Strong transparency required for carbon credit mechanisms

Philippe Delacote1*, Tara L’Horty2, Andreas Kontoleon3, Thales A. P. West4, Anna Creti5, Ben
Filewod6, Gwenole LeVelly7, Alejandro Guizar-Coutiño8, Ben Groom9, Micah Elias10

The credibility of carbon offset mechanisms is threatened by many issues related to their true
effectiveness. We advocate that these issues cannot be effectively addressed without a
dramatic improvement in transparency across the entire value chain of carbon offsetting, a
crucial step for achieving a reduction in carbon emissions.
Voluntary carbon credits have emerged as a key financing mechanism to scale up reforestation and
forest conservation, climate-friendly agriculture, and the clean energy transition, as well as
activities such as waste management and improved cookstoves. Carbon credits can be used by
private firms for offsetting their own emissions, for corporate social responsibility purposes, or as
pilots for compliance markets. The Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) has grown enormously in
recent years: over 286 million credits were generated in 2023, up from just over 5 million in 2007
(So et al., 2023, see Figure 1). The VCM was valued at roughly $2 billion in 2021 and expected to
reach between $10 and $40 billion by 2030 (BCG and Shell, 2023), with forest-based carbon credits
expected to represent the lion’s share of the market (TSVCM, 2021).
However, concerns about the environmental integrity of credits have been thrust into the spotlight
by numerous exposés of overcrediting and lack of impact (Blake, 2023; Greenfield, 2023). Demand
for carbon credits fell in the first half of 2023 (Bloomberg, 2023). Market prices dropped at the end
of December 2023 on the Xpansiv trading platform (Xpansiv, 2023): at $0,8 per ton for nature-
based carbon offsets (compared to $7,5 per ton during the same period in 2022) and at $0,5 per ton
for tech industry carbon offsets (compared to $1,1 per ton during the same period in 2022). The
prices of these volatile specific products are contrasted with aggregated price data gathered by
declarative assessments (Forest Trends' Ecosystem Marketplace, 2023), which recorded a global
volume-weighted average price of $7.37 in 2022. Calls have been made for the complete abolition
of offsetting (Childs, 2021; Martins, 2023). The fundamental question is whether offset mechanisms
can be salvaged through gradual adjustments or radical overhaul - or should they be thrown out
altogether?
Those concerns have caught the attention of regulators, who are starting to push for greater
transparency in the VCM (Table 1). Here, we provide guidance on the current problems involved

1
Université de Lorraine, AgroParisTech-INRAE, BETA, Nancy, France and Climate Economics Chair, Paris, France
* Corresponding author: [email protected]
2 Université de Lorraine, AgroParisTech-INRAE, BETA, Nancy, France and Climate Economics Chair, Paris, France

