 2, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 223, 247, 287.
115
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, September 27, 1898, January
24, 1899, and March 28, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 209, 250-1,
285; Easter Examinations 1898, “Classroom Papers, Fourth Form,” Box 18, Groton
School, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers,
FDRL. Friedel credits Groton with giving Roosevelt a general “impetus for public
service” and rates his performance as undistinguished, even though Roosevelt managed
to complete his first year of college courses and also won the Latin prize. Burns
characterized Roosevelt’s Groton letters as containing “hardly a hint of any intellectual
excitement.” Burns downplayed the Groton experience as having no impact on
Roosevelt’s future political views, values, or decisions other than shaping his “basic
attitudes toward social problems.” In contrast to Burns and Freidel, Ward finds that
43
During his first year at Groton, the ideas in Franklin Roosevelt’s political economy
class probably had implications for how he viewed Germany and France. Although a
Democrat, Roosevelt’s father had favored “Sound Money,” currency based solely on
gold, and he was “especially relieved” when the Republicans won the election of 1896.116
Franklin Roosevelt’s Groton political economy notebook reveals that, at the time, he
shared his father’s faith in the gold standard. “A measure must be stable,” he noted,
“Gold is stable, silver is unstable, therefore gold is the only suitable standard of value.”117
Furthermore, Franklin Roosevelt’s views about the gold standard may have had broader
implications beyond the stability of the dollar. Contemporaries argued that the gold
standard was the hallmark of more advanced nations such as Britain and Germany while
less advanced or declining nations had currencies based on bimetallism or silver. France
Roosevelt “displayed more than ordinary intelligence” while a student at Groton. The
school experience, Ward asserts, reinforced the optimism and confidence in the future
that his parents had passed to their son. Political scientist John Lamberton Harper goes
even further than Ward and finds that Roosevelt “experienced an intellectual awakening
of sorts” at Groton stimulated by the events of 1898 and what he read. Frank Freidel,
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1990), pp. 9-10; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox,
1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harvest, 1984), pp. 14-6. Geoffrey C. Ward, Before
the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New York: Harper and Row, 1985),
pp. 180, 191, and 194. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Germany: Franklin
D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), p. 23.
116
Entry November 3, 1896 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
117
Political Economy notebook, “Classroom Papers, Third Form,” Box 17, Groton
FDRL.
44
had been in the later category, and its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War seemed to
validate the view that French civilization was in decline.118
At Groton and, later, while attending Harvard, Roosevelt “delighted” in the
subscription to Scientific American that his parents had given him.119 An article that was
undoubtedly of interest to Roosevelt was an account of how his “cousin” Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt “inspected, participated in, and, no doubt,
infused with some of his own energy and decision” the gunnery training of the North
Atlantic Squadron.120 Evidently, the magazine also interested Franklin Roosevelt because
its articles reinforced the direction that his thinking already had began to take. While his
political economy class studied stable currency, Scientific American argued that “there
are certain economic laws which belong to the very nature and essence of things” and
cannot be changed. The magazine called for “the calm judgment of the farming and
artisan class” to assert itself against the “subversive and perilous teaching” of the
movement for the coinage of silver.121
In its treatment of nations, Scientific American reflected a faith in Social Darwinism,
addressing issues of “national character” and mirroring contemporary pseudoscientific
stereotypes about different races and nationalities. In fact, the magazine termed the
118
Nell I. Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1987), p. 86.
119
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, January 29, 1899 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 254.
120
“Our Big Ships in Fleet Practice,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, No. 12
(September 18, 1897), p. 178.
121
“The Serious Side of the American Character,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV, No.
18 (October 31, 1896), p. 326.
45
practice of anthropometric measurements as an “ingenious and scientific method.”122
While at Groton, such theories would have seemed natural to Roosevelt who underwent
regular anthropometric examinations. The fifty measurements taken in each exam
compared Roosevelt’s body size “to the Normal Standard of the Same Age” in “any
American Community.”123 After one such round of measurements, the growing boy
proudly reported his “marked improvement” to his parents.124
Scientific American provided its readers with a clear contrast between the national
character of France and the United States. As if addressing Roosevelt, the magazine
exclaimed, “If the American temperament is enthusiastic and impulsive, the American
mind is thoughtful, logical and practical, and delights to get down to first principles.”
Asserting, “Here-in we differ from the French nation,” the magazine argued that, unlike
France, the United States has “a passion for improvement, not merely in our mechanical
industries but in our social life and in our municipal and national government.” “The
Frenchman,” in contrast, “lacks the strong individualism, the power of independent
judgment, the patient determination to study the merits of a question and get to the
foundation truth.” Far from experiencing constant improvement like the United States,
France historically had “been at the mercy” of “the demagogue” preaching what
Scientific American considered “subversive and perilous” ideas, “a Robespierre or a
122
“The Bertillon System of Identification by Measurement,” Scientific American, Vol.
LXXVI, No. 14 (April 3, 1897), p. 214.
123
Anthropometric Chart, 1898-1899, “Miscellaneous Memorabilia,” Box 18, Groton
FDRL.
124
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, April 28, 1899, F.D.R.: His
46
Marat, quick to rush into the excess of a Reign of Terror or the bloodshed of a
Commune.” The implication for its readers was evident, due to its unique and distinctive
national character, France would never enjoy the same “remarkable progress” that
American “civilization” was experiencing.125
The French colonial empire portrayed in Scientific American provided virtually no
impetus for the advancement of French civilization. To readers such as Franklin
Roosevelt interested in the progress of civilization, the contributions of France’s colonies
must have seemed insignificant and irrelevant. Senegal supplied a new hippopotamus for
the Garden of Plants in Paris.126 In China, a French officer from Tonkin conducted a
geographical exploration in an area “not previously traversed by Europeans” and made
“important corrections in the map of the Yang-tse-Kiang and its tributaries.”127 Although
in French North Africa French archeologists and military officers had uncovered
extensive Punic and Roman ruins, the fruits of their labors remained sequestered
exclusively in museums in Tunis, Algiers, and Carthage.128
The French military reflected in the pages of Scientific American was an institution
locked in the past. Characterizing the massed French cavalry attacks in the Franco-
Prussian War as “brilliant though unfortunate,” the magazine noted how “useless” such
125
“The Serious Side of the American Character,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV, No.
18 (October 31, 1896), p. 326.
126
“The New Hippopotamus of the Garden of Plants, of Paris,” Scientific American,
Vol. LXXV, No. 14 (October 3, 1896), p. 265.
127
“Asiatic and African Explorations in 1896,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, No.
12 (September 18, 1897), p. 183.
128
“Archeological Discoveries in Northern Africa,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII,
No. 20 (November 13, 1897), p. 315.
47
tactics had become.129 Clinging to similarly anachronistic ways, French military
engineers put up twenty years of “systemic opposition” to proposals to demolish the
fortifications of Paris despite the fact that those fortifications “counted for nothing in the
defense of Paris in 1871” and presented a barrier to the growth and progress of the city.130
Surveying the armies of Europe, the magazine noted that while the German army was
probably “the most perfect of all” the French army was “still embarrassed by certain
sources of weakness” despite its complete reorganization and the brave men in its ranks.
The magazine pointed to corrupt contracts in the supply departments, large numbers of
“inefficient” officers, and the fact that military service does not suit the “brilliant” but
“giddy and thoughtless” temperament of the French people.131 The editors of Scientific
American saw little in the French national character that suited them for the discipline
necessary in modern military or industry. The French seemed more suited for the “world
of fashion” and the “pursuit of pleasure.” The magazine noted, “The French stand easily
first among the peoples of the world in the matter of getting up fetes and shows and in
arranging pageants which shall have the highest spectacular effects.”132
In contrast to its portrayal of France, Scientific American consistently praised the
advancement and progress of Germany. According to Scientific American, Germany’s
129
“Cavalry in Future Wars,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 9 (February 26,
1898), p. 140.
130
“Recent Archælogical News,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 7 (February
12, 1898), p. 102.
131
“The Armies of Europe,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVI, No. 16 (April 17, 1897),
p. 245.
132
“The Paris Exposition of 1900,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, No. 10
(September 4, 1897), p. 147.
48
industrial success was the product of a unique German character or “mind” which was
“essentially scientific and methodical,” the “qualities that contributed largely to the signal
triumph of the German arms in the memorable war of 1870.” The magazine suggested
that the same “restless energy” and “scientific methods” that had enabled Germans to
triumph over the French twenty-five years earlier were being applied to “the arts of
peace.”133 The pages of Scientific American catalogued German scientific achievements
ranging from suspension bridge and ship design, incandescent lighting and surgical
instruments, to a prototype dirigible and an early automobile in service as an urban
ambulance.134
Already in the late 1890s Scientific American portrayed Germany as a future rival of
the United States. On one hand, Germany was not immune from the European race to
acquire colonies, and the magazine noted in its survey of 1897 that “Germany has just
seized a Chinese port.”135 Nevertheless, the magazine portrayed the majority of German
expansionism as part of a much more subtle economic process. Germany owed its
“commanding position” in the world market to its ability to make “rapid encroachments”
into the foreign trade of other nations. In addition to scientific training in schools, and the
alliance between universities and industries, government played a key role in the
133
“The Secrets of Germany’s Industrial Success,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV,
No. 13 (September 26, 1896), p. 246.
134
“The Rigid Suspension Bridge at Loschwitz, Saxony,” Scientific American, Vol.
LXXV, No. 13 (September 26, 1896), p. 245; “The Leipsic Exhibition,” Vol. LXXXVI,
No. 23 (June 5, 1897), p. 355; “The Twin Screw Passenger Ships of the North German
Lloyd Company,” Vol. LXXVI, No. 20 (May 15, 1897), p. 307; “A New Dirigible
Balloon,” Vol. LXXV, No. 14 (October 3, 1896), p. 271; “A Velocipede Ambulance,”
Vol. LXXV, No. 15 (October 10, 1896), p. 284.
135
“A Retrospect of the Year 1897,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 1 (January
1, 1898), p. 4.
49
expansion of commerce. According to Scientific American, the expansion of German
trade was a “carefully planned and carried out” process that relied on a network of
commercial attachés or “agents” overseas.136 One United States consul in Germany
reported that, through representatives who possessed “a knowledge of the language of the
country they may visit,” Germany built up its foreign trade to the point that it had become
“One of the greatest competitors of the United States for the foreign trade of the
world.”137
VI.
After spring 1897 when Roosevelt joined a debating group at Groton, his thinking
about international affairs began to coalesce. Over the next two years, Roosevelt never
lost a debate, and it is likely that the positions he argued reflected his own views and
familial interests. After viewing one of his final debates his mother appraised, “He did
well.”138 Early topics of debate included the issue of a canal across the Nicaraguan
Isthmus and increasing the size of the United States navy.139 Roosevelt was no stranger to
either topic. His father had been one of the directors in a Nicaraguan canal company and
136
“The Secrets of Germany’s Industrial Success,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV,
No. 13 (September 26, 1896), p. 246.
137
“How to Win Foreign Markets,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV, No. 14 (October
3, 1896), p. 269.
138
Entry for March 7, 1899 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary Jan 1898-July 1905,
Book 2, Papers of Sara Delano Roosevelt, Box 67, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
139
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, February 27, 1897 and letter in
French and German to his mother, March 4, 1897 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1,
pp. 68, 69.
50
his uncle James Russell Soley had served as assistant secretary of the navy when
Congress authorized a major naval construction program. Theodore Roosevelt, another
advocate of a transisthmian canal and naval expansion, became the assistant secretary of
the navy in the spring of 1897.
It is likely that the “splendid” visit of Roosevelt’s fifth cousin Theodore Roosevelt to
Groton in June 1897 and Roosevelt’s subsequent visit with his “Cousin Theodore” at
Oyster Bay, Long Island the following month further reinforced his views.140 Clearly,
Theodore Roosevelt’s ideas and example continued to exert a fundamental influence on
the thinking of his younger kinsman. Despite some pressure from his parents to spend his
Fourth of July holiday at Hyde Park, for Franklin Roosevelt the letter on the stationary of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy inviting him to Oyster Bay for “as long as you can
stay” proved to be irresistible.141
Earlier that month, Theodore Roosevelt had delivered a speech at the Naval War
College calling for naval preparedness. Roosevelt based his speech on George
Washington’s maxim, “To be prepared for war is the most effectual means to promote
peace.” Asserting that the best way for the United States to avoid war was by being
prepared for war, Roosevelt called for “building a proper navy and carrying out a proper
foreign policy.” Rejecting the argument that military readiness would lead to “wanton
140
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, June 4, and June 8, 1897 in
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 110, 112.
141
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, June 11, 1897 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 115; Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, June 11, 1897, folder 11, “Roosevelt, Theodore. 1883-1944,”
Correspondence: Family Members, Box 20, Roosevelt Family Papers Donated by the
Children, FDRL. A copy of the last letter is also on Reel 313, Series 2, Volume 1,
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
51
aggression” by the United States, he observed that the only war since the Revolution
between the United States and a European power, the War of 1812, had been due to lack
of preparedness. He assessed that “again and again we have owed peace to the fact that
we were prepared for war.” Considering the potential threats to the United States,
Roosevelt admitted “that no nation can actually conquer us, owing to our isolated
position,” but cautioned that the United States could “be seriously harmed, even
materially, by disasters that stopped far short of conquest.” Roosevelt predicted, “If in the
future we have war, it will almost certainly come because of some action, or lack of
action, on our part in the way of refusing to accept responsibilities at the proper time, or
failing to prepare for war when war does not threaten.”142
Theodore Roosevelt, however, was not the only advocate of naval preparedness in
Franklin Roosevelt’s family. A few years earlier, James Russell Soley, Franklin
Roosevelt’s uncle, had been the first man to hold the newly created position of assistant
secretary of the navy. A teacher, prolific writer, international lawyer, and naval advocate,
Soley graduated from Harvard in 1870 and in 1871 joined the faculty of the United States
Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland as professor of ethics and English. In 1873, he
became the head of the academy’s Department of English Studies, History, and Law. He
married Mary Woolsey Howland two years later. From 1882 until 1890, he served as the
librarian of the Navy Department and the Superintendent of the Naval War Records
Office. During his tenure in the Navy Department library, he gathered rare books, prints,
and photographs, subscribed to scientific and technical journals, and catalogued the
142
Theodore Roosevelt address at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, June
2, 1897, “Washington’s Forgotten Maxim,” reprinted in Mario R. DiNunzio, ed.,
1994), pp. 173-9.
52
Navy’s diverse collection. After 1885, he also lectured at the Naval War College and at
the Lowell Institute in Boston on international law and naval history. In 1890, Soley
resigned his commission and President Benjamin Harrison nominated him to fill the
newly created post of assistant secretary of the navy. After leaving the Navy Department
in 1893, Soley practiced international law in New York City.143 In 1898, at the outbreak
of the Spanish –American War, Soley reportedly was under consideration to return to the
post of assistant secretary upon the resignation of Theodore Roosevelt.144
When Soley began his tenure as assistant secretary, the Navy was in the process of
modernizing and the first three steel cruisers, the ABC ships: Atlanta, Boston, and
Chicago, had recently joined the fleet. The first American battleships, Maine and Texas,
were still under construction. Soley worried, however, that there might not be sufficient
impetus to go beyond that modest initial start. When he assumed his duties, the U.S.
Navy was ranked twelfth in the world. Acting aggressively, the Harrison administration’s
Navy Bill of 1890 called for the rapid construction of one hundred vessels, to include the
battleships Oregon, Indiana, and Massachusetts. By the time Soley left Washington in
1893, the U.S. Navy ranked seventh in the world. It was during his tenure, moreover, that
the policy and strategy of the Navy Department shifted away from the defense of North
143
Biography of “James Russell Soley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 1890 to 1893,”
May 31, 1949, Box 205, ZB Files, Navy Department Library, Washington Navy Yard;
“Resigned to be Promoted: Prof. Soley to be Made Secretary Tracy’s Assistant,” The
New York Times, July 17, 1890, p. 5; “Assistant Secretary Soley,” The New York Times,
December 29, 1892, p. 9.
144
“Will Mr. Roosevelt Resign?” The New York Times, April 22, 1898, p. 4.
53
American coastal shores to the concept of defending the United States by taking
offensive action to threaten and divert the forces of an opponent.145
Soley shared a view of the world that was similar to that imparted on Franklin
Roosevelt by his father. Soley’s perspective was based on his fundamental belief in
Anglo-American exceptionalism and the steady progress of their superior institutions. He
advised, “Americans can never lose sight of the fact that England stands to-day in
European politics for the same idea of constitutional liberty that they themselves believe
in.” He pointed out, however, that Anglo-American constitutional liberty was unique and
“markedly different from that which prevails in France, and still more from that of
Germany.” More than just a common heritage bound the United States to Britain in his
way of thinking. Soley expressed his conviction that the people of the United States had
to consider “a serious calamity to England” as “a “calamity to the United States and the
entire world.”146
From his study of naval operations during the Civil War, Soley reached some
important conclusions. In The Blockade and the Cruisers, Soley observed that the vital
commerce of the United States was extremely vulnerable. The Confederacy, being
powerless to raise the Union blockade and acquiring few ships-of-war for strictly naval
warfare, immediately turned to commerce raiding against the merchant fleet of the United
States. He noted the asymmetric and effective application of relatively weak Confederate
naval power, “In warfare against commerce, the Confederacy could strike heavy blows,
145
James Russell Soley, “The Effect on American Commerce of an Anglo-Continental
War,” Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 6, issue 5, November 1889, p. 551.
146
War,” Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 6, issue 5, November 1889, pp. 545-6.
54
without fear of being struck in return.” Presaging the impact of the submarine in the
world wars of the next century, Soley noted that “a few cruisers well adapted for the
purpose” of commerce raiding by the Confederacy “inflicted injuries on the American
merchant fleet from which it never recovered.”147
Surveying the condition of the U.S. Navy in 1861, Soley also made his case for
deliberate naval preparedness before the onset of hostilities. He related that the U.S. Navy
in 1861 “was by no means in a condition of readiness for war” and had no plans for
transforming the force from a “peace footing” in case war broke out. Exacerbating
problems within the U.S. Navy, Soley believed, was “the general policy of inaction” of
the Buchanan administration “which forbade any measures pointing even remotely to
coercion” to the extent that even the “most ordinary preparations were neglected.” He
contended that the luxury of beginning military preparations after the onset of hostilities
succeeded in 1861 because of the Confederacy’s military weakness and inability to
mount offensive operations. Soley predicted that similar “good fortune” might not be
possible in the future against a prepared adversary. He theorized that in the first few
months of a modern conflict “the issue of the war is generally decided” and that “the
most telling blows” would already have landed.148
Another factor contributing to the “failure of preparation during peace” of the U.S.
Navy in 1861 was what Soley described as the “conservative tendencies” of officers to
resist change or realize the potential of new or improving technologies. Rapid advances
147
James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1895 edition), pp. 23-4, 168.
148
Sons, 1895 edition), pp. 1-2, 13, 21, 231-2, and 237.
55
in technology in the years immediately preceding and during the Civil War convinced
Soley that naval warfare had become a “new art” and a “living a growing science.”
Future success in modern war, he argued, required “men of progressive minds and of
energetic and rapid action.” Soley admitted that talented men would rise to the top during
war but cautioned that the requirement for preparedness “can only be attained by having
the ablest and most energetic men in the foremost places.” “Unless such a provision is
made, and made before war begins,” he warned, “the possibilities of naval development
will be neglected; the vigor and audacity that should mark the earlier operations of a war
will be wanting; and the opportunity of striking sharp and sudden blows at the outset will
be lost.”149
Soley’s ideas and his case for naval preparedness certainly left their mark on Franklin
Roosevelt’s views of sea power. Soley continued to advocate that the U.S. Navy be ready
for war. Admitting that while the U.S. Navy had many peacetime missions and that it
“protects American interests, chiefly by the exercise of moral force,” he believed that
only a navy in an “excellent state of preparation” could avert war. Initially making the
case for naval preparedness in 1887, when only the cruiser Atlanta had joined the fleet,
he feared that additional naval appropriations might be halted, leaving the country in
grave danger due to the misinformed popular belief that those few ships would be
sufficient. He labeled the initial plans to complete the Boston and Chicago “a respectable
beginning, but nothing more.” What he envisioned was replacing the sixty-odd rotting
ships of the Civil War-era U.S. Navy with a “modern fleet” comprised of “vessels in
considerable numbers,” eighty to one hundred warships, ranging from seagoing “monster
149
Sons, 1895 edition), pp. 2-4.
56
ironclads” or battleships, to cruisers, light draft gunboats carrying one or two guns, and
swift torpedo boats. Acknowledging the lead-time that naval construction required, he
asserted, “Potential strength will not deter foreign states from a policy of aggression.”
Rather than provoke war as the Buchanan administration feared, Soley conceived that
military preparations could avert war.150
Because of the serious consequences it would have for the United States, Soley
considered the nature of a major war between Britain on one side arrayed against a
continental European enemy on the other. Given British naval superiority and the
immense difficulty an enemy would have adequately blockading the British Isles, he
predicted that Britain’s European enemy would employ “commerce-destroyers” along
much the same lines as the Confederate raiders. He theorized that in a modern war the
conditions would become “much more favorable to the destruction of commerce than
formerly.” Soley argued that even a dozen raiding vessels “would produce a famine
immediately” in Britain. International law, furthermore, offered no relief. He observed
that the direction of contemporary international law supported declaring food as
contraband in order to starve out an enemy and induce the enemy population to force
their government to come to terms. Although Britain and the United States opposed the
broad definition of food as contraband, Soley noted that the continental powers of
Europe, namely France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, either assented or made no
objections to the policy of treating provisions as legitimate targets.151
150
James Russell Soley, “Our Naval Policy—A Lesson From 1861,” Scribner’s
Magazine, vol. 1, issue 2, February 1887, pp. 223-4, 234-5.
151
War,” Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 6, issue 5, November 1889, pp. 542-4, 548-9.
57
Soley put significant thought into the proper policy for the United States to follow in
the event of an “Anglo-Continental War.” Rather than forcing the United States to
abandon its traditional neutrality, he believed that the United States would not be drawn
inevitably into such a war as a belligerent if it pursued “its true policy, of armed
neutrality.” If backed by a war-ready fleet, he asserted the United States could “convoy
its transatlantic trade” and secure it against “an illegitimate extension of the rights of
capture.” With a force “of reasonable size” the United States would also be able to
conduct reprisals against any offender, an act he considered “a perfectly proper form of
coercion.” He suggested, however, that coercion or bravado would not be necessary if the
United States possessed a ready fleet; in which case, American threats could “remain
unuttered.”152 Over nine years before the Spanish-American War, Soley had formulated
what Theodore Roosevelt later popularized as speaking softly and carrying a “big stick.”
Soley also formulated some specific actions to support a policy of armed neutrality by
the United States. Rejecting the notion that the United States could ever build a fleet
capable of totally securing its merchant marine from commerce raiders, he advocated the
protection of commercial shipping in two ways. Fast steamships, supplemented with “a
few rapid firing guns,” would rely on their speed and upon dispersion for security. In
contrast, slow steamers were much more vulnerable. He believed that the U.S. Navy
would have to resort to the “clumsy process” of convoying the slower steamers and
providing partial security. Convoys should continue, he advocated, until there was a fleet
large enough to guard and patrol the sea-lanes. He also predicted that on the outset of any
Anglo-Continental War that a significant number of British merchant ships would seek to
152
War,” Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 6, issue 5, November 1889, pp. 543, 551.
58
be reflagged as neutrals. Protectionist United States laws, however, would prevent those
ships from acquiring American registry because they had been built abroad, something
Soley lamented as a missed opportunity for American business. Although those laws
could be suspended, he speculated that any “opportunity would be long gone before
Congress met.” To overcome that unfortunate condition, Soley advocated presidential
action and argued for the development of “a provision for executive suspension” of
statutes in such emergencies.153
In addition to Soley, the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan represented
another major influence upon Franklin Roosevelt’s early thinking. Like so many other
things in his life, it was relatives that introduced Roosevelt to Mahan’s writings. For
Christmas 1897, an aunt and uncle presented Franklin Roosevelt with a copy of Mahan’s
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783.154 His mother recalled that her son
“used to pore over Admiral Mahan’s ‘History of Sea Power’ until he had practically
memorized the whole book.”155 Mahan, however, had only initially published the work at
the prodding of another of Franklin Roosevelt’s uncles, James Russell Soley, the former
153
War,” Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 6, issue 5, November 1889, pp. 543-5.
154
The inscribed copy is in the library at Hyde Park. Half-nephew James Roosevelt
Roosevelt, Jr. also received a copy of the same book that Christmas. Alfred Thayer
Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1773 (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Company, 1896).
155
Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin, p. 15. Historian Frank Freidel
downplays the impact of what Roosevelt read. He asserts that Roosevelt “was not of a
particularly contemplative nature and there is no evidence that he thought much about
what he read.” Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1952), p. 32. I believe that Roosevelt’s letters showing his interest
in Scientific American or following the course of the Dreyfus Affair, the reasoning he
used during his debates at Groton, or his fascination with Mahan’s writing reflect
otherwise.
59
assistant secretary of the navy on the faculty at the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island. Soley also recognized and encouraged his nephew’s naval interests and
forwarded to Groton his own book about the navy in the Civil War.156
In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan attempted to establish a historical
explanation for British success, and for apparent French decline, throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Reflecting the ideas of many contemporaries, Mahan
attributed “England’s unique and wonderful success as a great colonizing nation” to
particular traits of English “national character.” In contrast, Mahan noted that the French,
unlike the British, possessed “a supercilious contempt for peaceful trade” that had
persisted since the Middle Ages and “a national trait” of “excessive prudence or financial
timidity” that stagnated the French population and its commerce. For those reasons,
Mahan believed that although France was “a fine country” with “an industrious people” it
would never become a major power or achieve anything “more than a respectable
position” in the rivalries between nations.157
In his treatment of the Seven Years War, Mahan emphasized his theme that France
lacked suitable character to be a major power, and his portrayal revealed greater respect
for Prussia than for France. Mahan related how the empress of Austria, “working on the
religious superstitions of the [French] king and upon the anger of the king’s mistress,”
united “the two Catholic powers” against Frederick the Great, “a Protestant king.” During
the war, Frederick’s “thrifty and able hands” put “the abundant wealth and credit of
156
The inscribed copy is in the library at Hyde Park. James Russell Soley, The Blockade
and the Cruisers (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1898); letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt
to his mother and father, September 25, 1898, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp.
207-8.
157
Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, pp. 53-4, 56-7.
60
England” to good effect; while, “the blindness and unwillingness” of France’s rulers
destined that they only “grudgingly” funded their own fleet. To Mahan, the traditional
preoccupation of the French navy with commerce raiding, rather than concentrated fleet
action, reflected the “national bias of the French” and guaranteed that France would never
“achieve more substantial results “ from war. In Canada, careful planning enabled
Montcalm to delay a British victory despite the “character and habits of the French
settlers” and a neglectful monarchy whose “paternal centralizing system of French rule
had taught the colonists to look to the mother-country, and then failed to take care of
them.”158
In the text, Mahan also made a case for what he considered to be the proper focus of
military preparedness. In addition to pursuing a flawed maritime strategy, Mahan argued
that France had foolishly neglected its sea power while seeking continental hegemony.
Mahan observed, “A false policy of continental expansion swallowed up the resources of
the country, and was doubly injurious.” Mahan, however, warned that history revealed
that “the simplicity of an absolute monarchy” enables it to use “the influence of
government” to rapidly build its sea power. As a result, Mahan advocated greater United
States naval preparedness “because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and
far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.”159
The direction of Roosevelt’s thinking is evident from an address that he delivered in a
debate on January 18, 1898 opposing the annexation of Hawaii. Opening with a strategic
argument that borrowed heavily from Mahan, Roosevelt claimed that annexation would
158
Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, pp. 283, 292, 295, 538-9.
159
Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, pp. 26, 74-5.
61
mean that “we should for the first time in our history have a vulnerable point” that could
“be cut off by a naval enemy.” Citing Mahan’s warning about the cost of fortifying the
islands, Roosevelt favored the United States merely retaining Pearl Harbor as a coaling
station. If in the future another major power had designs on Hawaii, Roosevelt predicted
that “the expression of the feelings of the United States would be enough to stop it.” In
Roosevelt’s mind, European governments took heed of the American opinions. As an
example, Roosevelt cited the substantial influence that the United States had wielded
over France when “the feeling of America led Louis Napoleon to withdraw his troops
from Mexico, a number of years ago.”160
Roosevelt then switched from strategic considerations to a more moralistic tack. He
argued against the United States taking “away the nationality of a free people” and
annexing the islands without the “consent” of their inhabitants. Revealing a strong strain
of American exceptionalism and a deep opposition to colonialism, he argued against
annexation on the grounds that only nations “ruled upon the monarchic plan, have seized
territory for commercial reasons.” In contrast to European colonialism, he argued that all
the United States wanted with the Hawaiian Islands was “a favorable trade treaty.”
Continuing, Roosevelt suggested that “not only are foreign colonies expensive, but they
are dangerous children and may bring political difficulties upon the mother country at
any moment.” Surveying the colonial record he asked, “Why should we soil our hands
with colonies?” After characterizing Italy’s colonial system as an utter failure, he made
160
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s notes for his address, January 19, 1898 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 160-3. The original is located in Master Speech File Number
1, FDRL.
62
his final point with another reference to France. He urged his audience, “ask yourself
what good France’s colonies do her.”161
From the address, the direction of Roosevelt’s conception of France is discernible.
From his comments about French colonialism, it is clear that he saw France as a power in
decline. In fact, when addressing the possibility that one of the major powers might
attempt to seize the Hawaiian Islands, Roosevelt considered only the actions of England,
Japan, and Germany, not France. Furthermore, Roosevelt’s comment about “nations of
modern times ruled upon the monarchic plan” seems to place the blame for French
decline with Louis Napoleon and the government of the Second Empire.162 For
Roosevelt, the rapid defeat of “monarchic” France during the Franco-Prussian War must
have presented a vivid contrast to his image of the First Republic. Among his Groton
papers, Roosevelt had made a special point to save an English translation entitled “THE
MARSEILLAISE” that lauded an earlier French “day of glory,” the heroic resistance of
“France’s children” during the Revolution.163
Less than two weeks after his debate, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s aunt and uncle presented
him with another of Mahan’s books, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and
Future. In addition, the following summer, his mother presented her son with Mahan’s
biography, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain.164
161
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s notes for his address, January 19, 1898 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 163-4.
162
Ibid, pp. 162-4.
163
THE MARSEILLAISE, “Miscellaneous Memorabilia,” Box 18, Groton School,
Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
164
Both books are currently part of the collection of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal
library at Hyde Park. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power,
63
Roosevelt proved totally receptive to Mahan and his ideas. In 1936, Roosevelt
acknowledged, “As a young man I had the pleasure of knowing Admiral Mahan and I
have an almost complete collection of his books and magazine articles.”165
Francis Parkman was another author whose ideas interested young Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Descended from Pilgrim forebears, Parkman belonged to a wealthy Boston
family with whom Sara Delano Roosevelt was familiar, and in January 1899, she
introduced her son to Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe.166 When he got back to Groton,
Franklin Roosevelt reported to his parents, “You’ll be pleased to hear that I’ve found a
Montcalm and Wolfe in the library.” He added, “I will surely finish it as I am much
interested.”167 Writing from the Romantic or Whig school of historical interpretation,
Parkman narrated for his readers the story of progress and its struggle against the forces
of reaction and evil. Historian C. Vann Woodward later characterized the book as the
triumph of “the Anglo-American forces of progress” over the medieval remnants of
“French absolutism, feudalism, and Roman Catholicism.”168
Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1897) and The Life of Nelson:
The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1897).
165
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to M. J. Smith, August 13, 1936, PPF 3790 “Mahan,
Adm. Alfred Thayer,” President’s Personal File, FDRL.
166
Entry for January 18, 1899, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers,
FDRL; Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother, January 30, 1904, in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 1, p. 526.
167
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, January 24, 1899, in F.D.R.: His
168
C. Vann Woodward foreword to Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (New York:
Atheneum, 1984 centennial edition), pp. xxv, xxvii-xxviii.
64
Several aspects of Parkman’s interpretation would have been particularly appealing to
Roosevelt. According to Parkman, Louis XV’s persecution of the Huguenots cost France
“the most industrious and virtuous part of her population, and robbed her of those most fit
to resist” the monarchy and the Catholic Church. He portrayed France as a fragmented
and divided nation “of disjointed parts” held together “by a meshwork of arbitrary
power.” The arbitrary power that Parkman referred to was the Bourbon monarchy, “one
great machine of centralized administration.” Furthermore, in Parkman’s portrait, behind
the throne of the French monarchy was the dominant Catholic Church, a reactionary
power that “clung to its policy of rule and ruin” and carried out the persecution of the
Huguenots with either “priestly fanaticism” or “selfishness masked with fanaticism.” In
Parkman’s tale it is fortuitous to the advancement of liberty that many of those
Huguenots “escaped to the British colonies, and became part of them.” Parkman’s
message to his readers was that the Catholic Church robbed the people “of every vestige
of civil liberty” and “is fatal to mental robustness and moral courage.” Catholicism was
the antithesis of progress, and the implication for French society was that in order to
“fulfil its aspirations it must cease to be one of the most priest-ridden communities of the
modern world.”169
In conjunction with the portrait of the French military found in Scientific American and
in Mahan’s writings, Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe seems to have awakened
Roosevelt’s interest in French politics in early 1899. Although the details of his thinking
are not entirely clear from his correspondence, the Dreyfus Affair excited Roosevelt, and
he probably accepted the contemporary warnings of a reactionary conspiracy at work in
169
Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 6, 8, 12, 546-7.
65
France. In 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew on the French General Staff,
had been sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil’s Island for treason. By 1898, the case
had become a political scandal after novelist Émile Zola denounced the verdict and
warned of a military-clerical conspiracy against the Republic. Later that year, a colonel
on the General Staff committed suicide after admitting that he had forged evidence of
Dreyfus’s guilt. The French army, however, did not consent to a retrial. In response,
during the winter and spring of 1899, calls for a resolution of the “Affair” became
increasingly compelling. Roosevelt’s interest in the “Affair” came during those calls for a
retrial of Dreyfus. In April 1899, Roosevelt requested that his parents send him a book on
the “Affair” so that he could compose an article for the school paper. Animated,
Roosevelt related to his parents that “when I get any spare time I shall work on the
‘Dreyfus case.’” The editor of the paper, however, seems to have rejected the article prior
to its completion because the paper had carried an article on the “Affair” the year
before.170
While at Groton Roosevelt also echoed the views of expansionist advocates such as
Josiah Strong who argued that in the future the “Anglo-Saxon race” would dominate the
world. Roosevelt sympathized with the Boers upon the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War
and thought that the unnecessary war could have been avoided. At Harvard, he collected
money for the Boer Relief Fund. Nevertheless, in the interest of progress, he favored a
British victory. Roosevelt reasoned that “it will be best from the humanitarian standpoint
170
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, April 18, 23, and 25, 1899, in F.D.R.:
His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 288, 292, 295.
66
for the British to win speedily and civilization will be hurried on.”171 While accepting the
notion of Anglo-Saxon superiority, Strong, like Theodore Roosevelt, had argued for
American exceptionalism, believing that the Anglo-Saxon race in the United States
represented “the highest type of Anglo-Saxon civilization.”172 Reflecting those views as
well as those of his grandfather Isaac Roosevelt, Roosevelt noted in a letter to his parents,
“You see the Old World is behind the new in everything--”173
VII.
Although Franklin Roosevelt had hoped to join the U.S. Navy after Groton, in
accordance with his father’s wishes he entered Harvard in the fall of 1899 instead.174
Although Roosevelt spent much of his time at Harvard in social activities and athletics,
beyond those two pursuits, he devoted time for the school paper, the Harvard Crimson,
and for studies in history. Occasionally, he would make the comment in his terse diary,
171
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, November 10, 1899 and January 21,
1900, in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 358, 378 and Franklin D. Roosevelt to
E. Reeve Merritt, May 26, 1902, Series 1, Reel 27, Theodore Roosevelt Papers,
Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
172
Excerpt from Josiah Strong, Our Country, printed in Richard and Beatrice K.
Hofstadter, Great Issues in American History, vol. 3, From Reconstruction to the Present
Day, 1864-1981 (New York: Vintage, 1982), p. 176.
173
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, April 25, 1899, in F.D.R.: His
174
67
“Working on History.”175 Much of Roosevelt’s historical study at Harvard focused on
genealogy and on understanding the role that his ancestors played in the past. In his
letters home, he would proudly relate finding “some additions to our family tree.”176
Advisor, Archibald Cary Coolidge, whose brother taught at Groton and who had served
as his uncle’s secretary while the later was minister to France in 1892, assisted Roosevelt
in selecting courses. He took Coolidge’s course on medieval and modern European
history his freshman year, along with courses in French and English literature, geology,
and a course on government given by history professor Silas Marcus Macvane. In his
sophomore year, he chose a two-semester course on American history that devoted a full
semester to the Colonial and Revolutionary periods and a two-semester course on English
history since 1688 also given by Professor Macvane. Courses in economics, public
speaking, and composition rounded out his second year. In his junior year, in addition to
courses in English and government, he took a course on United States constitutional and
political history to 1865 under Professor Edward Channing.177
Roosevelt’s European history and French literature courses crafted an image of France
heavily influenced by French Republican historical interpretation, namely celebrating the
175
Entry for February 2, 1902, “FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903),” Box 39, FDR as Author,
Writing and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal
Papers, FDRL.
176
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 21, 1901, in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 443. Biographer James MacGregor Burns has a different
interpretation. Discounting Roosevelt’s clear interest in history and genealogy, Burns
suggests that Roosevelt displayed no “interest in the intellectual side of Harvard beyond
meeting course requirements and cramming for examinations.” Burns dismisses “the
doctrines taught Roosevelt at Harvard” as having little relation to the views of the
politician of the 1930s.” James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox,
1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harvest, 1984), p. 19.
177
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 423-5, 460-1, 479-80.
68
Revolution of 1789 and its ideals while condemning the reactionary Bonapartists,
Royalists, and Catholic clergy that consistently opposed democratic France. After
completing European history and French literature, Roosevelt identified a shortcoming in
the Harvard library collection, and in May 1902, he received a check from his parents so
that the Harvard library could purchase “needed” works by French political philosopher
Jean Jacques Rousseau.178 Conducted in English, the intent of “French Prose and Poetry”
was to acquaint the student “with a few of the great writers of the last 3 centuries.”
Clearly structured to reveal the progress of the republican tradition over three centuries,
the course featured writers such as Racine, a prominent Jansenist who resisted the
Catholic Church hierarchy and the absolutism of Louis XIV, and Lamartine, a convert to
republicanism in 1848 and a member of the government of the Second Republic. The
final quarter of the course was devoted solely to the writings of Victor Hugo.179 Until his
death in 1885, Hugo had been a consistent critic of Bonapartists, a supporter of the
political views of French Socialists and extreme Republicans, and, after 1871, a defender
of the Communards.180 Apparently, Hugo’s writings interested Roosevelt to the extent
178
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, May 5, 1902, in F.D.R.: His
179
French 2-C, Course catalog, Department of French and other Romance Languages and
Literatures 1900-01, Box 764, HUC 8900.130.2, Harvard University Archives,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
180
James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992 ed.), p. 31; Alistair Horne, The Fall of Paris, The Siege
and the Commune, 1870-71 (New York: Penguin Books, 1985 ed.), pp. 28, 50-1, 233,
506.
69
that two years later he entertained himself during the passage to Europe with one of
Hugo’s books.181
Roosevelt’s studies, however, also led him to develop a broader historical view. In his
history thesis on the Roosevelt family, written while “cousin” Theodore Roosevelt
occupied the White House, he concluded that the success of his ancestors was due to the
fact that they possessed “progressiveness and a true democratic spirit.”182 By the time that
Roosevelt completed his undergraduate courses at Harvard, he was well on his way
toward developing what his son later characterized as a “sweeping view of history.”183
Increasingly, Franklin D. Roosevelt came to view his ancestors as the agents of reform.
In his view, several traits made his ancestors “good citizens,” leaders, and reformers.
Those included their sense of “duty” “instilled into them from their birth,” their “very
democratic spirit,” and the fact that they married “the best New York families” and
thereby “kept virile and abreast of the times.”184
181
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, July 24, 1903, in F.D.R.: His
182
“The Roosevelt Family in New Amsterdam Before the Revolution,” Notes and
Papers, Harvard College, Box 18, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business,
183
Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 59.
184
“The Roosevelt Family in New Amsterdam Before the Revolution,” Notes and
Papers, Harvard College, Box 18, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business,
and Personal Papers, FDRL. Although acknowledging that Harvard would provide
Roosevelt with some of the ideas that he would take into public service, Frank Freidel
dismisses the impact of the Harvard education on Roosevelt, believing that
extracurricular and social activities, rather than scholarship, were his priorities. Freidel
characterizes Roosevelt’s writing as “mediocre and uncritical.” Geoffrey Ward asserts
that Roosevelt “was rarely overly concerned with what anyone tried to teach him” at
Harvard. Ward finds Roosevelt most concerned with his crowded social life, displaying
no interest in achieving academic brilliance. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A
70
While a student at Harvard, Roosevelt admired Germany. Although his family stopped
their annual retreat to Bad Nauheim following his father’s death in 1900, his mother still
made occasional visits to Europe. In 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt and her son toured
Europe. While touring Norwegian fjords with several of Franklin Roosevelt’s friends,
they came upon Kaiser Wilhelm’s yacht, Hohenzollern. In an otherwise terse diary,
Franklin Roosevelt noted, “Wil.[helm] II came on board [our ship the] P.[rinzessin]
V.[ictoria] L.[ouise] for a few minutes & then we all went on the Hohenzollern and saw
her.”185 Although Sara Delano Roosevelt remained on their cruise ship, she proudly
related the incident to her sister. She noted that her son and his friends boarded the
Hohenzollern and then Franklin “passed the Emperor and bowed.” She observed that in
response to her son’s courtesy, the Kaiser “& his two companions” turned and looked
“quite distinctly” at her son.186
During that same 1901 vacation, Franklin Roosevelt and his mother also spent ten days
in Germany. It was then that Franklin Roosevelt made his only visit to Berlin. He and his
mother spent two days in the capital. She noted, “F.[ranklin] and I drove all over the city
to get an idea of it.” They found the sights “all very interesting.”187 Sara Delano
Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 10-1.
Geoffrey C. Ward, Before the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 215-7.
185
Entry for July 28, 1901, FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903), Box 39, FDR as Author, Writing
and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
186
Sara Delano Roosevelt to Dora Delano Forbes, July 29, 1901, Box 17, Folder 17,
“Forbes, Dora Delano, 1892-1940,” Roosevelt Family Papers Donated by the Children,
FDRL.
187
Entries for August 13 and 14, 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family
Papers, FDRL.
71
Roosevelt, however, seemed much more interested in taking her son to Dresden for a
longer stay. Their visit in Dresden included opera, plays, sightseeing, a visit to the
Meissen porcelain factory, and church services in English. Sara Delano Roosevelt
proclaimed the city to be “such a fascinating place.” On a more somber note, however,
she noted that that she “found great changes here since our winter here in 1868,” referring
to the changes that had taken place in Saxony after 1871 as a result of German unification
under Prussian leadership.188
Franklin Roosevelt’s editorials in the Harvard Crimson in 1903 and 1904 reflected his
positive regard for German culture and efficiency. Harvard, he asserted, could “produce
better results” by imitating the “recognized custom” in German universities of beginning
and ending lectures punctually.189 Commenting on a gift to Harvard from German Kaiser
Wilhelm II, Roosevelt noted, “The University counts itself fortunate in having . . . the
token of good-will which the head of the German race has shown.”190
Roosevelt had very little direct exposure to France while he was at Harvard. During
their 1901 vacation, he and his mother took the train from Geneva and spent four days in
Paris. The two stayed with Aunt Dora Delano Forbes in her Paris apartment. The brief
visit consisted of lunches and teas with Delano and Howland relatives in addition to
sightseeing at the Louvre and Versailles. The only other French town that the two visited
188
Entries for August 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt
Family Papers, FDRL.
189
Editorial for January 8, 1904, “Harvard Crimson: Editorials by FDR 1903-1904,” Box
19, Harvard College, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal
Papers, FDRL.
190
Editorial for November 10, 1903, “Harvard Crimson: Editorials by FDR 1903-1904,”
Box 19, Harvard College, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and
Personal Papers, FDRL.
72
in 1901 was Dieppe. Having taken the evening train from Paris, Franklin Roosevelt and
his mother caught the cross-Channel steamer in Dieppe later that night and arrived in
London the following morning.191
After receiving his bachelor’s degree in 1903, Roosevelt remained at Harvard for an
additional year to take economics and history courses that interested him. He selected
history courses by Marcus Silas Macvane, John B. Merriman, and Frederick Jackson
Turner. Evidently the ideas of the aged Professor Macvane had impressed Roosevelt.
Although he had already studied under Macvane for three semesters of government and
English history, he took Macvane’s year long course on the history of Continental Europe
covering the period from the Peace of Utrecht, through the fall of Napoleon I, to the
present. Under Professor Merriman, Roosevelt spent one semester studying Tudor and
Stuart England and another on the history of Germany from the Reformation to the end of
the Thirty Years’ War. Roosevelt also took Turner’s course: “The Development of the
West.”192 Those courses solidified the connection between the Whiggism of Roosevelt’s
family lore and the progressivism emerging in the United States early in the twentieth
century.
Franklin D. Roosevelt enjoyed history and that attitude that probably made his decision
to take additional courses by Professor Macvane that much easier. With the exception of
the three Bs that he received in Professor Macvane’s courses in history and government,
191
Entries for September 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary,
192
Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 505.
73
Roosevelt was a consistent C student while an undergraduate at Harvard.193 Concerned
with his students discovering the “truth,” Macvane argued that the “value of historical
study is not so much the amount of exact information that one carries away from it, as the
insight it gives into the life and thought of other times.”194
The “truth” that Macvane imparted to his students portrayed the history of Europe as
the constant struggle between the friends of progress and the forces of reaction. Clearly
an adherent of the Whig school of historical interpretation, Macvane portrayed history as
the emergence of Anglo-Saxon civilization and liberty as a result of the alliance between
Protestants and Whigs and despite the obstructionism of Catholics and Tories.195
According to Macvane, the history of the period between 1600 and 1750 could be
distilled into three episodes of Catholic, monarchical autocracy and reaction. Of those,
his primary focus was the struggle in England between Parliament and the Stuart kings.
In keeping with his whiggish perspective, Macvane noted that “it is best to devote
attention mainly to the course of affairs in England--the history of the continental states
being on the whole rather arid.” Although in considerably less detail, Macvane also
covered “the Catholic reaction in Germany” that, he argued, ultimately led to both the
Thirty Years’ War and “the practical disruption of the empire.” His final topic for the
193
Marks in courses of Freshman year, Sophomore year, and Junior year, Memoranda
page, FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903), Box 39, FDR as Author, Writing and Statement File,
194
Silas M. Macvane, European History.--Course C (New York: J. J. Little and
Company, 1889), p. 8.
195
Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, 1965 ed.), pp. 4-5, 12-3, 39-42. An ardent Anglophile quick to take
offense at any criticism of Britain, Macvane viewed amicable relations between Britain
and the United States as vital. Marcus Silas Macvane, “A Century of American
Diplomacy,” The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 87, number 520, pp. 270-1.
74
period up to 1750 was the growth of absolute monarchy and “French ascendancy in
Europe” and the subsequent struggle “against the unscrupulous ambition of Louis XIV.”
With regard to France, however, Macvane only briefly covered Cardinal Richelieu’s
policies and the reign of Louis XIV; instead, he placed greater emphasis on the rise of the
Huguenots and their dispersion.196
Macvane’s portrayal of the period of the French Revolution and First Empire
continued his established theme. Macvane considered the French Revolution “a social
upheaval against the state of affairs” created by the Catholic Church and the monarchy.
Concerning the French Constitution of 1791, Macvane judged that “Frenchmen took it all
too lightly” by “trusting too much in the Rousseau conception of the human race, that it
was all good.” In Macvane’s lectures there was no recognition that the revolution ever
went to excess, no terror. Instead, with an apparent air of Anglo-Saxon superiority,
Macvane argued that the Republic failed because the people “w[oul]d not take advice
from [the] example of Eng[land].”197
In Macvane’s portrait, Napoleon had no redeeming qualities and, starting in 1796, his
career was nothing more than a series of great excesses. Seeing something sinister in the
rapprochement between Napoleon and the Pope, Macvane emphasized to his students that
France was not a Catholic country and that, instead, it contained many Protestants and
Jews. Clearly sympathetic toward Britain and the forces arrayed against Napoleon,
Macvane termed Austerlitz the “terrible defeat” after which “Napoleon became master of
Europe.” Macvane emphasized the dark and oppressive nature of the French Empire and
196
Macvane, European History.--Course C, p. 4, 11-2.
197
Entry for March 3, 1900, Roger Bigelow Merriman, Notes in History 12, 1899-1900,
Box 1201, HUC 8899.338.12.54, Harvard University Archives.
75
decried “Napoleon’s work of destruction in Germany.” Continuing, he observed that the
“One gleam of light was [the] naval fight & victory of Trafalgar by Nelson over France &
Spain.”198
Macvane’s view of the course of European history after Napoleon is found in a book
that he published in 1900, the year Roosevelt arrived at Harvard. The book was a heavily
edited and revised translation of a European political history survey by French republican
Charles Seignobos. The work provided “an explanatory history of political evolution” in
Europe by emphasizing a cyclic, recurring pattern of revolution followed by “long
periods of conservation.” It was an interpretation that reflected Seignobos’s, as well as
Macvane’s, “preference for a liberal, unclerical, democratic, Western government.”199
It is not surprising that Macvane, who edited Seignobos work while the Dreyfus Affair
raged in France, portrayed France as being “divided into irreconcilable factions” after
1815. According to Macvane, “the Bourbons were restored by a foreign power” instead
of allowing “the French the free exercise of their right to choose their government.”
Unlike the other Allies, however, England had pursued a wise policy of not recognizing
the legitimacy of any French government during the Napoleonic Wars and of waiting
until after the conflict for the French people themselves to chose their rulers. In
Macvane’s narrative, France’s “progressive party” opposed monarchy and clericalism
and with the Revolution of 1848 it “converted France into a democracy.” Paris, Macvane
argued, was the center of the French yearning for democracy because in both 1830 and
198
Entries for October 17, 1899, March 16 and April 5, 1900, Roger Bigelow Merriman,
Notes in History 12, 1899-1900, Box 1201, HUC 8899.338.12.54, Harvard University
Archives.
199
Silas Marcus Macvane, ed., Charles Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since
1814 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1900), pp. iii, x.
76
1848 “the revolution made in Paris was passively accepted by the rest of the nation.”
France, however, remained plagued by its antiquated administrative system and, as a
result, had to copy the practices followed by more advanced countries. For example, the
French Constitution of 1814 copied the English, in 1848 France imitated the United
States government, and, after its defeat in 1870, France’s schools and military reforms
mirrored Prussian institutions.200
Familiar with his mother’s recollections of Saxony and Hannover during her youth,
Macvane’s portrayal of Prussia and the German states must have struck a familiar chord
in Roosevelt’s mind. Macvane observed that after the annexation of Hannover, Hesse-
Kassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt by Prussia, “a large body of people” in Hannover hoped
“for a return of the old dynasty” and “gave the most emphatic signs of hostility” to the
Prussian system. Meanwhile, “the repressive actions of Prussian generals in Schleswig
and Frankfort . . . gave Europe the impression of a barbarous power greedy for
conquests.” Meanwhile, the “four independent states” in southern Germany had no desire
for closer attachment to the north, and “the people” demonstrated an “aversion to the
Prussians and their military service.” Macvane argued that in southern Germany after
1868 “the opposition to Prussia increased.”201
Nevertheless, in Macvane’s portrait the status of liberalism and progress in Germany
after unification was not entirely bleak. Rather than exclusively dominated by Prussian
autocracy, Macvane portrayed Germany as a nation in tension between that impulse and
liberalism. He observed,
200
Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, pp. 115, 122,
103, 134-5, 155, 159, 224, 107, 164-5, 226.
201
Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, pp. 473, 480-1.
77
German society since the founding of the Empire, seems drawn in two
opposite directions by two conflicting tendencies. The one is
monarchical, bureaucratic, and military; springing from the Prussian
government, it tends to mold all Germany on the Prussian model, by
extending to it the old régime of divine right and ecclesiastical
authority. The other tendency is democratic, springing from the new
populations of the great cities and manufacturing districts, but now
beginning to extend to the rural sections and to affect even the
Conservatives . . .202
Consequently, he characterized German politics as being in a state of “confused but
undeniable unrest” between the “champions of a monarchy in alliance with the Church”
and the “democratic, anti-clerical, and industrial” impulse of the socialists, a party
strengthened by the infusion of radical republicans after the extermination of their own
party in 1849. 203
Macvane considered the German Empire to be a compromise between Prussian
absolutism and the liberal democracy of 1848, but a compromise in which Prussia held
the predominant share. He described the German constitutional system as the “personal
government of the King, who retains all his bureaucratic and military apparatus, slightly
controlled by a democratic representative assembly.” Macvane also portrayed the
unification of Germany as a compromise between popular wishes and the dictates of
Prussia, but a compromise in which the King of Prussia “reserved for himself the greater
share of the advantage.” As a result, Macvane warned that the German Empire was “a
daughter of Borussia,” the barbarian land at the southeastern corner of the Baltic sea
during the Roman era, “not of Teutonia (ancient Germany).”204
202
Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, p. 516.
203
Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, pp. 515-6.
204
Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, pp. 515-6.
78
In the spring of 1904, Roosevelt also took Frederick Jackson Turner’s course on “The
History of the West.” One of the attractions of the course may have been the fact that
Turner’s assigned readings included President Theodore Roosevelt’s Winning of the
West. Given Franklin Roosevelt’s interest in history and family, it is likely that the course
reinforced his thinking about the German people. Turner lectured about the earliest
Germans that migrated to America, Protestants from the Rhine River valley and
Palatinate. According to Turner, those members of “a great religious movement” sought
peace in America from the depredations of Catholics in the Thirty Years’ War and from
the armies of Louis XIV. Turner even noted how the governor of New York settled one
group of four thousand “favored German protestants” on a New York manor in 1709.205
Frederick Jackson Turner showed less sympathy for the French in his lectures. He
noted that although “French exploration was vast, from the snows of Canada to the cane
brakes of L[ouisian]a,” in sharp contrast to England, France had no intention of
establishing settlements “and consolidating her power on the Ohio.” Instead, Turner
suggested, “Desire for the western ocean drove them westward.”206 Turner’s later lectures
painted a picture of French intrigue in North America after the American Revolution. He
argued that the French hoped to prevent the United States from growing powerful by
205
Entry for March 7, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745,
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives. Roosevelt took a Caribbean cruise
early in the term and missed the lecture on March 7, but it seems likely that he would
have gotten the contents of the lecture from a classmate’s notes. He returned to
Cambridge on March 14, 1904. Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, March 14,
1904 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 527. Roosevelt had been visiting the
Columbian Expedition in Chicago with his uncle when Turner first presented his “frontier
thesis.”
206
Entry for March 11, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box
745, HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
79
keeping Americans east of the Allegheny Mountains, a desire supported by French plans
for “two Indian protectorates in west.”207
Turner, however, suggested that both President George Washington and his secretary
of state, Thomas Jefferson, viewed France with sympathy after the French Revolution.
Turner argued that, at the time, the two believed “that France was our ally.” Washington
and Jefferson, furthermore, “may have secretly favored [an] expedition” proposed by the
French “to help South America to revolt” against Spanish rule and to “aid France in
getting L[ouisian]a.”208
According to Turner, the establishment of the Directory in 1795 seems to have turned
both Washington and Jefferson against France. Turner noted that, in the spring of 1796,
the new government in France “feared” the growth of the United States and, as a result,
“wished to help Spain if possible.”209 Clearly, in Turner’s view, authoritarian France was
not a friend of the United States. Turner asserted, “Napoleon was determined to secure
entire Miss. valley, by detaching the west from the union, & have checked the U.S. at the
Alleghanies.” Probably to Roosevelt’s delight, Turner echoed Mahan’s general thesis
about the Napoleonic Wars, noting that the only thing that stopped Napoleon was “the
lack of sea power.”210
207
Entry for March 28, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745,
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
208
Entry for April 1, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745,
209
210
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives. For Alfred Thayer Mahan’s views of
the Napoleonic Wars see The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and
80
Turner’s lectures also offered broad proposals for the tenor of American foreign
relations. Taking a dim view of French colonialism in Asia, Turner argued explicitly that
“Oriental questions” should only “be settled by countries with experience with vast
territory; Russia & Eng[land].” The United States, he maintained, exerted valuable
international influence through its “will power & imagination.” As if alluding to
President Theodore Roosevelt, Turner acknowledged that “we talk big & think big” and
portrayed naval power as an effective force in world affairs.211 Turner’s prescription for
American security against Napoleonic designs was an alliance with England.212
Roosevelt’s decision to stay at Harvard and pursue his interests by taking an additional
year of classes and working on the Crimson reflected his distinct lack of concern with
earning specific grades or degrees. What emerges from an examination of Roosevelt’s
time at Harvard is a portrait of a young man concerned with gaining a practical
understanding about himself, his heritage, and his world. His emphasis on the practical
application of history was consistent with the urgings of historians of the progressive
school such as Turner. As a result, throughout the remainder of his life, Roosevelt
possessed a deep practical knowledge of historical events within a broad interpretive
framework built around the advance of civilization. Rather than a man with little
intellectual curiosity, Roosevelt emerged from his Harvard experience as an assiduous
Empire: 1793-1812. 2 Vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1892. Theodore Roosevelt provided a
review the book. Atlantic Monthly 71 (April 1893).
211
Entries for February 17 and April 6, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History
10B-1904, Box 745, HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
212
81
reader with what Joseph Lash described as “an amazingly retentive memory” and an
impressive “knowledge of events, geography and history, factual concrete knowledge.”213
VIII.
When it came time to marry, the Roosevelts tended to look to their relatives. One
cousin, attempting to “unravel” the family tree of “the mixed up Roosevelt’s,
Aspinwall’s, Woolsey’s & Howland’s,” noted, “They just had to marry cousins - the
whole family seems to have preferred themselves to any others!”214 Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s immediate family was no exception. James Roosevelt’s first marriage in
1853 was to his cousin, Rebecca Brien Howland. Furthermore, the case of half-brother
Rosy Roosevelt’s children suggests that marrying relatives met with familial approval.
Taddy married beneath his social station in 1900, an act that ostracized him from the
family. After the “disgusting business about Taddy” hit the newspapers, Franklin D.
Roosevelt noted that it would be best for Taddy “not only to go to parts unknown, but to
stay there and begin life anew.” Taddy’s sister Helen, however, chose more judiciously.
Helen later married her sixth cousin, Theodore Douglas Robinson, a nephew of Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s godfather Elliott Roosevelt.215
213
Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31,
Speeches and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, FDRL.
214
U. Connfelt to M. Suckley, January 28, 1943, “Genealogy: Howland,” Subject File,
Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
215
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s comments from a letter to his mother, Joseph P. Lash, Love,
Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1982), p. 43; Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp.
vii-ix, 430.
82
Given his background, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s marriage to his fifth cousin, Anna
Eleanor Roosevelt, on March 17, 1905 comes as no surprise. Eleanor had her debutante
debut in the winter of 1902 after her return from school in England, and she began to see
her cousin at “occasional dances” and “a house party at Hyde Park where all the other
guests were mostly his cousins.”216 At the White House on December 31, 1902, Franklin
Roosevelt attended a large lunch and later had tea with Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter
Alice and his niece Eleanor.217 The couple became engaged in late 1903 and announced
their formal engagement a year later.218 The wedding took place at the Ludlow house on
Fifth Avenue in New York City, and President Theodore Roosevelt gave the bride away.
Clearly Franklin Roosevelt’s marriage to Eleanor Roosevelt reinforced his ideas about
both France and Germany, particularly his sense of the sharp contrasts inherent in both
countries. Eleanor’s perspectives, like her life prior to her marriage, had been
fundamentally shaped by two influential people. Those two were her father, Elliott
Roosevelt, and the headmistress of the English boarding school that she attended from
1899 to 1902, Mlle. Marie Souvestre. The autobiography that Eleanor wrote in 1936
reveals that, under their influence, her images and memories concerning both France and
Germany fell into one of two extremes: harsh, dark, and unhappy, or dreamlike, beautiful,
216
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 103-4.
217
Entry for December 31, 1902, FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903), Box 39, FDR as Author,
Writing and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal
Papers, FDRL.
218
Elliott Roosevelt, ed. F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 517.
83
and delightful.219 Those images easily translated into a view that equated those two
extremes with the forces of reaction and the forces of progress.
As a child, Eleanor Roosevelt was never close to her mother because, as she perceived
it, “her mother had been so disappointed that she wasn’t beautiful.” She confided that, as
a result, she always had a “great devotion” to her father.220 As his deteriorating health
worsened due to alcoholism, however, life was not happy for his family. Hoping to find a
cure, he took his family to Europe in 1890, stopping initially in Berlin. In the capital,
Count Otto von Bismarck provided the family with excellent seats to a military review of
the Berlin garrison, and a German count took them to see cavalry drill. After Berlin, the
family stayed in a small Bavarian town for a month, so that Elliott could bathe and drink
from the mineral springs, and visited Munich and Oberammergau. Although Eleanor
began to speak a little German, the family had little to do with Bavarian commoners.
Accustomed to European aristocracy, Eleanor’s mother noted that the Germans in the
town were “all of a class that no one would think of meeting.”221 Although Eleanor’s
reactions to her first visit to Germany are not clear, it seems reasonable that the entire
experience, to include the martial display in the former Prussian capital, must have been
bewildering to the sheltered young girl who did not speak the language.
From Bavaria, the Roosevelt family continued to Italy where it toured Venice,
Florence, and Naples. In Italy Elliott Roosevelt resumed heavy drinking. Consequently,
on the advice of doctors, the family went to Graz, Austria, and soon Elliott entered a
219
See [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 8-12, 67-9.
220
Entry for July 15, 1940 in Journal, 1939-42, folder 3, box 31, Speeches and Writings,
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL.
221
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 34.
84
sanitarium in Vienna for treatment.222 Nevertheless, according to Eleanor’s recollections,
her father had been in a sanitarium in Germany, and the only incident that she recounted
from the time was one that left her “a disillusioned and disappointed child.”223 It seems
significant that, over time, Eleanor came to associate that unpleasant episode with
Germany rather than Austria.
Eleanor Roosevelt’s earliest recollections of France were as dark and unhappy as those
of Germany. In the spring of 1891, Elliott Roosevelt and his pregnant wife rushed to
Paris, leaving Eleanor and her brother to travel with their servants. Somehow Eleanor and
her nurse got off the train at a station and, unable to find their tickets, were left behind.
That night, “after much telegraphing,” the two boarded another train for Paris, where
Eleanor’s “distinctly annoyed” parents met them.224 Given her sensitive nature and desire
to please her father, her reception in Paris undoubtedly upset Eleanor immensely. She
commented, “I was not yet six years old, and I must have been very sensitive, with an
inordinate desire for affection and praise.”225 She later recalled her “despair” as a child
when her father merely gave her a “disapproving look” and how “she had aggravated
over this for weeks.”226 Her reception in Paris had been much more than just a
disapproving glance.
222
223
224
225
226
Entry for July 16, 1940 in Journal, 1939-42, folder 3, box 31, Speeches and Writings,
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL.
85
Following her sharp reception in Paris, Eleanor’s life became increasingly bleak.
Expecting to deliver a baby at the end of June, her mother settled down for several
months in a small house in Neuilly and her father entered a sanitarium. Eleanor’s parents
sent their five-year-old daughter to a convent, ostensibly “to learn French” and to keep
her “out of the way when the baby arrived.” In the Catholic convent, Eleanor felt
ostracized due to the fact that she “did not speak their language and did not belong to
their religion.” In a desperate attempt to get attention, Eleanor told an apparent lie to one
of the sisters, and refusing to recant, the convent contacted Eleanor’s mother who took
her daughter “away in disgrace.” Eleanor recalled, “The convent experience was a very
unhappy one.”227
Eleanor Roosevelt’s experiences at Allenswood with its French headmistress, Mlle.
Souvestre, between 1899 and 1902 stood at the opposite end of the spectrum from her
earlier experiences in Europe. The experience changed Eleanor’s thinking and
perspective. Upon Eleanor Roosevelt’s departure from Allenswood in 1902, Souvestre
was “happy in the thought that these three years of such sustained and productive work”
had proven to be “a period of joy and rest” for her young student.228
Initially shocked by the self-proclaimed atheist, Eleanor Roosevelt ultimately praised
Souvestre as a “woman who was not in the habit of hiding her feelings.”229 Souvestre’s
father had been a staunchly anti-Royalist writer and philosopher whose sympathies
227
228
Marie Souvestre to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 7, 1902, Allenswood: Souvestre, Marie,
Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
229
86
bordered on radical, forcing him to flee France to Geneva on several occasions.230 Prior
to the Franco-Prussian War, Mlle. Souvestre had run a school outside of Paris at Les
Ruches, but, according to Eleanor, “The siege of Paris had been such an ordeal that Mlle.
Souvestre had left France and moved to England.”231
Nevertheless, it was probably more than merely the “ordeal” of the Prussian siege of
Paris that induced Mlle. Souvestre to depart France. It seems more likely that the
destruction of the Paris Commune in 1871 was the event that compelled Souvestre to
move to England. An adherent disciple of French Radicalism, Souvestre was a self-styled
“radical free thinker” and nonconformist with anti-clerical views and a deep interest in
politics; later she became a passionate Dreyfusard.232 Fundamentally, Radicalism was a
militant form of Republicanism committed to regenerating France by the creation of a
strong, secular Republic. Free Thought was one Radical organization committed to the
militant secularization of marriages, baptisms, and festivals. Along with moderate
Republicans, Radical Republicans shared a particular view of French history. They
accepted the Revolution of 1789, viewed it as the foundation of popular sovereignty, and
believed that the essence of the political struggle was to defend the Republic against the
forces of reaction: Royalists, Bonapartists, and the Catholic Church. From the Radical
viewpoint, the Dreyfus Affair revealed the existence of a reactionary plot, and most
230
231
232
87
Dreyfusards saw the injustice against Captain Alfred Dreyfus symbolically as a political
opportunity to discredit the clerical-military threat to the Republic.233
At meals, Eleanor Roosevelt sat across from Mlle. Souvestre whom she considered
“far and away the most fascinating person.” Additionally, Mlle. Souvestre occasionally
invited Eleanor and several others to spend a few hours after dinner with her in the study.
Apparently, the Dreyfus case was one of Souvestre’s favorite topics of conversation, and
she often recounted the details of the affair for the spellbound girls listening to her. In
addition to her duties as headmistress at Allenswood, Mlle. Souvestre also taught French
literature and history.234 Presumably, her historical interpretation mirrored or validated
her own French radical and anti-clerical views. Thirty-six years later, Eleanor Roosevelt
noted, “I still say all my historical names in French, harking back to this early
teaching.”235 Given Souvestre’s convictions, however, it seems certain that Eleanor
Roosevelt retained more than simply “historical names” from Souvestre’s instruction and
that Eleanor undoubtedly accepted many of her teacher’s characterizations, perspectives,
and assumptions about the past. Testifying to Eleanor Roosevelt’s attentiveness,
Souvestre found her “highly interested in all her work” and noted, “She works admirably
in French and history and is the 1st out of a class of 9.”236
233
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992), pp. 4, 7-8, 13-5.
234
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 58, 64, 72; Lash, Eleanor and
Franklin, p. 80.
235
236
Souvestre’s comments for the January to April 1900 term, Allenswood: Report Cards,
88
Mlle. Souvestre also shaped Eleanor Roosevelt’s thinking beyond the daily regimen at
Allenswood. A “warm affection” developed between the two.237 Souvestre made a point
of occasionally introducing her guests to Eleanor Roosevelt and actively planned her
student’s vacations on the continent. After Christmas 1899, Souvestre arranged for
Eleanor Roosevelt “to live in a French family for the rest of my holiday, in order to study
French.” The family turned out to be “two very charming, cultivated women” who lived
with their mother in Paris. Souvestre joined Eleanor in Paris for the last few days of her
stay. Having forgotten any details of Paris from her first visit as a child, Eleanor
characterized her visit as “almost like a dream.”238
Souvestre not only assisted Eleanor in planning her holidays, she joined her on a
number of vacations. One of Mlle. Souvestre’s consistent themes was that while on
vacation they “see the people of the country.” In practice, the two spent a great deal of
time with friends of Mlle. Souvestre, presumably friends whose thoughts ran along
similar lines. In 1901 Souvestre joined her student during her summer vacation; the two
traveled through Marseilles, visited Pisa, and stayed in Florence with “an artist friend of
Mlle. Souvestre.” On their return trip, they spent several days in Paris. Eleanor Roosevelt
considered the trip “one of the most important things that happened in my education.”239
That Christmas, Mlle. Souvestre took Eleanor and another student to Rome, and in the
spring of 1902, Souvestre asked Eleanor to travel with her again. The two crossed the
Channel into France where they stayed with her friends, the Ribots, near Calais. Eleanor
237
238
239
89
recalled that she “felt somewhat awed by our two dignified and kindly hosts,” host
Alexandre Ribot, a Republican politician, later became premier of France in 1917. In
Belgium they visited other friends of Mlle. Souvestre and in Frankfurt stayed with the
family of two girls who had been students at Allenswood so that Eleanor might catch a
“glimpse of German family life and customs.”240
A transformation took place in Eleanor’s attitudes and thinking as a result of her
exposure to Mlle. Souvestre. She recalled that her father had taken her to Venice during
their visit to Europe when she was five. In Venice, she seemed almost overawed by a
statue of Saint Peter. As a young woman armed with new ideas, however, she returned to
Venice and found the Catholic icon “to be a little affair.”241 In Florence she had a similar
experience. Considering the impact of Mlle. Souvestre on her changed perspective,
Eleanor Roosevelt posed the rhetorical question, “Isn’t it queer how children take things
for granted until something wakes them up?” As Souvestre saw it, Eleanor Roosevelt’s
three years at Allenswood had created a life for her that was “entirely new and entirely
different, and, in several respects entirely contradictory,” from the life that she had
known.242 Souvestre passed away in March 1905 before she saw Eleanor Roosevelt
again.
IX.
240
241
Entry for July 15 or 16, 1940 in Journal, 1939-42, folder 3, box 31, Speeches and
Writings, Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL.
242
Marie Souvestre to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 7, 1902, Allenswood: Souvestre, Marie,
90
Franklin Roosevelt entered Columbia Law School in the fall of 1904, and in March
1905, during his second term at Columbia, he married Eleanor Roosevelt. Upon the
completion of his second term, the couple sailed to Europe in June 1905 for a three-
month honeymoon. Not surprisingly, the route the couple followed in Europe resembled
the path followed by his parents twenty-five years earlier. After landing in Liverpool, the
couple initially stayed in London for several days, a city that Eleanor recalled “my
husband loves.”243 London was followed by four days in Paris at the end of June. From
Paris, the couple traveled to Italy and spent a week near Venice. After Italy, they traveled
through the Alps, spent seven days at the Palace Hotel in St. Moritz and then toured
through Switzerland, southern Germany, Augsburg, Ulm, and the Black Forest. Franklin
Roosevelt had visited many of those places with his parents years before. After stopping
in Strasbourg and Nancy, the couple returned to their Aunt Dora Delano Forbes’s Paris
apartment “which is always the center for the entire family when they go to Paris.” After
reveling in the sights of Paris with their Forbes and Howland relatives, the couple
traveled back to London and sailed for the United States in early September.244 Their first
child, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, was born in early May 1906, apparently conceived, like
her father, in Europe.
The people and places that the couple saw on their honeymoon were familiar and
comfortable; clearly, their honeymoon exposed them to little, if anything, new. Their
243
244
Several years before, Aunt Dora’s husband and Franklin Roosevelt’s godfather, Will
Forbes, had passed away, and in 1903 Aunt Dora married her former husband’s younger
brother Paul Forbes. [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 127-38.
91
Maxwell and Bulloch relatives met them at the dock in Liverpool and got them “quickly
through the custom house.” They spent their first evening in Europe at the Bulloch home
“talking over old days, family history, etc.”245 In London, Franklin and Eleanor met with
his mother’s sister, Aunt Kassie, and her daughter Muriel Delano Robbins. One of
Eleanor’s roommates from Allenswood also met them in London, and together they paid
a short visit to the old school and then toured the art exhibit at the Royal Academy. In
London, they also saw many friends and acquaintances of Franklin Roosevelt’s parents to
include the Cholmeleys, the Edwardeses, and the United States ambassador in London,
Whitelaw Reid.246 Franklin and Eleanor spent their time in Paris with Aunt Dora,
shopping and visiting their Forbes and Howland relations. In Venice they toured the
Grand Canal with “an excellent gondolier recommended by Cousin Julia Delano” and
dined with Charles Forbes, Aunt Dora’s brother-in-law.247 Eleanor recalled, “We went to
one or two of the old palaces, thanks to Mr. Forbes’ kind offices, and visited some friends
of Franklin’s mother and father who lived there.”248 During the their stay in Cortina, they
met acquaintances of Sara Delano Roosevelt from Campobello “who were very nice and
245
James and Irvine Bulloch were half-brothers of Eleanor Roosevelt’s grandmother and
agents of the Confederate States of America who elected to settle in England after the
Civil War. James Bulloch’s eldest daughter married a Maxwell, who like the Bullochs
was a prominent official in the Cunard Steamship Company. Franklin D. Roosevelt letter
to his mother, June 16, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, p. 10.
246
Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 19, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
247
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother, June 22, June 26, and July 3, 1905, and
Eleanor Roosevelt letters to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 23, June 29, and July 5, 1905 in
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 16-7, 19, 20-1, 22-3, 24-5, 26-8.
248
92
made the hotel seem quite homelike.”249 Eleanor’s Aunt Tissie and Uncle Stanley
Mortimer were in St. Moritz when the couple arrived. Meals, golf, and walks with the
Mortimers, whose cottage was next to the Palace Hotel, occupied the majority of the time
Franklin and Eleanor spent at St. Moritz outside of their hotel room.250
The week and a half that Franklin and Eleanor spent in southern Germany and northern
Switzerland was the only period of their honeymoon that they did not spend with
relatives. Even then, however, Franklin Roosevelt clung to the familiar, making a point to
seek lodging in the hotels where he had stayed as a youth.251 Throughout their
honeymoon on the continent of Europe, Franklin and Eleanor seem to have had no social
interaction with any native Europeans, the only exception being Meredith Howland in
Paris and her half-French, half-American children.
Envious of cousin Muriel Delano Robbins’s opportunity to dine with the Kaiser, the
couple remained aloof from European commoners and disdainful of their actions. Eleanor
proudly reported that her husband had received the “great compliment” of being confused
for an Englishman because “he was so handsome and had the real English profile!” With
the air of traveling patricians, Franklin and Eleanor deliberately avoided talking with
“common” Americans as well as lower class Germans. For instance, Eleanor reported the
rudeness of “four large and burly Germans” who shared the compartment on their train.
249
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, July 15, 1905, F.D.R.: His Personal
250
Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, July 19, 1905 and Franklin D. and
Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, July 22, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, pp. 40-1, 44-5.
251
Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother, July 30 and August 7, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 51, 56.
93
She also noted with satisfaction that they managed to take a photograph of “a German
hen party who sat near us” in a restaurant. It is apparent, furthermore, that Eleanor could
not relate to the interests of the common Germans that she met. In Augsburg, “the little
old lady caretaker” of the town hall “endeavored” to explain the fine details in the
building to Eleanor and Franklin, but, Eleanor noted, “I don’t think she found me too
sympathetic so she finally gave it up.” She displayed a similar lack of sympathy during a
tour of an old church in the city and “came away with the creeps” after “the small boy
who kept the keys . . . exhibited with triumph the skeleton” of St. Afra.252 For meals at St.
Blasien, Franklin Roosevelt commented that they were fortunate to secure a table “on the
verandah - the dining room has four long pigsties where the strange assortment of mortals
(swine are mortal, n’est ce pas?) consume victuals.”253
It was during his honeymoon that Franklin Roosevelt seems to have accepted Professor
Macvane’s warnings about the spread of Prussian domination and bureaucracy in liberal
Germany. On his honeymoon, Franklin Roosevelt encountered a Germany that was
different from the images of his youth and his mother’s recollections. After seeing
changes in the Black Forest town of Freiburg, he lamented, “In fact it is so
unromantic.”254 Prussian bureaucratization provided a plausible explanation for many of
the unwelcome changes. The couple observed that in southern Germany and northern
Switzerland “they have all kinds of strange rules and regulations!” Franklin and Eleanor,
252
Eleanor Roosevelt letters to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 13, July 25 and August 1,
1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 9, 46-8, 52-5.
253
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, July 30, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
254
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, August 7, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
94
however, blatantly violated the posted regulations.255 Thirteen years later, Franklin
Roosevelt characterized the regimentation that they encountered in Germany on their
honeymoon as “preparation for the first stages of their war machine.”256 When news of
Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation in the Moroccan crisis reached him at the end of his
honeymoon, Franklin Roosevelt observed that the tone of the German government
revealed “a certain animosity and jealousy as usual.”257
Franklin Roosevelt’s reaction to the Moroccan crisis also provides an indication of the
direction of his thinking in several other areas. Clearly, he had developed the highest
regard for statesmen who could preserve peace between the major powers or serve as
peacemakers. Reflecting on the unexpected “peace” between the major powers after the
tension over Morocco, he noted, “I think Uncle Ted must be gratified to have done so
much towards it.”258 Franklin Roosevelt expressed surprise, however, that his kinsman’s
efforts to keep the peace had been well received not only in Britain but in France as well.
He observed, “Even the French were quite enthusiastic.” In Roosevelt’s mind, attitudes in
Britain and France had undergone a noticeable shift. He perceived that over the previous
few years those two countries had begun “adopting towards our country in general a most
255
Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, August 1, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
256
Entry for July 30, 1918, Diary 1918, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
257
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, September 7, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
258
Franklin D. and Eleanor Roosevelt letter to his mother, August 30, 1905 in F.D.R.:
His Personal Letters, vol. 2, p. 80.
95
respectful and almost loving tone.”259 Perhaps the attitude of the French government
signaled to Franklin Roosevelt that the Republicans in France had gained the upper hand
over the forces of reaction: imperialists, army officers, and revanchists seeking an
opportunity to avenge France’s defeat in 1870.
Following his honeymoon, Franklin Roosevelt returned to Columbia Law School.
Initially, Franklin and Eleanor rented an apartment in New York City. Not wanting to be
far from her son, his mother lived three blocks away in a house on Madison Avenue,
returning to Hyde Park during the summer months. Later, Sara Delano Roosevelt had
adjoining houses built so that they could live side by side. Eleanor Roosevelt considered
her mother-in-law “a very strong character” and quickly found herself “growing very
dependent” on her. Meanwhile, Franklin Roosevelt passed the bar exam in 1907 and went
to work for a New York City law firm that fall.260 For several years, he occupied himself
with work and his new familial responsibilities, his interest in France and Germany
seemingly confined to new additions to his stamp collection.261 Nevertheless, the
example, and the prodding, of Theodore Roosevelt helped to convince him to enter
politics in 1910, winning election to the New York State senate in November.262
Although Franklin Roosevelt entered politics as a Democrat, the party of his half-brother
259
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, September 7, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
260
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 122, 126-7, 138, 152-3.
261
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, August 23, 1907 in F.D.R.: His Personal
262
96
and their father, after his nomination by the Dutchess County Democrats in 1910, he
immediately sought the approval of Theodore Roosevelt, and it was quickly granted.263
Until his death in 1919, Theodore Roosevelt remained an influential figure in Franklin
Roosevelt’s life. While at Harvard, Franklin lead a student group that supported Theodore
Roosevelt’s election in the 1904 presidential race.264 On March 4, 1905, Franklin and
Eleanor “were thrilled” to attend “Uncle Ted’s inauguration” followed by lunch at the
White House. Eleven days later, Theodore Roosevelt came to New York for the couple’s
wedding.265 Over the next few years, Franklin and Eleanor remained close to Theodore
Roosevelt and frequently visited him at the White House.266
After leaving office in 1909, Theodore Roosevelt began a long safari in Africa and a
tour through Europe, returning to the United States in 1910. Upon his return, he shared
his impressions from his trip with close friends and family, presumably Franklin and
Eleanor were among those taken into his confidence. Theodore Roosevelt classified those
that he met throughout Europe as either proponents of progress or reactionaries.
Roosevelt thought that the city of Rome provided “the very sharpest contrasts” between
263
Theodore Roosevelt letter to his sister A. R. Cowles, August 10, 1910, Series 3A,
Reel 363, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD; Frank
Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1990), p. 17.
264
John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1983), p. 420, fn. 5.
265
266
Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), p. 41.For one
visit, see Franklin Roosevelt’s comments in his speech before the Associated Harvard
Clubs at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., May 1, 1920, Master Speech File No.
121, FDRL.
97
“radical modern progress . . . and the extremes of opposition.” Although not opposed to
Catholicism per se, Roosevelt believed the Catholic Church to be “the baleful enemy of
mankind” whenever and wherever “priestly reactionaries” had “the upper hand.” He
described the pope as “a worthy, narrowly limited parish priest” but a man under the
control of “a furiously bigoted reactionary, and in fact a good type of sixteenth century
Spanish ecclesiastic.” In contrast to the Vatican, he praised Garibaldi for leading “the
movement that turned Rome into what it now is” and lauded “the free-thinking Jew
mayor, a good fellow, and his Socialist backers in the Town Council.”267 In Italy, France,
Spain, and much of Germany, he believed that an incompatibility existed between
“Liberalism and very strong religious feelings.” He asserted that particularly in Italy and
France “devout Catholics were almost always reactionary” whereas “Liberals were
always anti-clerical - - probably inevitably so.”268
Despite his loathing of Catholic reactionaries, Theodore Roosevelt returned from his
trip with a higher opinion of France. He noted that although France’s “royalist press,
being Catholic” criticized him, his comments “delighted republican leaders.” He also
confessed that his meetings with “members of the various ministries” forced him to
overcome some of his “own complacent Anglo-Saxon ignorance” and view “French
public men” with greater regard. Roosevelt found that “in talking with these French
republicans” that he “had a sense of kinship” and a feeling of “sympathy somewhat akin
to that which I felt in talking with English Liberals.” He particularly praised “the able and
267
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 1, 11, 12,
Series 4A, Reel 416, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
268
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 42-3,
Ibid.
98
cultivated” Republican “public men” and French intellectuals that he met, declaring,
“What a charming man a charming Frenchman is!” 269
Despite his optimism for French progress behind the vanguard of the able and
cultivated, Theodore Roosevelt was less laudatory of the capricious French political
system. In his way of thinking, politics had undermined each of the successive
governments in France between 1789 and 1871, and politics flourished in the French
parliamentary system of “a government by groups, where the people do not mind
changing their leaders continually.” Fundamentally, the problem in France derived from
the mixed heritage of France’s institutions and culture. Roosevelt postulated that the
combination of France’s unique national character and its political system produced a
nation where the people “are so afraid of themselves that, unlike the English and
Americans, they do not dare trust anyone[sic] man with a temporary exercise of large
power for fear they will be weak enough to let him assume it permanently.”270 Despite its
cultural and intellectual achievements, heterogeneous France remained on a tier behind
the United States and Britain, by implication, relegated to play a role, perhaps, as a major,
regional power, but not as a great, progressive international power.
In sharp contrast to the exuberant, warm reception given him by the people of Paris
and the French government, Theodore Roosevelt related that in Berlin he had been
received correctly, but coolly, by the German authorities and the people. He noted, “But
excepting the university folk, they really did not want to see me.” Roosevelt perceived
that the United States, like Britain, had become extremely unpopular in Germany. He laid
269
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 55-7.
270
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 56-7;
Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, p. 113.
99
the blame for that hostility on the German upper classes. Emphasizing the Prussian
system that had come to dominate Germany, he noted that the “stiff, domineering,
formal” upper classes had “the organized army, the organized bureaucracy, [and] the
organized industry of their great, highly-civilized and admirably-administered country
behind them.”271
There seemed to be little immediate prospect for liberal, democratic values in a nation
dominated by the Prussian upper class and not by German intellectuals. Although
admitting individual exceptions, Roosevelt perceived that “the German upper class, alone
among the European upper classes - so far as I knew - really did not like the social type I
represented.” The German upper class, according to Roosevelt, regarded “loose
democratic governmental methods” and liberal ideas “as irregular, unnatural, and
debasing, and were rendered uncomfortable by them.”272 In Roosevelt’s mind, the unique
character of the Junker class accounted for their disdain of liberal democracy. Despite
their “fine domestic qualities,” Roosevelt considered ‘the North German women of the
upper classes” the least attractive of any he saw in Europe. He ventured that they,
perhaps, “are cowed in their home life” by husbands who “not only wish to domineer
over the rest of mankind - which is not always possible - but wish to, and do, domineer
over their own wives.”273
Roosevelt suggested, however, that those attitudes were not universal in Germany. He
experienced a particular affinity with the German intellectuals, “the professors and the
271
272
273
100
people” at the Berlin university, and “other African explorers and scientific men whom I
met while in Berlin.” Roosevelt also enjoyed the company of the army officer assigned
him as an aide, a descendant of the German patriot and lyric poet Karl Theodor Körner
who died fighting against Napoleon in 1813 during the Wars of Liberation, and the
“able” men “at the head of politics and the Administration.”274 He considered Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz “an exceedingly able man” and “enjoyed meeting the various other
ministers.”275
Theodore Roosevelt also offered his impressions of his “chief interest at Berlin,”
Kaiser Wilhelm II. After spending the better part of three afternoons with Kaiser
Wilhelm, Roosevelt assessed the emperor as “an able and powerful man.”276 “In the
fundamentals of domestic morality, and as regards all that side of religion which is
moral,” Roosevelt confided, “we agreed heartily; but there is a good deal of dogmatic
theology which to him means much and to me is entirely meaningless.” Roosevelt
contrasted his own views in international affairs with those of the Kaiser who had been
“brought up in the school of Frederick the Great and Bismarck,” noting that “there were
many points in international morality where he and I were completely asunder.”277
Roosevelt observed that “Germany has the arrogance of a very strong power” and that the
Kaiser’s references to Britain contained a “a curious mixture of admiration and
resentment.” Nevertheless, he judged that the Kaiser, although jealous of Britain, never
274
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 75, 78-9.
275
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 79, 82 83.
276
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, page 83.
277
101
consciously entertained any idea of “the conquest of England.” Others in Germany,
however, clearly entertained such views, and, therefore, if Germany had a navy as large
as Britain’s, Roosevelt believed it likely that incidents would occur which might induce
Germany to use its fleet “for the destruction of England.”278
Despite his basic admiration for the Kaiser and respect for his power, Roosevelt
assessed that Kaiser Wilhelm II “was not supreme.” Many people in Berlin stressed to
Roosevelt that, in fact, the Kaiser “must yield to the Nation on any point as to which the
Nation had decided views.”279 After hours of intimate conversation with the Kaiser,
Roosevelt assessed, “Down at the bottom of his heart, he knew perfectly well that he
himself was not an absolute sovereign.” Perceiving limitations on the Kaiser’s freedom of
action, Roosevelt believed that “whenever Germany made up its mind to go in a given
direction he could only stay at the head of affairs by scampering to take the lead in going
that direction.”280 By 1910, however, the Prussian upper class, not German intellectuals
and public servants, seemed to have dominated fundamental attitudes in Germany and,
therefore, the essential direction of the Kaiser’s policy.
Germany and, to a lesser extent, France figured prominently in Theodore Roosevelt’s
conception of international relations and cooperation. Of the two nations, Roosevelt had a
greater attraction toward the German people. To the Kaiser, he expressed his belief “that
the English, Germans and Americans ought to be fundamentally in accord; and that
278
279
280
102
nothing would so make for the peace and progress of the world.”281 Concerning the
conduct of international relations, however, Theodore Roosevelt found that his own
views not only differed from those of the Kaiser but diverged even sharper from the
views held by others shaping German policy. The Kaiser’s brother, for example, seemed
to espouse “the theory that might rules, and that the one crime in international matters is
weakness.” As a result, Roosevelt found Germany’s ambition almost limitless, unchecked
by any concern for “international equity” or responsibility.282 Roosevelt could not
condone such attitudes, shaped as they were by the Prussian upper class, preferring the
current leadership of France to that of Germany. In the area of statesmanship, Roosevelt
confessed his affinity for French Republicans, English Liberals, and American
progressives. He noted that “the radical liberal” in those three countries “is at least
working toward the end for which I think we should all of us strive.” Continuing, he
observed that “when he adds sanity and moderation to courage and enthusiasm for high
ideals he develops into the kind of statesman whom alone I can whole-heartedly
support.”283
Theodore Roosevelt, however, had little use for the “washy movement for international
peace” associated with Andrew Carnegie’s name and, instead, saw a need for military
power. Along with power, Roosevelt also believed that there had to be the resolve to use
that power, in order to enforce a nation’s “engagements’ and “the equities of other
peoples.” During Roosevelt’s presidency, the United States had became a power that
281
282
283
103
exerted considerable influence in international affairs; his decision to send the “Great
White Fleet” around the world recognized and strengthened that influence. Roosevelt told
von Tirpitz that he “thought it a good thing that the Japanese should know there were
fleets of the white races which were totally different from the fleet of poor [Russian
Admiral Zinovy Petrovitch] Rodjestvensky” whose Baltic fleet the Japanese sunk at
Tsushima in 1905. Roosevelt, furthermore, seemed flattered that Admiral Tirpitz and the
Kaiser both regarded the “voyage of the [American] battlefleet as having done more for
peace in the Orient than anything else that could have happened.”284
X.
Throughout his life, Franklin D. Roosevelt displayed an avid interest in genealogy and
history.285 One close observer later observed, “He has an amazingly retentive memory
and constantly floors his family with [his] knowledge of events, geography and history,
factual concrete knowledge.”286 Roosevelt, however, consciously sought to avoid
“dwelling on facts and on facts alone.” Admittedly, he sought “benefit in the present from
the lessons which undoubtedly exist in history.”287 Prodded by his professors at Harvard,
particularly Frederick Jackson Turner and Marcus Macvane, to “think big” and value
284
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 82, 84-5.
285
Tully, F.D.R., My Boss, pp. 10, 12-3.
286
Entry for August 6, 1940, Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches and Writings,
Lash Papers, FDRL.
287
Speech entitled “Montcalm’s Victory and its Lesson,” Oswego, New York,
September 30, 1913, Master Speech File Number 24, FDRL.
104
history for the insights it provides, Roosevelt developed a broad, sweeping historical
perspective. His thinking meshed the romantic impressions of his parents and his own
parochial travels in Europe with the contemporary ideas of Theodore Roosevelt, Francis
Parkman, A. T. Mahan, Macvane, and Turner. Taken together, those influences produced
in Roosevelt a remarkably coherent view of history and of Western Europe by the time he
departed the New York legislature and accepted President Woodrow Wilson’s offer to
become assistant secretary of the navy in 1913.
His ideas reflected the liberal, progressive view of history and world events. In 1912,
he observed that “the history of the past thousand years” was the story of “the Aryan
races . . . struggling to obtain individual freedom.” He argued,
The Reformation, for instance, and the Renaissance in Europe are too
commonly regarded as religious or educational struggles and have not,
by teachers of history, been sufficiently explained as efforts . . . to
obtain individual liberty. In the same way the American revolution, the
French revolution and at a later date the general European uprisings of
1848.288
As a function of his perspective, Roosevelt tended to view people and groups as either
agents of progress and individual liberty or as a manifestation of the forces of reaction.
From his point of view, American progressives, English Liberals and Whigs, Calvinists,
Puritans and Parliamentarians filled the ranks of history’s reformers. He believed that in
France the agents of progress consistently were Republican, anti-clerical, civilian, and
secular. In Germany, they were the liberal intellectuals of central Germany, in the
tradition of Martin Luther and the revolutionaries of 1848.
288
Address before the People’s Forum, Troy, New York, March 3, 1912, Master Speech
File Number 14, FDRL.
105
Against those reformers, Roosevelt’s thinking arrayed the opponents of liberty and the
forces of reaction: conservatives, Tories, advocates of monarchy and absolutism,
professional militarists and proponents of imperial expansion, clerics and the Catholic
Church. He believed that throughout history “the forces of reaction so often defeat the
forces of progress.”289 He conceived history as the cyclic interplay between the two
forces with periods of conservative, reaction punctuated by periods of reform that
ultimately moved the people closer to attaining individual liberty. That conception
persisted throughout his life. In 1940, for instance, he observed, “There have been
occasions . . . when reactions in the march of democracy have set in, and forward-looking
progress has seemed to stop. But such periods have been followed by liberal and
progressive times.”290
Roosevelt’s comments about France in 1912 and 1913 reveal a mixture of admiration
and disdain. Clearly, he was sympathetic to the efforts of French Republicans in 1789 and
1848, and he prized French cultural and artistic achievements.291 Despite its progressive
aspects, however, it seemed to Roosevelt that many archaic institutions and impulses
persisted in the French nation, aspects that Roosevelt labeled “un-American.” Concerning
society, Roosevelt believed that vestiges “of an outworn social system” dominated by the
monarchy and the Catholic Church remained in France despite the anti-clerical efforts of
289
Radio Address to the Young Democratic Clubs of America Meeting in Milwaukee,
August 24, 1935, Master Speech File Number 795, FDRL.
290
Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National Convention, July 19, 1940, Master
Speech File Number 1291, FDRL.
291
File Number 14, FDRL. On his attitude toward French culture, see, for example, Franklin
and Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, August 16, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
106
French Republicans. In addition, French political life remained sharply divided and
included monarchists and Bonapartists, advocates of what Roosevelt considered “a
discredited form of government.” In Roosevelt’s mind, closely linked to the French
monarchy was the impulse in France for overseas colonies and empire. Unlike “healthy”
British colonization, French efforts had been “comparatively artificial” efforts driven by
antiquated religious, military, and political motives. Considering France’s colonial
record, he commented, “But what had they gained besides the knowledge of the trails and
streams?”292 Evidently, Roosevelt also viewed the French administrative system, both at
home and in its colonial ventures, as an ineffective holdover from the past. In Panama in
1912, Roosevelt found the country “clean and fairly orderly--a very different Panama
than under the French.”293 On account of its inherent divisions and heterogeneous
national character, it seems evident that Roosevelt viewed France as a nation that did not
belong in the ranks of the great colonial or world powers. Nevertheless, he seems to have
believed that under responsible and progressive Republican leadership France was a
country that would continue to play an important role in European affairs.
By 1913, Roosevelt perceived that, although Prussian militarism dominated Germany,
the tension in the nation between the conflicting impulses of autocracy and liberalism
remained. He described the impulse as “the inevitable conflict between the past and the
future.” In the New York State senate Roosevelt had served as chairman of the Forest,
292
“Montcalm’s Victory and its Lesson”- Oswego, New York, September 30, 1913,
Master Speech File Number 24, FDRL.
293
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, April 22, 1912 in F.D.R.: His Personal
107
Fish and Game committee.294 In that capacity, he found conservation efforts in Germany
to be more farsighted than those in the United States. Praising the impact of the German
intellectual as a force for progress, Roosevelt observed, “It was recognized in Germany
for instance a hundred years ago that the trees on the land were necessary for the
preservation of the water power and indeed for the general health and prosperity of the
people.”295 For the time being, however, Prussian autocracy and militarism increasingly
dominated liberal Germany. Clearly, Roosevelt considered the government of Germany
in 1913 and the French monarchy during the Seven Years War to be analogous. He
warned that absolutist governments, because of their “highly concentrated organization,”
had the ability to arm rapidly. Whilhelmine Germany’s aggressive naval building
program exemplified that ability. Roosevelt, furthermore, suggested that Germany’s
military expansion constituted more than a threat to Great Britain alone; it represented a
global threat to all of the “Anglo-Saxon peoples.”296
Roosevelt’s perspective had clear implications for the direction he thought United
States policy should take. In 1913, he urged expanding the United States navy in order to
avoid “the usual weakness of Anglo-Saxon peoples, a lack of preparation for armed
conflict.” His primary purpose for advocating military preparation, however, was
peaceful; American military power would allow the nation to deter or avoid war rather
294
“Autobiographical sketch for the New York Red Book February 9, 1911,” Folder 12,
Box 39, Writing and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and
295
296
108
than wage it. Concerning war, he claimed, “We are all striving - army and navy alike - to
prevent its occurrence.” Roosevelt, nevertheless, viewed preparation as essential because
“no one can guarantee to the American people that there will be no more war.” From his
perspective, if the United States did not improve its naval power and prepare to “fight
with fourteen-inch guns at ranges of ten miles,” then it not only invited a potential attack
but also risked losing a future conflict in its initial stages before the nation could
effectively mobilize its strength and resources. Roosevelt, however, believed that the
United States possessed an inherent advantage over autocratic governments despite the
fact that autocracies “may have armies and navies of the greatest.” He perceived that the
power of absolute rulers was fragile. He surmised that military strength “is in itself of no
avail” and that ultimately an autocratic government “will go down in defeat if the people
at home on the farms or in the towns are weak in resources, in endurance, in fundamental
ideals.” 297
Although he emphasized the defensive value of military preparedness, it seems evident
that Roosevelt in no way espoused a passive policy for the United States. In that respect,
the activism that he urged against trusts and monopolies, which ran on an “out of date”
theory, presumably applied to autocratic governments as well. Considering the progress
of liberty and civilization, he argued, “The trust is evil because it monopolizes for a few
and as long as this keeps up it will be necessary for a community to change its features.”
Clearly, Roosevelt believed that the policies of the United States government needed to
further progressive goals. The people of United States, he further asserted, had a definite
responsibility to “care what happens after they are gone . . . and even care what happens
297
109
to their neighbors.” Mindful of that responsibility to the world and future generations,
Roosevelt offered the following prescription, “When men are serfs or are ruled by tyrants
they need first of all, individual freedom.”298
298
110
Chapter 3: The Great War and the Confirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1913-1918
To understand the present gigantic conflict one must have at least a

