Red hills

WP.Nos.
13419 & 13437/2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on 26.03.2024 Delivered on 30.04.2024
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. SUNDAR

AND
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N.SENTHILKUMAR
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017

and
WMP.Nos.14464, 14465, 14492 & 14493/2017
WP.No.13419/2017:-
M/s.Global Waste Recyclers Ltd

No.5/245, Thiruvallore High Road
Alamathi, Redhills, Chennai 600 057.
rep.by its Managing Director,
Mr.Bharath Pujara ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Government of Tamil Nadu

rep.by its Secretary
Housing and Urban Development
Department, Fort St George
Chennai 600 009.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
2.The Member Secretary

Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority
Thalamuthu Natarajar Maligai
No.1, Gandhi Irwin Road
Egmore, Chennai 600 008.
3.The Director,
Rural Development and Panachayat Raj
Panagal Building, Saidapet,
Chennai 600 015.
4.The Commissioner
Sholavaram Panchayat Union
Sholaavaram, Thiruvallur District.
5.The Superintending Engineer

Water Resources Organization
Palar Irrigation Division, Chepauk
Chennai 600 005. ... Respondents
Prayer : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
issuance of Writ of certiorari calling for the records of the 1 st respondent in
issued Letter No.24801/UD-VII[1]/2016-3 dated 26.04.2017 and quash the
same in lands comprised to an extent 1.21 acres in S.Nos.126/1B, 1B1,
295/2B2, B2 at Alamathi Village, Ponneri Taluk, Thiruvallore High Road,
Redhills, Thiruvallur District having automatically deemed to have been
released from reservation as catchment area under Section 38[b] of the Tamil
Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
For Petitioner : Mr.K.Kabir, Senior counsel

for Mr.G.Krishnakumar
For RR1 & 3 : Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General
assisted by Mrs.V.Yamuna Devi
Spl.Govt.Pleader
For R2 : Mr.R.Sivakumar
For R4 : Mr.S.V.Durai Solaimalai
For R5 : Mr.E.C.Ramesh
WP.No.13437/2017:-
M/s.B.T.Enterprises Private Limited

rep.by its Director Mrs.B.Tamil Selvi
Having registered office at
New No.185 [Old No.110]
Poonamallee High Road
Kilpauk, Chennai 600 010 ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu

rep.by its Principal Secretary to Government
Department, Fort St George, Secretariat,
Chennai 600 009.

WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
3.Alamathi Village Panchayat

rep.by its Executive Officer cum President
Alamathi Village, Sholavaram Panchayat Union
Thiruvallur District.
4.The Commissioner
5.Greater Chennai Corporation

rep.by its Commissioner,
Park Town, Chennai 600 003. ... Respondents
Prayer : Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for
issuance of Writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records of the 1 st
respondent in issuing Letter No.24801/UD-VII[1]/2016-3 dated 26.04.2017
and quash the same as lands comprised Survey Nos.292, 293, 294, 295,
296, 297 & 302 covered in Patta Nos.4100, 4121, 4122, 4133, 6078, 6188
and 6200 situated in No.111, Alamathi 2 Revenue Village, abutting Redhills-
Thiruvallur High Road, Sholavaram Panchayat Union, Thiruvallur District
have automatically deemed to have been released from reservation as
Catchment area under Section 38[b] of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country
Planning Act, 1971 and consequently direct the 2 nd respondent to process
planning application of the petitioner without reference that the lands of
petitioner are catchment area.
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
For Petitioner : Mr.P.Wilson, Senior counsel

for M/s.P.Wilson Associates
For RR1 & 3 : Mr.P.S.Raman, Advocate General
assisted by Mrs.V.Yamuna Devi
Spl.Govt.Pleader
For R2 : Mr.R.Sivakumar
For R4 : Mr.S.V.Durai Solaimalai
For R5 : Mr.E.C.Ramesh
COMMON ORDER
S.S.SUNDAR, J.,
(1)Though the petitioners are different, the writ petitions are filed
challenging the common order and common issues are raised by the
petitioners in both the writ petitions. Hence, these two writ petitions are
disposed of by this common order.
(2)WP.No.13419/2017 is filed for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash
the impugned proceedings of the 1st respondent dated 26.04.2017 in
respect of the lands measuring an extent of 1.21 acres comprised in
S.Nos.126/1B, 1B1, 295/2B2, B2 at Alamathi Village, Ponneri Taluk,
Thiruvallore High Road, Redhills, Thiruvallur District as the lands are
deemed to have been released from reservation as catchment area by
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
virtue of Section 38[b] of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning
Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1971'].
(3)WP.No.13437/2017 is also filed to quash the proceedings of the 1st
respondent dated 26.04.2017 in respect of the lands comprised in
S.Nos.292 to 297 and 302 in Alamathi 2 Revenue Village, abutting
Redhills-Thiruvallur High Road, Sholavaram Panchayat Union,
Thiruvallur District as the said lands are deemed to have been released
from reservation as Catchment area by virtue of Section 38[b] of the Tamil
Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 and to direct the 2nd
respondent to process planning application of the petitioner without
reference that the lands of petitioner are reserved as catchment area in the
Master Plan.
(4)Brief facts inWP.No.13419/2017 are as follows:-
(5)The petitioner is a Company registered under the provisions of the Indian
Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner purchased an extent of 1.21 acres in
S.Nos. 126/1B, 1B1, 295/2B2, B2 at Alamathi Village, Ponneri Taluk,
under a registered Sale Deed date 10.03.2008. The petitioner, in order to
construct a godown for storing the raw materials of the Company,
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
submitted an application on 22.08.2008 before the Commissioner,
Sholavaram Panchayat Union for planning permission and the 4 th
respondent processed the application in consultation with the 2 nd
respondent. The 4th respondent addressed a letter to the 5th respondent /
Water Resources Organization on 22.08.2008, to find out whether any
possibility of the construction of any building and to give No Objection
Certificate for the construction of godown by the petitioner. The 5th
respondent issued No Objection Certificate with conditions to raise the
foundation of the building.
(6)On 30.10.2009, the 4th respondent granted Planning Permission in favour
of the petitioner for construction of a godown. Pursuant to the Planning
Permission and the Building Plan approval, the petitioner had put up a
godown as well as office building. However, the 2 nd respondent / CMDA
issued a notice dated 26.11.2015 calling upon the petitioner to produce
the approved plan. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent after holding that the
entire construction is unauthorised, issued Locking, Sealing and
Demolition Notice dated 31.12.2015 under Sections 56 and 57 of the
Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
to as 'the Act']. The petitioner preferred a revision on 04.03.2016 under
Section 80-A of the Act as against the Locking, Sealing and Demolition
Notice. The 1st respondent rejected the revision on the ground that the site
in which the petitioner's building/godown is constructed, lies in Redhills
Catchment Area where no construction activities is permissible. Holding
that there is no chance for the petitioner's building to be regularised, the
1st respondent rejected the revision filed by the petitioner. Challenging the
same, the petitioner filed WP.No.18997/2015.
(7)The writ petition in WP.No.18997/2015 filed by the petitioner herein and
the other writ petitions filed by petitioner in WP.No.13437/2017, were
disposed of by this Court on 27.09.2016, by permitting both the
petitioners therein to file a detailed representation to the respondents and
the respondents were directed to consider and pass orders on the
representation of the petitioners therein within a period of two months
thereafter. There was an order of status quo till the 1 st respondent therein
passes an order on the representation of the petitioners. It was thereafter,
the petitioners in both cases contended before the 1st respondent that the
actions of CMDA in continuing to classify and treat the lands belonged to
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
the petitioner as catchment area is illegal by virtue of Sections 37 and 38
of the Act.
(8)The prime submission of the petitioner before the 1 st respondent is that
the lands including the petitioner's land though can be reserved in the
Second Master Plan as catchment area, unless the land is acquired within
three years, the lands are deemed to have been released from such
reservation automatically by virtue of Section 38[b] the Act. However, the
1st respondent passed the Impugned Order dated 26.04.2017 rejecting the
representation of the petitioners in both writ petitions on the ground that
the lands have been declared as Catchment Area in the II Master Plan
without reserving the lands for any public purpose, involving transfer of
ownership and that question of land acquisition or release under Section
38 of the Act, 1971, does not arise, since only a restriction on the usage of
lands in Catchment Area has been prescribed in the Master Plan. These
writ petitions are filed challenging the order dated 26.04.2017.
Brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of WP.No.13437/2017:-
(9)The petitioner is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the
Indian Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner purchased substantial extent
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
of lands comprised in S.Nos.292 to 297 and 302 in Alamathi II Revenue
Village abutting Redhills – Tiruvallur High Road within Sholavaram
Panchayat Union under different Sale Deeds registered in the office of the
Sub Registrar, Redhills between 30.09.2009 and 17.07.2015. The
petitioner has also put up a compound wall covering the entire lands
purchased by the petitioner and constructed temporary structures to serve
as godowns. Out of three godowns, the petitioner has let out one godown
to a third party and retained two other godowns for their own purpose. In
February 2014, the petitioner came to know about the II Master Plan for
Chennai Metropolitan Area 2026 [Development Regulations] vide
G.O.Ms.No.190 dated 02.09.2008 wherein the petitioner's lands were
classified as Redhills Catchment Area. Upon coming to know about
Master Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area and about the development
regulations classifying the lands of the petitioner / Company as Catchment
area, the petitioner applied before the Water Resources Development
authorities of Public Works Department by an application dated
03.02.2014 and sought for reclassification of land from agriculture to
commercial to the CMDA officials and to de-reserve the lands. Even
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
though the respondents did not dispute that the lands are petitioner's
private patta lands as per revenue records, the Chief Engineer, Water
Resources Department, Public Works Department, recommended that if
buildings were to be constructed, the height of the building should be
raised more than the nearest road to avoid inundation. Thereafter, the
petitioner / Company applied to Sholavaram Panchayat Union for
reclassification of the lands from catchment area to commercial zone. The
application submitted by the petitioner was forwarded by the Panchayat
Union to the 2nd respondent vide proceedings dated 11.05.2015 for
affixing the signature of the President of the Village Panchayat. However,
after returning the application, the 2nd respondent issued a notice on
24.06.2015 under Sections 56 and 57 of the Act for locking, sealing and
demolition of structure on the ground that the godown constructed by the
petitioner for commercial purpose is not permissible as the lands fall
under Redhills Catchment Area as per II Master Plan.
(10)It is seen from the records that the petitioner was pursuing his
application for reclassification from catchment area and questioned the
proceedings initiated under the provisions of Sections 56 and 57 of the
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
Act. The application submitted by the petitioner for reclassification was
processed simultaneously and the petitioner was asked to furnish
necessary particulars. The petitioner was also required to pay a sum of
Rs.69,326/- for paper publication in the English daily newspaper [The
Indian Express] and Tamil daily Newspaper [Dinamani]. However, De-
Occupation Notice was issued to the petitioner on 01.09.2015 on the
ground that commercial activities are not allowed in ''Redhills Catchment
Area'' where such activities are prohibited. The petitioner simultaneously
filed a statutory revision under Section 80-A of the Act 02.11.2015
challenging the order of Locking, Sealing and Demolition of the premises
and the subsequent de-occupation notice dated 01.09.2015.
(11)The 1st respondent rejected the revision filed by one Bala by an order
dated 28.12.2015. The revision petition filed by petitioner under Section
80-A of the Act, 1971, was dismissed by an order dated 16.02.2016 on
the ground that the entire extent of lands belonged to the petitioner is
located in the catchment area where no construction activity is permissible
as per the II Master Plan for the Chennai Metropolitan Area 2026.
Thereafter, the petitioner challenged the orders of the 1st respondent dated
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
28.12.2015 and 16.02.2016 by filing WP.Nos.18388 and 18400/2016
respectively. WP.No.18396/2016 is also filed by petitioner for a
declaration, declaring that the lands comprised in S.Nos.292 to 297 and
302, which have been reserved as catchment area in II Master Plan for
Chennai Metropolitan Area 2026, stand released from such reservation by
virtue of Section 38[b] of the Act. All the three writ petitions were
disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by a common order dated
27.09.2016. Though the Division Bench found bona fides in the
contention of petitioner that if an area reserved under the Master Plan is
not acquired within three years, the area is deemed to be released from
such reservation as per Section 38 of the Act, the Division Bench disposed
of the writ petitions with a direction to the writ petitioners to submit a
detailed representation to the respondents. The respondents were directed
to consider the representation and to pass necessary orders.
(12)However, the 1st respondent vide Impugned Order / proceedings dated
26.04.2017, rejected the representations preferred by the petitioners in
both the cases in the following lines:-
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
''5.After careful examination of facts and the