3
Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge, UK
4
Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Vrije University Amsterdam, Netherlands
5
Université Paris Dauphine PSL Research University, UMR LEDA, Paris, France and Climate Economics Chair, Paris, France
6
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
7
CEE-M, Univ Montpellier, CNRS , INRAE, Institut Agro, Montpellier, France
8
UN Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC). Cambridge, UK
9
Land, Environment, Economics, and Policy Institute, Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School, Exeter EX4
4PU, UK.
10
Natural Capital Investments, Blue Forest Conservation, USResearch Affiliate, University of California Berkeley, Carbon Trading
Project, US
with carbon offsetting and the extent and type of transparency that regulators and other stakeholders
should demand in order to increase the credibility of carbon credits. Transparency is a prerequisite
to start addressing the undisputable shortcomings surrounding offset initiatives. Notably, critical
information pertaining to transactions and the distribution of value throughout the value chain
(including to local communities) remains inaccessible to civil society, even within the regulations,
bills and projects that are actually in place. This dearth of data erodes the credibility of offset
projects and hampers efforts to rectify some of the core issues in the VCM.
Controversies about carbon offsetting
The VCM is highly controversial. While in theory offsets are an efficient way of meeting climate
targets by delivering mitigation at lower costs, the praxis has been challenging (Balmford et al.,
2023). Many see offsets as a misguided effort that allows polluting firms to avoid making changes
to their business models and technologies (Krishnan et al., 2023); others view the practice as mere
greenwashing (Trouwloon et al., 2023). The first and main element of offset projects to take into
consideration is additionality, which encompasses two components: incentives, i.e., whether the
project would have occurred without revenues from the sale of the carbon credits (as in Michaelowa
et al. 2019); and impact, i.e., whether the project actually reduces global warming or not, which is
found to be largely overlooked on the VCM (Michaelowa et al. 2023).
Multiple research teams have investigated the impact of offset projects, i.e., the net emission
reductions attributable to the projects (Wunder, 2015): in a systematic review, Probst et al. (2023)
find strong evidence that the achieved benefits were much lower than claimed across all important
categories of offset projects. Several studies of avoided deforestation or REDD+ (Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) projects, a key source of carbon credits,
have found little or no evidence of additionality (Delacote et al. 2022, Guizar-Coutiño et al. 2022,
West et al. 2020, West et al. 2023, Groom et al. 2022). West et al. (2020) found that 11 out of 12
REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon substantially overestimated their impacts on
deforestation, consequently inflating credit issuances. In their analysis of 40 REDD+ projects,
Guizar-Coutiño et al. (2022) found a 47% decrease of deforestation in project areas, but the impact
was concentrated in a few projects. Delacote et al. (2022) could not find any evidence of
additionality in five out of six REDD+ projects they evaluate. Most recently, West et al. (2023)
estimated that over 90% of the anticipated carbon offsets from 27 REDD+ projects across the
tropics were not associated with actual carbon emission reductions. Improved Forest Management
(IFM) projects have similar issues, although lack of data makes them more difficult to assess.
Badgley et al. (2022) found that 29.4% of the projects analyzed were over-credited in California’s
forest carbon offset program due to coarse regional carbon baselines. Similar additionality issues
also haunt improved cookstoves projects. Gill-Wiehl et al. (2024) find that improved cookstove
crediting methodologies are overcrediting projects to a great extent.
Beyond additionality, the total impact of the projects on emissions also depends on permanence.
The permanence of emission reductions associated with offsets has been questioned as well. Not
only should offset projects unequivocally demonstrate that emissions have been reduced in the
immediate term, but achieved reductions must be permanent once the project has ended, which
may not be the case for forest-based projects (Dutschke et al., 2008; Honegger et al., 2022). For
example, Simonet et al. (2019) showed that a pilot REDD+ project in the Brazilian Amazon had
effectively reduced deforestation while the project was active. However, Carrilho et al. (2022)
found in a follow up analysis of the same case study that there was a rebound in forest loss (and a
decrease in declared households well-being) once the project had ended, challenging the project’s
long-term efficacy.
The difficulties of evaluating and controlling emissions displacement are a third key concern
(Delacote et al. 2016, Filewod and McCarney, 2023). Emissions “leakage” resulting from offset
projects may be as significant a source of overcrediting as inappropriate baselines, but this
phenomenon is complex, challenging to measure, and frequently underappreciated (Haya et al.
2023). Even in the best case, technical limits to market leakage measurement precision (Murray et
al. 2004) considerably reduces the accuracy of the true level of impact (hence credits) for key
classes of projects (such as those that reduce the supply of economic goods and services, like most
REDD+ or IFM projects). Haya et al. (2023) found that 82% of the IFM credits issued by
California’s Air and Resources board did not represent true emissions reductions due to poorly
constructed leakage assumptions. This problem is intertwined with the measurement of impacts:
first, leakage has to be considered for a complete evaluation of impacts; second, despite recent
advances in the state-of-the-art for assessing project impacts, leakage may cause serious
identification uncertainty, as it makes the proper selection of a counterfactual more complicated.
Uncertainties in measurements can subsequently lead to complications in environmental
bookkeeping and the functionality of buffer pool systems (Delbeke et al. 2023). Measuring leakage
credibly, or at least conservatively, and communicating net impacts consistently and transparently,
are vital steps toward effective carbon markets.
Other challenges include the management of non-carbon externalities, whether positive or adverse.
Co-benefits include for example the enhancement of ecosystem services, biodiversity conservation
and livelihoods; they contribute to making carbon “charismatic” (Lou et al. 2022). As noticed by
Simonet et al. (2016), taking co-benefits into account has an impact on project implementation and