glimmering of understanding of foreign nations and their histories.
Eleanor Roosevelt to Franklin D. Roosevelt
August 7, 19141
Events from March 1913, when Franklin D. Roosevelt first entered national public life,
to the end of the Great War in November 1918 left an indelible mark on Roosevelt’s
thinking.2 During Roosevelt’s tenure as assistant secretary of the navy, his progressive
worldview coalesced and his views of France and Germany matured. Influenced by
1
Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 7, 1914, quoted in Joseph P.
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship, Based on Eleanor
Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), p. 202.
2
Roosevelt’s biographers have expressed a broad range of opinions concerning the
importance of Roosevelt’s experiences as assistant secretary of the navy. Biographer
Geoffrey Ward downplays Roosevelt’s actions in the Wilson administration and finds
him “more cheerleader and expediter than maker of decisions.” Frank Friedel finds
Roosevelt “impressionable” and notes that circumstances caused Roosevelt to alter his
views. Brushing through the Great War and ignoring the ideas that motivated Roosevelt’s
actions, Friedel casually assesses Roosevelt to have been contradictory during the Great
War, characterizing him as “a big navy man and an imperialist” who somehow came to
support the League of Nations by the end of the war. Friedel, however, notes that many
of Roosevelt’s experiences during that period “affected his later course of action.”
Concerned with the emergence of Roosevelt as a politician, James MacGregor Burns
assesses that the experience had a maturing effect on Roosevelt’s political judgment and
turned “him into a seasoned politician-administrator.” Gerhard Weinberg suggests,
however, that historians need to develop a more complete assessment of the influence of
Roosevelt’s experiences, particularly from the Great War and immediate post war era, on
Roosevelt’s perceptions and the impact of those perceptions on some of his most
important decisions and policies during the Second World War. Geoffrey C. Ward, A
First-Class Temperament: The Emergence of Franklin Roosevelt (New York: Harper and
Row, 1989), p. 433; Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 31-2; James MacGregor Burns, The
Lion and the Fox: Roosevelt, 1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1984), pp. 61-5, 67; Gerhard L. Weinberg, “World War II: Comments on the
Roundtable,” Diplomatic History, Summer 2001, vol. 25, number 3, p. 492. Weinberg,
Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History
(Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 186-7, 299-301.
111
contemporary progressive ideas amid heightened wartime sensitivities, Roosevelt
developed an enduring progressive outlook in which he perceived international events
from the perspective that groups and national leaders served either as the agents or the
opponents of progress. As Roosevelt matured as a politician, his experiences in the
Wilson administration also strengthened his appreciation for the primacy of domestic
political concerns. With his perspective shaded by the belief that he ranked among the
agents of progress, he developed an approach to foreign policy consistently conditioned
by his particular, partisan political perspective, awareness, and sensitivities.
The Great War taught Roosevelt some fundamental strategic lessons and reinforced his
thinking about military preparedness. Events convinced Roosevelt that the United States
exerted a major moral force in world affairs. The United States represented a powerful
force for democratic progress, and even symbolic American gestures represented a
significant psychological weapon to assist friends and allies. Building on the advocacy of
James Russell Soley, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Theodore Roosevelt, the circumstances
surrounding United States entry into the Great War solidified Roosevelt’s thinking about
the value of military preparedness to avert war or, if necessary, to wage it.
By the end of the war Roosevelt also had gained tremendous confidence in the ability
of the French soldier and guarded optimism for the future of the French political system.
He found the poiliu fierce and resolute and believed French soldiers particularly adept at
responding to and recovering from battlefield setbacks. Despite the fragmented,
heterogeneous nature of French society and political life, Roosevelt thought that French
morale and national will were not always hopelessly divided. Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau’s wartime leadership provided him an enduring frame of reference. In
112
Roosevelt’s thinking, the solution for France was a strong, progressive leader drawn from
the Radical or Republican ranks in the liberal center between the extremes of the French
Left and Right. Roosevelt believed that only with a man such as Clemenceau in power in
France would the French be capable of national unity. Given such leadership and resolve,
he believed that the French soldier would enable France to persevere.
In contrast to his image of French martial abilities and political life, Roosevelt
envisioned German morale as much more fragile. In the progressive spirit, Roosevelt
perceived a sharp dichotomy between the militaristic Prussian upper class and
industrialists in power in Imperial Germany and the submerged liberal and intellectual
masses of the old German states. Although he hoped that the idyllic liberal Germany of
his youthful recollections would ultimately reemerge in the post war period, Roosevelt
perceived the absolute dominance of an autocratic government supported by a
militaristic, Prussian upper class throughout the Great War. Consistent with his disdain
for German commoners, he pictured the unintelligent and brutal German soldiery as
prone to committing atrocities when they had the upper hand but highly susceptible in
defeat. Consequently, Roosevelt thought that a German battlefield setback potentially
would have a more decisive impact on the Prussian war machine and the Imperial
German government than a similar blow against French soldiers.
I.
Between 1890 and the end of the Great War in 1918, a generation of American
reformers responding to the problems in their urban-industrial society labeled themselves
113
as progressives. Although not a unified movement, progressivism encompassed many
diverse domestic reform impulses in the United States around the turn of the century. As
a group, those who considered themselves progressive shared an acceptance of
industrialization and faith in progress. Progressives believed that people could intervene
in economic and social affairs in order to improve their environment, to protect those hurt
by industrialization, and to advance civilization.3 Although normally regarded as a
domestic reform impulse, progressivism also guided the way policy makers and opinion
leaders in the United States viewed Germany during the Great War. Progressive ideology
shaped the antagonism toward Germany of many Americans and their affinity with the
French Republic. Ultimately, progressivism influenced how Woodrow Wilson and his
administration waged war against Germany on the side of the Allies.
Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, the majority of the men who later became advisors during
his presidency had considered themselves progressive in 1914. With the exception of
Cordell Hull, an agrarian progressive from Tennessee, the prominent men of the
Roosevelt administration essentially came from the ranks of mid western insurgents and
the upper class of the northeastern United States. In addition to Hull, progressive
Democrats included Breckinridge Long and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Many of those later
advisors, however, not only hailed from the Democratic Party but formerly had belonged
to the insurgent wing of the Republican Party and the Progressive Party as well. Harold
L. Ickes, William H. Woodin, Henry A. Wallace, Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, Felix
Frankfurter, and William J. Donovan had been members of the insurgent wing of the
Republican Party; in 1912, many of them had supported the Bull Moose or Progressive
3
Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, 1983), pp. 2-3, 21-2.
114
Party candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, as well. Certainly among the ranks of progressive
reformers were others whose earlier political affiliations were less distinct, for example,
settlement house worker Harry Hopkins. Others presumably shared the progressive
perspective by virtue of similar educational backgrounds at elite schools in New England.
Like Roosevelt, Sumner Welles attended Groton, Harvard, and Columbia Law School.
Similarly, Jay Pierrepont Moffat attended Groton and Harvard before embarking upon a
diplomatic career. Alumni of Harvard or Harvard Law included Adolph A. Berle,
William Phillips, William C. Bullitt, Archibald MacLeish, Stimson, and Frankfurter, and,
in addition to their studies at Harvard, Bullitt, Stimson, and MacLeish also attended Yale
University prior to United States entry into the Great War.
Hoping to restore power to the “people,” progressive reformers constantly attacked the
“interests” that, in their mind, had subverted opportunity and freedom in the United
States: monopolies and trusts, investment bankers, the industrial oligarchy, urban party
bosses, and political machines.4 American reformers and opinion leaders applied that
same outlook to Germany around the turn of the century. Germany had been an example
to American reformers since the 1880s. In the late nineteenth century, concessions to
labor in the United States fell far short of the legislation enacted by the German
government to protect workers. In contrast, after 1900, Germany rounded out the social
legislation inaugurated in the 1880s.5
4
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage
Books, 1955), pp. 204, 230-1.
5
Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Rise of Modern America, 1865-1951 (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1951, 4th edition), pp. 100, 204.
115
Although American reformers found support for their proposals in the precedents set
by Bismarckian welfare legislation, it would have been impossible for them to ignore the
criticism coming from intellectuals inside Imperial Germany. For instance, German
historian Theodor Mommsen decried the “pseudo-constitutional absolutism under which
we live and which our spineless people has inwardly accepted.”6 Consequently, between
the turn of the century and United States entry into the Great War, many Americans
increasingly accepted the view that unified Germany was a nation in tension between a
militaristic Prussian oligarchy and the liberal and democratic mass of the people. On a
speaking tour of eight mid-western states in early April 1917, Henry L. Stimson noted
that the distinction “between the German people and their autocratic government was
everywhere recognized.”7
German actions during the first decade of the twentieth century, however, convinced
American policy makers that the autocratic and militaristic Prussian system increasingly
dominated liberal Germany. Acquisition of the Philippines following the Spanish-
American War had raised tensions between the United States and Imperial Germany, and
during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, his friends Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and
diplomat Henry White were strongly anti-German. In the same vein, Roosevelt’s
Secretary of State John Hay perceived “something monstrous” in “the German mind”
with respect to war. In contrast to his friends and advisors, Theodore Roosevelt’s feelings
6
Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920 (Arlington
Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1985 ed.), pp. 80-1; Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A
Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989 ed.), pp.
132, 134, 138-9.
7
Entry for April 1917 in the Henry L. Stimson Diaries, Vol. III, frame 32, microfilm
edition, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
116
were mixed, but he maintained an attitude of good will toward Germany during most of
his tenure in the White House. The threat of German, and to a lesser extent British, naval
intervention against Venezuela in 1901 and 1902 induced Roosevelt to improve the
readiness of the U.S. Navy and formulate his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt
admired German leaders such as Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck and initially
displayed qualified admiration for Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser had sought improved
relations with the United States after the Venezuelan affair, and in 1902, Roosevelt’s
daughter Alice christened the Kaiser’s yacht, part of Wilhelm’s policy of consistent
flattery toward Roosevelt. Nevertheless, by 1908, Theodore Roosevelt also came to
distrust the Kaiser and the German government’s antagonism toward Britain.8
Following Theodore Roosevelt’s departure from the White House in early 1909,
distrust of German aspirations persisted among members of the United States government
and the press. In 1910, a confidential estimate by the Navy General Board predicted a
break with Germany likely on account of its expansionist drives in the Pacific and
Caribbean. Between 1910 and 1912, the War and Navy Departments repeatedly protested
8
Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989 ed.), pp. 390-1, 442, 446-7; Lewis
L. Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1991), pp. 75-81. At Harvard at the time, Franklin D. Roosevelt did not attend
the launching of the Kaiser’s yacht on February 25, 1902. Many of his family and
relations from New York City, however, did attend the ceremony near Jersey City. In
addition to President Theodore Roosevelt’s immediate family, the guest list included
Franklin Roosevelt’s mother, his half-sister Helen Roosevelt, and cousins Douglas M.
Robinson and Corrine Roosevelt Robinson. For a copy of the guest list see the untitled
memorandum, ca. February 1904, Series 13H, Reel 450, Theodore Roosevelt Papers,
Presidential Papers Microfilm, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. Theodore
Roosevelt’s daughter’s brief account of the launching and the visit of the Kaiser’s brother
to the United States can be found in Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours:
Reminiscences of Alice Roosevelt Longworth (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1934), pp. 48-9.
117
to the Department of State concerning alleged German designs on the Galapagos Islands
and Haiti, acquisitions that would threaten American dominance in the Caribbean and the
safety of the Panama Canal nearing completion. American periodicals expressed similar
concerns. For example, writing in 1909, Amos S. Hershey, a political science professor
from the University of Indiana, urged the creation of an Anglo-American alliance to
counter the German menace to American security, economic interests, and world peace.
Career diplomat Lewis Einstein was among the group of writers who emphasized the
importance of friendly ties with Britain and the danger represented by German naval
supremacy. Einstein predicted that German victory in a future war with Britain would
undermine United States economic and diplomatic interests in both the Caribbean and the
Far East.9
In contrast to the growing distrust and unease that marked American attitudes toward
Germany, attitudes toward France improved in the years immediately preceding the
outbreak of the Great War. One man, French ambassador Jean Adrien Antoine Jules
Jusserand, was particularly active and influential. Fully accepted in the United States,
Jusserand was a unique figure in American diplomatic history. Long serving, he first
presented his credentials in Washington, D.C. in February 1903 and was only recalled
over twenty-one years later. No stranger to American society, his wife, Mme. Elise
Jusserand, had been born in France of Bostonian parents. Furthermore, after arriving in
Washington, D.C., he quickly developed a close relationship with President Theodore
Roosevelt. That relationship, strengthened by frequent, strenuous walks with the
president in Rock Creek Park, resulted in his inclusion in Roosevelt’s “tennis cabinet.”
9
Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 10-13.
118
Jusserand effectively influenced Roosevelt’s ideas, especially those concerning France
and Germany, and it is revealing that Jusserand is said to have persuaded Roosevelt to
read Chanson de Roland rather than the Nibelungenlied. The French diplomat also
appealed to Roosevelt as a historian. Jusserand, like Roosevelt, became president of the
American Historical Society, the only non-American ever to do so, and in 1917, he won
the Pulitzer Prize in history.10
The amicable relations established between Jusserand and Theodore Roosevelt ushered
in a period of increasingly favorable attitudes toward France on the part of the United
States. In 1911, President William H. Taft pressed for arbitration treaties with both
France and Britain. By March 1912, although the Senate had watered down the treaties
and Taft refused to ratify them, in the American press it seemed that France had
undergone a fundamental transformation since the Agadir incident the previous year. The
editors of The New York Times declared that France “has obviously awakened now,
recovered from its disabilities, and prepared to fulfill its duties in the world of
progress.”11
The divisions that had apparently led to the French defeat during the Franco-Prussian
War and had persisted for forty years in French politics and society seemed healed.
American correspondents in Paris reported a “wave of buoyant optimism which is
sweeping over the country.” That optimism manifested itself in patriotic signs and
gestures, in support for the French army, in greater emphasis on “orderliness and self-
10
Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycraft, Twentieth Century Authors: A Biographical
Dictionary of Modern Literature (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942), pp. 739-40.
11
“The Awakening in France,” The New York Times, March 24, 1912, p. 14; Thomas A.
Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth edition (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 540-1.
119
discipline,” and in a strong campaign against immorality. The failure of a general strike
in the coal industry, hopeful observers suggested, was further evidence that “even the
Socialists are falling into line” with a popular patriotic movement. According to the
report from Paris, the movement resulted in a fundamental transformation in French
society and accounted for “great improvement in the national physique and a
modification of certain traits in the French character.”12
The American press argued that the “new France” that they were seeing in 1912 sprang
from the deep-seated aspirations of the French people. What the writers described was a
phenomenon that their progressive readers in the United States would have immediately
recognized. The New York Times reported that it appeared to “attentive observers” that
France was “at the beginning of one of those periods of moral and material renaissance
from the depths of the people, and not from elsewhere." The enthusiastic patriotism in
France reportedly represented the desires of the French people and was “too
spontaneous” to have been the product of inspiration or manipulation by “the
Bonapartists, with the considerable amount of private influence they have and the
newspapers they control.” Indeed, the military impulse in France, Americans reported,
was wholly unlike that existing in Germany. Progressive rather than autocratic, French
“democracy is a military one, for defensive, not offensive, measures.” Suggesting the
sharp contrast between the Prussianized German war machine and the French military,
writers explained that the enthusiasm of the French people for their army reflected the
12
“France Reborn in Patriotism,” The New York Times, March 24, 1912, p. 2C.
120
fact that the French army “is the only one that exists at present in Europe created in
perfect liberty.”13
In retrospect it is clear that the nationalist revival in France after 1912 was not the
manifestation of broad popular support that Americans perceived. American progressives
tended see events as being part of a dichotomy. The logical extension of that view was
that if the patriotic movement in France was not a reflection of popular will then it must
be a product of the conservative, reactionary, anti-democratic interests: Bonapartists,
Royalists, and the clergy. The nationalist revival in France, however, was neither. It was
largely a product of the efforts of a small group of conservative Republican politicians,
journalists, and the military. The key figure in that group was Raymond Poincaré, an
aloof but successful lawyer from Lorraine. Troubled by what he perceived as a distinct
lack of patriotism, Poincaré, as prime minister in 1912 and president of the Republic the
following year, deliberately set out to make nationalism the dominant issue on the
political agenda. He did so not only because he was conscious of the growing danger of
war with Germany but also to further his own political cause as well. Under Poincaré’s
leadership, the conservative Republicans hoped to break up the political power of the
Left, the Radical-Socialist bloc, and replace it with a Center-Right bloc that could contain
the threat posed to the Republic by the extremists on the Right.14
Notwithstanding the actual situation in France, many prominent Americans accepted
the reports that France was undergoing a popular rejuvenation and did their best to
13
“Awakened France Feels Her Strength,” The New York Times, March 31, 1912, part
III, p. 1.
14
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992), pp. 36-8.
121
encourage the progressive transition that they perceived. In New York City, diplomat
Henry White served as the toastmaster at a dinner commemorating the 125th anniversary
of the treaty of alliance between France and the American colonies and celebrating
negotiations for Taft’s proposed Franco-American arbitration treaty. In addition to
Ambassador Jusserand, those in attendance included former Senator Chauncey M.
Depew, Attorney General George W. Wickersham, and the mayor of New York City. At
the dinner, the mayor expressed surprise “that there were so many Franco-American
philanthropic organizations in existence.” The entire crowd of two hundred applauded
after White stated “that there could never be a war between the United States and
France.”15
At the time, the number of Franco-American societies in New York alone was
growing. Among the societies there was the Alliance Française. Organized by a special
act of the New York State legislature, a legislature that included Franklin Roosevelt, the
membership of the Alliance Française included financiers J. Pierpont Morgan and
Andrew Carnegie, former senator Depew, and members of the faculty at Columbia
University.16 In October 1912, the New York Supreme Court also approved the
incorporation of the Franco-American Committee, an organization created “to develop
and strengthen relations of all kinds between France and this country.” The directors of
the new committee included Henry White and J. P. Morgan, Jr. but also a group of
15
“French Diners Cheer For Peace Treaties,” The New York Times, February 7, 1912, p.
6. Depew, born in Peekskill on the Hudson in 1834, had been a railroad president, state
assemblyman during the Civil War, and U.S. senator. Depew was the principal speaker at
the unveiling of the Statue of Liberty. National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol.
23 (New York: James T. White and Company, 1933), pp. 96-7.
16
“Prof. Jordan Decorated,” The New York Times, September 27, 1912, p. 7.
122
philanthropists and financiers prominent in Franklin Roosevelt’s world: Henry Van
Dyke, W. K. Vanderbilt, A. Barton Hepburn, and George Foster Peabody.17
With the directors that it possessed, the formation of the Franco-American Committee
could not have escaped Franklin Roosevelt’s attention and interest. Like Roosevelt,
Henry Van Dyke was the scion of a proud colonial Dutch family and the son of a New
York railroad president and financier.18 W. K. Vanderbilt, whose brother lived up the
road from Hyde Park, was director of the Metropolitan Opera Company, a horse racing
and yachting enthusiast, and a generous contributor to Columbia and Vanderbilt
Universities and the American hospital in Neuilly. Several years later, Vanderbilt
founded and funded the Lafayette Escadrille, a group of American volunteers who flew
for France prior to United States entry into the Great War.19 New York City banker and
philanthropist A. Barton Hepburn was a scholarly writer on financial and economic
subjects and an active member of the chamber of commerce.20 George Foster Peabody,
another financier and philanthropist, had served as the chairman of the Democratic
National Committee and was chairman of the first New York State Conservation
Commission between 1910 and 1915. During that time he became a close friend of
Franklin Roosevelt, who chaired the State Forest, Fish and Game Committee. After
refusing several of Woodrow Wilson’s nominations, in 1916, Peabody became the vice
chairman of New York City’s Federal Reserve Bank. A Georgian by birth, is was
17
“A New Bond With France,” The New York Times, October 25, 1912, p. 12.
18
National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 23, p. 113.
19
National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 30 (New York: James T. White
and Company, 1943), pp. 15-6.
20
National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 23, pp. 100-1.
123
Peabody in 1924 who urged Roosevelt to try the therapeutic waters of Warm Springs,
Georgia, and he was active in promoting the Warm Springs Foundation until to his death
in 1938.21
The election of Woodrow Wilson in November 1912 did not arrest the growing affinity
that influential Americans had for France. Although a Republican appointee, Ambassador
Myron T. Herrick in Paris offered his assurance that Wilson’s election “will have no
effect on the foreign policy or the economic relations of America with France, which
make of her almost a sister nation.”22 The Paris press, however, was less restrained than
Herrick. Le Temps, “voicing the unanimous sentiments of France,” declared, “A man of
great worth has been elected to preside over the destinies of a great nation.”23 In light of
the fact that the French press had been so critical of Theodore Roosevelt only a few years
earlier, the comments of the French press in late 1912 must have further confirmed in the
minds of many Americans the extent of the progressive awakening in France.
During the first week in office in March 1913, President Woodrow Wilson and his
cabinet unanimously agreed to the need for a public statement outlining the essence of the
administration’s foreign policy. In what Secretary Daniels considered a “singularly clear
and impressive declaration,” Wilson announced, “We can have no sympathy with those
who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or
21
National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 27 (New York: James T. White
and Company, 1939), pp. 64-5.
22
“Herrick Hedges,” The New York Times, November 7, 1912, p. 7.
23
“Wilson Of Great Worth: Temps Thus Calls Victor,” The New York Times,
November 7, 1912, p. 7.
124
ambition.”24 Applying that formulation to Europe, it seems evident that members of the
Wilson administration perceived a clear distinction between the autocratic oligarchy in
power in Germany and a progressive, patriotic, and republican France. That attitude
formed the basis of the administration’s critical view of Imperial Germany and its
favorable, sympathetic reception of the French Republic.
II.
After arriving in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1913, Franklin and Eleanor
Roosevelt quickly developed a close, personal relationship with key figures in the British
and French embassies. Cousin Theodore Roosevelt’s friendships facilitated the process.
The elder Roosevelt’s circle of friends in the capital included Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, a
former secretary in the embassy in Washington, D.C. who returned as ambassador from
Great Britain in 1913, and the long-serving French ambassador, Jules J. Jusserand.25 Both
embassies made Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt welcome. In addition to their contacts
with the ambassadors and their wives, she recalled that “we did get to know a great
number of the younger members of the embassy staff quite well, and with some of them
we have always kept in touch.” Eleanor Roosevelt and Marie de Laboulaye, the wife of
24
Entry for March 11, 1913 in Josephus Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, 1913-1921, edited by E. David Cronon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 67.
25
pp. 234-6, 263-4. The fact that the Roosevelt’s moved into the house of Theodore
Roosevelt’s sister, Mrs. William Sheffield Cowles or Auntie Bye, on N Street probably
helped.
125
the second secretary of the French embassy, “became great friends.”26 What developed
was a unique working and social relationship between the Roosevelt family and the two
diplomatic missions. For example, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt’s children took
dancing lessons at the British embassy sponsored by Lady Spring-Rice, and games of
field hockey and baseball organized by Franklin Roosevelt mixed members of the British
embassy, such as future British ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay, with the Roosevelt
children and their friends.27 On a more formal level, it was not uncommon for Franklin
Roosevelt to dine with the British ambassador, and every Friday Eleanor Roosevelt called
on the wives of diplomats.28 When Sara Delano Roosevelt visited Washington, she made
a point of calling at the British and French embassies.29
The events of 1914 served to reinforce favorable attitudes toward France and suspicion
of Germany in the United States and directly affected how Americans viewed the
outbreak of war in Europe that August. On Independence Day, 1914, while newspaper
columns debated the assassination of an Austrian archduke that had taken place in
Sarajevo a week earlier, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan announced that “the
finishing touches” had been applied to an arbitration treaty between the United States and
26
pp. 263, 236. Other friends included Sir Arthur and Lady Willert, then a correspondent
for the London Times, the future Lady Vansittart, and Aurthur Murray.
27
James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of A
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 72, 69.
28
See for example Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, undated early
1915, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1948), p. 267; [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1937), p. 209.
29
See, for example, entry for May 4, 1918, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Diaries 1912-
1922, Box 68, Papers of Sara Delano Roosevelt, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
126
its sister republic, France. Bryan commented that the so-called French peace treaty would
soon be transmitted to the Senate along with a similar Anglo-American treaty.30
Ultimately, the existence of those conciliation treaties with France and Britain, and the
absence of a similar agreement with Imperial Germany, had some bearing on sympathy in
the United States, and especially within the Wilson administration, for the Allied cause.31
In late August 1914, the first month of the Great War in Europe, in a full page
interview in the New York Times, the German ambassador to the United States expressed
his regret for what he identified as “a general American hostility toward Germany.”
Hoping to counter American attitudes, Count Johann von Bernstorff commented, “I
cannot too strongly emphasize the error of the view which seems so general here—the
view that Germany, gone mad with lust for power and gain, has declared war on the
world.” Suggesting that people in the United States had only received a slanted British
view of the war after Britain cut the transatlantic cable, the ambassador argued that
Germany’s aims were entirely defensive and that the sympathy of the American people
should be with Germany.32 Eleanor Roosevelt assessed the German ambassador’s appeal
as a failure in a letter to a former schoolmate from Germany. She observed, “I think
Count Bernstorff has been unfortunate in talking too much at first” and that “he has
30
“French Treaty Ready,” The New York Times, July 4, 1914, p. 6.
31
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth edition
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 546.
32
Edward Marshall, “Count Von Bernsdorff Gives Germany’s Point of View,” The New
York Times, August 30, 1914, section IV, p. 1.
127
alienated many who felt he was trying to appeal to the popular sympathy over the heads
of the [U. S.] Government.”33
The letters to the editor following the German ambassador’s appeal likewise showed
little acceptance of von Bernstorff’s reasoning. Citing the German bombing of “the
sleeping women and children of Antwerp,” one reader rejected the characterization of
German aims as defensive. He countered, “Germany[,] in the lust of success[,] slays the
innocent and the defenseless.” Another found no “proof of German friendship for
America” that von Bernstorff had lauded. He instead recalled the aggressive action of the
German Asiatic Squadron against Admiral George Dewey in Manila Bay and the German
arms flowing to the antagonistic Huerta government in Mexico. The writer recounted in
detail a version of the events of April 1914 off Vera Cruz when nineteen Americans died
attempting to prevent a German merchant ship from unloading its cargo of guns and
ammunition. Although United States action had prevented the cargo from being landed at
Vera Cruz, the German ship, which the reader argued “had been taken over by the
Government in Berlin,” was able to land its deadly cargo in another port following the
diplomatic intervention of Argentina, Brazil, and Chili.34
The association of Germany with the Victoriano Huerta government in Mexico
strengthened Woodrow Wilson’s suspicions of German intentions. Huerta having come
to power in a coup, President Wilson had likened the regime in Mexico to a group of
cold-blooded murderers, and he withheld diplomatic recognition of the Huerta
33
Eleanor Roosevelt to Carola von Passavant, May 14, 1915, quoted in Lash, Eleanor
and Franklin, pp. 203-4.
34
“Victims and Victors” and “Germany’s Friendship,” The New York Times, August
31, 1914, p. 6.
128
government on the progressive grounds that it did not represent the Mexican people. “My
ideal,” Wilson confided, “is for an orderly and righteous government in Mexico; but my
passion is for the submerged eighty-five per cent of the people of that Republic who are
now struggling toward liberty.”35 Certainly, overt German assistance for Huerta further
convinced Wilson that the government in Berlin pursued anti-democratic aims that
reflected neither the wishes of the Mexican people nor those of the German people.
To Wilson’s ambassador in Berlin, the domination of Prussian autocracy in Germany
seemed complete before the outbreak of war in 1914. Arriving in Germany in 1913,
James W. Gerard, observed, “Prussia, which has imposed its will, as well as its methods
of thought and life on all the rest of Germany, is undoubtedly a military nation.” The
power in Imperial Germany, according to Gerard, rested not only in the officer corps and
the Prussian military system but also in “the class of nobles in Prussia who owns the
army.” Gerard likened the selection process for German officers to an exclusive club
where the members, in that case all of the officers of a particular regiment, had the power
to “black-ball” officer candidates. He observed that in practice the system essentially
reserved admission to the ranks of professional officers to the nobility. Although Gerard
perceived the existence of antagonism in German society between those professional
military officers and the civilian population, he emphasized the general reluctance of
civilians to protest the arrogant behavior of Prussian officers and their complete
submission to “the devils of autocracy and of war.” Furthermore, from his perspective,
the intentions of those “advocates of the old military system of Germany” were not
35
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth edition
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 555.
129
peaceful, having already decided between December 1913 and May 1914 “in favor of a
European war.”36
From the progressive point of view, people either abdicated power because they had
relaxed their vigilance, or their power was taken away from them by plotting, corrupt
“interests.”37 Furthermore, because progressives feared that the “interests” would
conspire to consolidate and expand their economic and political power, thereby
establishing virtual monopolies, they tended to view the aspirations of Imperial Germany
in a similar manner. Consistent with that formulation, Ambassador Gerard believed that
“fear” of their neighbors had actuated “the mass of Germans” prior to 1914, allowing
them to be dominated by a military autocracy owned by “the class of nobles in Prussia.”38
The American ambassador believed the ambitions of the Prussian upper class to be
insatiable. Gerard observed that the Prussian autocracy promised the German people a
war that would bring “not only security but riches untold and the dominion of the
world.”39
The progressive American perspective was that Germany represented an economic
threat to world commerce. Since the 1890s, Germany had made major encroachments on
the foreign trade of other countries, particularly Britain. It seemed as though Germany’s
“industrial armies were going to occupy the broad fields of international commerce with
the same restless energy with which her battalions marched from Saarbruck[en] to Sedan
36
James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917),
pp. ix, 59-61, 70.
37
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 202-3.
38
Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, p. 59.
39
Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, p. ix.
130
a quarter of a century ago.”40 In 1919 Woodrow Wilson surmised, “If Germany had
waited a single generation, she would have had a commercial empire of the world.”41
Although the United States had hoped to remain neutral in the World War, the Wilson
administration perceived German commercial gains as a distinct threat. In early 1917,
Secretary Daniels warned that German efforts to control trade “by unfair and
monopolistic methods” would force the countries of the world to stand together in self-
defense.42
To many progressives, however, Germany also posed a military as well as an
economic threat to the United States. German economic expansion, many surmised, not
only laid the foundation for future political influence but also for possible military
intervention. Observers in the United States believed the military staffs of Imperial
Germany had possessed plans for war with the United States for years. Assessing in 1887
“what is known of the methods of administration” in Germany, James Russell Soley in
the Navy Department surmised,
that the General Staff of the German Admiralty…have a plan of

operations with the details of the campaign already prepared, carefully
modified in accordance with every variation for the better or the worse in
our effective force, and ready to be put in operation at a few hours
notice.43
40
“The Secrets of Germany’s Industrial Success,” Scientific American, vol. LXXV, no.
13 (September 26, 1896), p. 246.
41
Woodrow Wilson address in Rome, January 4, 1919 in Woodrow Wilson, International
Ideals: Speeches and Addresses made during the President’s European Visit, December
14, 1918, to February 14, 1919 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919), p. 59.
42
Entry for February 27, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp.
100-1.
43
James Russell Soley, “Our Naval Policy—A Lesson From 1861,” Scribner’s
Magazine, vol. 1, number 2, February 1997, pp. 224-5.
131
Apparently, similar views persisted in the Navy and War Departments. In 1909-1910, the
War Department drafted plans for defeating a German attack and portrayed German
economic expansion in Latin America and the Far East as well-planned moves that would
produce war.44 The contemporary view was that German economic penetration provided
a foundation for future political, and ultimately military, hegemony.
From the very first stages of the Great War in Europe, Franklin Roosevelt and his
family favored Britain and France. On August 2, 1914, the day before Germany declared
war on France, and two days before German armies crossed the Belgian frontier and
Britain declared war on Germany, Roosevelt stated his preference for the outcome of the
war. He noted, “Rather than a long drawn-out struggle I hope England will join in and
with France and Russia force peace at Berlin!”45 Five days later, he added, “Everybody
here feels that this country as a whole sympathizes with the allies against Germany.”46 At
home, Eleanor Roosevelt comforted her English and French domestic servants whose
relatives in Europe had been called into military service.47
Given the close relationship between the Roosevelts and the British embassy in
Washington, D.C., Franklin Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for the British cause is not
surprising. Roosevelt’s background further strengthened his affinity with Britain. Raised
a staunch Episcopalian by parents who befriended English gentry during their visits to
44
Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-
1920 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 11.
45
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 2, 1914, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 246.
46
47
132
Europe, Roosevelt’s extended kinship network of cousins stretched into Britain. In his
immediate family, Eleanor Roosevelt had gone to school in England, and her father’s
older sister Anna, Auntie Bye, had lived in London as hostess for Franklin’s half-brother
James Roosevelt Roosevelt, the widowed first secretary of the U.S. embassy, when she
met and married the American naval attaché there. James R. Roosevelt later remarried
and lived in retirement with “his enchanting English second wife” as Sara Delano
Roosevelt’s Hyde Park neighbor.48
While not as deeply rooted as their family ties with Britain, the Roosevelts displayed
solid sympathy for France after 1914. To a certain extent, that sympathy derived from the
fact that France was a British ally. On a more basic level, in 1914 Franklin Roosevelt had
several Howland and Forbes relatives living in Paris. Family support for France,
however, was by no means a foregone conclusion. For instance, Sara Delano Roosevelt
described her sympathies during the Franco-Prussian War as having been “thoroughly
German.” In contrast, she recalled that at the time her father “was absolutely French.”
After 1914, however, she found no such differences of opinion in the family. By then, she
had come to share her father’s enthusiasm for the French cause and thought that everyone
else in the United States did so as well between 1914 and 1918.49
France, it seemed to the Roosevelts, possessed a new vitality in 1914 that the nation
had lacked in the Franco-Prussian War. Clearly, the Roosevelts accepted the notion of a
48
pp. 115, 234; Joseph Alsop, FDR, 1882-1945: A Centenary Remembrance (New York:
Viking Press, 1982), pp. 31, 40.
49
Sara Delano Roosevelt Memorandum, July 24, 1931, p. 10, Delano I, Genealogy,
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers,
FDRL.
133
spirit of popular patriotism motivating French actions. Franklin Roosevelt’s aunt, Dora
Delano Forbes, a resident of Paris, expressed admiration for the French fighting spirit and
the “sacred union” proclaimed by President Poincaré. In a letter to her nephew written
one month after the outbreak of the war, she related that “it is wonderful to see the
French[,] their current quiet patriotism united and with no factions now.”50 In April 1915,
she wrote again following her visit to a French military hospital. She found that “it was
distressing and pitiful to see the wounded and suffering, so many head and face and eye
wounds. Great portions shot-away forever—It brings the horror very near[,] but there is
not ‘a word’ of complaint[,] all want to get well to go back and fight again—”51
Although President Wilson had asked Americans to remain neutral in the European
War, Roosevelt’s ties to the British cause and sympathy for France made him
apprehensive that he would be able to comply with the president’s request. One night
while dining with Ambassador Spring-Rice, Roosevelt realized that the German
ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, was sitting at the next table. From the perspective of
members of the administration, Bernstorff was “an affable though dangerous antagonist.”
State Department counselor and Secretary of State Robert Lansing recalled, “I felt that it
was always necessary to be on my guard in talking with him and to be extremely cautious
in whatever I said because I knew that he would take advantage of the least slip of the
50
Dora Delano Forbes letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 3, 1914, Box 17,
Folder 16 “Forbes, Dora Delano. 1892-1940,” Correspondence: Family Members,
Roosevelt Family Papers Donated by the Children, FDRL.
51
Dora Delano Forbes letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, April 15, 1915, Box 17, Folder
16 “Forbes, Dora Delano. 1892-1940,” Correspondence: Family Members, Roosevelt
Family Papers Donated by the Children, FDRL.
134
tongue and utilize it later.”52 After the dinner Roosevelt commented, “I just know I shall
do some awful unneutral thing before I get through!”53
The widespread belief among progressives that Germany had aggressive designs in the
western hemisphere made it difficult for them to be objective about United States
neutrality despite Wilson’s appeal. Following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914,
Theodore Roosevelt believed that “the German General Staff has carefully considered the
question of hostilities with America” and suggested that their plans called for “the seizure
of some of our great coast cities and the terrorization of those cities.”54 Kinsman Franklin
Roosevelt harbored similar fears of German aspirations in August 1914. Anxious about
German naval activity and subversion, Franklin Roosevelt appraised, “The Germans may
be doing more than we suspect.”55 His wife Eleanor recalled the reports of German
submarines along the coast and of one having landed its officers, and Sara Delano
Roosevelt relayed that “the big gray building of the German Brothers across the river
from Hyde Park (North of it) is full of ammunition.”56
President Wilson not only feared that “something might happen on the high seas,” he
also believed that German subversives were hard at work in the Western Hemisphere.
52
Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1935; repr. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 356.
53
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, undated early 1915, F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 267
54
Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1915), pp. 119-20.
55
56
p. 242; Sara Delano Roosevelt letter quoted in Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 203.
135
Wilson observed that German propagandists were in Mexico “fomenting strife and
trouble between our countries.”57 Recalling the mood in Washington, D.C. in 1916,
Eleanor Roosevelt reflected that “there was a sense of impending disaster hanging over
all of us.”58
As the war in Europe continued, members of the Wilson administration began to fear
increasingly widespread subversion by the Central Powers in the United States. In mid
1915, Wilson authorized the U.S. Navy to take over the operation of two German-owned
radio transmitting stations in New Jersey and on Long Island.59 At the same time,
evidence received by the State Department from British sources implicated the Austro-
Hungarian and German diplomatic missions in the United States with spying and
fomenting strikes, forcing the recall of Ambassador Constantin Dumba and Germany’s
military attachés.60 Lansing believed that von Bernstorff, “a dangerous man” who
“required constant watching,” was responsible for “handling various propaganda and
activities launched by German agents in this country” but “was too clever to leave any
proofs of his share in them.”61 Ambassador Jusserand warned Franklin Roosevelt in 1915
that because German subversion was “certainly even worse than the public knows, too
57
Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), pp. 159, 186.
58
p. 242.
59
Entry for June 28, 1915 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp. 100-
1.
60
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), pp. 582-3.
61
Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, pp. 357-8.
136
many precautions can not be taken.”62 In a cabinet meeting in early 1917, Wilson
expressed his concern about German “plots” in Cuba and related a story from
Ambassador Gerard. According to Wilson, the German foreign secretary, Gottlieb von
Jagow, told Gerard that in the event that the United States entered the war against
Germany that it would “find that there are 500,000 German reservists ready to take up
arms for [their] mother country & you will have civil war.”63 Wilson also surmised that
Germany might find a pretext to seize a naval base in Cuba as a “most convenient” base
for submarines to operate against the United States.64 Later that year, following United
States entry into the war, Wilson publicly accused Germany of having designs on the
Americas and asserted that “their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our
very territory away from us.”65
One product of the progressive American viewpoint was the increasing perception of
the war in Europe as the struggle between two incompatible political philosophies. The
logical extension of such a view was the belief that there could be no neutrals in modern,
industrial struggles in the future. From early in the war, Theodore Roosevelt believed that
62
J. J. Jusserand to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 6, 1915, “Jusserand, J.J.”,
Correspondence, Personal Files, Box 51, Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
1913-20, FDRL.
63
Entry for February 27, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
106.
64
Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, February 6, 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, vol. 1, The World War:
Period of American Neutrality (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1939), p. 594.
65
Woodrow Wilson message to Congress, December 4, 1917, U.S. Department of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1926), p. xvi.
137
the war in Europe represented a political struggle with moral implications. He asserted
that “if one side was right this country must throw its strength on the side which was
right.” His niece recalled that “a neutral position was a difficult position for him to hold
for any length of time.”66
Increasingly, Woodrow Wilson also viewed the war as a global struggle between
competing and diametrically opposed ideologies rather than as a military contest between
European states. Although he had urged the American people to remain neutral, German
treatment of Belgium “stirred his passionate indignation” and by 1916 Wilson seems to
have chosen sides in favor of the Allies.67 Rather than a war between states and alliance
systems, immediately after the Great War, Wilson portrayed the conflict as
a war between systems of culture—the one system the aggressive system,

