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REMEMBERING EARLY MODERN
REVOLUTIONS
Typeset in Bembo
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements vii
Notes on contributors viii
Afterword 177
David Andress
Bibliography 191
Index 213
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
the History of the Reign of Henry VII as part of a collective project of translation
of Bacon’s works (Classiques Garnier).
Steven Sarson got his BA at the University of East Anglia, his PhD at Johns
Hopkins University, and his HDR at Paris 7 University. He was Lecturer, then
Assistant Professor at Swansea University and is Professor of American Civili-
sation at Jean Moulin University, Lyon. He is the author of Barack Obama:
American Historian (Bloomsbury, 2018), The Tobacco Plantation South in the Early
American Atlantic World (Palgrave, 2013) and British America, 1500–1800: Creat-
ing Colonies, Imagining an Empire (Hodder-Arnold, 2005; Bloomsbury, 2010),
as well as of various book chapters and articles in periodicals, including the
Journal of Economic History, Journal of the Early Republic and the William and
Mary Quarterly. He is editor of an eight-volume document collection on The
American Colonies and the British Empire (Pickering and Chatto, 2010–11). He
is currently working on the influence of the Glorious Revolution in America
from 1688 to the U.S. Bill of Rights and on the Declaration of Independence
in particular.
index of nearly 100 years of the Revue de la Société Haïtienne d’Histoire, de Géog-
raphie et de Géologie, Haiti’s preeminent social science journal. She has published
articles in French Studies and Francosphères, as well as in edited volumes.
Edward Vallance
This collection brings together papers ref lecting on the memory of the
English, American, French and Haitian revolutions. In so doing, of course, it
acknowledges that these historical moments do represent revolutions. Yet the
determination of what is or is not a revolution is clearly also dependent upon
shifts in public memory. For current evidence of this, we could turn to some
recently published Oxford handbooks on this subject. These handbooks offer
collections of essays by leading historians on topics that are seen to be of cen-
tral historical importance (at least to undergraduate students in Anglophone
history degree courses). The American and the French Revolutions each have
their own handbooks (the latter edited by one of our own contributors here).1
There are two handbooks covering the ‘English Revolution’, one focusing on
its literature, the other with a more purely historical remit.2 These last two
texts in particular give clear testimony to the transformative influence of pub-
lic memory on our understanding of revolution.
The ‘English Revolution’ discussed in these two handbooks was only
invented in the nineteenth-century by the French historian and statesman
Francois Guizot. It was Guizot who first repackaged what had previously been
the Earl of Clarendon’s ‘Great Rebellion’ as a revolution. Guizot’s redefini-
tion of the upheaval of England’s mid-century was grounded on historical
comparison: it was the similarity between 1642 and 1789 that meant that
the English civil war could now be recognised as a French-style revolu-
tion avant la lettre. As Guizot put it, ‘[The analogy of the two revolutions is
such that [the English] would never have been understood [as one] had not
[the French] taken place’.3 As Dan Edelstein and Keith Michael Baker have
recently argued, the self-consciousness of revolutionaries is a critical feature of
revolutions and that self-awareness is itself informed by a process of historical
2 Edward Vallance
Revolution, in which she noted that in its first English usage, ‘revolution’ was
attached to political restoration rather than transformation.
In the seventeenth-century, where we find the word for the first time as
a political term, the metaphoric content was even closer to the original
meaning of the word, for it was used for ‘a movement of revolving back
to some pre-established point . . . Thus, the word was first used not when
what we call a revolution broke out in England and Cromwell rose to the
first revolutionary dictatorship, but on the contrary, in 1660 . . . at the . . .