carbon credit transactions. In contrast, recurrent concerns arise regarding the harmful impacts of
carbon projects, encompassing issues related to property rights (Asiyanbi, 2016) and resource
control (Ehrenstein, 2018). Recent investigations by The Guardian and Follow the Money
(Grenfield, 2023), among several other major news outlets, have even shed light on potential
violations of human rights in connection with these projects (Greenfield et. al, 2023). The
complexity of achieving both environmental conservation and livelihood improvement has been
repeatedly emphasized (Delacote et al., 2022, Nantongo et al., 2024).
Nevertheless, offsets have a place within the political action climate change toolbox (alongside
more restrictive regulations and taxes) for a reason: in theory, they are an efficient market-based
solution to our generation's most pressing sustainability challenge. In practice, market mechanisms
have worked for environmental challenges before, including pollution control, fair trade
certification, and sustainable production reporting (Schmalensee et al., 2017). However, their
effective implementation is not guaranteed. Notably, the effectiveness of any market mechanism is
conditional on the quality, accuracy and transparency of information provided to stakeholders. This
is true across the VCM value chain: for example, lack of transparency by offset buyers can enable
misleading advertising and greenwashing (Bottega et al., 2024).
Lack of transparency
The lack of transparency around voluntary carbon credit transactions is consequently a cross-cutting
and urgent concern. Although information on offset projects (documentation, provenance, transfer,
retirement) is made increasingly publicly available by carbon offset programs, it is far from
exhaustive (Table 2). For example, while geospatial site boundaries are, in theory, publicly available
from many offset programs, many projects do not provide this information, while others provide
either corrupted files or boundaries that do not match the actual project areas; as noticed by West et
al. (2020, 2023) and Guizar-Coutiño et al. (2022), some projects had to be discarded from their
analysis due to these quality issues. Equally important is the lack of geographical information
concerning reference areas, from which baseline emission levels were derived. Such shortcomings
make assessing climate impacts difficult or impossible. Meanwhile, impacts on co-benefits are even
harder to measure; such as the number of individuals affected by projects, the nature and amount of
compensation they received, or the non-CO2 ecological impacts (biodiversity, water management).
Data on transactions are especially scarce. As an over-the-counter mechanism and with no legal
requirements to report sensitive information, data on prices or the identity of buyers and sellers are
almost nonexistent. Collection efforts depend on personal networks and voluntary declarations: the
long-established reports by Ecosystem Marketplace, for example, rely on a network of market
respondents and make public only aggregated annual syntheses (Forest Trends' Ecosystem
Marketplace, 2023). Moreover, given the complex web of intermediaries between the projects
developers who generate credits and the firms who buy them on the VCM, many—if not most—
offset sales cannot be traced to specific and verifiable projects (Carbon Market Watch, 2023).
Furthermore, the distribution of revenues across these value chains is completely opaque. Many
firms cite concerns over proprietary business models to explain their reluctance to share data on
their carbon offsetting practices (IOSCO Board, 2022), particularly for price data. As things stand,
firms lack incentives to disclose: the high-profile investigation into overstated offset impacts by The
Guardian, Die Zeit and SourceMaterial (Greenfield, 2023), for example, has not been followed by
data releases from private companies and carbon offset programs. These issues are even more
critical in light of recent calls for nature-based carbon credits to be differentiated on the basis of
their contributions to biodiversity (Tedersoo et al., 2023) and local livelihoods (Larson et al., 2022).
Transparency for effective mechanisms
We argue that improved transparency on carbon credit markets, in particular on transactions, is
necessary to establish the proper functioning and credibility of this important financial mechanism.
Transparency on disclosures has many benefits for diverse stakeholders. Although it will not solve
all the controversies related to carbon offsetting, it is a prerequisite without which the other issues
cannot be solved.
In terms of impacts and additionality, first, disclosures would help avoid fraud and protect both
investors and consumers, as in established commodity markets. As for any market, verification and
accountability are required. Additionality testing is the core of ensuring the integrity of market-
based mechanisms (Michaelowa et al., 2019) and recent developments have clearly shown that
additionality claims cannot be taken on trust. Such testing cannot be done credibly without
complete information disclosure and full transparency. Firms with the most robust climate strategies
should see their own interest: they will be able to prove (1) the amount they invest in carbon
offsetting, (2) how those investments coincide with their own mitigation strategies, and (3) what
real-life impacts they are having. The weight of evidence suggests that voluntary certification alone
is not enough to ensure that offsets are real. Only through transparency can truly impactful
initiatives dispel accusations of greenwashing. In contrast, keeping carbon credit transactions
opaque will jeopardize their mere existence, as suspicions of greenwashing will continue to grow
and transform the VCM into a ‘market for lemons’ in which low quality offsets (risky,
impermanent, non-additional) purge the market of high quality ones (Akerlof, 1970).
Disclosure is equally crucial for research, innovation and policy recommendations: scholars and
stakeholders require access to transaction information to assess the impacts of offset projects and
advance methodologies for estimating emission reductions, risk and equivalence, as well as
elucidating contemporary questions of public interest. Transaction disclosures will allow cost-
benefit analyses that will deliver policy-relevant information, complementing and extending the
impact analysis that have been performed so far. Furthermore, transaction disclosures will allow
researchers to assess whether the characteristics of credits that are valued by the market are aligned
with permanence, leakage and other socially important characteristics that determine their social
value (Groom and Venmans, 2023). This will bring important insights for policy formulation and
market design.
In terms of co-benefits, accurate information on value chains would help redress power
asymmetries, especially in internationally traded offsets, allowing impacted communities to