using science without conscience, stripping learning of its moral restraints,
and using every faculty of the human mind to do wrong to the whole race;
the other system reminiscent of the high traditions of men . . . struggling
toward the right and seeking above all things else to be free.68
To American progressives the war in Europe took on Darwinian significance as a
struggle between nations and ideologies. Franklin Roosevelt viewed military instruments
of power only effective if they reflected national will and determination. He argued “that
money[,] in spite of what the bankers say[,] is not an essential to the conduct of a war by
66
p. 231.
67
Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, p. 186; Woodrow Wilson’s comments at
the municipal building, Turin, Italy, January 6, 1919 in Woodrow Wilson, International
Ideals: Speeches and Addresses made during the President’s European Visit, December
14, 1918, to February 14, 1919 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919), pp. 84-5.
68
Woodrow Wilson Sorbonne speech, December 21, 1918 in International Ideals, p. 17.
138
a determined nation.”69 From his perspective, a determined people would always be “able
to find money with which to carry on war.”70 The implication of his viewpoint was that
the military power of governments that did not have the backing of their people would be
fragile. Such governments would be unable to sustain a war against a resolute,
democratic opponent.
III.
Franklin D. Roosevelt arrived in Washington in March 1913 to begin his duties as the
assistant secretary of the navy. During the 1912 presidential campaign, Roosevelt had
actively supported Woodrow Wilson’s election bid and impressed party leaders as being
“a singularly attractive and honorable courageous young Democratic leader.”71 Prior to
Wilson’s inauguration, Roosevelt had made it known that if asked to serve in the new
administration that he preferred the post in the navy department that his distinguished
cousin had held previously.72 For Roosevelt, however, the position of assistant secretary
69
Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 239-40.
70
p. 215.
71
Entry for March 6, 1913 in Josephus Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, 1913-1921, edited by E. David Cronon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 4.
72
Entry for March 15, 1913 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 10.
Prior to the nomination of Franklin Roosevelt as the assistant secretary of the navy,
Daniels checked with the senators from New York State to see if he would be acceptable.
Republican Senator Elihu Root cautioned Daniels that Theodore Roosevelt’s “fifth cousin
(once removed in political affiliation) might have T.R. qualities” namely an insistence
“about being the lead horse in any team.” Root observed, “Whenever a Roosevelt rides,
139
was not an end in itself. Roosevelt entered the administration imbued with the
progressive spirit, displaying the drive and enthusiasm to accomplish “great work . . . for
the public good.”73
From the onset, the members of the Wilson administration had lofty ambitions. They
were, according to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, “sincerely desirous of
promoting the peace of the world and to that end they were prepared to lead or inaugurate
movements that will result in hastening the day when war shall be ended.”74 That is not to
say, however, that the administration either ruled out the United States going to war or
rejected any use of American military power. Early in his administration, Wilson
delineated his position with respect to war, refusing to totally reject war as an instrument
of national policy. He emphasized, “We must not have war except in an honorable
way.”75
Military preparedness directly supported the administration’s foreign policy goals, and
Franklin Roosevelt quickly became one of the administration’s most consistent advocates
for military preparedness. Roosevelt’s primary concern during the summer of 1914 was
the readiness of the United States navy for war. Although Roosevelt expected German
intrigue and subversion in the western hemisphere, he did not believe that the German
military posed as much of a direct threat to the United States as the Japanese navy did.
he wishes to ride in front.” Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace—1910-
1917 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p.
127.
73
Entry for March 9, 1913 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp. 5-6.
74
Entry for April 8, 1913 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 26.
75
Entry for May 16, 1913 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 66.
140
Nevertheless, he did not want to take any chances. As the European capitals declared war
in 1914, he confided to his wife that “it is my duty to keep the Navy in a position where
no chances, even the most remote, are taken.”76
To counter the “political and sectional” pressures to divide the fleet between the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in the summer and fall of 1914, Roosevelt enlisted the
assistance of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt. Answering his
nephew’s request for articles, Theodore Roosevelt replied, “All right! I will do that. I will
get at it as soon as possible.”77 Franklin Roosevelt confided to Mahan, “I wish it were
possible to speak quite frankly, and in public, about the excess of our danger in the
Pacific over that in the Atlantic.”78 Mahan complied with Roosevelt’s request, preparing
an article for North American Review and providing an interview with the Saturday
Evening Post. With the outbreak of war, Mahan warned the assistant secretary that “the
war fever is extremely contagious” and advised, “I venture to submit that the fleet should
be brought into immediate readiness, and so disposed as to permit of very rapid
concentration, ready to proceed when desired.”79
76
Franklin D Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 2, 1914, F.D.R.: His Personal
77
Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 23, 1914, Elting E. Morison, ed.,
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 7, The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1914
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 779.
78
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Alfred T. Mahan, May 28, 1914 and July 17, 1914,
Correspondence Box 53, “Mahan, Alfred T.,” Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
79
Alfred T. Mahan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 31 and August 3, 1914,
Correspondence Box 53, “Mahan, Alfred T.,” Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
141
Mahan’s attitudes toward the belligerent powers mirrored Roosevelt’s own thinking.
“As I see it,” Mahan confessed during the first week of the war, “all our interests favor
British success.” Two weeks later, Mahan wrote to Roosevelt again because, Mahan
admitted, he knew “no one else in the Administration to whom I should care to write.”
The admiral offered, “My own sympathies have been strongly against Germany, because
I have believed her definitely the state responsible for the general war.” He added,
however, that he loved “fair play” and detected “disingenuousness” in the Japanese
actions in the Pacific.80
In addition to the clamor to split the fleet, in early 1915 domestic pressures to cut the
federal budget threatened the level of military readiness that Roosevelt sought. In
response to those pressures, President Wilson considered cutting at least one battleship
from the navy and reducing the budget of the War Department to five million dollars.81 In
that climate, military expansion seemed unlikely at best. Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels recalled that “at first against odds” he and his assistant secretary labored to attain
the goal of their three-year program of 1915, to have the strongest navy in the world. Of
Roosevelt, Daniels observed, “There was nothing in naval efficiency that did not
command his interest.”82
The budget threat to his preparedness program in 1915 forced Franklin Roosevelt to
elaborate clearly and to present his ideas about military, particularly naval and aeronautic,
80
Alfred T. Mahan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 4 and 18, 1914, Correspondence
Box 53, “Mahan, Alfred T.,” Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
81
Entry for January 22, 1915 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 91.
82
Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace—1910-1917 (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 129.
142
preparedness. He responded to the situation in a distinctly progressive manner by taking
the issue to the people. Admiral Mahan having passed away in the fall of 1914, Roosevelt
wrote a series of articles between 1915 and the spring of 1917. Writings by his kinsman
Theodore Roosevelt once again lent credence to his views. The intent of the articles was
to protect the existing size of the U.S. Navy and also generate support for further
increases in tonnage. In his first article, Franklin Roosevelt appealed to the “people of the
country [who] are beginning to take an intelligent interest in a reasonable preparation
against any sudden or unwarranted attack.” Although he considered the battleship “the
backbone of a fleet,” he argued for the creation of a balanced force that also included
scouting vessels, aircraft, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and supply ships. Roosevelt
warned that the United States was “far behind other nations,” particularly in scout vessels
and aircraft. To highlight that deficiency and the danger that it posed to the United States,
he noted that during a recent war game held by the navy, an “attacking fleet,” by
implication the German Imperial Navy, eluded the defending naval force and made a
successful landing in the Chesapeake Bay.83
Theodore Roosevelt took a similar tack in an article intended to sway “our
congressmen and, above all, our people,” arguing that with the U.S. Navy there had been
“a great falling off relatively to other nations” under the Wilson administration. He too
advocated a balanced fleet, built over the next two to three years that included not only
“cruisers and great fighting craft” but also submarines, destroyers, and “air-ships.” He
asserted, “The navy of the United States is the right arm of the United States and is
83
Franklin D. Roosevelt article, “War at Sea and its Weapons,” published September 27,
1915, Writing and Statement File, Box 40, Folder 5, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family,
Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
143
emphatically the peacemaker.” After citing the efficiency of German cruiser and
submarine operations during the first year of the war, Theodore Roosevelt expressed his
opinion that army forts constituted an ineffective defense and that the navy was not
prepared to accomplish the offensive operations vital for the defense of the continental
United States.84
In the articles that followed, Franklin Roosevelt and his kinsman pursued three
consistent themes that built upon their initial arguments. The first was the primacy of the
navy. Taking a cue from the former president’s article, Franklin Roosevelt commented
that “the average citizen has come to realize that the primary safety of the nation rests
with the Navy.”85 He further declared the army’s system of coastal defenses to be
inadequate and asserted that the “country need have nothing to fear” if the navy is
equipped in the correct proportions.86 In addition, Theodore Roosevelt added that the first
step necessary to mitigate disaster and prevent future wartime disgrace would be for the
United States to “immediately strengthen its navy and provide for its steady training.”87
His perspective, shared by his younger “cousin,” was that military preparedness served
84
Theodore Roosevelt, “Our Peacemaker, The Navy,” in America and the World War
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915), pp. 164-7, 171, 173.
85
Franklin D. Roosevelt article, “Memorandum on the Relation of the Navy to the
Farmer,” September 7, 1916, Writing and Statement File, Box 40, Folder 5, Franklin D.
Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
86
Franklin D. Roosevelt article, undated, “Since the commencement of the Great War in
Europe . . . ,” Writing and Statement File, Box 40, Folder 5, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
87
Sons, 1915), p. xiv.
144
two purposes. It served both as “a partial insurance” to prevent the outbreak of war and as
“a partial guarantee that if war comes” the nation “will certainly escape dishonor.”88
Franklin Roosevelt’s second major theme was that “comprehensive and modern plans”
drawn up by professionals would correct the “dangerously weakened condition” of
American defenses.89 He asserted that men such as he “have lately realized . . . the short-
comings of our preparation.” Citing science and the “facts” of “the profession of war on
land and sea,” he claimed that it was imperative that “the aeronautic arms of the Army
and Navy be increased . . . a hundredfold.”90 Several months later, he propounded that
only “partisans or narrow-minded-specialists” would dispute his position on aeronautic
matters. As “the first practical step” toward progressive efficiency, he favored a program
of national defense based on “all the scientific knowledge of military experts.”91
Roosevelt further urged the American people to accept the scientific naval construction
program proposed by professionals and authorities such as himself, rather than give
credence to the speculations of laymen, the “cranks” as well as “well-meaning people”
who lack “sufficient knowledge,” about the needs of “scientific warfare.”92 In Theodore
88
Theodore Roosevelt, “Preparedness Against War,” in America and the World War, p.
174.
89
90
Franklin D. Roosevelt article, “For September [1915] Number of ‘Flying’,” Box 40,
Folder 6, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Businessand Personal Papers, FDRL.
91
Franklin D. Roosevelt article for “Aerial Age Weekly,” March 1916, Box 40, Folder 8,
92
Franklin D. Roosevelt article, undated, “Since the commencement of the Great War in
Europe . . . ,” Writing and Statement File, Box 40, Folder 5, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
145
Roosevelt’s writings, “incompetents” such as Secretary of State Bryan and Secretary of
the Navy Daniels received particular scorn. The former president predicted that their
actions like the actions of many political appointees before them, “the clergymen, college
president’s, editors, and humanitarians,” would result in military disaster. As a remedy,
he urged that Congress “summon before its committees the best naval experts and
provide the battleships, cruisers, submarines, floating mines, and aircraft that these
experts declare to be necessary for the full protection of the United States.”93 In private,
Franklin Roosevelt had expressed similar views about the secretaries of state and the
navy. He confided, “These dear good people like W.J.B. and J.D. have as much
conception of what a general European war means as Elliott has of higher
mathematics.”94
The third theme centered on the belief that naval service improved citizenship. Men
that enlisted in the navy, Franklin Roosevelt suggested, returned home “in every way
better citizens than when they went in -- physically stronger, mentally more alert, and in
general cleaner and finer specimens of American manhood.”95 His cousin Theodore
agreed. The former Rough Rider and president observed that military service provided
young men the opportunity to develop the habits that would enable them to efficiently
perform their “civic duties in a free democracy” and thereby “increase our social and
93
Theodore Roosevelt, “Preparedness Against War,” in America and the World War, pp.
182, 201-3, 206-8.
94
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 2, 1914, quoted in Lash,
Eleanor and Franklin, p. 202.
95
146
industrial efficiency.” Theodore Roosevelt noted, however, that the military service and
preparedness that he advocated was not “militarism” but efficiency for the well being of
the nation.96 Franklin Roosevelt made a similar distinction between militarism and
progressive efficiency, placing himself among the far-sighted men who advocated the
later course. For example, in an effort to preserve naval service and preparedness after the
Great War, he explained to an audience, “I’m not the least bit, as you know, of a
militarist, but I believe that we’ve got to tell the truth to the country—”97
Franklin Roosevelt’s advocacy of military preparedness in 1915, furthermore, taught
him the political significance of such an approach. By late 1915, switching from his
earlier position favoring reduction of the battleship fleet, Wilson began urging increases
in the army and navy, seeking support among Democrats for his policies toward the war
in Europe. No doubt, Theodore Roosevelt’s attacks against Wilson’s preparedness record
accounted for part of Wilson’s reversal from his previous stand. The position that Wilson
took, however, also allowed him to overcome Bryan’s influence in the Democratic Party.
Bryan had warned of the danger of military preparations, to which Wilson countered,
“We have in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only for defense.” Solely with the
preparedness issue, Wilson, by February 1916, had established primacy among the
Democrats, winning the support of all but two Democratic Senators and over three-
quarters of the Democrats in the House.98 Wilson had used the issue to place himself in a
96
Theodore Roosevelt, “Preparedness Against War,” in America and the World War, pp.
183, 210.
97
Franklin D. Roosevelt speech at St. Stephen’s Church, Lynn, Massachusetts, April 11,
1920, Master Speech File Number 118, FDRL.
98
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1983), pp. 297-9.
147
powerful position for the coming presidential campaign. His secretary recalled that by
“demanding preparedness,” Wilson “had cleverly outwitted his enemies,” namely “the
pacifists whose feelings had been nurtured by Bryan” and the Republican Party, to win a
resounding victory in the 1916 campaign.99
Franklin Roosevelt certainly recognized the significance of the election of 1916. In the
election, Wilson received nearly three million popular votes over his tally of 1912. The
campaign was also significant because it created a Democratic coalition that included
nearly all independent progressives, many leaders of the Progressive Party repudiating
Theodore Roosevelt for Wilson and the left wing of the progressive movement joining
Wilson’s ranks en masse. Significantly, the campaign resulted in the Democratic Party
becoming the advocate of domestic reform and produced the fusion of progressivism with
the peace issue.100 Although early returns predicted a Republican victory, Wilson’s
election demonstrated in Franklin Roosevelt’s mind “that the American people cannot
always be bought.” In 1916, he declared Election Day to have been “the most
extraordinary day” in his life.101 On a more personal level, the 1916 campaign marked a
deeper appreciation for the primacy of domestic politics and the growing influence of
Woodrow Wilson on Franklin Roosevelt as well.
IV.
99
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), pp. 240-1, 247.
100
William A. and Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History of the United States
Since 1900, Vol. 1, War, Reform, and Society, 1900-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1993), pp. 112-4.
101
148
The Great War in Europe provoked controversy in Washington, D.C. over the direction
that United States policy should take. Twenty years later, Eleanor Roosevelt suggested
that the controversy reflected “differences between Theodore Roosevelt’s philosophy and
that of President Wilson and his Administration in general.”102 The conflict, however,
was not drawn along the neat, partisan lines that she recalled. Clearly, Woodrow Wilson
did not accept the necessity of United States intervention in the war until April 1917.
Prior to that time, he gradually came to appreciate the view that a decisive German
victory in Europe, although unlikely, would represent a danger to the United States.
Although he justified greater expenditures on the navy and army after late 1915, his goal
was to avert trouble on the high seas and protect American economic interests in the
Western Hemisphere. Sympathetic to the Allied cause, he believed that benevolent
neutrality on the part of the United States would check the spread of war and military
autocracy across the Atlantic. Wilson’s advisor Edward M. House, who went by the
honorary title of colonel, initially advised maintaining United States neutrality. By mid
1915, however, Colonel House recommended a policy of strong opposition to Germany,
even at the risk of war. In contrast, from the onset of the war, Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan favored pursuing United States neutrality as a moral example to the
world so that the administration might eventually be able to mediate the struggle and
restore peace.103
102
p. 230.
103
Smith, The Great Departure, pp. 16-7, 21-7.
149
Opposition to the policy of benevolent, pro-Allied neutrality pursued by Wilson came
from several quarters and increased after the sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania by a
German submarine in May 1915. German actions, particularly the invasion of neutral
Belgium, embellished by an effective British propaganda organization, enabled American
newspapermen and other influential Americans, many of them Rhodes scholars, to
convey British views to a shocked American public. For its part, the skeptical American
public generally came to accept as fact most British fabrications of German atrocities,
particularly stories of German soap factories that used human corpses, of a crucified
Canadian, and of Belgian babies with their hands cut off.104 Nonetheless, fully in touch
with the British and French views, Franklin Roosevelt saw it as unfortunate that the
American people displayed “a singular unwillingness” to accept fully all official British
and French accounts of German atrocities and wanton destruction.105
Nevertheless, some German military actions needed no embellishment from pro-Allied
spokesmen to shock the American public. The brutality of submarine warfare, aerial
bombardment, and the employment of poison gas seemed to go beyond the accepted
bounds of civilized warfare and shook progressive faith in legal restraints on German
barbarity. German strategic bombing provides a case in point. In late August 1914, amid
reports of German Zeppelin raids on Antwerp, the editors of The New York Times
predicted that “the German military authorities would hesitate long before deciding to
104
105
150
repeat over London the performance that has terrorized Antwerp.”106 Nevertheless,
German actions soon proved their predictions wrong. In January 1915, German Zeppelins
initiated a strategic bombing campaign against Britain and particularly against London.
The Zeppelin raids continued for the next two and a half years until German fixed-wing
bombers took over the campaign.107 Consistently, the eastern press called for a stronger
United States response to those outrages.
In the press and in public, one of the fiercest critics of the Wilson administration in late
1914 and 1915 was Theodore Roosevelt. Because the former president considered the
German invasion of neutral Belgium a “breach of international morality,” he attacked the
administration for allowing “our own selfish ease” to prevent the United States from
fulfilling its “explicit obligations to small neutral nations when they are deeply wronged.”
The apparent timidity of President Wilson drew Roosevelt’s particular criticism and
hostility, and he maintained that diplomatic action by the administration in late July 1914
“might possibly have resulted in either putting a stop to the war or in localizing and
narrowly circumscribing its area.” Roosevelt saw the war in Europe as “terrible and evil”
but believed that the United States had to take a stand.108 Consequently, he damned
106
“Why Zeppelins Will Not Attack London,” The New York Times, August 31, 1914,
p. 6.
107
Larry H. Addington, Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, second edition
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 152.
108
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1983), pp. 280-5.
151
Wilson and his policies with the comment, “Dante reserved a special place of infamy in
the inferno for those base angels who dared side neither with evil nor with good.”109
From Theodore Roosevelt’s perspective, the struggle in Europe was a timeless one that
pitted the forces of reaction and autocracy against the peaceful and democratic aspirations
of the people. German ideology and actions convinced him that Imperial Germany
represented autocracy. Roosevelt reaffirmed his affection for German patriots such as
Gerhard von Scharnhorst and the soldier-poet Theodor Körner, and noted, “As regards
Germany, my stand is for the real interest of the mass of the German people.” Roosevelt
believed that ninety per cent of the German people lived in fear, oppressed by a Prussian
autocracy that numbered less than ten per cent of the population. Peace was not possible
with Imperial Germany, he contended, because of the Prussian aristocracy’s acceptance
of an ideology that recognized no international morality, only force. He considered
German actions in Belgium in 1914-15 to be analogous to Turrene’s brutal treatment of
the Palatinate, Oliver Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland, and Napoleon’s despotism in
Spain, Prussia, and throughout the German states. Roosevelt believed that France, faced
with such a threat, acted rightly in 1914 by taking a stand against Germany. Roosevelt
conceived the war in Europe as being part of the broader history of men struggling for
progress and liberty, and he thought that the war might ultimately result in the growth of
democracy in Europe.110
109
Sons, 1915), p. xi.
110
Theodore Roosevelt, “The Belgian Tragedy ,” “Preparedness Against War,” and
“Utopia or Hell?,” in America and the World War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1915), pp. 17, 20, 22-3, 25, 37, 39, 200, 232-3; Theodore Roosevelt letter to Hugo
Münsterberg, October 3, 1914, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 8, The Service
152
Clearly Roosevelt believed that he had a responsibility to criticize Wilson’s policy
toward the war. Wilson’s failure to take a firmer stand, Roosevelt thought, not only
reflected timidity but also might result in the defeat of the forces of democracy and
progress. He commented, “I regard the Wilson-Bryan attitude of trusting to fantastic
peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing
in efficient force, as abhorrent.”111
Significant opposition to Wilson’s policy also existed within the administration itself.
Much of that opposition coalesced around Robert Lansing, the counselor of the State
Department. Wilson’s response to the sinking of the Lusitania prompted the resignation
of William Jennings Bryan in June 1915, and Lansing replaced Bryan as the secretary of
state. Although recognizing that “chief officials” of the administration and leading
members of Congress favored continuing neutrality, Lansing believed that the United
States must “be prepared to risk everything” to prevent either Germany winning or
breaking even. The German government, he believed, was “utterly hostile to all nations
with democratic institutions.” Evidence of German agents in Mexico, Latin America, and
the Caribbean convinced Lansing that Germany hoped to paralyze the United States into
inaction in the event of another Lusitania outrage; he concluded “democracy throughout
the world is threatened.” Lansing further believed that in a negotiated settlement, one in
which Germany would be allowed “to break even,” Germany would use the opportunity
to prepare with “its usual vigor and thoroughness” to resume “its attack on democracy” in
He Can Render, Ed., Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University

Press, 1954), pp. 822-4.
111
Theodore Roosevelt letter to Hugo Münsterberg, October 3, 1914, The Letters of
Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 8, The Service He Can Render, Ed., Elting E. Morison
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 824.
153
the future. In the meantime, he believed it essential that American public opinion “be
prepared for the time . . . when we will have to cast aside our neutrality and become one
of the champions of democracy.”112
In addition to Lansing, other officials in the Wilson Administration held views
comparable to those of the new secretary of state. Among those in the State Department
and foreign service that were strongly pro-Ally and believed that German victory
endangered the United States were William Phillips and Frank L. Polk.113 Franklin
Roosevelt also shared their views. It seems natural that he would, particularly since the
views of his two friends coincided with those of his cousin Theodore Roosevelt. Franklin
and Eleanor Roosevelt described Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips and his
wife Caroline as “intimate friends” and “old friends of ours.” The two men attended
Harvard together, and Eleanor had known the former Caroline Astor Drayton since her
visits to St. Moritz as a youth.114 During the Roosevelt’s honeymoon in 1905, Frank Polk
sailed with Franklin and Eleanor across the Atlantic. In Washington, the Roosevelts came
to know Frank Polk, the counselor of the State Department, and his wife Livy quite
well.115 Working in close proximity in the old State, War, and Navy Building, Franklin
112
Memorandum entitled “Consideration and Outline of Policies,” July 11, 1915,
reprinted in Robert Lansing, The War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 19-21.
113
Smith, The Great Departure, p. 21.
114
pp. 76, 198-9, 223, 239; Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 14, 1914
in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 222-3.
115
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 11, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 2, p. 7; Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 233.
154
Roosevelt’s friendship with Phillips and Polk brought him into personal contact with
Lansing and his views.
As early as August 1915, Roosevelt and Lansing seem to have shared similar views
about United States policy and the war in Europe. Franklin Roosevelt’s wife and mother
expressed similar attitudes as well. Roosevelt met with Secretary Lansing two days after
a German submarine apparently torpedoed the liner Arabic. Although President Wilson
wanted to postpone taking any action until all of the details had been ascertained,
Roosevelt noted, “I personally doubt if I should be so polite.”116 Eleanor Roosevelt
declared the incident “An outrage” and wondered “whether there are to be more words or
action of some sort over the Arabic.” Sara Delano Roosevelt related to her son, “I feel a
little as T.R. feels, in fact a good deal.” She added that “one thing” Wilson “must
remember—the time for dealings with German criminals is over. Diplomatic relations
with Germany are henceforth impossible.”117 A couple days later, Lansing wrote the
president expressing his opinion that the usefulness of the United States “in the
restoration of peace would certainly not be lessened by a state of war between this
country and Germany, and it might even be increased.”118 Although Lansing considered
the severance of diplomatic relations, Wilson’s methods seemed to triumph, and the
116
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 21, 1915 in F.D.R.: His
117
Letters by Eleanor Roosevelt and Sara Delano Roosevelt quoted in Lash, Eleanor and
Franklin, pp. 204-5.
118
Letter from Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, August 24, 1915, reprinted in Robert
Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1935; 1970 reprint ed.), p. 45.
155
German government yielded to United States representations, offering to pay an
indemnity and assuring that further attacks against passenger liners would not occur.119
V.
In January 1917, the situation in Europe seemed bleak and prospects for peace
increasingly remote. From Berlin Ambassador Gerard reported the “most depressing”
mood. He observed, “All hands seem cross.” Gerard relayed that the Kaiser had stated
“that he did not expect peace now” and believed that Germany would defeat any major
British offensive in the spring. Gerard sketched a picture of total military control in
Germany that subverted all vestiges of liberalism in the government. He appraised that
the Imperial German supreme commander Field Marshal Paul von Beneckendorff und
Hindenburg “was the real ruler of Germany.” According to Gerard’s sources, the Kaiser
“was losing his mind” and, having been reduced to little more than a figurehead, “spent
all his time praying and learning Hebrew.” In addition, Hindenburg supposedly
“censored” any remarks by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and had his
spies watching Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. Gerard also noted that “the Germans
are violating all the pledges in Belgium” and have instituted “an absolute reign of terror”
marked by “Sudden and arbitrary arrests,” deportations, and confiscation of food. He
related that Hindenburg’s chief of staff General Erich Ludendorff had demanded the
German actions in Belgium as “a military measure.” Assessing the possibility of
Germany resuming submarine warfare, Gerard believed that Hindenburg controlled that
119
156
policy and that he might resort to “reckless submarine war” to offset the impact of “any
substantial defeats in the field.”120
At the end of January 1917, the Wilson administration received word that Germany
would resume unrestricted submarine warfare in February in the war zone around the
British Isles. Contemplating the German message, Wilson feared that it would lead to
war. He told his secretary, “The break that we have tried so hard to prevent now seems
inevitable.”121 Secretary of State Lansing believed that if Germany adopted a policy “to
renew unrestricted submarine warfare” that all hope for a constructive dialogue that
might lead to peace would “vanish.” Lansing thought that unless the United States took
“a strong position” that the German government would only be encouraged “to act with
ruthlessness.” In response to “the danger which seems imminent,” Lansing asserted “that
the wisest course is to adopt a firm and uncompromising position as to the right of
merchant vessels to arm for defense.”122
Considering the decision of the German government to resume unrestricted submarine
warfare, Lansing noted, “If our people only realized the insatiable greed of those German
autocrats at Berlin and their sinister purpose to dominate the world, we would be at war
today.” The defeat of the Allies, he believed, “would mean the triumph of Autocracy over
120
Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, February 23, 1917 with enclosure James Watson
Gerard to Robert Lansing, January 3, 1916[1917], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol.
40, November 20, 1916—January 23, 1917, Arthur S. Link, et. al., editors (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 664-555.
121
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), pp. 254-255.
122
Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, January 31, 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, vol. 1, The World War:
Period of American Neutrality (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1939), pp. 581-2. Hereafter cited as The Lansing Papers.
157
Democracy.” His perspective convinced him that it was a matter of time before the
United States would be “in this war against the Kaiser and his military gang who rule
over Germany.”123 Lansing also believed that “the establishment of democratic
institutions throughout the world . . . would be impossible if Prussian militarism after the
war controlled Germany.”124
On February 3, 1917, Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany. His
administration, however, was less certain as to what subsequent steps should be taken.125
In a cabinet meeting on February 2, Wilson had “said that he didn’t wish to see either
side win” but had contrasted German brutality toward neutrals with British confiscations
of “property.” According to Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, the president
expressed his desire “to see the neutrals unite” but acknowledged that it “would put some
of the small powers in a delicate position.” Wilson concluded “that nothing should be
done now,” preferring to wait for “the ‘overt act’ by Germany” which would enable him
to ask Congress for the power to respond.126
During cabinet meetings in February, the debate turned to whether the United States
should convoy or arm its merchant ships. Daniels apparently argued against convoying
and in favor of dispersion. Determined to avoid “any act that would look like hostility” to
123
Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood
Press, 1935; 1970 reprint ed.), pp. 208-9.
124
Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, p. 214.
125
Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, February 2, 1917, The Lansing Papers, vol. 1,
pp. 591-2.
126
Franklin K. Lane to George Whitfield Lane, February 9, 1917, The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1983), pp. 183-4.
158
Germany, Wilson decided against convoying because it represented “a double” hazard
that endangered not only the merchant ships but also risked an engagement between
escorting American warships and German submarines. The president authorized a
statement telling ship owners “that they might arm” their ships but believed that the
United States government could not provide “guns and gunners” unless it received “new
power from Congress.”127
In January 1917, craving action, Roosevelt had taken an inspection tour of San
Domingo and Haiti. Eleanor Roosevelt viewed her husband’s visit to Haiti, an island not
entirely pacified by the Marines, as an effort to “do something with the spice of risk in
it.”128 During that tour, he suddenly received a cable notifying him that Ambassador von
Bernstorff had been given his papers. The cable also requested Roosevelt’s immediate
return to Washington. Roosevelt had expected that the summons marked an end to the
procrastination and indecision that he perceived in Wilson’s policies. He was mistaken.
Roosevelt later commented, “When I returned to the capital I expected to see the nation
mobilized for military action. Frankly, I was astonished to see that we were apparently
doing nothing.”129
Upon his return to Washington Roosevelt found an impasse and immediately sought a
solution that would enable the administration to adopt a policy of armed neutrality in a
127
Franklin K. Lane to George Whitfield Lane, February 9, 1917, The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1983), pp. 183-4 and entry for February 25, 1917 in Daniels, The
Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 105.
128
129
Franklin D. Roosevelt speech at Chautauqua, New York, August 30, 1919, Master
159
matter of days. Apparently taking a cue from the arguments of his uncle James Russell
Soley for pursuing armed neutrality under executive order rather than Congressional
authorization, Roosevelt prepared a memorandum that he requested Daniels forward to
Wilson. Roosevelt asserted “that an intolerable situation is beginning to arise” because
the only suitable guns were in the hands of the government, and ships would not leave
port unless they had protection. He confessed that some guns could be “condemned” and
sold as obsolete but rejected that “subterfuge” based on the age and quality of the suitable
6-inch guns in the U.S. Navy inventory. Roosevelt, instead, advocated loaning the guns to
the ship owners. He asserted, “Under the law, however, guns may be loaned provided a
suitable bond be given.” Roosevelt envisioned that with presidential authorization armed
merchant ships “could be made ready to sail” after as little as “four or five days’
work.”130
Roosevelt’s arguments seemed to have swayed Wilson’s thinking but not as far as
Roosevelt hoped. At the time Wilson, House, and Lansing favored pursuing a policy of
armed neutrality similar to that of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria during
the Revolutionary War, of the Baltic powers during the Napoleonic Wars, and of the
United States against France in 1798. On February 23, the cabinet debated arming
merchant ships and whether such a course required Congressional authorization. After the
130
Josephus Daniels to Woodrow Wilson, February 10, 1917, and enclosure Franklin D.
Roosevelt to Daniels, February 10, 1917, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41,
January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983),
pp. 189-90.
160
meeting Daniels assessed a shift in the president’s thinking. He noted that “Wilson
believed that he had that authority but wished the power of Congress behind him.”131
On February 26, 1917, Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress and asked
for the power to arm merchant ships. Wilson argued that “there may be no recourse but to
armed neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain and for which there is abundant
American precedent.”132 Although the House of Representatives voted 403 to 14 to
approve Wilson’s request, a filibuster by twelve Senators blocked Wilson’s request for
Congressional authorization. Congress adjourned without action on March 4. Wilson’s
advisor Colonel House bitterly noted that a “small band of Senators” had used “the
arbitrary rules of the Senate to defeat the wishes of the majority.” In progressive terms,
Wilson characterized his political opponents in the Senate as a “little group of willful
men” who represented “no opinion but their own.”133
After his bid in Congress failed, Wilson ordered the arming of merchant ships under
his executive authority. On March 6, Wilson called on the Navy Department to discuss
“arming ships.” Several days later, Wilson met with Daniels at the White House. Wilson
131
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 594. The argument for armed
neutrality as an alternative to war was laid out by European historian Carlton Joseph
Huntley Hayes. See Edward M. House to Woodrow Wilson, February 8, 1917 with
enclosure, and Robert Lansing to Wilson, February 10, 1917, The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1983), pp. 164-7, 185.
132
Woodrow Wilson address to a Joint Session of Congress, February 26, 1917, The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 283-7.
133
Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1926), pp. 454-8 and Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace—
1910-1917 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944),
pp. 594-5.
161
related that he had decided to arm the ships but “wished it all kept quiet.” Daniels, no
doubt assisted by Roosevelt, had the regulations already prepared and ready for the
president’s approval.134 Due to Wilson’s reluctance to make any public announcement
that might provoke the German government, on March 12 the State Department notified
the embassies and legations in Washington that the United States “determined to place
upon all American merchant vessels…an armed guard for the protection of the vessels
and the lives of the persons on board.”135 On March 13, after reviewing the final orders
with Roosevelt, Daniels sent them to the president, secretary of state, and attorney
general for their approval. Daniels implementing instructions to the U.S. Navy officers
commanding the armed contingent on each merchant ship also admonished them “not to
mention a word of your instructions.”136
Although consistent with Wilson’s intent, the secret orders presumably lacked the
public resolve that Lansing and Roosevelt favored. In March 1917, fearing that Wilson
would “maintain his policy of inaction,” Lansing outlined his thoughts in a memorandum
to the president and Lansing argued for a declaration of war against Germany, the
“enemy of liberalism.” Such a public declaration, Lansing believed “would give moral
134
Entries for March 6 and 8, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels,
pp. 109-110.
135
Department of State to the Argentine Embassy, March 12, 1917, File No.
763.72/3541a, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1917, Supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 171.
136
Entry for March 12, 1917 in the Diary of Josephus Daniels, The Papers of Woodrow
Press, 1983), p. 403.
162
support to the Entente Powers” and “put heart into the democratic element in Germany,
who are already beginning to speak boldly and show their teeth at their rulers.”137
In response to the inaction Roosevelt perceived, he candidly expressed his views both
with members of the administration and with the administration’s most vocal critics. In
conversations with Colonel House in March 1917, Roosevelt attributed the “principal
weakness of [the] Navy” to the procrastination of Secretary Daniels and his refusal to let
the department “make plans with France and England and study their methods.”138
Roosevelt also felt comfortable debating the merits of the administration’s policies
toward Germany among a circle of Republican critics that included Elihu Root, General
Leonard Wood, J. P. Morgan, and Theodore Roosevelt. At one such meeting in early
March 1917, the position that Franklin Roosevelt took is clear; he advocated a more
vigorous course for American policy than Wilson followed and demanded further
increases in the army and navy. He noted in his diary, “I backed T.R.’s theory.”139 Later
that same month, Roosevelt also defended General Wood’s public criticism that
“America could be taken” because it “had no army and no navy to defend itself.”140
To his credit, Roosevelt also brought up his views with Secretary Daniels and
President Wilson. In February and March 1917, Roosevelt hoped to improve the
readiness of the navy for a war that he believed the United States might to soon enter.
137
Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, pp. 233-5.
138
Entries for March 6 and 11, 1917, Diary 1917, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D.
Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
139
Entry for March 11, 1917, Diary 1917, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
140
Entry for March 23, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
120.
163
Military preparedness, he believed, would not automatically lead to war.141 Following a
brief tour of East Coast facilities, Roosevelt noted, “Told J.D. things not satisfactory [in]
Boston and worse [in] N.Y.” Unfortunately, from Roosevelt’s perspective, “He said
nothing.” In addition to inertia in the readiness for war of the U.S. Navy, the
administration was still in the process of drafting presidential instructions to arm
merchantmen to implement the policy of armed neutrality that Roosevelt advocated.
Roosevelt hoped that the president would take action without “equivocation.”142
Briefly serving as acting secretary with Daniels out of town, Roosevelt requested an
appointment with the president to urge a higher level of preparedness. Roosevelt hoped to
get the Atlantic Fleet into port in order to bring it to peak efficiency and to prevent
German submarines from being able to sink the battleships at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
An “enthusiastic” Roosevelt carried his “plea into high – very high circles.” “In fact,” he
recalled, “I went all the way to the top.” Wilson, however, refused Roosevelt’s request.
Nevertheless, Wilson’s reasons for apparent inaction seemed to have left an impression
on Roosevelt, and, after meeting with the president, he came to view Wilson’s efforts as
intentional and studied rather than equivocating. Wilson commented that such a move
might be seen as “an act of war,” precisely the kind of signal that he consciously wanted
to avoid sending. Roosevelt related that Wilson told him, “I want history to show not
only that we have tried every diplomatic means to keep out of the war; to show that the
141
142
Entries for March 9 and 11, 1917, FDR’s Diary, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D.
164
war has been forced upon us deliberately by Germany, but also that we have come into
the court of history with clean hands.”143
VI.
The United States entered the Great War in April 1917. Woodrow Wilson’s
message to Congress on April 2, 1917 reflected his thoughts about the nature of the war
and his perspective of the German government and people. On that occasion, Wilson
asked Congress for a declaration of war and made a clear distinction between the German
people and their government. He asserted that the United States had “no quarrel with the
German people” and that the American attitude toward them was one of “sympathy and
friendship.” Furthermore, although the German government waged what he considered
“warfare against mankind,” Wilson made it clear that he believed that the Kaiser’s
government had acted on its own “impulse” not the popular will. As Wilson saw it, the
143
Speech File Number 101, FDRL. Edward M. House to Woodrow Wilson, February 13,
1917, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 214-5. Frank Friedel argues that in
1941 Roosevelt found himself in a position similar to Wilson’s and was “reluctant to take
the final steps to bring the nation into war.” Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A
Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 29. My
assessment is that Roosevelt took a different lesson from Wilson’s 1917 actions. Rather
than seek to avoid war as Wilson had done by not doing anything that somehow might be
construed as antagonistic, Roosevelt followed the prescription offered by his uncle James
Russell Soley. Far from leading directly to war, Roosevelt believed that more advanced
naval preparations and the implementation of a policy of armed neutrality might enable
the United States to avoid entering the European War against Germany.
165
fight was not only “for the ultimate peace of the world” but also to bring about “the
liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included.”144
With an American declaration of war, Theodore Roosevelt’s public criticism of the
administration came to an end, and he expressed views similar to those of Wilson.
Consistent with his progressive perspective, Roosevelt characterized the conflict as “a
war for liberty and democracy against the ruthless militaristic tyranny of the Prussianized
Germany of the Hohenzollerns.” He observed that far from the civilized application of
military power, on the battlefields of the Western Front “Germany has re-introduced from
the dark ages poison gas and liquid fire, so as to kill her enemies with torture.” He
declared that the United States was fighting for an “overwhelming victory” over “the
tyrannous Prussianized autocracy which now menaces the entire peace-loving world.”
Presaging the policy of unconditional surrender, he urged that the United States not stop
“until we have brought down the whole fabric of Prussianized militarism.”145
Given the comments of Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, it is not surprising
that Franklin Roosevelt expressed similar views after United States entry into the war.
Both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt accepted accounts of German atrocities as
authentic.146 He believed that he had a responsibility “to warn the United States” about
144
Woodrow Wilson’s message to Congress, April 2, 1917, reprinted in Thomas G.
Paterson, ed., Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, vol. 2, Since 1914
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1989, 3rd edition.), pp. 51-5.
145
Theodore Roosevelt, The Foes of Our Own Household (New York: George H. Doran,
1917), pp. 274, 276, 297, 303.
146
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL; [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt,
This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), p. 242.
166
“the great dangers” facing the country.147 Consequently, at Chautauqua, in July 1917, he
announced to his audience, “The United States is not safe for your children if Germany
wins the war.”148 Clearly, Franklin Roosevelt accepted the notion that the United States
had entered the war “to liberate Germany and the world from the domination of Prussian
Junkerdom.” Prussia dominated the old Germany and posed a threat to the liberal world.
“[T]he ‘Junker’ class, the mortal enemies of liberalism and the sworn devotees of
autocracy, militarism and Pan-Germanism” controlled the Kaiser’s actions during World
War I and the direction of German foreign policy during the decade prior to 1914.149 In
that respect, Roosevelt reflected the view advertised by the administration that the
purpose of the war was the destruction of “MILITARISM AND KAISERISM.”150
Wilson’s next message to Congress in December 1917 demonstrates the extent that
progressivism shaped his administration’s conduct of the war. In terms of domestic
reforms, progressives believed that they could restore power to the people through “the
education of public opinion” and by awakening “the popular conscience.” The creation of
“an enlightened public opinion” then would enable the people to reclaim the power that
they had lost or abdicated and, at the same time, refashion the instruments of government
147
Speech at Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, New York, August 30, 1919, Master
Speech File No. 101, FDRL.
148
Roosevelt comments at the Speakers’ Training Camp for Patriotic Education,
Chautauqua, New York, July 7, 1917, Master Speech File Number 72, Speech Files,
FDRL.
149
Notes for a speech (1917-18), Master Speech File Number 83, FDRL.
150
Joseph P. Tumulty memorandum to Woodrow Wilson, November 3, 1918, Series 2,
Reel 101, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, Library of Congress
Manuscript Division.
167
to guarantee popular sovereignty.151 Wilson applied the same prescription to the
American conduct of the war. As he saw the problem, “the sinister masters of Germany”
continued to deceive the people of Germany. “Prussian military and commercial
autocracy,” furthermore, could not be trusted to either wage war within the bounds of
international law or negotiate a future peace. He argued that the United States “can
discuss peace” only “when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can
believe.” The main focus of Wilson’s strategy would be to wage a war to educate the
German people by providing “the truth” as the “only possible antidote” to the “falsehoods
that have kept the German people in the dark.”152 That strategy of reaching the German
people, the administration believed would be successful because as Lansing put it, “The
easiest man in the world to fool is a German officer.”153
VII.
The ideology of progressive reformers exerted a major impact on how the Wilson
administration viewed Wilhelmine Germany and, after April 1917, how it waged war to
overthrow it. Perceiving the German people and the German government as two separate
entities, the administration envisioned a strategy designed to educate and inspire the
German people to overthrow their government and replace it with a democratic system.
151
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 202.
152
Wilson’s message to Congress, December 4, 1917, U.S. Department of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, pp. ix-xii.
153
Entry for March 15, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
114.
168
In so doing, the administration took an approach to war that shaped how the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt would respond to another war in Europe twenty-
two years later. Wilson’s overall strategy for the defeat of Imperial Germany was clear:
educate and develop the popular conscience of the German people in order for them to
reclaim their power from their Prussian “masters” and refashion their government along
democratic lines.
The United States government was less certain how it should implement Wilson’s
strategic vision for the defeat of Imperial Germany. Army Chief of Staff General Peyton
C. March noted that after the United States entered the war that “the Administration was
not entirely clear in its own mind what our role in the struggle should be.”154 Some in
administration circles thought that the downfall of the Imperial German government
could take place at little direct cost to the United States. In April 1917, one Marine Corps
brigadier general offered his prediction to the secretary of the navy that Germany “cannot
hold out very much longer because people lack food.”155 In retrospect, Eleanor Roosevelt
noted that “many foolish people like myself said that only our financial resources would
be needed and that the only branch of service which would be called upon to fight would
be the Navy.” Others envisioned sending an army to Europe, but not immediately.156
Walter Lippmann of The New Republic had asserted to President Wilson that any army
“raised would probably be unready to fight before the war was drawing to a close” but
154
Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1932; Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 2.
155
156
p. 247.
169
that it would “give the country a sense of security.”157 General March observed that
“many military men, even, supposed that our assistance, as far as men were concerned,
would be limited to a show of the flag by a small force.”158
From the administration’s perspective, American soldiers would not be needed on the
Western Front for their combat potential but for their symbolic, moral impact both at
home and abroad. Along those lines, editors of the Scripps-McRae league advocated that
the administration “send an army to France” or do something “to stir up our people.”159
Eleanor Roosevelt recalled the contemporary belief that “the sight of new uniforms and
of fresh men at the front would restore” Allied “morale.”160 General March recalled that
no one then in authority “completely grasped the fact that if we did not get men to France
by the million, instead of by the thousand, the war would unquestionably be won by the
Central Powers.”161 Ultimately, the task fell to the French mission that arrived in the
United States on April 25, 1917 to convince the Wilson administration to dispatch large
numbers of soldiers to France immediately.
The Vice President of the Council of Ministers, René Viviani, an eloquent Socialist
with an excellent command of English, lead the French mission to the United States;
Maréchal Joseph Joffre, the hero of the Marne, accompanied him. Their message to the
157
Walter Lippmann to Woodrow Wilson, February 6, 1917, The Papers of Woodrow
Press, 1983), pp. 134-5.
158
March, The Nation at War, p. 2.
159
160
p. 247.
161
March, The Nation at War, p. 3.
170
American people and the Wilson administration was clear: “France wants American
troops on the Western Front and wants them at once.” In pursuit of that goal, the mission
spent nearly a week in Washington meeting administration officials, cabinet members,
and Congressmen. Escorted by Ambassador Jusserand, Viviani and Joffre attended a
boisterous, cheering session of the Senate and later visited the House of Representatives;
they also met with President Wilson. After the arrival of a similar British mission lead by
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur J. Balfour, both delegations conferred,
which led to further meetings with administration officials. 162
The Roosevelt family played a major role in meeting and entertaining the French
mission and assisting them broadcast their appeal for assistance. Their Washington social
circles and ties with the British and French embassies guaranteed the Roosevelts would
socialize with both the British and French missions during their visit. Eleanor Roosevelt
noted that after the United States entry into the war that she and her husband “were less
and less concerned with social life except where it could be termed useful or necessary to
the work which had to be done.”163 The Roosevelts thought that the French mission was
important. Upon their arrival to the United States, Franklin Roosevelt greeted Viviani,
Joffre, Marquis Pierre de Chambrun and the others in the French mission at Hampton
Roads, Virginia.164 Roosevelt’s cousin Warren Robbins from the State Department
162
“France Wants Our Military Forces Now to Brace Allies and Shake German Line;
Envoys Urge Action, Viviani Sees Wilson,” The New York Times, May 1, 1917, pp. 1-2
and “French Visitors Hailed in Senate,” The New York Times, May 2, 1917, p. 1.
163
p. 245.
164
C. H. McCarthy memorandum to Eleanor Roosevelt, April 25, 1917 with enclosed
draft press release, General Correspondence: France, Interdepartmental Correspondence,
171
escorted the party and was responsible for their comfort. In Washington, Eleanor
Roosevelt remained “very busy” entertaining members of the French and British missions
seeking American cooperation.165 The Roosevelt’s were among the government officials
who sailed down the Potomac to Mount Vernon with Joffre, Viviani, and Balfour to lay a
wreath on George Washington’s tomb.166 The Roosevelt’s close friend William Phillips
escorted the British mission.167 In Washington, Viviani and Joffre stayed with diplomat
Henry White, a former American minister in Paris and Theodore Roosevelt’s
representative at the Algeciras Conference.168
When Franklin Roosevelt met Joffre and Viviani at Hampton Roads, he urged them to
request the fullest assistance from the United States.169 Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter
Alice and her husband Congressman Nicholas Longworth made a similar point to de
Chambrun, their cousin by marriage.170 The French leaders quickly complied and called
for the almost immediate dispatch of United States soldiers. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled
Official Files, Box 14, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
1913-1920, FDRL.
165
p. 246.
166
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Da
Capo Press, 1992), p. 88.
167
“British Envoy’s Arrival,” The New York Times, May 12, 1917, p. 1.
168
Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours: Reminiscences of Alice Roosevelt
Longworth (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), p. 248.
169
Nathan Miller, F.D.R.: An Intimate History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1983), p. 139.
170
Longworth (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), p. 248.
172
that “the first plea made by the French mission was that some American soldiers be sent
to France in July.”171 Viviani asked President Wilson to send American troops within two
months. In a talk to the War College and in discussions with the president and the
secretary of war, Joffre made an immediate appeal for troops as soon as possible, even if
only a division.172
The William Phillipses hosted a luncheon that included the Roosevelts, their cousin
Alice and her husband Nicholas Longworth, and Secretary of the Interior Franklin K.
Lane and his wife Anne. At the luncheon, Joffre made the French desire for United States
troops explicit. The marshal stated, “You should send 25,000 troops at once, then again
25,000 and again and again, just as fast as possible.” Praising Joffre’s “fair words,”
Franklin Roosevelt insisted “on action at once. Action that will give something definite—
definite ships, definite men—on a definite day.”173 On April 30, Phillips forwarded the
State Department to Roosevelt such a detailed request from the French vice admiral
seeking United States naval cooperation.174 By April 30, furthermore, Lane, Treasury
171
p. 247.
172
Longworth (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), pp. 248-9.
173
174
William Phillips memorandum to Roosevelt, April 30, 1917 and Admiral
Chocheprat’s Note: U.S. Government’s Cooperation to French Naval Requirements,
General Correspondence: France, Interdepartmental Correspondence, Official Files, Box
14, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
173
Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo, and Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston
reportedly were in favor of satisfying Joffre’s plea.175
Increasing support for Joffre from both inside and outside of the administration
pressured Wilson to grant the French request. According to the press report following a
cabinet meeting on May 1, many in the cabinet favored granting the French appeal;
although, Wilson had not indicated his position.176 Amid growing cabinet and bipartisan
congressional support to honor the French plea for United States soldiers, Wilson’s critic
Theodore Roosevelt publicly came out in favor of supporting Joffre’s wishes. Hoping to
be at the head of a contingent of between one and four American divisions in France,
Roosevelt stated, “I most earnestly hope that the request of General Joffre to the
American people that we, at the earliest possible moment, send American troops to the
front will be granted.”177
Wilson’s actions quickly undercut Roosevelt’s bid. On May 2, 1917, the press
announced that the Wilson administration assured the French mission that it would grant
their plea to have an American division in France as soon as sufficient transportation was
available.178 The following day, the press reported it unlikely that Theodore Roosevelt
175
“France Wants Our Military Forces Now to Brace Allies and Shake German Line;
Envoys Urge Action, Viviani Sees Wilson,” The New York Times, May 1, 1917, p. 1.
176
“Peace Speech in Berlin Tomorrow; Chancellor to State Aims ‘Clearly;’ Call for
Troops Gains Favor,” The New York Times, May 2, 1917, p. 1.
177
“Roosevelt Hails Joffre’s Advice,” The New York Times, May 1, 1917, p. 2.
178
“Army to France Soon as Vessels Can Be Procured,” The New York Times, May 3,
1917, pp. 1-2.
174
would be leading the American troops.179 Also on May 3, both Viviani and Joffre visited
Wilson. For an hour Wilson and Joffre discussed a number of technical issues, with Joffre
offering the president his opinion as to what should be done. Wilson agreed to Joffre’s
request that the American general who was to command in France arrive in advance of
his army. It is also likely that during this meeting Wilson agreed with Joffre’s position
that American divisions complete their intensive training in France rather than delay
deployment until fully trained and prepared as advocated by Secretary of War Baker and
members of the General Staff. Afterwards Joffre noted that he had been favorably
surprised by Wilson’s promptness in accepting his views and by the degree to which
Wilson seemed to be a practical strategist conversant with military operations.180 In
addition, Viviani’s delegation secured an immediate loan of $ 200,000,000 and a monthly
loan of $ 160,000,000 that would start in July.181
With the formal aspect of its mission largely accomplished, on the afternoon of May 4,
the French mission departed Washington on a ten-day tour of the United States. In a
private railroad car provided by the State Department, Viviani and Joffre visited Chicago,
179
“Army to France Soon As Vessels Can be Procured,” The New York Times, May 3,
1917, p. 1.
180
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), pp. 298-9. War Department General Staff
reluctance to support Joffre’s proposal for immediate deployment to France is evident in
“Peace Speech in Berlin Tomorrow; Chancellor to State Aims ‘Clearly;’ Call for Our
Troops Gains Favor,” The New York Times, May 2, 1917, p. 1 and “Army to France
Soon as Vessels Can Be Procured,” The New York Times, May 3, 1917, pp. 1-2. After he
was ordered to Washington in early May, the press correctly speculated that Major
General John J. Pershing would command the force destined for France. “All American
Forces to Make One Big Army,” The New York Times, May 10, 1917, p. 1.
181
Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938,
trans. Anthony Forester (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 33.
175
Kansas City, St. Louis, Abraham Lincoln’s tomb in Springfield, Illinois, before going on
to Philadelphia and New York, West Point, Boston, Baltimore, and then back to
Washington for a farewell on May 15.182 Throughout the visit of the French mission,
crowds met Joffre with great enthusiasm.183 Following their tour through the Mid West,
the members of the French mission received an overwhelming reception from the people
of New York City. The New York Times reported that the Frenchmen “found such a
welcome as the city had never before accorded to any man or group of men.” Although
the weather was windy with intermittent rain on May 10, 1917, many thousands waited
for hours to glimpse the French mission and Maréchal Joffre. The paper assessed that “no
demonstration in the city’s history ever brought forth the number of people that came out
yesterday to look at the victor of the Marne.”184 The city held a reception for Viviani and
Joffre in a mansion on Fifth Avenue that same day. Determined that her grandchildren
should meet Joffre, Sara Delano Roosevelt took Anna, James, and Elliott from Hyde Park
to Fifth Avenue just to introduce them to the French soldier. In spite of the children
having whooping cough, the old général gave each of the children a kiss and treated them
and their grandmother with great kindness. An awestruck Sara Delano Roosevelt also
182
The itinerary for the trip is detailed in “Army to France Soon as Vessels Can Be
Procured,” The New York Times, May 3, 1917, pp. 1-2.
183
p. 246.
184
“French War Envoys City’s Guests; See in New York’s Warm Welcome New Hope
for a Glorious Victory,” The New York Times, May 10, 1917, p. 1.
176
related to Franklin and Eleanor that “the perfectly charming brave Joffre” was extremely
complementary about her son.185
The next evening, more than one thousand prominent New Yorkers honored the
delegates of both the French and the British missions with a diner at the Waldorf-Astoria.
The mayor of New York was the host, and his Committee to the British and French
commissions included J. P. Morgan and Bernard M. Baruch. In addition, the audience
boasted former President Theodore Roosevelt and his successor William H. Taft, former
presidential candidates Charles Evans Hughes and Alton B. Parker, the governor of New
York, a United States senator, and Major General Leonard Wood. Speeches by Viviani
and Balfour and the presence of Roosevelt evoked clamorous enthusiasm from the crowd,
particularly when Roosevelt and Joffre shook hands. Eloquently, Viviani praised the
United States, “The soul of America is so great and noble that it is fitting that America
should arise to fight for the cause of freedom and justice.” In contrast, Viviani told his
audience that the philosophy of Germany, and the force behind the German army, was
“brutal and savage.” Noting the tension in Germany, he remarked, “The kultur of
Germany is all very well so long as its interests are not crossed, but when they are, it is
like a wild beast.” Theodore Roosevelt spent the dinner seated next to Joffre, engaged in
a deep discussion in French.186
185
James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 79-80. Also of some
use are [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1937), pp. 248-9 and James Roosevelt and Bill Libby, My Parents: A Differing View
(Chicago: Playboy Press, 1976), p. 42.
186
“Balfour and Viviani Welcome US as Ally in the War for Civilization; Stir Diners to
Wildest Enthusiasm,” The New York Times, May 12, 1917, p. 1.
177
To a generation of Americans who had followed the scandals of the Dreyfus Affair and
sympathized with the Dreyfusards, Maréchal Joffre must have seemed an ideal officer to
represent a revitalized French Republic. Staunchly republican, anti-clerical, and
progressive, Joffre was a Freemason who openly ate meat on Good Friday. In 1911, he
had been selected as the Chief of the French General Staff less for his tactical or strategic
acumen than for his qualities as a “good Republican.” Nonetheless, observers of Joffre’s
bearing and demeanor found that he was “unmistakably a soldier.” His victory in 1914
during the First Battle of the Marne made him one of the most popular men in France.187
It seems particularly fitting that among Joffre’s party when he came to the United States
in 1917 was Major Dreyfus.188
VIII.
United States entry into the war and the French request for the dispatch of American
soldiers to France forced the Wilson Administration to consider how it would raise an
army of over one million men. It was a major task, one inconceivable to the War
Department and the General Staff at the time. In April 1917, the United States had fewer
than 200,000 soldiers under arms; it was, in the words of one senior officer, “scarcely
187
De la Gorce, The French Army, pp. 86-7, 107, 160-1 and Alistair Horne, The Price of
Glory: Verdun, 1916 (New York: MacFadden Books, 1964), pp. 19, 29-30.
188
U.S. State Department draft press release, circa April 25, 1917, General
Correspondence: France, Interdepartmental Correspondence, Official Files, Box 14,
Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
Alfred Dreyfus had been reinstated as a major in 1906 and awarded the Legion of Honor.
During the Great War, he returned to active service and ended the war as a lieutenant
colonel.
178
enough to form a police force for emergencies within the territorial limits of the United
States.” The Regular Army boasted a total strength of 127,588 and 66,594 National
Guardsmen in Federal service, previously activated due to trouble with Mexico.189 Henry
L. Stimson, William H. Taft’s Secretary of War, estimated that in April 1917 the United
States Army could field a mobile force of about 24,000 soldiers with sufficient
ammunition for a day and a half in a modern battle.190 A woefully inadequate force
considering that just during the Battle of Verdun in 1916, French and German casualties
amounted to 420,000 dead and 800,000 wounded.191
Previous efforts during the Wilson administration to improve the preparedness of the
United States Army had met with meager results, at best. During the summer of 1914,
1915, and 1916, Major General Leonard Wood ran Plattsburg camps to provide
rudimentary officer training for civilian leaders, ultimately training ten thousand reserve
officers. Stimson’s successor in the War Department, Lindley L. Garrison, had hoped to
build a large, effective reserve force that could avoid the local politics and
unpreparedness of the National Guard. Lindley had urged a tough line against Germany
and intervention in the war. During 1916, a presidential election year, Wilson rejected
Lindley’s plan for a “Continental Army” in favor of congressional supporters of the
National Guard. Believing Wilson to be a half-hearted advocate of preparedness, Lindley
resigned in 1916, and the administration took no further action to improve the state of the
189
Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1932; Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 1, 3.
190
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 86.
191
Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 (New York: MacFadden Books,
1964), pp. 320-1.
179
Regular Army before it entered the war.192 Instead of Lindley’s plan, Wilson had come
out in favor of a different approach to preparedness that included funding for a “navy
second to none” and expansion of the National Guard to 400,000 men. Nevertheless, in
May 1917, Congress passed a bill to raise a mass army by conscription and recruitment of
volunteers, approximately one-third would be Regular Army, one-third National Guard,
and one-third the National Army. Existing regular and guard regiments became part of
newly formed divisions and prepared for transport to France. Captain George C.
Marshall, a division staff officer in the First Division, the first sent to France, noted that
the members of the division staff met each other at sea and then had to be told the
organization of their new unit.193
It was during the visit of the French mission and the General Staff’s initial attempts to
form combat divisions that Theodore Roosevelt publicly proposed to raise a force of up
to four volunteer divisions and take them to France. The former Rough Rider argued that
the request of Marshal Joffre and the French mission “best could be realized by
permitting him to take volunteers to the trenches of France.”194 An earlier request by
Roosevelt to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker in February 1917 to raise a single
division met with no action.195 Roosevelt explained his desire to Ambassador Jusserand,
192
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 86-8 and John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior
and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Belknap Press, 1983), pp. 289-90.
193
Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), pp. 33-5.
194
“Roosevelt Hails Joffre’s Advice,” The New York Times, May 1, 1917, p. 2.
195
Theodore Roosevelt to Newton D. Baker, February 7, 1917 and Baker to Roosevelt,
February 9, 1917, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 8, The Service He Can
180
“I intend to do everything that is in me to serve in a manner that will be of most benefit to
my people, to France, and to Belgium, and to the Allies generally, and to humanity.”
Roosevelt continued, “I believe that the best service I can render as an ex-President of the
United States, is to be sent with my division to the front, just as soon as it is possible to
get my men in shape….”196 On April 10, 1917, Theodore Roosevelt met with President
Wilson to make his request again. Although Wilson would not commit to the venture,
Roosevelt believed that on the whole the interview had been “satisfactory.”197 Franklin
Roosevelt gave his enthusiastic support to Theodore Roosevelt’s attempt. Despite
additional support for Roosevelt’s proposal from members of Congress, French
ambassador Jusserand, and Georges Clemenceau, Wilson rejected the proposal. Backed
by the War Department, Wilson justified his refusal on the grounds that Roosevelt’s
actions would strip valuable officers away from the divisions that would be formed as
part of the national army. Franklin and Eleanor saw their dejected uncle after Wilson’s
decision became evident. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “I think the decision was a bitter
blow from which he never quite recovered.”198
The officers of the organization that Theodore Roosevelt proposed to field would have
come largely from the ranks of former Rough Riders, officers he had known in Cuba, and
Render, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,

1954), p. 1151.
196
Roosevelt to Jean Jules Jusserand, February 23, 1917, The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt, vol. 8, The Service He Can Render, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 1157.
197
Longworth (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), pp. 245-6.
198
181
from members of the New York National Guard. Among the twenty men who were hand
chosen by Roosevelt were William J. Donovan, Henry L. Stimson, and Frank Knox. As
early as 1916, Stimson, a former secretary of war, had helped Roosevelt develop tentative
lists of officers to lead the units he intended to raise. Following his meeting with Wilson,
Theodore Roosevelt gave up his plan, and on May 21, 1917 he released Donovan,
Stimson, Knox, and the others for other service.199
Given Theodore Roosevelt’s active encouragement, the allure of military service was
strong on the Roosevelt family throughout the Great War. During the summer of 1917,
Eleanor’s brother Hall Roosevelt and her cousin Quentin, Theodore Roosevelt’s youngest
son, enlisted in the aviation branch together.200 Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. joined the First
Infantry Division, the first United States division to sail to France; his brother Archie
quickly followed. Their other brother Kermit served with the British Army in
Mesopotamia and later transferred to the American Army in France. While Woodrow
Wilson urged Franklin Roosevelt to run for Governor of New York, kinsman Theodore
Roosevelt urged his nephew to get into the war.201 Throughout 1917 and 1918, Theodore
199
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 92; Richard Dunlap, Donovan: America’s Master
Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1982), pp. 48-9.
200
201
Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1990), p. 30; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and
the Fox (San Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), p. 64. Although the
former president’s hopes to raise and command a force of volunteer divisions had been
frustrated, Army Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March was sympathetic to his wish to
have all of his sons in active United States service. In April 1918, March assisted the
appointment to captain of Kermit Roosevelt, then serving with the British Army in
Mesopotamia, and his reassignment to the United States Army in France. Peyton C.
March, The Nation At War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company,
1932; repr., Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 345-6.
182
Roosevelt’s ideas fundamentally shaped Franklin Roosevelt’s views of wartime service,
leadership, and duty. The elder Roosevelt’s martial judgment provided a powerful frame
of reference for his nephew during the Great War and throughout his future.
Franklin Roosevelt pined to serve in uniform. Soon after United States entry into the
war, Roosevelt told Daniels “that he wished to enter the armed forces.” Considering the
impact of Theodore Roosevelt’s experiences as a Rough Rider on his subsequent political
rise, Daniels believed that his assistant “thought actual fighting in the war was the
necessary step toward reaching the White House.” Although President Wilson told
Daniels that Franklin Roosevelt’s “only and best war service is to remain where he is,”
the assistant secretary lobbied the president to make a personal appeal.202 Rejecting
Wilson’s suggestion that he run for governor, in mid 1918 Franklin Roosevelt told the
president that if he left the Navy Department “it could only be for active service.”203
Wilson refused Roosevelt’s request to resign and serve in uniform. In the summer of
1918, a persistent Roosevelt managed to take an inspection tour of the Western Front.
IX.
In retrospect, it becomes evident that the course of the war during 1918 had a major
impact on how Franklin Roosevelt and his generation viewed both German and American
power. By late 1917, the Central Powers seemed triumphant almost everywhere: Russia
202
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 130.
203
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson, July 18, 1918, The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, vol. 48, May 13–July 17, 1918 , ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, New Jersey:
183
had left the war, the Italian front had collapsed, the major French offensive of the
summer had disintegrated and there seemed no impetus for a successful Allied offensive
on the Western Front. After the winter lull, March 1918 witnessed the initiation of a
succession of German offensives that would last until July 1918 and reach within thirty-
five miles of Paris. The offensives, however, exhausted all German reserves of manpower
and morale, and the initiative on the battlefield passed to the Allies and the United States.
The experience of those Americans committed to battle after mid 1918 proved to be a
unique and particular one. Having gambled and committed all of the divisions in its
strategic reserve in May and June 1918, Germany had no forces with which to stem the
advance of the armies of the Allied and Associated powers, infused with large, fresh
American divisions, in the autumn of 1918. In Europe to tour the front, Roosevelt
perceptively noted in late July 1918, “The past month has I think clearly marked the
turning point of the war.”204
Not even Roosevelt, however, predicted the speed of the German collapse in the
autumn of 1918. After his trip to the front, he had hoped to return to the United States,
resign his position as assistant secretary of the navy, and join a battery of naval railway
guns in Europe as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy.205 Events, however, moved
too swiftly. Although German power seemed at its apex in June 1918, by October and
early November, the will of German soldiers and civilians to continue the war had
evaporated, and the mass movement for peace assumed the proportions of a social
204
205
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 130 and Eleanor Roosevelt,
This is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), pp. 270.
184
revolution.206 The suddenness of the German collapse undoubtedly came as a shock to
Roosevelt. He landed in New York City with influenza and pneumonia in September
1918, and, after recovering, he returned to Washington in mid October to finalize his
reports. Unfortunately for his aspirations, in October word also arrived from Germany
that it would discuss peace terms.207
Roosevelt’s visit to the front in 1918 reinforced his conceptions of German and French
soldiers. German morale, he believed, was fragile. Years later, he observed, “The facts of
the year 1918 are proof that a mighty German army and a tired German people can
crumble rapidly and go to pieces when they are faced with successful resistance.”208 In
contrast, French poilus epitomized intelligence and determination. Roosevelt rated
French sentries as “noticeably more alert” than their counterparts and was impressed with
the “two ferocious looking Poilus armed with rifles” who escorted him during his visit.
Seeing a group of dirty, tired German prisoners along the road, he offered, “They did not
impress me as being physically unfit, but there is an awful contrast between the amount
of intelligence in their faces compared with the French Poilus." That night, observing a
206
Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century (San Diego, California: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1985), pp. 146-9.
207
Eleanor Roosevelt, This is My Story, pp. 267-70 and Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to
Admiral Herbert O. Dunn, December 19, 1918, Master Speech File Number 79, FDRL.
Although nearly 1,500,000 German soldiers died on the Western Front alone, FDR seems
to have largely attributed the rapid German collapse to economic difficulties brought
about by the British blockade of the Central Powers. See for example FDR’s faith in
“internation economic and non-intercourse boycott . . . as the principle weapon to be used
against recalcitrant” nations in his 1923 proposal for the Bok Peace Award. “Roosevelt,
Franklin D. Bok Peace Award: A Plan to Preserve World Peace,” Box 3, Eleanor
Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
208
Navy Day Radio Address, Mayflower Hotel, October 27, 1941, Master Speech File
Number 1389, FDRL.
185
French division being pulled out of the line near Chateau Thierry, he commented that
“these Poilus after many days of constant fighting and shell fire still looked awake and
intelligent, very different from the stolid, stupid look on the faces of the German
prisoners.”209 Nowhere in Roosevelt’s account of his travels in France is there any
indication of a contemporary awareness of the mutinies that immobilized the French
army the previous summer.
Roosevelt’s experiences during his tour validated his views of sea power and further
convinced him that air power might enable civilization to avoid the horrors of the
Western Front Again. Concerning naval activity and the implementation of the blockade,
he appraised offensive operations and coastal bombardment to be very effective and
assessed that improved patrolling and escorting, “with which I had something to do in the
summer of 1917,” had made the waters around Britain safe again. In northern France, he
visited several U.S. Navy aero squadrons that would soon be operational. He saw first
had the effect of German bombing raids. After inspecting the devastation caused by
German raids at several airfields and in French towns, he noted the blast radius of the
latest 800 to 1200 pound German bombs and saw the potential of heavier bombs. He
confidently believed that the United States “happens to have an answer” in the form of a
1750 pound bomb slated to be dropped by American night bombers. He envisioned the
great potential of heavy bombs dropped behind the front lines on transportation facilities,
“ammunition dumps, air dromes and military objectives.”210
209
Entry for August 4, 1918, Diary 1918, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
210
186
Roosevelt also noted the seemingly indomitable spirit of French public officials that he
observed and heard about in France. He praised the dedication of local French officials
and public servants who remained at their posts even “during the ‘touch-and-go’ days of
1914.” He hypothesized that the French people “seem to lose their heads even less than
the Anglo-Saxons.” Although he consistently lauded the intelligence and tenacity of the
French soldier, Roosevelt directly attributed French success during the Great War to
France’s Radical leaders, particularly Georges Clemenceau. Roosevelt met Clemenceau
in August 1918 and declared him to be the “greatest civilian in France.”211
Clemenceau fueled the imagination of American progressives. His early militant
republicanism brought him in conflict with the regime of Napoleon III, and Clemenceau
spent several years in the United States as a teacher and journalist prior to returning to
France in 1869. His political career began as mayor of Montmartre after the overthrow of
Napoleon III. A vigorous and stormy politician, his skills as a duelist and debater won
him the sobriquet, “The Tiger.” Despite a reputation for extreme Radicalism earned in the
Chamber of Deputies in the early Third Republic, the Clemenceau of the late 1890s and
early 1900s was someone with whom progressives could relate. After failing to win
reelection in 1893, Clemenceau dedicated himself to journalism and became a passionate
Dreyfusard. In 1898, he published Émile Zola’s sensational open letter denouncing the
French Army’s conspiracy against Captain Alfred Dreyfus and the Republic. He returned
to parliament in 1902 as the Radical Party donned the mantle of progress in France.
During Clemenceau’s first term as President of the Council of Ministers, or Prime

211
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL. Roosevelt also noted the
absence of Clemenceau at a lunch given by President Raymond Poincaré at the Elysee
Palace in honor of Herbert Hoover.
187
Minister, from 1906 to 1909, he proposed a package of progressive legislation that
included the ten-hour workday, an income tax, and pensions for the elderly. Like Franklin
Roosevelt, Clemenceau was a Freemason. Prior to his installment as Prime Minister and
Minister of War in November 1917 at the age of seventy-six, Clemenceau had been a
consistent critic of the government’s defeatism and inability to win a decisive victory. He
publicly supported initiatives to bolster French morale and determination like Theodore
Roosevelt’s proposal to deploy and command an American volunteer unit in France. In
March 1918, Clemenceau characterized his policy, “Internal policy, I wage war; foreign
policy, I still wage war.”212 The chairman of Wilson’s War Industries Board, Bernard
Baruch, considered Clemenceau to be a “great Frenchman” with “indomitable will and
courage.” According to Baruch, in 1917 and 1918 Clemenceau “was the savior of
France.”213
From Roosevelt’s perspective, Clemenceau ably provided civilian leadership to control
and direct the French war effort, taking a more involved and personal role than Wilson
did in the United States. In Clemenceau’s office, the prime minister showed Roosevelt
his “big map with all the latest troop movements” and a report detailing the latest
progress at the front “up to one hour before.” Roosevelt also observed how Clemenceau
directed the national effort through the services of trusted agents such as André Tardieu
working through a series of ad hoc executive agencies tailored to specific wartime needs.
Characterizing Tardieu as the “best executive administrator in the French Cabinet,”
212
James F. McMillan, Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992) pp. 6, 14, 18-20, 74-5.
213
Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1960), p. 112.
188
Roosevelt was fascinated how Tardieu essentially had “authority over the Ministers of the
other departments” and expected that a good many resented Tardieu’s interference and
were jealous of him. The process of executive agencies, however, produced tangible
results that benefited United States forces and the coalition war effort; Roosevelt noted,
“It is a beautiful and practical plan and it is showing results every day because everyone
knows what French Government ‘Red Tape’ still is, and it is even more difficult for an
American to untie.”214
Closer to the front, Roosevelt visited the headquarters of French Maréchal Ferdinand
Foch, the commander-in-chief of all the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers in
France. Spending an hour with Foch, Roosevelt was impressed with the calmness and
complete sense of control evident in the headquarters staffed by “half a dozen officers
and perhaps a dozen enlisted men.” Roosevelt noted that as commander-in-chief Foch
concerned himself with major results and the objectives of his strategy and with his
potential reserves of manpower, guns, and ammunition. He also assessed that in his
actions Foch gave “constant and necessary attention” to his political leaders and the
national efforts “to keep the Allied Armies in a position to make victory a certainty.”215
The trip also provided Roosevelt with an opportunity to pay a visit to Maréchal Joffre.
The two talked about “the days in May 1917 when our decision to send a really great
army to Europe hung in the balance.” Roosevelt assessed that without the efforts of Joffre
214
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL. In contrast to Tardieu,
Roosevelt noted that the Minister for Foreign Affairs “does not carry as much weight as
his title would indicate.”
215
Franklin D. Roosevelt address to the Graduating Class of the United States Military
Academy, West Point, New York, June 12, 1935, Master Speech File Number 783,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
189
and the French mission “that only a small part of the million and a quarter men now in
France would be here.” Joffre spoke frankly telling Roosevelt of his discouragement in
Washington and the inability of the Secretary of War and the General Staff to provide
“any definite statement” of United States plans or anything more than generalizations “as
to the numbers of troops, time of departure, program for guns, deliveries of material,
etc.[,] etc.” Roosevelt took pride in Joffre’s insistence that it was Roosevelt’s “friendly
advice” from the very first day after meeting the French mission at Hampton Roads that
“in the end enabled him to obtain the answers for which he had come to America.”216
During his tour of the front in the summer of 1918, Franklin Roosevelt never
recognized the fragile nature of morale in the French Army. Roosevelt saw, instead, only
the indomitable spirit of the French poilu. The previous year, mutinies had spread
throughout half of the French Army following a failed and bloody offensive at Chemin
des Dames directed by Général Robert Nivelle. In April and May 1917, after the French
Army sustained 110,000 casualties, 40,000 men refused to go to the front. Several
regiments had attempted to march on Paris. The French Grand Quartier Général
recorded mutinies in 113 infantry regiments, twelve artillery regiments, a dragoon
regiment, and 25 additional battalion-sized units, in all affecting sixteen French corps.217
The French government managed to conceal the extent of the 1917 mutinies, and the
American image of the indomitable French soldier remained intact.
216
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913 -1920, FDRL.
217
Paul-Marie de la Gorce, The French Army: A Military-Political History (New York:
George Braziller, 1963), p. 127 and James F. McMillan, Twentieth Century France:
Politics and Society, 1898-1991, p. 67.
190
X.
Despite Wilson’s rejection of Theodore Roosevelt’s plans to raise volunteer divisions
for service in France, Franklin Roosevelt remained a staunch believer in Theodore
Roosevelt’s military abilities. In August 1917, after news arrived that German drives had
taken Riga and threatened Petrograd, Franklin Roosevelt announced that if the
administration had “sent TR over to Russia with 100,000 men,” then, “This would not
have happened.”218 The force Theodore Roosevelt hoped to raise for duty on the Western
Front included Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, and William J. Donovan, men who
considered themselves to be progressive Republicans. Theodore Roosevelt’s martial
judgment clearly made a lasting impression on his younger kinsman. In the summer of
1940, when Franklin Roosevelt wanted to bolster United States military preparedness and
security, he offered cabinet positions to Stimson and Knox.
In 1918, Stimson and Knox each commanded artillery units in France. Both men,
however, served with units supporting divisions that only entered combat in active
sectors after the German spring offensives of 1918 had been halted. Stimson’s combat
experience consisted of one month as an observer with the British 51st Division at the
front near Cambrai and three weeks in the line commanding an artillery battalion in the
305th Artillery Regiment, 77th Division. Despite the relative quiet of the sectors where he
served, Stimson took great pride in the fact that “he was actually in command of troops in
the line” and that his unit was “holding our little sector against the Boche line and to that
218
Entry for August 21, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
194.
191
small extent responsible for civilization.”219 In early August 1918, Stimson was ordered
home, promoted to colonel, and given command of a new artillery regiment being readied
at Camp Meade, Maryland for “the great operations being planned for 1919.”220
Before the Great War, Stimson’s early career brought him into contact with Theodore
Roosevelt and ultimately owed a great deal to the former Rough Rider. Fascinated with
the American West as a young man, Stimson became a law partner in Elihu Root’s Wall
Street firm in 1893 and first met Theodore Roosevelt the following year. In the wave of
excitement over the outbreak of war with Spain in 1898, Stimson joined a cavalry troop
in the New York National Guard, serving with the troop for nine years. Root became
President Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war in 1899, and while in the presidency
Roosevelt referred to Root’s former law partner as “Sergeant Stimson” and in 1902
hailed him as “young Lochinvar.” In December 1905, Roosevelt called Stimson to the
White House and subsequently appointed him to the post of United States Attorney for
the Southern District of New York. When President William H. Taft offered Stimson the
position of secretary of war, Stimson replied that he had to confer with four people first:
his wife, his father, his law partner, and Theodore Roosevelt. At the state convention in
1910, Theodore Roosevelt nominated Stimson to run for governor of New York.
Although the campaign of 1912 and Stimson’s loyalty to Taft caused a rift between
Stimson and Theodore Roosevelt, the rift largely mended by late 1915 after the outbreak
219
Entry for July 11, 1918, Henry L. Stimson Diaries, IV:147-8, Yale University
Library.
220
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 97-9.
192
of war in Europe and the criticism that both men had for Wilson’s handling of United
States foreign policy.221
Shared interests and mutual acquaintances brought Franklin Roosevelt into direct
contact with Stimson. It is likely that one of Stimson’s assistants as U.S. Attorney in New
York, Felix Frankfurter, first introduced Stimson to Franklin Roosevelt.222 Theodore
Roosevelt also constituted a powerful link between the two. In 1909, Theodore Roosevelt
asked Stimson “to act as his personal counsel and advisor” and their “families saw a great
deal of each other” after Roosevelt returned from Africa, living only eight miles apart.
Occasional contact between Franklin Roosevelt and Stimson probably occurred due to
the proximity of the Stimson residence with Oyster Bay. For instance, in September 1911
Secretary of War Stimson and former Rough Rider General Leonard Wood went for a
221
“Memorandum of interesting (to me) occasions & events in my life during the past
few years—Begun Jan 17th 1909,” “Personal Reminiscences, 1911-1912,” and “Previous
Relations With Colonel Roosevelt,” microfilm edition of the Henry L. Stimson Diaries,
I:1-4, II:8-19, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut. See also Henry L.
Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1947), p. 91 and Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of
Henry Stimson, 1867-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), pp. 7-8, 52-3, 58-9, 61.
222
Godfrey Hodgson, a British journalist and observer of American politics, credits
Frankfurter with introducing Franklin Roosevelt and Stimson; however, he suggests that
the first meeting took place between the two men in January 1933. See Hodgson, The
Colonel, pp. 61, 166-7. Stimson’s diary suggests that he met Theodore Roosevelt’s
nephew much earlier. See “Previous Relations With Colonel Roosevelt,” microfilm
edition of the Henry L. Stimson Diaries, II:12, 19, Yale University Library. In 1910,
Theodore Roosevelt prodded both men to run for New York state office, Stimson for
governor and Franklin Roosevelt for the state Senate. During the 1912 presidential
campaign, Felix Frankfurter, then serving with the Bureau of Insular Affairs, earned
Theodore Roosevelt’s praise as one of the “associates and counselors” that he would like
to have “in this great cause for which I am fighting.” Theodore Roosevelt to Paul A.
Ewert, July 5, 1912, Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 7,
The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1954), pp. 570-2.
193
long horseback ride with Theodore Roosevelt and his nephew.223 Coincidentally,
Theodore Roosevelt prodded both progressives into New York politics in 1910. The
former president nominated Stimson to be governor of New York; while, Franklin
Roosevelt ran for state senator.224
Franklin Roosevelt’s criticism of Wilson’s policies prior to United States entry into the
Great War, his support for Theodore Roosevelt’s theories, and his sessions with
Republicans publicly critical of the Wilson administration brought him into direct contact
with Stimson’s Wall Street partner Elihu Root, General Wood, and, presumably, Stimson
himself.225 Stimson considered Theodore Roosevelt’s “personal crusade in favor of a
strong American stand against Germany” to have been the former president’s greatest
service to his country.226 In May 1917, when Theodore Roosevelt abandoned his plans to
raise four volunteer divisions, he released Stimson who subsequently served at the War
College in Washington, D.C. before joining the 77th Division that autumn.227
223
“Previous Relations With Colonel Roosevelt,” microfilm edition of the Henry L.
Stimson Diaries, II:12, 19, Yale University Library.
224
Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1990) p. 18; James MacGregor Burns, The Lion and the Fox:
Roosevelt, 1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984) pp. 31,
34.
225
Entry for March 11, 1917, Diary 1917, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt:
226
227
194
Reflecting the attitudes of progressive America, Stimson characterized France as “still
standing nobly on guard for us and for civilization.”228 Stimson believed that the war in
Europe was a direct result of “the Prussian doctrine of state supremacy” and the theory
“that all rights belonged to the state.” The world, Stimson perceived, was “divided
between those who believed in the individual and democracy and those who believed in
the state and autocracy.” Although submarine attacks had been an immediate cause for
the United States to enter the war, he believed that “the basic enemy was Prussianism.”229
In Stimson’s mind, the Great War had become a conflict between political ideologies,
ideas, and national will.
Stimson’s experiences on the Western Front shaped his views of the combatants and
the dynamics of the war. He found French soldiers “inspiring” and noted that “British and
French morale seems perfectly good and they are confident.”230 Stimson believed that the
French character was particularly adept at responding to temporary battlefield setbacks.
During a major German offensive on the Somme in late March 1918, he observed, “Only
the French seem calm.” Stimson added, “It is really a sign of their superior knowledge of
military affairs that they take the rather startling situations calmly and make their
dispositions as if it were all in a day’s work.”231 In contrast, Stimson believed that
228
Entry for May 1, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:91, Henry Lewis Stimson
Papers, manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
229
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 87, 89.
230
Entries for February 17 and March 28, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:52 and
76, Yale University Library.
231
Entry for March 31, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:77, Yale University
Library.
195
German and Austrian morale was much more fragile than that of either France or Britain.
He envisioned that a successful defense against German and Austrian offensives might be
sufficient to turn their people against continuing the war. If the Allies could “check”
offensives by either Germany or Austria, then it would “be fatal to them.”232 He predicted
that if the German offensives of mid 1918 could be stopped then “the crisis will be
over.”233 Stimson surmised “that if the Boche ever cracked he would crack badly[,] and if
he gets a good sock dolager of a set back this summer . . . that he will go up in the air.”234
Several days later he reported the German offensive on Paris stopped and offered, “From
now on he will decline and, I hope, decline rapidly.”235 Despite Stimson’s optimism
about a rapid German decline, he saw little prospect that the end of the war would come
in 1918 even though the effect of an unsuccessful offensive “on Germany will be
tremendous.”236
Stimson admired the French soldiers he encountered and praised their martial qualities.
He contrasted American soldiers who “looked vigorous and young and powerful” with
their French counterparts “who looked older and rather worn although showing a fine
232
Entry for May 1, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:92, Yale University Library.
233
Entry for July 4, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:143, Yale University Library.
234
Entry for July 25, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:159, Yale University
Library.
235
Library.
236
Library.
196
spirit and elan.”237 Stimson, who had lived in Paris as a boy, noted with pleasure his
encounters and dinners with French officers.238
Stimson, nonetheless, held a less favorable view of German soldiers. He inherited his
father’s disgust for “the martial swagger” of Imperial Germany.239 Indicative of his
attitude, Stimson occasionally referred to German soldiers as “the Prussians.”240 He
characterized German soldiers as “those creatures” and blamed the “Boche” for “the
blight he has put upon this sad land.”241 Unlike the morale of the French, Stimson
believed that a sharp battlefield setback would be sufficient to destroy the morale of the
German soldiery and people and, ultimately, topple their militaristic and autocratic
society. In his thinking, German battlefield setbacks were the mechanism that would lead
to the awakening of the German people. Concerning the individual Germans that he
believed had been tricked by the autocratic Prussian oligarchy into supporting the war,
237
Entry for July 4, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:141, Yale University Library.
238
Entries for April 12, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:85, Yale University
Library. For other dinners, see entries for February 15 and 24, and April 2, 1918, Henry
Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:51-2, 58, 80, Yale University Library. Stimson professed
admiration for the French. In 1871, his father took the Stimson family to Europe, living
initially in Berlin, then Zurich, and finally Paris. Stimson’s father worked under Louis
Pasteur in Paris for one year. The Stimson family returned to the United States in 1873.
Hodgson, The Colonel, pp. 28, 171.
239
Hodgson, The Colonel, p. 171.
240
Entry for June 22, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:131, Yale University
Library.
241
Entries for July 8 and 31, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:144, 162, Yale
University Library.
197
Stimson thought that after a battlefield defeat “his government can no longer hide the
truth from him”242
Like Stimson, William Franklin Knox also served with the artillery during the Great
War. Following completion of college in 1898, Frank Knox volunteered for service in the
Spanish-American War. He joined the 1st Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, the “Rough
Riders,” at Tampa, Florida and fought with Theodore Roosevelt in Cuba. A newspaper
reporter and, later, editor and publisher, Knox became politically prominent after the
Spanish-American War. In 1910, he became the chairman of the Michigan Republican
Party central committee and a political appointee to the board of Indian commissioners
the following year. In 1912, he managed Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign for the
Republican nomination in the west and subsequently supported him as the candidate for
the Progressive Party. When the United States entered the war in 1917, Knox enlisted as
a private soldier. He received orders to attend officers’ training school and an
appointment as a captain of cavalry. His initial assignment found him serving at Camp
Dix, New Jersey as a division personnel officer. In December 1917, Knox earned
promotion to major and assignment as the commander of the ammunition train of the
153rd Artillery Brigade, 78th Division. As Knox prepared to deploy to France, Theodore
Roosevelt noted, “Lord, how I wish I was going over with you!” In France, Knox served
with the 78th Division from May 1918 through the Armistice, participating in the St.
242
Library.
198
Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives and ultimately being promoted to colonel in the
Reserve Corps.243
Staunchly progressive, Knox’s attitudes about the war in Europe mirrored those of
Stimson, Theodore Roosevelt, and their interventionist circle. Prior to United States entry
into the war, Knox supported Theodore Roosevelt’s immediate call for “a big, highly
efficient navy and a small, highly efficient regular army” and, ultimately, a system of
universal military training; he remained critical of Wilson’s foreign policy.244 Knox
believed that, if successful, the leaders of Germany would impose “their imperious will
on the rest of the world.” In Knox’s mind, he perceived the enemy to be an “all-
powerful” imperial German autocracy, “Kaiserism.” He predicted that German victory
would result in the complete “submergence of all those principles and those ideals which
mean freedom and individual liberty.”245
Knox’s experiences during the Great War in France were striking similar to those of
Stimson as well. On paper, Knox’s 78th Division spent thirty-eight days in battle during
the Great War, seventeen days in quiet sectors and twenty-one days in an active sector of
the Western Front. During its first offensive at St. Mihiel in September 1918, the 78th
243
National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. F, 1939-42 (New York: James T.
White and Company, 1942), pp. 25-6. Theodore Roosevelt letter to Frank Knox, January
31, 1918, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, Library of
Congress Manuscript Division.
244
Theodore Roosevelt letters to Frank Knox, October 23 and November 9, 1915 and
Knox’s copy of Theodore Roosevelt’s manuscript for his speech “National Duty and
International Ideals,” Chicago, April 29, 1916, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and
Writings File, Box 5, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
245
Frank Knox speech to American Legion, Columbia, South Carolina, November 11,
1940, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, Library of
199
Division remained in reserve. The division was only committed to combat for four days
in November 1918 during the last stage of the Meuse-Argonne campaign.246 The day of
the Armistice found Knox and his men in “a little town outside of Verdun . . . all torn to
pieces by shell fire and the ground so pock-marked with shell holes.”247
After the war, Colonel George C. Marshall, a future chief of staff of the U.S. Army,
commented on the phenomenon that he sensed during the autumn months of 1918. By the
end of July, he believed, “The entire aspect of the war had changed.” In consequence,
those committed to combat after July 1918 tended to view the conflict much differently.
He observed, “A veteran of a single battle like the St. Mihiel is prone to draw some
erroneous conclusions.” In sharp contrast to veterans of the First Division involved in
earlier fighting and “familiar with the vicissitudes of Cantigny and the terrific fighting at
Soissons,” Marshall judged that “the members of a previously inexperienced division
considered themselves the victors in a prodigious struggle.”248 Marshall’s comments
apply to both Stimson and Knox. Before the end of the war the United States dispatched
forty-two divisions to France, nearly 2,084,000 soldiers. Of those forty-two, however,
elements of only four divisions, approximately 58,700 soldiers, had been in units
committed to active combat prior to July 1918 when German reserves were exhausted.249
246
Leonard P. Ayres, The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 108, 113-5.
247
Frank Knox speech to American Legion, Columbia, South Carolina, November 11,
1940, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, Library of
248
George C. Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 123, 148-9.
249
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 32-3, 104-7.
200
XI.
The fundamental interrelationship between domestic attitudes and wartime strategy in
the Wilson administration is evident in the actions of the Committee on Public
Information, the CPI, created by executive order only eight days after the declaration of
war.250 The chairman of the CPI, George Creel, recognized that “modern war, and this
war in particular, necessitate readjustments in the gathering and distributing of news.” In
addition to the American people, the CPI planned to reach Germany and disseminate
stories that would “exercise a depressing effect on the morale of their people” if they
continued to support their government’s war effort.251 The CPI’s tasks were two fold:
fight “indifference and disaffection in the United States” and undermine militarism,
Prussianism, and Junkerism in Germany in order to bring about the establishment of a
democratic German government. Creel, furthermore, did not operate in a vacuum.
Secretary of War Newton Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels had initially
suggested to President Wilson that he appoint Creel to a “Committee of Publicity.”252
Although he served as chairman of the CPI, by Wilson’s order Creel’s committee
250
Letter from Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, May 17, 1917, in Arthur S. Link, ed.,
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1983), p. 304
251
Enclosure “Committee on Public Information Preliminary Statement to the Press,” in
letter from Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, May 17, 1917, in Arthur S. Link, ed., The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1983), pp. 304-13.
252
201
included three other members, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the
Secretary of the Navy.
Franklin Roosevelt enthusiastically worked with Creel and assisted his efforts at home
and abroad.253 His son James recalled that in 1917 and 1918 his father remained
preoccupied “with World War I and politics.” Understandably, the CPI’s difficult work of
endeavoring to shape domestic attitudes while simultaneously serving the war effort
overseas naturally appealed to Roosevelt. One night, for example, Roosevelt worked in
Creel’s office until 2:30 in the morning.254 To shape domestic attitudes, the Secretary of
the Navy or in his absence Roosevelt as the Acting Secretary held a press conference
“once or twice a day, which was quite a strain.”255 Members of the administration viewed
domestic opposition to Creel’s methods as coming from plutocrats and German
sympathizers.256 To overcome such opposition, the progressive approach was to educate
the people, encourage them to support the war effort, and explain the reasons for United
States involvement. The CPI did that with representatives, Four Minute Men, trained at
253
Roosevelt clearly accepted the CPI’s interpretation of events. See Frank Friedel,
Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952),
pp. 332-3.
254
James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R., p. 111.
255
Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference #260 – A, December 27, 1935, 10:45 a.m. in
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, vol. 6 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 359-61.
256
Entries for April 16, October 24, and October 26, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet
Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp. 135, 226-7.
202
special camps such as the Speakers’ Training Camp in Chautauqua, New York, where
Roosevelt addressed a group in July 1917.257
During his tour in Western Europe, Roosevelt maintained a close working relationship
with the CPI. In London in late July 1918, Roosevelt seized every opportunity to
reinforce Anglo-American relations in the press and castigated “the representatives of the
Committee on Public Information over here” for their inactivity.258 Concerned with the
charges Italian socialists were making about the United States being an imperialist
country, Captain Charles E. Merriam, the Commissioner to Italy of the CPI, asked
Roosevelt to talk to press correspondents and editors. Roosevelt spoke for over forty-five
minutes and provided Merriam’s best copy of the week.259 In Paris in August, James F.
Kerney, the representative of the CPI, enlisted Roosevelt to extol the success of the
Allied anti-submarine effort in order to boost French, and damage German, morale.
Roosevelt held a press conference on August 21.260 At the conference Roosevelt spoke
frankly with French newspaper editors about the U.S. Navy and even related to them that
the procedure in Washington was for departments to hold “a conference in the morning
for the afternoon papers, and an afternoon conference for the morning papers.” Such a
system of press conferences, however, was more than Clemenceau was prepared to allow
257
Roosevelt comments at the Speakers’ Training Camp for Patriotic Education,
Chautauqua, New York, July 7, 1917, Master Speech File Number 72, Speech Files,
FDRL.
258
259
Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1952), p. 362.
260
Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship, p. 367.
203
in wartime. Clemenceau, having already modified French censorship rules for Kerney,
told Roosevelt, “Oh, you will destroy my government!”261
Cooperation between the CPI and the uniformed services stretched from Washington
to France. Secretary of War Baker and Navy Secretary Daniels both supported Creel’s
efforts.262 Nevertheless, even with secretariat support and cooperation, there were
problems coordinating the work of the services and the CPI. In the War Department, the
Military Intelligence Division recognized the value of disseminating information and
psychological warfare and established a Propaganda Subsection and a Psychological
Subsection. The Propaganda Subsection in the War Department had the task of bringing
the military point of view to the civilian staff of the CPI as well as channeling calls for
American propaganda. Likewise, in France, the army established a psychological section
within the general staff of the headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, for
propaganda against the enemy. With ambitious enthusiasts in the military and civilian
information agencies, disputes arose over blurry lines of jurisdiction, particularly in
France. In spite of basic cooperation, there was a recognized need to delineate which
organization had primary responsibility in Allied, neutral, and enemy countries. By June
1918 the War Department and the CPI had largely resolved primary and supporting
261
Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference #260 – A, December 27, 1935, 10:45 a.m. in
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, vol. 6 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 359-61. For Kerney’s role in
persuading Clemenceau to allowing CPI activity and products in France, see George
Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920; Reprint
edition, New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 292.
262
Entries for April 11, 12, and 16, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, pp. 132-3, 135. For Secretary Newton D. Baker’s support for the CPI and praise
for Creel, see his forward to George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1920; Reprint edition, New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. xi.
204
responsibilities in Europe for psychological warfare, the CPI taking the lead in Allied and
neutral countries and military intelligence responsible for enemy countries.263 Working
with the psychological section of the AEF, the CPI was able to assert that “by balloons,
mortars, and aeroplanes we carried the truth across the firing line into the Central
Powers,” showering the enemy with over three million leaflets and pamphlets.264
Under the aegis of the CPI, the Wilson administration also set up what it hoped would
be the nucleus for the German government in the future, the Friends of German
Democracy. In addition to establishing contacts inside Germany through Berne,
Switzerland, the Friends of German Democracy also produced the leaflets that the armed
forces showered on German front line soldiers, stressing that the United States was not
fighting the German people, only the German militarists. Prodding them to overthrow
their government, the leaflets urged, “Arise for a struggle for a free Germany!”265
Unlike the uniformed services, substantially less interest in any cooperation existed
between the State Department and the CPI. Although President Wilson regarded his
friend George Creel as “progressive,” Secretary of State Lansing believed that Creel
displayed “socialistic tendencies” and was overly ambitious to the point of lacking
discretion. Depicting Creel as hostile to the State Department and to him personally,
263
Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the
Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of
America, 1986), pp. 154-8. The experiences of Captain Walter Lippmann provide the
best example of the blurred relationships in France. See Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann
and the American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), pp. 145-9.
264
George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in
1918 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1938), pp. 31-9.
265
George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1938), pp. 35-7.
205
Lansing claimed that “the policy of keeping the entire control of publicity, so far as
diplomatic matters were concerned, in the hands of the Department of State was followed
up to the end of the war.”266 Members of the United States diplomatic corps in Europe
expressed similar hostility toward CPI representatives. In fact in February 1918, Lansing
complained of the CPI’s efforts in Europe to President Wilson. Faced with a choice,
Wilson decided to support the efforts of the CPI and bypass the State Department. In
going outside of traditional State Department foreign policy channels, Wilson moved
toward a new pattern of diplomacy, a method intent on educating and appealing to the
mass public opinion of a nation. More than the diplomatic relations practiced by the State
Department with heads of state, Wilson’s new diplomacy also concerned itself with
diffusing information throughout all levels of society to include opposition groups, labor
unions, and the press.267 Focused as it was with cultivating channels outside of the
traditional domain of the State Department, Wilson’s new diplomacy provided a powerful
example for Franklin Roosevelt who, like Wilson, supported the CPI’s methods and
efforts.
For many who later played influential civilian roles in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration, their experiences in the Great War profoundly influenced their
perspective of both German and American power. At the time of the Great War, they, like
Franklin Roosevelt, considered themselves to be progressives and accepted its basic
tenets. Although they served in uniform in 1917 and 1918, men such as Hugh S. Johnson,
Felix Frankfurter, Adolph A. Berle, Walter Lippmann, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. had no
266
Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, pp. 322-4.
267
Gregg Wolper, “Woodrow Wilson’s New Diplomacy: Vira Whitehouse in
Switzerland, 1918,” Prologue, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 230-33, 237-8.
206
battlefield experience. They based their attitudes on the progressive view of the war
propounded by official Washington and shaped by the Committee on Public Information.
Sumner Welles worked at the embassy in Argentina. William Bullitt worked for the State
Department in Washington, D.C. after serving as foreign correspondent for the
Philadelphia Ledger. Although Cordell Hull had served in Cuba during the Spanish
American War, he spent the Great War in the halls of Congress. Rejected for military
service, Harry Hopkins worked at American Red Cross headquarters in the capital.
Harold L. Ickes worked for the Illinois State Council of Defense and for the Y.M.C.A. in
France. Others, such as William Dodd, the future ambassador to Germany, served among
the university professors whose talents the CPI put to use.
XII.
With its stress on will power and psychological factors, the Wilson administration
viewed the Great War as more than a military conflict between industrialized countries.
Speaking a few weeks after the Armistice, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker announced
that military victory “was a composite result.” Instrumental in victory had been not only
“the superb heroism of the American soldiers and the veteran soldiers with whom we
were associated” but also an “unseen but pervasive and unending flood of ideas.”268
Commenting on the impact of the first United States convoy arriving in France in June
1917, a naval intelligence officer, Captain W. R. Sayles, expressed similar views about
268
Secretary Newton D. Baker’s forward to George Creel, How We Advertised America
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920; Reprint edition, New York: Arno Press, 1972), p.
xvi.
207
the power of symbolic factors and psychological forces. Sayles commented that “the
morale of the whole French Nation was such that I believe a delay of two months more in
our sending troops,…giving them some visual demonstration that we were really in the
war; would have resulted in France capitulating.” Sayles asserted that the first convoy
could not have arrived “at a more psychological moment.” He predicated that without a
visible show of American troops in France in June 1917 that “France would have
speedily been reduced to the same condition of chaos, confusion, and anarchy to which
the German Intelligence Departments had brought Russia.”269
Because of that composite view, members of the Wilson administration believed that
the war had not been fought solely by those in uniform on the Western Front, but also by
the American men and women who supported them. Clearly, the view persisted in the
administration that the most decisive aspects of the United States war effort had been
influenced and supervised by civilians. When Germany appeared on the verge of collapse
in late October 1918 at the height of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, members of the
administration were quick to laud the “statesmanship” of President Wilson and “the
masterly way in which you have dealt with the situation.”270 Another confided to the
president, “The internal collapse in Germany, to my mind, is the direct result of your
statesmanship.”271 Praising civilian accomplishments during the war, Baker argued,
269
Enclosure to Captain W. R. Sayles memorandum, May 13, 1919, “The Visit of the
‘Joffre’ Mission to the United States and its Result—The First Convoy,” Franklin D.
270
L. S. Rowe to Woodrow Wilson, October 29, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Series
2, Reel 101, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
271
Letter to Woodrow Wilson from the Federal Reserve Board, October 30, 1918,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
208
We share with the soldiers who went to France the dignity and glory of
having fought as they fought, along a somewhat different front and with
not quite the same peril; but we fought with the same spirit, we fought for
the same cause, we fought with them . . . .272
Franklin Roosevelt shared Baker’s sentiments about the significance of civilian
contributions. Several years after the war, in response to a friend preparing a tablet at
Groton to honor those who served in the Great War, Roosevelt responded that although
he “did not wear a uniform” that his name should be listed with those “in the first
division of those who were ‘in the service,’ especially as I saw service on the other side,
was missed by torpedoes and shells. . . .”273
Based on contemporary attitudes, the implications for victory in the Great War were
clear for many who served. Certainly the United States had overestimated German
military power. Although the United States military had planned to have eighty divisions
overseas by June 1919 and an additional twenty more by the end of that year, it seemed
evident that the United States had misjudged the situation. The German collapse came
sooner than anyone anticipated because German morale made its military a fragile
instrument. Of the forty-two United States divisions in France prior to the signing of the
Armistice, only twenty-seven saw any combat, some entering the line only in November
1918 within days of the end of the war.274 Many thought that more decisive to the final
outcome of the war than the mobilization of those divisions was the propaganda
272
Secretary Newton D. Baker’s forward to George Creel, How We Advertised America
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920; Reprint edition, New York: Arno Press, 1972), p.
xvii.
273
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter quoted in James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion
and the Fox (San Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), p. 66.
274
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 25.
209
campaign and psychological warfare that avoided the enemy’s military forces. It seemed
evident that a one hundred division American Army was not only unnecessary, but that
the United States might have realized greater, and less costly, results with other
approaches.
The Great War also played a fundamental and enduring role in the direction of
Franklin Roosevelt’s thinking about strategy. Although Roosevelt had been a publicist of
Mahan’s ideas in 1914 and 1915, with United States entry into the war he developed a
much more subtle approach to grand strategy than a direct contest of Mahanian battle
fleets. Increasingly Roosevelt adopted an asymmetrical strategy, one that favored using
an indirect approach to get at an enemy’s weakness rather than attack enemy strength.
Certainly, the lessons of the CPI, psychological warfare, and the blockade of the North
Sea reinforced in Roosevelt’s thinking that the most effective use of American power was
to strike German weaknesses. His tour of the Western Front would have reinforced those
views and very distinctly demonstrated for him the costly impact of a symmetrical
strategy that pitted an American Army directly against an enemy army and failed to
account for the powerful impact of morale and psychological factors.
To Frank Knox, the Great War also reinforced an important lesson. He believed that
American military preparedness was essential because “we may not have the good
fortune that we had before to have Great Britain and France hold the lines while we get
ready.”275 Franklin Roosevelt learned an identical lesson. Roosevelt told his audience in
May 1918, “And we shall not soon forget that in this first year of the war that has passed
275
Frank Knox speech for the annual celebration of “Le jour de Sainte-Barbe,” Boston,
December 4, 1937, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5,
Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
210
we have had the actual conflict three thousand miles away and have been protected by the
troops of France and Britain while we prepare in safety.” He solemnly predicted, “That
will not always happen if future wars come.”276
XIII.
By late September 1918, British, French, and American offenses regained the initiative
on the Western Front, tearing holes in the German lines. Historian Frederich Meinecke
lamented the fact that “the boundless demands of the Pan-German-militaristic-
conservative combine” had dragged Germany “down into this abyss.”277 On October 3,
1918, General Erich von Ludendorff, the first quartermaster-general of the German army,
informed his government that Germany had to conclude an armistice immediately.278
Ludendorff had also urged the transformation of the German government into a system
that would convince the Allies of its liberalism and representative nature.279 Several days
later, Prince Max of Baden, the newly installed German Imperial Chancellor, notified
President Wilson that the German government had accepted Wilson’s program “as a basis
276
Roosevelt commencement address at Drexel Institute of Technology, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, May 1, 1918, Master Speech File Number 75, Speech Files, FDRL.
277
Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978),
pp. 394-5.
278
Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1955), p. 341.
279
pp. 396-8.
211
for peace negotiations” and requested an immediate armistice.280 Suddenly faced with no
obstruction, the three majority parties in the Riechstag, the Social Democrats, the Centre,
and the Progressives, supported the new chancellor and enacted a series of immediate
reforms. The result was a constitutional transformation that brought democratization,
ministerial control by parliament, ended monarchical control of the army, and widened
suffrage. Kaiser Wilhelm II, however, stubbornly refused to abdicate.281
In October 1918, the Wilson administration had to determine the basis on which the
war would end. First, before formally replying to Prince Max’s appeal, Wilson requested
clarification as to whether the chancellor represented “the constituted authorities of the
Empire who have so far conducted this war” or had acted on his own volition and
authority.282 Although several members advocated the “unconditional surrender” of
Germany, the majority in Wilson’s cabinet favored an armistice because it would achieve
what they thought the United States was fighting for.283 Key, however, was the belief that
the armistice could only be with a government that represented the liberal, democratic
German people. No agreement was possible with an “autocratic government in Germany”
280
Speech of the German Chancellor, October 5, 1918, enclosure to File No.
763.72119/3113, Chargé Oederlin to Wilson, October 6, 1918, in U.S. Department of
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, supplement 1,
The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 337-8.
281
pp. 396-8.
282
Secretary of State to Chargé Oederlin, October 8, 1918, File No. 763.72119/2113,
U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1933), p. 343.
283
Entry for October 22-3, 1918, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
343.
212
and that if it remained in power that there should be “no let up until the Kaiser, Von
Tirpitz & Co were hung.”284
Discussing the initial German response, Wilson’s cabinet concluded that it was in the
interest of the United States to conclude an earlier rather than a later peace. Secretary
Daniels noted contemporary belief that if the United States and the Allies continued “to
win” that the “selfish aims” of the Allied Powers would increasingly assert themselves.285
Concerned about the selfish interests of Britain and France, Wilson proposed “to go into
the Peace Conference armed with as many weapons as my pockets will hold so as to
compel justice.”286
American fears of resurgent German militarists also revealed the necessity for an
armistice agreement. By October 31, 1918, the Wilson administration believed that an
armistice and peace were possible with a liberal German government. Secretary of State
Lansing, however, warned “the German military regime has not been eliminated, that it is
still all powerful and that it intends to resume control in the event of the failure of the
present negotiations.”287 To the Wilson administration, an immediate armistice would
serve the purpose of bolstering German liberals against the Prussian militarists
responsible for the war while also forestalling Allied assertiveness and selfishness.
284
Entries for October 13 and 14, 1918, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, p. 340.
285
Entry for October 22, 1917, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
343.
286
Entry for October 17, 1918, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
342.
287
Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, October 31, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers,
Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
213
On November 5, 1918, Secretary of State Lansing sent a communication to the
German government announcing that the United States and the Allied governments had
authorized the Allied generalissimo, French Maréchal Ferdinand Foch, to receive
representatives of the German government and communicate armistice terms to them.288
With armistice negotiations underway, Clemenceau reported to Wilson on November 9,
1918, “I regard it as almost certain that they will accept it.” Clemenceau also noted the
confusion in Germany and breakdown of German military authority.289 Mutiny swept
through the German High Seas Fleet. Soldier and worker councils in Munich proclaimed
a Bavarian Republic on November 7, an example quickly followed in Frankfurt, Leipzig,
Cologne, and Stuttgart. On November 9, 1918, Prince Max announced that Kaiser
Wilhelm II had decided to renounce his throne as king of Prussia and German emperor.
That afternoon, events moved beyond the control of Prince Max, so Philipp Scheidemann
of the German Social Democratic Party announced the establishment of a German
Republic.290 The Kaiser reportedly crossed into Holland the next day.291 Later on
288
Secretary of State to Swiss Minister Sulzer, November 5, 1918, File No.
763.72119/3813k, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 468-9.
289
Edward House to the Secretary of State for the President, November 9, 1918, File No.
763.72119/9104, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
290
Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1955), pp. 344-8; Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History
(Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989, 2nd edition) pp. 168-9.
291
Chargé Bliss in the Netherlands to the Secretary of State, November 10, 1918, File
No. 862.001W64/39, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
214
November 10, the United States chargé reported that the revolution in Germany had been
a “splendid, almost bloodless success in Berlin.” He added that Prince Max had
transferred the office of chancellor to Frederich Ebert, the leader of the majority
Socialists, who had begun to form a new government.292 On the morning of November
11, 1918, representatives of the German government signed the armistice ending the
war.293
Unable to get into uniform before the Great War ended, Roosevelt nevertheless
remained busy during the last month of the war prior to the signing of the armistice. He
served for a period as the acting secretary of the navy during which time he provided
input into the naval clauses of the Armistice agreement. President Wilson wanted
“moderate” terms sufficient to prevent the “renewal of hostilities by Germany but not
humiliating beyond that necessity, as such terms would throw the advantage to the
military power in Germany.”294 Although the German terms proposed by the Navy
292
Chargé Bliss in the Netherlands to the Secretary of State, November 10, 1918, File
No. 862.00/305, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
293
Edward House to the Secretary of State for the President, November 11, 1918, File
No. 763.72119/9129, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
294
Woodrow Wilson cablegram to E. House, October 28, 1918 and P. C. March to J. J.
Pershing, October 27, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential
Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
215
Department seem rather harsh, Roosevelt justified them with the argument that “it will be
less difficult for Germany to accept harsh Naval terms than harsh Army Terms.”295
Meanwhile, in addition to armistice negotiations, late October and early November
1918 witnessed closely contested and partisan congressional races in the United States.
On October 25, Wilson made an appeal to voters to support the Democratic Party,
declaring that the failure to return Democratic majorities in either house would be seen as
a repudiation of his leadership. The election, however, resulted in Republican majorities
in both houses of Congress.296 The Wilson administration and the leadership of the
Democratic Party viewed the election results as the result of a reactionary backlash to
their reform efforts at home and abroad. Rather than being the will of the people, Homer
S. Cummings, The Vice Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, blamed the
outcome on the “lavish use of money” by a corrupt Republican Party. He also noted that
the Republican slogans for “Unconditional Surrender” and “No Negotiated Peace” had
been surprisingly effective in their “deliberate misrepresentation” of the president’s
policy.297 Writing from the office of the Democratic National Committee, Senator Key
Pittman of Nevada claimed that “Republican leaders successfully deceived the people of
the United States” and had lead them to believe that the president was prepared “to make
295
Franklin Roosevelt undated memorandum for President Wilson, circa late October
1918, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 51, September 14—November 8, 1918,
Arthur S. Link, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 486-7.
296
William A. and Arthur S. Link, American Epoch, p. 165.
297
Homer S. Cummings to Woodrow Wilson, November 7, 1918, Woodrow Wilson
Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential papers Microfilm, Library of Congress
216
easy terms with Germany.”298 The last was a lesson that Franklin Roosevelt apparently
took to heart, coming to terms before an enemy was soundly defeated and had
surrendered unconditionally was politically risky.
The end of the war and the impending shift of the American economy away from
military production also offered a lesson to Roosevelt. In the days immediately following
the signing of the Armistice, Wilson saw great benefits from continued military
production, far beyond the military value of those munitions. Wilson told his cabinet that
what was needed was a gradual demobilization that would “not disturb conditions” in the
American economy or society. Keen that American labor should not be idle, he suggested
that it was “better [to] make more shells than we need.”299 The lesson was that the
domestic political, economic, and social impact of military spending could be more
valuable than the military worth of the munitions or hardware purchased.
Additionally, the Great War and its aftermath had the long-term impact of shifting
Roosevelt family sympathies toward France and away from Germany. James and Sara
Delano Roosevelt had ensured that Franklin Roosevelt received relatively equal exposure
to the French and German languages as a child. Initially, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt
seem to have followed the example of his parents with their own children; the outbreak of
war in 1914 ended that balance. Before the first winter of the war, the Roosevelts had
released their German governess, ostensibly because of her sinus problems, and retained
only a French governess. During the war, the Roosevelts tried two different French
298
Senator Key Pittman to Woodrow Wilson, November 6, 1918, Woodrow Wilson
Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential papers Microfilm, Library of Congress
299
Entries for November 12 and 13, 1918, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, pp. 348-9.
217
governesses for their children, and although both taught the language capably, Eleanor
Roosevelt judged that “they were very bad” for her children’s “dispositions.” After the
war, the Roosevelts settled on a single, French-speaking, Swiss Protestant governess,
Mademoiselle Seline Thiel, from Neuchâtel.300 The result was that the Roosevelt
children, unlike their parents, could speak only French, not German. In contrast to his
father, Roosevelt’s son James related that he left Harvard in 1928 without a diploma
because he failed German.301 When Eleanor Roosevelt took her two youngest sons on a
tour of France, Belgium, and the Rhineland in 1929, she discovered that they could not
understand German at all, and they begged her to take them back to France.302
300
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 169, 209, 211, 272 and 343. James
Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a Lonely Man
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 42-3 and Elliott Roosevelt and
James Brough, The Roosevelts of Hyde Park: An Untold Story, p. 133. Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s governess, Mademoiselle Rosat Sandoz, was also from the Swiss canton of
Neuchâtel.
301
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 110.
302
218
Chapter 4: The Affirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1919-1928
Every war . . . brings after it a period of materialism and conservatism;

people tire quickly of ideals.
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his son Elliott1
By the mid 1920s, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s worldview coalesced into a coherent
perspective and reservoir of strategic thinking. From Franklin D. Roosevelt’s progressive
perspective, the forces of conservatism, militarism, and imperialism seemed to flourish in
the aftermath of the Great War. Faced with the apparent failures of the Paris Peace
Conference, Woodrow Wilson’s efforts on behalf of the League of Nations, and his own
defeat in the election of 1920, Roosevelt deliberated about how to avoid the mistakes he
recognized. Throughout his life, Roosevelt considered history to be cyclic in nature. The
intervention of the United States in the Great War and Woodrow Wilson’s dream of a
League of Nations to enforce international peace represented a period of idealism and
progress to Roosevelt but at tremendous human cost. There were limits as to how long
idealism could be sustained before it would be followed by a period of conservatism and
reaction. The postwar era, Roosevelt believed, was one of those periods “when reactions
in the march of democracy have set in, and forward-looking progress has seemed to
stop.”2
Although national progressivism lacked any semblance of a vital, national movement
by the 1920 election, Roosevelt labeled himself progressive during his vice presidential
campaign. After his election defeat, he continued to characterize himself as progressive,
1
2
Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July 19, 1940, Master Speech
File Number 1291, Speech File, FDRL.
219
or increasingly what he called liberal, throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s.3
Roosevelt operated from a remarkably durable and consistent worldview in which he
perceived international events from the perspective that groups and national leaders
served either as the agents or the opponents of progress. Although he observed that
throughout history “the forces of reaction so often defeat the forces of progress,” he could
not conceive the forces of reaction as being representative of informed, popular will.4 He
did not imagine that the governments or groups that he considered reactionary could ever
have true popular support. Instead, he perceived that a conservative and reactionary
minority, “people who would have the whole of their government put into the hands of a
little group,” constantly worked to subvert the will of the people and rob them of their
freedom and liberty.5
Rooseveltapplied h is perspective to both domestic and foreign affairs. In his thinking,
the postwar years solidified the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy.
Roosevelt saw the failure of the League of Nations and the postwar resurgence of
militarism and conservatism as the work of reactionaries in Europe and in the Republican
Party in the United States. After the Great War, Roosevelt advocated policies to
encourage and sustain the efforts of liberal Germans. He criticized the Republican Party
for its unyielding stance on war debts and reparations and took personal steps to bolster
what he nostalgically saw as liberal, urban, and manufacturing Germany. In the late
3
Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July 19, 1940, Master Speech
File Number 1291, Speech File, FDRL.
4
Radio Address to the Young Democratic Clubs of America Meeting in Milwaukee,
August 24, 1935, Master Speech File Number 795, FDRL.
5
Radio Address to the New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 26, 1939, Master
220
1920s and early 1930s, he viewed the failure of the Wiemar Republic and the rise of
National Socialism as symptomatic of the rejuvenation of the forces of conservatism,
Prussian militarism, and autocracy.
He perceived similar forces at work in postwar France as well. Those forces manifest
themselves during the Paris Peace Conference and the 1920s in French demands for
security and reparations payments from Germany. Confident that a strong, progressive
leader in France such as Georges Clemenceau had the potential to unite the country,
Roosevelt watched as political jealousies and infighting fragmented French wartime
unity. Accompanying political and social reaction in France were impulses that Roosevelt
saw as French imperialism and militarism. From agitation for a Rhennish Republic and
the occupation of the Ruhr, to the treatment of Robert Nivelle, events of the postwar
years undoubtedly reinforced Roosevelt’s basic Dreyfusard distrust of conservative,
Catholic French générals.
During the postwar years, Roosevelt blended the ideas of Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson, the two men who had the most profound effect on Franklin
Roosevelt’s adult life, into his thinking. In the 1920 campaign Roosevelt publicly
assumed the reform mantle of Theodore Roosevelt while he also advocated the
internationalism of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations. He emulated their
statesmanship. Each had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and the title of peacemaker.
They served as a powerful example for a protégé to follow in his public career, and
Franklin Roosevelt’s proposal for a Society of Nations dominated by the great powers
that would preserve or, if necessary, restore world peace reflected both of their
influences.
221
At the same time Roosevelt’s thinking about American power matured and became
more sophisticated, developing into a comprehensive strategic concept. In the 1920s,
Roosevelt considered how the employment of United States power could preserve
international peace. Although he had been a consistent advocate of military preparedness
since joining the Wilson administration, over time, his thinking came to emphasize
international cooperation, suasion, and symbolic measures as effective tools to maintain
and restore international peace. International cooperation would take the form of
concerted economic sanctions and blockade. He also speculated that symbolic American
actions alone might have a salutary effect on international situations. When those tools
proved inadequate, rather than dispatch another American Expeditionary Force overseas
to fight costly land battles, Roosevelt envisioned a response comprised of sea power,
aerial bombing, and public information to complement blockade and economic sanctions.
Roosevelt conjectured that economic sanctions, coercion, and blockade could allow a
capable statesman to achieve his foreign policy aims, to include objectives essentially
military in nature, without resorting to war or involving active belligerency on the part of
the United States. His thinking essentially updated the strategy of armed neutrality.
Roosevelt, however, did not believe that military preparedness was unnecessary, and he
rejected the idea that military preparedness would inevitably provoke war. Instead he
believed that military preparedness served two vital purposes in the United States. First,
air and sea power gave credence to economic measures while also dissuading aggressor
states. The second was the impact of military spending on the domestic economy. Ever
the politician, Roosevelt not only envisioned that military preparedness could secure
222
important foreign policy objectives, he assessed that it could also provide the engine for
domestic prosperity and thereby enhance political prospects.
I.
Following the Armistice, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt traveled to Europe, officially
to assist the demobilization and disposition of Navy assets and properties in France.
President Wilson had sailed to Europe three weeks earlier for the peace negotiations, and
the Roosevelts hoped to glimpse the proceedings. The visit was Franklin Roosevelt’s last
to Europe for nearly a decade. Fellow passengers on the George Washington included
Charles Schwab, Bernard Baruch, and Edward N. Hurley.6
While the Roosevelts were at sea, they received word that Theodore Roosevelt passed
away. Eleanor Roosevelt mused, “The loss of his influence and example was what I
seemed to feel most keenly.”7 Despite the loss, Theodore Roosevelt and his ideas
remained a powerful influence on Franklin Roosevelt. Thirteen years later, Franklin
Roosevelt noted that Theodore Roosevelt was one of three men in American history
“who chiefly stand out for the universality of their interest and of their knowledge.”8 In
retrospect, although he remained a powerful example, the passing of Theodore Roosevelt
marked the beginning of a shift in Franklin Roosevelt’s thinking about foreign affairs.
6
During the Great War, Buruch served as chairman of the War Industries Board and
Hurley the chairman of the Shipping agency. As such, both men were part of Wilson’s
War Cabinet. Steelman Schwab was the head of Wilson’s Emergency Fleet Corporation.
Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1960), pp. 95, 85.
7
p. 275.
8
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward (New York: John Day Company, 1933) p. 11.
223
Franklin Roosevelt’s thoughts on preparedness and foreign policy remained in accord
with that of his kinsman throughout his tenure as assistant secretary of the navy. During
the war, however, the influence of Woodrow Wilson, particularly with respect to political
matters, gradually increased. Following Theodore Roosevelt’s death, Wilson’s influence
grew, and Franklin Roosevelt returned from Europe in February 1919 staunchly
supporting Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy and the League of Nations.9
Upon their arrival in Paris, the Roosevelts found “many celebrities and all one’s
friends!”10 Although it did involve some work, the journey largely consisted of social
events in Paris and battlefield tours. From their elegant rooms in the Ritz, the Roosevelts
were at the center of a vibrant, post-armistice Paris. Many of the Roosevelt’s extended
family were also in Paris at the time: Aunt Dora Delano Forbes and Uncle Fred Delano,
cousins Fay, Pauline, and Charlie Forbes, Mme. Hortense Howland, Teddy Roosevelt,
Jr., his brother Kermit, and Kermit’s wife Belle Roosevelt.11 Eleanor Roosevelt
exclaimed, “Paris is wonderful.”12
9
Tracing the emergence of Roosevelt’s attitudes toward Europe and his “vision” of
“partial internationalism,” John Lamberton Harper argues that by 1919 Roosevelt
possessed an “emerging worldview” that “combined Wilson’s antagonism toward
European power politics with Theodore Roosevelt’s more traditional and punitive ideas
about how to keep the peace.” John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe:
Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean Acheson (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), pp. 3, 35.
10
Letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 11, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters,
1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 450.
11
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 278-9; Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara
Delano Roosevelt, January 11, 12, 14, and 17, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1905-
1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 450, 451, 452, 457-8.
12
Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 12, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 451.
224
There was, however, another side of France in early 1919 that Eleanor Roosevelt
increasingly found more disturbing. Her response to the scantily clad women of the Paris
nightclubs was to declare that France was “no place for the boys,” particularly her young
cousin Sheffield Cowles, serving as an aide to her husband.13 Even worse, depressing
reminders of the war and the severe casualties were everywhere. Widows in black filled
the Parisian sidewalks.14 Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “The city itself was unchanged but
practically every French woman was dressed in black.”15 Accompanying her aunt on a
visit to a French military hospital, Eleanor recoiled at the sight of the seriously wounded
men. She confessed that she “could hardly bear to look at the men with the horrible face
wounds.”16 Next, she and her aunt visited a hospital for those men blinded by the war.
Almost speechless, Eleanor Roosevelt also accompanied Edith Wilson, the president’s
wife, as she visited soldiers in the American hospital.17
Two American Army officers drove Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt through the
battlefields of the Somme front on January 18, 1919. The route took them through Senlis,
Compiègne, Noyon, Ham, St. Quentin, Cambrai, Bapaume, Albert, and Amiens.18 The
journey reinforced Franklin Roosevelt’s images from his battlefield tour several months
13
Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, February 11, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
14
15
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 279.
16
17
18
225
earlier. That night, he reflected, “We have had a very wonderful day and one which we
shall never forget.”19 The tour also left a deep and lasting impression on Eleanor
Roosevelt. She recalled, “The picture of desolation fostered in me an undying hate of war
which was not definitely formulated before that time.” The experience also strengthened
her conviction that war was useless “as a means of finding any final solution to
international difficulties”20
Like her husband on his trip to the front in August 1918, Eleanor Roosevelt left the
battlefields of the Western Front with an almost idealized portrait of the French soldier in
her mind. A soldier the Roosevelts encountered that day certainly strengthened Eleanor
Roosevelt’s image of the determination, tenacity, and self-sacrifice of the French enlisted
soldier. In the ruined town of Cambrai, the Roosevelts “met a French sergeant with the
Croix de Guerre with Two Palms.” Only recently, the heroic sergeant had been reunited
with his two little children, who reportedly had been carried off to Belgium in 1914
during the initial German advance. The family lived on the bottom floor of their roofless
home, and, nearby, a small school had opened for the few dozen families that had
returned to the town.21 To Eleanor Roosevelt, sickness seemed rife in France in early
1919 and life hard in the ruined villages. After seeing the conditions, she observed that
French soldiers “could stand the hardships better than could our men who were
accustomed to greater comforts in their homes and better food and perhaps a less trying
19
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 18, 1919, F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 458.
20
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 280-2, 364-5.
21
Franklin Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 18, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
226
climate.” Eleanor Roosevelt later noted that she was particularly impressed with all “the
little French soldiers, under-sized and looking undernourished” had accomplished.22
During his first few days in France, Franklin Roosevelt dedicated his efforts to the
demobilization of Navy property. With the end of the war, the French struck hard
bargains on settlement claims or stalled demobilization contracts in the obvious hope of
getting better deals as United States forces chaffed to depart. Roosevelt got involved in
what had been fruitless negotiations over a radio station under construction near
Bordeaux. To resolve the impasse, Roosevelt went to French minister André Tardieu, one
of Clemenceau’s trusted agents. Roosevelt had seen Tardieu in action the previous
August and considered him a man who could cut red tape.23 When Roosevelt threatened
to pack up the station and ship it home, Tardieu agreed that the French government would
take over the radio station and also pay the United States 22,000,000 francs. Eleanor
Roosevelt informed her mother-in-law that Franklin’s “biggest deal is done” and that it
was “a big success.”24 The previous negotiator praised Roosevelt as a man who “knows
how to handle the French.”25 The incident served to further strengthen Roosevelt’s self-
image of his ability to deal with French officials.
That winter, his work in France complete, Franklin Roosevelt also made a brief trip to
Koblenz, the last visit to Germany in his life. The word in Paris was that American troops
22
23
24
25
Nathan Miller, F.D.R.: An Intimate History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1983), p. 157.
227
in the Rhineland had been remarkably well treated by the Germans and “billeted in the
best rooms,” a distinct contrast to the treatment many American soldiers received in
France since the armistice.26 The official purpose of Roosevelt’s trip was to visit and
inspect the Marines stationed on the Rhine. It also offered Roosevelt another opportunity
to satisfy his fascination with the battlefields of the Western Front. For Roosevelt war
remained horrible yet fascinating. Following his inspection tour, Eleanor Roosevelt noted
that her husband returned laden with helmets, shell casings, and “all kinds of loot from
battlefields and Germany!”27
In addition to passing over the old battlefields, the 1919 inspection tour was
memorable for Roosevelt. It constituted his last visit to Germany, and what struck him
was the relative absence of tangible signs of the German defeat. Near Koblenz, as his
party approached the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein overlooking the Rhine, Roosevelt related
to his companions how he had been through the valley several times as a boy by bicycle
and boat. Anticipating the sight of the stars and stripes flying over Ehrenbreitstein,
Roosevelt was dismayed when they saw no flag above the castle. Incensed, Roosevelt
found the officer commanding the sector and demanded to know why the American flag
was not flying as a sign to the German people. Unmoved by the officer’s retort that they
26
27
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 467; [Anna] Eleanor
Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 288.
228
did not want to upset the German people, Roosevelt immediately took up the matter with
General John J. Pershing upon his return to Paris, and Pershing corrected the matter.28
At the Paris Peace Conference, meanwhile, President Wilson also was not satisfied due
to his inability to realize his vision for the peace treaty. United States Food Administer
Herbert Hoover recalled that one of his preliminary sessions with Allied ministers was
“an enlightenment in national intrigue, selfishness, nationalism, heartlessness, rivalry and
suspicion, which seemed to ooze from every pore—but with polished politeness.29
Bernard Baruch, tasked with drafting the economic clauses of the Peace Treaty, recalled,
“On most issues, the French were especially obstinate.”30 National interests quickly rose
to the forefront. For instance, contrary to American intentions, the Allied blockade
seemed bent on starving the German people. Although the British eventually acquiesced,
French promises to relax the blockade were only slowly, and partially, followed through.
Meanwhile, French luxuries passed through the blockade into Germany; food did not.31
American protests brought countercharges of being pro-German from Allied officials
and journalists. Himself an object of criticism in French and British journals, Baruch
believed that a “concerted campaign of raking criticism” was underway in the French and
28
Franklin D. Roosevelt memorandum, May 23, 1942, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol.
2, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 1323-5.
29
Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 287.
30
Winston, 1960), p. 101.
31
Winston, 1960), p. 100.
229
British press targeted against President Wilson and his advisors.32 Harold Nicolson, a
member of the British delegation, concurred with Baruch. On January 26, 1919, he noted,
“Feeling in Paris is turning against Wilson and the Americans.” The following day, at a
luncheon offered by the French press, he “gathered a vivid impression of the growing
hatred of the French for the Americans.” He added, “Wilson shares this growing
unpopularity.”33 Nicolson labeled the attacks in the press against Wilson as “dreadful”
and “most unfair.”34 Because of the strict censorship that the French government
exercised over French newspapers, Wilson believed that the attacks against him had the
tacit approval of the French government.35
In addition to the personal attacks in the open press, Wilson’s meetings behind closed
doors with Allied leaders resulted in bitter quarrels and relentless demands, “evidence on
every hand of the ignoble, grasping nature of men and nations.”36 As a consequence,
Americans in Paris increasingly came to view their country as the “only nation that
approached unselfishness.”37 Hoover believed that because the United States had been
32
Winston, 1960), pp. 126-7.
33
Diary entries for January 26 and 27, 1919 in Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) pp. 249-50.
34
Diary entries for February 11 and March 16, 1919 in Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking
1919 (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) pp. 261 and 285.
35
Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) p. 79n68.
36
Winston, 1960), pp. 126-7.
37
Bernard Baruch comment in entry for April 7, 1919, in Josephus Daniels, The Cabinet
Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, edited by E. David Cronon (Lincoln, Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 385.
230
“more detached from the war,” American statesmen could rise above the “malign forces”
that shackled Allied diplomats.38 Baruch assessed that Allied unity disintegrated with the
end of the war, and Allied representatives came to Paris intent on vengeance and spoils.39
Wilson suggested that the French intentionally obstructed proceedings in an attempt to
break him down, an attitude he described as “damnable.”40 To make matters worse, by
late January 1919, there was a growing suspicion that the French hoped “to mark time”
until Wilson returned to the United States several weeks later; after which, “the French
may be able to rush the others into decisions.”41
Following the armistice, the American pro-French disposition that existed during the
war seemed to wither. The post-war inflation raging in France caused many problems.
Eleanor Roosevelt noted that in Paris “the prices are worse than New York for
everything.”42 Many soldiers interpreted increasing post-war prices as a reflection of
greed and thanklessness on the part of the French merchants; consequently, they had
neither understanding nor forgiveness for the French people. Anti-French attitudes among
American soldiers also seem to have been a symptom of the growing bitterness of many
38
Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 438.
39
Winston, 1960), p. 96.
40
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) p. 283.
41
Diary entry for January 23, 1919 in Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York:
Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) p. 247.
42
231
veterans still chaffing to return home many months after the armistice.43 Eleanor
Roosevelt observed, “The one cry on every side is ‘we want to go home’ and they say
only the troops actually in Germany are at all contented.”44
While in Paris, the Roosevelts believed that they had a duty, associated with the task of
demobilization, to call on French public officials. They met with Tardieu and Georges
Leygues, the Minister of Marine, and lunched with scores of French admirals and naval
captains.45 Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt also left calling cards for President Raymond
Poincaré at the Elysée Palace.46 Later, Poincaré received the Roosevelts formally, and
they paid their respects.47 The encounter, it seems, was little more than a formality. In
contrast to his political rival Clemenceau, Poincaré, an austere, conservative Republican,
did not make much of an impression on the Roosevelts. Rather than refer to Poincairé’s
residence as the Elysée, Eleanor Roosevelt called it the “Palais Murat,” having associated
the building with its previous occupants from the First Empire, Maréchal Joachim Murat
43
Frank Freidel, Over There: The Story of America’s First Great Overseas Crusade
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990, revised edition) pp. 222, 226-7, and 232.
44
45
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 278; Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano
Roosevelt, January 11, 13 and 14, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (New
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 449, 450 and 452.
46
47
232
and his wife, Napoleon’s sister Caroline Bonaparte.48 Franklin Roosevelt’s talk with
Clemenceau about disarmament made a deeper impression.49
The Roosevelts would have concurred with Wilson’s nomination of Clemenceau as the
chairman of the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson made the nomination as a tribute to the
French Republic and the tragic suffering it endured during the war. Wilson, however, also
intended the nomination as a tribute to Clemenceau himself. Prior to the beginning of the
Peace Conference, Wilson announced that he and Clemenceau shared a “brotherhood of
heart in these great matters.”50 Wilson thought that under Clemenceau’s leadership
France had become one with “all those who love freedom and truly believe in the
progress and rights of man.”51
While in Paris, the Roosevelts also managed to stay in contact with French and
American friends and political figures from Washington. The Roosevelts met with old
friends from the French embassy in Washington, Ambassador Jules Jusserand, the
Laboulayes, a former French naval attaché and his wife, and Colonel Fabry, Maréchal
48
49
“Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute,” The New York Times, October 3, 1928, p.
12.
50
Woodrow Wilson address in Paris, January 18, 1919 in Woodrow Wilson,
International Ideals: Speeches and Addresses Made During the President’s European
Visit, December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919),
pp. 90-2.
51
Woodrow Wilson addresses to the French Senate in Paris, January 20, 1919 in
Woodrow Wilson, International Ideals: Speeches and Addresses Made During the
President’s European Visit, December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919 (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1919), p. 96.
233
Joseph Joffre’s aide during the French mission to the United States in 1917.52 Concerning
the area around the Avenue des Champs-Elysées and the Tuileries Quarter, it seemed to
Eleanor Roosevelt that “everyone had left Washington and congregated there!”53 The
Roosevelt’s circle included luncheons with Secretary and Mrs. Robert Lansing, with
Colonel and Mrs. Edward House, and with Edith Boling Wilson, the president’s wife.
Among their other friends were Joseph Grew and his wife and journalist Herbert Bayard
Swope.54 Staying at the Hôtel Crillon, the headquarters of the American delegation in
Paris, were many other friends and acquaintances to include Frank Polk, Walter
Lippmann, Adolph Berle, William Bullitt, Felix Frankfurter, Norman Davis, James
Shotwell, and journalists Ray Stannard Baker, William Allen White, and Lincoln
Steffens.55
The Roosevelt’s returned from France with President and Mrs. Wilson who shared
their ideas with their shipboard companions. Concerning the Roosevelts, Edith Boling
Wilson reported that she and her husband “found them very delightful companions.”56
President Wilson made his attitude about Allied political leaders clear to his traveling
52
53
54
Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 11, 14, 17 and 20, 1919, F.D.R.:
His Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 450,
452, 454-5.
55
Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New York: Vintage
Books, 1981) pp. 151-2; Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American
Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, 1986) pp. 57-8, 438-9.
56
Edith Boling Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company,
1939), p. 240.
234
companions. Displaying a powerful sense of American exceptionalism, he asserted that
“the world considers the United States as the only nation represented in this great
conference whose motives are entirely unselfish.”57 By the time he landed in the United
States, Franklin Roosevelt had become a standard bearer for Wilson’s foreign policy.
II.
Following Wilson’s brief return to the United States from Paris, his proposal for a
League of Nations drew public opposition from the Republican dominated Senate. On
March 4, 1919, thirty-nine Republican Senators or Senators-elect declared that they
would not approve a peace treaty that embodied the League covenant. In the United
States, Wilson’s opponents praised the Republican “Round Robin” declaration.
Meanwhile, in France, many believed that Wilson and his Fourteen Points had been
repudiated and acted accordingly.
Returning to Paris in mid-March, 1919, an alarmed Wilson moved quickly to halt what
he believed were efforts to sidetrack the League or compel American concessions.
Ultimately, Wilson’s actions resulted in the inclusion of the League covenant as part of
the peace treaty. France, however, insisted on equivalent concessions for acquiescing to
Wilson’s covenant. Clemenceau’s initial demand was for reparations from Germany to
cover the cost of damages. Having seen Germany invade France twice in his lifetime,
Clemenceau’s second demand was for security against a resurgent Germany, either by the
French occupation of German territory to the Rhine or by the creation of a buffer state
57
Dr. Grayson diary entry for February 22, 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol.
55, Arthur S. Link, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 224.
235
between France and Germany. Clemenceau, however, had a difficult time dealing with
Wilson whom he saw as too idealistic. Because Secretary Lansing and Colonel House
both seemed willing to make concessions in Wilson’s absence, the French premier told
House, “You are practical, I understand you, but talking to Wilson is something like
talking to Jesus Christ!”58
Wilson reacted strongly to calls for concessions and resisted any compromise.
Clemenceau’s personal demands to Wilson for compensation and security resulted in “a
bitter scene” that ended with the premier storming out of Wilson’s residence. Attacks on
Wilson by the French press continued. Nevertheless, March and April 1919 were months
of hurried compromise in Paris, compromise that upset Wilson. Compromise, however,
was essential if the peace treaty and the League covenant were to be signed in June. One
of the key Frenchmen responsible for developing compromises was André Tardieu.
Following United States entry into the Great War, Tardieu headed the French Mission in
Washington, D.C. and during the Paris Peace Conference was, according to Baruch, “one
of Clemenceau’s most trusted lieutenants.”59 Tardieu worked behind the scenes as
Clemenceau’s personal representative to coordinate the efforts of the French delegates
and develop acceptable compromises.60
Viscerally opposed to compromise, Wilson came to view domestic and foreign critics
of his policies, Republican opposition in the Senate, and French demands for reparations
58
Quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition) pp. 606-9.
59
Winston, 1960), pp. 101, 103.
60
Diary entry for April 9, 1919 in Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York:
Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) p. 307; see also Ibid, pp. 28, 81, 182.
236
and security as interrelated. Although Colonel House thought that Tardieu was “the one
nearly indispensable man at the Conference,” Wilson disliked and distrusted
Clemenceau’s plenipotentiary. While Wilson was in the United States, Tardieu had
proposed the establishment of an independent Rhennish Republic in the Rhineland for a
few years, after which a plebiscite could decide its future, satisfying the principle of self-
determination. Wilson already had suspected Tardieu, who had led the French mission in
the United States during the war, of being in sympathy with his political opponents.
Coming amid the Republican “Round Robin” and at a time when Wilson feared efforts to
sidetrack the League or force American concessions, Tardieu’s proposal brought
immediate rejection from Wilson who hoped to have his principles accepted in their
entirety.61 The American Ambassador to France, William Graves Sharp, warned Wilson
that André Tardieu, “Clemenceau’s chief leader of intrigue,” had been “in almost
constant communication . . . with all of the intense partisan Republican opponents of the
President.”62
Wilson’s admiration for Clemenceau did not extend to other French politicians. Wilson
distrusted the French politicians that he likened to machine “bosses” in the United States.
Wilson thought “that the rank and file of the French people themselves are all right, but
that they are under the absolute domination of the political element.” Rather than forfeit
all hope for the French people, Wilson believed that with “the proper opportunity” that
“the French people would be all right in every way.” Wilson also observed that due to the
61
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) pp. 152-4.
62
Dr. Grayson’s diary entry for March 19, 1919, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,
volume 46, March 17-April 4, 1919, Arthur S. Link, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey:
237
machinations of French politicians, the “rank and file people of the United States had
turned from being pro-French to being pro-British.”63
In spite of his differences with Clemenceau, Wilson thought Poincaré or one of his
representatives would be much worse. Clemenceau had been a moderating and
constructive influence. While Wilson suggested that he and Clemenceau shared a
“brotherhood” in their general goals, he possessed no such faith in any of Clemenceau’s
conservative political opponents. Publicly, when he first arrived in France, Wilson had
expressed his “deep personal respect” for Poincaré as “the representative of the great
people of France.”64 Those attitudes did not last. Several months later, he confided to
journalist Ray Stannard Baker his fear that if Clemenceau resigned that the French would
probably “get some man like Poincaré in his place.”65 In Paris, Wilson developed a view
of French politics and leaders that perceived Clemenceau and his Radical Party as the
agents of progress; opposing them were the forces of conservatism and reaction in the
parties of the center and right. A generation of American progressives, many of whom
participated in the peace conference, evidently shared Wilson’s views.
In contrast to the French poilu that emerged from the Great War with his image intact,
the American view of the French officer corps and conservative Republican political
63
Dr. Grayson’s diary entry for March 19, 1919, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,
volume 46, March 17-April 4, 1919, Arthur S. Link, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey:
64
Woodrow Wilson response to Poincairé’s welcome address during a luncheon in Paris,
December 14, 1918 in Woodrow Wilson, International Ideals: Speeches and Addresses
Made During the President’s European Visit, December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919), p. 3.
65
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) pp. 282, 324.
238
leadership increasingly dimmed. What emerged was an image of a partisan, politically
reactionary, and Catholic group. While Joffre had been widely acclaimed in the United
States in May 1917, according to Josephus Daniels, the anti-clerical Joffre had been
forced to retire and step aside due to partisan jealousy.66 Although Clemenceau’s ascent
to power later that year managed to keep senior French military leaders under civilian
control, it was clear that neither Poincaré nor Foch liked the premier. Wilson was
suspicious of Poincaré, Foch, and French générals. After visiting battlefields, a resentful
Wilson thought that French officers had restrained their troops from cheering for him.67
On March 28, 1919, General Tasker H. Bliss, one of the American plenipotentiaries,
warned the president that he believed Foch intended to break off the armistice, a move
Bliss feared would disrupt the Peace Conference and might lead to a resumption of the
war.68
During the Peace Conference, Wilson deemed unilateral French efforts to gain security
for France at the expense of German territory or unity to be imperialistic and militaristic.
Maréchal Ferdinand Foch consistently was associated with those efforts. On several
occasions in May and June 1919, Clemenceau had categorically rejected the proposals
and disavowed the actions of Foch and his subordinate in the Rhineland, Général Charles
Mangin. The French officers advocated a separate Rhennish Republic and urged the
66
Entry for September 18, 1917, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p.
207.
67
68
239
detachment of Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria from Germany.69 Much to the chagrin of
President Poincairé, a conservative Republican, and of French military leaders,
Clemenceau retained ultimate control over French policy throughout 1919.70 Wilson
wrote, “Throughout the sessions in Paris it was evident that a militaristic party, under the
most influential leadership, was seeking to gain ascendancy in France.”71
In the end, Wilson accomplished less than he hoped for in Paris, the Treaty of
Versailles being a compromise between his Fourteen Points and the particular interests
and demands of Allied governments, especially France.72 The final treaty signed at
Versailles in June proved a disappointment for Wilson. Although the treaty did include
the covenant of the League of Nations, it was not what Wilson had envisioned. Toward
Germany, he thought the treaty had aspects of a vengeful Carthaginian peace that he
hoped to avoid. Wilson had believed that a moderate policy would allow Germany,
purged of its militarists, to assume an honorable and prosperous position among the
nations of the world. In addition, Wilson believed that the election of a German national
constituent assembly, the removal of Prussian military masters, and the maintenance of
civil order would give substantial impetus to German moderates and liberals hoping to
establish a democratic government. National politics hampered many of his hopes for the
69
Paul-Marie de la Gorce, The French Army: A Political and Military History, trans.
Kenneth Douglas (New York: George Braziller, 1963) pp. 161-9.
70
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992), p. 77.
71
Excerpt from Wilson letter to Senator Hitchcock quoted in “France protests Wilson
Charge,” The New York Times, March 12, 1920, p. 2.
72
Arthur S. and William A. Link, American Epoch: A History of the United States Since
1900, volume 1, War, Reform, and Society, 1900-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993,
seventh edition), p. 166.
240
reemergence of moderate and liberal Germans.73 Fearing an explosion in Germany if the
Allies took too much territory and riches, Wilson told the other heads of state on March
27, “We do not want to destroy Germany and we could not do so. Our greatest mistake
would be to furnish her with powerful reasons for seeking revenge at some future time.
Excessive demands would be sure to sow the seeds of war.”74
At Versailles, concerned about being labeled pro-German by the Allies and “soft” in
domestic political circles, Wilson had no direct contact with German liberals and
moderates. After receiving a message transmitted from German political leaders, General
Tasker Bliss, a member of the American commission, wrote the president that it was “a
pity” that Germany “cannot in any way be heard while peace terms are being discussed.”
Finally in mid April, the Allied heads of state agreed to arrange a meeting with German
representatives. Although the German delegation arrived at Versailles on April 29 and
presented their credentials, they sat for over a week. Wilson, Clemenceau, and British
Prime Minister David Lloyd George decided that they would not talk with the Germans,
presenting the German delegation no opportunity to break their united front. When the
statesmen of the victorious powers finally received the German delegates at the Trianon
Palace on May 7, 1919, the delegates received a lashing from Clemenceau and a book
containing terms. Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German minister of foreign
affairs, received the terms and read a German reply that Wilson considered defiant and
73
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) pp. 46-7, 84,
380.
74
Wilson address to the Big Four quoted in Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His
Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W.
W. Norton and Company, 1986) p. 255.
241
offensive. Afterwards, Wilson dismissed the minister as “not frank, particularly Prussian,
and stupid.” The next day, Wilson told his French and British counterparts that he
regretted that German people had starved because the treaty was not yet ready and that
Germany would be forced to sign the treaty in two weeks, enough time for the German
government to reconcile itself to the inevitable. To Wilson it seemed incredible that the
German people were allowing representatives of the old regime to speak on their behalf.
Instead of negotiating with the German foreign office, Wilson envisioned a German
public eager for peace that, with a little education, would accept the treaty. He proposed
that economic advisers meet with German moderates to explain to the German people
that the commission had considered conditions in Germany as it drafted reparation
articles.75
III.
Following his return from France and with demobilization well underway, Roosevelt’s
attention turned almost solely to politics. Intent on keeping himself before the
Democratic National Committee and in the public eye, he made a number of speeches in
1919 extolling progressive values and the League of Nations. On March 6, 1919, two
weeks after returning from Europe, Roosevelt advocated “the proposed organization of a
League of Nations.” He offered “first-hand information” of the attitude of American
servicemen in Europe, saying that they “wanted a peace signed that will carry with it a
75
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) pp. 46-7, 260-
1, 387-93, 402-3, 410.
242
pact that would help the civilization of the future.” Roosevelt added, “That is why every
man over there is supporting a League of Nations.”76 Later that month, Roosevelt praised
the veterans in rousing, progressive terms and predicated “that anarchy and lawlessness
and the doctrines of destruction will have but short shrift in any American community.”77
He also credited the war with making the United States “at last one unified nation, . . .
speaking one tongue, thank God, maintaining a common liberty and recognizing the high
purpose of service” for “all mankind.” American unity, Roosevelt suggested, “was why
the German line gave way at last” the previous autumn. From his perspective, President
Wilson was laboring “to solve the great problems of humanity so that nations may not
again be torn by conflict.”78 Roosevelt remained committed to progressive policies at
home and abroad. “We are progressive,” he proudly told his listeners in Chautauqua,
New York.79 At the Democratic National Committee meeting, Roosevelt captured his
listeners with an attack on the Republican Party for following the reactionary “Old
Guard” and urged that his party continue to be “a progressive Democracy.”80 Increasingly
in 1919 and 1920, Roosevelt came to view the Republican Party as a reactionary
opponent of reform minded Democrats and Independents.
76
Roosevelt speech, March 6, 1919, Baltimore, Maryland, printed in Baltimore
American, March 7, 1919, p. 11, Master Speech File No. 85, FDRL.
77
Roosevelt speech, March 24, 1919, Baltimore, Maryland, printed in Baltimore
American, March 25, 1919, p. 16, Master Speech File No. 87, FDRL.
78
Roosevelt speech, March 24, 1919, Baltimore, Maryland, printed in Baltimore Sun,
March 25, 1919, p. 11, Master Speech File No. 87, FDRL.
79
Roosevelt speech, August 30, 1919, Chautauqua, New York, Master Speech File No.
101, FDRL.
80
Joseph Alsop, FDR, 1882-1945: A Centenary Remembrance (New York: Viking
Press, 1982) p. 93.
243
Roosevelt’s efforts to remain in the public eye succeeded, and during the 1920
campaign, the Democratic Party nominated Roosevelt as the vice presidential running
mate for nominee Governor James M. Cox of Ohio. Roosevelt advocated a platform of
progressivism at home and abroad. In his acceptance speech given on the porch of his
Hyde Park home, Roosevelt suggested that the two major problems facing the next
administration were United States “relations with the world” and the critical need for
“organized progress at home.” Domestic progress, Roosevelt asserted, required a
fundamental reorganization of “the archaic shortcomings of our governmental
machinery.” In foreign affairs, he advocated a peace treaty that included a League of
Nations. Touting the League as the basis for “peace that will last,” Roosevelt argued that
“the method and machinery by which the opinion of civilization may become effective
against those who seek war is at last within the reach of humanity.” To the critics arguing
that the League would surrender United States sovereignty he offered the
characterization, “It is not anti-national, it is anti-war.”81
Cox and Roosevelt initially announced their campaign aims following a meeting with
President Wilson. They made it clear that they considered the League of Nations to be the
primary issue of the campaign. Roosevelt told the press that there was “a problem” in
American relations “with other countries and a definite solution is not to be avoided.” In
front of Wilson, the candidates pledged themselves to “the ratification of the League of
Nations in a form that will not cancel America’s usefulness and influence in the
League.”82
81
Roosevelt’s acceptance speech at Hyde Park, 1920, in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters,
1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 500-508.
82
“Cox and Roosevelt Define Their Aims,” The New York Times, July 21, 1920, p. 1.
244
During the election campaign of 1920, Roosevelt believed that the United States was
entering the cycle of conservative reaction that historically follows a period of reform and
progress. Roosevelt also made it clear that he considered his ticket to be a part of “an
unhalting march of progress.”83 Governor Cox labeled Republican candidate Warren G.
Harding a reactionary and asserted that the “special interests” behind Harding were
“seeking to reverse the order of advance and turn to rout the Progressive victories that
have been won.”84 Nonetheless, election for Cox and Roosevelt in 1920 was a long shot;
Wall Street betting commissioners gave two and one-half to one odds that Republican
candidate Warren G. Harding would win.85 In a progressive jab at Harding’s penchant for
campaigning from home, Roosevelt described Harding as an “out of touch” and
“mysterious figure” under the control of “the bosses of his party.” Roosevelt suggested
that, in contrast to his opponent, “Whatever the results of the election, I shall feel that I
have acted on the square with the American people.”86 Seeing the campaign and his
political future as part of the broader sweep of history, Roosevelt stated, “In the long run
the true statesman and the honestly forward-looking party will prevail.”87
83
84
“Cox in California Portrays Harding as a Reactionary,” The New York Times,
September 18, 1920, p. 1 and “Cox and Roosevelt Define Their Aims,” The New York
Times, July 21, 1920, p. 1.
85
“Bet at 2 ½ to 1 on Harding,” The New York Times, July 21, 1920, p. 1.
86
“Cox and Roosevelt Define Their Aims,” The New York Times, July 21, 1920, p. 1.
87
245
Franklin Roosevelt and James Cox portrayed their Republican opponents as
reactionaries disloyally pandering to German voters. Cox charged that “pro-German
elements” were backing Harding in hope of scrapping the League of Nations covenant
and obtaining a separate peace between the United States and Germany.88 Several days
later, commenting on Harding’s German supporters and his attitude toward the League,
Cox alleged that Harding was guilty of “the most stupendous conspiracy the world has
ever seen.”89 Roosevelt accepted Cox’s views. After the election, Roosevelt told Josephus
Daniels that even “the German” who had been his mother’s gardener for twenty years
voted for Harding because of a letter that he had received from Germany.90 During the
campaign, Roosevelt charged that Harding’s campaign managers were “attempting to
secure the hyphenated vote” by “making special appeals to the small but very dangerous
element which was not loyal during the war.” In Roosevelt’s mind, the Republican Party
had repudiated completely the progressive legacy of Theodore Roosevelt and instead was
“doing deliberately the things which Theodore Roosevelt gave the last years of his life to
stamp out.”91
The Republican Party’s apparent repudiation of Theodore Roosevelt’s ideals
convinced Franklin Roosevelt that he should inherit the mantel of his kinsman rather than
88
“Cox Hints Johnson Got Harding Pledge,” The New York Times, September 26, 1920,
p. 14.
89
“Cox Backs League in Verbal Duels with Pro-Germans,” The New York Times,
September 29, 1920, p. 1.
90
Entry for November 13, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels,
pp. 564-5.
91
“Roosevelt Charges Play to Alien Vote,” The New York Times, September 23, 1920,
p. 4.
246
anyone in the Republican Party. Throughout the country, Cox and Roosevelt portrayed
themselves as the progeny of Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party of 1912. In
California, Cox praised Theodore Roosevelt’s running mate, California Senator Hiram
Johnson, and argued that Johnson battled the same foes of reaction in 1912 that opposed
Cox in 1920.92 Meanwhile, in Hartford, Connecticut, Franklin Roosevelt linked Harding
to a senator that had received payments from Standard Oil during his kinsman’s
presidency, suggesting that he was continuing his kinsman’s efforts to eliminate
corruption in major American corporations.93 Of the Republicans who had opposed
Wilson’s League of Nations, Roosevelt asserted that any “man who opposes concrete
reforms and improvements in international relations is of necessity a reactionary, or at
least, a conservative in viewing his home problems.”94
Given the rhetoric, it is not surprising that the election campaign of 1920 caused a rift
in the Roosevelt family between the Hyde Park Roosevelts and their the Oyster Bay
cousins. The personal criticism of Franklin Roosevelt by the children of Theodore
Roosevelt distanced Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt from their Oyster Bay relations.
During the fall of 1920, Alice Roosevelt Longworth and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., both
active in the Republican Party, publicly campaigned for Harding.95 Theodore Roosevelt,
92
“Cox in California Portrays Harding as a Reactionary,” The New York Times,
September 18, 1920, p. 1.
93
“Roosevelt Calls for Independence,” The New York Times, September 18, 1920, p. 7.
94
1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 504.
95
Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), p.
254.
247
Jr. resented cousin Franklin Roosevelt’s characterization of himself as the heir of
Theodore Roosevelt’s political legacy. Addressing a troop of former Rough Riders,
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. labeled his kinsman “a maverick” that “does not have the brand
of our family.”96
On election day, Harding came away with a landslide victory over Cox, amassing over
sixteen million popular votes to Cox’s nine million. The Republican Party also swept the
House and Senate, gaining impressive majorities. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “The
election was an overwhelming defeat which was accepted very philosophically by my
husband, who had been completely prepared for the result.”97 Roosevelt’s comments
during the campaign of 1920 show philosophical acceptance to be a product of his
progressive views. Roosevelt doubted whether the country would elect a Democrat
president until the Republicans had brought about “a serious period of depression and
unemployment.” “Every war,” he observed, “brings after it a period of materialism and
conservatism; people tire quickly of ideals, and we are now but repeating history.98
IV.
In January 1920, the French National Assembly failed to elect Clemenceau to the
presidency, and he withdrew into retirement. An underground campaign by Aristide
Briand, reminding Catholic deputies of Clemenceau’s anti-clericalism and fostering
96
“Raps Franklin Roosevelt,” The New York Times, September 18, 1920, p. 7.
97
98
248
concerns about the future sovereignty of the parliament, succeeded in denying him the
presidency of the Republic.99 Seeing in Clemenceau’s exclusion the triumph of the
“militaristic party,” on March 8, 1920, Wilson observed, “They were defeated then, but
are in control now.”100 On April 1, 1920, in a letter to the House of Representatives,
President Wilson, suspicious of the intentions of the Allied Supreme Commander and the
aspirations of French générals for a French satellite in the Rhineland, stated “that Field
Marshal Ferdinand Foch has no authority over United States troops in German
territory.”101
To the Wilson administration, after the departure of Clemenceau from office in early
1920 and the defeat of the Versailles Treaty in the United States Senate on March 20,
1920, French political and military leaders seemed particularly unrestrained in their
imperialistic, reactionary designs. In response to German military actions in the Ruhr
basin and German troops entering the neutral zone, a violation of Article 42 of the Treaty
of Versailles, the French government demanded an immediate German withdrawal on
April 2, 1920. Absent German compliance, French troops occupied Frankfurt, Offenbach,
Hanau, Darmstadt, Bad Homburg, and Dieburg on April 6.102 In Koblenz, State
99
McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991, p. 92; Philippe
Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938, trans.
Anthony Forster (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985) p. 90.
100
Excerpt from Wilson letter to Senator Hitchcock quoted in “France protests Wilson
Charge,” The New York Times, March 12, 1920, p. 2.
101
“Our Rhine Force is Not Under Foch,” The New York Times, April 2, 1920, p. 14.
102
“French Quickly Occupy German Cities; Frankfort Quiet Under Heavy Guard; Berlin
Government Denounces Move,” The New York Times, April 7, 1920, pp. 1-2.
249
Department representative Pierpont B. Noyes, the American Rhineland Commissioner,
“formally disassociated himself from any action” involving the French occupation.103
The French occupation of Frankfurt and Darmstadt drew mixed reaction. Although the
British Prime Minister stated that the action met with the disapproval of the Allied
governments, the governments of Poland and Belgium publicly announced their approval.
From Sumner Welles’ perspective, the action seemed to violently incense public opinion
in the United States. The result was that in Britain and the United States, French demands
for strict German compliance with the Treaty of Versailles often were seen as being
motivated by imperialistic, territorial ambitions.104 Not everyone in the United States,
however, reacted unfavorably to the French action. For example, Massachusetts Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge read a group declaration into the Senate record. Criticizing Wilson
and his comments about “a militaristic party” in power in France, Lodge declared,
“Precautions against the recurrence of armed invasions taken by the victims of repeated
German aggressions are justified.”105
Although the French Army withdrew from Frankfurt and the other occupied cities on
May 17, 1920, suspicions remained in Democratic circles of growing reaction and
imperialism in Europe. French and British attitudes and actions since the signing of the
Treaty of Versailles convinced Wilson that the United States “could not trust” Britain and
103
“Withdrew Our Support,” The New York Times, April 7, 1920, p. 3.
104
Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944) p.
18.
105
“Lodge Reads to Senate Criticism of Wilson,” The New York Times, May 4, 1920, p.
3.
250
France.106 Wilson commented to Daniels that they both knew of the hatred of British
leaders toward Germany and their selfishness.107 The previous summer, Secretary Daniels
had characterized Lloyd George as a Tory bent on imperialism and militarism.108 In
Washington, French proposals to give the League of Nations a permanent military force
seemed a thinly veiled effort to make the League an instrument of French imperial power.
Meanwhile, through the summer of 1920, France and Britain scrambled to establish
protectorates over Turkey’s former possessions in the Middle East: Palestine, Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Arabia.109
In November 1920, French Général Robert Nivelle visited Navy Secretary Daniels in
Washington, D.C. 110 Self-confident, cultured, and elegant, Nivelle possessed an almost
hypnotic allure and a talent for handling politicians. His Protestantism reassured
politicians wary of “Jesuit generals.” As son of an English mother, he spoke perfect
English, an asset during a time of strained Franco-British cooperation. An ardent believer
in the doctrine of the attack, Nivelle began the Great War as a colonel and rose rapidly. In
May 1916, Nivelle assumed command of the Second Army at Verdun from Général
Philippe Pétain. In December 1916, the eloquent Nivelle became the French Commander-
in-Chief, promoted ahead of Pétain, his immediate superior. Nivelle believed that victory
106
Entry for May 4, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 526.
107
Entry for June 1, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 536.
108
Entry for July 9, 1919, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 424.
109
Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 102-3,
107.
110
Daniels, pp. 563-4.
251
was a matter of moral force, and in April 1917, he launched an attack against the
Chemin-des-Dames. The costly offensive that bore his name broke the French Army, and
mutinies broke out in over half of the regiments. In the aftermath, Pétain became
Commander-in-Chief of the mutinous French Army with Nivelle relegated to Algeria as
the governor-general. Nominated to the Supreme War Council in 1920, Nivelle
represented France at the tercentenary of the Mayflower.111
Daniels referred to Nivelle as “the only Protestant General in France” and believed that
the impressive Nivelle had been discriminated against solely because of his religion and
republican political orientation.112 The views of Daniels were probably representative of
those held by many in the administration who perceived the ouster of Nivelle in 1917 to
have been the result of the reactionary political and religious attitudes of the French
officer corps rather than due to any battlefield leadership failure on Nivelle’s part.
Indeed, because the Wilson administration had no contemporary awareness or
understanding of the costly failure of the Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames
and the subsequent mutinies throughout the French Army, Nivelle’s removal reinforced
American suspicions of reactionary, Catholic French senior officers. The fact that both of
Nivelle’s successors, Pétain and Foch, were Catholic would have served to validate the
perspective in Washington, D.C.
It was only in 1919 that Roosevelt and the Navy Department first learned of the extent
of mutiny in the French Army in 1917 after Nivelle’s failed offensive. Rather than
111
Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 (New York: McFadden Books,
1964), pp. 228-9, 232, 313-6, 324-5; Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of
the Third Republic, pp. 46-9.
112
Daniels, pp. 563-4.
252
revising earlier perceptions about the sterling morale of the French soldier or the qualities
of Nivelle, American naval leaders viewed the incident as the result of German
subversion, an “offensive by the German Intelligence Department, the real method by
which they still hoped to win the war.” In a report forwarded to Roosevelt, the former
naval attaché in Paris noted that France in 1917 had fallen into “the condition of anarchy
and demoralization” due to “the skillful guidance of the German Intelligence bureaus.”
According to the attaché, French politicians proved ineffective against the “German
propagandists” and “enemy agents” in France that had sapped “the morale of the French
people, and especially the morale of the French Army, that was going and going rapidly.”
Only the arrival of the first American troop convoy and the subsequent accession to
power in late 1917 of Clemenceau changed the perilous condition in France.
Clemenceau’s accession, the attaché asserted, “once and for all broke the grip which
Germany had on French politics.”113 The report left intact the sterling American image of
the French soldier. It also reinforced American attitudes about the power and
effectiveness of propaganda and subversion while directly attributing French political
turmoil to German subversion.114
113
114
In the assessments of the Wilson administration, the situation in France in 1917 was
not the only time during the Great War that German subversives collaborated with
foreign reactionaries to the advantage of Germany. Assessments of the collapse of
Rumania, for example, reflected a similar interpretation. In the summer of 1916, Rumania
had entered the war on the Allied side, only to be crushed by the Central Powers before
the end of the year. Edward M. House relayed to President Wilson the assessment that
“the Roumanian fiasco” had been the result of collusion between Germany and “the
corruption of high Russian officials who permitted Germany to over-run that country by a
preconcerted plan.” Edward M. House to Woodrow Wilson, January 22, 1917, The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 40, November 20, 1916—January 23, 1917, Arthur S.
253
V.
Following his defeat in the 1920 election, Roosevelt accepted a job as the vice
president of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, in charge of running the
New York office.115 Many of his activities, even at work, had a political rather than a
strictly commercial bent. He saw the period as an interlude in his political career while
the Republicans either made good or failed. Throughout this period, he still considered
himself a progressive. Increasingly, however, he began to use the terms liberal and
progressive interchangeably. During the summer of 1921, he answered partisan charges
in the Senate alleging the Wilson administration of military mismanagement. August
1921 brought a much-prized vacation on Campobello Island. It turned out to be a tragic
vacation when Roosevelt contracted poliomyelitis.116
Following a period focused almost exclusively on rehabilitation and recuperation, by
mid 1922 Roosevelt’s interests returned to domestic politics and United States foreign
relations.117 Interspersed with those interests were trips to Georgia and Florida in constant
Link, et al., editors (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 540.
The similarities between those Great War interpretations and the Roosevelt
administration’s assessment of the French defeat in 1940 are striking.
115
Statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt, released for morning papers, February 23, 1928,
Miscellaneous Memoranda, Fidelity and Deposit Co. of MD, Subject File, Box 16,
116
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, vol. 1, The Lion and the Fox, 1882-1940 (San
Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984) pp. 86-7, 89.
117
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, vol. 1, The Lion and the Fox, 1882-1940 (San
Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984) pp. 88-9. Burns argues that polio
did not alter Roosevelt’s personality or his attitudes. Burns believes that the illness
254
pursuit of therapy and a possible cure. His mobility restricted by heavy braces and
crutches, rather than being a direct participant in events as he had while assistant
secretary of the navy, Roosevelt became more of an observer. Each morning he began his
day reading newspapers, focusing initially on the editorials and political commentaries.
During his months of therapy in the waters of Warm Springs, Georgia, he had his wife
send copies of The New York Times and The New York World. By the time he entered the
White House in 1933, Roosevelt’s daily procedure for digesting the morning and evening
papers had become systematic.118 Eleanor Roosevelt contrasted her husband’s approach
with that of Woodrow Wilson who received only select newspaper clippings that filtered
the news. She observed that her husband dedicated time every day “for his study of the
press, particularly the opposition press,” in order to stay informed “on all shades of
opinion in the country.” Beyond his morning and evening rituals with the newspapers, he
spent much of his time reading, primarily history and biography. His wife rated her
husband an assiduous reader who “devoured books,” often at the rate of a book a day, and
invariably captured the author’s points.119
“strengthened already existent or latent tendencies in his personality.” Biographer Ted