restoration of the monarchy’.12
According to Koselleck and the many scholars who have followed him,
revolutions not only transform political and/or constitutional arrangements
but also fundamentally alter understandings of time. The French Revolution
moved European culture from a world governed by backward-looking astro-
logical, eschatological or traditional chronological frameworks to one in which
a clear distinction between past and present had been established, enabling
the imagination and realisation of different political futures. This association
between revolution and modernity is clearly evident in some recent schol-
arship: witness Steven Pincus’s declaration of the revolution of 1688 as ‘the
first modern revolution’, a moment he characterises as a struggle between two
competing ideologies, both intent on modernising the English state.13
We can certainly recognise, in a seventeenth-century English context, read-
ings of ‘revolution’ that understood it in the earlier, cyclical sense, such as that
given by the Royalist astrologer George Wharton in reference to Charles II’s
restoration:
cultural and white racial superiority, have influenced our view of history than
in the marginalising of the Haitian revolution. David Geggus has argued, ‘Of
all the Atlantic revolutions, the fifteen-year sturggle that transformed French
Saint-Domingue into independent Haiti produced the greatest degree of social
and economic change, and most fully embodied the contemporary pursuit of
freedom, equality and independence’.20
Yet, Geggus observed, it was absent from Palmer and Godechot’s discus-
sion of ‘Atlantic Revolutions’, seemingly out of place in their ‘grand narrative
of liberal, republican democracy’.21 The exclusion of Haiti, then, cannot be the
same grounds as the diminishing profile of 1688: Haiti is not neglected because
it did not experience a ‘true’ revolution but is instead overlooked on the basis
of Eurocentric assumptions about the epicentre of revolutionary activity. It
is worth noting here that Geggus’s comments sit within a single essay in The
Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, an editorial choice that reflects the con-
tinuing marginalisation of Haiti in discussions of the Age of Revolutions in
spite of a considerable revival of scholarly interest.
Haiti, more than any other revolution, reminds us too that the process of
forgetting is as critical as national, local and individual remembrance to shap-
ing revolutionary ‘memory’.22 If, as David Armitage has argued contrary to
Koselleck, revolutions remain civil wars, then it has been recognised since
classical times that forgetting was the best means of quelling these conflicts.23
In the early modern period, collective amnesia came to be legislated through
‘acts of oblivion’.24 Yet these acts sought not to demand the impossible – that
a public that had lived through revolutionary trauma should forget that horror –
but rather that these memories should no longer be acted upon.25 As our con-
tributors show, these orders were never fully observed, even by the states that
had legislated for them in the first place. Revolutionary horror was invoked to
clamp down on popular political activity, to stigmatise religious and political
opponents (sometimes long after the revolution itself) and to try to close down
the consideration of political alternatives.
In the case of England, it could be argued that suppressing the memory of
the mid-century revolution came to be a matter of government policy. Even
in this case, however, the policy was one of selective remembrance (as around
the regicide) rather than total historical oblivion. As John Frow has observed,
‘forgetting’ is integral to the process of remembering since ‘the activity of com-
pulsive interpretation that organises it [memory] involves at once selection and
rejection’.26 In this sense, ‘forgetting’ is important in a constructive sense: in the
case of the United States, France and Haiti, the memory of revolution is critical
to national identity. The processes of erasure here are not straightforward acts of
censorship or denial but, as Kate Hodgson demonstrates in her analysis of Haiti’s
national celebrations, a result of gradual processes of telling and retelling that
have occluded those elements of revolutionary history that cannot be accom-
modated within narratives dominated by themes of emancipation and liberation.
6 Edward Vallance
history courses is determined (at least in the UK) by politicians, not academics.