negotiate a more equitable share of profits. Indeed, many offsetting projects explicitly aspire to
impact both carbon emissions and local livelihoods. It has been shown that the combination of those
two objectives influences project implementation (Delacote et al. 2022). However, the current lack
of information about how value is distributed to affected communities utterly prevents independent
assessment of such outcomes (Sills et al. 2017).
Open and reliable information on project locations, actions and volumes produced (currently
imperfectly provided by offset registries) are a vital minimum requirement; given the current crisis
of confidence faced by the voluntary carbon market, the prices paid by carbon credit buyers and the
amounts received by project beneficiaries (including communities living on the lands where
projects occur) should also be disclosed.
Improving VCM transparency
One solution would be to strengthen transparency requirements within the existing governance
framework of third-party certification. Project proponents selling carbon credits and firms buying
them could commit to sharing reliable information on transactions, potentially with a short time-lag
to protect business interests. Since the voluntary carbon market is not (yet) regulated by an
international administrative body, efforts to develop frameworks and registries are central to
building legitimacy and credibility, and have blossomed in the past few years. Table 3 sheds light on
the multifaceted approaches of transparency within these initiatives and throughout the entire
project life cycle. On the supply-side, it often involves the establishment of a centralized registry
facilitating the clear identification of carbon credits and including varying degrees of precision in
project documentation. A system of this nature, taking into account the interactions between
compliance and voluntary as well as domestic and international markets, is essential to prevent
double counting in the context of the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Schneider et al. 2019). Price
disclosure is another facet of transparency: for some, it entails the development of digital platforms
where carbon credits are converted into financial instruments built on blockchain technology (a
secondary voluntary carbon market) (Marchant, 2022). On the demand side, initiatives for greater
transparency focus mainly on the use of carbon credits in net-zero claims (Kreibich and Hermwille,
2021). Ironically, the VCM also remains highly opaque due to this polysemy of transparency.
We doubt that the necessary increases in transparency can be delivered by industry-led voluntary
certification schemes alone. First, certification standards face stringency and participation problems:
standards designed to include most market participants can implement low-requirement rules, while
standards with the most stringent rules may fail to attract participation. Second, the proliferation of
standards can also have a dilution effect, leaving credit buyers unable to differentiate quality; this is
a general problem of many standards (e.g. energy efficiency, green finance). The growth of rating
agencies which use their own frameworks to determine the quality of VCM credits, such as BeZero,
Calyx Global, Renoster, and Sylvera, represent a push for higher transparency in the market. Yet,
inconsistencies among rating methodologies, which usually are not fully transparent, can lead to
different outcomes in project-specific analysis and potentially legitimize low quality credits
(Wawrzynowicz et al. 2023). Third, it is not clear whether carbon credit buyers actually care about
the quality of the credits. For instance, Bakhtary et al. (2023) show that even if buyers are willing to
pay more for credits with co-benefits, they care more about the number of attributes (Sustainable
Development Goals) than measured climate impacts.
Given our skepticism of the potential to adequately strengthen transparency requirements within the
existing governance framework of third-party verification, we see regulation as the key tool to
increase transparency. The VCM is Voluntary, but as it grows in importance so does the case for
public intervention. The European Parliament has already moved to limit carbon-neutral claims
based on offsetting - commercial practices will be deemed “misleading” if they fail to distinguish
the role of offsets in environmental claims (European Parliament, 2023), and the United States
Commodity Futures Trading Commission has indicated interest in engaging to limit environmental
fraud. In California, Assembly Bill 1305 has made information disclosure mandatory for entities
operating in the state. To the best of our knowledge, this recent tendency toward better transparency
does not encompass information about transactions.
Policymakers worldwide can and should make transparency requirements mandatory to access the
VCM and create rules for carbon offsets within existing regulatory structures. Growing
transparency requirements on food products in the European Union provide a model to follow. For
example, in France, a label designed to provide information on the conditions under which
producers are paid is currently being tested (CGAAER, 2022). Extra-financial regulation is another
policy pathway to transparency, with firms increasingly obliged to report and make transparent their
use of carbon credits - for example, under the newly approved rules of the European Sustainability
Reporting Standard and in particular the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. As the use of
carbon credits grows around the globe, we must ensure that such initiatives are replicated and
harmonized.
Transparency as a required preliminary step
We recognize that carbon offsets and the VCM face many well-known issues that jeopardize their
credibility - and, indeed, their very existence. Furthermore they cannot be the only tool used to
reach net zero. As suggested by Jones and Lewis (2023) for the forest conservation case, demand-
side policies are also necessary to effectively conserve tropical forests and halt deforestation. Yet,
they are now playing an important role, and their growth is driven by strong policy and market
inertia. We argue that without a dramatic increase in transparency, including full disclosure on
transactions and value sharing, the issues plaguing carbon offsetting cannot be fixed. Improving the
transparency of carbon offsetting mechanisms now, through decisive actions that mandate
information disclosure, is essential if their promise of economically efficient mitigation is to be
realized in time.
Achieving transparency is the first necessary step for restoring the credibility of VCM, but is not
sufficient. Consensus about robust impact evaluation of offsets, as well as clear statements by
companies on their offset-based climate strategies, are also necessary if the offset market is to
become a serious contributor towards net zero.