Morgan, however, takes a fundamentally different view. In contrast to Burns, Morgan
asserts that polio marked a dividing point in Roosevelt’s life, essentially creating “two
Franklin D. Roosevelts.” Morgan portrays Roosevelt as having different values before the
illness. Before the illness, Morgan finds Roosevelt to have been a vindictive, self-
interested, and opportunistic fraud who chose expediency over principle. Burns, The Lion
and the Fox, p. 89; Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1985), p. 258.
118
Grace Tully, F.D.R. My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 76-7; Lash,
Eleanor and Franklin, p. 316.
119
capo Press, 1992), pp. 101-2; Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42,
Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, FDRL.
255
In 1921 André Tardieu published a book that could not have escaped Roosevelt’s
attention. With a forward by Edward House and an introduction by Clemenceau,
Tardieu’s book, The Truth About the Treaty, recounted the postwar setbacks, failures, and
recriminations that had been of “no benefit to anyone except the German reactionaries.”
He believed that “the conservative spirit of the Senate has reasserted itself” and that its
failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty encouraged German noncompliance. Tardieu
assessed that “German militarism lives in the spirit” and predicted a future “war which
will be sought by the Pan-Germanists” unless Britain, France, and the United States
united to stop them. From his point of view, the absence of allied unity and its negative
impact on enforcement of the Versailles Treaty would allow the reactionary nature of
Germany “in all its insidious and penetrating forms” to recover. He predicted “all the old
perils of before will arise again for all of us, with bankruptcy in the bargain.” He assessed
that although the “pillars of Allied victory” were the British fleet and the French army,
the Allies could not have conquered Germany without the overwhelming assistance
United States. The solution that Tardieu advocated for the future was the preservation of
the victorious coalition of the Western Front, “The union of the three democracies—
France, Great Britain and the United States—is the fundamental guarantee of world
peace.”120
In his introduction to Tardieu’s book, Clemenceau added further reinforcement to his
lieutenant’s themes. Although he acknowledged that in the victory of 1918 France
required “the splendid aid of trusty Allies,” Clemenceau argued that the role of the allied
coalition did not end with the German armistice. He urged that the coalition of 1918
120
André Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1921), pp. 435, 437, 461-2, 469-72, and 476.
256
“maintain its full effect in peace by the continuation of our common undertakings.” He
asserted that merely winning the war was not sufficient for an enduring peace in the
postwar. Stating “the miracle of the war won demanded an even greater miracle—the
miracle of a peace organized,” from Clemenceau’s perspective, an enduring peace first
required a common plan. He acknowledged that peace can naturally “lead to the
slackening of our will,” but characterized as worthless any peace treaty unless it was
enforced. Believing that positive change in Germany could be effected through a process
of continual evolution, he maintained that to be effective the treaty would require
sustained enforcement efforts on the part of each member of the allied coalition,
gradually remaking German civilization “little by little.” Because they were “unable to
fathom” that they had been defeated in the war, the German people remained susceptible
to the same ancient evils that made them “aspire to hegemony,” particularly since
Germany constituted “a civilization grafted upon the survival of barbarism.” Victory,
Clemenceau observed, came with the “responsibility in the most noble effort to achieve a
lasting peace by the sole forces of Right.”121
Although not a participant, Roosevelt undoubtedly followed Clemenceau’s 1922 visit
to the United States with keen interest. Clemenceau arrived in the United States on
November 18, and after visiting New York, Washington, Chicago, and Boston, he
departed on December 13, 1922. Wilsonians greeted the former prime minister with great
enthusiasm. Roosevelt’s friends Frank Polk, Bernard Baruch, Colonel Edward House,
121
Georges Clemenceau, Introduction to André Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty
(Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1921).
257
and Ambassador Jules Jusserand greeted Clemenceau, made his arrangements, and
escorted him during his visit.122
During his visit, Clemenceau made two stops that would have intrigued Franklin
Roosevelt. The first was to his kinsman’s home at Oyster Bay. Clemenceau visited
Theodore Roosevelt’s home Sagamore Hill on Long Island because he “wished to study
the environment which had produced so great an American.” At Theodore Roosevelt’s
grave, Clemenceau accompanied by Polk, House, Baruch, and General John J. Pershing
laid a wreath. One of the escorts told the press that Clemenceau then paused in a silent
tribute “at the grave of the man who had been his personal friend and who he revered as
one of the greatest Americans.”123
Clemenceau’s second visit was to see Woodrow Wilson. Although their relationship at
the Paris Peace Conference had been stormy at times, Wilson and Clemenceau parted in
June 1919 on the best of terms; Clemenceau confided to Wilson’s physician, “I feel that I
am saying good-by to my best friend.”124 They met again for the last time on December
6, 1922. Clemenceau described the meeting as “affectionate, of more than the utmost
cordiality, as between friends.” During the visit Clemenceau praised Wilson for his
instrumental role in the creation of “newly liberated,” independent states in Eastern
122
“Clemenceau’s Ship in the Harbor Now,” The New York Times, November 18, 1922,
pp. 1, 3; “Mission Complete Tiger Bids Adieu,” The New York Times, December 13,
1922, pp. 1, 3; “Clemenceau Races Through City Again,” The New York Times,
December 13, 1922, p. 3.
123
“The ‘Tiger’ Pilgrim to Roosevelt Tomb, Up at 4, in Bed at 8,” The New York Times,
November 20, 1922, pp. 1, 7.
124
Quoted in Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at
the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) p.
433.
258
Europe. Clemenceau also tried to play down the defeat of the Versailles Treaty in the
U.S. Senate and the withdrawal of American soldiers from the Rhineland. He stated,
“There can be no estrangement of French and American hearts.” Elaborating his belief
that both countries shared the same democratic ideals, Clemenceau told Wilson, “We
hold no malice for your leaving us.” Clemenceau also suggested that perhaps the time
had come for to revise the Monroe Doctrine to include parts of Europe as well. The next
day, Clemenceau was scheduled to speak at Chautauqua, one of Franklin Roosevelt’s
occasional forums.125
Franklin Roosevelt undoubtedly was very receptive to the ideas expressed by
Clemenceau during his visit, particularly since many of Clemenceau’s arguments
coincided with Roosevelt’s views. The former prime minister believed it imperative that
Britain, France, and the United States stand together; his mission in the United States was
to try and make that a reality. He suggested, “there can be no entente in Europe unless
America is in it.” Clemenceau, however, did not advocate a return of American soldiers
to the Rhine. Instead, he argued that merely a gesture from the United States would be
sufficient to force Germany into compliance with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
He told his audience in Boston, “What we want is nothing—a gesture, something to make
Germany understand [but] without [Americans] coming back in arms in Europe.”
Clemenceau asserted that the true nature of France and the French Army was democratic,
125
“Tiger and Wilson Recall Old Times in Cordial Reunion,” The New York Times,
December 7, 1922, pp. 1, 4.
259
not militaristic or imperialistic. He remarked, “When I think that we are charged with
being militarists and imperialists—excuse me—I laugh.”126
Clemenceau vigorously argued for American involvement in Europe. Acknowledging
the bitter history of relations between France and Germany, Clemenceau observed, “I
have no illusions about the history of my country.” In recognition of the periodic power
of the forces of militarism and reaction, he continued, “I am pleading for an American
influence in Europe that will protect Germany against France, if necessary, no less than
France against Germany.” Although he acknowledged the American fear of foreign
entanglements, he noted that Americans and Europeans “all come from the same blood.”
He exhorted his audience, “Think of your dear old Pilgrims, your cavaliers, your
Huguenots!” Sharing the same blood, in Clemenceau’s mind, meant that France and
Britain in unity with the United States shared a collective responsibility for “the civilized
world.” Concerning the power of American influence in Europe, he suggested that the
moment the United States made its desires known “all the threats coming from Germany
will stop.”127
Clemenceau’s visit and his message drew adverse, hostile reactions from the quarters
that Roosevelt considered reactionary. The initial opposition to Clemenceau’s visit came
from the French government under the reins of Prime Minister Poincaré. Through a
variety of sources, Poincaré’s government relayed its “official opposition” to the visit.
Poincaré’s government cautioned that Clemenceau, “a private citizen, should not be
126
“Tiger Tells Boston Entente Needs Us,” The New York Times, November 24, 1922,
pp. 1, 2.
127
“America Can End It, Clemenceau Said,” The New York Times, November 24, 1922,
p. 2.
260
accepted as an official French spokesman.”128 In the U.S. Senate, Clemenceau’s plea
drew particularly intense criticism from the Republicans who had been irreconcilable
toward the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty. The “irreconcilables” argued that
Clemenceau was responsible for the current misery in Europe and that United States
enforcement of the Versailles Treaty would only “add misery and suffering to Europe.”129
In contrast to the Senate criticism, Wilsonians saw Clemenceau as a moderating
influence at the Paris Peace Conference. Rather than subscribe to the arguments coming
out of the Senate, they believed that during the conference Clemenceau held in check the
vengeful militarism and imperialism of Poincaré, Foch, and their circle. American
involvement in Europe, they believed, was necessary to hold those forces in check and
prevent them from crushing the liberal spark in the infant German Republic.
VI.
A proposal that Roosevelt drafted in 1923 clearly reflects the impact of Clemenceau’s
ideas and the depth of Roosevelt’s continued interest in European peace and progress. In
May 1923, editor and publisher Edward M. Bok proposed a nation-wide contest for a
plan by which the United States could cooperate with other countries to achieve and
preserve world peace. Eleanor Roosevelt worked as a member of Bok’s policy
128
“Clemenceau Visit Opposed in France,” The New York Times, November 18, 1922,
p. 17.
129
“Senators Denounce Clemenceau’s Plea,” The New York Times, November 23, 1922,
pp. 1, 3; “Tigriphobia at Washington,” The New York Times, November 24, 1922, pp. 1,
6.
261
committee.130 What her husband developed was a plan for a new permanent international
organization, armed with the tools it needed for decisive action, and, unlike the existing
League of Nations, clearly independent of the Quai d’Orsay. In 1944, Franklin Roosevelt
recalled that his plan “was in many aspects similar to the new plan for the United
Nations.”131 The plan reveals a depth and complexity in Roosevelt’s strategic thinking
and demonstrates the degree to which his ideas coalesced in the 1920s.
Roosevelt never submitted his proposal. After his wife became a member of Bok’s jury
for the award, Roosevelt shelved his proposal to avoid any potential embarrassment or
perception of impropriety.132 Roosevelt’s plan combined the humanitarian and egalitarian
attributes of Wilson’s League of Nations with the responsibility that Theodore Roosevelt
believed that the great powers had to preserve peace. Roosevelt’s proposal became a
synthesis of the ideas of the two men most influential to his thinking about the role of the
United States in world affairs.133
130
Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971) pp.
282-3.
131
Franklin D. Roosevelt memorandum, Quebec, September 15, 1944, and Roosevelt
memorandum January 19, 1944, attached to a copy of “A Plan to Preserve World Peace:
Offered for ‘The American Peace Award’,” Folder 46, Bok Peace Award 1923 or 1924,
Box 41, Writing and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and
132
133
Wilson’s health had declined steadily since he left the White House; he died on
February 3, 1924.
262
As Roosevelt drafted hisentry for the Bok Peace Award, Poincaré’s occupation of the
Ruhr was ongoing, having been launched on January 11, 1923. The American press
painted a grim picture of the current leadership in France. Poincaré, according to The
New York Times, “believes he has a master grip on the reparations situation and he
intends to keep it, no matter who gets squeezed, until Germany capitulates.” The
newspaper asserted that Poincaré’s actions did not have popular support in France. The
author noted, “It would be a mistake to say that M. Poincaré has all Frenchmen behind
him.” Nevertheless, The New York Times observed that with the French parliament in
recess that there were no reins on the prime minister.134
Weighing the problems in Europe, Roosevelt noted the great anxiety caused by the
inability of the nations of the world “to restore order in the economic and social process
of civilization” or to put an end to war. He asserted American history, national self-
interest, and the “high purpose to help mankind to better things” all justified United
States participation with other nations to end war. He also argued for a continuous United
States involvement with other nations rather than a gathering “hastily summoned in time
of threatened crises.” His “Plan to Preserve World Peace” acknowledged that the U.S.
Senate would not currently, “or probably for many years to come,” allow the United
States to enter the League of Nations. He also assumed that no plan to guarantee world
peace could succeed without United States participation.135
134
“Say Poincare Won’t Give Way,” The New York Times, July 5, 1923, p. 7.
135
Foreword and Note Preliminary to Summary, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace
Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
Another copy is in folder 46, Bok Peace Award 1923 or 1924, Box 41, Writing and
Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
263
Roosevelt’s plan was to retain “all that is best in the existing League, including the
great humanitarian and economic enterprises of the League” while changing the structure
of the League and the obligations of member states.136 As a first priority, he thought that
his proposed Society of Nations needed a powerful executive, not just an assembly of
equals. His proposal preserved the General Assembly of the League but added a standing
Executive Committee always ready to deal “with any matter affecting the peace of the
world.” Unlike the existing League machinery, Roosevelt’s proposed Executive
Committee could call the assembly into extra-ordinary or special sessions. The core of
the Executive Committee would be the “so-called ‘Great Powers’” of France, Britain, and
the United States augmented by Great War Allies Italy and Japan. Representatives of six
small nations elected by the Assembly would round out the Executive Committee.
Roosevelt thought that the Executive Committee should sit “in practically continuous
session” in order that it might “obtain immediate action in the event of unlooked for
crises” and routinely exercise executive powers in the name of the Society of Nations.137
Roosevelt’s proposed Executive Committee reflected the theoretical influences of
Theodore Roosevelt’s advocacy for the cooperation of the Great Powers to preserve
international peace and, in practice, of the regular sessions of the Supreme Council
during the Paris Peace Conference.138
136
Summary, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World
Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
137
Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to
Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
138
The United States, France, Britain, Italy, and Japan comprised the Supreme Council
or the Council of Ten in Paris and met on a continuous basis for nearly five months. See
Margaret MacMillan, Paris, 1919 (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 53-8.
264
In an apparent counter to French and, to a lesser extent, British obstinacy, militarism,
and imperialism, decisions of the Executive Committee would require the assent of two-
thirds of the members, a provision that Roosevelt believed would prevent one or two
“recalcitrant nations” from blocking “the will of the great majority.” Although initially
established in Geneva, Roosevelt offered that the meetings of the Assembly and the
Executive Committee could “be held in other places to suit the convenience of the
members” and, presumably, to prevent any European capital from developing a
disproportionate influence over the Society of Nations.139
Roosevelt also hoped to give his proposed organization the machinery and power to
settle disputes or to deal with aggressor states. In accord with many existing treaties
between the United States and other countries, he called for arbitration of “all disputes
which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy.” In an obvious reference to
Poincaré’s occupation of the Ruhr, Roosevelt argued that arbitration would also “apply to
the case of demonstrations made by one nation against the other for the purpose of
collecting financial debts.” Nations, Roosevelt envisioned, would refer their grievance to
the Society of Nations rather than “taking direct action.”140
To deter war and punish aggressor states, Roosevelt, taking a lesson from the Great
War, proposed the application of economic pressure, “the severance of all trade or
financial relations, and the prohibition of all intercourse.” He admitted that the “so-called
economic and non-intercourse boycott” amounted to “an untried experiment,” but he
139
Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to
Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
140
Articles 12 and 13 and Final Note to Plan, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace
Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
265
believed that it offered “great possibilities as a deterrent of war and of aggressive acts.”141
The Society could, he suggested, tailor or postpone some of those measures to best
facilitate attaining its goals or to minimize losses to its members. Unlike Article X of the
League of the Nations that provoked intense Senate opposition, in Roosevelt’s proposal,
if the Society deemed that military force might be necessary to restore international
peace, then it would recommend such action and invite members to contribute armed
forces.142
Clearly, when Roosevelt referred to contributing military forces, he envisioned that
contribution to consist primarily of naval and air forces, bolstered by a campaign of
public information, rather than the deployment of an American Expeditionary Force or
AEF. His thinking about military force reflected his lessons from the 1917 and 1918
period. During the Great War, he had been impressed with the work of the Committee on
Public Information and the impact of psychological factors on morale. Roosevelt also
believed that the cooperation of the U.S. Navy with the capital ships of Britain and
France had played a decisive role in the economic blockade of Germany. After the war,
he attributed the U.S. Navy with a key role in the subsequent collapse of the power of
Imperial Germany.143 Therefore, in 1919 and the early 1920s, he advocated continued
141
Final Note to Plan, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve
World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
142
Articles 15 and 16, Summary, and Final Note to Plan, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok
Peace Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers,
FDRL. Roosevelt’s ideas for the League to have an enforcement mechanism may have
been influenced by the arguments of Léon Bourgeois, who Clemenceau selected to assist
in drafting the League of Nations covenant, for the League to possess an international
police force and a military staff.
143
Speech at Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, New York, August 30, 1919, Master
Speech File No. 101, FDRL. Although nearly 1,500,000 German soldiers died on the
266
appropriations for the navy. He noted with dismay the dangerous attitude in Congress
“that all wars are over.” Arguing that he was “not the least bit…a militarist,” he urged
that the Congress allocate money to keep officers and men from leaving the service and
to “help feed some of the wives and children of the navy.”144 Naval appropriations would
also enable the navy “to carry out their program for the development of the airplane.”
having seen its potential in 1918, as early as 1919, Roosevelt publicly asserted that the
airplane “will be one of the great factors in all future wars.”145 Certainly, what Roosevelt
envisioned in 1923 was not another AEF, but rather an air and naval force intended to
enforce international economic sanctions and, presumably in conjunction with a
campaign of public information and psychological warfare, defeat aggressor states.
VII.
Although attuned to the potential of technology in future wars, Roosevelt never
thought deeply about the political movements and ideologies emerging in Europe as a
result of the Great War and its aftermath. He had no understanding of the nationalist,
anti-Semitic direct-action groups flourishing in Germany in the early 1920s or the nature
Western Front alone, Roosevelt seems to have largely attributed the rapid German
collapse to economic difficulties brought about by the British blockade of the Central
Powers.
144
Speech at St. Stephens Church, Lynn, Massachusetts, April 11, 1920, Master Speech
File No. 118, FDRL.
145
Franklin Roosevelt press interview, June 26, 1919, “Must Develop Aero, Says F.D.
Roosevelt,” Poughkeepsie, New York, Evening Star and Enterprise, Folder 62, Box 40,
Writing and Statement Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal
Papers, FDRL.
267
of fascism emerging, particularly among veterans, in Italy and France. Roosevelt’s
progressive outlook led him to view new ideologies such as National Socialism and
fascism as manifestations of older, pre-existing ideologies and forces. Frances Perkins,
who had known Roosevelt since his term in the New York Senate, averred that Roosevelt
“never could understand or comprehend dictators.”146 Like many other liberal-
progressives, his thinking merely equated those groups with monarchists, imperialists,
Tories, reactionary Republicans, and the forces of wealth, aristocratic privilege, and big
business.147
Roosevelt tended to see National Socialism and fascism through the lens of the Whig
and progressive historians of his youth, equating current political manifestations in
Europe with past events. As he explained it, his ancestors had struggled “to throw off a
fascist yoke” during the American Revolution.148 In a 1925 review of Claude Bowers’
Jefferson and Hamilton, Roosevelt noted that running through his mind as he thought of
the year 1800 was “the constantly recurring thought of parallel or at least analogous
situations existing in our own generation.” Roosevelt related his anger when people
denied “that the forces hostile to control of government by the people as a whole …
which existed in the Crisis of 1790-1800 should still be a threat in our day/and land.”
146
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946) pp. 34-5,
156.
147
Tennessee Wilsonian Cordell Hull, for example, believed that the alternative to the
“progress” of world democracy was “the lapse of the world back to the control of
hereditary and arbitrary kings, dictators, and other autocrats.” Cordell Hull, The Memoirs
of Cordell Hull, volume 1 (New York” The MacMillan Company, 1948) p. 127.
148
Stenographer’s copy of Roosevelt’s informal, extemporaneous remarks before the
Daughters of the American Revolution, April 21, 1938, Master Speech File No. 1131,
FDRL.
268
Roosevelt characterized Federalist Alexander Hamilton as the true aristocrat, a
“convinced opponent of popular government,” and “a virtual dictator” who with the
assistance of “the monied class” had supreme control over the American government.
Roosevelt added, “With Hamilton were the organized compact forces of wealth, of
prestige, of commerce, of the press.” The militaristic Hamilton also had the support of the
U.S. Army and President George Washington who was with him “at heart.” Perhaps it
was with the European situation in mind that Roosevelt confided, “I have a breathless
feeling too as I ---- wonder if a century and a quarter later the same contending forces are
not again mobilizing.”149
Roosevelt, likewise, failed to comprehend nuances or even salient differences between
parties on the left of the political spectrum. While Roosevelt carefully followed domestic
politics, speeches, and attitudes of Democrats and Republicans across the country,
Frances Perkins did not think that he either read substantially or thought deeply about
what she termed “unorthodox political groups.” Perkins noted that even after perusing a
Socialist Party handbook, Roosevelt never fully understood “what the Socialists were
driving at.”150 He muddled distinctions between Whigs, liberals, Democrats, Social
Democrats, Radicals, Socialists, Bolshevists, and Communists.
Rather than perceive a host of political parties, groups, and ideologies, Roosevelt saw a
dichotomy between the agents of civilization and progress and the forces of conservatism
and reaction that opposed them. Reviewing Bowers’ Jefferson and Hamilton, he noted
149
Typed copy of long-hand, “Review of Claude Bower’s [sic] book, Jefferson and
Hamilton November 19, 1925,” folder 64, Box 41, Writing and Statement File, Franklin
D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
150
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946) pp. 34-5,
156.
269
that Thomas Jefferson was “the natural democrat against the natural aristocrat,”
Hamilton. Roosevelt argued, “Jefferson could count only on the scattered raw material of
the working masses.” Equating the 1790s to current political groups, from Roosevelt’s
progressive perspective, Jefferson, Sam Adams, James Madison “and all their lieutenants
and all their followers were called anarchists and atheists and traitors - modern words like
Bolshevik and socialist and radical had not yet come to men’s tongues.”151 Bowers, a
Hoosier Democrat who believed that there was “a fundamental and irreconcilable
difference in the two parties,” thought that Roosevelt’s review hit “the nail on the head
with a resounding whack in its application of the lessons of the Jeffersonian period to the
problems of today.”152
The 1920s served to affirm Roosevelt’s progressive view of history that maintained a
powerful grip on his thinking and his understanding of current and previous events. A
draft introduction to a history of the United States that Roosevelt wrote in 1924
demonstrates that his historical perspective had remained virtually unchanged since his
days in Harvard. Clearly his experiences during the intervening twenty years had served
to validate and confirm the progressive ideas of his schooldays. The work that he drafted
in 1924 covered the progress of civilization from the Middle Ages to the colonization of
North America and the struggle between the agents of progress and the forces of reaction,
aristocracy, and imperialism. In his thinking, the period through the fourteenth century
151
Typed copy of long- hand, “Review of Claude Bower’s [sic] book, Jefferson and
Hamilton November 19, 1925,” folder 64, Box 41, Writing and Statement File, Franklin
D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
152
Claude Bowers to Franklin Roosevelt, December 2, 1925, folder 64, Box 41, Writing
and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers,
FDRL.
270
was “a mad kaleidoscopic scramble for power and plunder” by kings, overlords, barons,
and bishops, rival Popes, and a politicized Catholic Church.153
In contrast to the forces of reaction, aristocracy, and imperialism, Roosevelt thought
that “events of truly great significance to the future of civilization” also took place during
the centuries of the Middle Ages. Those included the growth of towns in which the
inhabitants had a voice in their government, improvements in roads and ship
construction, renewed interest in geography after the Crusades, and the signing of the
Magna Carta. He asserted that by the early fifteenth century more people than ever before
were discussing “the rudiments of science and art and letters and government,” modern
civilization was emerging. In Roosevelt’s mind, Columbus was an “agent of his time”
who represented an era where, despite the emergence of the absolute monarchy under
Louis XI and the desire for new kingdoms by European rulers and princes, “the
imagination of thousands in Europe was on fire.”154
With the exception of the English colonization of North America, Roosevelt viewed
the European race for colonies as a manifestation of the forces of imperialism, militarism,
and reaction. Roosevelt portrayed Spanish colonization on behalf of “His Most Catholic
Majesty” as “a false glory,” bent solely on “exploitation” and producing only a hybrid
race that was “part cavalier, part Indian, later on in part negro.” Similarly, Roosevelt
153
Roosevelt’s draft “history of the United States,” in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp.
546-552. Although he asserts that Roosevelt’s draft contained no “new or original ideas,”
James MacGregor Burns finds that the fragment reveals “a marked socio-economic
interpretation.” Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 89.
154
546-552.
271
portrayed French efforts prior to the establishment of English colonies in North America
as little better, afraid of competition and focused on fishing, fur trapping, and trading
with Indian tribes. Roosevelt observed that the French left few historical records and
nothing that he could characterize as “sound and permanent colonization.” He noted that,
in sharp contrast to Spanish and French imperialistic exploitation, the English came to
North America as permanent colonizers whose efforts advanced the course of
civilization.155
What is impressive about the draft history written while Roosevelt was boating around
the Florida Keys is the extent that it remained consistent with the progressive
interpretations of his college days. The draft reveals Roosevelt’s historical perspective to
have been a synthesis of the progressive interpretations of his Harvard professors,
particularly Frederick Jackson Turner and Silas M. Macvane, and Whig or progressive
histories such as Francis Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe and Theodore Roosevelt’s The
Winning of the West. Rather than repudiate his progressive perspective during the Great
War or its aftermath, the events of the intervening twenty years since Roosevelt left
155
546-552. John Lamberton Harper argues that Roosevelt had a general “animus toward
European imperialism” and makes no distinction between Roosevelt’s attitude toward
English colonialism and British involvement in the subsequent wave of European
imperialism in the nineteenth century. Harper suggests that Roosevelt oscillated between
Theodore Roosevelt’s “view that Britain was America’s indispensable partner” and
Woodrow Wilson’s view of British imperialism as “a malign force.” John Lamberton
Harper , American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and
Dean Acheson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 26-7, 37. My view is
that Roosevelt drew a clear distinction between the permanent settlements that
constituted English colonization in North America and Australia, which represented the
advance of civilization, and the later, more exploitive, British imperial ventures in Africa
and Asia.
272
Harvard and his opportunity for reflection in the 1920s further confirmed the progressive
world view of his youth.
VIII.
With the retirement of Clemenceau from French political life, Roosevelt hoped for the
emergence of a liberal successor from the ranks of progressive French moderates. Radical
Edouard Herriot was among the French political leaders who seemed to have promise.
Certainly, the similarities of Herriot’s proposals to reform the League with aspects of his
own proposal for the Bok award must have intrigued Roosevelt. While Roosevelt was
formulating his proposal for the Bok Peace Award, Herriot drafted a protocol to the
League of Nations that called for compulsory arbitration in the event of conflict and
sanctions against violators. British elections, however, brought down the British
government and ended Herriot’s hopes for his “Geneva protocol.”156 While in power
from June 1924 to April 1925, Herriot followed an agenda based on antimilitarism,
anticlericalism, and the expansion of individual opportunity through education
improvements. His government was a mixture of Radicals and French Socialist Party
members known as the Cartel des Gauches, a political alliance reminiscent of the
coalition formed between the two parties at the turn of the century during the Dreyfus
Affair.157 It seems natural that Herriot was the type of French political leader that
Roosevelt believed the United States needed to assist and encourage.
156
Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 117-8.
157
Brace Jovanovich, 1985, second edition) pp. 258-9.
273
As prime minister replacing Poincaré in 1924, Herriot and his Cartel des Gauches
cabinet had inherited a difficult financial situation caused by Poincaré’s occupation of the
Ruhr. Gripped by runaway inflation, Germany halted reparations payments, a move that
increased French anxiety since reparations were intended to finance reconstruction and
pay American loans. The depreciation of the franc and the accompanying financial panic,
brought Herriot’s Radical-Socialist government to power. Herriot’s cabinet, however,
made matters worse, concealed the gravity of the problem it inherited, and alienated
treasury bondholders with Socialist rhetoric calling for severe measures against capital.
The result was a run on the franc, and by early 1925, Herriot’s government drew vigorous
attacks from Poincaré and right-wing deputies.158 In an argument that would have
appealed to American progressives, Herriot and the Radicals voiced their suspicions that
conservative financiers subverted their efforts, having erected “a wall of money” against
the republic.159
To Roosevelt it seemed that the greedy, shortsighted policies of the U.S. Senate and
the Coolidge administration demanding repayment of war debts benefited the forces of
reaction in France while hampering the agents of liberalism in both France and Germany.
From his perspective, Republican reaction had prevented United States entry into the
League of Nations and now threatened the course of democracy in Europe. On the subject
of the debts plaguing France in particular, Roosevelt argued that both the Harding and
Coolidge administrations lacked even a “general plan of settlement based on the
reconstruction and stabilization of a torn Europe.” Echoing Clemenceau, he suggested
158
Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 94-8.
159
Brace Jovanovich, 1985, second edition) p. 259.
274
that what France needed for the task of rehabilitation was “words of sympathy, of
encouragement, of hope, of cooperation” from the United States. Rather than such
kindness, Roosevelt argued that the Republicans only responded with a “cold dismissal.”
Commenting on the lack of Republican vision and understanding, Roosevelt predicted
that, unless European morale could be strengthened, in the long run even the United
States “itself would be involved in the general financial ruin that would follow.”160
Without relief home or abroad, Herriot handed in the resignation of his cabinet on
April 26, 1925. Six Radical-Socialist ministries followed in the next fifteen months, and
the franc fell to about one-tenth of its pre-war value. Finally, in July 1926, Poincaré
obtained a majority in the chamber and became prime minister. Once in power, Poincaré
managed to stabilize the franc by the end of the year. Poincaré’s financial success
compared with the Cartel’s own failed efforts, undoubtedly confirmed the suspicions of
Herriot and the Radical-Socialists that their programs had been blocked by the great
economic powers, businessmen, and the right-wing press, particularly a number of
Catholic newspapers.161 The suspicions of Herriot and his coalition undoubtedly
resonated with liberals in the United States.
160
Roosevelt speech on Republican Attitude Toward War Debts, 1926, Master Speech
File No. 252, FDRL. That same year, Clemenceau issued an open letter to President
Calvin Coolidge in which he warned that differences between France, Britain, and the
United States “threaten to have a serious effect on the future of the civilized world.”
Clemenceau decried the “money peace” of the Dawes Plan and the commercial greed that
seemed to guide Coolidge’s administration in its dealings with debtors such as France.
Georges Clemenceau open letter to Calvin Coolidge, August 26, 1926, reprinted in
Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, translated by F. M. Atkinson
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), pp. 424-6.
161
Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 98-9;
Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 260; James F. McMillan,
Twentieth Century France, pp. 95-6.
275
Likewise, the situation in the Wiemar Republic and the apparent resurgence of the
forces of Prussian militarism, reaction, and wealth gave liberal Americans cause for
concern. In the mid 1920s, although the agents of liberalism maintained nominal control,
the Wiemar Republic seemed threatened. In 1923, the republic had been threatened by
the French occupation of the Ruhr and the hyperinflation that destroyed the value of the
mark, by separatist movements in Bavaria and the Rhineland, and by Communist and
right wing rebellions. The German government ultimately stabilized the situation but at a
cost, and a sense of crisis hung over the Wiemar Republic. With few options available to
restore order, the German government had been forced to turn to the Army. While the
Wiemar Republic survived the challenges of 1923, it continued to move to the right. In
1925, the death of Social Democratic Reichspräsident Ebert brought the election of
Imperial Field Marshal Paul von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg for a seven-year term.
To liberal observers, the election of Hindenburg, the German supreme commander for the
later half of the Great War, signaled the growing power of conservatives and
reactionaries in Germany. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the increasingly
impoverished German middle-class, large cartels and trusts benefited from the economic
stability and parliamentary weakness of the mid-1920s. Formed in 1926, the steel
combine Vereinigte Stahlwerke produced half of German steel; munitions manufacturer
Krupp produced the rest. Chemical manufacturer I. G. Farben became the largest
corporation in Europe.162 It seems natural that American progressives viewed the forces
162
Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1955) pp. 415-6, 420; Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth
Century, pp. 261-7; Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History (Carbondale, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1989, second edition) p. 182.
276
gathering in Germany, the emergence of trusts and the resurgent power of Prussian
militarists and conservatives, as manifestations of forces that they had opposed before.
Sumner Welles advocated bolstering liberal elements in Germany and was among
those that shared Roosevelt’s criticism of the Republican foreign policy of the mid 1920s.
Welles thought that the remaining “bare vestige of the old German liberalism of 1848”
needed be encouraged by the Allies, thus making it easier for the new republic to
succeed. Welles believed that the Republican attitude toward war debts, coupled with
American trade barriers, contributed to unemployment in Europe, wrecked the German
middle-class, and ultimately encouraged Germany “to adopt its autocratic economic
policy.” Looking back eighteen years later, Welles lamented that the Coolidge
administration had done nothing to strengthen the forces of liberalism in Europe and to
bolster “the few weak elements in Germany which were working for a peaceful co-
operation with the world.” He believed that the election of Hindenburg, the weakening
political power of the Social Democrats in the parliament, and the emergence of huge
business cartels, represented a setback for liberal, democratic elements in the Weimar
Republic. In retrospect, contemplating the ultimate failure of the republic, Welles thought
that by 1926 “the forces set upon revenge and Pan-Germanism had already regained far
too much of a hold on the body politic.”163
Despite the considerable difficulties facing the Wiemar Republic, Roosevelt hoped that
the democratic, intellectual, urban, manufacturing Germany would reemerge. In the
absence of Republican policies to encourage those elements, Roosevelt took his own
steps. His son James observed that “Germany was a country that intrigued father” and
163
Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp.
9-11, 28-9, 46.
277
when the Weimar Republic had trouble maintaining the value of the mark, his father
speculated in German marks and joined a Canadian corporation that bought stock in
eighteen German utilities, chemical companies, and light industries.164 While financial
investment was certainly one goal of Roosevelt’s ventures, his efforts seem intent on
fostering the progressive goal of restoring industrial competition and forestalling the
formation of economic oligarchies. Declaring “the highly centralized economic system”
to be “the despot of the twentieth century,” Roosevelt perceived a need to restore the
competitiveness of small enterprises.165 To that end, in 1927 Roosevelt became one of the
organizers of the International Germanic Trust Company, an organization “engaged in
furthering the industrial development of Germany and in promoting international good-
will through established channels.” For the next year, he served as a director of both the
International Germanic Trust Company and the International Germanic Company.166
IX.
Although he diligently followed foreign affairs and pursued economic ventures,
Roosevelt’s primary interest remained domestic politics. In early 1928, Roosevelt
164
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 181 and Elliott
Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (New
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 223.
165
Franklin D. Roosevelt speech before the Commonwealth Club, Palace Hotel, San
Francisco, California, September 23, 1932, Master Speech File No. 0522, FDRL.
166
Harold G. Aron to Roosevelt, July 9, 1927 and Roosevelt to Julian Gerard, January
27, 1928, International Germanic Trust Company, Box 23, Subject File, Franklin D.
Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
278
announced that he was “almost completely recovered from infantile paralysis” and
prepared to take an active role in that year’s political campaigns. Consequently,
Roosevelt dropped from the directorship of the International Germanic Trust Company,
the International Germanic Company, and the American Construction Council.167 In
addition to supporting Democrat Al Smith’s presidential campaign, in the autumn
Roosevelt was nominated for the governorship of New York.
Despite his preoccupation with domestic politics, in mid 1928 Roosevelt offered a
critique of the foreign policy of the previous two Republican administrations. Roosevelt
thought that nine years of Republican foreign policy had contributed little toward
progress and solving the problems of the world. He declared, “During these nine years we
have stood still.” He suggested that even the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-2
was ineffective “because we assumed that a mere signature was enoug[h] and no
machinery was set up to finish the work.” Roosevelt acknowledged that the American
public did not want membership in the League of Nations. Roosevelt, however, went on
to praise
the great effectiveness of the League in many matters which do concern

us, international health work, improvement of labor conditions, aid to
backward peoples, the improving of education, the clarification of
international law, and assistance to world trade. Best of all, it offers a
common round table where threats against the peace of the world can be
discussed and divergent views compromised.
167
“Franklin D. Roosevelt Quits Several Posts,” The New York Times, February 23,
1928, p. 34.
279
He suggested that even without United States membership in the League, that the United
States should provide “a larger share of sympathetic approval and official help” to the
League than accorded by the Harding and Coolidge administrations.168
Roosevelt expressed similar views after his nomination for the governorship, arguing
that the League “has its faults, but it has brought about improvements in a great many
things.” He particularly lamented the Republican attitude toward war debts. He
commented, “The people of Europe speak of us as money-grabbers and self-seekers, and
think we are concerned only with our own pocketbooks.” As an alternative, Roosevelt
offered that an “internationally minded” Democratic foreign policy would allow the
United States “to resume our friendship with the other nations and to assume again the
position of moral leadership.”169
It is also clear that Roosevelt’s perspectives of France and Germany solidified prior to
his final trip to France in 1931. At the beginning of May, he received word that his
mother had been hospitalized in Paris for influenza during a visit with her sister Dora
Delano Forbes. He cancelled his plans to vacation at Warm Springs, Georgia, and sailed
for France with his son Elliott in tow.170 Roosevelt spent ten days in France before sailing
back to the United States for a governors’ conference. In Paris, Roosevelt stayed at the
fashionable George V. He commented that during the trip he planned to visit his mother
168
“Dissect Diplomacy Under Republicans,” The New York Times, June 11, 1928, p.
23.
169
“Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute,” The New York Times, October 3, 1928, p.
12.
170
“Roosevelt Makes Plans to Sail on Wednesday But Has Not Yet Decided on Trip to
Mother,” The New York Times, May 3, 1931, p. 1; “Roosevelt Will Go to Mother in
Paris,” The New York Times, May 5, 1931, p. 3.
280
in the American Hospital in Neuilly, talk with French officials, and “see a large number
of friends.” Former Ambassador Jusserand, Georges Leygues, and André Tardieu were
among the French officials and acquaintances from the Great War that he met with in
Paris. Roosevelt also took his son Elliott on a tour of the “devastated regions” of the
Western Front around Belleau Wood and Chateau-Thierry.171
Upon his return from France, Roosevelt expressed guarded optimism about overall
conditions in France. Roosevelt made the overall assessment, “Things are not going full
speed in France.”172 Consequently, he thought symbolic American gestures remained
important to the French people. Following a visit to the United States display at the
French Colonial Exhibition in Vincennes, Roosevelt urged that the American colonial
exhibit remain standing after the exposition closed as “a permanent expression of
Americanism” and an example of the “truly American character.”173
Nevertheless, he assessed that conditions in France “are much better than in most
European countries.” He expressed interest in the French system of unemployment
insurance and suggested it worthy of further study. Roosevelt particularly praised the
progress of agricultural recovery in the areas devastated by the Great War. In addition to
progress rebuilding smashed farms, Roosevelt credited Tardieu, the current Minister of
Agriculture, with enacting a tariff that allowed the French to stabilize agricultural prices
171
“Roosevelt in Paris to See Ill Mother,” The New York Times, May 14, 1931, p. 11;
“Roosevelt Visits French Exposition,” The New York Times, May 15, 1931, p. 8;
“Roosevelt On Way Home,” The New York Times, May 23, 1931, p. 5; “Roosevelt
Returns, Praises Farm Tariff,” The New York Times, May 28, 1931, p. 22.
172
“Roosevelt Returns, Praises Farm Tariff,” The New York Times, May 28, 1931, p.
22.
173
“Roosevelt Visits French Exposition,” The New York Times, May 15, 1931, p. 8.
281
and keep the country out of a more serious economic depression. He also believed that
aid to agriculture by the French government had helped stabilize business. Roosevelt
particularly noted how the French government was striving for “a good balance” between
industry and agriculture.174
During his conversations with Tardieu and other French officials, Roosevelt certainly
ascertained the turmoil in French politics. Tardieu’s political standing in 1931
undoubtedly would have given him cause for consternation since the progressive
elements in France were not united and were, in fact, working against each other. After
174
“Roosevelt Returns, Praises Farm Tariff,” The New York Times, May 28, 1931, p.
22. From Roosevelt’s praise for Tardieu’s initiatives it is clear that André Tardieu was
the type of French politician that Roosevelt admired. Evidently, the lessons of the 1931
visit were not lost on Roosevelt, and during his first Hundred Days in the White House he
strove for a similar balance in the United States with the creation of the National
Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(AAA). Arguably, Tardieu’s massive public works and rural electrification initiatives
provided a prototype for similar New Deal programs. In 1914, Tardieu was elected to the
Chamber of Deputies and entered military service. Wounded and medically retired from
military service in 1916, after the United States entered the war he headed the French
War Commission in the United States until November 1918, purchasing and shipping
over $3,000,000,000 worth of supplies to France. Tardieu, a former civil servant and
influential journalist, possessed a powerful, arrogant personality and a brilliant intellect.
Tardieu, like Georges Mandel another of Clemenceau’s trusted lieutenants, had expressed
his admiration for the Anglo-American political system and hoped to reform the
antiquated French system along two-party lines. Tardieu, furthermore, shared
Clemenceau’s dream of creating a strong French executive and reducing parliamentary
control. Following Clemenceau’s retirement in 1920, Tardieu spent the first half of the
1920s ostracized from politics; in the meantime, he advocated the modernization of the
French economy along American lines and the adoption of the Taylor system of scientific
management. In 1928, he became minister of the interior in a Poincaré cabinet. From
1929 to 1932, Tardieu served variously as president of the Council and as minister of the
interior, agriculture, and war. As prime minister, Tardieu launched an unemployment
insurance program and announced a large-scale program of public works. Tardieu
proposed not only the modernization of French agriculture and industry but also the
building of schools, hospitals, and houses, and the electrification and spread of telephone
communications across the countryside. “Andre Tardieu, 68, Ex-Premier, Dead,” The
New York Times, September 18, 1945, p. 23; Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The
Decline of the Third Republic, p. 176; James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France,
pp. 89, 101, 103-4.
282
Tardieu became prime minister in November 1929, Radicals had refused to serve in
Tardieu’s cabinet, and despite his progressive initiatives, the French Left labeled him an
authoritarian bent on the destruction of French democracy. Furthermore, the vast majority
of French politicians did not share his belief that the French parliamentary system needed
overhauling, and members of the Senate remained worried that Tardieu would restrict
them to a purely technical role. French politicians displayed no inclination to accept
Tardieu’s proposed changes and reform a system that Roosevelt considered archaic.175
From Roosevelt’s perspective, the forces of conservatism and reaction in France seemed
to have dominated the antiquated French political process.
During his trip to Europe in 1931, Roosevelt only visited France, but, afterwards, he
thought that economic and political conditions in France were substantially better than
conditions in neighboring Germany. Roosevelt confided to a fellow New York Democrat
that “the very difficult economic conditions” in Europe disturbed him. He added that
because those conditions fostered authoritarian regimes, the world was “in a period of
very real danger to our type of civilization.”176 Since 1925 Field Marshal Hindenburg had
remained Reichspräsident. By all accounts, with the end of the German economic boom
in 1929, the political extremes made huge gains and broad domestic support for a
German foreign policy of cooperation vanished. Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists, or
175
In December 1930, the Senate ousted Tardieu, and he became minister of agriculture.
Although, Tardieu served as prime minister again from February to May, 1932, little
came of Tardieu’s initiatives. With the failure of the “Tardieu experiment,” he became a
harsh critic of the French parliamentary system. Totally incapacitated by a stroke in 1939,
he died in 1945. “Andre Tardieu, 68, Ex-Premier, Dead,” The New York Times,
September 18, 1945, p. 23. Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third
Republic, pp. 176-7; James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France, pp. 89, 103-4.
176
Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Elisabeth Marbury, June 9, 1931, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, volume 1, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), p. 195.
283
Nazis, emerged as a major party in the September 1930 elections, having received major
support, according to Welles, from business interests, “the greedy, the Tories and the
shortsighted.”177 In the 1930 parliamentary elections, the Nazis jumped from twelve to
107 seats in the Reichstag.178
Roosevelt never returned to Germany, and his earlier experiences in Germany became
increasingly fictitious, almost mythic, in their character. What becomes apparent,
however, is the extent that Roosevelt accepted those nostalgic accounts and that they
became an enduring part of his mature worldview. For instance, his son James recalled
that the story of his father’s bicycle trip in Germany with his tutor grew with the telling.
James noted that his father would boast to his sons how he had been arrested by German
authorities four times in a single day for stealing cherries, wheeling his bicycle into the
waiting room of the train station, riding his bicycle in town after dark, and running over a
goose. James recalled, “As the years went by, he improved bit by bit on this story, finally
insisting that the goose had ‘committed suicide’ by sticking its neck through the
spokes.”179 At other times, Roosevelt’s story was that he had been arrested for bicycling
down the wrong side of the street.180 Concerning his visit aboard the Kaiser’s yacht
177
Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944) pp.
29-30.
178
Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 339.
179
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 21. Sara Delano
Roosevelt’s diary noted the departure of her son and his tutor “with their bicycles.”
Several days later she observed, “They visited Heidelberg, Baden Baden, and Strasburg
and had a nice trip.” See entries for August 14 and 17, 1896 in Sara Delano Roosevelt
Diary, 1880-1897, Box 67, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
180
Grace Tully, F.D.R. My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), p. 70.
284
Hohenzollern in 1901, Roosevelt omitted the fact that he had bowed to the German
emperor and instead developed, and continued to embellish, a tale in which he had crept
into the Kaiser’s stateroom and stole a pencil from the royal writing desk.181 The
fictionalized account bolstered Roosevelt’s professed credentials as a dedicated opponent
of Prussian autocracy and militarism; his romantic fabrications allowed him to distance
himself from his earlier praise of Kaiser Wilhelm in the 1903 Harvard Crimson.
Consistent with his own view of himself as an agent of reform, Roosevelt portrayed
himself as an opponent of the autocratic and militarist Prussian upper- class, the forces of
reaction in Germany. Certainly his claim to the King of England in 1918 that he had seen
the “first stages” of German preparations “of the war machine” contained a bit of
braggadoccio at the time.182 Nonetheless, after years of embellishment, Roosevelt seems
to have adopted his romanticized conceptions about the Imperial Germany of his youth.
He later claimed that as a schoolboy he personally had witnessed the militarization of
Germany between “1888 or 89” and 1896, saw railroad employees and students
uniformed, watched students taught to march, and observed the centralization of
181
Roosevelt’s son Elliott recounted the tale and noted that “if so, that particular trophy
has not yet turned up amongst the Hyde Park memorabilia.” Elliott Roosevelt, ed.,
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, volume 1, Early Years (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1947), p. 458. One account holds that the prize pencil bore the Kaiser’s tooth marks. See
Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1952), p. 58.
182
Entry for July 30, 1918, Diary, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
285
government power in Berlin.183 In Roosevelt’s case, his mind seems to have blurred the
facts of his youth to fit his mature conception of Germany.
X.
Accepting the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in the fall of 1932,
Roosevelt belied his progressive and internationalist perspective. He stated, “Ours must
be a party of liberal thought, of planned action, of enlightened international outlook, and
of the greatest good for the greatest number of our citizens.”184 He told his listeners
during the campaign that “we can still believe in change and progress.” He argued that
from the perspective of progress there were “only two general directions” that people and
governments could take in Europe and the United States. Roosevelt postulated that
Alexander Hamilton exemplified the autocratic approach, “was impatient of slow-moving
methods,” and had “surrendered to the belief that popular government was essentially
dangerous and essentially unworkable.” He stated that in 1932 the Republican Party
represented Hamilton’s approach, as did governments in Europe that were “building
towards a dominant centralized power.” On the other hand, pitted in a duel against the
forces of autocracy, Roosevelt believed that Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Party
183
Roosevelt Presidential Press Conference, Number 922, February 23, 1945, Complete
Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, volume 25, 1944-1945 (New
York: Da Capo Press, 1972), p. 62.
184
Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 139.
286
of 1932 exemplified the democratic approach in which “a system of government and
economics exists to serve individual men and women.”185
According to Sumner Welles, before taking the oath of office, Roosevelt already had
developed the general lines that he intended United States foreign policy to take during
his presidency, having “studied every aspect of American foreign relations during those
years” prior. Welles praised Roosevelt’s qualifications as president to conduct American
foreign affairs, particularly Roosevelt’s education, his training and experience in
government, and his personal knowledge of Europe. Describing Roosevelt’s progressive
worldview, Welles observed that, above all else, Roosevelt possessed an “almost intuitive
understanding of the great forces which control human relations.”186 Clearly, well prior to
his inauguration on March 4, 1933, Franklin Roosevelt had developed a coherent,
progressive perspective of France and Germany and a durable blueprint for American
foreign policy and military strategy. His worldview provided him a consistent foundation
upon which to base his future policies, actions, and strategic views as president.
185
Franklin D. Roosevelt speech before the Commonwealth Club, Palace Hotel, San
Francisco, California, September 23, 1932, Master Speech File No. 0522, FDRL.
186
Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p.
50.
287
Chapter 5: Implementing his Worldview: France, Germany, and the Second World War
in Europe, 1933-45
…I have an unfortunately long memory and I am not forgetting either our

