The ABAP Underverse

Risky ABAP to Kernel Communication & ABAP-tunneled buffer overflows

Andreas Wiegenstein Virtual Forge GmbH

[email protected]

"Hailing frequencies open."

Virtual Forge GmbH
SAP security product company based in Heidelberg, Germany Focus on (ABAP) application security services
ABAP Security Scanner ABAP Security Guidelines ABAP Security Trainings SAP Security Consulting

Andreas Wiegenstein
CTO and founder of Virtual Forge, responsible for R&D SAP Security Researcher, active since 2003 Speaker at SAP TechEd 2004, 2005, 2006, DSAG 2009, Co-Author of "Secure ABAP Programming" (SAP Press)

Belief: Our SAP system is secure.

Roles & Authorizations Segregation of Duties Secure Configuration & System / Service Hardening Encryption Secure Network Infrastructure Password Policies Patch Management Identity Management Single Sign-on

Reality-Check

Advanced Business Application Programming

Fundamentals

Proprietary language, exact specification not (freely) available Platform-independent code Client separation built-in Integrated auditing capabilities System-to-System calls via SAP RFC standard Built-in transport system and version control Various programming paradigms:
Programs & Forms, Reports, Function Modules, Dynpros Classes & Methods, Business Server Pages, Web Dynpro ABAP

Integrated platform-independent SQL Standard: Open SQL Built-in authentication, roles and (explicit) authorization model Thousands of well-known standard programs and database tables 150+ Million Lines of Code in an ECC6.0 System

ABAP's Attack Surface

ABAP Security Risks

Back Doors
Intentional bugs, e.g. malicious developer or spy

Side-effects
Unintentional bugs, e.g. due to lack of knowledge

Insecure alternatives to SAP standard security mechanisms

The ABAP Runtime

( theoretical behavior )

Persisted Code ABAP Source Code (DB)

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

Static ABAP examples

REPORT ZSTATIC_ASSIGN. DATA lv_secret TYPE string. FIELD-SYMBOLS <fs> TYPE ANY. PARAMETERS lv_tmp TYPE string DEFAULT 'Bishop'.
ASSIGN lv_tmp TO <fs>.

REPORT ZSTATIC_DELETE. DELETE FROM usr02 WHERE bname = sy-uname.

The ABAP Runtime

( dynamic ABAP commands )

Persisted Code ABAP Source Code (DB)

Dynamic Code ABAP Source Code (Input)

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

ABAP Byte Code (Dynamic)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

Dynamic ABAP example #1

REPORT ZDYNAMIC_ASSIGN. DATA lv_secret TYPE string VALUE 'ZFT'. DATA lv_share TYPE string VALUE 'Bishop'. FIELD-SYMBOLS <fs> TYPE ANY. PARAMETERS lv_tmp TYPE string DEFAULT 'lv_share'.
ASSIGN (lv_tmp) TO <fs>.

Hack #1:
Hack #2:

lv_secret
sy-opsys

Dynamic ABAP example #2

REPORT ZDYNAMIC_DELETE. PARAMETERS lv_tmp TYPE string DEFAULT 'bname = sy-uname'. DELETE FROM usr02 WHERE (lv_tmp).
Bad Hack: 1 = 1

Better Hack:
Good Hack:

mandt = sy-mandt

The ABAP Runtime

( persisted code generation )

Persisted Code ABAP Source Code (DB)

Dynamic Code ABAP Source Code (Input)

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

ABAP Byte Code (Dynamic)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

Persisted code generation

REPORT ZPERSISTED_ABAP. DATA: lt_prog(97) OCCURS 0 WITH HEADER LINE. PARAMETERS lv_name TYPE string. lt_prog = 'REPORT ZFT.'. CONCATENATE `DATA lv_tmp(82) lv_name `'.` INTO lt_prog. lt_prog = 'WRITE / lv_tmp.'. APPEND TYPE c APPEND APPEND lt_prog. VALUE '` lt_prog. lt_prog.

INSERT REPORT 'ZFT' FROM lt_prog. GENERATE REPORT 'ZFT'. SUBMIT ('ZFT').

The ABAP Runtime

( dynamic code generation )

Persisted Code ABAP Source Code (DB)

Dynamic Code ABAP Source Code (Input)

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

ABAP Byte Code (Dynamic)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

Dynamic code generation

REPORT ZDYNAMIC_ABAP. DATA: prog(72) OCCURS 0 WITH HEADER LINE. DATA: pool(20) TYPE c. PARAMETERS lv_name TYPE string. prog = 'REPORT MASSIVEDYNAMIC.'. APPEND prog = 'FORM BELL.'. APPEND prog = 'DATA name TYPE string.'. APPEND CONCATENATE `name = '` lv_name `'. ` INTO prog. APPEND prog = 'WRITE : / ''Hello '', name.'. APPEND prog = 'ENDFORM.'. APPEND GENERATE SUBROUTINE POOL prog NAME pool. PERFORM ('BELL') IN PROGRAM (pool).

prog. prog. prog. prog. prog. prog.

ABAP code generation risks

ABAP developer right = "root" access Silent way to acquire "SAP ALL" privileges takes 56 characters. Noisy way to acquire "SAP ALL" privileges takes 34 characters. Entire SAP system must be considered compromised in case of an ABAP Command Injection vulnerability

The ABAP Runtime

( Kernel Communication )
Persisted Code ABAP Source Code (DB) Dynamic Code ABAP Source Code (Input)

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

ABAP Byte Code (Dynamic)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

SAP Kernel Functions for the ABAP Runtime

Kernel Calls

System Calls

Kernel Methods

Kernel Communication
High-performant pool of helper functions Should only be used by SAP Can be explicitly invoked from ABAP Mostly undocumented functionality Three types of Kernel functions exist:
Kernel Calls System Calls Kernel Methods

Kernel Calls
REPORT ZKERNEL_CALL. DATA lv_dbhost LIKE msxxlist-host. CALL 'C_SAPGPARAM' ID 'NAME' FIELD 'SAPDBHOST' ID 'VALUE' FIELD lv_dbhost.

370+ different Kernel Calls in ECC 6.0 In general, no implicit authority check Importing / Exporting parameter not obvious

System Calls
REPORT ZSYSTEM_CALL. DATA: lv_nam, lv_val TYPE string. DATA: m_err TYPE i. DATA: m_c_msg TYPE %_c_pointer.
lv_name = 'chevron_V'. SYSTEM-CALL ICT DID 11 PARAMETERS m_c_msg lv_nam lv_val m_last_err.

Polymorph interface

Kernel Methods
METHOD convert BY KERNEL MODULE ab_expconvDbuf. ENDMETHOD.

Can't be declared by custom code Are called like normal methods Have typed parameters

The ABAP Runtime

( Kernel Hooks )

Persisted Code ABAP Source Code (DB)

Dynamic Code ABAP Source Code (Input)

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

ABAP Byte Code (Dynamic)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

Kernel Hooks
Kernel Hooks are ABAP subroutines (FORMs) called from the ABAP C/C++ Runtime. Data exchange works via Kernel Calls Multiple ABAP commands use Kernel Hooks
OPEN DATASET CONVERT TIME-STAMP WRITE AS TIME-STAMP

Kernel Hooks example (part 1)

FORM SYSTEM_HOOK_ZFT.
FIELD-SYMBOLS: <P1> type any, <P2> type any, <P3> type any, <P4> type any, <R1> TYPE I, <R2> LIKE SY-SUBRC.

* First, pop the Kernel parameters from the stack CALL 'AB_GET_C_PARMS' ID 'P1' field <P1> ID 'P2' field <P2> ID 'P3' field <P3> ID 'P4' field <P4>.

Kernel Hooks example (part 2)

* Next, call a function to process the data
CALL FUNCTION 'ZPROCESS_THIS_STUFF' EXPORTING date = <P1> time = <P2> hour = <P3> mint = <P4> IMPORTING res = <R1> subrc = <R2> EXCEPTIONS NO_PERMISSION.

Kernel Hooks example (part 3)

* Finally, push the results onto the Kernel stack and exit the hook
CALL 'AB_SET_C_PARMS' ID 'P1' FIELD <R1> ID 'P2' FIELD <R2>. ENDFORM.

Kernel Hooks risks

Malicious code can attach itself to the execution of ABAP commands that use Kernel Hooks Whoever experiments with this: don't call the ABAP command you're hooked in

Risky Kernel Calls ( 8 out of 370+ )

Kernel Call 'SYSTEM' Risk OS command execution

'XXPASS' & 'XXPASSNET'

'INTERNET_USER_LOGON' 'C_GET_TABLE' 'C_MOD_TABLE'

Compute password hash

Brute force credentials Unauthorized table read access Unauthorized table write access

'C_DB_EXECUTE'
'C_DB_FUNCTION'

SQL Injection; DB modification

SQL Injection; DB modification

CALL 'SYSTEM'
CALL 'SYSTEM' ID 'COMMAND' FIELD lv_cmd ID 'TAB' FIELD lt_result-*sys*.

ID 'COMMAND' defines OS command ID 'TAB' receives output (optional) Implicit auth check in Kernel (S_C_FUNCT) Can be disabled by setting profile parameter rdisp/call_system to 0 Not the only way to execute OS commands!

CALL 'XXPASS' / 'XXPASSNET'

CALL 'XXPASS' ID ID ID ID ID 'CODE' 'NAME' 'CODX' 'PASSCODE' 'VERS' FIELD FIELD FIELD FIELD FIELD 'akagi' 'castle' lv_hash lv_pass lv_vers.

ID 'CODX' returns the hash value Terminates session and locks user account Defensive reaction depends on name(space) of the calling program (Y*, Z* problematic)

CALL 'INTERNET_USER_LOGON'
CALL ID ID ID ID 'INTERNET_USER_LOGON' 'UNAME' FIELD lv_userid 'PASSW' FIELD lv_password 'TICKET' FIELD lv_ticket 'PASSFLAG' FIELD lv_pwdstate.

Performs user switch & creates logon ticket Can check credentials only (TESTMODE) Keeps track of failed login attempts

CALL 'C_GET_TABLE'
CALL ID ID ID ID ID 'C_GET_TABLE' 'TABLNAME' FIELD 'INTTAB' FIELD 'GENKEY' FIELD 'GENKEY_LN' FIELD 'BYPASS' FIELD
lv_tab lt_tab-*sys* lv_key lv_keylen lv_bypass.

Low-level direct access to database tables Cross-Client data access

CALL 'C_MOD_TABLE'
CALL ID ID ID ID ID 'C_MOD_TABLE' 'TABLNAME' FIELD 'INTTAB' FIELD 'FCODE' FIELD 'DBCNT' FIELD 'SQLCODE' FIELD
lv_tab lt_tab-*sys* 'U' lv_dbcnt lv_sqlcode.

Low-level direct access to database tables

U(pdate), I(nsert) or D(elete) table rows

Cross-Client data access

CALL 'C_DB_EXECUTE'
CALL 'C_DB_EXECUTE' ID 'STATLEN' FIELD lv_len ID 'STATTXT' FIELD lv_stmt ID 'SQLERR' FIELD lv_sqlerr.

Executes an arbitrary SQL command

(Except SELECT)

Cross-Client data access Can gain full control over SAP database

CALL 'C_DB_FUNCTION' #1
CALL 'C_DB_FUNCTION' ID 'FUNCTION' FIELD 'DB_SQL' ID 'FCODE' FIELD 'EP' ID 'PROCNAME' FIELD lv_proc ...

Executes an arbitrary stored procedure Can gain full control over SAP database

CALL 'C_DB_FUNCTION' #2
CALL 'C_DB_FUNCTION' ID 'FUNCTION' FIELD 'DB_SQL' ID 'FCODE' FIELD 'PO' ID 'STMT_STR' FIELD lv_stat ...

Executes an arbitrary SQL statement Cross-Client data access Can gain full control over SAP database

Risky Kernel Calls

DEMO

Risky Kernel Calls Summary

No (comprehensive) documentation
Unknown number of critical Kernel Calls

Several known calls can bypass SAP security mechanisms Several 0 days wait for "responsible disclosure" Kernel Calls must be addressed in ABAP security guidelines, development standards & security assessments: Don't use Kernel Calls

Buffer overflows in Kernel Calls

Kernel Calls can't be accessed remotely ABAP has automatic memory management bad news for "buffer overflow exploiters" But... (Custom) ABAP programs can expose Kernel Calls to external input
Attackers must find a data flow path to a vulnerable parameter of a Kernel Call

ABAP Runtime shields Kernel Calls

External Input SAP GUI RFC Web Application Web Service

Persisted Code

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

SAP Kernel Functions for the ABAP Runtime

Kernel Calls

System Calls

Kernel Methods

Buffer overflow risks

An attacker may find a way to pass input to a vulnerable Kernel or System Call Since Kernel / Systems Calls can only be executed by ABAP commands, an exploit needs to be tunneled through the ABAP code The risk increases, if the "ABAP tunnel" can be invoked remotely, e.g. via RFC or a Web page.

ABAP-tunneled Buffer Overflows

External Input SAP GUI RFC Web Application Web Service

Persisted Code

ABAP Byte Code (DB)

SAP Kernel

ABAP Runtime

SAP Kernel Functions for the ABAP Runtime

Kernel Calls

System Calls

Kernel Methods

Buffer overflows in Kernel Calls (1)

CALL 'C_SAPGDEFPARAM' ID 'NAME' FIELD lv_buffy ID 'VALUE' FIELD lv_dummy.

Buffer overflow* in NAME with > 103 chars Exposed by RFC-enabled function module But data-type is a TEXT60 only.

Buffer overflows in Kernel Calls (2)

CALL 'BUILD_DS_SPEC' ID ID ID ID 'FILENAME' 'PATH' 'OPSYS' 'RESULT' FIELD FIELD FIELD FIELD lv_buffy lv_buffy lv_buffy lv_na.

Buffer overflow* in NAME with > 404 chars Buffer overflow* in PATH with > 204 chars Buffer overflow* in OPSYS with > 428 chars Exposed by RFC-enabled function module But data-type is a TEXT80 only.

Buffer overflow in System Calls

SYSTEM-CALL ICT DID 29 PARAMETERS lv_buff1 lv_buff2 lv_dummy lv_dummy lv_dummy lv_dummy lv_dummy lv_dummy.

Buffer overflow* in parameter 1 & 2 with > 200 characters Not exposed

Exposed Buffer overflow in a Kernel Call

CALL 'C_SAPGPARAM' ID 'NAME' FIELD lv_buffy ID 'VALUE' FIELD lv_dummy.

Buffer overflow* in NAME with > 108 chars Exposed by RFC-enabled function module Data-type is a TEXT255

Buffer Overflow PoC

DEMO

Buffer overflow protection steps

1) Pick a Kernel / System Call and identify its importing parameters 2) Send overlong input and check if the ABAP workthread dies 3) Check where this Kernel / System Call is used (in the SAP standard) and which data types are used in the data flow path 4) Test if overlong user input can reach the vulnerable Kernel / System Call 5) Block access to the vulnerable ABAP code or use a data type that is too short for an exploit

Summary
There are severe security risks in ABAP, too: (Custom) ABAP Code can bypass security features of the SAP standard and thereby violate regulatory compliance. Kernel Calls provide lots of (undocumented) functionality that can bypass SAP security mechanisms Kernel Calls can also introduce (remote exploitable) buffer overflow risks

Secure ABAP Development

Organizations
BIZEC Business Security Initiative
http://www.bizec.org

Literature

"Secure ABAP-Programming" (German only)

SAP Press 2009

SAP Security Notes

SAP Security Note 1493516 "Correcting buffer overflow in ABAP system call"
Covers the buffer overflow in the SYSTEM-CALL

SAP Security Note 1487330 "Potential remote code execution in SAP Kernel"
Covers the 5 buffer overflows in the Kernel Calls

Q&A
"... So, after all these slides, you must have lots of questions to ask. Am I right?" "Yes, of course. Lots of questions." " Well. What are they?"

Disclaimer
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