Figures and tables

Figure 1: Number of credits generated over time by the voluntary carbon market categorized by
type: reduced emissions, impermanent removals, and mixed. Source: (1)

Issuances by Reduction / Removal Over Time Millions

89% 300

88% 280

Impermanent
260
Removal
240
Mixed
220
78% 90%
Reduction
200

180

87%
160

140
77% 62%
120

100

80
93%
93%
75% 60
35%
88% 16%
98% 78%
93% 40
98% 4% 9%
20% 12% 8%
21% 20
100%
21%
95% 9% 6%
100% 5% 3% 6% 6% 2%
100% 100% 2% 1% 3%
100% 5%
0
2% 4% 1% 2% 5% 1% 2% 3% 1%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 *
2023
Table 1 : Examples of regulatory impulses for transparency on the VCM
Regulation
Documents Region Contents related to transparency
level
Establishment of an electronic national platform
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, Ambiente e Ação Climática. (2024). Decreto-Lei
Portugal Direct for registering carbon projects, market agents
n.º4/2024, de 5 de janeiro. Diário da República, Série I, n.º 4/2024
and transactions
Skidmore, C. (2022) Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero (commissioned by the Recommends the establishment of a carbon
UK Direct
UK government). credit and offset regulator by 2024 (Pillar 6.5)

Necessity of governmental intervention to

Climate Change Committee. (2022, October). Voluntary Carbon Markets and Offsetting. UK Direct
reinforce guidance and regulate the VCM