The strange return of seventeenth-century Britain to the A-level curriculum
is a case in point. Sadly, the result neither of popular demand nor of academic
pressure, the restoration of England’s seventeenth-century revolutions to the
school classroom is the product of the whim of an English literature graduate,
journalist and sometime Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove. Pre-
dictably, the version of seventeenth-century England currently being offered
by the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance (AQA) and EdExcel is as rela-
tively untouched by historical revisionism as the current A-level version of the
French Revolution.29
It might be suggested that this is inevitable, that popular histories and A-level
textbooks cannot be expected to match the sophistication of academic works
and that it would be counterproductive for them to be so, at least in terms of
sustaining public interest in history. Maybe so, but the danger identified by
Andress is that when we encounter the people of the past as cartoonish ste-
reotypes rather than as real, complex, flesh-and-blood individuals, ‘historical
distance’ can actually inoculate us from the horror of revolution and detach us
from a necessary empathy with the victims of revolutionary violence. Equally,
treating historical atrocities as purely ‘lessons from history’ runs the risk of
obscuring the very specific contexts that produced these phenomena. An in-
depth study of how the Holocaust is taught in UK schools, for example, has
demonstrated that 68 per cent of students were unaware of what anti-Semitism
meant. As Professor Yehuda Bauer put it in his foreword to the report: ‘The
Holocaust is too often turned into vague lessons of the danger of “hatred” or
“prejudice” at the expense of really trying to understand the reasons and moti-
vations for the genocide’.30
If, as Armitage has suggested, revolutions are also violent civil wars, then
this ought to provide a salutary reminder of the often vast human costs of rev-
olutionary expectation. The enduring association of revolutions with eman-
cipation and the pursuit and defence of liberty has, though, as Andress also
remarks, had a powerful countervailing influence. There is no better example
than the weight of expectation that was placed upon the movements of the
Arab Spring and the motivations behind Western interventions in Libya and
Syria. The ongoing bloodshed and collapse of civil society in those countries
would seem to support John Dunn’s view that we ‘shall never master the polit-
ical lessons of revolution unless we can own up frankly to our shared political
and social incapacity for precognition’.31
While this seems undeniable, it might also be said that we will never master
the political lessons of revolution so long as we fail to interrogate thoroughly
the memory of these events. The contributions to this volume emphasise the
complexity of public memory, its varied forms and sites, individual and local,
as well as national. In so doing, they provide a means of challenging dominant
narratives of revolution and questioning the unity of meaning and experience
8 Edward Vallance
Notes
1 Jane Kamensky and Edward G. Gray (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; David Andress (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
French Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
2 Laura Lunger Knoppers (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Literature and the English Revolution,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Michael J. Braddick (ed.), The Oxford Handbook
of the English Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
3 Quoted in David Armitage, Civil War: A History of Ideas, New York: Knopf, 2017, p. 157.
4 Keith Michael Baker and Dan Edelstein, ‘Introduction’, in Keith Michael Baker and Dan
Edelstein (eds.), Scripting Revolution: A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revo-
lutions, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015, pp. 1–21.
5 David R. Como, ‘God’s Revolutions: England, Europe, and the Concept of Revolution in
the Mid-Seventeenth Century’, in Baker and Edlestein (eds.), Scripting Revolutions, ch. 2.
6 The best summary remains Harry Thomas Dickinson, ‘The Eighteenth-Century Debate
on the “Glorious Revolution”’, History, 61, 1976, 28–45 and see also the preface to my
The Glorious Revolution: 1688-Britain’s Fight for Liberty, London: Little, Brown, 2005.
7 Tim Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy, London: Allen Lane, 2005;
Steven Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2009.
8 Mark Knights, ‘The Long-Term Consequences of the English Revolution: Politics, Politi-
cal Thought and the Constitution’, in Braddick (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the English
Revolution, ch. 30.
9 The BBC Radio 4 documentary, ‘Things We Forgot to Remember: The Glorious Revo-
lution’, broadcast in December 2009, was recorded after the publication of a number
of major reinterpretations of the period, some produced by trade presses. Nonetheless,
the episode largely treated 1688 as a moment that would be unknown to most listeners.
Eight years later, the television documentary, ‘British History’s Biggest Fibs: Episode 2, the
Glorious Revolution’, BBC 4, January 2017, assumed that viewers would still be familiar
only with older narratives of 1688.
10 John Foran, David Lane and Andrea Zivkovic (eds.), Revolution in the Making of the Modern
World: Social Identities, Globalisation and Modernity, London: Routledge, 2008, p. xiv.
11 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution’, in
Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004, pp. 43–57, quotations at p. 39; see also Reinhart Koselleck, Critique
and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Oxford: Berg, 1988, pp.