enemies or our objectives.
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson,
19351
Examining President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wartime decisions and strategic direction
within the context of his background, experiences, and perspective provides a deeper
appreciation for the foundation, depth, and consistency of Roosevelt’s thinking and his
fundamental goals. The worldview that Roosevelt developed before he entered the White
House shaped and influenced his strategic thinking toward the Second World War in
Europe. As war threatened in the 1930s, Roosevelt’s response to events in Europe and
toward the war that broke out in September 1939 reflected his views of France and
Germany and his enduring progressive frame of reference. Likewise, that progressive
perspective shaped his major wartime decisions and policies for waging the war after
formal United States entry into the war in December 1941. Roosevelt’s worldview also
guided his strategic decisions intended to shape postwar France and Germany.
Within the context of Roosevelt’s worldview and his strategic concept, a consistent
pattern becomes apparent in his wartime decisions. Roosevelt was a wartime leader
whose previous experiences provided him with an enduring frame of reference, and he
deliberately patterned his leadership after the examples of his earlier years. In his actions,
he intentionally drew from the lessons of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and
incorporated those lessons into his strategic thinking. Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary
1
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, February 6, 1935, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, March 1934-August 1935 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 397-8.
288
recalled that he strove to be the type of president that Theodore Roosevelt would have
praised as active, using his “constitutional powers to the hilt in order to do what the
nation expected of him.” His secretary judged that “there was always the influence of
what T.R. had done as President.”2 At the same time, he adhered to the doctrine of
Wilson that presidential success “lay in the extent to which he chose to lead the nation,
not only as head of state and head of government, but as its political leader.” In addition
to patterning his actions after and blending the ideas of his two predecessors, he also
attempted to avoid the pitfalls that Wilson, in particular, had encountered. His daughter,
Anna Roosevelt Boettinger, commented in December 1943 “that her father long had it on
his mind to avoid the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson and … had done it to a remarkable
degree.”3
Roosevelt’s actions, however, reflected more than the influence of particular people,
they embodied the ideas and attitudes that had informed his emerging worldview, namely
the lessons and experiences of his youth, the ideas in the books he read and courses he
took, and contemporary intellectual currents such as Social Darwinism and
progressivism. Throughout his adult life, he viewed contemporary and historical events
as part of the advance of civilization marked by the constant struggle between the agents
of reform and progress and the reactionary forces of conservatism, autocracy, and
imperialism. That outlook caused him to blur fundamental distinctions between his
2
Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 59, 71.
3
Entry for December 14, 1943, in Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of
Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, edited by John Morton Blum (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1973), p. 279.
289
adversaries and opponents at home and abroad until they fit his overall dichotomy.4
Consequently, Roosevelt equated political opponents of his policies with foreign
adversaries.
He applied that worldview to the events of the Great War and the postwar era, and he
thought deeply about how to avoid the mistakes he perceived. Those lessons informed his
policies and actions as he sought the reemergence of liberal Germany and, after June
1940, republican France. The result was a remarkable degree of consistency in
Roosevelt’s policies and strategic direction throughout the Second World War. Roosevelt
aptly described his coherent strategic focus in the White House with his comment to
Henry L. Stimson in 1935, “I have an unfortunately long memory and I am not forgetting
either our enemies or our objectives.”5
Motivated by much more than military expediency, Roosevelt pursued a broad political
agenda. He waged a war to defeat Nazi Germany and also to create the enduring
conditions for a peaceful postwar world. What follows is not intended to be a narrative of
the Second World War. It illuminates the role of Roosevelt’s worldview in his actions,
policies, and strategic direction for the United States as wartime president. In so doing, it
4
The election campaign of 1940 reveals how Roosevelt’s thinking tended to equate both
domestic and overseas opponents in his overall struggle of democracy versus fascism.
For instance, Harold L. Ickes recorded that Roosevelt developed “the theory on which we
will undoubtedly run the campaign, namely, that Willkie represents a new concept in
American politics--the concept of the ‘corporate state.’” Roosevelt claimed that Willkie’s
concept was also the theory behind the fascism of Mussolini’s Italy and practically no
different than the “nazism of Germany.” Entry for June 30, 1940 in Harold L. Ickes, The
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 223.
5
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, February 6, 1935, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, March 1934-August 1935 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 397-8.
290
provides a deeper appreciation for a little known or studied aspect of Roosevelt’s
thoughts and behavior.
I. Roosevelt and the Resurgence of Prussian Militarism, Conservatism, and Autocracy
Consistent with his progressive worldview, Roosevelt believed that the government of
Adolph Hitler represented a triumph of the forces of reaction, Junker conservatism, and
Prussian militarism and a disconcerting setback to German liberalism. As he entered the
White House, Roosevelt saw continuity between the newly installed government of
Adolph Hitler and the militarist, oligarchic Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Figures that
Roosevelt associated with Prussian imperialism and reaction held power in Berlin in early
1933. Aging imperial Field Marshal Paul von Hindenberg, part of the command team that
launched the German offensives on the Western Front in 1918, occupied the German
presidency. The previous chancellor, Baron Franz von Papen, had become the vice-
chancellor in the Hitler government. A nobleman and former Imperial Garde K rassier
officer, von Papen had served as the German military attaché in the United States during
the first two years of the Great War. Secretary of State Lansing had demanded the recall
of the imperious von Papen and his naval counterpart in December 1915 after they were
implicated in German espionage and sabotage plots.6 Recalling the efforts of von Papen
and his associates, Eleanor Roosevelt noted that during the Great War the German
6
Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 583. Lansing believed that
German Ambassador Count von Bernstorff “in all probability directed these enterprises”
but was able to hide his role successfully, allowing the military and naval attachés accept
the blame. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis, Indiana:
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935; repr. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), p.
357.
291
attachés had “succeeded in thoroughly arousing the antagonism of the American people
by spying into American affairs.”7 The German foreign minister was Baron Konstantin
von Neurath, a professional diplomat and former member of the imperial German
Foreign Service who had occupied his current office since June 1932. Prussian Minister
of the Interior Herman Goering served as minister without portfolio in the new cabinet.
Industrialist Alfred Hugenberg, the former director of Krupp, served as minister of
economics. Among those who publicly supported Hitler was Prince August Wilhelm, the
son of Kaiser Wilhelm II.8 Roosevelt told the French ambassador, “Hitler is a madman
and his counsellors, some of whom I personally know, are even madder than he is.”9
Although Roosevelt’s energy during his first term was focused on economic recovery,
he followed events in Germany and sought to influence events in Europe. Starting in May
1933, Woodrow Wilson provided the conscious inspiration for many of Roosevelt’s
policies and actions. For instance, believing that the German government would disrupt
the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on May 16, 1933 Roosevelt dispatched a cable to
the heads of state involved in the Geneva conference and the London Economic
Conference. Roosevelt’s goal was to prevent the break up of the disarmament conference
and also to suggest the direction that the negotiations should continue.10 Roosevelt
7
p. 243.
8
“Ex-Kaiser, 74, Celebrates in High Spirits; Writes of Homesickness for Germany,” The
New York Times, January 28, 1933, p. 1.
9
Roosevelt quoted by Ambassador Paul Claudel, April 5, 1933, in Frank Friedel,
Company, 1990), p. 113.
10
Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), p. 115.
Nevertheless, when questioned by the press as to whether the disarmament message had
292
envisioned that his message would build upon the pledge made by President Woodrow
Wilson at Mobile, Alabama in October 1913 that “the United States will never again seek
one additional foot of territory by conquest.” Roosevelt noted “that the definite policy of
the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.”11
Roosevelt’s message seemed to validate views in his administration of the power of
United States moral suasion in international affairs. Roosevelt thought that his message
had the effect “of pouring oil on troubled waters.”12 To Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Roosevelt
confided his belief that his message had averted a war.13 Secretary of State Cordell Hull
believed that Roosevelt’s message “had some influence with Hitler” because he
responded in a conciliatory manner, rather than announcing German rearmament as
anticipated.14
Roosevelt’s sources reinforced his views of Germany. One was Samuel R. Fuller, Jr., a
former naval reserve officer who knew Roosevelt during the Great War, who had
been directed chiefly at Germany, Roosevelt obtusely replied, “No, the whole world.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference, May 16, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 129. Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Heads of Nations
Represented at the London and Geneva Conferences, May 16, 1933, Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 126-8.
11
Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), pp. 132-
3.
12
13
Entry for May 22, 1933 in the Henry Morgenthau, Jr. diary, quoted in Frank Friedel,
Company, 1990), p. 114.
14
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York: The MacMillan
Company, 1948) p. 227.
293
extensive business ties in Germany and the Netherlands. Fuller conveyed to Roosevelt his
impressions and declared Hitler to be “a successful dictator” who was “fully organized
and in full power.” He assessed that in Germany “all personal liberty, as we know it here,
has gone.” Ominously Fuller offered, “To us, it seems also that Germany, a nation which
loves to be led, is again a marching nation; and so a danger.”15 Roosevelt’s ambassador in
Berlin, Professor William Dodd, assessed that “armament and training for war are major
interests” in Germany, tendencies that he believed were “contrary to all liberal
philosophy.”16 The withdrawal of Germany from the Geneva Disarmament Conference
and the League of Nations marked the apparent triumph of the forces of militarism and
big business. Dodd suspected collusion with arms manufacturers and was disconcerted by
15
Samuel R. Fuller, Jr. to Roosevelt, May 11, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
16
William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, August 12, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D.
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 358-9. Roosevelt’s past influenced
his choices of ambassadors, and he initially chose to fill the ambassadorships in Berlin
and Paris with Democratic Party faithful who reflected his progressive aspirations, rather
than foreign service careerists. Roosevelt originally offered the post in Berlin to James
M. Cox, his running mate from the 1920 election. After Cox declined for family reasons,
Woodrow Wilson’s advisor Edward House recommended Dodd, a professor of history at
the University of Chicago who had received his doctorate in 1900 from the University of
Leipzig. Jesse I. Straus of New York accepted the appointment to the Paris embassy.
Straus, the president of Macy’s and a major campaign contributor in 1932, was the
nephew of Oscar Straus, Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of labor and commerce and the
first Jew to rise to cabinet level in the United States government. Franklin Roosevelt’s
offer of the Paris post to Straus, furthermore, reflected his deep sympathy with the anti-
clericalism of the French Left. Clearly, Roosevelt viewed the French Revolution, the
laicization of the state, and the emancipation of Jews as a progressive advance for
civilization in France. In their youth both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt followed the
case against Captain Alfred Dreyfus, the only Jewish officer on the French general staff,
with great interest. The figures that they admired had championed progressive anti-
clericalism in education, in the army, and in political life: Mlle. Marie Souvestre,
Maréchal J. J. C. Joffre, and Clemenceau.
294
Hitler and his circle. The ambassador reported, “Liberal and intellectual Germany is very
uneasy, but it dares not speak out.”17 Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter wrote from
England appraising Roosevelt of “the violence and madness now dominating in
Germany.” Frankfurter observed that “the present rulers of Germany” ascribed “to the
gospel of force and materialism.” Frankfurter further related that Hitler’s withdrawal
from the Geneva Conference was largely the result of domestic considerations.
According to Frankfurter’s sources, Hitler’s action was “an effort to divert attention from
economic difficulties” and from “internal dissensions.”18
The assessments of Fuller, Dodd, and Frankfurter merely reinforced Roosevelt’s own
assessment of National Socialism. Power in Germany, Roosevelt believed, was
concentrated in the hands of on oligarchy consisting of the conservative upper class,
Prussian militarists, and industrialists.19 According to Roosevelt’s progressive frame of
reference, in a fascist or Nazi system control was in the hands “of infinitely small groups
of individuals” who subverted the will of the people and did not allow “a single one of
the democratic sanctions that we have known.”20 Although proud of his historical
17
William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, October 28, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D.
18
Felix Frankfurter to Roosevelt, October 17, 1933, “Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1933”
Container 97, Reel 60, General Correspondence, The Papers of Felix Frankfurter,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
19
Radio Address to the New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 26, 1939, Master
Speech File Number 1250, FDRL. See also excerpts from May 10 and 14, 1930, Donald
Day, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Own Story (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1951), pp. 128-9.
20
Stenographer’s copy, Graduation Exercises University of Virginia, June 10, 1940,
Master Speech File Number 1285, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech Files, FDRL.
295
background, Roosevelt’s education and perspective naturally led him to view fascism and
National Socialism as current manifestations of previous, reactionary political systems.
He asserted, “When you come down to it, there is little difference between the feudal
system and the fascist system.”21 Consistently, Roosevelt refused to recognize that
fascism or National Socialism could have popular support. In his mind, there were “only
two general directions” that governments could take: “government for the benefit of the
few” or “government for the benefit of the many.”22 In 1934, he noted that the inspiration
for fascism derived “from a class or a group or a marching army” rather than being a
popular manifestation. He specifically challenged the assertion that the narrow, restrictive
nationalism of fascism and Nazism could be “supported by the overwhelming mass of the
people themselves.” Instead, he argued that the danger to world peace that those
movements represented derived from a very small, but extremely powerful, group of
individuals rather than from the population itself.23 Militarism, he believed subverted the
liberal impulse, and Roosevelt ominously related to the press that “the Germans are
drilling, the school children are drilling….”24
Rather than give up on liberal Germany, Roosevelt harbored the hope “that German
sanity of the old type that existed in the Bismarck days when I was a boy at school in
21
James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey
House, 1948), p. 128.
22
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward (New York: John Day Company, 1933), p.
17.
23
Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), pp. ix-
xii, 134.
24
Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference, August 25, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 375.
296
Germany will come to the front again.”25 Dodd confided, “My interpretation of this is
that all liberal Germany is with us—and more than half of Germany is at heart liberal.”26
Roosevelt accepted Dodd’s assessment and envisioned the continued existence of a
liberal, educated, urban, German middle class, a group he tended to characterize as “the
people.” Considering the situation in Germany, Roosevelt observed “that in every
country the people themselves are more peaceably and liberally inclined than their
governments.”27 In October 1933, he told a group that “the very great majority of the
inhabitants of the world” are opposed to territorial expansion, imperialism, and
domination at the expense of their neighbors.28
As Roosevelt saw the problem, the leaders in power in Nazi Germany kept the German
people in the dark. The solution, in Wilsonian fashion, therefore was to go over the heads
of Germany’s leaders and the powerful special interests and address the German people
directly. Frankfurter informed the president that “highly educated Germans” were
completely barred from all knowledge of the outside world and that “all channels of light
are shut from them.” Frankfurter urged Roosevelt to broadcast directly to the people of
25
Franklin D. Roosevelt to George H. Earle, December 22, 1933, F.D.R.: His Personal
26
27
Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, April 14, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
28
Roosevelt address to the Third Annual Women’s Conference on Current Problems,
October 13, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1,
January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1969), pp. 423-4.
297
Germany because “no other voice in the world would carry as much weight as yours.”29
Meanwhile, Dodd expressed his conviction that in Europe “the educated and even
uneducated people are in the main with us, only they are forbidden from saying
anything.” He believed that one remedy was for the people of Europe to have the
American principles of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and
Abraham Lincoln put before them as clearly as possible.30
To deal with what he considered the imperialistic and autocratic impulses that
threatened world peace, Roosevelt advocated a progressive approach intended to
supplement and implement the efforts of Woodrow Wilson to educate the peoples of the
world, rather than address political leaders, business executives, and financial autocrats.31
Roosevelt believed that the United States could wield a powerful moral force. He asserted
through “constant education and the stressing of the ideals of peace that those who seek
imperialism can be brought in line with the majority.”32 His desire to reach and educate
the German people prompted Roosevelt to have a German edition of his book On Our
Way published in Berlin in 1934.33
29
Felix Frankfurter to Roosevelt, October 17, 1933, “Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1933”
Container 97, Reel 60, General Correspondence, The Papers of Felix Frankfurter, LCMD.
30
31
32
Roosevelt address to the Third Annual Women’s Conference on Current Problems,
October 13, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1,
January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1969), pp. 423-4.
33
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Unser Weg (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1934). Frankfurter
initially had urged a broadcast “in German.” In December 1933, however, Ambassador
298
II. The Strategic Concept for the Defeat of Germany and the Drive for Preparedness,
1936-1939
As Germany threatened the peace of Europe in the late 1930s, Roosevelt’s worldview
provided the foundation of his strategic approach for the defeat of Nazi Germany. His
progressive frame of reference influenced how he perceived events in Europe and in the
United States. As he campaigned for reelection in 1936, Roosevelt saw the contest as part
of a larger “struggle with the old enemies of peace,” which had grown powerful,
resurgent, and increasingly united.34 Believing that war would be disastrous for
civilization, Roosevelt earnestly pledged to keep the United States out of war while
simultaneously taking actions to enhance the military preparedness of the United States
and hasten the defeat of Adolph Hitler’s Nazi regime.
In Roosevelt’s response to the crisis in Europe, his strategic thinking reflected the
concepts that had coalesced in his mind by the mid 1920s. The Great War convinced him
war represented a bloody and destructive setback to civilization and progress. Roosevelt
returned to Chautauqua on August 14, 1936 and, recalling his visit to the Western Front,
announced, “I hate war.” Chautauqua, however, did not mark a departure for Roosevelt.
Throughout the address, his internationalist message was consistent with the strategic
Breckinridge Long reported the problems with trying to listen to one of FDR’s radio
addresses in Fascist Italy, and Long’s comments may have induced FDR to stick with the
printed word. See Breckinridge Long to Roosevelt, December 8, 1933, in Edgar B.
Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February
1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 516-7.
34
Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 214-5.
299
views that developed from his Great War experience. The president made it clear that he
and his administration were “not isolationists except insofar as we seek to isolate
ourselves completely from war.” Instead, Roosevelt sketched the internationalist
approach that his administration had taken towards the prevention of war. Although they
had come “to nought,” Roosevelt claimed that his administration had “cooperated to the
bitter end” at the Geneva disarmament conference, sought an international treaty to deal
with the international arms trade, and participated at the London Naval Conference in
hope of naval limitations.35
Roosevelt continued those themes in his quarantine speech, given in Chicago on
October 5, 1937, and intended “to persuade the people that this country should make a
definite and positive effort to preserve the peace.” Accompanying Roosevelt’s drive to
preserve peace in Europe was a complementary impulse to enhance the preparedness of
United States naval and air forces.36 Roosevelt asserted, “It is my determination to adopt
every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war.” The president, however, made it
clear that while his administration was “adopting such measures as will minimize our risk
35
Franklin D. Roosevelt address, August 14, 1936, Chautauqua, New York, Master
Speech File No. 889, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech Files, FDRL.
36
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), p.
208. Despite primarily dealing with domestic matters in the autumn of 1937, two sources
seem to have fueled the need for the quarantine speech in Roosevelt’s mind. One was a
stream of State Department reports on the Sino-Japanese War charging Japan with
violating the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The other was American
newspaper accounts of the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in Munich on
September 25. Presidential secretary Grace Tully recalled that Roosevelt read accounts of
the staged and highly militaristic Hitler-Mussolini meeting while on the train enroute to
Chicago and “rather glowered at the pictures of the two little men.” Grace Tully, F.D.R.:
My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 229-230. Telegram from Cordell Hull
to Geneva, September 28, 1937, Master Speech File No. 1093, FDRL.
300
of involvement” that there was no such thing as “complete protection in a world of
disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.”37
Rather than resorting to intervention with military force, his reflection on the lessons of
the Great War convinced Roosevelt that economic sanctions could serve as powerful
international tools to maintain peace. To effectively use such tools, furthermore, would
require international cooperation between the nations “who want to live in peace under
law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal
acceptance through the centuries.”38 In December 1937, Roosevelt called attention to the
fact that a 1933 statute gave him “very wide powers—in effect the right to impose
economic sanctions ‘in order to prevent war.’” Rather than unilateral action, however, the
president cautioned that the United States should only impose sanctions “after
consultation and in co-operation with the other democratic powers,” namely France and
Britain.39
Following up on his quarantine speech, in October 1937, Roosevelt considered making
a public appeal for international cooperation. Roosevelt conceived issuing a message
calling for all governments to reach an agreement on the fundamental rules of
international conduct, the most effective means of reducing armaments and promoting
economic security, and measures to guarantee respect for humanitarian concerns in the
event of war. According to Sumner Welles, the president believed that even if the
37
Franklin D. Roosevelt dedication of the Outerlink Bridge over the Mouth of the
Chicago River, Chicago, Illinois, October 5, 1937, Master Speech File No. 1093, FDRL.
38
Franklin D. Roosevelt dedication of the Outerlink Bridge over the Mouth of the
Chicago River, Chicago, Illinois, October 5, 1937, Master Speech File No. 1093, FDRL.
39
Entry for December 18, 1937, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 274.
301
European powers did not make any progress toward disarmament, the effort would have
had the salutary effect of uniting all governments, with the exception of Germany and
Italy, behind United States efforts to maintain peace. Roosevelt also thought that the
proposal might “have a tonic effect upon the smaller countries of Europe” and upon “the
great democracies,” France and Britain, who “during the preceding three years … had
surrendered all initiative and all semblance of leadership.” If Britain and France halted
Germany and Italy, Roosevelt believed that German and Italian support to Japan would
stop and that a weakened Japan would be forced to make peace with China. Roosevelt’s
proposal was consistent with his fundamental strategic goals, and Welles noted that
Roosevelt “felt that the rousing of public opinion on a world scale would in itself be
productive of practical good and would have instant repercussions on the German and
Italian peoples.”40 In the final respect, Roosevelt’s motivation reflected the conclusion
reached by Wilson’s secretary James Tumulty that President Wilson’s notes had sown
“the seed of dissention that ruined German morale at home.”41 A further sign of the
impact of the Great War, Roosevelt hoped to deliver his international appeal on Armistice
Day. At the insistence of several of his advisors, however, Roosevelt delayed releasing
his appeal and after the Anschluss, the union of Germany and Austria, he sensed that the
opportunity had passed.42
40
64-7.
41
Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), p. 278.
42
67-9.
302
Although he hoped for international cooperation, Roosevelt also highlighted the
importance of United States military preparedness. In his advocacy of preparedness,
Roosevelt resolved not to repeat what he characterized as Woodrow Wilson’s mistake by
“refusing to permit the American fleet to be brought back from Guatanamo Bay in order
to be put in shape for the world war that seemed to be inevitable.”43 Echoing the
arguments made by kinsmen James Russell Soley and Theodore Roosevelt and his own
advocacy for preparedness in 1913, the president informed Congress that the international
situation compelled the United States to think of its own security. The president rated the
armed forces inadequate and argued that they required substantial increase. He
specifically asked for funds for the army to procure antiaircraft artillery and ammunition
and for the navy to build two additional battleships, two additional cruisers, and increase
its current building plan by twenty percent. Roosevelt sought increases to provide coastal
protection, air defense for communities far from the coast, and the ability to “keep any
potential enemy many hundred miles away from our continental limits.”44
Meanwhile, Roosevelt considered how best to wage a successful war against Nazi
Germany. In September 1938, during the crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia
over the Sudeten region, Roosevelt laid out for his cabinet a comprehensive strategic
blueprint for defeating Germany that had coalesced from the lessons he distilled from the
Great War and his deliberation about how to reduce the terrible human cost of another
43
Entry for July 11, 1933, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 1,
The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 61.
44
Franklin D. Roosevelt message to Congress, January 28, 1938, Master Speech File No.
1110, FDRL. Concerning arguments for naval preparedness to avert war and for security,
see James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1895 edition) and Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915).
303
Western Front. The president noted that first he would get “word to the German people if
he could” that the “territorial integrity of Germany was not threatened and would not be
infringed upon.” Such an announcement, Roosevelt predicted would not only allay the
apprehensions of the German people, it would also serve to undermine their support for
the Hitler regime in power. He offered that the next step would be to “announce that
every frontier of Germany would be closed tight regardless of consequences.” While the
British fleet bottled up the German navy, the countries surrounding Germany would be
induced to join the economic boycott or face rationing. Rationed countries, Roosevelt
explained, “would be allowed to import only sufficient foods and other supplies to
provide for the needs of their own population based on their consumption before the
war.” Such a program, the president believed would prevent any excess supplies from
being re-exported into Germany. With the economic boycott and blockade in place,
Roosevelt would wage war principally from the air. He shared his assessment “that with
England, France, and Russia all pounding away at Germany from the air, Germany would
find it difficult to protect itself even with its present preponderance in the air.” Tellingly,
Roosevelt expressed the “opinion that the morale of the German people would crack
under aerial attacks much sooner than that of the French or the English.” In contrast to
the terrible cost of the Great War, Roosevelt perceived great advantages from his
proposed strategy, asserting that it “would cost less money, would mean comparatively
few casualties, and would be more likely to succeed than a traditional war by land and
sea.”45
45
Entry for September 18, 1938, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
304
Roosevelt dreaded the impending outbreak of war in Europe and saw the conflict as
detrimental to the advance of civilization. The intervention that Roosevelt envisioned,
however, did not include wading in with military force but with moral and material
support instead while the United States pursued partisan neutrality. In a letter to William
Phillips, the president suggested that ninety percent of the American people were anti-
German and anti-Italian. Believing Wilson’s appeal that the American people remain
neutral in thought as a mistake, he added, “I would not propose to ask them to be neutral
in thought….”46 Roosevelt believed that the industrial output of the United States could
“flow to England and France by way of Canada and otherwise” even if the administration
“had to enforce our neutrality laws.” Roosevelt told the cabinet, “In carrying out our
neutrality laws we would resolve all doubts in favor of the democracies.”47 To that end,
he assembled a group, to include members of the State Department, the Treasury
Department, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, to examine the economic weapons available to employ against Germany and
assist France and Britain. According to Adolph Berle, the group “undertook to outline a
set of documents implementing the ‘neutrality’ of the United States, but in the sense that
this neutrality was primarily to assist ‘the Democracies’.”48 Rather than the impartial
neutrality advocated by Woodrow Wilson in 1914, the result was closer to the traditional
46
Franklin D. Roosevelt to William Phillips, September 15, 1938, F.D.R.: His Personal
47
48
Adolph Berle memorandum to Sumner Welles, March 21, 1939, Box 73, “Welles,
Sumner (1938-42),” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, Berle Papers, FDRL.
305
policy of armed neutrality pursued by the United States during the Quasi War, suggested
by James Russell Soley, or attempted belatedly by Wilson in March 1917.
Consistent with the belief that the dispatch of an American Expeditionary Force or
AEF had been a mistake, Roosevelt discouraged any thought of the United States sending
another AEF to fight in Europe. To Roosevelt, however, the sympathy, moral, and
economic support of the United States represented another matter wholly different than
deploying military force. Unlike Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt proposed to make the
moral support of the United States evident to France and Britain. Hoping to bolster the
governments of France and Britain, Roosevelt confirmed, “I would strongly encourage
their natural sympathy while at the same time avoiding any thought of sending troops to
Europe.”49
Several days after outlining his strategy to his cabinet, Roosevelt made an appeal for
continued negotiations in the Czech crisis. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “All through the
Czech crisis in 1938 he continued his attempts to save the peace, through appeals to
Hitler and the heads of other countries.”50 During the crisis, she pondered “the French
reservists leaving” for the front in 1914 and commented on the stupidity of nations
resorting to war again.51 Meanwhile, Franklin Roosevelt sought to forestall the slide
toward another war; he confided that he “wanted to avoid the mistake that Wilson made
49
Franklin D. Roosevelt to William Phillips, September 15, 1938, F.D.R.: His Personal
50
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), p.
208.
51
Entry for September 20, 1938, in [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt’s My
Day: Her Acclaimed Columns, 1936-1945, edited by Rochelle Chadakoff (New York:
Pharos Books, 1989), p. 97.
306
in 1914.” Roosevelt thought that Wilson might have averted the outbreak of the war if he
“had expressed himself vigorously” and timed his message better.52 First, Franklin
Roosevelt sent a series of appeals to the heads of state of the contending countries. As
war seemed almost unavoidable, he directed subsequent appeals to Hitler and Mussolini.
Rather than simply dispatch messages prepared by the State Department for his approval,
Roosevelt took a central role in the process. Throughout the crisis, Sumner Welles and
Adolph Berle continued to draft and revise presidential messages, while Roosevelt
personally revised, edited, and dictated. Berle noted that “the President certainly wanted
action.” Roosevelt’s secretary recalled “that the President had a tigerish devotion to his
conviction that negotiations, however, protracted, were preferable to warfare and he felt
that even the egomaniacal dictators would not be insensible to such appeals.”53 In that
respect, Roosevelt seems to have found his inspiration in the actions of kinsman
Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 as mediator of the Russo-Japanese War or in bringing about
the Algeciras Conference.54
The course of events in September 1938 convinced Roosevelt that he had avoided the
1914 mistakes of Wilson and, after the manner of Theodore Roosevelt, played a decisive
52
53
Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 233-4 and
Adolph Berle memorandum to Sumner Welles, October 5, 1942, Box 73, “Welles,
Sumner (1938-42),” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, and entries for September
27 and 30, 1938, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
54
For Theodore Roosevelt’s role as mediator and negotiator, see Lewis L. Gould, The
Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press,
1991), pp, 179-84, and 189-91; and Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise
of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956;
paperback edition, 1989), pp. 267-314, 357-89.
307
role in preventing Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia and preserving peace in Europe.
During the Munich conference, Roosevelt “was enthusiastic about the good reception” of
his first message to Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and others.55 He
was more pleased with his second message to Hitler and Mussolini. Ambassador William
Bullitt communicated to the president, “Your second telegram to Hitler was a
masterpiece.”56 A year after the Munich conference, Roosevelt recalled that his messages
to Hitler and Mussolini had been particularly effective. He confided, “And I think the
message prevented Hitler from marching as he doubtless intended.”57 Following the
settlement, Eleanor Roosevelt characterized her husband’s message as “grand and so well
timed.”58
By the late 1930s, Roosevelt equated conditions in Germany with those during the
Great War. Roosevelt and his closest advisors believed that Nazi Germany teetered on the
verge of internal collapse with the German people intentionally kept in the dark by their
Nazi and militarist masters.59 George Messersmith, the United States minister in Austria
55
Entry for September 27, 1938, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
56
William C. Bullitt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 28, 1938, Correspondence of
William C. Bullitt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and R. Walton Moore, FDRL.
57
Jim Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey House,
1948), pp. 197-8.
58
Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Anna Roosevelt, 3 October 1938, Mother and Daughter:
The Letters of Eleanor and Anna Roosevelt, edited by Bernard Asbell. (New York:
Fromm International, 1988), pp. 105-106.
59
George S. Messersmith memorandum, “Comparing Briefly Certain Aspects of the
Situation in Europe in 1914 and 1936,” September 10, 1936, pp. 21-22, “Messersmith,
George S. 1936-37,” Reel 53, Container 83, General Correspondence, The Papers of
Felix Frankfurter, LCMD. William E. Dodd to R. Walton Moore, April 18, 1936, Edgar
B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 3, September 1935-
January 1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 290-1.
308
and the former consul general in Berlin, concluded, “Economically, financially, and in
spite of the apparent activity, industrially also, Germany [is] fa[r] weaker than in 1914.”
He added that “there is unquestionably greater social discontent in Germany today than
there was in 1914.” Meanwhile, Dodd reported, “The masses of German people, in so far
as I have been able to contact with them, are very displeased, but not able to say a word.”
Apparently, Roosevelt also accepted the assessment that the fully mobilized German
economy was on the verge of collapse and that the German people were on the verge of
revolt. Believing incorrectly that Germany was fully mobilized for war by 1936, the
president rated German power as extremely fragile and the German economy at the
breaking point, equating the situation in Germany with that of 1917 and 1918.60 He hoped
that the Nazi regime might collapse before it could launch a major war. The result,
Roosevelt anticipated, would be a restoration of the liberal Germany that he nostalgically
recalled from his youth.
60
As German rearmament continued, assessments of Germany by members of the
Roosevelt administration increasingly accepted the notion that although Germany was
strong militarily, its power was extremely fragile. Ambassador William Dodd adjudged
that the German government was desperate “to save Germany from economic disaster.”
William E. Dodd to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 19, 1936, Edgar B. Nixon, ed.,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 3, September 1935-January 1937
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 390-2. American
military attachés supported the view of Germany mobilized for war. In October 1936, the
military attaché in Berlin forwarded a report to the War Department assessing the
changes in the German economic system since the ascent of Hitler. The attaché believed
that the German development of production facilities for synthetic fuels indicated full
wartime mobilization of the German economy. He claimed that the “German concept of a
self-sufficient nation is almost exactly similar to our concept of a nation industrially
mobilized for war.” The attaché concluded, “Germany in peace time engages in an
enormous program of industrial mobilization so as to make herself self-sufficient in war.”
Military Attaché, Berlin, Military Intelligence Division Report No. 14,932, Germany
(Economic), Subject: Petroleum, October 22, 1936, Box 625, Military Intelligence
Division Correspondence, 1917-41, Records of the WFGS, Record Group 165, National
Archives, Federal Record Center, Suitland, Maryland.
309
After Kristallnacht, the vicious anti-Jewish pogrom carried out by the Nazis, Roosevelt
moved to strengthen American sea and air power into a weapon that he thought would
deter foreign aggressors. Mindful of Wilson’s refusal to bring the fleet to readiness,
Roosevelt directed the U.S. Navy to form a strong Atlantic squadron. In addition,
consistent with his view of the efficacy of both naval and air power in comparison to
large ground forces, he moved to enhance the Army Air Corps and give it greater
strategic potential. Roosevelt held a conference at the White House on November 14,
1938 that included WPA administrator Harry Hopkins, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau,
General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and Major General H. H. Arnold,
the chief of the Air Corps. Roosevelt explained “the necessity for having a large mass of
airplanes in being, together with a large productive capacity to be available as a striking
force to back United States foreign policies.” Arnold noted that in reference to Hitler, the
president believed that a well-equipped army of 400,000 men would not serve as a
deterrent “whereas as heavy striking force of aircraft would.” Not satisfied with
American medium bombers, the president also directed the development of a long-range
strategic bomber. Conscious of the time it had taken the United States to mobilize in 1917
and 1918, Roosevelt reminded his audience that the United States took over a year to get
a large army into action in France during the Great War. He insisted that the United
States “must not be caught napping again.” Roosevelt explained that he envisioned “a
sufficiently large air force to deter anyone from landing in either North or South
America.”61
61
H. H. Arnold memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 15, 1938, Special
Conferences, November 14, 1938, PPF 1P, President’s Personal File, FDRL. Roosevelt
not only appreciated the impact of his proposed aircraft program on deterring aggressor
310
As war threatened to break out in Europe, Roosevelt’s strategic thinking reflected the
progressive ideas of twenty-five years earlier that Germany and the concept of Pan-
Germanism represented an economic and military threat to the world, brought up to date
with his appreciation for the potential of air power. On January 31, 1939, Roosevelt
called the Senate Military Affairs Committee to a meeting in the White House. He
confided that he wanted the American people “to gradually realize” the “potential
danger” that European dictators represented. Roosevelt outlined his thoughts about the
strategy that he believed Hitler to be following and told the Senators, “Beginning about
three years ago, there was rather definite information as to what the ultimate objective of
Hitler was,” namely “a policy of world domination between Germany, Italy and Japan.”
Roosevelt assessed that if France, Britain, and the other independent nations of Europe
decided to fight Hitler that it could not be assumed that they would defeat Germany and
Italy. He added, “the best opinion is that it is a fifty-fifty bet.” He suggested that Hitler
and Mussolini could win by wiping out the French and British air forces in a short time.
He offered that if the Allies were be driven under ground by German air attacks and were
not be able to get the munitions or aircraft that they needed “to keep the fight going, the
chances are they would have to yield.” With the military force of France and Britain
states, he also anticipated the positive effect of military spending on the domestic
economy of the United States. Against the backdrop of the crisis over the Sudetenland,
military procurement programs provided the president with an attractive and immediate
outlet for government spending. In late 1938, Roosevelt authorized an Army Air Corps of
7,500 combat aircraft and called for the United States to produce 20,000 planes per year,
a move that would have generated major industrial expansion and activity. He also began
to consider the favorable impact that orders from abroad for aircraft might have on
American industries. Nevertheless, Congressional critics who did not perceive any direct
threat to the United States in the late 1930s expressed doubts about the need for
additional aircraft and showed little support for Roosevelt's production goals. Henry H.
Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 97, 157-9, 163, 169,
173, 177-83, 194.
311
rendered nonexistent, the next step in Hitler’s domination of Europe would be for “all the
small nations” to “drop into the basket of their own accord because it is silly for them to
resist.” He postulated the next step, “Africa automatically falls.” According to the
president, Nazi Germany would then demilitarize those nations. Although they would be
left with their flag and the guise of sovereignty, Roosevelt explained that the result would
be total economic and military domination of the defeated countries. Roosevelt
predicated that following the domination of Europe and Africa that “the next perfectly
obvious step” would be for Hitler to look west across the Atlantic and move against
Central and South America. The president solemnly characterized the problem facing the
United States, “It is the gradual encirclement of the United States by the removal of first
lines of defense.”62
Roosevelt perceived civilization at stake in the impending war. Committed to
preventing a German victory while continuing to hope that the Hitler regime might
collapse before another devastating war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt averred that there
were two aspirations at work in his foreign policy. He commented, “The first – from our
point of view – the first is the hope that somebody will assassinate Hitler or that Germany
will blow up from within.” He noted that the “other attitude” at work was that the United
States “must try to prevent the domination of the world – prevent it by peaceful means.”
Roosevelt went on to describe the policy of the United States would be one of “self-
protection” rather than being neutral. Although he intended to prevent any munitions
from going to Germany, Italy, or Japan, the president asserted, “I will do everything I can
to maintain the independence of these other nations by sending them all they can pay for
62
Franklin D. Roosevelt conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee, January
31, 1939, Special Conferences, PPF 1P, President’s Personal File, FDRL.
312
on the barrelhead… Now, that is the foreign policy of the United States.” Roosevelt told
the Senators that he supported the initiative by the French government to spend five
million dollars in the United States on aircraft. Roosevelt explained that his
administration wanted “France to continue as an independent nation” and that “if France
yields and England yields, there won’t be any independent nation in Europe or Africa or
anywhere else.” He suggested that the strength of American democracy required that
France and England maintain their independence. Roosevelt stated, “I am frankly hoping
that the French will be able to get the fastest pursuit planes we can turn out.” He added,
“And I hope to God they get the planes and get them fast and get them over there in
France. It may mean the saving of our civilization.”63
Hitler occupied all of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939.64 The situation was what
Berle had characterized several months earlier “as the beginning of a Napoleonic sweep
over Europe.”65 On that afternoon, Berle spent more than an hour with Roosevelt;
Germany was one of the major topics of discussion. In violation of his assurances at the
Munich conference, Hitler had moved into Czechoslovakia earlier that day. Berle noted
the mood, “During the day, the news of Hitler’s annexation of Bohemia and Moravia
came in, giving rise to considerable of a state of mind.” Berle assessed that because of
Hitler’s actions the State Department was “rapidly getting to the boiling point,” and he
63
64
Entry for February 20, 1939, The Diary of Adolph Berle and Adolph A. Berle
memorandum, March 16, 1939, Box 55, “Berle – Memoranda – 1938-44,” State
Department Subject File, 1938-1945, Berle Papers, FDRL.
65
Adolph Berle memorandum, November 4, 1938, Box 55, “Berle – Memoranda –
1938-44,” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, Berle Papers, FDRL.
313
gathered that Roosevelt felt the same way. Berle, however, was surprised to discover that
Roosevelt “was not particularly bothered by” the German action. Rather than indifference
to Hitler’s aggression, the president’s attitude stemmed from his belief that “the
economic and organization stresses and strains of taking in eastern Europe will make the
going increasingly hard” for Nazi Germany.66 Roosevelt’s concept was one that he
repeated that summer in his commencement address at West Point. He told the graduates
that “the military strength of a country can be no greater than its internal economic and
moral solidarity.”67
The failure of Wilson in 1914 to avert war in Europe and Theodore Roosevelt’s
success in 1905 preventing war between the major powers continued to guide Roosevelt’s
actions, and in April 1939, he dispatched another a progressive appeal to Europe.68 The
president drafted the initial message and forwarded it to the State Department where a
group led by Welles and Berle worked revisions. The message that emerged combined “a
polite diplomatic communication to Hitler and Mussolini” that reflected Theodore
Roosevelt’s message to the Kaiser with “a manifesto to the German and Italian people” in
Wilsonian fashion over the heads of the dictators.69 After several days of drafts,
Roosevelt and Welles finalized the message to Hitler and Mussolini on April 14. Berle
noted the president’s central role, “The authorship of the President’s address to Mussolini
66
Adolph Berle memorandum, March 16, 1939, Box 55, “Berle – Memoranda – 1938-
44,” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, Berle Papers, FDRL.
67
Franklin D. Roosevelt West Point Commencement, West Point, New York, June 12,
1939, Master Speech File No. 1229, Speech File, FDRL.
68
Entry for April 15, 1939, The Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL.
69
Adolph A. Berle memorandum, President’s draft of April 10, 1939, entry for April 11,
1939 and entry for April 13, 1939, The Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL.
314
and Hitler is distinctly and definitely his own. No one added anything to it other than the
necessary technical development of the ideas which he himself had definitely worked
out.” On April 15, the White House released Roosevelt’s message to Hitler and Mussolini
to the press. The administration simultaneously “put into effect the arrangements
previously made to have it broadcast widely so that it would be received by as much of
the German and Italian public as could possibly be reached.”70
From the perspective of Roosevelt and his advisors, the mid April message to Europe
averted immediate war once again. Four days after the broadcast of the message, Berle
assessed “that the plan of giving wide radio publicity to the President’s message has had
some effect in Italy and in Germany.” He observed “that the rising tide of public opinion”
in Germany after the broadcast “compelled publication of the message” in the German
press. He also thought that the impact of the message on the German people had
dissuaded Hitler from “an immediate and contemptuous rejection” of Roosevelt’s appeal
to respect the territorial integrity of nations.71 Confident that his actions had delayed the
70
Entry for April 15, 1939 and White House press release No. 147, April 15, 1939, The
Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL.
71
Entry for April 19, 1939, The Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL. In
retrospect it is clear that Roosevelt’s appeal to Hitler and Mussolini and the people of
Germany and Italy was not as successful as the Roosevelt administration believed. The
German and Italian press vilified the appeal. Although Roosevelt’s message generally
provided a boost to French and British morale, it had the unintended effect of weakening
the position of the Baltic and Eastern Europe states with respect to Germany. Donald C.
Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 261-4. In addition, Roosevelt’s appeal did not
delay any planned German attack against the Netherlands or France. Instead, in May
1939, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland. He proclaimed at a conference on
May 23, “Further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood.”
Document L-79, International Military Tribunal, Trials of the War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 2, The Medical
Case, The Milch Case (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp.
387-8.
315
outbreak of war in Europe, Roosevelt considered dispatching an ambassador to Germany
“in the near future,” upgrading relations from the chargé level. Roosevelt selected
Breckinridge Long, a student of Woodrow Wilson’s at Princeton, for the position.72
Roosevelt complemented his progressive appeals to Europe with further efforts during
the summer of 1939 to generate support for preparedness in the United States. Roosevelt
believed that while Germany and Italy had spent a great deal of their money on their
militaries, their economies had grown weaker and their power was extremely fragile. He
asserted that because of their economic condition the two countries had already reached
the conclusion “that their economic solution lies in conquest” and aggression. Having
shown the inevitability of conflict, the president outlined what he thought “would happen
if Germany and Italy won an European War.” He asserted that an unprepared United
States “would be out of the picture entirely” and unable to influence the course of
German domination. Roosevelt thought that the first step would be the immediate
disarmament of the French army and the British fleet. The result, according to the
president, would be the “complete domination of Europe.” With the French army and
British fleet out of the way, Roosevelt portrayed “a German conqueror” dominating the
remainder of Europe and seizing their colonies. Although he averred that Germany was
“not quite ready to take on the United States” directly, an indirect German approach
through South and Central America could happen by coercion rather than war. The result
72
With the outbreak of war in Europe, Long took charge of a Special Division in the
State Department to handle emergency matters arising out of the war. Hugh Wilson was
assigned as his assistant. Entry for September 2, 1939, Breckinridge Long, The War
Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections From the War Years 1939-1944, Fred L. Israel,
ed. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 1, 3.
316
would be German economic domination followed by the demand that their armies and
navies be put under the control of German officers.73
Consistent with his strategic conception for air and sea power to complement economic
warfare, the military preparedness that Roosevelt envisioned in 1939 did not involve a
potential American Expeditionary Force. At a press conference, the president was asked
if he would resort to conscription in the event of a war in which the United States decided
to participate. Although the U.S. Army contained about 400,000 men at the time, he
replied that there were no plans “for an Army of more than a million men.” Roosevelt
proceeded to clarify his comment, “In other words, it is an honest fact that our Army
plans do not contemplate ever having to raise more than a million men.”74 Certainly, the
drastic increase in the size of the U.S. Army Air Corps already proposed by Roosevelt
would account for the bulk of those additional 600,000 men.
With Germany threatening war in August 1939, Roosevelt again attempted to forestall
the outbreak of the conflict. The president approved statements addressed to Hitler, King
Victor Emanuel of Italy, and the president of Poland. President Roosevelt next issued a
call to resolve the German-Polish situation by either negotiation or arbitration. The
president of Poland accepted the substance of Roosevelt’s appeal, but Hitler failed to
reply. Roosevelt expected war.75
73
Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential press conference number 557A, June 23, 1939,
Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 13, 1939 (New
York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 461-3.
74
Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential press conference number 540-A, April 20, 1939,
Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 13, 1939 (New
York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 316-7.
75
Entry for August 26, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol.
2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 701.
317
Sensing Europe on the verge of war, Roosevelt remembered “what had happened at the
time of the last world war.” He directed specific actions to avoid Wilson’s mistakes and
assist the democracies against Germany. In the case of a declared war, the Department of
Justice and the State Department would delay getting the declaration of neutrality to the
president for signature. In the meantime, the War and Navy Departments were to contact
aircraft manufacturers and munitions makers. The manufacturers would quickly ship
available aircraft and munitions either to Canada or beyond the three-mile limit.
Roosevelt also instructed the military departments not to raise any questions “if airplane
manufacturers wanted to ship planes intended for American delivery to England or
France on pending orders.” Hoping to hinder the German merchant marine, Roosevelt
instructed the Treasury Department to require clearance papers in American ports. The
president envisioned that German boats attempting to depart without the papers be halted
by force. He also directed that marines be ready to board all German merchant ships in
American ports for the purpose of “protecting property.” In actuality, he intended for the
marines to be on board to prevent the crews from disabling their vessels as had happened
to German merchantmen during the Great War. In the event that an undeclared war broke
out, Roosevelt instructed that the United States would “permit the sale of war munitions
and materials to any nation that can come and buy them.” He reasoned that since the
Royal Navy would have swept the German merchant marine from the seas such a policy
would “be to the decided advantage of Europe and France.”76
76
Entries for August 26 and 29, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L.
Ickes, vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp.
700-2, 704-5, and 715.
318
III. A Reappraisal of Roosevelt and the European War: Isolationist and Interventionist,
1939-1941
A survey of Roosevelt’s strategic thinking prior to United States entry into the Second
World War reveals that the choice of Roosevelt either as an isolationist and reluctant
belligerent or as an ardent interventionist seeking to enter the war by almost any means
presents a false dichotomy. Rather than being either, Roosevelt embodied strains of both
of those views into a coherent and consistent approach toward the situation in Europe.
Although his actions seemed to draw the United States inexorably into deeper
involvement in the European War, Roosevelt continued to pursue his goal of keeping the
United States out of the war. Rather than dissembling, Roosevelt charted a steady and
rational foreign policy and strategic concept that derived from his worldview. His wife,
Eleanor Roosevelt, judged that her husband’s actions in 1939 and 1940 were “only a
continuation of the line of action he had begun to follow as far back as 1936.”77
Following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Roosevelt pursued a
policy intended to keep the United States out of the European War as a formal belligerent
and bring about the defeat of Hitler’s Nazi regime. While implementing a policy of
armed neutrality that favored the Allies, the Roosevelt administration looked for
opportunities to act in pursuit of two primary goals: bring about the defeat of Nazi
Germany and avoid active United States participation in the war as a combatant. Hoping
to fundamentally influence the outcome of the European War, Roosevelt and his
administration thought that they could bring about an internal collapse in Germany
77
Capo Press, 1992), p. 211.
319
similar to the events in October and November 1918 that had hastened the sudden end of
the Great War. In theory, if Nazi Germany’s militaristic expansion could be checked, and
word got to the German people, they would respond to military setback by rising up
against their autocratic Prussian masters and deposing them. The result, Roosevelt
suggested, would be a restoration of the liberal Germany that he nostalgically recalled
from his youth. He confided
that there’s no reason on God’s earth why the Germans shouldn’t again
become the kind of nation they were under Bismarck. Not militaristic.
They were productive; they were peaceful; they were a great part of
Europe. And that’s the kind of Germany I would like to see.78
United States intervention in the Great War and the views of kinsmen Theodore
Roosevelt and James Russell Soley also provided an example for Roosevelt’s neutrality
policies as president. The earlier arguments of Theodore Roosevelt, demanding United
States intervention against Imperial Germany as a moral imperative for civilization
against the terrible evil represented by the forces of reaction, conditioned Franklin
Roosevelt’s thinking about neutrality. Theodore Roosevelt argued that administrations
had to take a side when civilization was at stake. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration avoided active combat in the European War for several years, it was not
strictly neutral. Less than two weeks after Germany invaded Poland, Roosevelt expressed
his complete agreement with Jim Farley’s assessment that even without the United States
the being a formal belligerent “we are to all intents and purposes in a state of war.”79
78
Oral History interview with John Franklin Carter, February 9, 1966, FDRL.
79
House, 1948), p. 195.
320
Similarly, in early 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt noted, “As a matter of fact we are already in
a war—an economic war and a war of philosophies.”80
Immediately prior to the outbreak of the European War, Roosevelt resolved to not
repeat the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson concerning neutrality. He commented that he
planned “to remind the American people” of Wilson’s caution when the Great War broke
out “to be neutral not only in deed but in thought.” Roosevelt, however, rejected Wilson’s
approach and deemed it “impossible in a situation such as exists in Europe today for a
fair-minded people to be neutral in thought.81 After the European War broke out,
Roosevelt addressed the American people by radio on September 3, 1939. The president
professed that he hated war and stated, “I hope that the United States will keep out of this
war. I believe that it will.” Acknowledging that events in Poland were far away, he
cautioned against adopting an isolationist view. While not isolationist, Roosevelt also did
not contemplate United States military intervention in the European war. The president
announced, “Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its
armies to European fields.” Roosevelt noted that a neutrality proclamation was being
prepared in accordance with the Neutrality Act and traditional United States foreign
policy that reached back to the presidency of George Washington and a long-standing
tradition of armed neutrality. In contrast to Wilson’s 1914 approach, Roosevelt was quick
to declare that he would not ask the American people to remain neutral in thought, and he
stated, “This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American
80
[Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, The Moral Basis of Democracy (New York: Howell,
Soskin and Company, 1940), p. 46.
81
Entry for August 26, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol.
2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 704-5.
321
remain neutral in thought as well.”82 Roosevelt deliberately pursued opportunities to aid
France and Britain with munitions, aircraft, and supplies.
On September 4, Roosevelt discussed the question of United States neutrality with his
cabinet. With British and French declarations of war against Germany, the cabinet
decided to issue the customary neutrality declaration. According to Ickes, however,
Roosevelt “was not in so much of a hurry to issue the proclamation required under the
Neutrality Act.” Roosevelt wanted to provide Britain and France with “all the opportunity
to export munitions of war, none of which could be exported after this proclamation was
once issued.”83
Attitudes in the Roosevelt administration about the fragile nature of German strength
persisted after the outbreak of the European War, and conditions in Germany were
believed to be comparable to those of 1918. In September 1939, Roosevelt predicted
either a German victory or the distinct possibility that “there will be a revolution in
Germany itself” by June 1940.84 He was not alone. In the State Department, Breckinridge
Long noted, “It looks to me as if there was trouble brewing in Germany.”85 Likewise, in
late October 1939, a report from the Department of Commerce noted “the German
economic situation now is comparable to the conditions of 1917 rather than to those of
82
Franklin D. Roosevelt radio address on neutrality (Fireside No. 14), September 3,
1939, Master Speech File No. 1240, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech File, FDRL.
83
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 715
84
vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 9.
85
Entry for October 11, 1939 in Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge
Long: Selections from the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska
Press, 1966), p. 27.
322
1914.”86 Central to that assessment was the belief that Germany had “already transformed
her economy into a government controlled war economy” well before 1937, that
“Germany has no more possibility of [economic] expansion,” and that with its labor fully
mobilized “by all available voluntary and compulsory means” that “a certain decline in
labor productivity” was already evident.87 Military intelligence reports from Europe
complemented the perceptions held in the Interior, State, and Commerce Departments
and in the White House.88 Together, the attaché reports suggested that economic embargo
and blockade would be extremely effective measures against Germany. 89
86
Europe on the Eve of the War, October 26, 1939, p. 10, Industrial Economics
Division, Box 114, Secretary of Commerce, Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, FDRL.
87
Europe on the Eve of the War, October 26, 1939, pp. 4, 5, 8, and 9, Industrial
Economics Division, Box 114, Secretary of Commerce, Papers of Harry L. Hopkins,
FDRL
88
The Army attaché in London reported that his sources indicated “that the supply of
gasoline for military aircraft and mechanized vehicles in Germany was now estimated to
be sufficient for approximately two or three months operations only.” He also believed
that the Nazi-Soviet Pact would not alleviate the German fuel shortage since Soviet
production barely met the requirements of the Soviet military. Military Attaché London,
Report No. 40403, September 13, 1939, Subject: Supply, File No. 2655-B-356, Military
Intelligence Division, Box 1572, Record Group 165, National Archives. In October 1939,
the attaché in Berlin reported that the German conquest of Poland only increased the
limited German supply of raw materials by about five percent. Reportedly, the poor
transportation infrastructure in Poland would impair any possible benefits coming to
Germany from the Soviet Union. Military Attaché Berlin, Report No. 16,907, October 3,
1939, GERMANY (Economic) Subject: The Effect Upon Germany of the Occupation of
Poland, File No. 2655-B-390, Military Intelligence Division, Box 1572, Record Group
165, National Archives.
89
The administration assessment that the Germany economy had been fully mobilized in
the 1930s was inaccurate. Hoping to achieve his objectives without a protracted, general
war, it was not until 1942 that Hitler placed the German economy on a war footing. Prior
to economic mobilization in 1942, Hitler chose to use, rather than expand, the existing
German industrial base, and between 1933 and 1938, only about ten percent of the
German gross national product was spent on armaments. Although Hitler clearly wanted
war in 1939, he was not prepared for a general war. The German submarine fleet was not
particularly strong and the capital ships of Germany’s future battlefleet were still in the
323
Although Germany opened new offensives against Denmark and Norway in April
1940, some American observers recalled the situation in the summer of 1918 and saw
reason for guarded optimism. The month before, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Betty Stark, provided Roosevelt with his assessment that the blockade had produced
under-nourishment in Germany, a condition that “tends to undermine the nerves and
morale of the entire population.” Stark believed “either oil or finances, or both, may be
deciding factors, and perhaps to this should be added morale. Any one or any
combination of these could bring on peace without a definite military decision having
been reached.” He estimated that, without new offensives, German stocks might last until
the spring of 1941.90 Not only would a renewed offensive deplete scarce German
resources, it recalled the desperate German offensive on the Western Front in the summer
of 1918. During the first week of May, Ambassador William Bullitt reported that there
was “no undue despair” in Paris because “People remember too well that until the month
of August 1918 it appeared that Germany was winning the war.”91
Evidently, the German attack on the Western Front in the summer of 1918 influenced
how Roosevelt viewed the Battle of France in May and June 1940. Roosevelt,
furthermore, became more optimistic after the Dunkirk evacuation exceeded all
process of being built. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs, Trans. Richard and
Clar Wilson (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 165-6, 189-229. See also Burton H.
Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1959) pp. 17-20, 76-82.
90
Admiral H. R. Stark, “Rough Informal Estimate of the Foreign Situation,” March 1,
1940, folder: Navy: Jan-Mar 1940, Departmental File, Box 58, President’s Secretary’s
File, FDRL.
91
William C. Bullitt letter to R. Walton Moore, May 6, 1940, “Bullitt, W. C. 1940-
1941,” Group 55, Box 3, R. Walton Moore Papers, FDRL.
324
expectations. At a cabinet meeting on June 9, the president surmised “that if the French
can hold out for three weeks they will be able to win against the Germans.”92 That same
day, Berle noted that even if the Germans emerged as the “masters of the situation” that
“they will be in such bad shape economically” that they will have to open up peace
initiatives.93 As Berle noted at the end of June, “By all tests and standards that we know,
a personality like Hitler’s and a movement like that which he has instituted, smashes up
in time.”94
In the wake of the Battle of France, Roosevelt crafted a course for his administration to
bring about a German collapse while avoiding the need for formal United States military
intervention. Consistent with that strategic concept, Roosevelt announced in July 1940,
“That we will not use our arms in a war of aggression, that we will not wage war in
Europe[,] Africa or Asia is known not only to every American but to every government
in the world.”95 To Roosevelt, the key was to maintain pressure on Germany until it
collapsed upon itself. Economic sanctions and blockade formed the centerpiece of that
pressure. With regard to American and British policy, he believed “that the only way out
of the difficulties of the world was by the starving of the people of Europe, particularly in
92
Entry for June 9, 1940, in Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 3, p. 202.
93
Entry for June 9, 1940, Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle papers, FDRL.
94
Entry for June 30, 1940, Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle Papers, FDRL.
95
Italics handwritten in the original by Roosevelt. Draft of Roosevelt’s Message to
Congress, Second Appeal--Additional Defense Appropriation, July 10, 1940, Master
Speech File Number 1289, Speech File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New
York.
325
regard to their supply of fuel to carry on the war.”96 Roosevelt’s newly appointed
secretaries of War and Navy, Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, concurred. Stimson noted
that the “war was going to be decided by fuel and that Germany was really very short of
fuel.” He predicted that German oil and other essential supplies “would be exhausted . . .
in the autumn.”97 Knox concurred with Stimson’s views and argued, “war today has
become a war of food and oil.” He reasoned that because “Europe has insufficient
supplies of both,” the “only chance for ultimate success” rested upon “the maintenance of
that blockade.”98
In a deliberate effort to avoid the type of problems that Wilson faced, Roosevelt
closely controlled his policy. Roosevelt told Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes that
he intentionally tried to be the kind of president “who kept track of everything.” He
resolved to avoid the administrative failures of Wilson “who let his Cabinet run the
show.” Roosevelt believed that “Wilson literally didn’t know what was going on”
96
Entry for July 19, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXX: 24-5, microfilm edition,
Reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library; entry for June 18, 1940,
Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle papers, FDRL. At the end of May 1940, the
Ministry of Economic Warfare depicted a highly vulnerable German economy, over
stretched to the absolute limit of its power. The British maintained that German strength
was brittle and that “by April 1941, she would be down to one million tons of oil. This
was her dying out figure in the last war.” Entry for May 24, 1940 in Hugh Dalton, The
Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-1945, edited by Ben Pimlott (London:
The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1986), p. 20. In the middle of
the Battle of France, British military chiefs reported to the cabinet, “Germany might still
be defeated by economic pressure, by a combination of air attack on economic objectives
in Germany and on German morale and the creation of widespread revolt in her
conquered territories.” “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality,” May 25, 1940, W.P.
40(168), CAB 66/7, PRO, Kew.
97
Entry for July 18, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXX: 23, microfilm edition,
Reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
98
Speech to New England Council, Boston, November 14, 1940, Speeches and Writings
File, Box 5, The Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
326
because he had “left everything” to his subordinates.99 To avoid Wilson’s mistakes,
improve his span of control, and aid in formulating and condensing information,
Roosevelt established the executive office of the president soon after the German
invasion of Poland. The next day he remarked, “Don’t think that I am not watching
everything with an eagle eye.”100
Roosevelt also sought to preclude some of the partisan politics that had plagued
Wilson and contributed to his own defeat in the election of 1920. During the war, Wilson
had refused to consider bringing Republicans into his cabinet and creating a “super-
cabinet.”101 Roosevelt, however, discussed such a move as early as September 1939.102
During the Battle of France, Roosevelt brought Republicans Stimson and Knox into his
administration and later added William Donovan as his Coordinator of Information. In
1917, Theodore Roosevelt had selected all three to serve in the volunteer force he
proposed to take to France.
99
Entries for July 5 and June 5, 1940 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L.
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954),
pp. 232, 201.
100
The Reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, Executive Order No.
8248, September 8, 1939, in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
1939: War—And Neutrality, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1941), pp. 490-506. Entry for September 9, 1939 in Harold L. Ickes,
The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 721. Roosevelt also reduced the ability of the Secretaries
of War and Navy to plan and conduct operations outside of his knowledge by placing the
Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and their planning staffs
directly under the executive office of the president.
101
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), p. 263 and 265.
102
Entry for September 9, 1939 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
327
Reflecting his strategic thinking formulated in the period immediately following the
Great War, Roosevelt envisioned a strategic concept based on economic sanctions, naval
blockade, moral suasion in the form of propaganda and psychological warfare, and air
power to contribute to the defeat of Nazi Germany. The result would be to eliminate the
need for the United States to enter the European War as a ground combatant. Roosevelt,
however, remained committed to military preparedness, largely in the form of air and
naval forces, to support his policy of armed neutrality or in the event that the United
States entered the war. Always sensitive to his base of political support, in September
1940, Roosevelt remarked that naval preparedness was the only form of rearmament that
was politically feasible. “American mothers don’t want their boys to be soldiers,” he
observed, “so nothing really big can be done at present about expanding the Army. But
the Navy is another matter; American mothers don’t seem to mind their boys becoming
sailors.”103
Confident in his strategic approach, Roosevelt remained optimistic about the prospect
of a German defeat. “There isn’t the slightest doubt in my mind that Hitler will be
defeated,” he told Jim Farley on January 4, 1941, “but it will take more than a year to do
it.”104 Keeping Britain in the war presented a challenge. Recognizing that Britain’s
precarious financial resources and the desperate shipping situation in the Atlantic could
undermine the British ability to resist beyond the summer of 1941, the Roosevelt
administration acted to keep Britain in the war until Germany collapsed. In January 1941,
103
Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1964), p. 68.
104
House, 1948), p. 340.
328
the administration proposed the Lend-Lease Bill that it portrayed as an “aid to
democracies” bill. The administration intended that Lend-Lease would maintain freedom
in the United States by aiding the Allies and also keeping the United States out of the
European war as an active combatant.105 On March 11, 1941 Roosevelt signed into law
“An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States” and subsequently designated Harry
Hopkins, who was living in the White House, “to advise and assist” him “in carrying out
the responsibilities placed upon” him by the act.106 Hopkins viewed his new duties
liberally and enjoined government representatives serving on the Lend-Lease liaison
group to “concentrate on ‘licking Hitler’, whether or not it comes strictly under ‘lend-
lease’.”107
With the passage of Lend-Lease, Berle judged that by early 1941 United States foreign
policy “really moved into another phase of things, a semi-belligerent phase.” He
perceived that United States policy had undergone “a steady drift into a deep gray stage
in which the precise difference between war and peace is impossible to discern.”
Consistent with the concept of armed neutrality, Berle rejected the thought that the
president’s policy meant that war was inevitable. He averred, “Curiously enough, I am
105
Despite vocal opposition, Lend-Lease passed by 60 votes to 31 in the Senate and 317
to 71 in the House of Representatives. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), pp.
721-3.
106
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, March 27, 1941, “Franklin D. Roosevelt,”
Box 214, Special Assistant to the President, 1941-1945, The Papers of Harry L. Hopkins,
FDRL.
107
Lynn R. Edminster to Harry Hopkins, May 22, 1941, “Ideas About the War,” Box
158, Special Assistant to the President, 1941-1945, The Papers of Harry L. Hopkins,
FDRL.
329
not sure that it means war, necessarily.”108 To bolster the administration’s case for not
adhering to strict neutrality, Attorney General Robert Jackson advanced the argument
“that ‘neutrality’ does not imply impartiality where somebody else starts an unjustified
war.”109
Rather than a shooting war between the United States and Nazi Germany, Roosevelt’s
advisors anticipated a “political rather than military” contest between the leaders of the
two countries. It was a viewpoint colored by their liberal-progressivism. As a result, in
the Roosevelt administration psychological factors, morale, leadership, and suasion
seemed to take on greater importance in comparison to conventional military armaments
and ground forces. Clearly linked to the ideas that had driven the progressive activities of
the Committee on Public Information, Roosevelt even suggested that George Creel be
brought into the administration to “do the same job on propaganda that he did during the
last war.”110 In their calculus of national strategic power, presidential advisors believed
that Roosevelt’s mystique and moral influence, “the myth of Roosevelt,” constituted “a
moral strength which would be worth many divisions when the ultimate showdown
comes.” They believed that Germany acknowledged that United States power had
produced the German defeat in 1918 and thought, as a result, Germany hoped to avoid
any direct confrontation that might bring the United States into the European War. They
thought that the administration’s aggressive neutrality backed by military force had
108
Entry for March 9, 1941, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Adolph A. Berle Papers,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
109
Berle characterized Jackson’s argument as consistent with the international law
theories of the seventeenth century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. Entry for March 13, 1941,
The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
110
Entry for February 8, 1941 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
330
dissuaded German aggression and prevented conflict between the United States and
Germany. Berle summed up the attitude in the spring of 1941 and noted, “I think the
Germans simply do not want war with us.”111
The success of German submarines in the North Atlantic in 1941 confronted the
Roosevelt administration with a challenge. The administration’s Lend-Lease efforts
would be of little use if American-made war material and munitions did not reach British
forces. Similar to Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt took a broad view of the
Monroe Doctrine and during the election of 1940 noted this his policy was to “vigorously
support the Monroe Doctrine for the protection of the American Hemisphere.”112 In 1941,
Roosevelt extended the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine eastward into the middle of
the Atlantic. In April, the United States occupied Greenland. Roosevelt subsequently
justified the action by stating “we are applying to Denmark what might be called a
carrying out of the Monroe Doctrine” to prevent the potential transfer of Greenland to
Germany.113 He also extended the naval reconnaissance patrols that had been operating in
the Atlantic since September 1939 from approximately 300 miles off the coast to over
111
Entries for February 14 and March 9, 1941, the Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers,
FDRL. Berle’s assessment was not new. For instance, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief
of Naval Operations, had assessed in March 1940, “Germany will make every effort to
avoid friction [with] the United States which might endeanger [sic] our neutrality.”
Admiral Harold R. Stark, Rough Informal Estimate of the Foreign Situation, March 1,
1940, Folder: Navy: Jan-Mar 1940, Departmental File, Box 58, President’s Secretary’s
File, FDRL. On a similar note, in 1906, Theodore Roosevelt assessed that Germany
“respects the United States only in so far as it believes that our navy is efficient and that
if sufficiently wronged or insulted we would fight.” Howard K. Beale, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1956; paperback edition, 1989), p. 394.
112
Franklin D. Roosevelt notes filed June 1940, Democratic Platform, Speech File (No
Number), FDRL.
113
Franklin D. Roosevelt press conference, April 15, 1941, in The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941: The Call to Battle Stations, edited by Samuel
I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 117-120.
331
1,000 miles “for the safety of the Western Hemisphere” and to fulfill “the obligation we
have under the Monroe Doctrine.” When asked about the possible limit of the patrols,
Roosevelt replied, “As far on the waters of the seven seas as may be necessary for the
defense of the American hemisphere.”114 The naval patrols radioed the locations of
German submarines to British warships and aircraft. He also issued orders for American
ships to be convoyed to Iceland, an order soon expanded to include neutral ships and,
ultimately, British ships. At Iceland, U.S. Navy escort destroyers turned Lend -Lease
convoys over to the Royal Navy for the remainder of the voyage to Britain.115
The maturing military contacts between the United States and Britain led to a strategic
conference in Washington, D.C. from January 29 until March 29, 1941. The conference,
the first of the American-British Conversations, produced a fundamental agreement on
grand strategy known as ABC-1. In the Pacific, the two countries would maintain a
policy of deterrence against Japan, and, in the event of United States entry into the war,
the Allied priority would become securing the Atlantic and the defeat of Germany and
Italy. Although United States planners considered that a major invasion of Europe might
be necessary, Roosevelt endorsed a joint strategy for victory over Germany that rested on
complementing the British blockade with strategic bombing and subversion on the
continent.116 Meanwhile Roosevelt and his advisors resisted acknowledging any
114
Franklin D. Roosevelt press conference, April 25, 1941, in The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941: The Call to Battle Stations, edited by Samuel
I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 132-135.
115
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), pp. 723-4, 728-30.
116
Maurice Matloff and Snell, Edwin M., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-
1942, vol. 3 of the series The United States Army in World War II: The War Department
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 33-48.
332
requirement for a large American ground force to Europe again. Other forces would
substitute for another AEF. By May, based on Stimson’s directives, the War Department
understood that the basic United States policy during the period of so-called “neutrality”
was that “British forces are to be considered as an American Expeditionary Force.”117
General Marshall, meanwhile, found Roosevelt unreceptive to his requests to increase the
size of the U.S. Army, and in the fall of 1941, Roosevelt actually favored decreasing the
size of army ground forces in favor of air and naval forces.118
In the spring of 1941, one of Roosevelt’s intelligence analysts reaffirmed his basic
formula for Allied victory over Germany. To crack the political power of the Nazis over
Germany, John Franklin Carter thought several things had to happen. First, the Anglo-
American Allies had to check Nazi success much as had happened along the Marne River
in 1918 and “Put an end to the series of German political and military victories.”
Meanwhile, the Allies would continue to bomb German cities, wrecking German morale,
industry, and transportation infrastructure. Carter believed the financial system in Europe
was demoralized, the labor supply inadequate, and the transportation system “heavily
overloaded” and, consequently, “the weakest part of the entire German war-economy.”119
Blockade, Carter reasoned, remained a most effective weapon. He assessed that the
117
Estimate of the Situation on Aid to Britain, May 19, 1941, 4323-31, War Plans
Division General Correspondence, 1920-1942, Records of the War Department General
and Special Staffs, RG 165, National Archives.
118
Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the
United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1955), p. 624.
119
John F. Carter, Second Interim Report Submitted by John Franklin Carter: Political
Conditions in Nazi Germany; Economic Conditions in Nazi Germany; Reactions of
American Businessmen to Nazi Germany, March 31, 1941, Box 97, “Carter, John F.:
Mar.-Oct. 1941,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
333
“weakest element in German Europe is the Nazi Party” and the strongest was the German
army. Carter argued that the victories of the German army had been instrumental in
increasing “respect for the Party’s political leadership” and “popularizing the regime.”
Nevertheless, Carter perceived substantial fissures in the Nazi system. Heavy losses in
the German army, Carter reported, had led to mutinies and the refusal of soldiers “to
support invasion plans for England.”120 By late September, Roosevelt received further
indications that Hitler’s regime was in trouble. The director of Naval Intelligence sent
Roosevelt a report on sagging civilian morale and factional strife in Germany.
Concerning German morale, the report judged that “heavy bombing by the British during
the last two months has had a decided effect upon the German civilian morale.”121
In September 1941, Roosevelt considered arming merchant ships, the solution he had
advocated in early 1917. Although noting that the Neutrality Act specifically forbid
providing arms to merchant ships, he observed to the press that during “the so-called
quasi-war against France in 1798” many armed merchantmen “beat off French
privateers.” He added that in accordance with international law, merchant ships achieved
similar results during the War of 1812 against British attacks.122 The following month,
Roosevelt requested that Congress repeal the Neutrality Act and authorize him to arm
120
John F. Carter, Second Interim Report Submitted by John Franklin Carter: Political
Conditions in Nazi Germany; Economic Conditions in Nazi Germany; Reactions of
American Businessmen to Nazi Germany, March 31, 1941, Box 97, “Carter, John F.:
Mar.-Oct. 1941,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
121
Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence memorandum for Franklin D.
Roosevelt, September 26, 1941, Navy Department: 1934-Feb. 1942, Box 4, Safe File,
President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
122
Franklin D. Roosevelt press conference, September 23, 1941, in The Public Papers
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941: The Call to Battle Stations, edited by
Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 393-6.
334
merchantmen. In November both houses of Congress removed the major restrictions of
the 1939 Neutrality Act, allowing American merchantmen, armed and unarmed, to go
anywhere legally and carry any cargo.123 On November 20, Knox proclaimed “that our
vessels will be armed in two weeks.”124
In his cabinet, Stimson, Knox, Ickes, and Morgenthau chafed under the president’s
restraints that prevented greater military intervention by the United States.125 Roosevelt,
however, apparently had no intention of asking Congress for a declaration of war against
Germany. Roosevelt seems to have remained committed to the belief that armed
neutrality would suffice to achieve his aims without having to resort to war. His strategy
seemed to be working. Roosevelt observed that Hitler “knows he is racing against time”
and that having “heard the rumblings of revolt among the enslaved peoples,” knows that
the days in which he may achieve total victory are numbered.” In late October, in
preparation for a Navy Day address, Roosevelt drafted,
I can say however that neither I nor any responsible officer of our
government or of our military and naval establishments thinks that the
defeat of Hitler requires a costly expedition which will start on Fifth
Avenue with colors flying and end in a victory march down Unter den
Linden over the dead bodies of German women and children. The defeat
of Hitler can be accomplished by means considerably more practical than
that.126
123
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), p. 731.
124
Entry for November 20, 1941, Breckinridge Long, The War Diary of Breckinridge
Long, ed. Fred L. Israel (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 224.
125
Frank Friedel, Franklin Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 394-5.
126
Italics represent Roosevelt’s handwritten notes in the original. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Navy Day radio address, October 27, 1941, Second Draft with Notes, Master Speech File
No. 1389, Speech Files, FDRL.
335
In the Navy Day Address he delivered October 27, 1941, Roosevelt declared “the
existence of a state of unlimited emergency” and announced that “we Americans have
cleared our decks and taken our battle stations” against Hitler and Hitlerism. The
president noted that he disregarded comments by Hitler that Nazi Germany had no global
aspirations. In order to stop the global march of Hitler, Roosevelt declared that the
“primary task” of the United States was to provide “more and more arms for the men who
are fighting on actual battlefronts.” Pledged to “the destruction of Hitlerism,” the
president announced that American ships would get through under protection of the U.S.
Navy. Referring to the “facts of the year 1918” as “proof that a mighty German army and
a tired German people can crumble rapidly and go to pieces when they are faced with
successful resistance,” Roosevelt outlined his strategic concept for the destruction of
Hitler and Prussian militarism,
The first objective of that defense is to stop Hitler. He can be stopped and
can be compelled to dig in. And that will be the beginning of the end of
his downfall, because dictatorship of the Hitler type can live only through
continuing victories and increasing conquests.127
In the fall of 1941, members of the Roosevelt administration were hopeful. Knox
seemed confident that the United States would master the German submarine threat in the
North Atlantic, and while waiting for authorization to arm merchant ships, he reported
that “we have the guns ready and the crews trained.” The situation in Europe seemed
positive as well. Berle assessed that the German forces in the Soviet Union were
“obviously risking everything” in a desperate gamble. Based on reports of German loses,
Berle noted, “It seems increasingly clear that the German operations in Russia are
127
Franklin D. Roosevelt Navy Day radio address, Mayflower Hotel, October 27, 1941,
Master Speech File No. 1389, Speech Files, FDRL. By the spring of 1942, Berle began to
doubt the authenticity of the map cited by Roosevelt, and Berle suspected that British
Intelligence had crafted the map.
336
approaching disaster.”128 On November 17, 1941, William Donovan reported to
Roosevelt that the German people already were experiencing greater hardships in the
current war than they had during “the years 1914-1918.” The Coordinator of Information
noted “that a considerable number” of Germans were “extremely frightened” of British
air raids and that German losses in the Soviet Union had produced “a staggering blow”
on the German home front. German morale seemed to be weakened and at low ebb.
Recalling the phenomenon of 1918, Donovan assessed, “One major setback or even
prolonged slaughter and the German will to sacrifice and to conquer might hang
dangerously in the balance.”129
On the evening of December 7, 1941, following the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor
and the Philippines, Roosevelt dictated the war message that he read to Congress the next
day. Eleanor Roosevelt attended her husband’s message to Congress and, noting the
“curious sense of repetition” she felt as she reflected on Wilson’s message in 1917. From
her perspective, the Japanese attack on the United States had been an act of pure
desperation carried out as part of “German strategy.”130 Franklin Roosevelt chose not to
request a declaration of war against Germany and Italy and continued to pursue a policy
of armed neutrality in the Atlantic. Nonetheless, following the Japanese attack, Roosevelt
told his cabinet several times that he expected Germany to declare war on the United
128
Entry for March 9, 1941, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL; Frank
Knox to John G. Winant, November 10, 1941, General Correspondence: 1941, The
Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
129
William J. Donovan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 17, 1941, Coordinator of
Information: 1941, Box 128, Subject File, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
130
Entry for December 9, 1941, in [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt’s My
Pharos Books, 1989), p. 226.
337
States.131 Perhaps Roosevelt had two motivations for waiting. By not asking Congress to
declare war, he could continue to delay, and perhaps avoid altogether, United States entry
into the European War. In addition, waiting for a German declaration of war on the
United States, would allow Roosevelt to achieve Wilson’s goal of being judged by
definitive historians as having had clean hands.132
With the declaration of war on the United States by Hitler and Mussolini on December
11, Roosevelt’s hope of avoiding United States entry into the European War came to an
end.133 Roosevelt informed Congress that German “forces endeavoring to enslave the
entire world are now moving towards this hemisphere.” The Roosevelt administration,
however, interpreted the German declaration of war as an act of desperation by a regime
coming apart and hoping to save its grip on power through further expansion. As if
expressing a sense of relief, he asserted that the German quest for world dominance “long
known and long expected” had finally “thus taken place.” That day, Roosevelt requested
that Congress “recognize a state of war between the United States and Germany” in the
struggle between “the forces of justice and of righteousness” and “the forces of savagery
and barbarism.”134
131
Entry for December 14, 1941 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
132
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Extemporaneous, Informal Remarks at Dinner of the Trustees
of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 4, 1939, in The
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939: War—And Neutrality,
edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941), pp.
117-8.
133
On Hitler’s long-range goals and his decision to declare war on the United States, see
Gerhard L. Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II
(Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 68-9, 89, 90-3.
134
Franklin D. Roosevelt message to Congress, Declaration of War on Germany,
December 11, 1941, Master Speech File, No. 1402, Speech File, FDRL.
338
IV. The Fall of France and Roosevelt’s French Policy, 1940
After the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940,
Roosevelt’s worldview had a fundamental impact on how he interpreted events in France
and responded to the Franco-German Armistice a month and a half later. Ever since his
visit to the Western Front in 1918, Roosevelt retained an idealized image of the French
soldier: fierce, intelligent, and tenacious. When properly led, those soldiers would never
surrender. As Roosevelt saw it, the failures of the French poilu resulted from the
shortcomings and weakness of their political leaders and could not be attributed to the
quality of the individual soldier. He recognized the political difficulties in France and the
inherent lack of political unity in a system often marked by turmoil and constantly
subjected to the dangerous influences of French reactionaries and German subversion.
The strongest example in Roosevelt’s mind was Georges Clemenceau. Roosevelt also
acknowledged that it was possible for a strong republican statesman to emerge in France
and master the political situation. Clearly, the postwar Naval Intelligence interpretation of
the 1917 mutinies in the French army constituted an enduring reference for Roosevelt.
Reportedly, German subversion and agents in France and propagandists under skillful
German guidance had caused anarchy and demoralization in the army and throughout
French society and politics. Those conditions remained until Clemenceau returned to
power and broke the German hold on French politics.135
135
339
In June 1940, Roosevelt’s ambassadors in France merely reinforced his
preconceptions. On June 10, 1940, as German forces approached Paris, the French
government evacuated the capital for the Loire valley. Several days prior to that
departure, however, Ambassador William Bullitt theatrically opted to remain in the
capital.136 Intent on remaining in Paris, Bullitt increasingly lost touch with the intentions
of the French government during its last days in Paris. 137
During May, the first phase of the battle had not gone well for the Belgians, Dutch,
French, and British. German successes left some in the White House in a gloomy mood;
what Eleanor Roosevelt and her personal staff had “banked on was an int’l socialist
revolution in all countries.” They agreed, according to the first lady’s assistant Joseph
Lash, that such a revolution “was unlikely if Hitler won!”138 The president, however,
became more optimistic after the evacuation at Dunkirk exceeded all expectations. The
second phase of the German offensive began on June 5, and at a cabinet meeting on June
136
Bullitt compared his actions with those of Elihu Washburne and Myron Herrick.
Washburne served as American minister during the Siege of Paris and Commune in
1870-71. Herrick, Taft’s ambassador, remained in France until the outset of the World
War in 1914. Herrick stayed in Paris in 1914 during the Battle of the Marne although the
French government evacuated to Bordeaux. Bullitt to Secretary of State for the president,
June 12, 1940, 740.0011 European War 1939/3691 3/14, Department of State Decimal
File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National
Archives. Entry for June 13, 1940, Berle Diary, Roosevelt Library. An ailing
Ambassador Straus returned to the United States in August 1936, tendered his resignation
in order to recuperate, and died of cancer on October 4, 1936. Well-educated, confident,
and sophisticated, Philadelphia patrician William C. Bullitt had previously served as
President Roosevelt's first ambassador to the Soviet Union.
137
Bullitt’s decision had future repercussions for the Roosevelt administration’s relations
with the French during the war. In Paris, General Charles de Gaulle recalled that Bullitt’s
farewell left the leaders of the Third Republic with the tragic impression “that the United
States no longer had much use for France.” Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. 1, The
Call to Honour, 1940-1942, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Viking Press, 1955), pp.
60-61.
138
Entry for May 27, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches
and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, FDRL.
340
9, the president surmised “that if the French can hold out for three weeks they will be
able to win against the Germans.”139 Although Bullitt’s previous report recalling the
mood in August 1918 probably reinforced the president’s thinking, it seems evident that
to Roosevelt the situation in France was analogous with that in 1918 at the height of the
German offensive on the Western Front.
Roosevelt’s assessment on June 9 explains his response to the French appeal that he
received the next day. On the night of June 9, the Canadian minister accompanied by the
American military attaché met with the recently appointed French military chief Général
Maxime Weygand. In Bullitt’s absence, the minister telegraphed his report to Ottawa
with the request that it be relayed to Roosevelt. Weygand characterized the situation as
“very critical and not hopeful.” The général asserted that his soldiers “will continue
fighting as long as the men have arms.” Consistent with the images of the fierce poilu of
the Great War, Weygand expressed “nothing but admiration for his men who are fighting
without hope of having any rest.” Acknowledging that all French reserves had been
committed, Weygand stated, “As heavy casualties occur on both sides Germany will still
have considerable strength when France [is] completely exhausted.” Weygand believed
that the United States could provide hope in two ways. The first was the delivery of
promised United States war material, particularly field guns and aircraft. Weygand’s
second request was for the United States to enter the war. He asserted, “Long resistance
impossible unless the United States declares war immediately. Germany would then
reconsider her position and such action on the part of the United States would make
139
Entry for June 9, 1940, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol.
3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 202.
341
Allied victory possible….” The Canadian minister noted that Weygand’s remarks could
only be summarized in one way, “Those who can help must do so now.”140
Confident three more weeks of French resistance would bring about a German
defeat, Roosevelt probably viewed Weygand’s concerns as the natural response of
military leaders in combat with a desperate German adversary. It is not surprising that
Roosevelt did not take the action Weygand urged and enter the war. From Eleanor
Roosevelt’s perspective, a major factor restraining the United States from sending an
AEF to France was the inordinate length of time it would take to prepare one.141 Given
the president’s predictions about the timing of a German collapse, it his clear that he
thought the dispatch of an AEF would be too late to make any contribution to the Battle
of France. Meanwhile, he believed American rhetoric and material support would bolster
French political will. Furthermore, in retrospect, it seems that Weygand’s request
probably struck Roosevelt as entirely natural for a newly appointed commander. Once
again, the situation on the Western Front seems to have provided an enduring frame of
reference for Roosevelt. To observers in Washington in 1940, Weygand seemed to be in a
situation analogous to that of Maréchal Ferdinand Foch who proven victorious in 1918.
In April 1918, several weeks after the initiation of the great German offensives of 1918,
140
Telegram from the Canadian Minister in France to the Secretary of State for External
Affairs, June 10, 1940, enclosed in a memorandum from Sumner Welles to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, June 12, 1940, Box 2, France, Safe File, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
141
Entries for May 10, May 27, and June 3, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42,
Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches and Writings, Lash Papers, FDRL.
342
Foch became General-in-Chief of all Allied Armies in France.142 At the time, Weygand
served as Foch’s chief of staff.
Having resolved to remain in Paris, Bullitt requested that Tony Biddle, the United
States ambassador to the Polish government in exile, assume his mission to French
government after it left Paris. An army intelligence officer in the Great War, Biddle
believed that German successes in Poland fundamentally relied on subversion and
espionage. In his report to Roosevelt, Biddle assessed that Polish infantry and cavalry had
“proved themselves superior” to the individual German soldiers they encountered. Rather
than soldier skill, German success resulted in Poland because “the German High
Command applied their entire ‘bag of tricks’,” namely the subversion methods that they
had perfected in the Spanish Civil War. Biddle observed that Polish minorities “had
served as fertile ground for the skillful and effective subversive machinations of German
agents previous to the conflict.” He continued, “In fact, elements thus organized in
advance of the conflict, proved valuable aids to the German totalitarian form of campaign
in terms of internal sources of information as well as agents in fomenting internal unrest
and division during the course of the conflict. Biddle described a mature and pervasive
German espionage web throughout Poland that effectively communicated with German
air and ground forces throughout the campaign. He noted that “in many cases” those
agents “commanded key positions in the communications as well as other fields.” He also
reported that parachutists cut communications, spread rumors in Polish communities,

142
In 1918, many political leaders had hoped unrealistically that the elevation of Foch
would halt the German offensives immediately. Nonetheless, the situation along the front
remained extremely critical for months as Foch desperately strove to stabilize Allied lines
against further German attacks. James B. Agnew, C. Reid Franks, and William R.
Griffiths, The Great War (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy,
1984), pp. 254-5, 278, and 372.
343
“and in many cases, disguised in Polish officer’s uniforms, intercepted and
countermanded military orders.” In Biddle’s mind German spies were practically
everywhere.143 To a striking degree, the tenor and conclusions of Biddle’s report of the
Battle of Poland reflect the persistence of the intelligence assessments and conclusions of
the Great War during which Biddle had served as an intelligence officer.
Unfortunately, Biddle also lacked the intimate knowledge of the French political scene
that Bullitt possessed which would have enabled him to grasp fully the dynamics in the
French government. Distance and roads packed by refugees exacerbated Biddle’s lack of
familiarity. Biddle departed Angers by automobile on June 10 to assume his "Special
Mission" near the French government displacing in the direction of Tours.144 It was four
days, however, before Biddle finally established direct contact with the French
government. On the morning of June 14, as the French government prepared to evacuate
Tours for the Bordeaux region, Biddle finally made personal contact with the French
Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud. Finding Reynaud “in a state of profound depression and
anxiety,” Biddle reported ominously to Roosevelt “the possible collapse of the French
armies was a question not of days but of hours.” Reynaud observed “that the situation in
which the French Army now found itself was worse than the situation of the German
Army when it surrendered in 1918.” Biddle relayed Reynaud’s assessment that the only
143
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle report for Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Factors Contributing to
Poland’s Defeat” and “ “Military Aspects of the Polish-German Conflict and Lessons to
be Learned Therefrom,” Report on the Polish-German Conflict, Box 48, Poland: Biddle
Report: 10/16/38 – 9/19/39, Diplomatic Correspondence, President’s Secretary’s File,
FDRL. Anthony J. Drexel Biddle was a businessman, sports enthusiast, and socialite,
whose Democratic Party connections and support for Roosevelt brought him
appointments as ambassador to Norway in 1935 and Poland in 1937.
144
Biddle to Secretary of State, September 10, 1940, 123 Biddle, Anthony J. D., Decimal
File 1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, National Archives.
344
hope for continued French resistance, to include continuing the fight from North Africa,
relied on an immediate declaration of war by the United States. According to Reynaud,
France would be able to continue the fight at sea and from North Africa only if it seemed
that victory, no matter how distant, remained possible.145
The situation in France resulted in major delays in communications between Roosevelt
and France. For instance, as the French government evacuated south to Bordeaux on June
14, Biddle, who inexplicably did not travel with Reynaud, received a telegram from
Roosevelt for the prime minister. Biddle relayed the message south, and the prefect at
Angoulême handed Reynaud a copy when the prime minister stopped in the town.146
Rather than reply to Reynaud’s appeal, the message from Roosevelt replied to an earlier
message Reynaud had dispatched before departing Paris on June 10. Many days out of
touch, Roosevelt’s message seemed to be a response to the urging of Weygand of June 9
rather than the desperate appeal of Reynaud five days later. Roosevelt encouraged
Reynaud to keep fighting and noted that he was “particularly impressed” by Reynaud’s
previous “declaration that France will continue to fight on behalf of democracy even if it
means slow withdrawal, even to North Africa and the Atlantic.” Not realizing that his
vision of continued and effective French military resistance in France was illusory, the
president pledged more supplies and noted that Allied resistance had “profoundly
145
740.0011 European War 1939/3768, Department of State Decimal File Relating to
World War II, 1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives. A. J.
Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 14, 1940, 740.0011 European War 1939/3790,
Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, Microfilm
Publication M-0982, National Archives.
146
A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 14, 1940, 740.0011 European War
1939/3771, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945,
Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives; Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the
Fight, 1930-1945, trans. James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), p.
510.
345
impressed the American people.” The French fleet, Roosevelt reminded Reynaud, also
represented significant military potential to continue the fight against Germany. He
noted, “Naval power in world affairs still carries the lessons of history, as Admiral Darlan
well knows.”147
At noon on June 15, Biddle cabled Roosevelt after having received no reply to
Reynaud’s appeal. Biddle again notified the president of the increasingly critical
situation. “Decisions of the gravest importance,” Biddle noted, hinged on the president’s
reply to Reynaud’s plea. Biddle, however, seemed to believe that the battle could
continue and that a move headed by Minister of the Interior Georges Mandel, who had
been one of Clemenceau’s lieutenants, might immediately overthrow the Reynaud
government. Biddle, however, seems to have misread the dynamics within the French
cabinet. The ambassador, who had little prior contact with the French government,
suggested that Mandel, if successful, would probably set up a new government and
continue the fight from North Africa.148 Five hours later Biddle cabled the president again
to clarify the alternatives under consideration by the Reynaud government. The
ambassador asserted that the French could either “move to North Africa and continue the
fight” or “sue for peace which would of course be unconditional.” Biddle, furthermore,
remained completely out of touch with the military situation, a condition exacerbated by
147
President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull intended to reassure the French
government, albeit privately and without any formal obligations. Biddle’s instructions
demanded that “it must be made entirely clear that the message is personal and private
and not for publication.” Cordell Hull to Freeman Matthews, June 13, 1940, 740.0011
European War 1939/3770A, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II,
1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives.
148
A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State for the president, June 15, 1940, 740.0011
European War 1939/3691 6/14, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War
II, 1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives.
346
the attachés of the embassy remaining in Paris with Bullitt. Naively, Biddle referred to “a
French evacuated Army in Africa” as if such a force remained a serious possibility.149
Roosevelt hoped for continued French resistance overseas in order to delay a German
operation against the Western Hemisphere and to exacerbate the conditions that would
precipitate the internal collapse of Germany. Following a conversation with Roosevelt on
June 10 during the Battle of France, Jay Pierrepont Moffat recorded, “According to the
President, no nation need ever surrender. There are occasions when a nation can no
longer fight and must adopt a policy of nonresistance… How? First, by dispersing the
navy around the globe….”150 Those factors explain another dimension of Roosevelt’s
animosity toward French leaders after the Battle of France. On June 15, Roosevelt told
the British and French ambassadors that, in his opinion, France would be better off if it
allowed Germany to occupy all of Metropolitan France, not ask for an armistice, and the
government, part of the French army, and the fleet continued the struggle overseas. The
president declared that the prospects of an Allied victory were “quite good” because
149
1939/3691 7/14, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945,
Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives. By June 15, however, the scheme to
evacuate an army to North Africa, like a similar plan for the army to hold out indefinitely
in a “Breton Redoubt,” were fantasies built on assumptions that the German offensive
had invalidated. André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France, trans. Desmond Flower (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 206-207; Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. 1, The
Call to Honour, 1940-1942, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Viking Press, 1955), pp.
66-68, 74-76; Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight, 1930-1945, trans. James D.
Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. 494, 503n3, 512; and Auphan and
Mordal, Jacques, The French Navy in World War II, trans. A. C. J. Sabalot (Annapolis,
Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1959; reprint, Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 93. Although the schemes for a Breton Redoubt and an army
evacuated to Africa were overcome by rapidly moving events, the French government
still could have evacuated to North Africa and continued the war. Significant
uncommitted combat forces remained in the French colonial empire after the Battle of
France.
150
Entry for June 10, 1940, in Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers, ed. Nancy H.
Hooker (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 310-311.
347
Germany would collapse under the pressure of the blockade. It was essential, for that
reason, that the French fleet not fall into German or Italian hands.151
Around midnight on the night of 16-17 June, Reynaud proposed that Maréchal
Philippe Pétain, his deputy prime minister, be named his successor, and French President
Albert Lebrun charged Pétain to form a new government for the purpose of ascertaining
what the German armistice terms would be. In Washington, the Roosevelt administration
immediately assumed that the French government had fallen under the influence of
German subversion and was in the process of unconditional surrender to Germany.
Roosevelt had observed that “our sympathies lie with those nations which survive the
attack or remain ready to defend themselves if attacked.”152 On June 17, before the
French armistice delegation even received the German terms, he issued an Executive
Order freezing French assets.153
Ever since his duties in France during the Paris Peace Conference, Roosevelt believed
that he could deal with the French and that his comments held great weight.
Consequently, Roosevelt dispatched a strong message to the new French government on
June 17. The president stated that United States already had made clear its views
regarding the disposition of the French fleet. If the French government failed to honor
those wishes and permitted the French fleet to fall into “the hands of her opponents,”
Roosevelt declared, then it would “permanently lose the friendship and good-will of the
151
Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 1
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), pp. 270-271.
152
Number), FDRL.
153
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York: MacMillan, 1948), p.
791.
348
Government of the United States.”154 After delivering Roosevelt’s message to Admiral
Jean Darlan and the Council of Ministers on June 18, Biddle reported that it had a “highly
salutary effect at this juncture.”155 On the following day Biddle cabled to Roosevelt that
the situation had become “more encouraging on the maintenance of a free Government
and salvation of the fleet for which we here have worked so hard: your ‘hard’ message
did the trick.” Despite Biddle’s estimate, the message from Roosevelt did not improve the
situation in the French government. Not only did the president’s cable have little
influence on the decisions of French leaders, the incident left the Roosevelt
administration with the mistaken belief that tough rhetoric alone could influence the
French government.156 Nonetheless, a French delegation signed the Franco-German
Armistice at Compiègne on June 22, 1940. The Franco-German armistice ending the
Battle of France went into effect on June 25, 1940.
The failure of the French government to remain an active belligerent in June 1940
condemned those French leaders in Roosevelt’s mind. Believing that the war was being
fought “to cleanse the world of ancient evils,” Roosevelt rejected the notion that any
154
Cordell Hull to consul at Bordeaux, June 17, 1940, 740.0011 European War
1939/2691 5/7A, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 2, General and
Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 456.
155
1939/2691 6/7, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 2, General and Europe
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 457.
156
In contrast to Biddle’s assessment, Sir Ronald Campbell, the British ambassador in
France, instead found that Roosevelt’s message had left the French government “very
indignant.” The French government considered Roosevelt’s statement to be “intolerable
interference” by a neutral country, especially one that had “failed to come up to their
expectations.” A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 19, 1940, 740.0011 European
War 1939/3691 13/14, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-
1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives. Llewellyn Woodward, British
Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1970), pp. 297-298, 322.
349
compromise was possible with Hitler. He later wrote, “There never has been – there
never can be – successful compromise between good and evil.”157 Already skeptical
about the state of leadership in France, the armistice convinced Roosevelt that the forces
of reaction had seized power and that their actions served Hitler either directly or
indirectly. United States relations with France after June 1940 rested on the fundamental
assumption that German subversion abetted by French reactionaries had undermined and
overthrown the true France. In a speech Roosevelt approved beforehand, Bullitt observed
that German propaganda had lulled “honest French democrats and liberals” into
complacency and that “the free nation of France was overthrown” by “high-placed and
influential German agents” and “communist and Nazi agents of Germany in each town
and village.”158 Rather than military necessity, Welles believed that “the real cause of the
policy pursued by the French Government in its capitulation” had been the subversive
actions of men such as Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin who “had succumbed to German
influence.”159 Secretary of State Cordell Hull asserted that France had “come completely
and hopelessly under the domination of Hitler and his economic policies of totalitarian
157
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message on the State of the Union, January 6, 1942,
Master Speech File No. 1409, FDRL.
158
William C. Bullitt address to the American Philosophical Society, Independence
Square, Philadelphia, August 18, 1940, Department of State press release, 123 Bullitt,
William C./668, Decimal File 1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State,
RG 59, National Archives. For Roosevelt’s sanction and the setting of the speech, see
Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For The President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between
Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1972) pp. 498-501.
159
Memorandum of Conversation, Sumner Welles and René Sainte-Quentin, June 24,
1940, 740.00119 European War 1939/434, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940,
vol. 2, General and Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957),
p. 459.
350
autarchy.”160 Roosevelt saw the hand of “Hitler’s propaganda machine” and its ability to
spread “falsehood and rumor-mongering” with creating the “defeatism” that lead to the
French defeat.161 In early July, a review of the foreign situation by the key members of
the State Department concluded “that the continent of Europe is now in German hands
and…any other idea is simply wishful thinking.”162
Information delivered to Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle on July 1 by special
messenger from J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
reflected the contemporary view of the French defeat. The downfall of France had been
the work of the “One Hundred,” a group of prominent social and financial families in
France with strong fascist ties. Reportedly, the group included munitions manufacturers
such as the Synder family, Pierre Laval, Maréchal Pétain, and Général Weygand, who
supposedly “belongs to a secret society which has strong Fascist tendencies.” Hoover
assessed that the French government under German control would be reorganized on the
“Nazi pattern” and would, presumably, serve as a German puppet or satellite. The
precious equipment that the United States had already furnished for the defense of
France, amounting to 400 aircraft, 2,000 airplane engines, and 500 artillery pieces,
apparently had fallen directly into German hands. Hoover’s report assessed that the
fascist forces in France “were perfectly willing to let Adolph Hitler and his Government
160
Memorandum of Conversation by Cordell Hull, June 27, 1940, 840.51 Frozen
Credits/246, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 2, General and
Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 461-2.
161
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message on the State of the Union, January 6, 1942,
Master Speech File No. 1409, FDRL.
162
Entry for July 7, 1940, microfilm of the Adolph A. Berle Diary, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York.
351
take full advantage of the assistance rendered to France by the United States.”163 Rather
than appreciate the success of German strategy and battlefield leadership in 1940, New
Dealer Rexford Tugwell blamed the French defeat on internal forces, “the reactionaries
who had brought France into such disrepute.”164 The British ambassador in Washington
bitterly alleged “that no resistance would be made by any of the French naval officers” to
“turning over the French warships” to Germany and claimed “that there would soon be in
France a completely Fascist French government entirely in sympathy and subservient to
the German government.”165 From France, no reports arrived to confirm or refute the
reports in Washington.166
163
Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolph Berle, July 1, 1940, 740.0011 European War
1939/4474, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945,
Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
164
Rexford Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Company, 1957), p. 617.
165
Sumner Welles memorandum of conversation, July 1, 1940, 711.94/1585, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 4, The Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
166
On June 30, 1940 President Roosevelt and the Department of State strove to break the
three week silence of Ambassador William C. Bullitt in Paris. Entry for June 30, 1940,
The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL. 166 The president ended the mission of
Biddle as Bullitt’s stand in on June 24. Earlier that day the French government had
evacuated Bordeaux, eventually for Vichy. Biddle departed for London to resume his
mission near the Polish government-in-exile. Telegram from Cordell Hull to A. J. Biddle,
June 24, 1940, 123 Biddle, Anthony J.D./236, Decimal File 1940-1944, General Records
of the Department of State, RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Telegram from
A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 25, 1940, 123 Biddle, Anthony J. D./237 and
letter from A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, September 10, 1940 in 123 Biddle,
Anthony J. D., Decimal File 1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State, RG
59, National Archives. The staff of the United States embassy in France lay scattered in
four separate sections; one remained isolated in Paris, another section waited in
Bourdeaux for directions, a third sat at Cande, and the fourth section moved to rejoin the
French government at La Bourboule and follow it to Vichy. Report from Robert Murphy
in La Bourboule to the Secretary of State, July 5, 1940, 123 Bullitt, William C./663,
Decimal File 1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, National
Archives.
352
On July 9 and 10, 1940, the French National Assembly met in Vichy and voted to
abolish the Third Republic and give Pétain full executive and legislative authority as the
Head of the French State.167 Having characterized the choices as “government by the
people versus dictatorship,” “freedom versus slavery,” and “moving forward or falling
back,” Roosevelt displayed no sympathy for the new French State.168 Bullitt returned to
the United States and diplomatic relations with the French State devolved to the chargé
level, a status commensurate to the relations maintained with Germany since 1938.
Sumner Welles noted that since the Pétain government had been appointed in strict
accord with French constitutional procedure “[t]he United States could have refused to
recognize the Pétain government, it is true—but only on some ground other than
legitimacy.”169 With the abolition of the Third Republic, Roosevelt treated France in the
same manner that he treated Nazi Germany. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
U.S. Army signal corps had already bugged the German embassy and consulates in the
United States, and in a cabinet meeting on July 11, 1940, Roosevelt directed that J. Edgar
Hoover, “give the French Embassy the same kind of treatment which he is giving the
German Embassy.”170 On July 18, Roosevelt disputed a reference to the French
government “as being a free and sovereign state.”171 At a White House dinner, Roosevelt
167
Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1982 edition), pp. 28-33.
168
Franklin D. Roosevelt Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July
19, 1940, Master Speech File No. 1291, Speech File, FDRL.
169
156.
170
Entry for July 11, 1940, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Presidential Diaries, FDRL.
171
Entry for July 19, 1940 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol.
3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 238-9.
353
elaborated further. He related “how he bluntly told [the French] Ambassador that [the]
Petain govt. was a [t]ool of the nazis and under Nazi duress [and] that his
communications with Petain came via Berlin.”172 Roosevelt maintained “that the
sovereignty of France ceased in June of 1940 when President LeBrun disappeared.” To
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt later confided his belief that Pétain “was really just a
de facto dictator without legal functions and simply exercised control because he was a
man whom the people would follow.”173
Roosevelt feared that collaboration in France between the Vichy regime and Nazi
Germany would undermine the sanctity of the blockade and delay the predicted German
collapse. He treated as fiction the armistice division of France into a German-controlled
northern area and a southern area under French administration, and he believed it crucial
to reinforce the British blockade of France. On July 19, the president announced
limitations on oil exports at a meeting with Morgenthau, Welles, Knox, and Stimson.
Roosevelt concluded “that the only way out of the difficulties of the world was by the
starving of the people of Europe, particularly in regard to their supply of fuel to carry on
the war.” He believed that under recent legislation he could act to prevent the shipment of
all petroleum supplies “to the Nazi Axis Powers.”174 Consistent with his assessment of
the total German domination of the French government, Roosevelt’s subsequent
172
Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches
and Writings, Joseph R. Lash Papers, FDRL.
173
Minutes of a Meeting at the White House on Thursday, January 7, 1943, at 1500,
“Minutes of Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1945,” Conferences, Box
29, Map Room, FDRL.
174
Entry for July 19, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXX: 24-5, microfilm edition,
reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library; Entry for June 18, 1940,
microfilm of the Adolph A. Berle Diary, Roosevelt Library.
354
proclamation of July 26 flatly prohibited “the export of petroleum products to France.”175
Furthermore, because members of the administration believed that France “has fallen
under German control,” there was no consensus as to whether any relief supplies from the
American Red Cross should be allowed through the blockade for refugees in France.176
V. Roosevelt and the Restoration of the True France
After the French defeat, Roosevelt sought to restore the victorious coalition of 1918 in
order to prosecute another war against German militarism and to establish the conditions
for the reemergence of what he considered the true France. Roosevelt’s policies reflected
the hope of November 1918 and a vision of progressive, republican France. In 1940 he
wrote that his policy was “to aid nations which have been overrun by invaders to reinstate
themselves as democracies if and when it becomes clear that they are able to set up new
governments wholly free from the control of dictatorships.”177 Roosevelt maintained
contact with the French people, cultivated civilian leaders, and attempted to ameliorate
the impact of the forces of reaction on the people of France. Roosevelt also endeavored to
prevent Germany from deriving benefits from French collaboration that would nullify the
impact of the blockade and enable Hitler to maintain his hold on power. Roosevelt also
worked to bring the French military potential in North Africa back into the war on the
175
Robert Murphy to the Secretary State, 30 July, 1940; Hull to Vichy, received August
3, 1940, “Petroleum,” 1940, box 11, France, Vichy Embassy, General Records, 1940-
1942, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84, National Archives,
Suitland.
176
Entry for July 3, 1940, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
177
Number), FDRL.
355
Allied side, what Welles characterized as “the keystone in the strategic design for the
defeat of Germany.” The move would block further German expansion and trigger a
German collapse.178 Although the tactics and the methods of the Roosevelt administration
shifted with regard to France as the fortunes of war shifted, Roosevelt’s French policy
reflected the consistency of his worldview.
Roosevelt hoped to bring France back into the war against Germany; however, by late
1940, the Vichy government seemed bent on full economic and military collaboration
with Germany and the French colonies in West and North Africa seemed open to German
exploitation. Roosevelt’s dealing with French administrators during the Great War and in
France afterwards convinced him that he could deal with the French and that his
comments held tremendous sway. A Dreyfusard, he had a visceral distrust of the political
motives of French générals. Consequently, Roosevelt also endeavored to limit the long-
term political impact of Maréchal Henri Philippe Pétain in Vichy and Général Charles de
Gaulle at the head of the Free French movement. Roosevelt’s attitude was consistent with
Wilson’s dictum, “The politics of generals and admirals must be tabooed.”179 Because the
French people had not chosen either soldier, Roosevelt considered both without
sovereignty and did not want to do anything that might prevent the French people from
having the opportunity to choose their leaders after the war. When treated with caution,
he believed, French military leaders could be used out of expediency to achieve more
vital administration goals. Roosevelt’s desire to monitor and forestall French assistance to
178
64-7.
179
356
the German war effort, to give hope to and maintain contact with the French people, and
to encourage elements of the French military to return to the war against Germany
motivated the decision to dispatch an ambassador to Vichy and consular agents in North
Africa and, ultimately, to invade French North Africa.
Roosevelt took great interest in the reports concerning North Africa, and the
implications for action loomed in his mind. The president immediately directed the State
Department to summon Robert Murphy, the chargé in Vichy, to the United States for
consultation. The September appointment of Général Maxime Weygand, the commander
in chief of the French army, as the French delegate general with supreme authority in
Africa interested Roosevelt. Although Weygand had been involved in the move for an
armistice to end the Battle of France, the president hoped that Weygand would lead anti-
Nazi action in French North Africa. Roosevelt considered Weygand “an honorable old
soldier” who would not tolerate “French subservience to Germany” indefinitely. In his
discussions with Murphy, furthermore, the president recalled Weygand’s role in the Great
War as Foch’s chief of staff, assessing Weygand’s experience working with a coalition of
American, British, and French soldiers to be a great benefit in the current war against
Germany. The French African policy of the United States was, in Murphy’s view, “the
president’s personal policy.”180
180
Murphy commented on Roosevelt’s fascination “with the thought of the Church in
world politics” and noted that he “seemed to have exaggerated the bond existing between
Catholics because of their religion.” Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), pp. 67-8. Murphy departed Vichy on
August 22 and First Secretary H. Freeman Matthews assumed direction of the embassy.
Memorandum, August 22, 1940, “123 Murphy,” 1940, box 1, General Records, 1940-
1942, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84, National Archives,
Suitland.
357
Roosevelt met with Murphy at the White House and outlined his instructions for future
United States policy. The relatively independent conditions in North Africa impressed the
president. He hoped to cultivate resistance under the leadership of Weygand. Roosevelt
viewed Murphy, a Catholic who had served for years in Germany and France, as an ideal
emissary to form an intimate relationship with the French général. Roosevelt winked at
Murphy and told him, “You might even go to church with Weygand!” The president told
Murphy that he remained “particularly concerned about the fate of the French fleet.”
Roosevelt commented that he did not consider Général de Gaulle a major factor in
French affairs and that he had a “poor opinion” of de Gaulle’s judgment after his
muddled operation against Dakar in French West Africa.181
In Roosevelt’s thinking, de Gaulle was a far cry from republican-minded French Army
officers such as Maréchal Joseph Joffre or Général Robert Nivelle. A Dreyfusard at
heart, Roosevelt seemed to view de Gaulle as the epitome of the partisan French officer.
The fact that de Gaulle’s Third Republic patron had been Reynaud, a man of the French
Right, would have validated Roosevelt’s suspicions. Roosevelt later confided to his wife,
181
At the end of their meeting, the president directed Murphy to communicate directly
with the White House and avoid “State Department channels.” After the meeting,
Murphy asked Under Secretary Welles about the communication arrangement directed by
the president. Welles reassured Murphy and stated, “That is the way he often operates.”
Company, 1964), pp. 68-70. For the State Department, however, the arrangement led to
confusion and uncertainty; Berle noted, “We have sent Murphy to North Africa but he
did not bother to get any instructions.” Entry for November 26, 1940, The Diary of
Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL. In contrast to his poor opinion of de Gaulle, an
incident in the middle of January 1941 demonstrates the depth of Roosevelt’s sympathy
with the French resistance movement against Germany. The Vichy government requested
that the United States return a number of prisoners that had escaped from Devil’s Island
and reached Florida and Puerto Rico. Customarily, the United States would have returned
those prisoners to the nearest French port, Martinique. Roosevelt, however, blocked any
prisoner transfer. He directed Hull to contact the Free French in London so that the
prisoners could be enlisted in “the army of Free France” in French Equatorial Africa.
Entry for January 19, 1941, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol.
3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 411.
358
“General de Gaulle is a soldier, patriotic, yes, devoted to his country; but, on the other
hand, he is a politician and a fanatic and there are, I think, in him almost the makings of a
dictator.”182 Tugwell assessed that de Gaulle had “megalomania.”183 Although Churchill
and Roosevelt shared the fundamental aim of enticing the French colonies in Africa into
rejoining the war against Germany and Italy, in 1940 Churchill was de Gaulle’s only
patron. Roosevelt, however, refused to commit to French resistance under de Gaulle’s
leadership and explored other options.
In addition to sending Murphy as his personal emissary to North Africa, Roosevelt
simultaneously dispatched retired Admiral William D. Leahy to Vichy as his ambassador
to France. Leahy’s mission constituted a major component of the policy that the United
States followed for the next year toward France, Germany, and the European war.
Beginning in December 1940, the administration pursued two fundamental objectives
that supported Roosevelt’s overall strategy. The first aimed at slowing and opposing
French collaboration with Germany. Admiral Leahy served as Roosevelt’s watchdog in
Vichy while the president attempted to cultivate French public opinion to oppose French
cooperation with Germany. The administration believed that blocking French economic
collaboration with Germany and tightening the blockade of continental Europe would
fatally weaken an over stretched Germany, perhaps sparking the overthrow of the Nazi
regime. The second objective was to encourage the resistance of the French colonies in
Africa and bring them back into the war against Germany. Control of the French fleet and
182
Capo Press, 1992), p. 248.
183
Rexford Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Company, 1957), p. 617.
359
French bases remained a key objective in United States plans and initiatives concerning
North and West Africa. The administration placed great faith in its ability to check
German expansion into North and West Africa and hoped that renewed French resistance
might reverberate among the liberal resistance in Germany.
Leahy’s background and experience made him an ideal emissary for Roosevelt to
dispatch to a French government under the leadership of the French Right. Given the
influence of the Great War on Roosevelt’s thinking, it is not surprising that originally he
had approached General John J. Pershing, the commander of the AEF who had served
with Pétain in the Great War. When Pershing’s health precluded him from accepting the
president’s offer, Roosevelt turned to Leahy, a choice that Pershing strongly endorsed.184
Roosevelt had known Leahy since his tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. During
Roosevelt’s second term in the White House, Leahy served as the Chief of Naval
Operations from 1937 until his mandatory retirement in 1939. Upon his retirement,
Roosevelt selected Leahy to serve as the governor of Puerto Rico but told the admiral that
if war broke out he would need him back as an aide and advisor. In Roosevelt’s mind,
Leahy was “the best man available for this mission.”185
184
Franklin D. Roosevelt to John J. Pershing, November 13, 1940, in Elliott Roosevelt,
ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, vol. 2, (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1950), pp. 1079-80; Pershing to Leahy, November 27, 1940, Leahy Papers,
LCMD.
185
Franklin D. Roosevelt telegram to William D. Leahy, November 17, 1940, Leahy
Diary, The Papers of William D. Leahy, LCMD. The son of an Irish-Catholic, Populist
lawyer, Leahy was born in Hampton, Iowa in 1875, and grew up in Ashland, Wisconsin.
After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1897, Leahy served on the battleship
Oregon and saw action at the Battle of Santiago. He saw service in the Philippine
insurrection and the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion as well as extensive service at
sea in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. His assignments gave him first-hand
experience with United States intervention in the Pacific, the Caribbean, and Central
America. Beginning in 1913, he established a close working relationship with Roosevelt.
During the interwar years, he held a succession of destroyer, cruiser, and battleship
commands and also served in Washington, D.C. as chief of the navy’s bureau of
360
The appointment of Leahy did not signal an acceptance of the French State by
Roosevelt. Instead, it represented an effort by the United States to counter Germany and
to promote and bolster resistance against fascism within France. Secretary of State Hull
recalled “neither the President nor I had any thought of indulgence toward the Pétain
regime.”186 Noting what he perceived to be monarchical tendencies in the French regime,
Roosevelt pointed out to Leahy that “in his decrees” Pétain “uses the royal ‘we’ and I
have gathered that he intends to rule.”187
On December 2, Leahy met with Roosevelt for a long discussion of his duties as
ambassador to France. Leahy noted that three main ideas emerged from the conversation.
The president instructed Leahy to maintain “close relations…with Marshal Pétain;
…persuade the French not to join in the war with Germany against Britain;
and…convince French naval officers” that German use of the fleet or French naval bases
would be the end of France.188 Roosevelt related that he had “been much perturbed by
reports indicating that the resources of France were being placed at the disposal of
Germany beyond that positively required by the terms of the armistice.” Based on a
ordnance. His career culminated in his assignment as Chief of Naval Operations from
1937 until his mandatory retirement in 1939 at sixty-four; Roosevelt selected Leahy to
serve as governor of Puerto Rico upon his retirement. William D. Leahy, I Was There
(New York: Wittlesey House, 1950), p. 3; Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life
of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985),
pp. 5-133; John Major, “William Daniel Leahy,” in Robert W. Lowe, ed., The Chiefs of
Naval Operations (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 101-117.
186
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York: MacMillan, 1948), p.
852.
187
Franklin D. Roosevelt to William D. Leahy, December 20, 1940, Leahy Diary, The
Papers of William D. Leahy, LCMD.
188
Memorandum, December 13, 1940, 123 LEAHY, WILLIAM D./16 1/4, Decimal File
1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
361
progressive fear of reactionary special interests that subvert the people and his
appreciation of the impact of German subversion, Roosevelt blamed French collaboration
on “the selfish interests of individuals” and on “unrequired governmental cooperation
with Germany motivated by the belief in the inevitableness of a German victory.” He
averred that in the event of a German victory that, at best, France would be “a vassal
state.” As a result, Roosevelt instructed Leahy to stress “that only by the defeat of the
powers now controlling the destiny of Germany and Italy can the world live in liberty,
peace and prosperity; that civilization cannot progress with a return to totalitarianism.”
After expressing concern about the French fleet serving Germany, Roosevelt emphasized
to Leahy that with he had followed “the efforts of France to maintain its authority in its
North African possessions and improve their economic status.” Roosevelt expressed his
“sympathetic interest” in the French efforts in North Africa and directed Leahy to inform
the French that the Roosevelt administration was “prepared to assist in this regard in any
appropriate way.”189
Through Leahy’s mission Roosevelt sought an avenue to maintain contact with the
people of France and keep alive what he saw as their true democratic character. Leahy
called at the White House prior to his departure for Vichy, and afterwards Roosevelt
issued a press release emphasizing that Leahy was carrying on the tradition of friendship
between the people of France and those of the United States. Although that friendship
derived from the Revolution, Roosevelt asserted that it was “welded when the American
189
Franklin D. Roosevelt to William D. Leahy, December 20, 1940, Leahy Diary, The
362
and French peoples fought side by side on the battlefields of 1918” and that it “must be
preserved as one of the pillars of the democratic way of life.”190
In a manner reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought to maintain a link to
the French people and preserve the ability to appeal to them over the heads of the self-
interested men in authority in Vichy. In August 1940, Roosevelt requested that all letters
to him sent to the United States embassy in Paris or Vichy or to the consulates in
Bordeaux, Lyon, and Marseilles be collected and sent to him via pouch.191 Leahy further
strengthened Roosevelt’s personal contact with the people of France and provided a
conduit to former French political leaders in Metropolitan France. In addition, Roosevelt
sent a number of “personal messages through secret channels” to many of the French
civilian leaders in Metropolitan France. Roosevelt insisted that they would “be of far
greater service hastening the restoration of independence in their country if they were to
leave France and work for her freedom from outside.” He desired the services of a
civilian leader who could enhance “the prestige and effectiveness” of the Free French
organization, presumably to subordinate de Gaulle to civilian authority.192
In his fireside chat “on national security” delivered over the radio at the end of
December, Roosevelt hoped to encourage French popular resistance and counter the idea
prevalent in Vichy that there could be any negotiated settlement with Hitler that would
190
Transcript of White House Press Release, Leahy Diary, The Papers of William D.
Leahy, LCMD.
191
Robert Murphy memorandum for Cecil M. P. Cross, August 22, 1940, and Cecil M.
P. Cross circular letter No. 396 to all American Consular Officers in France, August 30,
1940, “OF 3186 POLITICAL REFUGEES July – Sept. 1940,” Box 3, OF 3186 Political
Refugees July 1940 – 1944, Official File, FDRL.
192
162.
363
benefit France. The address incorporated suggestions from Free French businessman Jean
Monnet. Because they came “from a ‘free’ Frenchman of proved sagacity,” Felix
Frankfurter suggested to the president that Monnet’s recommendations “may lend
desirable confirmation to your own thinking.”193 Simson, who had known Monnet “pretty
well” as Secretary of State, also endorsed his “constructive suggestions” for United States
policy. Monnet believed that two major objectives existed for the United States: “to
prevent France from joining the New Europe” under Germany and “to save North Africa
from being acquired by the Germans,” especially the French fleet and its bases. For
Monnet, the key to the critical situation lay in the “two forces alive in France and
resisting German pressure - one is public opinion, the other North Africa.”194 In his
address, the president claimed that the proposed “new order” in Europe merely
represented Nazi tyranny. In addition, Roosevelt labeled French hopes for a “negotiated
peace” with the Axis powers as “Nonsense!” To aid countries opposing Axis aggression
and resisting incorporation into Hitler’s “new order,” Roosevelt stated that the United
States would “be the great arsenal of democracy.”195
Several initiatives demonstrate the degree of importance Roosevelt placed on the
United States cultivating French public opinion. In late November, Berle noted that he
had “arranged to get some more information headed in the direction of France” because
the French people were “hungry for news” but “will believe none but the American
193
It was Monnet who proposed the phrase “arsenal of democracy.” Felix Frankfurter to
Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 19, 1940 and Jean Monnet Memorandum, December
18, 1940, The Papers of Felix Frankfurter, LCMD.
194
Entry for December 2, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXXII: 7, microfilm
edition, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
195
Franklin D. Roosevelt Address, December 29, 1940, Fireside Chat No. 16 – Arsenal
of Democracy, Master Speech File No. 1351, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech Files, FDRL.
364
news” that they could pick up on short-wave radio. As a result, the administration
arranged to quadruple the number of American newscasts to France.196 Despite the
increased volume of programs, not all of the French people could receive the signal, and
the administration considered having the British rebroadcast American news programs.
On December 24, Under Secretary of State Welles “very confidentially” contacted the
British embassy in Washington, probably at Roosevelt’s request. Welles requested the
British Broadcasting Corporation rebroadcast American French language news programs
to improve their reception in France, Morocco, and French Equatorial Africa. Welles also
urged that announcements during the rebroadcast news bulletins make it explicit that the
programs were “authentically” American. The Under Secretary cautioned, however, that
no reference to the intervention of the United States “should be allowed to become
generally known.” Seeing the obvious advantage of honoring Welles’ request, the British
Foreign Office forwarded it to the Ministry of Information to work out the technical
details.197
Roosevelt also sought other methods to influence public opinion in France. On New
Year’s Eve, Roosevelt contacted Churchill and expressed his belief “that for
humanitarian and also political reasons limited quantities of milk and vitamin
concentrates for children should be sent to unoccupied France.” Although the president
had no intention of weakening the blockade, he finally acknowledged the actual situation
196
Entry for November 30, 1940, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
197
Telegram No. 3251 from Butler, December 24, 1940; Empax 120 from Butler,
December 24, 1940; Telegram No. 349, Foreign Office to Butler, January 18, 1941;
Minutes, Broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation of French news from the
United States, microfilm of FO 371/24263/390-4, British Foreign Office, United States
Correspondence, 1938-1945, Public Record Office, Kew.
365
of France. He commented, “My belief is that it is logical and expedient to make a
distinction between occupied and unoccupied territories.”198
Roosevelt thought that supplies could “be distributed under the strict control and
supervision of the American Red Cross” in France in a manner that would not benefit
Germany. The president suggested that such a program “would help to win over the
French people” and make them hostile to cooperation with Germany. Roosevelt noted,
furthermore, that the United States would dispatch only limited quantities of supplies and
that those would not “be of any appreciable assistance to Germany” if requisitioned.
Committed to the policy of economic warfare, Roosevelt suggested to the prime minister
that conditional relief shipments would represent only an isolated, but wise, exception to
the blockade and would not jeopardize its enforcement or effectiveness.199
As Roosevelt considered the situation of France in the strategic context of the
European War, he evidently thought that the evacuation of the French government to
North Africa could constitute a significant advantage for the Anglo-American war effort.
Evacuation of the French government would allow for the British blockade to have
greater coherence and effect by removing the anomaly that unoccupied France seemed to
represent. In addition to strengthening the blockade, the departure of the French
198
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, December 31, 1940, in Warren F.
Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, vol. 1, Alliance
Emerging (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 117-8.
199
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, December 31, 1940, in Warren F.
Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, vol. 1, Alliance
Emerging (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 117-8. The use
of the Red Cross would also allow Roosevelt to exercise control over the operation that
he would not have been able to do if an independent organization had been selected for
the task as recommended by Herbert Hoover. A Red Cross relief effort would allow
Roosevelt to evade domestic political criticism from Hoover and tailor the assistance to
suit his own objectives.
366
government would further overextend German power by forcing Nazi Germany to
occupy, administer, and feed all of continental France thereby hastening the Nazi
collapse. The move would also bring important elements of the French army and navy
back into the war against Germany and provide a crucial boost to British military power.
In addition, the move, much like Clemenceau’s accession to power in 1917, would
provide the opportunity to break the apparent grip that Germany had on the French
government. As a result, one of Leahy’s initial requirements in Vichy was to determine
the circumstances under which Pétain would evacuate to North Africa rather than bow to
German pressure and coercion. Pétain, however, rejected any thought of evacuation to
North Africa. Leahy immediately reported Pétain’s inclination to Roosevelt, noting, “He
will not under any circumstances abandon continental France and move his Government
to Africa.”200
Following Pétain’s categorical refusal to consider evacuation to North Africa, the
Roosevelt administration focused on blocking Vichy collaboration while encouraging
French resistance in North Africa to German demands. Weygand became a more crucial
figure. On the outset of his mission, Roosevelt had tasked Murphy to discover the extent
of Weygand’s authority, what the old soldier had in mind for the future, and what “could
the United States do to encourage him.” Weygand agreed to meet Murphy in Dakar on
December 21.201 Murphy found Weygand and his staff of admirals, generals, and civilian
200
William D. Leahy to Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 25, 1941, Leahy Diary, The
201
“123 Murphy, Robert D.” Box 1, 1940: Robert Murphy to Pierre Laval, December 7,
1940, Murphy to Pierre Étienne Flandin, December 17, 1940, Tele 1153 Murphy to the
Secretary of State, December 17, 1940. France, Vichy Embassy, General Records, 1940-
42, Foreign Service Posts of the Dept of State, RG 84, National Archives, Suitland,
Maryland.
367
governors extremely cooperative and straightforward, and all of them encouraged
Murphy to speak with their subordinates in Algeria, Morocco, West Africa, and Tunisia.
French officers confidently suggested that they could defend North Africa from the
Germans indefinitely with the aid of United States equipment and fuel. Over one hundred
thousand soldiers, aviators, and sailors fell under Weygand’s command, with nearly
double that many in reserve. Murphy judged, however, that shortages in ammunition and
heavy equipment prevented their employment in offensive operations. During Murphy’s
visit, British radio announcements from London, however, made Weygand’s staff
extremely anxious. The British broadcasts threatened to sabotage French defensive
efforts in North Africa by prematurely encouraging German suspicions and counter
action.202
Murphy’s mission proved highly successful. He credited his success to the openness of
French colonial administrators, both civilian and military, which displayed implicit trust
in the United States government. When Murphy departed for Lisbon on January 5, 1941,
he carried with him the initial draft of an economic agreement that Weygand had
approved. Three weeks later, a directive from the Secretary of State instructed him to
return to North Africa and “state to Weygand that the United States Government is
prepared in principle to proceed with the matter of extending economic cooperation.” The
resulting agreement, the Murphy-Weygand Accord, authorized the French to purchase a
limited amount of non-strategic supplies in the United States using frozen French credits.
202
Company, 1964), pp. 72-81; Hitler remained suspicious of Weygand and ordered the
measures that he directed for Operation Attila be maintained. See Germany, Auswärtiges
Amt., Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, The War Years, vol.
11, September 1, 1940-January 31, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1960), p. 918.
368
Furthermore, the French would be allowed to ship those goods through the British naval
blockade for use in North Africa. The agreement also allowed a system of American
“observers” to operate throughout North Africa to monitor the agreement.203 The belief
was that American economic assistance could isolate North Africa from the reactionary
influence of Vichy and stiffen resolve in the event of any German intervention.
Although Roosevelt viewed French colonialism as the vestige of an archaic system,
consistent with his instructions to Leahy was the belief that it would be even more
detrimental to the course of civilization for French colonies in Africa to fall into the
hands of Nazis and serve the German war effort. In February 1941, Berle noted the
administration assessment that considerable numbers of German “observers” were
already in the west African ports of Casablanca and Dakar. Berle “desperately” pondered
how the United States could stop the German encroachment into West Africa. He
believed that the only effective method would be for the United States to land troops at
Dakar and Casablanca, an option the judged “obviously impossible at the moment” due to
the meager size of the U.S. Army. As a result, Berle decided that the solution was “to
energize, in some fashion, the French North African Government and the French forces,”
but he did not know if such a course of action would be possible.204
Other voices in the Roosevelt administration echoed Berle’s assessment. In May,
Stimson’s Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy saw great strategic potential in the
French colonies in North Africa. McCloy observed,

203
Company, 1964), pp. 73, 81-3, 89-92. For the text of the Murphy-Weygand economic
accord, see William Leahy to the Secretary of State, February 28, 1941, 740.00112
European War 1939/2274, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. 2, Europe
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office, 1959), pp. 226-9.
204
Entry for February 14, 1941, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
369
The whole situation in North Africa centers around the personality of one
man, Weygand. . . . North Africa is the key to the Mediterranean, the East,
and the Atlantic. . . . From every angle, Africa presents real possibilities
and should not be written off merely because Vichy collaborates.205
That same month, Leahy wrote Roosevelt about “how easy it would be to start the
German disintegration with so small an army” deployed to North Africa. Leahy assessed,
A seriously vulnerable point today in the German expansion plan is North

Africa, and it is my opinion that a comparatively small army of 250,000
men thoroughly equipped with modern weapons, including aircraft, could,
with General Weygand’s poorly equipped force hold North Africa, insure
control of the Mediterranean Sea, and shorten the duration of the war by
half.206
Consistent with Leahy’s comments, the concept of a preemptive attack to preclude
German intervention or block German expansion figured prominently in the Roosevelt
administration’s thinking about military operations against French possessions well
before the United States formally entered the Second World War. Roosevelt likewise
accepted the necessity of such preemptive military strikes to block the forces of reaction,
and he seems to have found an enduring lesson in Britain’s bold destruction of the neutral
Danish fleet at Copenhagen to keep it from the grasp of Emperor Napoleon. After the fall
of France, Roosevelt condoned British action against the French fleet in July and against
Dakar in September 1940. Roosevelt and his advisors also accepted that the United States
armed forces could play a direct role in preemptive operations. Their thinking reflected
Theodore Roosevelt’s broad interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Berle acknowledged
that the United States had the right to intervene in foreign territory with military force
205
John J. McCloy Memorandum for the Secretary of War, May 17, 1941, 4511-1, War
Plans Division General Correspondence, 1920-1942, Records of the War Department
General and Special Staffs, RG 165, National Archives.
206
William D. Leahy to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 26, 1941, Leahy Diary, The Papers
of William D. Leahy, LCMD.
370
“lest a military enemy should grab it first and make trouble for us.”207 In October 1940,
following newspaper accounts that the French government intended to fortify and
improve the harbor facilities in their possessions in the West Indies presumably for use
by German submarines, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy to plan for an emergency
operation against Martinique.208 The Navy Department asked Army Chief of Staff
George Marshall “to have ready a force of 5,000 men on 72 hours’ notice for use in
Martinique.” Marshall and Stimson believed that the operation was “highly inadvisable”
because it would probably ensure that the wavering French colonies in North Africa
would fall “head over heels into the arms of Germany.” Apparently, only Stimson’s
strong objections against undertaking any adventure without the force needed “to blow
the whole French force out of the Islands” diffused the situation.209
In August 1941, at the Atlantic Conference, the British explicitly raised the possibility
of American troops participating in a combined operation against French North Africa.
The British urged United States intervention into the French colonies on the grounds that
the action would defend the Western Hemisphere, prevent German penetration of North
and West Africa, and provide a potential base for a joint land offensive against Europe
should that be necessary. United States military planners, however, quickly
207
Entry for February 13, 1941, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
208
“Martinique Pro-British” and “Plebiscite Plan Reported,” New York Times, 3
September 1940; “Vichy to Reinforce West Indies Base,” 1 October 1940. Also New
York Times, 2, 3, and 8 October 1940. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,
Global Logistics and Strategy, vol. 4 in the series The United States Army in World War
II: The War Department (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p.
61.
209
Entries for October 30, 31 and November 1, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries,
XXXI: 91, 96, 100, 101, microfilm edition, reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale
University Library.
371
acknowledged that the United States did not yet possess “land forces in adequate strength
and suitably equipped for operations in North Africa.”210
After the Atlantic Conference, the War Department, with the concurrence of
Roosevelt, initiated detailed planning to seize the French territories of North and West
Africa. Roosevelt envisioned the potential expansion of the Monroe Doctrine to include
Dakar. The resulting plans figured prominently in United States military strategy and
relations with the French State for the next year. The War Department considered
operations against Dakar and Casablanca and, based on the training, mobilization, and
equipment requirements and seasonal weather constraints, recommended “the expedition
should not be sent before November 1942.” In a memorandum to the president, Stimson
noted the indications “that the French are working feverishly to strengthen the defenses at
Dakar,” presumably under German orders. He added, “We must assume that the French
forces will fight us.”211
Perhaps recalling the tenacity of the French poilu from his trip to the Western Front,
Roosevelt apparently believed that success in North Africa would require the assistance
of a respected French senior officer whom the soldiers would obey. In that respect,
Weygand offered significant potential for Roosevelt’s aspiration of bringing French
military power in North Africa back into the war against Germany. Weygand, who as
Foch’s chief of staff had read the armistice terms to the German delegation in 1918, was
strongly anti-German. The Roosevelt administration justified the courtship of Weygand

