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Judges on Judging
Fifth Edition
Judges on Judging
Views from the Bench
Fifth Edition
David M. O’Brien
University of Virginia
FOR INFORMATION:
CQ Press
E-mail: [email protected]
1 Oliver’s Yard
55 City Road
United Kingdom
India
3 Church Street
Singapore 049483
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.
Printed in the United States of America.
Title: Judges on judging : views from the bench / collected and edited by David M. O’Brien, University of
Virginia.
Description: Fifth edition. | Washington DC : SAGE CQ Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references.
Subjects: LCSH: Judges—United States. | Judicial process—United States. | Political questions and judicial
power—United States.
The First Edition of this collection of judges’ speeches and writings originated
while I was working as a judicial fellow in the office of the administrative
assistant (now the office of counselor) to the chief justice at the Supreme Court
of the United States. I remain grateful for the opportunities that Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger and his administrative assistant, Mark Cannon, afforded me,
along with the support of Edward Artinian and of reviewers and colleagues,
particularly Henry J. Abraham. That first edition received the American Bar
Association’s Certificate of Merit for contributing to the public’s understanding
of law and courts. Like the first edition, subsequent editions have been well
received and used in a range of courses. Those who teach and study judicial
processes and judicial policymaking have found the breadth of coverage useful
in presenting the contrasting views and experiences of state and federal judges,
especially the differing experiences of trial and appellate court judges, as well as
those who have served or are serving on the Supreme Court. Others find the
chapters presenting competing judicial philosophies and approaches to
interpreting the Constitution and Bill of Rights especially useful in courses on
constitutional law, jurisprudence, and judicial politics. University of California,
Berkeley, law school professor Martin Shapiro’s comment on an earlier edition
perhaps expressed it best: “Imagine the fun of teaching a course in which you
ask students to compare opinions of particular judges with their off-the-bench
writings on judging. What a great supplement to a regular constitutional law
course.”
In this fifth edition, the introductory essays have been thoroughly revised and
updated. They highlight from a historical perspective the increasing frequency of
and controversies over current judges’ and justices’ off-the-bench commentaries.
This fifth edition includes four appendices: Appendix A, Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, establishing the basis for the federal courts; Appendix B,
Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78 on the role of the federal judiciary and
the power of constitutional interpretation; Appendix C, a selected bibliography
of off-the-bench commentaries; and Appendix D, a time chart of members of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
This edition incurred still more debts. I appreciate the permission to incorporate
new material and the suggestions over the years of the following reviewers:
Elizabeth Beaumont, University of Minnesota; Christopher Bonneau, University
of Pittsburgh; Russell Fowler, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; Banks
Miller, Ohio State University; Patrick Schmidt, Southern Methodist University;
Kim Seckler, New Mexico State University; James Todd, University of Arizona;
Michael C. Tolley, Northwestern University; Mark Petracca, University of
California, Irvine; Douglas E. