SQL Injection
SQL Injection
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2.2 CSRF
Cross Site Request Forgery is also a mayor security threat
[15] consisting in sending a malicious request to vulnerable
website, usually from an authenticated client of the server
trusts; the malicious request could include performing data
deletion, doing transactions or changing passwords. This
attack is successful due the fact that developers tend to trust
that a client will never send a request he/she is not entail to
or one that the GUI is not designed to dispatch. Unlike XSS
attacks, that exploits the trust of the client in the website,
this attack exploits the trust of the website in the client.
3.1 Looking for websites Figure 2: Acunetix reporting several web vulnera-
bilities.
To get a good sample of the different websites in Colombia
we decided to considerate the main Colombian economic sec-
tors such as health, mining, agriculture, and so, as reported distinguish websites built from scratch from those that use
in [12]. Later we looked for the bigger companies in those a CMS or a Web Framework and analyze the vulnerability
fields in [13], also we checked the most visited websites in incidence on those groups. This being said, we can expect
Alexa Colombian ranking [2]. Finally we also considered independent results for each group.
some websites developed by Colombian software companies. In order to gather this information, we decided to use
Using this method we identified 130 websites which are the Wapppalyzer tool [16] available as a Google Chrome plugin.
base for this study. This tool uncovers the technologies used in a website, in
Figure 1 we present a portion of the unveiled technologies in
3.2 Websites classification Semana website; note that the uncovering process is subject
We collected the following data for each relevant site: to a percentage of trust. The study of that percentage and
• Name means to improve it are out of the scope of this paper.
• Economic sector We replicated the same process over the whole 130 rele-
• Programming language vant websites and collected the previous information.
• Content Management System (CMS) 3.3 Vulnerability analysis
• Web Framework Testing the three vulnerabilities over the 130 relevant web-
Distinguishing this technological groups is important be- sites requires a lot of time and effort. Instead of a manual
cause they offer different security features developers can vulnerability analysis, we selected and used an automatic
take advantage from. Note that, even when all websites are web vulnerability scanner: Acunetix Trial Edition [1]. This
built in a programming language, not all of them are built tool collects information about different vulnerabilities just
using a Web Framework or a CMS; thus, not all of them by providing it with the website URL. Figure 2 shows an ex-
can benefit from the same security features. Also, given ample of how Acunetix tool finds and collects vulnerabilities
that novice developers tend to naively trust their users and in a specific website.
leave security as low development priorities, it is relevant to By using this tool we were able to collect an important
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Figure 3: Programming languages reported by Wap-
palyzer.
Figure 4: Web Frameworks reported by Wappa-
amount of data. However, due to the big amount of links or lyzer.
sections that some sites contained, in some cases Acunetix
could not complete the analysis in a reasonable amount of
time, for this reason we decided to limit the execution time
to two hours for every website. So, if the execution reached
two hours, the test was manually stopped and the partial
results were collected for further analysis.
4. RESULTS
First we identified the programming languages and the
main tools used to build the websites. Figure 3 shows the
number of websites that were developed in each program-
ming language (based on the Wappalyzer analysis). This
figure shows that PHP was the most popular programming
language. It is important to mention that some websites
could contain different section developed with different pro-
gramming languages, but only the main URL address was
analyzed.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the Framework and CMS
based websites and additional tools used in their develop-
ment. We found that CMSs frameworks are widely used; Figure 5: CMSs reported by Wappalyzer.
being Joomla the most popular. We found many Frame-
work based websites, being Microsoft ASP the most used
Framework. Note that we are distinguishing between web-
sites built from scratch, using a Framework or a CMS and,
also note, that websites built using a particular language
are not forced to use a CMS or Framework. This explains
why the most used Language and CMS don’t correspond to
the most used Framework’s language; CMS, Framework or
plain-language based websites are different subsets over the
130 websites that constitutes our testing sample.
Figure 6 shows that XSS, CSRF and SQL injections are
present in many websites, being CSRF the most persistent
security failure. Besides, XSS and SQL injections are present
in almost a quarter of the total analyzed websites.
Finally, Figure 7 shows all vulnerabilities found grouped
by economic sectors. It shows that no matter the sector
there are many security issues, although, the education sec-
tor is the most unsecure. Similarly, Figure 8 shows that
Colombian websites are equally vulnerable no matter if they
are built from scratch, using a Web Framework or a CMS.
Figure 6: Website vulnerabilities reported by
Acunetix.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Colombian reality as we could survey in march of 2015
is far from the ideal, we found dozens of vulnerable web-
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sites, some of them being vulnerable to multiple basic at-
tacks; almost an eighty percent of the analyzed websites
presented at least one basic vulnerability. Today basic tech-
niques for attacking websites remain being important secu-
rity threats. Even when these techniques are well known and
studied, nowadays there are many Colombian websites that
still present these vulnerabilities, and it seems to be that
Colombian web developers continue ignoring the protection
mechanisms against these basic techniques.
Seems natural to guess that the Education sector should
be the less affected, but in fact we found it has more se-
curity issues than any other. This is alarming since most
websites in this sector belong to Colombian Universities in
which there are programs related to computer science and
software engineering.
Give proper education to software engineers and develop-
ers closer to the needs of modern industry is still an impor-
tant problem to solve; the three techniques we studied are
rather common and easy to patch, but it seems that devel-
opers don’t know about them or just give less importance
or underestimate their threat. Moreover, our results from
Figure 8 raises more questions about the developers’ aware-
ness about the different security features available in CMS
and Web Frameworks, as websites built from scratch seems
to have the same security level; more testing is needed to
answer this questions.
In the near future companies, universities and government
should focus on web security and properly train developers
in this field, in order to mitigate the impact of these threats
and their negative impacts over the entire society. Also, we
Figure 7: Vulnerabilities grouped by economic sec-
want to point out the highly importance of the collaboration
tors.
between universities and modern industry as a core-way to
bridge the breach between what is taught and the actual
skills a professional must have to build quality applications.
As future work we will promote the inclusion of courses
about web security, and we will also promote an advisory
center to help Colombian Universities and developers in gen-
eral to train software engineers in a better way. We will im-
pulse our goals through a website dedicated to collect data
and detect security threats.
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