contention put forth by the Advocates of the
petitioners and the Chennai metropolitan
Development Authority, it is concluded that the
question of acquisition of lands in Red Hills
Catchment Area as per Section 36 does not arise,
since only a restriction on the usage of the lands in the
Red Hills Catchment Area has been prescribed in
Second Master Plan without reserving the said lands
for any public purpose wherein the ownership of the
lands needs to be transferred from the existing owners
to the Authority of Government. Accordingly, since
the question of Land Acquisition does not arise and
invoking provision of Section 38 of Town and Country
Planning Act will also not arise. Therefore, the
Government hereby reject the appeal filed by
M/s.B.T.Enterprises Private Limited, rep.by its
Directors, Mrs.B.Tamilselvi and M/s.Global Waste
Recyclers Limited, rep.by its Managing Director,
Mr.Bharath Pujara to release the lands in S.Nos.292,
293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 302, 126/2B, 1b1 and
2952B2B2 respectively from the reservation as
catchment area.''
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(13)Challenging the legality of the order of the 1st respondent, the petitioners
have filed the present writ petitions.
(14)Mr.M.K.Kabir, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the learned
counsel on record for the petitioner in WP.No.13419/2017 made the
following submissions:-
➔ A reading of Sections 2[30],20, 27, 36, 37 and 38 of the Act would
only show that any land which is required, reserved or desinated
for public purpose in a Master Plan, shall be deemed to be released
from reservation, requirement or designation if the land is not
acquired within three years from the date of publication of notice
under Section 26 or 27 of the Act.
➔ The 2nd respondent has no power to declare any particular area as
''catchment area'' under the provisions of the Town and Country
Planning Act, 1971, thereby prohibiting construction or
development without resorting to the provisions of Sections 36 and
37 and paying compensation as required under Land Acquisition
[Central] Act.
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
➔ Since the object of the Act is only to regulate the land use, the
Planning Authorities or the Government has no power to prohibit
development by declaring a particular area as catchment area.
➔ The restriction of use is sought to be introduced through Rule 19 of
the Tamil Nadu Combined Development and Building Rules, 2019.
The Regulations for development in prohibited or restricted areas,
are furnished in Annexure XVIII of the Tamil Nadu Combined
Development and Building Rules, 2019. In Appendix-B of
Annexure VII, areas zoned as Primary Residential use zone and
Mixed Residential use zone, Industrial use zone and the areas
covered in approved layouts, and areas reserved for commercial
exploitation within 122 m. (400 ft.) wide ORR, developments are
permissible subject to satisfying zoning regulations and planning
parameters prescribed in the rules. Therefore, the impugned order
as if no construction is permissible is illegal and unconstitutional.
➔ In Annexure XVII of the Tamil Nadu Combined Development and
Building Rules, 2019, it is for the Catchment Management
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
Agencies to prescribe Regulations for development therein as per
Appendix-B. In the absence of prohibition under Clause 12 of
Annexure-XVII read with Appendix-B, the Development
Authorities can exercise their discretion without any guidelines.
The declaration of Red Hills Catchment Area as a ''no development
zone'' is therefore, a mischief as the authorities may now permit
development according to their whims and fancies without any
accountability. Therefore, the whole exercise of declaring a vast
extent of about 13,000 Hectares of land as catchment area and to
vest them with the Catchment Management Agencies to regulate
development without any guidelines, clearly indicate that the
classification suffers from legal mala fides.
➔ In Raju S.Jethmalani Vs. State of Maharastra reported in 2005
[2] SCC 222, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that a
citizen cannot be deprived of his right without following a
procedure according to law. When a property is earmarked for a
particular purpose to serve a public cause in a Master Plan, unless
the property is acquired within three years from the date of
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
publication of Plan by paying compensation to the land owners for
restricting their land use, the property is deemed to be released
from such reservation and the respondents cannot be heard to say
such classification does not affect the right of the petitioner as if it
is the power of the State to classify the land in the larger interest of
public under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 or under
the Chennai Metropolitan Development Act. The judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure
Industrial Coke and Chemicals Limited reported in 2007 [8]
SCC 705, is relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel to support
his arguments.
(15)Mr.P.Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in
WP.No.13437/2017 made the following submissions:-
A) The lands were used originally for agricultural purposes and
later on put to other purposes after the lands dried up and
became unfit for cultivation. The petitioner obtained the
planning permission and approval from the Executive Engineer
cum President of Alamathi Village Panchayat on 11.11.2013.
18
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
The petitioner thereafter put up the construction which is in
accordance with the approved plan. Apart from the payment of
Property Tax, the petitioner is also paying the amount levied
under the Tamil Nadu Ubran Land Tax Act, 1966. Hence, the
construction which is in accordance with approved plan cannot
be termed as illegal.
B) The petitioner came to know about the II Master Plan for
Chennai Metropolitan Area only when the petitioner received
the notice for demolition. 27 Villages were reserved in the
Master Plan as Catchment Area and almost major portion of
this area is covered by constructions in all the 27 villages.
There are even Government Buildings, commercial buildings,
schools and colleges, petrol bunks etc., in the entire lands
reserved as catchment area. The rejection of petitioner's
application / representation on a ground that it is a catchment
area, which is a total prohibitory zone, is contrary to the
Regulations where developments are regulated even according
to the respondents. Therefore, the impugned order is arbitrary,
19
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
discriminatory and irrational and contrary to Regulation
24[2][C] when petitioner's building is permissible.
C) Earlier, the Chief Engineer of Public Works Department who
was consulted, had recommended to reclassify the land to
permit the petitioner's development when the application was
earlier filed by the petitioner for plan approval. The petitioner
was made to pay charges towards publication regarding change
of land use. However, without reference to the process of
petitioner's application for reclassification, the petitioner's
revision under Section 80-A of the Act, filed as against the order
of locking, sealing and demolition, is dismissed by the
Government only on the ground that it is a 'no development
zone' where no construction can be permitted. This itself
would show how the respondents are inconsistent while
exercising their power under the Statute.
D) The facts leading to this writ petition would only indicate that
the object behind the classification is not in public interest and
the bona fides of classifying or declaring a vast area as a
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
catchment area is questionable. In other words, the impugned
order suffers from legal mala fides.
E) This Court, earlier passed an order in a batch of writ petitions
in WP.Nos.18388, 18396 and 18400/2016 accepting the case of
the petitioners therein that after expiry of three years from the
date of publication of notification, the reservation that it is a
catchment area, is deemed to be discontinued after the lapse of
time. Hence, the impugned order without taking note of the
observation of this Court is erroneous.
F) Any land which is reserved, restricted, required or designated
for a purpose which is required to serve public purpose, has to
be acquired under Section 36 of the Act. Once Section 36 of
the Act kicks in, such reservation gets de-reserved under
Section 38[b] of the Act if the land is classified, designated or
required for public purpose under the Act. The respondents
without acquiring the land, cannot prohibit or restrict the
petitioner from utilising the land in violation of Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India. In the absence of any specific
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
provision under the Act to reserve a vast extent of area as a
Catchment Area in exercise of the power to prepare a Master
Plan for development, the classification of petitioner's land and
other lands as catchment area is illegal and colourable exercise
of powers.
G) When the State and the Local Body including the CMDA in
unequivocal terms state that they have no intention to acquire
lands even at the time of preparing a plan and that it is not
necessary to acquire the land or to pay any compensation in
terms of Section 37 or Section 39 of the Act, the Impugned
Order would certainly affects/infringes the rights of petitioner
under Article 300-A of the Constitution. When the right to
property is not only protected under Article 300-A but also
recognised as a human right, the provisions of the Town and
Country Planning Act, 1971, and the Tamil Nadu Combined
Development and Building Rules, 2019 cannot be read to
interpret the provisions to mean something which is not
expressly given under the Statute.
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
H) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balram Kumawat Vs. Union of
India reported in 2003 [7] SCC 628, Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti V. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd reported in 2004 [1]
SCC 391 and Union of India Vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.,
reported in 2004 [2] SCC 747, has categorically observed that a
statutory scheme cannot be allowed to ordinarily deprive a
person of his right to use the land by way of reservation or
designation. In other words, the constitutional right of the
petitioner guaranteed under Article 300-A is at stake because of
the wrong interpretation and understanding of the provisions of
the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.
I) The scope of Sections 36 to 38 of the Act has been considered
and interpreted by this Court in the following judgments:-
(a) Pallawi Resources Ltd Vs. Protos Engineering Company

Pvt. Ltd [2010 [5] SCC 196] ;
(b)Arruppukkottai Nadars Uravinmurai Podhu Abiviruthi Trust
rep.by its President Mr.M.Sudhahar Vs. The Commissioner,
Aruppukkottai Municipality Aruppukkottai and the Director
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
of Town and Country Planning Madras

[MANU/TN/0894/2002] ;
(c) S.Kanagam Achi Vs. the Director Town and Country
Planning [MANU/TN/1572/2014] ;
(d)Commissioner Aruppukkottai Municipality Vs.
K.S.Kamakshi Chetty and Others [MANU/TN/3603/0211] ;
(e) V.Nagamani & Mrs.Soundara Devi Vs. The Director of
Town and Country Planning [2010 [2] CTC 510] ;
(f) Pillayar P.K.V.K.N.Trust Vs. Karpaga N.N.U.S [2010 [9]
SCC 344] ;
(g) State of Mysore Vs. H.Sanjeeviah [AIR 1967 SC 1189] ;
(h)Himat Lal K.Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad
and Another [1973 [1] SCC 222] ;
(i) S.Rathna Devi Vs. The Secretary to Government and

Another [WP.No.17753/2020] ;
(j) Sparejon Samuel Vs. The Director of Town and Country
Planning and Another [WP.No.136/2015] ; and
(k)A.S.Rathinam Vs. The Director of Town & Country
Planning and 2 Others [WP.No.22991/2021].
Therefore, the effect of failure to acquire land under Sections 36
and 37 of the Act within three years renders the classification,
reservation or designation invalid as held by the above referred
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to judgments.
J) Since this Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court has interpreted the
powers conferred on respondents 1 and 2 under Sections 26,
27, 36 and 37 of the Act elaborately and with reference to
similar enactments in other States, the judgment of the Division
Bench in J.Amsaveni Vs.The State of Tamil Nadu and Others
reported in 2023 [4] CTC 851 cannot be a binding precedent
which is in ignorance of not only the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court on examining the same provisions of
the Tamil Nadu Act, but also on the construction of similar
provisions under similar legislations throughout the country.
K) The respondents have permitted all types developments within
the area reserved as Catchment Area quite contrary to the stand
taken while rejecting representation of petitioner. The petitioner
has only put up godowns which can be permitted even
according to 2019 Regulations. Hence, impugned order is
liable to be quashed and the writ petition has to be allowed.
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(16)The 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit in WP.Nos.13419 &
13437/2017 specifically taking a stand that no building or commercial
building can be approved in the Red Hills Catchment Area irrespective of
its extent. It is contended by the Government that declaration of Red Hills
Catchment area with a separate set of regulations or development
restrictions imposed on lands which cannot be construed as land reserved
for public purpose in the Master Plan. It is stated that Section 17
specifically authorise the officials to prepare Master Plans specifying the
areas where developments can be allowed. Prescribing the land use
zoning like residential, commercial, institutional, industrial etc., is part of
the function of development authorities who are planning development.
Since the land classified as Catchment Area was not required for a public
purpose, without acquisition, areas can be conserved by restricting
developments.
(17)It is stated further that the II Master Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area
was approved by the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.190 dated 02.09.2008
specifically categorising areas within Chennai Metropolitan Area as Areas
for Buildings of Special Character, Ecologically Sensitive Areas,
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
Development Prohibited Areas, Areas of Special Character, Natural
Hazard Prone Areas and Green Belt Areas under Regulation 24 of
Development Regulations for Chennai Metropolitan Area.
(18)In the counter affidavit, it is also stated that the area bounded by
Tiruvanmiyur in the North, Bay of Bengal in the East, Buckingham Canal
in the West and Chennai Metropolitan Area boundary in the South
classified as Aquifer Recharge Area considering the good aquifer and
recharge potential of the area. A development in this area is limited to 0.8
FSI with the height of 9m and ground coverage of 40%. The 1st
respondent also compared the restrictions with the restrictions in Coastal
Regulation Zone Areas, regulated areas as per the Archaeological Survey
of India [ASI]. It is contended by the 1st respondent that in all these cases,
restrictions cannot be construed as reservation of land for public purpose
and hence, CMDA does not require these lands. When there is no
question of acquisition, the petitioner is not deprived of their right over the
property and the land will continue to remain in their ownership. It is also
stated that the petitioner can use the land for any activity other than
construction of a structure. Therefore, in the counter affidavit, a definite
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
distinction is made between lands reserved for public purpose and zoning
of areas restricting development. It is to be noted that agricultural
activities are recommended.
(19)A counter affidavit was also filed by the 2nd respondent almost in tune
with the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent. Surprisingly, an additional
counter affidavit is filed by the 2nd respondent quite contrary to the stand
taken by respondents 1 and 2 in the main counter affidavit.
(20)The Member Secretary of the 2nd respondent / CMDA has stated in the
additional counter affidavit as follows:-
 The Government and the 2nd respondent has received several
representations requesting for relaxing all Rules relating to
water bodies for development of their patta lands. The
Government by its Letter dated 18.07.2022, called for the
details of water bodies marked in the I Master Plan, II Master
Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area and to list out variations
between the two Master Plans in respect of water bodies. The
2nd respondent caused site inspection between 17.09.2022 and
03.10.2022 and an interim Report was submitted. The subject
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matter was discussed. After due discussion, the authority
resolved to take up a study on 'Regulations for Red Hills
Catchment Area', to review the present provisions and suitable
recommendations on the subject of reclassification for change
of land use from Red Hills Catchment Area.
 The Centre for Urbanization, Building and Environment
[CUBE], IIT Madras Research Park was appointed as
Consultant to study on 'Impact on Urbanization of Red Hills
Catchment Area and Measures for its Conservation and
Protection from Urbanization' with a request to recommend
appropriate measures for protection of catchment areas in the
context of urbanization development and to examine possibility
of permitting developments in the catchment area to introduce
best practices in the International and National level in
maintaining and protecting the catchment areas and the level of
urban uses permitted in the catchment areas and to suggest
appropriate measures to protect catchment area and to examine
the possibility of permitting developments in the study area in
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an overall balanced frame work of sustainable urban growth.
 In the additional counter affidavit, it is also indicated that
M/s.CUBE was also entrusted to review special Rules and
Developments in the catchment area and M/s.CUBE filed its
Inception Report in July 2023 and the Interim Report during
December 2023. It is also mentioned that based on the
scientific study and assessment of various aspects, the
respondents will review the Development Regulations.
 It is further stated that on 05.01.2024, the Interim Report of the
consultant, namely, M/s.CUBE was reviewed by a Technical
Review Committee comprising of several officials of the State,
who has recorded its recommendations by a letter dated
06.02.2024. It is once again reiterated by the 2 nd respondent
that Final Report will be considered by the Review Committee
once again and based on the suggestions of the Technical
Review Committee, the further action will be taken.
 The 2nd respondent has also stated that the Report to be
submitted by M/s.CUBE may have an impact upon the
30
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consequential reliefs sought for in the writ petitions.
(21)The tenor and spirit of the contents of the additional counter affidavit is
interestingly contrary to the contents of the counter affidavits filed by
respondents 1 and 2.
(22)Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Advocate General appearing for the official
respondents highlighted the importance of Red Hills Catchment Area as
Red Hills Lake is one of the most important sources for supply of drinking
water to Chennai City and neighbouring areas. He pointed out that the
main source of water to Red Hills lake is the surface run-off from the
combined Catchment Area of the tank which comprises Free Catchment
Area and Intercepted Catchment Area. Since 27 villages including
Alamathi Village are situated in the Free Catchment Area of Red Hills
tank, learned Advocate General submitted that any development towards
residential or institutional or commercial or industrial purposes will
adversely affect the quantity of water in the tank which is the main source
of drinking water for the Chennai City. He further submitted that the
necessity to prevent construction of buildings in such areas and to
preserve the Catchments drainage pattern, the Red Hills Catchment Area
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was notified in II Master Plan prepared in the year 2008. Learned
Advocate General submitted that the Development Regulations for
Chennai Metropolitan Area as per II Master Plan was approved vide
G.O.Ms.No.190, Housing and Urban Development Department dated
02.09.2008 and was published in the Government Gazette on 02.09.2008.
He also pointed out that the Government in exercise of its power conferred
under sub-section [4] of Section 32 and Section 122 of the Act, 1971, had
repealed and replaced the Development Regulations, 2008 by the Tamil
Nadu Combined Development and Building Rules, 2019 [hereinafter
referred to as 'the Rules, 2019'].
(23)The whole argument of the learned Advocate General is based on the
provisions of the Rules,, 2019 replacing the Development Regulations,
2008 vide G.O.Ms.No.190 dated 02.09.2008. He submitted that as per
the Rules, 2019, activities which can be permitted in Primary Residential
Use Zone and Mixed Residential Use Zone subject to certain conditions
and Regulations, are permitted. Only classifications such as Commercial
Use Zone and Institutional Use Zone etc., have not been made in these
villages to prohibit such activities in this Catchment Area. It is also
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pointed out that some authorised activities are permitted without
expansion or enlargement. Hence, there is only restriction and not
prohibition for development.
(24)Learned Advocate General submitted that Sections 36 to 38 of the Act
are not attracted as there is no reservation or designation for a public
purpose and no land owner can complain on any curtailment of their right
over the land. Only where a particular land is reserved for parking,
playgrounds or public road, or similar public purpose, Sections 36 to 38
of the Act will have application. However, in the instant case, there is no
reservation or designation for a public purpose and the land owner
continues to be the owner of the land.
(25)Learned Advocate General in unambiguous terms, submitted that the
Government or Local Body has no proposal to acquire the land in
question either under Sections 36 and 37 of the Act or to pay
compensation under Section 39 of the Act to any of the owners of the
land. He further submitted that existing authorised activities are
permitted in this area. He also pointed out that the land owners can
continue their agricultural activities in the Catchment Area as these areas
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were shown as Agricultural Zone in the I Master Plan. He added that
there is no public purpose for which the lands are required and hence,
there is no proposal to acquire such lands. Learned Advocate General
further submitted that only usage is restricted or regulated as authorised
in the Master Plan and the Rules and there is no complete prohibition on
the use of the land.
(26)Learned Advocate General relied upon paragraph No.141 of the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of K.T.Plantation
Private Limited Vs State of Karnataka reported in 2011 [9] SCC 1,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court made observations, distinguishing
power of eminent domain and the power of State which exercise police
power and referred to the restrictions that are imposed on private property
in public interest while doing Zoning Regulation in urban planning. He
also pointed out that by declaring the vast area as water Catchment Area,
no individual has a right to seek reclassification of the land and the land
owners are permitted to use the land as per the Zoning Regulation. He
also pointed out that the State has power to impose restrictions as in the
case of area which are within the Coastal Regulation Zone or Forest Area
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where any development is restricted.
(27)Learned Advocate General then relied upon the judgment of this Court
in J.Amsaveni Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in 2023 [4]
CTC 851, which according to him, has followed the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Association of Vasanth
Apartments Owners Vs. V.Gopinath and Others reported in AIR 2023
SC 1011. Referring to the fact that the Division Bench had dismissed the
writ petition which is on identical facts, learned Advocate General
submitted that the Division Bench has noted that there is no transfer of
land but only restrictions for land use. Since the Division Bench has held
that Section 38 of the Act is inapplicable to the facts, the decision of the
earlier Division Bench cannot be ignored either as per incuriam or on
any other ground merely because a different view is possible on the same
set of facts. Since the petitioners herein have not challenged the
Regulation, the petitioners cannot render the effect of Regulations
ineffective merely by stating that the lands which are not acquired within
three years from the date of publication of notice, cannot come under the
purview of restrictions by reserving the area as Catchment Area.
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(28)This Court has anxiously considered the submissions made by the
respective learned Senior Counsels appearing for the petitioners and the
learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents and
perused the materials.
(29)The questions/issues that arise for consideration before this Court are as
follows:-
(a)Whether the Government or the Local Body