210
Maurice Matloff and Snell, Edwin M., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-
1942, vol. 3 of the series The United States Army in World War II: The War Department
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 55, 102-3.
211
Joint Plans - Occupation of Dakar, 4511-5, War Plans Division General
Correspondence, 1920-1942, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs,
RG 165, National Archives.
372
because of his military potential. Welles concurred with the insistence of War
Department planners “that every political decision should be made with a primary regard
for the success of the military operations, and that consequently the chief purpose of our
policy should be to reduce the opposition of the French military and naval establishments
in North Africa to the barest minimum.”212 The removal of Weygand as delegate general
in late 1941, apparently under German pressure, confounded Roosevelt’s concept for
North Africa.213
In January 1942, British military leaders and war planners met their counterparts in
Washington to review and develop the strategic direction for the war. The group
reaffirmed the basic Germany-first grand strategy and validated the view that the defeat
of Germany was “the key to victory” because the collapse of Italy and Japan would
naturally follow from a German defeat.214 In the implementation of the grand strategy,
the military planners regarded a joint Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa
to be of the highest strategic importance. The planners, however, concluded that the two
allies would not possess sufficient resources during the first half of 1942 “to force an
entry into French North Africa.” The planners also considered Dakar in French West
Africa to be of great strategic importance but assessed it “unlikely that we shall gain free
212
164.
213
Entries for 20 and 21 October and December 4, 1941, Leahy Diary, The Papers of
William D. Leahy, LCMD.
214
Washington War Conference American-British Strategy, ABC-4/CS-1, Proceedings
of the American – British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences Held in Washington, D.C. on
Twelve Occasions Between December 24, 1941 and January 14, 1942, Box 1,
International Conferences, Record Group 218 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
373
entry into Dakar” without similar cooperation in French North Africa. As a result, the
planners assessed that the earliest the operation could be conducted was in the autumn of
1942 when weather conditions were more favorable and troops were expected to be
available.215 The planners concluded that the operations against North Africa would
require that the United States “receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance that
there will be only token resistance.” The Chiefs of Staff, however, assessed that the
planning for the operation had to envision the employment of a large force because “the
French authorities would in all probability only issue the invitation if the bait were, in
their opinion, adequate.”216
Welles recalled that Roosevelt examined the strategic alternatives in early 1942
“toward hastening the defeat of Germany and Italy” and concluded “that North African
operations were those best calculated to ensure the achievement of the desired results.”217
French cooperation was essential to ensure the success of the operation. From the
perspective of the White House, it was imperative “to make satisfactory arrangements
with a French figure who had sufficiently strong position with the people of North Africa
and the fighting forces, to enable him to over-ride the local situation and cause our own
215
Joint Planning Committee Report, Movements and Projects in the Atlantic Theater –
For the First Half of 1942, ABC-4/6, January 13, 1942, Proceedings of the American –
British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences Held in Washington, D.C. on Twelve Occasions
Between December 24, 1941 and January 14, 1942, Box 1, International Conferences,
Record Group 218 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
216
Chiefs of Staff Conference, ABC-4/1, December 26, 1941, Proceedings of the
American – British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences Held in Washington, D.C. on
Twelve Occasions Between December 24, 1941 and January 14, 1942, Box 1,
International Conferences, Record Group 218 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National
217
163.
374
forces to be welcomed as liberators.” De Gaulle was ruled out because he had no
authority or following in North Africa and because he was “violently disliked by a large
portion of the population.” De Gaulle’s attack on Dakar, furthermore, “showed that his
judgment, his military leadership and his sources of information could not be trusted.”218
Although it had already excluded de Gaulle from the planned invasion of North Africa,
in October 1942 the White House also suspected him of ambitious political intrigues that
were not confined to France. John Franklin Carter, an analyst in the executive office of
the president, informed Roosevelt that the head of the Free French organization in the
United States was scheming to overthrow “FDR and his regime.” Reportedly, working
under the conviction “that Roosevelt is eager to be an American Dictator,” Free French
agents, with the support of de Gaulle, had become “engaged in an intrigue with John L.
Lewis looking to the overthrow of the Administration by a workmen’s revolt.”219 Lewis,
the president of the United Mine Workers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations,
had broken with Roosevelt during the 1940 election and endorsed his Republican
opposition. Roosevelt directed Carter to take up the report with the FBI.220 Already
suspecting “that Axis agents have been planted among the Free French, particularly at
their various headquarters,” the reports of political intrigue certainly reinforced
218
American – De Gaullist Relations, 1942 – 1944 (Notes compiled by Captain Wood),
The White House, June 23, 1944, folder 20 “General de Gaulle,” Box 5, Admiral Leahy
1942-1948, Chairman’s File, Record Group 218 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National
219
John F. Carter, Report on Alleged Intrigue Between Free French and John L. Lewis,
October 8, 1942, Box 98, “Carter, John F.: Aug.-Dec. 1942,” President’s Secretary’s File,
FDRL.
220
Franklin D. Roosevelt memorandum to John F. Carter, October 15, 1942, Box 98,
“Carter, John F.: Aug.-Dec. 1942,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
375
Roosevelt’s view that de Gaulle and his organization could not be trusted and validated
the exclusion of de Gaulle from the landings in North Africa.221
With Weygand in retirement in southern France and unwilling to oppose Pétain’s
orders, the administration turned to Général Henri Giraud, who had escaped from
Germany in April 1942 and was also living in southern France. Reminiscent of Joffre and
Nivelle, Roosevelt’s choice of Giraud reflected the president’s perspective that a French
général should be nonpolitical, anti-clerical, and remain focused on purely military tasks.
A report written in November 1942 assessed that Giraud had earned the reputation of
being “a soldier of great courage” and, having escaped during both World Wars from
being a German prisoner of war, demonstrated that he had no intention of serving
Germany.” During the Battle of France, Giraud had been called upon to assume
command and rally a French army mauled by the German attack through the Ardennes.
Enroute to his new command, he was captured. The contemporary account was that “a
French patriot or group of patriots” had financed Giraud’s escape from Germany in April
1942, suggesting that he had excellent connections with the resistance on the European
continent.222 As early as November 9, 1942, Roosevelt suggested “that eventually Giraud
would have to be removed from command but that possibly he could be retained in a
221
John F. Carter, Report on Free French Intelligence, August 31, 1942, Box 98, “Carter,
John F.: Aug.-Dec. 1942,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
222
General Henri Honore Giraud, Research and Analysis Branch Report Number 455,
November 1942, Intelligence Reports, 1941-1961, Record Group 59 General Record of
the Department of State, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1221, National
Archives.
376
political position such as governor” in North Africa.223 At Casablanca, presidential
advisor Harry Hopkins “gained a very favorable impression of Giraud.” Hopkins
assessed, “I know he is a Royalist, and probably is a right-winger in all his economic
views, but I have the feeling that he is willing to fight.”224
At Casablanca in 1943, Roosevelt told Murphy that he still deplored de Gaulle’s
apparent readiness to start civil wars. Murphy recorded Roosevelt’s view that “it was as
important as ever to prevent any disputes between Frenchmen which might interfere in
military operations.” Roosevelt surmised that future military success by the United States
in the war against Nazi Germany could hinge upon the ability of Frenchmen to maintain
order in the territories through which supplies had to move to the fighting fronts. The
president reaffirmed to Murphy the wisdom behind previous associations with Vichy
from 1940 to 1942 and his conviction “that he should continue to refuse to recognize de
Gaulle or anybody else as the sole governing authority for France until the French people
were free to make their own choice.”225 The president remained suspicious of de Gualle’s
motives. At Casablanca, Roosevelt met with Giraud and had a gentlemanly conversation
in French. In contrast, during his meeting with de Gaulle, the Secret Service kept a
submachine gun trained on de Gaulle the entire time. Roosevelt scoffed at de Gaulle’s
characterization of himself as Clemenceau with Giraud relegated to the role of Foch. It
seems instead that Roosevelt fancied himself as having assumed the mantle of
223
Minutes of a Meeting at the White House on Monday, November 9, 1942, “Minutes
of Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1945,” Conferences, Box 29, Map
Room, FDRL.
224
Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper
225
Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 170.
377
Clemenceau. Concerning the squabble between de Gaulle and Giraud, Hopkins relayed
that the president “thought Giraud should land on top” rather than be subordinate to de
Gaulle. Consistent with Roosevelt’s belief that the proper relationship for the French
military was to be bound by civilian authority, Hopkins observed that Giraud left him
with “a feeling that he had made up his mind that he was going to do whatever the
President wanted in Africa.”226
On Armistice Day in 1942, Roosevelt recalled the brave soldiers who “fought and
won that fight against German militarism” in 1918. In the current war against German
militarism again, Roosevelt found it “heartening” that “large numbers of the fighting men
of our traditional ally, France,” were fighting alongside American and British soldiers in
North Africa and that “soldiers of France will go forward with the United Nations.”227
Under the command of Giraud, the French Armée d’Afrique reinforced the Anglo-
American campaign in Tunisia. In February 1943, Leahy, who became Roosevelt’s Chief
of Staff in the White House the previous summer, contrasted the actions of “General
Giraud, who is fighting in North Africa, and General de Gaulle, who is talking in
England, and through a partisan press, in America.”228 In May 1943, over 275,00 German
and Italian soldiers capitulated. Roosevelt had achieved his objective of bringing the
French army back into the war along side Britain and the United States. The result was
that, in the summer of 1943, Roosevelt confidently asserted that his administration had
226
and Brothers, 1950), p. 683-5, 691, and 693.
227
Franklin D. Roosevelt address first draft, November 11, 1942, Amphitheater,
Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia, Master Speech File No. 1438, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Speech Files, FDRL.
228
Entry for February 2, 1943, Leahy Diary, The Papers of William D. Leahy, LCMD.
378
followed a consistent policy toward France since the Battle of France in 1940.229 The
collapse of Germany, however, remained more elusive.
VI. Roosevelt and the German Resistance: The Other Dimension of “Unconditional
Surrender”
At a press conference at the end of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943,
Roosevelt announced a policy that had already been in effect for several years demanding
the “unconditional surrender” of Germany and Japan. Shaped by the lessons of the Great
War and its aftermath, “unconditional surrender” was a policy that derived from
Roosevelt’s conviction that an enduring peace required that there be no settlement with
the forces of reaction in Germany. Roosevelt told Averell Harriman that he “was
determined not to repeat Woodrow Wilson’s tragic mistake in … starting a discussion of
peace terms with the enemy before the surrender.”230 Although the Kaiser left Germany,
the armistice left the forces of reaction and autocracy undefeated. Adamant that there not
be any negotiated settlement with Hitler’s regime, Roosevelt also wanted to prevent the
conclusion of any inconclusive peace that would allow Prussian militarism or Junker
conservatism to maintain their grip on power. In so doing, the policy of “unconditional
surrender” also meant that Roosevelt refused to offer assistance to the opposition against
Hitler inside the German army and foreign office.
229
Entry for July 16, 1943, William D. Hassett, Off the Record With F.D.R., 1942-1945
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 191.
230
W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946
(New York: Random House, 1975), p. 190.
379
Several enduring lessons from the Great War and its immediate aftermath certainly
shaped Roosevelt’s policy nearly twenty-five years later. Following the United States
declaration of war in 1917, Theodore Roosevelt had urged continuing the war until the
achievement of an “overwhelming victory” that destroyed German militarism. By
October 1918, members of Woodrow Wilson’s cabinet used the term “unconditional
surrender” in their debates over German armistice overtures. The following month,
during the 1918 election, Republicans effectively used the slogan to accuse Wilson of
settling for easy terms with Germany.231 Clearly, the lesson of 1918 was not lost on
Roosevelt and his advisors. For example, as early as 1937, diplomat George Messersmith
asserted that it was essential for the United States “not to negotiate in any way with
Germany until we have a responsible government to deal with.”232 The aftermath of that
war convinced his Roosevelt that unless German autocracy and militarism were defeated
soundly the forces of reaction would dominate the postwar world again.
The ideas presented in his Harvard classes, during his tenure in Albany, and in the
Wilson administration also conditioned Roosevelt’s thinking about the forces at work
inside Germany during the Second World War. In Roosevelt’s mind the Prussian
militarism and autocracy of the Great War merely reemerged under Hitler. Hitler, the
president believed, drew his support from the reactionaries left over from Imperial
Germany: industrialists, imperialists, militarists, and the conservative upper class
Prussian gentry. Any distinction between those groups blurred in Roosevelt’s thinking. In
231
232
George S. Messersmith letter to Felix Frankfurter, February 2, 1937, “Messersmith,
George S. 1936-37,” Reel 53, Container 83, General Correspondence, The Papers of
Felix Frankfurter, LCMD.
380
1940, for example, Roosevelt characterized the dictatorships threatening the United
States as the reemergence of the enemies of the Great War. He offered, “They are not
new, my friends, they are only a relapse--”233 Later that same year, Roosevelt referred to
the Central Powers of the Great War as “the axis of 1918.”234
In that respect, Roosevelt’s advisors shared similar views. As members of the
Roosevelt administration surveyed Nazi Germany in late 1940, the Great War provided
their frame of reference. In November 1940, Secretary of the Navy Knox told his
audience “we face again in a more dreadful form the same peril that we faced when we
boarded transports to sail for France in 1918.” Perceiving Nazi Germany as a
manifestation of Prussian autocracy with dreams of pan-Germanism, Knox thought that
“in its essence” there was little difference “between the Kaiserism that we fought in ’18
and the Hitlerism that threatens us today.”235 Secretary of War Stimson believed that the
militaristic dictatorship in Nazi Germany denied individual freedom and represented a
primary threat to world peace in the same manner that he believed the Great War had
been “the result of the Prussian doctrine of state supremacy,” of which one manifestation
was submarine warfare.236
233
Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July 19, 1940, Master
Speech File Number 1291, Speech File, FDRL.
234
Franklin D. Roosevelt Armistice Day Address, Arlington National Cemetery,
November 11, 1940, Speech File No. 1346, Speech Files, FDRL.
235
Frank Knox Armistice Day Address, Columbia, South Carolina, November 11, 1940,
Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, The Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
236
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 89-90. In a cabinet meeting in December 1940,
Stimson advocated United States intervention in the European war “to forcibly stop the
German submarines” once again. Entry for December 19, 1940, Stimson Diaries, XXXII:
46, Yale University Library.
381
The equating of the political situation in Germany with that of 1914-1918 became so
pervasive in official Washington that dissenting viewpoints carried no weight. In the
absence of a United States ambassador in Berlin, diplomatic reports that opposed the
popular view went unheeded. Among those whose views were overlooked was diplomat
George Kennan. Kennan, who had transferred from Prague to Berlin in 1939, recalled,
I was shocked to realize, in talking with President Franklin Roosevelt later

in the war, that he was one of the many people who could not easily
distinguish World War II from World War I and still pictured the Prussian
Junkertum as a mainstay of Hitler’s power just as it had been, or had been
reputed to be, the mainstay of the power of the Kaiser. Actually, Hitler
found his main support in the lower middle class and to some extent in the
nouveau riche. The older Prussian aristocracy was divided; but from its
ranks came some of the most enlightened and courageous of all the
internal opposition Hitler was ever to face.237
In December 1939 and January 1940, consistent with the view of Germany teetering on
the verge of internal collapse, the Roosevelt administration turned a deaf ear to
representatives of the German resistance in the United States. Expecting the German
people to revolt, the Roosevelt administration had no desire to assist conservative,
nationalist Germans with Prussian and imperial backgrounds and deliberately rejected
peace feelers from what they perceived as the forces of reaction in Germany, regardless
of whether they were Nazis or their conservative opponents. Because Roosevelt
anticipated the popular breakup of Germany, he did not want to do anything to sustain the
power of reactionaries to the detriment of the German people. As a result, Roosevelt and
his administration turned a cold shoulder to the opposition against Hitler in the German
Army and Foreign Office and followed a policy that refused to acknowledge their
requests for assistance. In Roosevelt’s mind, their program of opposition to Hitler
237
George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967),
p. 123.
382
represented an internal struggle among the forces of German militarism and Prussian
conservatism, the foes of civilization from the Great War.
As a result the visit to the United States during the winter of 1939 and 1940 of Adam
von Trott der Solz, a descendent of Hessian nobility and Prussian Junkers, ended in
disappointment. Former Chancellor Brüning had vouched for von Trott as someone who
“really represented responsible, potentially powerful, conservative forces in Germany.”
Although von Trott managed to see several State Department officials and Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, the meeting with Frankfurter ended on a sour note.
Frankfurter relayed his suspicions about von Trott to both Roosevelt and Messersmith at
the State Department.238 The administration made no distinction between conservative
Germans and Nazis; as Roosevelt and his advisors saw the situation, they all seemed to
be working toward the same ends, if not working together. By late November, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation was trailing von Trott.239 When von Trott departed Washington,
D.C. in January 1940, Roosevelt chided Frankfurter, “For Heaven’s sake! Surely you did
not let your Trott friend get trotted out of the country without having him searched by
Edgar Hoover. Think of the battleship plans and other secrets he may be carrying
back.”240
238
Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance Against Hitler: The Search For Allies
Abroad (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992), pp. 33, 184-5, and 187-8.
239
See J. Edgar Hoover letters to Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson, December 18,
1939 and January 16, 1940, F.B.I. Reports 1939-40, Box 11, Department of Justice, OF
10b, FDRL.
240
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Frankfurter, January 17, 1940, Box 135, Subject File, PSF,
FDRL.
383
Later in January 1940, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt met with Paul Hagen, member of
the German opposition to Hitler who recently became research director for the American
Friends of German Freedom. On January 9, Joseph Lash wrote Eleanor Roosevelt about
“a wonderful German who has just arrived in this country” who, according to Lash, was
“the leader of an opposition group to Hitler.” Lash, Hagen, and Eleanor Roosevelt met on
January 22, and Hagen told her that his resistance group was “intact” and represented an
“imp[ortan]t a[n]d a potential force” in his “gov[ernmen]t’s executive dep[artmen]ts.”
When she asked whether his group drew support from the churches, Hagen confided that
the “top Catholic hierarchy wanted a deal with Hitler while Protestant leadership was
confused.” Hagen asserted “that a negotiated peace on Hitler’s terms, one that did not
restore democratic r[igh]ts to the German people w[oul]d be catastrophic and end all
democratic possibilities.” Hagen, consequently, urged firmness by the United States and
stressed the need to make it clear that the United States “w[oul]d have no part in a peace
that w[oul]d repr[e]sent a Hitler victory.”241
Other aspects of Hagen’s message, however, were at odds with the accepted view in
the White House. Hagen “minimized existing underground org[anization]s” and told the
first lady that “there were no possibilities of a democratic revolution [in Germany]
without a defeat in war.” When Eleanor Roosevelt asked Hagen to tell her “what
specifically the U.S. c[oul]d do,” he replied that American “diplomacy c[oul]d find
241
Entry for January 22, 1940, Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches and
384
methods.” Unconvinced by Hagen and his arguments, Eleanor Roosevelt ended the
conversation in favor of lunch and seems to have taken no action on the meeting. 242
Amazingly enough, the correspondence between Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles and the Roosevelts shows that the administration had obtained, from a variety of
sources, a fairly complete picture of the aims of the German opposition to Hitler. As
Welles saw the situation, the “mass of information” suggested that if the Allies declared
that they would not dismember Germany that “steps would be taken by [the] army to
overturn or modify [the] present régime in Germany and bring into power a government
with whom [the] Allies could negotiate.” The administration, however, was “inclined to
regard these stories as part of [a] German war of nerves” motivated by Hitler in an effort
to avoid “imposing losses and privations on the German people which might well
jeopardize [the] existence of [his] régime.” It seemed to Welles that Hitler was using the
peace initiatives to avert a possible democratic revolt at home, and as a result, with
respect to German domestic as well as foreign policy, any early peace would clearly be
“an inconclusive or precarious” one. Furthermore, from the administration’s point of
view, the “framers of German policy whether Nazi or non-Nazi,” namely Hitler and the
conservative opposition against him, were virtually indistinguishable. 243 On top of
242
Entry for January 22, 1940, Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches and
243
Undated and untitled memorandum apparently written shortly after Roosevelt
announced the Welles mission to Europe on February 9, 1940, “Roosevelt, F & E,”
Welles Mission: M-S, 1940, Box 155, Special Mission to Europe, 1940, Sumner Welles
Papers, FDRL. A message from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain confirmed
that the information reaching the president “from Germany corresponds with what has
been reaching His Majesty’s Government.” Chamberlain thought “it is not unreasonable
to suppose” that the initiatives coming out of Germany “were the policy of the German
Government.” Copy of Chamberlain message to Roosevelt, undated, “Roosevelt Jan-Apr
1940,” Box 150, Major Correspondents, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
385
Welles’ assessment of the German peace initiatives, Roosevelt jotted a note to emphasize
that there must be “no inconclusive or precarious peace.”244 Expecting Hitler’s regime to
collapse under popular pressure, the administration refused to negotiate with Hitler and
totally discounted the opposition to Hitler from within the German government.
In early February, Roosevelt decided to dispatch Welles to the capitals of Europe in
order to get a better appraisal of the situation. The Roosevelt administration’s hopes
seemed to have remained fixed on popular opposition to Hitler and on giving the Allies
more time to rearm. Roosevelt explained to Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge
Long his motivation for sending Welles. After the discussion, Long noted,
He figured it could not do any harm and it might do good. He

conceived the idea that the Germans might launch a spring offensive
about now. If Welles’ visit would delay that offensive or possibly
prevent it, it would be worth a great deal. If it prevented it
altogether, that would be fine. If it delayed it a month, that would be
so much. Even a week would mean a lot….245
While on his mission in Europe, Welles clearly remained indifferent to the opposition
against Hitler within the German government. Welles visited Berlin for three days and
met with members of the Nazi government to include Hitler, Rudolph Hess, Hermann
Goering, and Joachim von Ribbentrop. He also met with two men linked to the
opposition against Hitler, Ernst von Weizsäcker and Hjalmar Schacht, a minister without
portfolio in Hitler’s government. During his visit, Welles observed that all of the officials
of the German Foreign Office were “dressed in military uniform,” and he was struck by
244
Roosevelt’s handwritten note on White House letterhead, undated, “Roosevelt, F &
E,” Welles Mission: M-S, 1940, Box 155, Special Mission to Europe, 1940, Sumner
Welles papers, FDRL.
245
Entry for March 12, 1940, Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long:
Selections from the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press,
1966), p. 64.
386
the links that he saw there with Imperial Germany. Although Welles found von
Weizsäcker genuinely hoping for “a way by which an absolute holocaust could be
avoided,” he largely dismissed the State Secretary as “a typical example of the German
official of the old school of the nineteenth century.”246 Welles, furthermore, seemed
unconvinced after his session with Schacht. Schacht told Welles “that a movement was
underway, headed by leading generals, to supplant the Hitler régime.” Schacht, however,
was sure that Welles would understand why he “was unable to mention any names.”247
Schacht may have been silent about the identity of the opposition in Germany out of
secrecy, but Welles’ discussions that same day left him with the distinct impression that
there was another explanation. After meeting with the Belgian and Italian ambassadors in
Berlin, Welles noted “that the internal and army opposition to Hitler, which had assumed
some proportions in November 1939, has now completely died away.”248 A week later,
Welles told Chamberlain that during his stay in Germany he gained the impression that
“some of the leaders of Germany had so identified the fate of Germany with the fate of
the Nazi regime” that they now shared its convictions.249
The Roosevelts admired German author Thomas Mann, and that spring Mann also
offered some recommendations for dealing with Germany. Mann acknowledged “the
246
Welles Report, Berlin, March 1, 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940,
vol. 1, General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 34, 42-3.
247
vol. 1, General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 57.
248
vol. 1, General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 50.
249
Welles Report, London, March 11, 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1940, vol. 1, General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 76.
387
distinction between the German people and their destroyers” and characterized Hitler’s
regime as “a handful of perverted and bloody-minded men” possessing a “vile and
anachronistic spirit.” Mann advocated that the United States pursue a policy of patience
“until severe military defeats have shaken that power” and brought about a popular
revolt. He assessed that “any sort of definite peace is notoriously impossible” until the
German people rise up and “shake off their present rulers.”250
After the French defeat in 1940, the Roosevelt administration hoped to avoid
Wilson’s mistakes of 1918 and adopted the outlines of the national policy that would be
characterized as unconditional surrender. Because members of the Roosevelt
administration believed Germany overstretched and on the verge of internal collapse,
they anticipated a round of German peace overtures that would give the Nazis the
opportunity to consolidate their gains. The administration, however, soon moved to close
that avenue. In early July, Berle noted that the United States government would play no
future role in “transmitting German offers” of a negotiated peace or relaying peace
feelers to Britain.251 In addition to refusing to transmit German peace feelers, Sumner
Welles also thought that a coup by the leaders of the German army against Hitler would
not make much difference in the fundamental aims of German policy. He judged that
Hitler, like Kaiser Wilhelm II, was merely a figurehead. Welles believed “that German
policy during the past eighty years has been inspired and directed, not by the Chief of
State, but by the German General Staff.” Although he considered Hitler’s Nazi Party an
evil, criminal machine, he assessed that the German general staff had used the Nazi
250
Thomas Mann, This War, trans. Eric Sutton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), pp.
5, 54, 60-62, 66.
251
Entry for July 5, 1940, Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle Papers, FDRL.
388
machine for its own purposes, namely to renew its “attempt to dominate the world.”
Welles believed that the United States would make a grave mistake if it settled for any
negotiated German surrender that left the German general staff intact, even if Hitler were
deposed.252
The Roosevelt administration believed that German peace initiatives could not be
trusted. In August 1940, Knox had been adamant that the United States should not fear an
immediate German attack but rather “a great gesture of friendship” intended to calm
American fears and to paralyze United States defensive preparations. Opposed to any
negotiated peace, he proclaimed, “Any appeasement policy with Hitler would be only
playing into his hands.”253 Although not labeled “unconditional surrender,” Knox
announced in January 1941 that the president had “repudiated all thought of a peace
dictated by aggressors, sponsored by appeasers, and bought at the cost of other people’s
freedom.”254 Addressing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Knox characterized
proposals for “a stable negotiated peace between Great Britain and Germany” as “a wild
fancy.” He asserted, “A negotiated peace without victory can be effected only when a
military stalemate has existed for a long time, and under conditions where the belligerents
252
342.
253
Frank Knox statement on conscription, August 14, 1940, Speeches and Writings File,
Box 5, The Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
254
Frank Knox speech to the Canadian Society of New York, New York City, January
18, 1941, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, The Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
389
feel a reasonable degree of confidence that the peace terms will be faithfully
executed.”255
In February 1941, Roosevelt asked Berle to review Wilson’s speeches of 1917. In his
review of Wilson’s wartime speeches, Berle identified several key themes that he thought
particularly pertinent in 1941. Berle perceived the presence in 1941 of a resurgent enemy
that he characterized as “the military masters of Germany” and “the Prussian aristocracy”
who hoped to revitalize and achieve their “astounding dream of pan-Germanism.”
Although he believed that the United States had sincere friendship for the German
people, Berle assessed that the Prussian military autocracy had to be destroyed in the
Second World War in order to save liberal Germany and to keep the world at peace. For
Berle, Wilson’s speeches provided a compelling “argument against a negotiated peace”
with the military party of Germany, a group that did not reflect the will of the majority.
Berle also praised Wilson’s rejection of the August 1917 peace proposal of Pope
Benedict XV. Based on Wilson’s response, Berle recorded that the litmus test of every
peace proposal had to be, “Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely
upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on one hand, and of a group of
free peoples on the other?” Another lesson from Wilson became evident to Berle during
the review, namely the United States must “not be diverted from winning the war by
insincere approaches on the subject of peace.”256
255
Frank Knox statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, January 31, 1941, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, The Papers of Frank Knox,
LCMD.
256
Adolph Berle memorandum, February 18, 1941, the Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle
Papers, FDRL.
390
In March 1941, the reports of John Franklin Carter to Roosevelt reinforced the
president’s faith in a strategic framework for the unconditional defeat of Nazi Germany
by blockade, economic sanctions, moral suasion, and air attack. Carter provided further
rationale for the United States refusing to negotiate with Hitler or any military
government in Germany. According to Carter’s reports, “the German High Command has
given up the idea of winning the war” and intend to seize “all they can in Europe” and
then bargain for peace. Advocating a tighter blockade, Carter asserted that “we should
stop stuff getting into Germany,” target vulnerable oil and gasoline stocks, and “use food
as a weapon.” Carter informed Roosevelt that the Nazi system was “too strong for anti-
Nazi revolts at present” but thought that an Allied bombing campaign that lasted at most
two years would change that and “crack them.” Carter also relayed to Roosevelt that
because German morale had been built on Hitler’s successes, military defeat would also
bring about the popular collapse of the regime. He provided the president with the
assessment “that Germany would crack with a few military defeats—‘they haven’t the
guts to take it.’” Whether due to bombing or battlefield setback, Carter predicted “revolt
would come in the industrial areas, particularly the Rhineland,” coincidentally the same
areas that Roosevelt equated with the urban, liberal Germany of his youth.257
Content to wait for the people of Germany to overthrow both Hitler and the German
war machine, Roosevelt apparently chose not reply to German peace initiatives in 1941.
In September, Naval Intelligence informed Roosevelt that conservative German officers
257
John F. Carter, Memorandum on Conditions in Germany, March 6, 1941,
Memorandum of Conversation with V. C. Genn, General Motors Corporation Managing
Director, Switzerland, March 21, 1941, and Memorandum of Conversation with E. W.
Zdunek, General Motors Managing Director, Belgium, March 27, 1941, Box 97, “Carter,
John F.: Mar.-Oct. 1941,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
391
wanted “to discuss peace terms” with the president’s representative. Reportedly, the
German officers proposed that if the Allies agreed to “not seek dismemberment and
eternal ruination of Germany, the coup [against Hitler] might be attempted.”258 Roosevelt
took no action. Likewise, in October 1941, Leahy reported to the president that he had
expressed repeatedly “that America will not make any effort to bring about a negotiated
peace with Hitlerism.”259 Roosevelt affirmed Leahy’s stance and commented, “You were
quite right in expressing the opinion that this country will not join in any effort to bring
about a negotiated peace with Naziism.” The president added, “This attitude of ours
should be clear by now to all the world.”260
Amid new rumors of German peace initiatives in 1942, reports relayed by Carter to
Roosevelt argued that even in the event that Hitler’s regime collapsed that the forces of
German conservatism and militarism would continue to thrive. The assessment was that
the combination of “British bombings” and “the failure of the Nazi Russian campaign of
the past winter” produced “conditions in Germany similar in many respects to the 1918
position when the German army was massed for it[s] last desperate effort to break
through the existing Western Front.” Rather than setting the conditions for a liberal
regime to succeed Hitler, however, the prediction was that the failure of the German army
to achieve a strategic breakthrough against the Soviet Union would result “in a collapse
of the Hitler Regime with the almost immediate removal of Hitler, Georing[sic], Goebels,
258
Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence memorandum for Franklin D.
Roosevelt, September 26, 1941, Navy Department: 1934-Feb. 1942, Box 4, Safe File,
President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
259
William D. Leahy to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 15, 2003, Leahy Diary, The
260
Franklin D. Roosevelt to William D. Leahy, November 1, 1941, Leahy Diary, The
392
Himmler et al with the German Army generals taking over the Government reins.” Carter
also relayed the assessment that “Franz Von Papen is laying the ground-work for a return
to Germany” to “assume leadership” over the German Reich.261
Similarly, in December 1942 as Roosevelt prepared for his trip to Casablanca, it
seemed increasingly apparent that years of Nazi domination had eroded the ability of
German liberals to effectively resist Hitler’s regime or seize power in the event of regime
collapse. The fear was that the German army, rather than anything representative of the
German people, would constitute the government that followed Hitler’s demise. Carter
responded to a query from the president by affirming his belief “when the Hitler regime
begins to crumble, the Army will be the only remaining group in Germany with the will
and, above all, the weapons with which to remove the Nazis.”262
Having discounted the resurgence of a liberal German government in the wake of
Hitler’s regime collapsing, it seems evident that Roosevelt intended his announcement of
“unconditional surrender” as a message to those expected to seize power in Germany. He
wanted to ensure that in the event of a sudden collapse that the United States could act
quickly to guarantee that the German army could not consolidate its power. Amid
planning for the cross-channel attack, Roosevelt predicted that the collapse of Germany
would be sudden, and rather than fighting though the country he envisioned what he
termed a “railroad occupation.” General Marshall reflected that the shortage of railway
rolling stock would probably necessitate an advance by truck rather than train. Harry
261
John F. Carter, Report on Nazi Peace Rumors, June 3, 1942, and attachment, Box 98,
“Carter, John F.: June-July 1942,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
262
John F. Carter, Report on “Sedgwick’s” Answer to Your Question, December 1, 1942,
Box 98, “Carter, John F.: Aug.-Dec. 1942,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
393
Hopkins proposed retaining an airborne division on standby to seize Berlin within two
hours of the collapse of the Hitler regime.263 Robert Sherwood assessed that because
Roosevelt “was influenced by grim memories of the results of the Armistice of 1918,” he
did not believe that uprisings against Hitler such as the one in July 1944 would lead to the
achievement of total victory. In November 1943, he drafted a statement that explained
“that the unconditional surrender formula meant that the United Nations would never
negotiate an armistice with the Nazi Government, the German high command, or any
other organization or group or individual in Germany.”264 Roosevelt intended to broker
no deals that would allow the forces of reaction to retain power in postwar Germany.
VII. Roosevelt Implementing his Vision for Postwar France and Germany
During the Second World War, Roosevelt pondered the nature of the postwar world. It
seems evident that he still feared that another world war might produce the conditions
that would “drag civilization to a level from which world-wide recovery may be all but
impossible.”265 To prevent that and a corresponding resurgence of the forces of
conservatism and reaction, he hoped to establish a structure for international and great
263
Minutes of a Meeting Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff on Friday,
November 19, 1943, at 1500, “Minutes of Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1942-1945,” Conferences, Box 29, Map Room, FDRL.
264
265
Franklin D. Roosevelt address at the San Diego Exposition, October 2, 1935, San
Diego, California, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol.
3, September 1935-January 1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1969), p. 13.
394
power cooperation. In contrast to Wilson, he wanted to reach a wartime understanding
with allies during the war for a postwar international organization and for crucial political
and territorial issues, rather than save those for the peace conference.266 Recalling the
challenges that confronted Wilson, Roosevelt believed wartime unity provided the best
opportunity for the Allies to meet “the difficult task [that] came after the war when
diverse interests tended to divide the allies.”267 He also wanted the wartime alliance to
endure. He wrote, “But—above all things—we must continue in the peace the
cooperation among the United Nations which is the essential force in the winning of the
war.”268 In addition, Roosevelt sensed that the advance of civilization would require
more than just continued cooperation between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet
Union. Conscious of the impact of France and Germany on the international situation
after the Great War, Roosevelt sought the reemergence of republican France and a liberal
alternative to a Prussian -dominated German state.
Roosevelt conceived the United Nations as the centerpiece of a progressive and
peaceful postwar world. At Tehran in November 1943, Roosevelt sketched out the
structure he proposed for the United Nations Organization. The organization consisted of
the continued cooperation of the “4 Policemen,” an Executive Committee, and a general
assembly of the “40 United Nations” that also could carry on the humanitarian programs
266
64-7.
267
Tripartite Dinner Meeting, February 8, 1945, Yusupov Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and
Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 798.
268
Franklin D. Roosevelt notes on first draft, Annual Message on the State of the Union,
January 7, 1943, Master Speech File No. 1447, FDRL.
395
of the League of Nations.269 Unlike the League of Nations, he envisioned an organization
with the capability to enforce international disarmament and punish aggressors.
Following the pattern of Wilson’s League of Nations, the new organization would
contain a general assembly in which all nations had representation. He believed,
however, that the enforcement mechanism for the United Nations was the great powers
working in concert through an executive council. Certainly, the lessons of his past
provided a clear course for Roosevelt. Theodore Roosevelt had argued for cooperation
between the major powers to police the world. The deliberations of the executive council
during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference established an example of that great power
cooperation in action. As he acknowledged in 1944, Roosevelt’s ideas for a postwar
Society of Nations that he laid out in 1923 submission for the Bok Peace Award “was in
many aspects similar to the new plan for the United Nations.” 270
Germany and France figured prominently in Roosevelt’s conception of the future
world. Recalling the problems after the Great War that plagued France and Germany, he
believed that the resurgence of the forces of reaction in either or both of those countries
could be detrimental to the advance of civilization. During his first term in office, he had
assessed that serious threats to civilization grew out of continued national jealousies,
increased armaments, and aggressive ambitions that disturb the peace. For instance at an
address in Arlington National Cemetery on Armistice Day in 1935, he expressed his
269
and Brothers, 1950), pp. 789-90.
270
396
conviction that he and his generation had a “sacred obligation” to pass on the memory
and lessons of the Great War. In addition to the horrors of the front lines, Roosevelt
consistently credited war with ushering in a period of reaction detrimental to the reform
impulse. He asserted his progressive belief “that elation and prosperity which may come
from a new war must lead – for those who survive it – to economic and social collapse
more sweeping than any we have experienced in the past.”271
As a result, it seems clear that Roosevelt worked to influence the nature of the French
and German states that would emerge at the end of the Second World War. What
Roosevelt outlined for the future was entirely consistent with his worldview. Since the
French defeat in 1940, he hoped for the reemergence of what he considered the true
France under a republican and anti-clerical government that no longer aspired to be a
colonial power. Under those conditions, Roosevelt believed that France would eventually
rejoin the ranks of the great powers. Roosevelt also sought to resolve what he saw as a
fundamental, enduring tension in Germany and minimize the powerful influences of
Prussian militarism and Junker conservatism in favor of German liberalism.
Roosevelt followed a course crafted to restore republican France to the ranks of the
democratic powers. During the six-week Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in the autumn
of 1944, representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, the
Big Four, drafted a tentative charter for the new United Nations and proposed that France
become the fifth sponsoring power. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius conveyed to
Roosevelt in early 1945, “It is in the interests of the United States to assist France to
271
Franklin D. Roosevelt address, November 11, 1935, Amphitheater, Arlington
National Cemetery, Virginia, Master Speech File No. 815, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech
Files, FDRL.
397
regain her former position in world affairs in order that she may increase her contribution
in the war effort and play an appropriate part in the maintenance of peace.” Although
recognizing the complex challenges with such a course, Stettinius urged the president that
in the long run the United States would “undoubtedly gain more by making concessions
to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and
influence, than we will by treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.”
The Secretary of State believed that inclusion of France might “help create a cooperative
spirit among the French” and would “probably prove popular with the other small
countries of Europe who profess to fear the results of a peace imposed by non-European
powers.” Believing that “a considerable portion” of United States troops would be
withdrawn from Germany “after the early period of occupation,” he thought the inclusion
of France would facilitate their replacement by French troops.272 During discussions with
the British at Malta prior to the Yalta Conference, the United States agreed “that France
should be a fifth sponsoring power” of the United Nations.273 Also in January 1945,
Roosevelt agreed in principle that the instrument of German surrender should also be
prepared in a French text, equally authentic as the English and Russian texts, with French
participating in signing the German surrender. He also consented to French participation
in the Allied authority over postwar Germany and a French zone of occupation.274
272
Edward R. Stettinius to Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 4, 1945, in Foreign Relations
of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945
273
“Items Still Open Before Conference Can Be Called,” February 8, 1945, in Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta,
1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 794.
274
H. Freeman Matthews to Edward R. Stettinius, January 19, 1945, in Foreign Relations
of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945
398
Roosevelt believed that it might take time for “a stable French central government” to
be established.275 Roosevelt apparently thought that assisting governmental transition and
supporting the reemergence of the true France would required the subordination of de
Gaulle’s political motives to civilian leadership. Rather than military, Roosevelt reasoned
that de Gaulle harbored larger political ambitions. In November 1943 amid planning for a
cross-Channel attack, Roosevelt predicated that de Gaulle “will be right behind the army
when there is a penetration into France” so that there can be an immediate “take over by
his faction as rapidly as the army advances.”276 Roosevelt hoped to preclude that from
happening in liberated France.
He insisted that support from the United States to the Free French not result in de
Gaulle becoming the de facto ruler of a liberated France. With the lessons from his
history classes at Harvard under Silas Macvane to guide him, Roosevelt demanded that
the United States not take any actions that might in some way undermine the ability of
the French people to choose their own leaders after liberation. In late 1943, Roosevelt
judged that the real sentiment in France was “that the people of France did not want de
Gaulle.”277 While supporting the Free French as a provisional government, he remained
resolute that de Gaulle should not receive formal diplomatic recognition because he had
275
Robert Murphy memorandum of conversation with Franklin D. Roosevelt, September
9, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Quebec, 1944
276
Minutes of Meeting Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff, held on board ship
in the President’s Cabin, on Monday, 15 November, 1943, at 1400, “Minutes of Meetings
of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1945,” Conferences, Box 29, Map Room, FDRL.
277
Entry for December 17, 1943, in Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary
of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, edited by John Morton Blum (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 282.
399
“no direct authority from the people.”278 Because Roosevelt believed that “Self-
determination means an absence of coercion,” he wanted to ensure that the Allied armies
liberating France did not impose de Gaulle on an unwilling French population.279 To
those ends, de Gaulle was excluded from the invasion of Normandy. As Allied armies
prepared to liberate Paris in August 1944 and de Gaulle arranged to fly to France,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander in the European theater,
simply proposed “to receive him as the commander of the French Army” rather than as a
head of state.280 At the local level in France, Eleanor Roosevelt noted in late August that
beyond all expectations “the French seem quite able to undertake their own civilian
government.”281
Nonetheless, her husband only seriously considered designating de Gaulle as the de
facto head of what constituted “the Provisional Government of France” in September
1944 after three conditions were met. The first was that France largely was liberated. The
second was the indication “that the resistance groups and others in France have no
intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de
Gaulle.” Third was the requirement that de Gaulle bring into his organization members of
278
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, September 19, 1943, F.D.R.: His Personal
279
George M. Elsey, “President Roosevelt’s Policy Towards De Gaulle,” June 21, 1945,
folder 20 “General de Gaulle,” Box 5, Admiral Leahy 1942-1948, Chairman’s File,
Record Group 218 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
280
Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1944, in Dwight
D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, vol. 4, The War Years, edited by
Alfred D. Chandler, et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 2069-70.
281
Entry for August 26, 1944, in [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt’s My
Pharos Books, 1989), pp. 353-4.
400
the resistance in Metropolitan France and civilian leaders such as Jules Jeanneney, the
last president of the French Senate. Secretary of State Hull informed Roosevelt, “Of
course, the word ‘provisional’ would not be dropped until after general elections are held
in France.”282 Roosevelt, however, agreed with advisor Harry Hopkins who supported
diplomatic recognition of the provisional government only after “the French set up a real
zone of the interior” and effectively enlarged the Consultative Assembly to make it more
representative. Because the second condition would strengthen parliamentary democracy
in France, Roosevelt noted, “I would not be satisfied with de Gaulle merely saying that
he was going to do it.”283 Although sure that de Gaulle would continue to “make all the
mischief he can,” Churchill subsequently informed Roosevelt, “De Gaulle is no longer
sole master, but is better harnessed than ever before.”284 On October 23, 1944, after
Eisenhower declared a large zone of interior for France, Roosevelt extended diplomatic
recognition to the provisional government.285
Another issue for Roosevelt was the French desire to extend the French frontier to the
Rhine or establish an independent Rhennish state aligned with France. It is likely that
Roosevelt viewed French designs on the Rhineland as a manifestation of the monarchical
282
Cordell Hull memorandum for Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 17, 1944, in Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
283
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, October 19, 1944 in Warren F. Kimball,
Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, vol. 3, Alliance Declining
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 352-3.
284
Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 22, 1944 in Warren F. Kimball,
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp 363-5.
285
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, October 23, 1944 in Warren F. Kimball,
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 367.
401
and Bonapartist influences that had motivated French generals after the Great War. In his
visit to Moscow in December 1944, de Gaulle had raised the question to Soviet Premier
Josef Stalin of the expansion of the French frontier to the Rhine.286 Although it had
received no official indication from France that it intended to annex portions of Germany
up to the Rhine, the State Department assessed that “long standing French ambitions in
this area may lead to more or less open efforts to favor separatism, as was done in 1919.”
The State Department, however, informed Roosevelt, “General de Gaulle is known to
desire that France remain permanently on the Rhine.”287
For Roosevelt it was imperative that the postwar situation limit conditions for
conservative French générals and the French Right to exploit as had happened
immediately after the Great War. In January 1945, as the defeat of Germany seemed in
sight, Roosevelt personally approved carving out a sector for French forces in the
occupation of Germany and arming eight additional French divisions.288 Roosevelt told
Soviet Premier Josef Stalin that his actions “were only out of kindness” for France.
Clearly, Roosevelt’s actions served two basic goals. First, the designation of a limited
French sector under a larger Allied occupation effort would thwart de Gaulle’s apparent
286
Josef Stalin telegram to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 3, 1944, in Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta,
1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 288-9.
287
Briefing Book Paper: France, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic
Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1955), pp. 300-9.
288
The German counterattack in the Ardennes in December 1944 probably added impetus
to the proposal to arm more French divisions. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston
Churchill, January 8, 1945 in Warren F. Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete
Correspondence, vol. 3, Alliance Declining (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1984), p. 501; H. Freeman Matthews to Edward R. Stettinius, January 19, 1945, in
Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 297-8.
402
desire to annex German territory up to the Rhine, which he had told Soviet Premier Josef
Stalin “was the natural boundary of France,” and permanently station French soldiers
there. Second, Roosevelt apparently thought eight new French divisions “composed of
Frenchmen who had had previous military training” could form the nucleus of a future
French army fully integrated into the Allied coalition and serving coalition aims in
occupied Germany.289
The Roosevelt administration also believed that rearming additional French divisions
and providing them with an occupation sector in Germany help preserve peace and
prevent German domination by the forces of reaction. Recognizing it likely that the
United States would begin bringing troops home soon after the collapse of Germany,
Churchill informed Roosevelt that without the assistance of a French postwar army it
would not be possible to “hold down western Germany.” Recalling the failures of the
interwar period, Churchill noted that without the assistance of the French army after the
current war “All would therefore rapidly disintegrate as it did last time.”290 Stimson
argued that keeping the French focused on the common enemy, Germany, “will keep the
French factions together” and reduce the likelihood of the revolution in France that
Roosevelt apprehensively predicted.291
289
Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 4, 1945, Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in
290
Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 19, 1944 in Warren F.
Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, vol. 3, Alliance
Declining (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 398-9.
291
403
Roosevelt also sought to contain the colonial impulse that he believed had subverted
the true France. Reflecting his perspective of the archaic and artificial nature of French
colonialism, he believed that all French colonies should not revert to French control
automatically after the war. In 1943, he pointed out that there were several places “which
should definitely not go back to France.” Those were Indochina, New Caledonia, the
Marquesas, and Dakar. He argued that, at the very most, the French might be able to keep
civil administration in New Caledonia and Dakar but no armaments or fortifications.
Expanding the Monroe Doctrine to the African coast, Roosevelt stated that he viewed
“Dakar as a continental outpost for the Americas which would start on the Coast of West
Africa.” Concerning Morocco, he assessed, “It was definitely the objective of the French
to keep the Arabs down and not permit them to become educated.” Pointing out that the
Sultan did not want to remain under French rule, Roosevelt suggested the United States
could assist in the tutelage of Moroccan engineers, doctors, and professionals.292 At
Yalta, he urged that Indochina should become an international trusteeship. Concerning
the people of Indochina, Roosevelt assessed, “France had done nothing to improve the
natives since she had the colony.” He expressed concern that de Gaulle seemed intent
upon restoring French military control over the Indochinese.293
Roosevelt’s aspirations for the reemergence of liberal Germany after the war were a
direct result of his earlier experiences and views. For Roosevelt, German aggression was
292
Minutes of a Meeting Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff held on board
ship in the President’s Cabin, on Monday, November 15, 1943, at 1400, “Minutes of
Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1945,” Conferences, Box 29, Map
Room, FDRL.
293
404
not the result of German unification but of the influence of Prussian militarism. He
thought deeply, however, about how to reverse the effects of decades of Prussian
influence on the German people. Guiding his actions were his worldview and the
mistakes that he believed Wilson had made. As a result, Roosevelt pursued a policy that
would “rule out any compromise with Nazism, bargaining over terms, or cries of
deception from the Germans after the war.”294
By early 1943, Roosevelt had decided that the partition of Germany probably provided
the best opportunity for German liberalism to reemerge. Rather than “use the methods
discussed at Versailles” by the French to arbitrarily divide Germany, Roosevelt hoped
that the “differences and ambitions” of the German people could generate “a division
which represents German public opinion.” According to Hopkins, if that consensus did
not emerge, Roosevelt was still committed to dividing Germany into several states, one
of which had to be Prussia. Hopkins noted the president’s determination, “The Prussians
cannot be permitted to dominate all Germany.”295
By the time of the Tehran in November 1943, Roosevelt suggested that Germany could
logically be broken up into three or more German states after the war. He envisioned a
southern state south of the Rhine, to include Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, that “was
largely Roman Catholic.” The territory north and west of that southern state, to include
Hamburg, Hannover, and possibly Berlin, would form a northwestern or Protestant state.
Prussia and Pomerania in eastern Germany would form a third state, of which Roosevelt
294
W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946
(New York: Random House, 1975), p. 190.
295
405
commented “it might be said that the religion of the northeastern part is Prussianism.”
Based on planning for the cross-channel attack and the need to prevent any crossing of
lines of communication, the British proposed that the United States occupy the southern
state. Roosevelt commented that he “did not like it” and preferred the Protestant and
urban northwestern state.296 British silence and delay and the advanced state of detailed
planning for the Normandy invasion eventually forced Roosevelt to acquiesce to the
southern zone.
Roosevelt continued to think about the partition Germany for the remainder of his life.
He also considered the international control of “the old Hanseatic League German free
ports” and of the Saar and the Ruhr, whose resources he told Henry Wallace “served as a
source of power for the industrialists” responsible “from time to time for precipitating
international conflict.”297 The remainder of Germany, he proposed dividing up into five
small countries. He described those states as a reduced Prussia, Hannover, Saxony,
Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel, and Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.298 It is worth
noting that, in addition to a Catholic southern state and a diminished Prussia, Roosevelt
selected Saxony and Hannover, where his mother had lived as a child, and Hessen.
Hessen contained the cities of Frankfurt and also Bad Nauheim where he spent his
summers as a boy. Given the nostalgia associated with those three states and his own
296
297
Entry for December 18, 1943, in Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of
Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, edited by John Morton Blum (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1973), p. 284.
298
406
interest in history, Roosevelt may have recalled the opposition of all three to Prussia
during the Austro-Prussian War and the anti-Prussian and independent attitudes that
persisted following German unification.
Recalling the centralization in Berlin of governmental activities during his youth,
Roosevelt rejected a federal system because he thought Prussian influences could exploit
and dominate the other German states politically or economically as it had over “the last
twenty years.” At Yalta inFebruary 1945, he commented at Yalta that he still thought
“dismemberment of Germany” the proper course. Roosevelt recalled how “forty years
ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not really been known
then” and communities “dealt with the provincial government” rather than Berlin.299
Unlike Wilson’s public announcement of his Fourteen Points and the ensuing political
debates, Roosevelt “thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of
the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many as there had been
German stated in the past.” When Churchill argued that publicly announcing any
potential dismemberment of Germany would make the Germans fight harder, Roosevelt
observed, “My own feeling is that the people have suffered so much that they are now
beyond questions of psychological warfare.” Rather than embolden German resistance,
Roosevelt intended to announce dismemberment plans only after “unconditional
surrender.”300
299
Second Plenary Meeting, February 5, 1945, Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in
300
Second Plenary Meeting, February 5, 1945, Livadia Palace, Matthews Minutes, in
407
To complement dismemberment of Germany, Roosevelt envisioned other actions to
break the power of the forces of reaction and prevent their resurgence. His approach was
consistent with his appreciation of the forces of reaction in Germany: Prussian Junkers,
industrialists, Nazis, and militarists. To lessen the power of Prussian conservatives, East
Prussia would be transferred to Poland and the great estates of the Junkers broken up.
Rather than a “complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr
and Saar,” Roosevelt wanted German industry to continue in those areas but under the
aegis of the international community to prevent clandestine rearmament. In addition to
international control of the Ruhr and Saar, Roosevelt envisioned curbing industrialists by
dismantling steel, electrical, and metallurgical industries and banning the manufacture of
arms, all types of aircraft, and “everything that goes into an aircraft.” The net result of
limitations on industrialists would be to provide greater opportunity for small
businessmen in Germany, an objective that Roosevelt had supported as early as 1927.
The Nazis would be tried and also excluded from public office; Hopkins suggested to
Roosevelt that the Gestapo and Nazi Party members could be sent to the Soviet Union to
serve as forced labor. To diminish the power of militarism, Roosevelt wanted to abolish
the German general staff and, as with the Nazis, ban Army officers from politics.301
Struck by the destruction in Crimea in early 1945, Roosevelt told Stalin that he had
become much “more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago,”
301
Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorandum to the Secretary of State, September 29 and
October 20, 1944; Cordell Hull memorandum for Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 29,
1944; Second Plenary Meeting, February 5, 1945, Livadia Palace; and Harry Hopkins
note to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 5, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 155-8, 620, and 634.
408
Roosevelt told Stalin that he hoped he would repeat the earlier toast that he proposed “to
the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.”302
In addition to exclusion of army officers, Roosevelt believed that it might take a
substantial period of time to counter the effects of militarism on the German people.
Roosevelt declared “when Hitler and the Nazis go out, the Prussian military clique must
go with them. The war breeding gang of militarists must be rooted out of Germany – and
out of Japan – if we are to have any real assurance of future peace.”303 He believed
extensive controls should be maintained over communications systems, the German
press, and educational system.304 Recalling his boyhood in Germany when “school
children were not in uniform, [and] did not march all the time,” Roosevelt advocated
education reforms to eliminate school uniforms and children being “taught to march.” In
such a way, he thought the German people could reverse fifty years of gradual
militarization. One of the key concerns in Roosevelt’s thinking was that after the war the
German people had to acknowledge that they had been beaten if they were to reject the
forces of reaction and begin the process of moving “in a non-militaristic method.”305 The
total occupation of Germany was one way he intended to make the reality of defeat clear
302
303
Franklin D. Roosevelt message to Congress, September 17, 1943, in The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943: The Tide Turns, edited by Samuel
I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), p. 391.
304
Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorandum to the Secretary of State, October 20, 1944, in
305
Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential press conference number 992, February 23, 1945,
Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 25, 1944-1945
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 63-4.
409
to the German people. Earlier in the war, during an hour visiting with General Pershing,
Roosevelt recalled his 1919 visit to the American sector in Germany and the incident
involving the American flag flying over Ehrenbreitstein. The president recognized the
need during the occupation for the German people to have a constant and visible
reminder “until the last American soldier was out.”306 Rather than just occupying a strip
of Germany up to the Rhine, Roosevelt advocated total occupation by a substantial force
in the American sector alone. As early as 1943, Roosevelt told the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that he “personally envisioned an occupational force of about one million United States
troops.”307 Furthermore, while Roosevelt intended that the German people not starve or
Germany become an agrarian state, he wanted to ensure that the postwar standard of
living in Germany was not higher than that in the Soviet Union as a constant reminder to
them of their situation.308
306
Franklin D. Roosevelt memorandum, May 23, 1942, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters,
vol. 2, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 1323-5.
307
308
Memorandum by Lord Cherwell, September 14, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 343-4.
410
Chapter 6: Insights and Conclusions
…certain events of truly great significance to the future of civilization

took place….In all countries a growing protest over the abuses of the
churchly power….the imagination of thousands in Europe was on fire….
at least a handful of people were thinking in larger terms than ever before.
Franklin D. Roosevelt draft “history of the
United States,” 19241
On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed away. His son Elliott
assessed that his father had been a “force for progress” but that with his father’s death
“the modern world lost its most influential and persuasive advocate.”2
Although Roosevelt also did not live to witness the surrender of Nazi Germany, by the
time of his death victory in Europe was in sight. In Europe, Roosevelt’s strategic vision
and worldview ensured that the United States emerged from the Second World War as
the victor. With the Nazi war machine destroyed, Adolph Hitler committed suicide later
that month. At the same time, the Allies had a blueprint in place for how to prevent the
resurgence of German militarism in the postwar period. Despite the political challenges,
republican France seemed poised to rejoin the ranks of the major powers. Less than two
weeks after Roosevelt’s death the San Francisco Conference opened, a forum intended to
turn the Dumbarton Oaks draft into the charter for the United Nations Organization. Of
the visions of the future held by leaders during the Second World War, the course of
1
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s draft “history of the United States,” 1924, in Elliott Roosevelt,
ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1948), p. 548.
2
Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 248.
411
events during the 20th century has demonstrated Roosevelt’s worldview to be the most
enduring.
I.
As president, Franklin D. Roosevelt operated from a durable and coherent perspective
and historical consciousness that had developed fully by the mid 1920s. His worldview
coalesced in the 1920s as he attempted to make sense of three fundamental crises that
shook his world at all levels. On the international level was what Roosevelt saw as the
failure of the Paris Peace Conference and the corresponding rise of the forces of reaction
both in Europe and in the United States. On the domestic scene was the repudiation of the
Treaty of Versailles and Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations by the U.S. Senate. On
the personal level, polio compounded the sting of Roosevelt’s defeat in the election of
1920.
Rather than alter or remold Roosevelt’s character, polio provided Roosevelt with a
dedicated opportunity for reading and reflection insulated from the constant demands of
public life or political office. He capitalized on that opportunity and sought to understand
better his world, beginning to draft a history of western civilization. He also developed a
proposal for a Society of Nations that had the ability to dissuade or defeat aggressor
states and preserve or restore international peace while avoiding the horrors of another
Western Front. The premises, perspectives, and opinions that Roosevelt reaffirmed in the
1920s derived axiomatically from his experiences, studies, and background.
412
Identification of the emergence and development of Roosevelt’s worldview
necessitates a reinterpretation of his early life, education, and family. In general, scholars
have not appreciated the influence of those aspects on Roosevelt’s thinking. Detailed
study of those aspects allows fresh insights into Roosevelt’s decisions as president and a
deeper understanding of the outlook, attitudes, and perceptions from which he operated.
What emerges is a portrait of Roosevelt that is different than the popular image.
Reassessment of Roosevelt’s early life reveals him to have been a much more serious
student than typically acknowledged. Rather than a poor student, Roosevelt was curious
and engaged; he read avidly, was a skilled debater, and possessed a flair for languages.
From a young age, he displayed a fascination for reading and interest in history, political
events, and naval affairs. He eagerly anticipated the arrival of Scientific American,
followed the Dreyfus Affair, read the works of Victor Hugo, and pored over the histories
of Francis Parkman, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and kinsmen James Russell Soley and
Theodore Roosevelt. Imbued with a sense of history reinforced by his own experiences
and his family’s station in society, while at Harvard he tried his hand at writing his own
history and placed himself and his ancestors within a Whig framework that emphasized
the steady contributions of his kinsmen to the advance of civilization since the days of
Charlemange. As his senior thesis on the role of his family attests, Roosevelt had a deep
appreciation for practical history that enabled him to understand better the world, an
approach consistent with the advocacy of progressive historians such as Frederick
Jackson Turner.
Secure in his position as a patrician and Hudson Valley gentleman, Roosevelt’s
historical consciousness gave him incredible confidence. As a student, his primary
413
interest was not in attaining particular grades or degrees but with understanding his
world. Beyond fleeting personal satisfaction, grades and academic achievements did not
factor prominently in Roosevelt’s genteel world. He demonstrated above-average
potential at Groton in history and languages, excelling in Latin, French, and German. He
received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard in only three years but elected to remain at
Harvard for a fourth year as a graduate student, not to attain a degree but to take history
and economics classes that interested him and to edit the Crimson. It is inconceivable that
the position of Crimson editor would have been entrusted to a poor student.
Roosevelt’s reading and studies complemented his experiences in the Wilson
administration and honed his ability to think strategically. In the White House, Roosevelt
demonstrated substantial strategic skills that complemented his more commonly
acclaimed political acumen. Veteran Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson observed that
Roosevelt possessed “sound strategic instincts.” Stimson, however, believed that because
Roosevelt had such exceptional instincts that he had a tendency to operate from intuition
and had a “weakness for snap decisions.”3 Roosevelt remained an intuitive, visceral
statesman and decision-maker who did not question his fundamental assumptions.
II.
Reassessment of Roosevelt’s thinking allows a reinterpretation of his actions and
motives prior to United States entry into the European War. Rather than being either an
isolationist or an interventionist, it becomes evident that Roosevelt embodied both of

3
414
those impulses into a coherent approach. He sought to influence events in Europe and
bring about the demise of Hitler’s regime without resorting to formal belligerency on the
part of the United States or the need to dispatch another AEF to fight on the continent of
Europe.
Those impulses persisted in his strategy after the United States entered the war in
December 1941, and Roosevelt pursued the defeat of Nazi Germany through a peripheral
strategy that rested on concerted Allied application of blockade, sanctions, and air power
and was intended to avoid German strength. Looking for the battlefield setback that
would trigger a German collapse as had happened in the autumn of 1918, Roosevelt
supported Allied expeditions on the periphery, initially in North Africa and subsequently
in Sicily. With the staggering cost of the Western Front in his consciousness, he
consistently sought to eliminate German militarism but at the least possible human cost to
the United States.
Roosevelt’s worldview, however, had fundamental implications for how the United
States waged World War II and the course the war took. Because of Roosevelt’s strategic
approach, the United States faced major wartime challenges. Although initially intended
to be of relatively short duration until Germany collapsed, the blockade lasted for several
more years, intensifying suffering on the continent of Europe. The persistence of Hitler’s
government also meant that the humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade deepened
across Europe as the war continued, significantly beyond the six months to a year that
many in the Roosevelt administration anticipated. Far from overstretched and on the
verge of collapse, the German economy did not mobilize fully until 1942.4 The
4
Faced with a new war in early 1942, Hitler directed vast changes to Nazi economic
policy and increases in the size of the German army. With Hitler’s approval, between
415
combination of aid to the Allies and a strategy of hemispheric defense for the U.S. Army
guaranteed that no combat ready AEF was ready and possessed the capability to directly
attack German power. Consequently, when Anglo-American victories in North Africa
and Sicily were insufficient to cause the elusive crack up of Germany, the United States
had to resort to dispatching another AEF to fight on the continent of Europe.
Meanwhile, unfettered by any direct attack, Hitler moved Germany to a wartime
footing, fortified the Atlantic defenses, and launched his “final solution” to exterminate
the peoples he considered inferior. In addition, while Roosevelt’s policy of
“unconditional surrender” may have prolonged the war and bolstered the fighting spirit of
the German people as critics argued at the time, it undercut the resistance against Hitler
inside the German army and foreign office, leaving resistance members with little
prospect for ultimate success even in the event their attempts on Hitler’s life succeeded.
Although Roosevelt wanted to avoid the error of the Great War and refused to condone
January and May, Armaments Minister Fritz Todt and his successor Albert Speer
introduced centralized control measures and increased the proportion of the German
gross national product dedicated to military output. In February, Hitler ordered full
wartime mobilization of Germany industry. Prior to that, the German economy had
produced both guns and butter, armaments and consumer products, due to Hitler’s
insistence that military production should not lower the standard of living for the German
people or limit the output of consumer goods. During the first two years of the war, Hitler
had allowed Germany to avoid the strain of total war with an economy that was semi-
mobilized. Gordon Craig, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1968), pp. 45-7, 61-5. During a meeting with Armaments Minister Albert Speer on
February 19, Hitler directed that “peace-time planning and developments in all firms be
stopped immediately.” Hitler emphasized “that there will be time for this after the war”
but threatened “heavy penalties” against industrialists who in any “way attempt, in the
organization of their factories, to take account of peace-time purposes at this stage.”
Record of Albert Speer’s discussion with Hitler, February 19, 1942, 192/405459,
National Archives Microcopy No. T-73, Record for the Reich Ministry for Armaments
and War Production (Reichministerium fur Rustung und Kriegsproduktion), Record
Group 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, National Archives.
In 1941, German armaments production accounted for only 16 percent of German
industrial production, rising to 22 percent in 1942, 31 percent in 1943, and 40 percent in
1944. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), p. 211.
416
any negotiated peace, the cold shoulder that his administration gave the members of the
German resistance against Hitler seems particularly tragic and unsettling.
Roosevelt’s unwavering self-confidence clearly contributed to his inability to
reexamine his assumptions, perceptions, and attitudes. Although the demands of
Depression-era and wartime leadership gave Roosevelt little opportunity for introspection
as president, he showed little inclination to do so. Rather than alter his perspective or
question his opinions, he tended to gloss over any reports or circumstances that
contradicted his worldview. For instance, although the absence of a popular revolt in
Germany against Hitler seemed to present a quandary for Roosevelt’s nostalgic image, he
did not question his conception of a liberal Volk in Germany. He could not imagine the
Nazi regime enjoying enthusiastic popular support. Roosevelt, instead, persisted in his
anticipation of the popular collapse of Hitler’s regime well into the Second World War.
Because he operated from a historical consciousness that equated individuals and
groups in the present with others in the past, Roosevelt never fully grasped or understood
the forces at work in 20th century Europe. Tragically, during the late 1930s and
throughout the Second World War Roosevelt’s perspective of National Socialism was
flawed and incorrect. Presuming that nothing was really new, he did not distinguish
between Hitler’s fascist National Socialist regime and Kaiser Wilhelm’s government
during the Great War, believing them both under the control of Prussian conservatism
and militarism: major industrialists, the Junkertum, and the German general staff.
Consequently, Roosevelt chose to ignore appeals from the courageous opposition against
Hitler in the German army and foreign office, having equated them with Hitler or his
aims.
417
Roosevelt’s dealings with French générals suffered from a similar disposition to regard
them as manifestations of the forces of reaction not representative of the true France. By
equating conditions in Europe in 1940 with those in 1918, Roosevelt was unable to
appreciate the situation in France in May and June 1940. Despite the lack of any tangible
United States assistance during the Battle of France, Roosevelt believed that rhetoric
could keep the French in the war. Because he envisioned in June 1940 that the German
collapse was a matter of weeks away, Roosevelt perceived the armistice ending the Battle
of France as the work of German subversion abetted by French reactionaries.
Roosevelt’s anticipation of an imminent German collapse contributed to his visceral
rejection of Maréchal Philippe Pétain’s government and his treatment of France as an
enemy even before the end of the Third Republic and the establishment of the French
State. The creation of the authoritarian French State in Vichy merely served to confirm
Roosevelt’s views, he equated the traditionalist and authoritarian Vichy state with the
fascism in Nazi Germany.5 Administration distrust of Vichy and French générals
precluded any serious consideration of landings in southern France in late 1942 and
hampered efforts to enlist French forces in North Africa, assistance that might have
forestalled the German seizure of Tunisia. Meanwhile, Roosevelt’s distrust of de Gaulle
and desire to supplant him left an enduring cloud over Franco-American relations.
Relations between the Roosevelt administration and Charles de Gaulle’s Free French
organization suffered because of Roosevelt’s Dreyfusard suspicions of the général. De
Gaulle’s apparent desire to preserve the French colonial empire, as evidenced by his
5
Robert O. Paxton assesses that the French State that replaced the parliamentary Third
Republic in 1940 was “certainly not fascist.” Paxton notes that only in the final days of
the war did some pre-war French fascists find positions in the Vichy government. Robert
O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 112-3, 218.
418
efforts in the French colonies in central Africa, the Middle East, Dakar, and Indochina,
his patronage from the French Right, and his apparent political ambition certainly
reinforced Roosevelt’s predisposition to see de Gaulle as a manifestation of the forces of
reaction in France. Having rejected de Gaulle, Roosevelt entertained thoughts of enticing
more acceptable French générals back into the war on the side of the Allies in North
Africa with the hope of restoring the Allied coalition that had proven victorious on the
Western Front in 1918.
In the United States, furthermore, Roosevelt did not think the American people would
be able to grasp the nuances of his strategic course. Cautious about not getting ahead of
public opinion, he consciously neglected to educate or fully inform the public what he
was attempting to do with respect to the European War. Outside of his immediate circle
of advisors, Roosevelt made no dedicated effort to share his strategy for bringing the
worldview contained in his Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter to fruition.
Consequently, United States entry into the war in December 1941 fueled the voice of
Roosevelt’s critics unable to reconcile the president’s words with his actions, criticism
that continues to influence popular views of United States entry into the Second World
War. Although Roosevelt’s strategic concept remained consistent and he explained his
goals in private, he made no concerted effort to share his blueprint with the American
public. After laying out his concept to the Senate Military Affairs Committee in January
1939, he cautioned his audience against making any public statements, believing that “the
country would not understand” the strategy and how it might achieve his seemingly
419
contradictory goals.6 Roosevelt resisted prodding to come out publicly, such as the appeal
by his old Harvard professor Roger B. Merriman “to give this poor propaganda
bewildered people a lead.”7
In the balance, nonetheless, it is clear that Roosevelt and his worldview provided
consistently focused and enduring strategic direction for the United States in a victorious
global war against Adolph Hitler’s designs. Although weary upon his return from Yalta,
Roosevelt proudly proclaimed to his wife, “It’s been a global war, and we’ve already
started making it a global peace.”8 Throughout his tenure in the White House, Roosevelt
operated from a coherent worldview and a corresponding drive to be an agent of
progressive reform. He patterned his actions on Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson and
strove not to repeat the mistakes that Wilson, in particular, had made. Even though he
deferred many political decisions and details about the future to the postwar peace
conference, his desire to reach wartime agreement between the great powers on major
questions arguably prevented the reoccurrence of some of the problems that had
undermined Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to craft an enduring peace. At the same time,
Roosevelt established a powerful legacy for the postwar world, the foundation of
enduring security in Western Europe, and a mechanism for international cooperation.
6
7
Roger B. Merriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 6, 1941, “MERRIMAN, ROGER
B.,” PPF 962, President’s Personal File, FDRL.
8
Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 246.
420
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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE WORLDVIEW OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:

Michael S. Bell, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004

Dissertation directed by: Professor Keith W. Olson

President Franklin D. Roosevelt operated from a remarkably consistent view of

experiences, and his exposure to contemporary ideas, Roosevelt’s worldview fully

Roosevelt’s thinking as president and his strategic direction in response to the

advance of world civilization. His background and personal experiences, understanding

democracy. He believed that he was an agent of progress.

of his thinking. As wartime leader, he remained focused on his fundamental strategic

continued cooperation between the great powers, the reestablishment of republican

France, and the revitalization of German liberalism.

AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the

Professor Keith W. Olson, Chair

assumptions underpinning strategic direction and decision-making as the United States

transitions from peace to war.

as a member of the Department of History at West Point. With the assistance of a

Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York and at other repositories.

Library, especially Raymond Teichman, Robert Parks, Mark Renovitch, Nancy

historian of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided critical analyses and

As always, my greatest acknowledgement is to my wife, Terri, and our wonderful

follows is a testament to their love, inspiration, and encouragement.

Chapter 2: The Development of Roosevelt’s Worldview, 1882-1913 11

Chapter 3: Great War and the Confirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1913-1918

Chapter 4: Affirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1919-1928 219

Chapter 6: Insights and Conclusions 411

He has an amazingly retentive memory and constantly floors his family

Before he entered the White House, Franklin D. Roosevelt already possessed a

decisions as president.2 That worldview shaped how he understood and responded to

perspective. As he matured during the progressive era, his formal education

events affirmed his progressive perspective. His tenure in Woodrow Wilson’s

administration as assistant secretary of the navy proved to be a formative experience

background and personal experiences, understanding of historical events, and ideology

strategy.4 It enabled Roosevelt to formulate and deliberately pursue long-range strategic

Roosevelt’s deep conviction that he had a personal responsibility to advance civilization

the continued advance of civilization in the 20th century.

World War II in Europe.

their independence, he envisioned a period of great power paternalism in order to prepare

them for eventual self-rule.

conservative opponents of the advance of civilization. Roosevelt’s pervasive outlook

cause of progressive civilization.

himself with advisors who viewed the world in a similar manner.

overseas. In Roosevelt’s strategic thinking, Britain, France, and Germany figured

prominently. The advance of world civilization required liberal, reform-minded leaders in

of his thinking. In office, he consciously reflected on the experiences of Theodore

statesmanship. As wartime leader, he remained focused on his fundamental strategic

continued cooperation between the great powers, the reestablishment of republican

France, and the revitalization of German liberalism.

worldview. In contrast to its wartime alternatives, Roosevelt’s liberal worldview has

Examination of the influences on Roosevelt’s thinking and the development his

depicted as preparation for pragmatic political activities and maneuvering as president,

expediency rather than out of any coherent or fundamental strategy.7

attainment of specific grades. As a student at Harvard, he already had developed a

important because it provided him with a relatively uninterrupted opportunity for

throughout the remainder of his life. Three complementary influences fundamentally

historical interpretations; and his own travels in Europe.

civilization superior to that found in France. Although disdainful of common Germans,

Roosevelt believed, had a responsibility to promote liberty and progress.

liberal in his outlook.”12