160–1n.
12 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, London: Faber & Faber, 1963, pp. 42–3.
13 Pincus, 1688, ch. 2.
Introduction 9
14 Quoted in Tim Harris, ‘Did the English Have a Script for Revolution in the Seventeenth
Century?’, in Baker and Edelstein (eds.), Scripting Revolutions, ch. 1, p. 28.
15 On which see Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political
Instability in a European Context, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
16 Harris, ‘Did the English Have a Script for Revolution in the Seventeenth Century?’;
Christopher Hill, ‘The Word “Revolution” in Seventeenth-Century England’, in Richard
Ollard and Pamela Tudor-Craig (eds.), For Veronica Wedgewood These: Studies in Seventeenth-
Century History, London: Collins, 1986, pp. 134–51.
17 Brecht Deseure and Judith Pollmann, ‘The Experience of Rupture and the History of
Memory’, in Erika Kuijpers, Judith Pollmann, Johannes Muller and Jasper van der Steen
(eds.), Memory before Modernity: Practices of Memory in Early Modern Europe, Leiden: Brill,
2013, ch. 17, p. 328.
18 Judith Pollmann, Memory in Early Modern Europe: 1500–1800, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017, p. 51.
19 Koselleck, ‘Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution’, pp. 48–9; much of
the modern historiography of 1688 now emphasises its violent nature. The most strident
claims in this regard have been made by Steven Pincus, 1688, p. 7.
20 David Geggus, ‘The Haitian Revolution in Atlantic Perspective’, in Nicholas Canny (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, c. 1450–1850, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011, ch. 31, p. 533.
21 Ibid., p. 546.
22 The classic study in this case is Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the
Production of History, Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
23 Armitage, Civil War, p. 59; David Armitage, ‘Every Great Revolution Is a Civil War’, in
Baker and Edelstein (eds.), Scripting Revolutions, ch. 3.
24 On which, see Pollmann, Memory in Early-Modern Europe, ch. 6.
25 Judith Pollmann and Erika Kuijpers, ‘Introduction: On the Early Modernity of Modern
Memory’, in Kuijpers et al. (eds.), Memory before Modernity, pp. 9–10; Ross Poole, ‘Enact-
ing Oblivion’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 22, 2009, 149–157.
26 Quoted in Isabel Karremann, The Drama of Memory in Shakespeare’s History Plays, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 9.
27 Blair Worden, Roundhead Reputations: The English Civil Wars and the Passions of Posterity,
London: Allen Lane, 2001, chs. 3 and 6; C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint
L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution, London: W. H. Allen & Co edn., 1989, pp.
376–7; For sans-culottes, see David Andress ‘Afterword’ in this volume.
28 Pollmann, Memory in Early-Modern Europe, ch. 2.
29 And I make this statement in the full knowledge that one of these exam boards uses
excerpts from my own book on the revolution of 1688.
30 Sylwia Holmes, ‘Do We Need to Rethink How We Teach the Holocaust?’, The Guardian,
27 January 2016, www.theguardian.com/teacher-network/2016/jan/27/do-we-need-
to-rethink-how-we-teach-the-holocaust, accessed 20 April 2018. For the report from
the UCL Centre for Holocaust Education on which the article is based, see www.holo
causteducation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/What-do-students-know-and-understand-
about-the-Holocaust1.pdf, accessed 20 April 2018.
31 John Dunn, ‘Understanding Revolution’, in Foran, Lane and Zivkovic (eds.), Revolution in
the Making of the Modern World, ch. 2, pp. 24–5.