can declare a vast extent of land covering more
than 27 Villages [approx. 13,000 Hectares] as
Water Catchment Area in the II Master Plan
for Chennai Metropolitan Area, 2026 and to
prohibit any activity by declaring the same as
'No Development Zone' without acquisition of
such land as contemplated under Sections 36
and 37 of the Town and Country Planning Act,
1971?
(b)Whether the reservation or designation or
requirement of such vast extent of land as
Catchment Area to preserve the land as 'No
Development Zone' shall be deemed to be
released from such reservation, allotment or
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designation if the entire land is not acquired

within three years from the date of publication
of notice in the Tamil Nadu Government
Gazette under Section 26 of the Act?
(c) Whether the 2nd respondent has power to
declare or reserve a vast extent of 13,000
Hectares of land covering 27 villages as 'No
Development Area' or restricting developments
in the Master Plan without acquiring the land
under Sections 36 and 37 of the Act or without
paying compensation in terms of Section 39 of
Town and Country Planning Act?
(d)Whether reservation of vast extent of land as
Catchment Area in the Master Plan in this case
without an intention of paying compensation
infringes the rights of land owners guaranteed
under Article 300-A of the Constitution and
hence, as a consequence, the Impugned Order
is unconstitutional.
(e) Whether the impugned order is liable to be
quashed on the ground of being arbitrary,
discriminatory and irrational on account of the
position that the respondents have allowed
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developments indiscriminately for several years

without restrictions in other cases and
thousands of buildings by private developers,
institutions, industries, hospitals, schools,
colleges, Government offices, Local Bodies,
Corporations have come up with planning
approvals in the area reserved as Catchment
Area in the Master Plan?
(f) Whether the impugned order can be sustained,
especially when the respondents have now
proposed to review the regulations after the
final report from ''CUBE'', an Expert Body
constituted based on representation of
stakeholders?
(g)Whether the judgment of Division Bench in
J.Amsaveni Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and
Others reported in 2023 [4] CTC 851, is in
ignorance of the statutory provisions and
several binding precedents of Hon'ble Supreme
Court on the interpretation of provisions under
the Town Planning Legislations of different
States?
(h)Whether prohibitions for developments or
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restrictions for developments by declaring a

vast area as Catchment Area can be accepted
as it is like prohibiting developments under
Coastal Zone Regulations [CZR] or restricting
developments in areas declared to be
prohibited for development under
Archaeological Survey of India Regulations or
restrictions in development under Forest Act?
ISSUES [a], [b], [c] & [d]:-
(30)In view of the growth of cities like Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, even
during British Regime, Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915, Madras Town
Planning Act, 1920 etc, were enacted. It is to be noted that every Town
Planning Scheme is meant to provide Regulations for development. It is
also to be noted that even under Madras Town Planning Act, 1920, the
Local Body or the State Government was required to acquire private patta
lands for using it for any public purpose, after paying compensation under
the Land Acquisition Act for the land which is reserved or designated in
Town Planning Scheme.
(31)The successful planning is to make people's lives more convenient by
creating a physical environment which conduces to health, safe passage
39
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from place to place etc., to create a lung space within the city and to
prohibit relentless building activities and to regulate activities by
classifying lands based on user Zone which form part of such Town
Planning scheme. Whenever a person's property right is injuriously
affected by virtue of any provisions contained in any Regional Plan or
Master Plan or Detailed Development Plan, the person's right to
compensation is provided even under the Madras Town and Country
Planning Act, 1920.
(32)The Madras Town and Country Planning Act, 1920, was repealed by the
Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 [Act 35 of 1972]. It
is seen that there is no material change in the scheme of Act. The Act
provides for appointment of Director of Town and Country Planning Act
and other authorities apart from constitution of Town and Country
Planning Board. The functions and powers of the Board as well as
functions of other authorities are given in the Act. Under Section 9A of the
Act, which was introduced by way of an amendment in the year 1974,
Madras Metropolitan Development Authority [MMDA] consisting of 12
persons was established. Under the Town and Country Planning Act,
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1971, after the declaration of Local Planning Area in terms of Section 10
and after the constitution of appropriate Planning Authority under Section
11, every Regional Planning Authority and Local Authorities are required
to prepare and submit a Master Plan under Section 17 of the Act for the
Local Planning Area providing for all or any of the following matters,
namely,
(a)the manner in which the land in the planning

area shall be used ;
(b)the allotment or reservation of land for
residential, commercial, industrial and
agricultural purposes and for parks, playfields
and open spaces ;
(c) the allotment or reservation of land for public
buildings, institutions and for civic amenities ;
(d)the making of provision for the national
highways, arterial roads, ring roads, major
streets, lines of communication including
railways, airports and canals ;
(e) the traffic and transportation pattern and traffic
circulation pattern ;
(f) the major road and street improvements ;
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(g)the areas reserved for future development,

expansion and for new housing ;
(h)the provision for the improvement of areas of
bad layout or absolute development and slum
areas and for relocation of population ;
(i) the amenities, services and utilities ;
(j) the provision for detailed development of
specific areas for housing, shopping, industries
and civic amenities and educational and
cultural facilities;
(k) the control of architectural features, elevation
and frontage of buildings and structures ;
(l) the provision for regulating the zone, the
location, height, number of storeys and size of
buildings and other structures, the size of the
yards and other open spaces and the use of
buildings, structures and land ;
(m)the stages by which the master plan shall be
carried out ; and
(n)such other matters as may be prescribed.
(33)Similar provisions are made in respect of different plans in respect of
other planning areas in cities and towns of the State. Section 26 of the
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Act contemplates publication of the notice of the preparation of Master
Plan for hearing any representation for modification of plan and Section
28 of the Act contemplates approval by Government. Section 35 of the
Act specifically enables restriction on the applicability of any provisions of
enactments governing Local Bodies which can be provided in the
Development Plan and other aspects. Section 35-A deals with transfer of
development rights by owner of site or land by surrendering it free of cost
to Planning Authority when it is required for public purpose subject to
terms. The procedure for variation, revocation or modification of Master
Plan, Regional Plan or New Town Development Plan etc, is also
prescribed under Section 32 of the Act.
(34) Chapter IV of the Act is regarding acquisition and disposal of land
and it is relevant to extract the following provisions:-
36. Power to acquire land under the Land

Acquisition Act.- Any land required, reserved or
designated in a regional plan, master plan, detailed
development plan or a new town development plan, as
the case may be, shall be deemed to be land needed
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for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894) and may
be acquired under the said Act as modified in the
manner provided in this Act.
37. Power to purchase or acquire lands
specified in the development plan.-
(1) Where after the publication of the notice in
the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette of preparation of
a regional plan, master plan, detailed development
plan or a new town development plan, as the case may
be, any land is required, reserved or designated in
such plan, the appropriate planning authority may,
either enter into agreement with any person for the
acquisition from him by purchase of any land which
may be acquired under section 36 or make an
application to the Government for acquiring such land
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of
1984):
Provided that if the value of such land exceeds
fifty thousand rupees the appropriate planning
authority shall not enter into such agreement without
the previous approval of the Government.
(2) On receipt of an application made under
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sub-section (1), if the Government are satisfied that

the land specified in the application is needed for the
public purpose specified therein, they may make a
declaration to that effect in the Tamil Nadu
Government Gazette, in the manner provided in
section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central
Act I of 1894), in respect of the said land. The
declaration so published shall, notwithstanding
anything contained in the said Act, be deemed to be a
declaration duly made under the said section 6 of the
said Act:
Provided that no such declaration in respect of
any particular land covered by a notice under section
26 or section 27 shall be made after the expiry of
three years from the date of such notice.
(3) On the publication of such declaration, the
Collector of the district within whose jurisdiction the
land is situate, shall proceed to take order for the
acquisition of such land under the said Act; and the
provisions of that Act shall, so far as may be, apply to
the acquisition of the said land with the modification
that the market value of the land shall be the market
value prevailing on the date of publication of the
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notice in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette under

section 26 or section 27, as the case may be.
38. Release of land.- If within three years from
the date of the publication of the notice in the Tamil
Nadu Government Gazette under section 26 or section
27- (a) no declaration as provided in sub-section (2)
of section 37 is published in respect of any land
reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose
specified in a regional plan, master plan, detailed
development plan or new town development plan
covered by such notice; or
(b) such land is not acquired by agreement, such
land shall be deemed to be released from such
reservation, allotment or designation.
39. Right to compensation.- (1) Any person
whose property is injuriously affected by virtue of any
of the provisions contained in any regional plan,
master plan, detailed development plan or a new town
development plan made under this Act shall, if he
prefers a claim for the purpose to the Tribunal with
such particulars and within such period as may be
prescribed, be entitled to obtain compensation in
respect thereof as determined by the Tribunal:
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Provided that property shall not be deemed to

be injuriously affected by reason of any of the
provisions inserted in any development plan which
impose any condition or restriction in regard to any of
the matters specified in clause (f) of sub-section (2) of
section 15, or in clauses (k) and (l) of sub-section (2)
of section 17 or in clauses (m) and (n) of sub-section
(1) of section 20, as the case may be.
(2) If, at any time after the day on which any
regional plan, master plan, detailed development
plan, or a new town development plan has come into
force, such plan is varied, or revoked, any person who
has incurred any expenditure for the purpose of
complying with such plan, shall, if he prefers a claim
for the purpose to the Tribunal with such particulars
and within such time as may be prescribed, be entitled
to obtain compensation in respect thereof as
determined by the Tribunal, if by reason only of the
variation or revocation of such plan, such expenditure
has ceased to be in any way beneficial to him.
(35) Chapter V namely Sections 40 to 46 contain some special provisions
regarding new Town Development Authority. Chapter VI consists of
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provisions relating to Control and Development and use of land. The
provisions under Chapter VI of the Act deals with development and
conformity in the development plan restrictions of buildings and lands in
the area of the planning authority and gives powers to the authorities to
stop unauthorised development and to take action for removal of
unauthorised development etc. Chapter VII deals with levy, assessment
and recovery of development charges. Chapter VIII deals with Finance.
Chapter IX deals with constitution of Tribunals etc. Chapter X deals
with appeal, revision and review as against orders passed by the
authorities under the Act in exercise of their functions. Chapter XI deals
with general provisions regarding penalties for various violations or
offences specified under the Act. All miscellaneous provisions are under
Chapter XII of the Act. The power to make Rules is given to the
Government under Section 122 of the Act and all the Rules, Notifications
and Orders are to be placed before legislation in terms of Section 123 of
the Act. Under Section 124, the Planning Authority, with the previous
approval of the Government, can make Regulations which is not
inconsistent with the Act and Rules made thereunder.
48
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
(36)The Development Control Rules for Madras Metropolitan Area
originally framed, was substituted by G.O.Ms.No.328, Housing and
Urban Development dated 18.02.1983. The Development Control Rules
specifically mandate that every development should be with a written
permission of the authority or such other Executive Officer of Local Body
to whom the power has been delegated by the authority. However, the
development Regulations for Chennai Metropolitan Area vide II Master
Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area, 2026, was prepared by Chennai
Metropolitan Development Authority [CMDA] and approved by the
Government of Tamil Nadu vide G.O.Ms.No.180, Housing and Urban
Development Department dated 02.09.2008.
(37)In the II Master Plan, which was approved by the Government,
Development Regulations are found regarding written permission for
development, the manner and procedure of obtaining permission etc. The
classification with reference to the user is provided under the Regulations.
The procedure for getting site approval and regarding the requirements to
get approval for projects, is given. While the land use are classified under
11 categories, the development that can be permitted within each category,
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is given in the Regulations. After the 11 categories of User Zones,
Regulation 24 speaks about areas for buildings of special character like
multi-storeyed buildings, continuous building areas and economically
weaker section areas are given. Under Regulation 24[2], CRZ Area,
Aquifer Recharge Area and Catchment Area are given under the heading
'Ecologically Sensitive Areas'. Under Regulation 24[2][C], the area as
found in Annexure XII has been declared as Red Hills Catchment Area in
order to protect the Redhills and Puzhal lakes from the negative impacts
of urban development. Regulations for development in Catchment area is
given in Annexure-XII. As per Annexure – XII, about 23 villages in full
and substantial survey fields in four more villages, have been declared as
Catchment Area. While permitting, existing authorised activities, it is only
said that activities which are allowed in Commercial Use Zone and
Institutional Use Zone are prohibited. Use of land as permissible in
Primary Residential Zone, Mixed Residential Zone, Industrial Zone are
allowed. Continuous Government lands are deemed to have been zoned
for Open Space and Recreational use for developing social forestry and no
land can be reclassified as Urban Use Zone even though Urban Use Zone
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is not classified or defined.
(38)As pointed out by the learned Advocate General, now, the Regulations
vide G.O.Ms.No.190 dated 02.09.2008 is replaced by the Tamil Nadu
Combined Development and Building Rules 2019. Catchment Area has
been shown under Annexure XVII where development is prohibited or
restricted. Regulations for Redhills Catchment Area is given in Appendix-
B which is in consonance with the Development Regulations vide
G.O.Ms.No.190.
(39)First of all, this Court is unable to find any scope for declaring a vast
extent of land [more than 13,000 Hectares covering 27 villages] as a 'No
Development Zone' unless such land is reserved or required or designated
for a public purpose. When a land is reserved, alloted or designated for
any purpose specified in a Master Plan, the Planning Authority namely,
the CMDA may acquire the land by an Agreement or by paying an
amount agreed or in lieu of any amount by granting the land owner, the
transfer of development rights or by making an application to the
Government for acquiring such land. In the present case, the Master Plan
was published in the year 2008 and hence, the acquisition ought to have
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been under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(40)Under Section 36, the land required, reserved or designated in a Master
Plan, shall be deemed to be a land needed for a public purpose under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. From the reading of Sections 36 and 37, it
may be inferred that the Government on the requisition of the Planning
Authority can issue a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act. However, if the land is not acquired in terms of Section 37 within
three years, such land shall be deemed to be released from such
reservation, allotment or designation. Section 39 provide for
compensation to a person if a property of the said person is injuriously
affected by virtue of any of the provisions contained in any of the Master
Plan subject to the proviso which gives certain exceptions. Except
reservation of land for public purposes as contemplated under Section 36,
no other reservation, prohibiting development is contemplated under the
Act. It is to be noted that the Impugned Order refers to the area as ''No
Development Zone''.
(41)When the State or the Local Body has made their stand very clear that
they never had a proposal to acquire the land under Section 37 or to pay
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compensation for the land under Section 39 of the Act, the Act does not
give respondents any scope for contending that they have right to declare
the area as water catchment area in public interest while preparing Master
Plan and to reject Planning Permission on the ground that the area
reserved is a 'No Development Zone'.
(42)Article 300-A of the Constitution declares that no person can be
deprived of his or her property otherwise than by an authority of law.
Therefore, a person cannot be deprived of his property right merely by an
executive decision without any legal authority under a statute which is
also expected to be a fair legislation. Unless there is a specific provision
under law which authorises to restrict the rights of individuals, it is
impossible for an authority who is delegated to perform certain functions
under statute, to deprive the property right of individual owners to his
whims and fancies.
(43)The Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
K.T.Plantation Private Limited and Others Vs. State of Karnataka
reported in 2011 [9] SCC 1, though recognizes deprivation of property of
an individual by legislation for a public purpose, the power of eminent
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domain, recognizes the power of judicial review over a decision, which
deprives a person of his private property as unlawful and unfair, if it
undermines the rule of law. When Article 300-A protects private property
against an executive action, acquisition of property without payment of
compensation will be unconstitutional. Since a law which is enacted to
acquire a land for public purpose has to be reasonable, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in several judgments has reiterated that the law which is
intended to deprive the property right of a person should be reasonable
and it should comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It is
therefore, recognized that a law that is intended to acquire private
property for public purpose should provide for payment of compensation
and should not be violative of Articles 14, 19 or 21.
(44)It is useful to refer to a few judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court to
understand the scope of Article 300-A of the Constitution, namely:
(a)2003 [7] SCC 589 [Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others