European Commission. (2022). Proposal COM(2022) 672 final for a regulation establishing a
EU Direct Minimum quality standards for carbon removals
Union certification framework for carbon removals.
"Publicly available data to promote
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). (2022, November). Voluntary Inter-
Trading transparency", "Price discovery" (Key
Carbon Markets: Discussion Paper. national
considerations for a better-functioning VCM)
ISDA - International Swaps and Derivatives Association. (2022, December). Verified Carbon Inter- Standardized documentation to increase legal
Trading
Credit (VCC) Transactions Definitions. national certainty and consistency to VCC trading
Address fraud and other misconducts.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (2023, June). Press Release N o 8736-23:
Report information related to manipulative
CFTC Division of Enforcement Creates Two New Task Forces; Press Release N o 8723-23: USA Trading
trading, fraudulent practices and potential
CFTC Whistleblower Office issues alert seeking tips relating to carbon markets misconduct.
manipulation in tokenized markets
U.S SEC - Securities and Exchange Commission. (2022, March). The Enhancement and Proposes mandatory disclosure of the quantity
Carbon credit
Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Rel. No. 33-11042; 34-94478 USA of carbon reduction achieved through offsets to
use
(proposal). fulfill companies' climate objectives
Transparency regarding the utilization and
European Parliament. (2022). Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) - Carbon credit
EU quality of carbon credits in sustainability
2022/2464/EU. use
reporting standards for corporations
USA/ Mandatory disclosures not only from carbon
Carbon credit
California Assembly. (2023, October). Bill No. 1305: Voluntary carbon market disclosures. Californi credit buyers but also from the purchasers and
use
a entities asserting the achievements
Guideline to employ reliable methods, prevent
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). (2012, October). Green Guide on environmentally friendly Sustainability
USA double-selling, disclose future emission
products. claims
timelines, adhere to legal requirements
Guidance to disclose the portion of carbon-
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). (2023, June). Advertising guidance: misleading Sustainability
UK neutral and net-zero claims based on offsetting,
environmental claims and social responsibility. claims
adherence to standards and schemes
European Parliament. (2023). Empowering consumers for the green transition. Sustainability Requires clear differentiation of carbon offsets'
EU
P9_TA(2023)0201. claims role in environmental assertions
Table 2 : Transparency requirements of carbon offset programs

verification and follow-up documents, with

Unique registry listing projects, issuances and

Publication of project description, validation,

Project validity period and explicit renewal rules

Carbon credit prices and distribution of value

Follow-up of credit retirements in the registry
Number of carbon credits issued by project

Follow-up of credit transfers in the registry

Credits traceable by serial number

Double-counting verification

Detailed transactions
detailed calculations
retirements

American Carbon Registry     

Cercarbono  
Climate Action Reserve       
Climate Austria (national standard)
Fairtrade Climate International     
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
(FCPF) 
Global Carbon Council    
Gold Standard     
Label bas carbone       
Clean Development Mechanism      
Joint Implementation Mechanism   
Peatland Code   
Plan Vivo    
BioCarbon   
Program Architecture for REDD+
Transactions     
Program REDD+   
Puro.earth  
Registro de huella de carbono  
Soil Capital 
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) / Verra
(including CCB projects)        
Woodland Carbon Code    
Table 3: Examples of private initiatives for higher transparency on the VCM
 Requested information

Registry to identify
transparency

Stakeholders and
Treatment of

Value distribution
Transactions and
and track credits

Detailed project

price discovery
documentation

Use of carbon
Year
Initiative

governance

credits
Core Carbon Principles (CCPs), by the ICVCM 2023 Core  
Carbon Credit Quality Initiative (CCQI) tool 2022 Core   
Tropical Forest Credit Integrity (TFCI) Guide 2022 Peripheric   
Iniciativa Brasileira Para O Mercado Voluntário De Carbono (BRVCM) 2022 Peripheric   
Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (ACMI) 2022 Core  
Nordic Dialogue on Voluntary Compensation 2022 Core  
ICROA Code of Best Practice 2023 Peripheric  
BeZero 2022 Peripheric  
Calyx Global 2023 Peripheric   
Ratings by private agencies
Sylvera 2022 Peripheric
Renoster 2022 Peripheric
Climate Action Data (CAD) Trust 2023 Core 
IHS Markit Carbon Meta-Registry 2021 Core 
State of the Voluntary Carbon Market, by Ecosystem Marketplace 2007 Core 
Info compensation carbone (INFCC) 2022 Core 
Claims Code of Practice, VCMI 2023 Core 
High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of
Non-State Entities 2022 Core 
Corporate Net-Zero Standard, Science-Based Targets initiative 2023 Core 
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Acknowledgements
The BETA contributes to the Labex ARBRE ANR-11- LABX-0002-01. This research is part of the
Agriculture and Forestry research program by the Climate Economics Chair. BG is funded by
Dragon Capital and acknowledges the funding of the UKRI/NERC projects BIOADD (ref:
NE/X002292/1), BIOESG (NE/X016560/1) and RENEW (NE/W004941/1).
Author contributions
P.D. proposed the initial concept and led the paper writing. T.L.H, A.K., T.A.P.W., A.C., B.F.,
G.L.V., A.G.C., B.G., and M.E. contributed to paper development and revision in their specific
areas of expertise.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.