1
REMEMBERING THE GOOD OLD
CAUSE1
Edward Legon
The idea that some overarching ‘cause’ drove opposition to and resistance
against the English crown and the established church in the 1640s is a notable
casualty of revisionist scholarship. Historians now advise that parliamentari-
anism was ‘an inherently fissiparous movement’ that was unable to withstand
the political, religious and socio-economic pressures of the 1650s.2 And yet
a number of those who supported Parliament looked back to those actions,
and the decisions upon which they were based, and spoke collectively of a
‘good old cause’. What this three-word catchphrase meant has been a subject of
investigation by a handful of seventeenth-century historians, literary scholars
and rhetorical theorists.3 Prominent among these is Austin Woolrych whose
1957 article ‘The Good Old Cause and the Fall of the Protectorate’ interpreted
regular references to the slogan from the mid-1650s as evidence of its role in
rallying radical millenarian and republican disillusionment with the Crom-
wellian Protectorate. For Woolrych, the capacity of the good old cause to act as
a core around which grievances coalesced lay in its having offered ‘deliverance
in a return to the past’ for those who deployed it.4
By evoking a form of nostalgia with which men and women imagined a
pure, primitive and even prelapsarian parliamentarianism, Woolrych’s article
foreshadowed recent interest in how the civil wars in Britain were remem-
bered.5 In his account, the slipperiness of memory was utilised by those hos-
tile to Oliver Cromwell as a method of ‘blur[ring] the differences between
commonwealthsmen, who denounced the usurper of the sovereignty of the
people’s representatives, and “saints”, who reviled the apostate in the name of
the kingship of Christ’.6 Woolrych’s emphasis on the capacity of the good old
cause to conceal differences was taken up by the literary critic Annabel Pat-
terson, who couched the good old cause as an ‘ideologeme’ that was capable
12 Edward Legon
of uniting those ‘who, if they agreed on nothing else, agreed that the Restora-
tion of the Stuarts was a disaster for . . . civil liberties and religious toleration’.7
More so than Woolrych, Patterson’s work emphasised the ‘oldness’ of the good
old cause as the means by which ‘the antiquity’ and thus the legitimacy of
republican thought were expounded.8
Common to both of these accounts is an association of the good old cause
with forms of political and religious radicalism. In turn, continued references
to the phrase after the Restoration have been seen as interchangeable with the
endurance of forms of radical opposition to the monarchical and episcopal
settlements of the 1660s.9 Yet the available evidence suggests that, after 1660,
the good old cause was used by a more diverse range of individuals to connote
a longer history of Protestantism.
With this chapter, I explore, and seek to explain, this evidence in a way that
builds on two implications of Woolrych’s and Patterson’s work: namely, that
the phrase had both legitimising and mobilising potential. Where I diverge
from these accounts is by locating this potential in the inherent historicity of the
good old cause as a signifier of the objectives of ‘godly’ Protestants since the
late sixteenth-century. For this purpose, I demonstrate that uses of the good
old cause by Parliamentarians occurred earlier than the 1650s and that these
built on similar language that was considerably older. In doing so, I suggest
that the phrase is an example of what the rhetorical theorist Michael Calvin
McGee has labelled ‘ideographs’ and that, correspondingly, it was serviceable
to leading Parliamentarians as a way of legitimating opposition to crown and
established church by invoking a longer-term struggle between Protestantism
and counter-reformation ‘popery’.10 In turn, I argue that the commitment of a
politically, religiously and socially diverse support base was secured.
By highlighting the ideographic potential of the good old cause, I shed
light on continued efforts by opponents of crown and established church to
mobilise popular opinion after the Restoration and, in some cases, to justify
decisions that were made beforehand. In doing so, I suggest that a favourable
interpretation of the civil wars and revolution, one that did not necessarily
dwell on the trial and execution of Charles I or the establishment of a Com-
monwealth, remained salient to Englishmen and -women across society after
the Restoration.
To make these claims, I draw on the output of the English and Scottish
presses from the late sixteenth-century until Charles II’s death in 1685. More-
over, by trawling evidence of seditious and treasonable language in govern-
ment papers after 1660, I consider the deployment of the good old cause in oral
interactions between known former Parliamentarians and Republicans. That
uses of the phrase are to be found in both kinds of evidence reflects an under-
lying tension of Charles II’s reign: while the government and its supporters
believed that any revival of the good old cause spelled catastrophe for crown
and established church, a range of individuals who had fought for or otherwise
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