Vs. Union of India and Others] ;
(b)1981 [1] SCC 166 [Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji Vs.
Union of India and Others] ;
(c) 2005 [2] SCC 126 [State of U.P. and Others Vs. Manohar] ;
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(d)2005 [12] SCC 77 [State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Basant

Nahata] ;
(e) 1982 [1] SCC 39 [Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and
Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others];
(f) AIR 1988 SC 1487 [Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore Vs.
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Karnataka and Others].
(45)A Town-Planning legislation is intended to regulate development of
towns to secure present and future inhabitants, better sanitary conditions,
amenities and convenience. The object behind every Town Planning
Legislation is to improve the living conditions of the people. In this State,
Madras Town Planning Act, 1920 [hereinafter referred to as ''1920 Act'']
was enacted with the same object. Preparation of Town Planning Scheme
by Municipal Council, formation of layouts, construction and
improvement of public roads, projects and structures, to provide transport
facilities, water supply, laying drainage, reservation of land for streets,
roads etc., shows that the object behind the legislation was the same as in
the present Act. Even earlier, under 1920 Act, acquisition of private land
is contemplated when a private land is required for planned development
of city under the Act. Section 33 of the Act, 1920, is similar to Section 37
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of the Act, 1971 and if the land is not acquired within three years, the land
ceases to have effected as a declaration under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. Compensation at market value as on the date of
publication of Town Planning Scheme is required to be paid to the land
owners. Therefore, Sections 36 to 39 of the Act, 1971, are not new but
was effective for more than a century and which specifically mandates
acquisition of any land required, reserved or designated in a Regional Plan
or Master Plan or Detailed Development Plan for a public purpose.
(46)The learned counsels for the petitioners have cited several judgments
before this Court about the scope of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act, 1971.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court have reiterated the position
that the reservation or designation or declaration in Master Plans cannot
survive when the land of a private land owner is not acquired within three
years from the date of publication of the plan under the Act, 1971.
(47)In Bhavnagar University Vs.Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd. and Others
reported in 2003 [2] SCC 111, a Three Member Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has considered a few provisions under Gujarat Town
Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 which are similar to the
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provisions under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.
The question that arose for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court
was whether by reason of inaction on the part of the State and its
authorities under the Town Planning Act to acquire the lands [which was
reserved in a Development Plan for a public purpose] for a period of more
than 10 years, in terms of provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
lands stood de-reserved/re-designated. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after
referring to several provisions, has followed well accepted principles on
the interpretation of statute to hold that rights, whether private or public,
cannot be taken away or hampered by implication from the language
employed in a statute, unless the legislature clearly and distinctly
authorises the doing of a thing which is physically inconsistent with the
continuance of an existing right and that, an act should be so interpreted
as in no respect to interfere with or prejudice a clear private right or title
unless that private right or title is taken away per directum. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has considered the facts of the case before it and has
observed as follows:
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''29. By reason of the provision of the said Act,

a reasonable restriction has been imposed upon the
owner on the user of his property. In terms of Section
12 of the said Act, town planning is contemplated
through preparation of draft development plan which
contains not only proposals for designating certain
area for residential, industrial, commercial,
agricultural or recreational purposes but also for the
purposes for maintaining environment and ecological
balance by setting up zoological gardens, green belts,
natural reserves and sanctuaries. In terms of such
development plan reservation of certain land for
public use is also provided. From the relevant
provisions of the said Act, as noticed hereinbefore, it
is absolutely clear that in terms thereof the State
Government is made the ultimate authority to publish
a development plan, inter alia, providing for
designation or reservation of the land. The State
Government while arriving at its conclusion as
regards public interest involved in the matter is
required to arrive at its satisfaction on objective basis
as provided in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 17 to
the effect that the lands in respect whereof reservation
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is proposed to be made can be acquired for the

fulfilment of the object therefor either by agreement or
compulsory acquisition within the period specified
therein. It has not been disputed before us nor is it
necessary to consider in the facts and circumstances of
this case as to whether establishment of the
educational institutions or universities would be
covered by the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section
12 thereof.
30. Sections 20 and 21 of the said Act are
required to be read conjunctively with Sections 12 and
17. We may notice that clause (k) of sub-section (2) of
Section 12 does not find mention in sub-section (2) of
Section 17 as regards proposed reservation for the
State and other statutory authorities but clauses (n)
and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 12 are
specifically mentioned in Section 20. In Section 20,
provisions of clauses (b), (d), (f), (k) and (o) of sub-
section (2) of Section 12 have specifically been
mentioned. The High Court has proceeded on the
basis that the words “designation” or “reservation”
are interchangeable for the purpose of the Act. The
said finding of the High Court is not in question.
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31. Whereas in terms of Sections 12 and 17 of

the said Act, the reservation and designation have
been provided, sub-section (1) of Section 20 thereof
only enables the authorities to acquire the land
designated or reserved for the purpose specifically
mentioned in clauses (b) and (n) of sub-section (2) of
Section 12 as also other clauses specified therefor
either by acquisition or agreement or in terms of the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (1)
of Section 20 is merely an enabling provision.
32. Sub-section (2) of Section 20, however,
carves out an exception to the exercise of powers by
the State as regards acquisition of the land for the
purpose of carrying out the development of the area in
the manner provided for therein; a bare reading
whereof leaves no manner of doubt that in the event
the land referred to under sub-section (1) of Section
20 thereof is not acquired or proceedings under the
Land Acquisition Act are not commenced and further,
in the event an owner or a person interested in the
land serves a notice in the manner specified therein,
certain consequences ensue, namely, the designation
of the land shall be deemed to have lapsed. A legal
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fiction, therefore, has been created in the said

provision.''
(48)Following its earlier judgment in the case of Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay Vs. Dr.Hakimwadi Tenants Association and Others
reported in 1988 [Supp] SCC 55, arising out of the provisions of the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that if any private land is shown as reserved,
allotted or designated for any purpose specified in any development plan,
the same can be acquired within ten years either by an Agreement or by
following the procedure prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act. If no
steps are taken for acquisition of land within a period of six months from
the date of service of notice under Section 127 of the said Act, it is held
that the land shall be deemed to have been released from such reservation
or allotment or designation.
(49)It is relevant to extract paragraph No.40 of the said judgment which
reads thus:
''40. The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment

of the property must be strictly construed. It is well
settled that when a statutory authority is required to
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do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be

done in that manner or not at all. The State and other
authorities while acting under the said Act are only
creature of statute. They must act within the four
corners thereof.''
(50)As a matter of fact, the question whether the reservation would get
automatically extended if a revised plan is made, was also examined by
Hon'ble Supreme Court and in paragraph No.53, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as follows:-
''53. As the facts of the present case stand

absolutely on a different footing and this Court in K.L.
Gupte case [AIR 1968 SC 303 : (1968) 1 SCR 274]
was not called upon to answer the same, the same
cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition
that by reason of Section 21 of the Act, the designation
of the land although lapsed in terms of Section 20, the
same would get automatically extended or revised
once a revised plan is made. This Court in K.L. Gupte
case [AIR 1968 SC 303 : (1968) 1 SCR 274] merely
held that the land which is reserved for ten years can
be subjected to further reservation for any period till
it is actually required for its town planning activities
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leading to revision of development plans from time to

time. Therein, this Court did not negate the right of
owners. Such a right of the landowners, as noticed
hereinbefore, has been specifically acknowledged.
Nowhere it was stated that the valuable right
conferred on a landowner of getting his land reserved
by serving notice would be defeated or taken away
merely because a revised development plan was in the
offing.''
(51)Similar provisions under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning
Act, 1966, [hereinafter referred to as 'the Maharashtra Act'] was also
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in yet another judgment in
Shrirampur Municipal Council, Shrirampur Vs. Satyabhamabai
Bhimaji Dawkher and Others reported in 2013 [5] SCC 627 and the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if any land reserved, allotted or
designated for any purpose specified in any plan under the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, is not acquired by the Agreement
or under the Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the reservation,
allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and thereupon,
the land shall be deemed to be released from such reservation, allotment
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or designation and shall become available to the owner for the purpose of
development as otherwise permissible by referring to Section 127 of the
Maharashtra Act.
(52)The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Prakash R.Gupta Vs Lonawala
Municipal Corporation reported in 2009 [1] SCC 514, reversed the
judgment of the High Court to hold that the land in question, be released
in favour of private owner. The High Court rejected the prayer of the
private owner of the property by stating that there is no lapse of the
reservation on account of Section 49 of the Act which refers to a scheme.
Making a distinction between the scheme and reservation, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court again reiterated that the reservation in the final Regional
Plan or Development Plan cannot continue and the land has to be released
in favour of private owner if the land is not acquired within ten years from
the date on which the Regional Plan or Development Plan came into force.
(53)A similar view has been expressed in several precedents and we would
summarise only a few, which are stated below:-
➔ Arruppukkottai Nadars Uravinmurai Podhu Abivirudhi Trust

rep.by its President, Mr.M.Sudhahar Vs. The Commissioner,
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Arruppukkottai Municipality, Arruppukottai and Another

reported in MANU/TN/0894/2002 ;
➔ S.Kanagam Achi Vs. The Director, Town and Country
Planning reported in MANU/TN/1572/2014 ;
➔ Commissioner, Arruppukkottai Municipality Vs. K.S.Kamakshi
Chetty and Others reported in MANU/TN/3603/2011 ;
➔ V.Nagamani and Mrs.Soundara Devi Vs. The Director of Town
and Country Planning and Another reported in 2010 [2] CTC
510 ;
➔ Pillayar PKVKN Trust Vs. Karpaga NNUS reported in 2010 [9]
SCC 344 ;
➔ State of Mysore Vs. H.Sanjeeviah reported in AIR 1967 SC
1189 ;
➔ Himat Lal K.Shah Vs. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad
and Another reported in 1973 [1] SCC 227 ;
➔ Raju S.Jethmalani and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and
Others reported in 2005 [11] SCC 222 ;
➔ S.Rathna Devi Vs. The Secretary to Government and Another
in WP.No.17753/2020 dated 19.03.2021 ;
➔ Sparejon Samuel Vs. The Director of Town and Country
Planning and Another in WP.No.136/2015 dated 15.10.2015 ;
➔ A.S.Rathinam Vs. The Director of Town and Country Planning
and 2 Others in WP.No.22991/2021 dated 03.01.2022.
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(54)Since the Act does not contemplate requirement, reservation, designation
of a private land in the plan prepared under the Act, 1971, for a public
purpose without acquiring it and the fact that the Government or CMDA
has no proposal to acquire the land, this Court is of the view that the
reservation of such a vast extent of land as Catchment Area in Master
Plan and to treat the same as ' No Development Zone ', while passing the
impugned order shows that the land is reserved for a public purpose in the
plan and hence, the impugned order is invalid and it has no sanctity of
law. If the Government reserves such a vast area declaring the same as a
No Development Zone, without any intention to acquire or to pay
compensation at least under Section 39 of the Act, such a declaration even
at the inception is void and we cannot accept the case of the respondents
that such classification or declaration without acquisition is available to
the Town Planning Authorities or the Local Body or the Government in
exercise of their power under the Act, 1971. Such declaration amounts to
deprivation of proprietory right of individual owners and the declaration is
unconstitutional as it affects the right guaranteed under Article 300-A of
the Constitution.
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(55)In the factual context, it is also useful to refer to yet another judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court which arise in a different context. In Chairman,
Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals
Limited and Others reported in AIR 2007 SC 2458 : 2007 [8] SCC 705.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of the M.P. Nagar
Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam [Act 23 of 1973] [hereinafter referred to
as 'the Madhya Pradesh Act'].
(56)It is necessary to record the following facts to understand the ratio
decidendi of the said judgment. On 13.02.1974, the State Government
issued a Notification in exercise of its power under Section 13[1] of the
Madhya Pradesh Act constituting Indore Planning Area covering 37
villages. The 2 villages, B and K were not included in the said
Notification. In respect of the area covered under the Notification dated
13.02.1974, the State Government issued a notification, establishing the
authority, 'Indore Vikas Pradhikaran [which is the appellant before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court] under Section 38 of the Madhya Pradesh Act, the
State delegated its power in favour of the District Planning Committee. By
a Notification dated 13.11.2000, the District Planning Committee
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amended the planning area by adding 115 villages including the two
villages, B and K. A draft Development Plan was published on
27.06.2003 followed by the Declaration dated 24.08.2004 declaring the
intention to prepare a Town Development Plan after resolution, for
construction of a by-pass road of 60 meters width. The private owners
who own lands in Villages B and K, submitted application on 02.12.2004
before the Planning Authorities for sanction of their development plan
under Section 29[1] of the Madhya Pradesh Act. Since the said
application was not considered by the officials, a writ petition was filed by
the private land owners for issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the
sanction of site plan. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated
17.05.2006. The private land owners filed an appeal before the Division
Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court and the same was allowed striking
down the declaration made under Section 50[2] of the Madhya Pradesh
Act.
(57)The question that arose for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court,
was whether the District Planning Committee in exercise of its delegated
power can automatically extend the area of a portion of the appellant land,
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namely, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran despite the Notification constituting the
appellant by the State is restricted to the area covered by the Notification
dated 13.02.1974. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered several
principles and the following paragraphs are relevant:
''46. Where, however, a scheme comes into force,

although it may cause hardship to the individual
owners as they may be prevented from making the
most profitable use of their rights over property,
having regard to the drastic consequences envisaged
thereunder, the statute should be considered in such a
manner as a result whereof greater hardship is not
caused to the citizens than actually contemplated
thereby. Whereas an attempt should be made to
prevent unplanned and haphazard development but
the same would not mean that the court would close its
eyes to the blatant illegalities committed by the State
and/or the statutory authorities in implementation
thereof. Implementation of such land development as
also building laws should be in consonance with
public welfare and convenience. In United States of
America zoning ordinances are enacted pursuant to
the police power delegated by the State. Although in
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India the source of such power is not police power but

if a zoning classification imposes unreasonable
restrictions, it cannot be sustained. The public
authority may have general considerations, safety or
general welfare in mind, but the same would become
irrelevant, as thereby statutory rights of a party
cannot be taken away. The courts must make an
endeavour to strike a balance between public interest
on the one hand and protection of a constitutional
right to hold property, on the other.
....
Human rights issue
53. The right to property is now considered to
be not only a constitutional right but also a human
right.
54. The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights
of 26-8-1789 [Ed.: This historic declaration also
known as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen, 1789 was adopted by the French National
Assembly after the French Revolution.] enunciates
under Article 17:“17. Since the right to property is
inviolable and sacred, no one may be deprived
thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained,
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obviously requires it and just and prior indemnity has

been paid”. Further under Article 17 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 dated 10-12-
1948, adopted in the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution it is stated that: (i) Everyone has
the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others. (ii) No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.
55. Earlier human rights were existed to the
claim of individuals right to health, right to
livelihood, right to shelter and employment, etc. but
now human rights have started gaining a multifaceted
approach. Now property rights are also incorporated
within the definition of human rights. Even claim of
adverse possession has to be read in consonance with
human rights. As President John Adams (1797-1801)
put it:
“Property is surely a right of mankind as real as
liberty.”
Adding,“The moment the idea is admitted into society
that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and
that there is not a force of law and public justice to
protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”
56. Property, while ceasing to be a fundamental
right would, however, be given express recognition as
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a legal right, provisions being made that no person

shall be deprived of his property save in accordance
with law.
Interpretation of the Act
57. The Act being regulatory in nature as by reason
thereof the right of an owner of property to use and
develop stands restricted, requires strict construction.
An owner of land ordinarily would be entitled to use
or develop the same for any purpose unless there
exists certain regulation in a statute or statutory rules.
Regulations contained in such statute must be
interpreted in such a manner so as to least interfere
with the right to property of the owner of such land.
Restrictions are made in larger public interest. Such
restrictions, indisputably must be reasonable ones.
(See Balram Kumawat v. Union of India [(2003) 7
SCC 628] ; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Pilibhit
Pantnagar Beej Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 391] and Union of
India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [(2004) 2 SCC
747] ) The statutory scheme contemplates that a
person and owner of land should not ordinarily be
deprived from the user thereof by way of reservation
or designation.
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.....
59. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.
Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627]
construing Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act,
this Court observed: (SCC pp. 634-35, para 6-7)
“6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of
the Act confers a valuable right in favour of a
person whose lands are sought to be acquired.
Having regard to the provisions contained in
Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in
exercise of its power of ‘eminent domain’ may
interfere with the right of property of a person
by acquiring the same but the same must be for
a public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.
7.Indisputably, the definition of public
purpose is of wide amplitude and takes within
its sweep the acquisition of land for a
corporation owned or controlled by the State,
as envisaged under sub-clause (iv) of Clause
(f) of Section 3 of the Act. But the same would
not mean that the State is the sole judge
therefor and no judicial review shall lie.
(See Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596].
It was further stated: (SCC p. 640, para 29)

“29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation.
This Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad
Sharma [AIR 1966 SC 1593] observed that in
such a case the provisions of the statute should
be strictly construed as it deprives a person of
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his land without consent. [See also Khub

Chand v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1967 SC
1074] and CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P)
Ltd. [(2004) 1 SCC 597] ]
There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a case of
this nature due application of mind on the part of the
statutory authority was imperative.”
In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [(2005) 12
SCC 77 : JT (2005) 8 SC 171] it was opined: (SCC p.
102, para 59)
“In absence of any substantive
provisions contained in a parliamentary or
legislative act, he cannot be refrained from
dealing with his property in any manner he
likes. Such statutory interdict would be
opposed to one's right of property as
envisaged under Article 300-A of the
Constitution.”
In State of U.P. v. Manohar [(2005) 2 SCC 126] a
Constitution Bench of this Court held: (SCC p. 129,
paras 7-8)
“7. Ours is a constitutional democracy and
the rights available to the citizens are declared
by the Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f)
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was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to

the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed
in the Constitution, which reads as follows:
‘300-A. Persons not to be deprived of
property save by authority of law.—No person
shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.’
8. This is a case where we find utter lack of legal
authority for deprivation of the respondent's property
by the appellants who are State authorities.”
In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] the law is stated in
the following terms: (SCC p. 622, para 34)
“34. The right of eminent domain is the
right of the sovereign State, through its regular
agencies, to reassert, either temporarily or
permanently, its dominion over any portion of
the soil of the State including private property
without its owner's consent on account of
public exigency and for the public good.
Eminent domain is the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the Government,
or in the aggregate body of the people in their
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sovereign capacity. It gives the right to resume

possession of the property in the manner
directed by the Constitution and the laws of the
State, whenever the public interest requires it.
The term ‘expropriation’ is practically
synonymous with the term ‘eminent domain’.”
It was further observed: (SCC p. 627, para 48):
“48. The word ‘property’ used in Article
300-A must be understood in the context in
which the sovereign power of eminent domain
is exercised by the State and property
expropriated. No abstract principles could be
laid. Each case must be considered in the light
of its own facts and setting. The phrase
‘deprivation of the property of a person’ must
equally be considered in the fact situation of a
case. Deprivation connotes different concepts.
Article 300-A gets attracted to an acquisition
or taking possession of private property, by
necessary implication for public purpose, in
accordance with the law made by Parliament
or a State Legislature, a rule or a statutory
order having force of law. It is inherent in
every sovereign State by exercising its power
of eminent domain to expropriate private
property without owner's consent. Prima facie,
State would be the judge to decide whether a
purpose is a public purpose. But it is not the
sole judge. This will be subject to judicial
review and it is the duty of the court to
determine whether a particular purpose is a
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public purpose or not. Public interest has

always been considered to be an essential
ingredient of public purpose. But every public
purpose does not fall under Article 300-A nor
every exercise of eminent domain an
acquisition or taking possession under Article
300-A. Generally speaking preservation of
public health or prevention of damage to life
and property are considered to be public
purposes. Yet deprivation of property for any
such purpose would not amount to acquisition
or possession taken under Article 300-A. It
would be by exercise of the police power of the
State. In other words, Article 300-A only limits
the powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of
law. There has to be no deprivation without
any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other
mode is not acquisition or taking possession
under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is
no law, there is no deprivation. Acquisition of
mines, minerals and quarries is deprivation
under Article 300-A.”
Rajendra Babu, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) in Sri Krishnapur Mutt v. N. Vijayendra
Shetty [(1992) 3 Kar LJ 326] observed: (Kar LJ p.
329, para 8)
“8.The restrictions imposed in the
planning law though in public interest should
be strictly interpreted because they make an
inroad into the rights of a private person to
carry on his business by construction of a
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suitable building for the purpose and

incidentally may affect his fundamental right if
too widely interpreted.”
.....
72. Land use, development plan and zonal plan
provided for the plan at macro-level whereas the town
planning scheme is at a micro-level and, thus, would
be subject to development plan. It is, therefore,
difficult to comprehend that broad based macro-level
planning may not at all be in place when a town
planning scheme is prepared.
73. Once a final plan comes into force, steps
inter alia are taken for acquisition of the property.
Section 34 of the Act takes care of such a contingency.
The town development scheme, as envisaged under
Section 49 of the Act, specifically does it. Out of nine
clauses contained in Section 49, six relate to
acquisition of land for different purposes. Clauses (v),
(viii) and (ix) only refer to undertaking of such
buildings or construction of work by the authority
itself, reconstructions for the purpose of buildings,
roads, drains, sewage lines and the similar amenities
and any other work of a nature such as would bring
about environmental improvements.
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........
79. Section 50 of the Act no doubt uses the word
“at any time”. The question, however, is what that
would imply. The town planning scheme, it would bear
repetition to state, is made for the purpose of
implementation of a development plan. Ordinarily,
therefore, it would envisage the time period for
coming into force of the development plan and the
expiry thereof. Unless such a construction is to be
given to the words “at any time”, it would lead to
manifest injustice and absurdity which is not
contemplated by the statute. For giving an effective
meaning to the provisions of Section 50 of the Act, the
same is required to be read in the context of other
provisions of the statute and in particular the
interpretation clauses which we have noticed
hereinbefore.
80.Section 50(1) of the Act provide for
declaration of this intention to prepare town
development scheme “at any time”. The words “at any
time” do not confer upon any statutory authority an
unfettered discretion to frame the town development
scheme whenever it so pleases. The words “at any
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time” are not charter for the exercise of an arbitrary

decision as and when a scheme has to be framed. The
words “at any time” have no exemption from all forms
of limitation for unexplained and undue delay. Such
an interpretation would not only result in the
destruction of citizens' rights but would also go
contrary to the entire context in which the power has
been given to the authority.
81. The words “at any time” have to be
interpreted in the context in which they are used. Since
a town development scheme in the context of the Act is
intended to implement the development plan, the
declaration of intention to prepare a scheme can only
be in the context of a development plan. The starting
point of the declaration of the intention has to be upon
the notification of development plan and the outer
limit for the authority to frame such a scheme upon
lapsing of the plan. That is the plausible interpretation
of the words “at any time” used in Section 50(1) of the
Act. (See State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender
Singh [(2004) 10 SCC 585] .)
(58)The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on further on the interpretation and
purposive construction of an enactment and quoted the principle reiterated
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by it in RBI V. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd
repoted in 1987 [1] SCC 424 and the relevant paragraph is extracted
below:-
“33.If a statute is looked at, in the context of its

enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker,
provided by such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at
without the glasses provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and
discover what each section, each clause, each phrase
and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit
into the scheme of the entire Act.”
(59)The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed
by Indore Vikas Pradhikaran upholding the view of the Division Bench of
the High Court holding that the Draft Development Scheme prepared by
the appellant therein in respect of two villages is ultra vires. The
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court on the interpretation of statute and
on the scope of preparing a Development Plan under the Town Planning
Act vis-a-viz., reiterated the right to property as recognised under Article
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300-A of the Constitution. Hence, the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran's case is an authority for the
proposition that restriction or regulation regarding development under
Town Planning legislation cannot be equated with the police power of the
State and a classification imposing unreasonable restriction cannot be
sustained. The Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised the principle that
Article 300-A of the Constitution will come into play whenever such
restriction does not fall within the statutory power. In other words, when
there is lack of legal authority for deprivation of the petitioners' properties,
this Court has to strike down such illegal act. When we look at the Act as
a whole and try to find out the object and purpose of each provision, this
Court is unable to find such police power in the State to prepare a Master
Plan with unreasonable restrictions without even disclosing or with a
backing of a scientific study.
(60)The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently, in Association of Vasanth
Apartments' Owners Vs. V.Gopinath and Others reported in 2023 SCC
Online 137 : AIR 2023 SC 1011, made a distinction between the
requirement of Open Space Regulation [OSR] for development of
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Apartments as required under Rule 19 of the Development Control Rules
[in short 'DCR'] and the reservation or designation of any private land for
public purpose while preparing Master Plan or Detailed Development
Plan under the Act, 1971. The Constitutional validity of Rule 19 of DCR
came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. A writ
petition was filed by the Association of Apartment Owners challenging the
vires of Rule 19 of DCR under which a Gift Deed has to be executed in
respect of 10% of area as OSR when total area of development exceeds
10,000 sq.m. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition
and upheld the validity of Rule 19. The Association preferred an appeal
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered several other cases where similar issues arose for consideration
and dealt with cases elaborately. On behalf of appellants before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the argument was that the rule is contrary to the
Act, that the requirement of 10% as OSR is violation of the civil right
vested in every owner of the property to hold the land and that without
payment of compensation, the appellants cannot be deprived of their
property which is required to be conveyed in favour of Corporation as per
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DCR. Referring to some of its earlier judgments and by referring to
constitutional right under Article 300A and Article 14, the argument
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the requirement to transfer
free of cost 10% area reserved for recreational purposes is
unconstitutional and the lands which are not being used for the purpose of
Open Space should be reverted to the Apartment Owners. However, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court made a distinction between Sections 36 to 39 of
the Act, 1971 and the requirement under DCR to reserve up to 10% of the
area as OSR if the total area of layout is more than 10,000 sq.m.
Referring to Section 36 of the Act, 1971, it was contended before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court that Rule 19[b] of DCR is beyond
the rule making power as the Act does not empower the State to acquire
the land without compensation.
(61)The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after analysis of all the statutory provisions
under the Act, 1971, held that the Act does not contemplate execution of
Gift Deed in principle. However, it was held that the land required,
reserved or designated in Regional Plan, Master Plan, Detailed
Development Plan, which is contemplated under Sections 36 and 37 of
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the Act, 1971, is different from the requirement of reserving 10% of the
area of development as OSR in terms of Rule 19 of DCR and is not ultra
vires the Act and Rule 19 is statutory in nature. It is also held that neither
the impugned Rule nor Regulation violates Article 14 or Article 300A of
the Constitution of India. It was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that
such reservation as OSR does not involve transfer. This judgment is on
the interpretation and scope of Rule 19[b] of DCR. The scope of Sections
36 to 39 as interpreted by Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, in
catena of judgments earlier discussed, would lead to the only conclusion
that there is no scope of reservation of private property in the Master Plan
for a public purpose and thereby, prohibit development without reference
to Sections 36 to 39 of the Act.
(62)From the facts and legal principles narrated above, this Court is
inclined to hold as follows:-
(a)The Government or the Local Body has no right to declare the
vast extent of 13,000 Hectares as Water Catchment Area in the
II Master Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area 2026 for public
purpose if they intend to prohibit any development activity
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without an intention of acquiring such land.
(b)Reservation or designation or requirement of such vast extent
of land as Catchment Area in the Master Plan and thereby
prohibiting any development by declaring the same as 'No
Development Zone', is deemed to be released from such
reservation, allotment or designation since the land is not
acquired within three years from the date of publication of
notice in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette as contemplated
under Section 26 of the Act, 1971.
(c) The 2nd respondent has no power to declare or reserve a vast
extent of 13,000 Hectares of land covering 27 villages as 'No
Development Area' or restricting development in the Master
Plan without acquiring the land under Sections 36 and 37 of the
Act or without paying compensation in terms of Section 39 of
the Act, 1971.
(d)The reservation of vast extent of land as Catchment Area in the
Master Plan in this case without an intention of paying
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compensation infringes the rights of land owners guaranteed
under Article 300-A of the Constitution and such reservation is
therefore, unconstitutional and can be ignored.
ISSUE No.[e]:-
(63)In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, specific averments
are made as to discrimination in permitting development. In paragraph
No.23 of the affidvit in WP.No.13437/2017, the details of about 59
buildings which have been recently constructed after II Master Plan, are
furnished. In the counter affidavit, there is no specific denial as to the
developments by several other Companies and individuals putting up huge
constructions in the same vicinity which falls under Redhills Catchment
Area. A specific ground is also raised that the impugned order prohibiting
development, by citing the classification as Catchment Area is arbitrary
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The impugned
order is therefore, discriminatory and the petitioners have been
discriminated by prohibiting them from utilising their lands even for
construction of a godown without any other activity, while others in
the same area are allowed to make profitable use of their rights over
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the property. A similar ground is also raised by the petitioner in
WP.No.13419/2017. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be
quashed on the ground of being arbitrary, discriminatory and
irrational.
ISSUE [f]:-
What is Catchment?
(64)Invariably, Catchment is an area of land where water collects when it
rains, often bounded by hills. As the water flows over the landscape it
finds its way into streams and down into the soil, eventually feeding the
river. Some of this water stays underground and continues to slowly feed
the river in times of low rainfall. Every inch of land on the earth forms
part of a catchment. Catchment in the normal parlance means collection
of rainfall. Catchment Area with reference to a water body denotes the
area from which rainfall flows into such water body like river or stream.
In Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India and Others reported
in AIR 2000 SC 3751, Catchment Area is understood as the area wherein
the rainfall water is collected and drained into the river or reservoir. The
entire area from which drainage is received by a body of water [Reservoir,
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lake or river] is recognized as Catchment Area in a few legislations. In
several countries Catchment Authority is constituted under statutes to
manage and protect water catchments by providing catchment
infrastructure to ensure supply of quality water. From a little search, this
Court finds instances of appointing Agencies to manage and protect the
Catchment Area and to provide Catchment infrastructure to promote and
ensure water quality. In Tamil, Water Catchment Area is known as
''ePh;g;gpog;g[ gFjp'' which is given the meaning ''ePh;epiyfSf;F. ePh;
te;J nrUtjw;F Mjhukhd gFjpahf mika[k; kiH
bga;a[k; gug;g[/''
(65)The Catchment Area is not a water body as such. However, any area
may serve as a Catchment Area with reference to a particular water body.
Catchment is natural and it cannot be and need not be artificially created.
In other words, out of a larger area which serves as a Catchment Area, an
extent of about 13,000 Hectares of land covering 27 villages have now
been earmarked to impose restrictions on development without a
scientific study or knowledge of any social or economical impact and the
possible benefits to the public. What is the outweighing advantage by
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prohibiting development is not stated on the basis of any scientific study.
By providing infrastructure to drain water to collect through storm water
drainage channel or by making rain water harvesting compulsory in all
areas surrounding Redhills lake, it is possible to achieve desired result
without prohibiting development. If the 2nd respondent has notified a vast
extent of about 13,000 Hectares as a 'No Development Area' to prevent
any urban activities, the same without a scientific study cannot be
permitted. Even if it is done in public interest, there is no scope for
keeping the reservation without acquiring the land in terms of Section 38
of the Act, 1971. No other provision saves total prohibition for
development affecting the property rights of the land owners. Though the
right to property is no more fundamental after Article 19[1][f] had been
deleted, the right guaranteed under Article 300-A is recognized as a
constitutional or human right. Unless deprivation of right is under a fair
and reasonable legislation, an executive decision in exercise of power
under a statute without an application of mind or on any scientific basis
cannot be permitted.
POLICY DISCONNECT OR GLARING CONTRADICTIONS:-
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(66)In the counter affidavit, it is stated that Redhills, Sholavaram and Puzhal
lakes are the main sources of water supply to the Chennai City. Since
these lakes have vast catchment areas in which several water bodies are
existing and major water source to these lakes is the run-off during
rainfall in the water bodies situated in the upstream site of these lakes, it
is contended that maintenance of Catchment Area free from developments
is very important to maintain the quantity as well as quality of drinking
water supply sourced from these lakes to Chennai City. It is further stated
that considering the importance of this Catchment Area [27 villages which
are notified as Redhills Catchment Area], it is stated that the development
therein are regulated as per Regulations in Annexure-XII of Development
Regulations 2008. It is also stated that in the Catchment Area, only
existing developments are allowed and no reclassification into any urban
use zone is permitted.
(67)It is true that the State has a definite interest in seeing that no drop of
water from any of the streams of the State go waste. If it is a contention
that the vast extent of land is now classified as water catchment area
prohibiting or restricting building activities and to keep the land as
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Agricultural Use Zone, this Court is unable to find any logic or any
scientific basis for the conclusion.
(68)Every year about 90,000 cubic Kilometres volume of water evaporates
from sea. Only less than 10% of the quantity is returned to the lands by
rain. A scientific study reveals that 8% of fresh water is required for
human health and sanitation purposes and 20% is consumed by
industries. Remaining water around 70% is used only for agricultural
purposes. It is true that agricultural operation is most essential and
production of food grain and other consumer goods is very important for
the existence of mankind and animals and all other living things. When
the State has no definite plan or infrastructure to save water that goes to
Sea during rainy season throughout the State, we are unable to appreciate
any wisdom in the decision of the State, Local Body and the Planning
Authorities to now designate a vast extent of more than 13,000 Hectares
of land [covering 27 villages] in a partially developed portion of the City
as Catchment Area with a hope that this would ensure regular feeding to
Red Hills Lake which is one of the main sources of drinking water to the
city and to allow only agricultural operation in this huge area which
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would deprive the city population to get a drop of drinking water from the
lakes.
(69)The Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court have time and again issued
several directions to preserve and protect water body and water resources.
In this regard, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Orissa Vs Government of India and Others reported in 2009 [5] SCC
492, has issued directions to the Central and State Governments to
constitute a body of eminent scientists to find out scientific ways and
means to solve water shortage problem throughout the country. However,
both the Central and State Governments have not found out a solution to
prevent the increasing volume of rain water going to Sea by maintaining at
least the carrying capacity of every water body. This Court, has issued
several directions, taking note of the ecological impact by growing
Eucalyptus trees and Karuvelam trees which draw up huge quantity of
water from soil wherever they are planted, no active or effective step is
taken by the State Government all these years despite several directions
issued by this Court earlier to prevent falling of water level dramatically
due to growing of these species. As a matter of fact, we find that growing
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of Eucalyptus trees in plain is encouraged by the Government owned
Undertaking like M/s.Tamil Nadu Newsprint and Paper Limited [TNPL].
(70)Learned Advocate General produced before this Court, the Interim
Report submitted by the Centre for Urbanization, Buildings and
Environment [hereinafter referred to as M/s.CUBE] on the Study of
Impact of Urbanization of the Red Hills Catchment Area and Measures for
its Conservation and Protection from Urbanization.
(71)From the Report, it is revealed that out of 1189 sq.km of Chennai
Metropolitan Area, [now the area is expanded to above 5000 sq.km.] an
extent of 137.2 sq.km [13,720 Hectares] is declared as Red Hills
Catchment Area. The Report is submitted only in the year 2023. From
the Report it is also seen that the Report is about the study of Impact of
Urbanization of Redhills Catchment Area and Measures for its
Conservation and Protection from Urbanization. The concern of the
Expert Body is about the Urban Development which can significantly
impacts Catchment Areas, affecting the hydrological cycle, water quality
and overall ecosystem. Since urban development involves the
construction of impervious surfaces such as roads, buildings and parking
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lots, which prevent the natural infiltration of water into ground, leading to
increased surface run-off, the Committee expressed its concern because of
more water being flown into rivers and streams which can cause higher
peak flows and increase the risk of flooding. The Expert Body also
expressed its concern about the possible water pollution or contamination
due to industrial activities in Catchment Area. The Expert Body also
accepts vegetation as a balancing factor in regulating water flow reducing
erosion and enhancing water quality through natural filtration process.
(72)If the prime intention of the respondents to reserve huge area as
Catchment Area for the purpose of getting more water flow into Redhills
Lake, the agricultural activities suggested by the Expert Body is quite
contrary to the idea of Catchment Area being served as a water source for
the Redhills lake. If agricultural activity is permitted in such huge extent
of area, even a drop of water will not be available in the Redhills lake for
human consumption. Therefore, obviously there is a policy disconnect.
(73)From the above, this Court only infer that the respondents have no idea
while declaring 27 villages as Catchment Area in the II Master Plan. It is
surprising to note that the Catchment Area should be understood as a
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natural geographical feature. Therefore, by declaring a portion of Redhills
Area as a Catchment Area is discriminatory. Even though management of
catchment area is essential to improve the eco system, what is more
required is to provide the necessary infrastructure to maintain the
Catchment Area to serve the real purpose, that is, to get quality drinking
water for the City. Culling out a specific area as a Catchment Area and
declare this as a Development Prohibited Zone, as admitted by the
respondents in the counter affidavit, is due to lack of proper consultation
and planning. Therefore, the necessity for getting a Report from
M/s.CUBE indicates that the respondents have now realised the Policy
Disconnect or the lack of wisdom in restricting the Redhills Catchment
Area to confined 13,720 Hectares of land and to declare the same as
''Development Prohibited Zone''.
(74)This Court, having gone through the Report and the contents of the
counter affidavit, can infer that the decision taken in the year 2008 to
declare a vast extent of 13,000 Hectares as Catchment Area in the Master
Plan does not go well with the reasons now stated in the counter affidavit,
prohibiting development in Catchment Area.
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(75)From the above discussion, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the
impugned order is lacking wisdom and it suffers from legal malafides.
POINT [g]:-
(76)The learned Advocate General relied upon the judgment in
J.Amsaveni's case [cited supra]. In a similar case, a different note is
struck in the following lines:-
''30. In the present case, there is no transfer of

land but only restriction on use. The records reveal
that the proposal for removing the area from being a
catchment area was also considered atleast a decade
ago, and rejected. Sections 26, 27 and 38 apply where
at the time of making the plan, the land is reserved,
allotted or designated for the use by the State for
creation of public utility areas like roads, parks,
community halls, etc. If these areas are not acquired,
then the reservation under the plan lapses and the
owner gets a right to develop it in a manner he deems
fit. Even then, the development must be in accordance
with the plan. As long as the plan exists, the owner
cannot claim a right to raise a construction.''
(77)The question before the Division Bench is exactly the same. After
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taking note of the fact that the Redhills and Puzhal lakes are very
important lakes for water supply and it is the duty of the State to protect
the same, the Division Bench observed that Catchment Areas had been
identified in the Master Plan and there is no transfer of ownership.
(78)The question before this Court is whether this Court, being a co-equal
Bench, can ignore the said judgment or hold that the said judgment
cannot be a binding precedent.
(79)The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again reiterated that if a
Coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by
another Bench, the matter has to be referred to a Larger Bench. While the
law laid down in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger in strength is
binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength, it is
always held as inappropriate for a Division Bench to overrule the
decisions of co-equal Bench. Such a practice is held to be detrimental not
only to the rule of discipline and the Doctrine of binding precedents, but
was considered with great amount of concern to avoid inconsistency in
decisions on the binding of law as consistency and certainty is more
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important for the development of law. However, if a judgment of co-equal
Bench is per incuriam of a Larger Bench or a binding precedent by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court or in ignorance of statutory provisions, a
judgment cannot be a precedent or an authority for the proposition it lays.
This exception is well accepted. Keeping in mind the principles that
Hon'ble Supreme Court had reiterated to maintain judicial discipline, this
Court has considered the judgment of the Division Bench in
J.Amsaveni's case [cited supra] with a forensic mind.
(80)The Division Bench in J.Amsaveni's case, has dealt with the same
situation where the owner of land submitted a representation alleging that
by virtue of Section 36 of the Act, 1971, the lands which fall within the
Catchment Area as per the II Master Plan are not acquired by the
Government within the period prescribed and that the lands shall be
deemed to have been released. However, the Development Authority
rejected the representation on the ground that the question of applying the
Land Acquisition Act does not arise as the classification of lands as
Catchment Area only restrict the usage of lands and hence, Section 38 of
the Act, 1971, is not applicable. The Division Bench dealt with a case
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where the private land owner filed a writ petition to quash the
communication dated 19.09.2017 and to direct the respondents to release
the lands belonged to the petitioner from being reserved as Catchment
Area and reclassified the same as Urban Use Zone within the stipulated
time. It is to be noted that the issue that was taken for consideration by
the Division Bench was whether the respondents therein are justified in
classifying the area as a water catchment area for Redhills lake and
declare it as a 'No Development Zone' under the II Master Plan for
Chennai Metropolitan Area. After referring to Sydney Water Catchment
Authority and Stream Sense Manual to know, what is a catchment, the
Division Bench has relied upon several judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court and the recommendations to protect and improve the environment,
the water bodies and the need to prioritize providing drinking water over
other development programs. Again the Division Bench relied upon a
few judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court on the importance to preserve
the valuable right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
and the duty of Courts to balance development on one hand and
environment on the other. The Division Bench, in paragraph No.12,
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referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Vikas
Pradhikaran Vs. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals Limited reported
in 2007 [8] SCC 705, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
follows:-
''45. Town and country planning involving land

development of the cities which are sought to be
achieved through the process of land use, zoning plan
and regulating building activities must receive due
attention of all concerned. We are furthermore not
oblivious of the fact that such planning involving
highly complex cities depends upon scientific
research, study and experience and, thus, deserves
due reverence.
46. Where, however, a scheme comes into force,
although it may cause hardship to the individual
owners as they may be prevented from making the
most profitable use of their rights over property,
having regard to the drastic consequences envisaged
thereunder, the statute should be considered in such a
manner as a result whereof greater hardship is not
caused to the citizens than actually contemplated
thereby. Whereas an attempt should be made to
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prevent unplanned and haphazard development but

the same would not mean that the court would close its
eyes to the blatant illegalities committed by the State
and/or the statutory authorities in implementation
thereof. Implementation of such land development as
also building laws should be in consonance with
public welfare and convenience. In United States of
America zoning ordinances are enacted pursuant to
the police power delegated by the State. Although in
India the source of such power is not police power but
if a zoning classification imposes unreasonable
restrictions, it cannot be sustained. The public
authority may have general considerations, safety or
general welfare in mind, but the same would become
irrelevant, as thereby statutory rights of a party
cannot be taken away. The courts must make an
endeavour to strike a balance between public interest
on the one hand and protection of a constitutional
right to hold property, on the other.''
(81)This Court has already referred to the relevant passages of the judgment
of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Vikas Pradhikaran's case [cited
supra] in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment.
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(82)The judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Vikas
Pradhikaran's case [cited supra] has been relied upon by the co-equal
Bench ignoring the spirit of the judgment as a whole and ignoring the
principle or legal position reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said
judgment.
(83)Be that as it may, the Division Bench then extracted the facts leading to
the filing of writ petition including the grounds raised in the writ petition.
The judgment of a learned Single Judge made in WP.No.30169/2022 was
relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner therein, wherein the
learned Single Judge held that lands having not been acquired as per
Section 38 of the Act, 1971, stand released. After referring to the details
furnished by the respondents therein for classifying 23 villages as Redhills
Catchment Area, the Division Bench considered the policy of the
respondents to restrict development only to preserve Redhills Catchment
Area. After accepting the contention of the respondents that Sections 37
and 38 cannot be made applicable for classification of vast area as
Catchment Area and therefore, application of Section 38 of Act, 1971,
does not arise after referring to Sections 36, 37 and 38 of the Act, 1971,
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the Division Bench held that the State has power to regulate the manner in
which an area is to be developed and that, it is fundamental of any Zoning
Regulation law. The Division Bench also observed that a combined
reading of the provisions of the Act shows that the plan must propose
transfer of title from the owner to the Government for the purpose of
implementing any of the plans set forth under Section 36 of the Act.
Quite surprisingly after referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Association of Vasanth Apartments Owners Vs. V.Gopinath
and Others reported in 2023 SCC Online 137, the Division Bench has
held as follows:-
''30.In the present case, there is no transfer of

land but only restriction on use. The records reveal
that the proposal for removing the area from being a
catchment area was also considered atleast a decade
ago, and rejected. Sections 26, 27 and 38 apply where
at the time of making the plan, the land is reserved,
allotted or designated for the use by the State for
creation of public utility areas like roads, parks,
community halls, etc. If these areas are not acquired,
then the reservation under the plan lapses and the
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owner gets a right to develop it in a manner he deems

fit. Even then, the development must be in accordance
with the plan. As long as the plan exists, the owner
cannot claim a right to raise a construction.
31. A master plan is formed under Section 17 of
the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.
The master plan is prepared by the local planning
authority after consultation with the regional planning
authority. The provision under Section 17(2)
empowers the architects of the master plan to decide
as to how the land in the planning area (defined under
Section 2(30) which includes the Master Plan for
Chennai area) are to be used. The said Section 17
makes a difference between the manner of use under
Section 17(2)(b) and 17(2)(c). This Section makes it
very clear that the planning authorities have the
power to restrict the usage of particular land or area.
The provisions relating to acquisition do not apply to
these lands. The areas where lands which are
required, reserved or designated alone are to be
proceeded for acquisition. In the case at hand, the
restriction is on the use, that is to keep apart the area
for the surface water to run off into the lake. By no
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stretch of imagination, the restriction on use can be

interpreted as requisition/reservation/designation for
the purpose of land acquisition in terms of Section 17
(2) (b), (c), (d), (g), (i), (k) and (j). The relevant
provision reads as under:
"17. Master Plans.

...
(2) The master plan may purpose or provide

for all or any of the following matters,
namely:-
(a) the manner in which the land in the

planning area shall be used;
(b) the allotment or reservation of land for

residential, commercial, industrial and
agricultural purposes and for parks, play-
fields and open spaces;
(c) the allotment and reservation of land for

public buildings, institutions and for civic
amenities;
(d) the making of provision for national

highways, arterial roads, ring roads, major
streets, lines of communication including
railways, airports and canals;
(e) the traffic and transportation pattern and

traffic circulation pattern;
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(f) the major road and street improvements;
(g) the areas reserved for future development,

expansion and for new housing;
(h) the provision for the improvement of areas

of bad layout or obsolete development and
slum areas and for relocation of population;
(i) the amenities, services and utilities;
(j) the provision for detailed development of

specific areas for housing, shopping,
industries and civic amenities and educational
and cultural facilities;
(k) the control of architectural features,

elevation and frontage of buildings and
structures;
(l) the provision for regulating the zone, the

location, height, number of storeyes and size of
buildings and other structures, the size of the
yards and other open spaces and the use of
buildings, structures and land;
(m) the stages by which the master plan shall

be carried out; and
(n) such other matters as may be prescribed."
32.The right of the owner to develop an area

after getting approvals, is restricted, for a period of
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three years. On the lapse of three years, law presumes

that the Government does not require the land
reserved by it and a right is conferred on the owner to
develop it in accordance with law. The three year
period is a reasonable restriction on the right of the
owner. We have to note, even if there are no
reservations, still the owner has to comply with the
zoning and town planning laws. It is always open to
the State to restrict the development of land. For
example, it can refuse to grant permission for
residential constructions in an industrial area and
vice versa. That does not mean the right of the owner
of the land is taken away, it is only regulated.
Similarly, in the present case, the right, title and
interest over the lands of the petitioner and those
situated in 23 villages found in Annexure XVII of the
2019 Rules, are not taken away and they continue to
be the owners. Even at the time of purchase, the
petitioner was aware that they are purchasing lands
near a huge trough of water. Unplanned development
in such areas would lead to not only cutting of the
source of water to the Red Hills lake but could also
have consequences of flooding.
108
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
33.This would have been sufficient to dispose

the writ petition. However, considering the importance
of the issue we have to dwell into The Tamil Nadu
Combined Development and Building Rules, 2019.
These Rules of 2019 have been notified on 04.02.2019.
The notification has been issued, inter alia, in the
exercise of powers vested in the Government under
Section 32(4) and Section 122 of the Tamil Nadu Town
and Country Planning Act, 1971, apart from several
other legislations dealing with local bodies. In
particular we would refer to Annexure XVII read with
Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Combined Development and
Building Rules, 2019. As per the Annexure XVII,
certain areas come under the category of development
prohibited or restricted areas. Clause 12 of Annexure
XVII reads as follows:-
"(12)Catchment area (only for CMA): Redhills
and Puzhal lakes are the main sources of water supply
to the Chennai City. In order to protect this water
source from the negative impacts of the urban
developments contiguous areas in the catchments of
these lakes has been declared as "Redhills catchments
area". The description of the catchments area and
109
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
regulations for development therein is given in

Appendix-B."
34. As stated above, Red Hills and Puzhal lakes
are very important lakes for water supply and it is the
duty of the State to protect the same. Therefore, to
prevent the negative impacts of urban development in
these areas, "catchment areas" had been identified
and Regulations for development had been notified. In
so far as Red Hills catchment areas are concerned,
Appendix-B to Annexure-XVII gives a list of 27
villages. Out of these 27 villages, 23 villages are
covered in full and 4 villages have been partly
notified. A perusal of the list of the villages notified
shows that Vellanur and Morai villages come under
the category of the entire villages being notified as the
catchment areas. These two villages are found in
Serial Nos. 4 and 5.
35.It has also been notified in clause 6 of
Annexure B that no lands shall be re-classified into
any urban use zone. The Rules read with the Annexure
makes it very clear that the State and its entities in
discharging its duties to protect the environment and
to save the catchment areas, have decided to prohibit
110
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
any development in the form of layouts in these areas.

The need of the public outweighs the private interest
in real estate development. Furthermore, the same has
been observed in the very judgment that has been
relied upon by the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 18388 of
2016 etc. batch dated 27.09.2016. The relevant
paragraph No. 13 reads as under:-
"(13) Admittedly, in Development Regulation
No. 24(2) (c), Annexure-XII of the Second
Master Plan for Chennai Metropolitan Area,
2026, the lands situated at Alamathi Village
belonging to the petitioners are covered under
the Redhills Catchment Area. According to the
respondents, the lake at Redhills is the main
source of water supply to Chennai and in order
to protect it from the negative impacts of
urbanisation of the surrounding areas, it has
been declared as a catchment area, where
development is restricted. However,
development to certain extent are allowed,
subject to satisfying zoning regulations and
planning parameters in some areas falling
under the catchment area, whereas, it is the
specific case of the petitioners that as per
Section 38 of the Act, if an area reserved under
the Master Plan is not acquired within three
years from the date of publication of such
Master Plan, such area is deemed to be
released from such reservation."
36. The above order was passed on 27.09.2016
111
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
and the Regulations have come into force on

04.02.2019. We have to point out that the petitioner
has not challenged these Regulations also. We have
already held that Section 38 is inapplicable to the
facts of the case. The solution of the petitioner ought
to have been to challenge the Regulation and she has
failed to do so.
37.It is the duty of the State under Article 38 to
promote the welfare of the people by securing and
protecting as effectively as possible a social order in
which justice prevails. Apart from that, the petitioner
owes a duty under Article 51 A (g) to protect and
improve the natural environment including forest,
lakes, rivers and wild life and to have compassion for
all living creatures. It is well-known that the lakes of
Puzhal and Red Hills, supply water to the residents of
the city of Chennai. There has been a growing demand
for development of property in and around Chennai.
This development has to go hand in hand with the
requirements of environment. We feel that, in
discharge of this constitutional duty to balance the
interest of the public and to protect the environment,
at the same time respecting the rights of the
112
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
individuals who own the property, these Regulations

have been brought into force. Without water supply
there is no point in trying to develop the land.
38.As early as in 1990, CMWSSB had flagged
the issue of the negative impact of development of
house sites in the catchment area. If the catchment
area is filled up with houses, it will not only result in
flooding but in the long term would result in drying up
the lakes. We now refer to the work Understanding
your catchment-Stream sense manual. It stated the use
of catchment area. It reads:-
"Vegetation and wetlands act like sponges to
slow and absorb water during wet times of the
year. When we replace vegetation and wetlands
with impervious surface (roading, paving,
parking areas, rooftops, etc.), less water
infiltrates into the ground and more water
flows directly into streams through drainage
ditches and stormwater drainage pipes. The
increased runoff may cause a variety of
problems, including flooding, streambank
erosion, sedimentation and pollution. The
problems created by paved surfaces are made
worse at dry times of the year. Because
infiltration is slowed, there is less build up of
groundwater. The 'psonge' becomes dry.
Without the return of groundwater, many
streams simply dry up during periods of low
rainfall. By reducing the amount of water a
113
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
catchment can hold, you end up having too

much when it rains and not enough when it
does not."
This shows that development, by means of construction

on catchment areas, is absolutely deleterious to the
environment.
39.It is in that light, the petitioner's right to

property has been restricted and not taken away.
Therefore, the argument on Article 300A fails. It is
here that the position of law approved by the Supreme
Court in Vasanth Apartments' case (stated supra)
assumes relevance. The Court has in approval of the
above view, quoted the view in Village of Euclid Ohio
v. Ambler Realty Co, reported in
MANU/USSC/0172/1926 as extracted hereunder:
"21.Building zone laws are of modern origin.
They began in this country about 25 years ago.
Until recent years, urban life was
comparatively simple; but, with the great
increase and concentration of population,
problems have developed, and constantly are
developing, which require, and will continue to
require, additional restrictions in respect of
the use and occupation of private lands in
urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom,
necessity, and validity of which, as applied to
114
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
existing conditions, are so apparent that they

are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or
even half a century ago, probably would have
been rejected as oppressive. Such regulations
are sustained, under the complex conditions of
our day, for reasons analogous to those which
justify traffic regulations, which, before the
advent of automobiles and rapid transit street
railways, would have been condemned as
fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there is no inconsistency, for, while the
meaning of constitutional guaranties never
varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a
changing world it is impossible that it should
be otherwise. But although a degree of
elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning,
but to the application of constitutional
principles, statutes and ordinances, which,
after giving due weight to the new conditions,
are found clearly not to conform to the
Constitution, of course, must fall."
(84)First of all, the Division Bench has not noticed the stare decisis or the
decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Vikan Pradhikaran's
case [cited supra] and in the latest judgment in Association of Vasanth
Apartments Owners's case [cited supra] reported in 2023 SCC Online
137. In the later judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made the
115
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
distinction between the reservation or designation or requirement of an
area for a public purpose in a Master Plan and the requirement of
reserving 10% of OSR where construction/development is in respect of
more than 10,000 sq.m. as per Development Control Rules. It is noted
that Hon'ble Supreme Court in the later case, held that there is no transfer
involved since Rule 19 of DCR is held to be a valid legislation. The
Division Bench in J.Amsaveni's case has quoted the selected phrases
from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above cited two cases
and came to the conclusion, apparently contrary to several judgments of
Larger Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the position reiterated
in several decisions quoted by this Court in this judgment on
interpretation of similar provisions under different statutes.
(85)Having regard to the issue that was framed for consideration and the
conclusions reached placing reliance on the selected phrases of the two
judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court to derive some provisions ignoring
the principles of law and the scope of similar provisions under different
statutes as interpreted by Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court is unable to
116
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
follow the judgment of the Division Bench in J.Amsaveni's case [cited
supra.
(86)The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Assam Vs. Ripa Sarma reported
in 2013 [3] SCC 63, has held that a judgment rendered in ignorance of
the earlier judgments of the Benches of co-equal strength, or by a binding
precendent, cannot be elevated to the status of precedent.
(87)In Narmada Bachao Andolan and Others Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh and Others reported in 2011 [7] SCC 639, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has considered the Doctrine of Precedents and Doctrine of Per
Incuriam and the discussion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by referring to
different several factual contexts cannot be ignored. For convenience, it is
relevant to extract the relevant paragraphs which read thus:-
''PRECEDENCE DOCTRINE:-
64. The court should not place reliance upon a
judgment without discussing how the factual situation
fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by
analysing all the material facts and the issues
117
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
involved in the case and argued on both sides. A

judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has
some distinguishing features. A little difference in facts
or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the
precedential value of a decision. A judgment of the
court is not to be read as a statute, as it is to be
remembered that judicial utterances have been made
in setting of the facts of a particular case. One
additional or different fact may make a world of
difference between the conclusions in two cases.
Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a
decision is not proper. (Vide MCD v. Gurnam
Kaur [(1989) 1 SCC 101 : AIR 1989 SC 38] , Govt. of
Karnataka v. Gowramma [(2007) 13 SCC 482 : AIR
2008 SC 863] and State of Haryana v. Dharam
Singh [(2009) 4 SCC 340 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 112] .)
PER INCURIAM DOCTRINE:-

65. “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In
practice per incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium.
The courts have developed this principle in relaxation
of the rule of stare decisis. Thus, the “quotable in
law” is avoided and ignored if it is rendered in
118
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
ignorance of a statute or other binding authority.

66. While dealing with the observations made by
a seven-Judge Bench in India Cement Ltd. v. State of
T.N. [(1990) 1 SCC 12 : AIR 1990 SC 85] , the five-
Judge Bench in State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries
Ltd. [(2004) 10 SCC 201] , observed as under :
(Kesoram Industries Ltd. case [(2004) 10 SCC 201] ,
SCC pp. 292 & 297, paras 57 & 71)
“57. … A doubtful expression occurring in a
judgment, apparently by mistake or
inadvertence, ought to be read by assuming
that the court had intended to say only that
which is correct according to the settled
position of law, and the apparent error should
be ignored, far from making any capital out of
it, giving way to the correct expression which
ought to be implied or necessarily read in the
context, …
***
71. … A statement caused by an apparent
typographical or inadvertent error in a
judgment of the court should not be
misunderstood as declaration of such law by
119
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
the court.” (emphasis added)

(See also Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya
Lal [(1975) 2 SCC 232 : AIR 1975 SC 907]
, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602
: 1988 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 1988 SC 1531]
, State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 139] and Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra [(2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1
SCC (Cri) 514] .)
67. Thus, “per incuriam” are those decisions
given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory
provision or authority binding on the court concerned,
or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or
conclusion that has been arrived at without
application of mind or proceeded without any reason
so that in such a case some part of the decision or
some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is
found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.
68. Admittedly, the NWDT award did not
provide for allotment of agricultural land to the major
sons of such oustees. The States of Gujarat and
Maharashtra had given concessions/relief over and
above the said award. Thus, Narmada Bachao
Andolan (1) [(2000) 10 SCC 664] has been decided
with the presumption that such a right had been
120
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
conferred upon major sons by the NWDT award

and Narmada Bachao Andolan (2) [(2005) 4 SCC 32]
has been decided following the said judgment and
interpreting the definition of “family” contained in the
R&R Policy. When the two earlier cases were being
considered by the Court, it had not been brought to its
notice that the NWDT award did not provide for such
an entitlement. In such cases, the issue is further
required to be considered as to whether, as we will
consider the definition of the word “family” at a later
stage, the mistake inadvertently committed by this
Court earlier, should be perpetuated.
69. The Courts are not to perpetuate an
illegality, rather it is the duty of the courts to rectify
mistakes. While dealing with a similar issue, this
Court in Hotel Balaji v. State of A.P. [1993 Supp (4)
SCC 536 : AIR 1993 SC 1048] observed as under :
(SCC p. 551, para 12)
“...To perpetuate an error is no heroism.
To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial
conscience. In this we derive comfort and
strength from the wise and inspiring words of
Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter [1 NY 3
(1847)] , AMY at p. 18:
“a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that
121
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
he is fallible and therefore ever ready to learn

: great and honest enough to discard all mere
pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it
may lead : and courageous enough to
acknowledge his errors.”’ [Ed. : As observed
in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. v. Union of
India, (1986) 1 SCC 43, p. 46, para 2.] ”
(See also Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of
M.P. [(2004) 7 SCC 558 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1989] and Mayuram Subramanian
Srinivasan v. CBI [(2006) 5 SCC 752 : (2006)
3 SCC (Cri) 83 : AIR 2006 SC 2449] .)
70. In Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In
re [(1995) 3 SCC 619] this Court observed : (SCC p.
629, para 10)
“10. … None is free from errors, and the
judiciary does not claim infallibility. It is truly
said that a judge who has not committed a
mistake is yet to be born. Our legal system in
fact acknowledges the fallibility of the courts
and provides for both internal and external
checks to correct the errors. The law, the
jurisprudence and the precedents, the open
public hearings, reasoned judgments, appeals,
revisions, references and reviews constitute the
internal checks while objective critiques,
debates and discussions of judgments outside
the courts, and legislative correctives provide
the external checks. Together, they go a long
way to ensure judicial accountability. The law
thus provides procedure to correct judicial
errors.”
122
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
(88)It is also useful to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
V.Kishan Rao Vs. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital and Others reported
in 2010 [5] SCC 513, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
follows:-
''54. When a judgment is rendered by ignoring the

provisions of the governing statute and earlier larger
Bench decision on the point such decisions are
rendered per incuriam. This concept of per incuriam
has been explained in many decisions of this Court.
Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was)
speaking for the majority in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372]
explained the concept in the following words : (SCC p.
652, para 42)
“42. … ‘Per incuriam’ are those decisions
given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some
inconsistent statutory provision or of some
authority binding on the court concerned, so
that in such cases some part of the decision or
some step in the reasoning on which it is
based, is found, on that account to be
demonstrably wrong.”
(89)How and what renders a judgment, per incuriam is also considered by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Land Development and
123
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others reported in 1990 [3] SCC 682.
(90)In Subhash Chandra and Others Vs. Delhi Subordinate Services
Selection Board and Others reported in 2009 [15] SCC 458, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court considered a few judgments on the issue, what is per
incuriam. Whether a decision may be held to be per incuriam where
relevant statutory provisions, or binding case law authority, have been
overlooked or misinterpreted in arriving at the decision. It is well settled
that a per incuriam precedent can be ignored or overlooked and of course,
it is not an easy job in every case where the factual issues are little
complicate. In the instant case, this Court has already observed that all
the provisions of the Act, 1971, were not considered by the co-equal
Bench. There is no specific provision which would enable the authorities
to classify any land in the Master Plan as one reserved for public purpose
and thereby prohibiting development without resorting to Sections 36, 37
and 39 of the Act, 1971. In other words, the 1971 Act though permits
restricted land use according to classification subject to payment of
compensation as contemplated under Section 39 of the Act, it does not
124
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
authorise the classification of a huge track of lands as Catchment Area
and declare the lands as ''No Development Zone'' without acquiring the
same as contemplated under the Act. The conclusion reached by the
Division Bench accepting the arguments of the respondents therein that
reservation of a vast extent of land as Catchment Area does not fall within
the purview of Sections 36 and 37 of the Act and therefore, Section 38 is
not applicable, is in ignorance of law and principles reiterated by Hon'ble
Supreme Court and this Court on the interpretation of Sections 36 to 38 of
the Act, 1971, in several precedents. Since the judgment of the Division
Bench in J.Amsaveni's case [cited supra] has failed to take note of
several judgments which are binding on application of Doctrine of stare
decisis, the said judgment does not stand as a precedent. This Court has
no hesitation to hold that the judgment by co-equal Bench in
J.Amsaveni's case is per incuriam of the core provisions of the Act,
1971, and several binding precedents.
ISSUE [h]:-
(91)The learned Advocate General submitted that the restrictions or
prohibitions in the Catchment Area is permissible in exercise of the police
125
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
power of the State. He also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in K.T.Plantation Private Limited and Another Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in 2011 [9] SCC 1. He contended that the State has
police power to acquire the land in exercise of its power of eminent
domain which are distinguishable. In the above judgment, the
constitutional validity of Roerich and Devikarani Roerich Estate
[Acquisition and Transfer] Act, 1996, [hereinafter referred to as 'the
Acquisition Act'] and Section 110 of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961,
along with scope of Article 300-A of Constitution were examined. The
Acquisition Act contemplates some compensation and not compensation
payable under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that Acquisition Act was meant for promotion of agriculture and
therefore, enacted as an agrarian reform to get protection under Article 31-
A of Constitution so that no one can challenge under Articles 14 and 19 of
Constitution. Even though Act provides for compensation, it was argued
that compensation fixed is illusory. Since it is held that Act is protected
under Article 31-A of Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further
held that the Acquisition Act cannot be called in question in any Court on
126
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
the ground that compensation provided by that Act was not adequate.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court however clarified the legal position that a law
seeking to acquire private property for public purpose cannot say 'no
compensation shall be paid' in paragraph No.192. When Tamil Nadu
Town Planning Act contemplates acquisition by following Land
Acquisition Act when a land is reserved for public purpose in a Master
Plan and requires payment of compensation even if a person's right to
develop is affected by restrictions, this Court is unable to find any support
to the stand of State relying upon this judgment.
(92)It is to be noted that the Town Planning Act is enacted in exercise of
statutory power of the State under Article 243[W] of the Constitution
which reads as follows:-
243W. Powers, authority and responsibilities of

Municipalities, etc.Subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law,
endow--
(a)the Municipalities with such powers and
authority as may be necessary to enable them to
function as institutions of self-government and such
127
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
law may contain provisions for the devolution of

powers and responsibilities upon Municipalities,
subject to such conditions as may be specified
therein, with respect to—
(i)the preparation of plans for economic
development and social justice;
(ii)the performance of functions and the

implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to
them including those in relation to the matters listed
in the Twelfth Schedule;
(b)the Committees with such powers and authority
as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the
responsibilities conferred upon them including those
in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth
Schedule.
(93)The following are the subjects listed in Twelfth Schedule of the
Constitution:-
Twelfth Schedule [Article 243W of the Constitution

(Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992]
1. Urban planning including town planning.
2. Planning of land- use and construction of
buildings.
128
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
3. Planning for economic and social development.

4. Roads and bridges.
5. Water supply for domestic, industrial and
commercial purposes.
6. Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid
waste management.
7. Fire services.
8. Urban forestry, protection of the environment
and promotion of ecological aspects.
9. Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of
society, including the handicapped and mentally
retarded.
10.Slum improvement and upgradation.
11.Urban poverty alleviation.
12.Provision of urban amenities and facilities such
as parks, gardens, playgrounds.
13.Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic
aspects.
14.Burials and burial grounds; cremations,
cremation grounds and electric crematoriums.
15.Cattle pounds; prevention of crue;ty to animals.
16.Vital statistics including registration of births
and deaths.
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WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
17.Public amenities includind street lighting,

parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences.
18.Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries.
(94)A legislation by a State in exercise of its power under Article 243[W] is
only to provide basic amenities and to carry out responsibilities conferred
upon the Local Body in relation to matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule.
Having regard to the source of power, this Court is unable to accept the
contention that the State has exercised its police power while preparing
the Master Plan or any Development Plan through the authorities. The
Police Power of the State may be exercised when the legislative power is
exercised to protect the environment in public interest or when the
legislation intend to protect the nation during emergencies. It is to be
noted that Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically held in the case of
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran's case [cited supra], that in India,
source of power to legislate on town planning, is not a police power.
(95)Learned Advocate General submitted that the restrictions under Town
Planning Act are similar to the Coastal Zone Regulation or restricting
development under Archaeological Survey of India Regulations or under
130
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
different Central enactments by the Union. The Central Government, in
exercise of its power to protect environment, enacted Environment
Protection Act. The Coastal Zone Regulations are in exercise of its power
under the Act to protect environment. Similarly, the source of power to
restrict development or prohibit development under different enactments
cannot be compared with the restrictions under Town Planning legislation.
When the restrictions or reservation under the Town and Country
Planning Act is subject to satisfying the statutory provisions, the
respondents cannot rely upon prohibitions or restrictions in different
enactments where the source of power and object of legislations are
entirely different. Hence, this Court is unable to countenance the
arguments of learned Advocate General by comparing the restrictions
under the Town Planning Act to that of Coastal Zone Regulations or other
restrictions under Archaeological Survey of India Regulations.
ISSUE [i]:-
(96)From the additional counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is seen
that M/s.CUBE, an Expert Body has been tasked to carry out a study on
the impact of urbanization of Redhills Catchment Area and measures for
131
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
its conservation and protection from urbanization. The Expert Body has
submitted an interim report. The respondents have now stated that the
Report was required by the Government at the instance of representatives
from various stakeholders. Therefore, the respondents have submitted
before this Court that they will review the categorisation and fresh
Regulations on the development in water catchment area after a study.
When the respondents have decided to review the Regulation after the
Final Report from M/s.CUBE, this Court is of the view that the impugned
order cannot be allowed to stand. It is also to be noted that the impugned
order is contrary to the Master Plan inasmuch as the petitioners' were
directed to demolish the godown/building only on the ground that no
development is permissible in catchment area. Whereas, some
developments which are permissible in Mixed Residential Zone, Semi-
Industrial Zone, are permitted even as per the Regulations in catchment
area. The impugned order is therefore, contrary to the Regulations in the
II Master Plan.
CONCLUSION:-
(97)For all the above reasons, the writ petitions stand allowed and the
132
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
impugned order dated 26.04.2017 in Letter No.24801/UD-VII[1]/2016-3
is hereby quashed. The classification of limited extent of 13,720 Hectares
of lands as catchment area as per Second Master Plan is declared
unconstitutional. However, it is open to the respondents to revise the
Master Plan taking note of this judgment and in the light of the
recommendations of M/s.CUBE in their Final Report strictly adhering to
the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.
The respondents shall consult experts and provide necessary
infrastructure to ensure protection of water bodies throughout the area
where the jurisdiction of CMDA is extended and supply of quality
drinking water in sufficient quantity. No costs. Consequently, connected
miscellaneous petitions are closed.
[S.S.S.R., J.] [N.S., J.]

30.04.2024
AP
Index: Yes
Internet : Yes
Neutral Citation: Yes
133
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To
1.The Secretary
Government of Tamil Nadu
Department, Fort St George
Chennai 600 009.

3.The Director,
Rural Development and Panachayat Raj
Panagal Building, Saidapet,
Chennai 600 015.
4.The Commissioner
5.The Superintending Engineer

Water Resources Organization
Palar Irrigation Division, Chepauk
Chennai 600 005.
134
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
S.S. SUNDAR, J.,

and
N.SENTHILKUMAR, J.,
AP
Common Order in
WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017
30.04.2024
135

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WP.Nos.

13419 & 13437/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Reserved on 26.03.2024 Delivered on 30.04.2024

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.S. SUNDAR

WP.Nos.13419 & 13437/2017

M/s.Global Waste Recyclers Ltd

1.The Government of Tamil Nadu

2.The Member Secretary

5.The Superintending Engineer

For Petitioner : Mr.K.Kabir, Senior counsel

M/s.B.T.Enterprises Private Limited

1.The State of Tamil Nadu

2.The Member Secretary

3.Alamathi Village Panchayat

5.Greater Chennai Corporation

For Petitioner : Mr.P.Wilson, Senior counsel

disposed of by this common order.

(2)WP.No.13419/2017 is filed for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash

the impugned proceedings of the 1st respondent dated 26.04.2017 in

respect of the lands measuring an extent of 1.21 acres comprised in

S.Nos.126/1B, 1B1, 295/2B2, B2 at Alamathi Village, Ponneri Taluk,

Thiruvallore High Road, Redhills, Thiruvallur District as the lands are

deemed to have been released from reservation as catchment area by

Act, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1971'].

(3)WP.No.13437/2017 is also filed to quash the proceedings of the 1st

respondent dated 26.04.2017 in respect of the lands comprised in

S.Nos.292 to 297 and 302 in Alamathi 2 Revenue Village, abutting

Redhills-Thiruvallur High Road, Sholavaram Panchayat Union,

from reservation as Catchment area by virtue of Section 38[b] of the Tamil

respondent to process planning application of the petitioner without

(4)Brief facts inWP.No.13419/2017 are as follows:-

(5)The petitioner is a Company registered under the provisions of the Indian

Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner purchased an extent of 1.21 acres in

S.Nos. 126/1B, 1B1, 295/2B2, B2 at Alamathi Village, Ponneri Taluk,

under a registered Sale Deed date 10.03.2008. The petitioner, in order to

construct a godown for storing the raw materials of the Company,

submitted an application on 22.08.2008 before the Commissioner,

Sholavaram Panchayat Union for planning permission and the 4 th

respondent processed the application in consultation with the 2 nd

respondent. The 4th respondent addressed a letter to the 5th respondent /

Water Resources Organization on 22.08.2008, to find out whether any

possibility of the construction of any building and to give No Objection

Certificate for the construction of godown by the petitioner. The 5th

respondent issued No Objection Certificate with conditions to raise the

foundation of the building.

(6)On 30.10.2009, the 4th respondent granted Planning Permission in favour

of the petitioner for construction of a godown. Pursuant to the Planning

godown as well as office building. However, the 2 nd respondent / CMDA

issued a notice dated 26.11.2015 calling upon the petitioner to produce

entire construction is unauthorised, issued Locking, Sealing and

Demolition Notice dated 31.12.2015 under Sections 56 and 57 of the

to as 'the Act']. The petitioner preferred a revision on 04.03.2016 under

in which the petitioner's building/godown is constructed, lies in Redhills

Catchment Area where no construction activities is permissible. Holding

that there is no chance for the petitioner's building to be regularised, the

same, the petitioner filed WP.No.18997/2015.

(7)The writ petition in WP.No.18997/2015 filed by the petitioner herein and

the other writ petitions filed by petitioner in WP.No.13437/2017, were

disposed of by this Court on 27.09.2016, by permitting both the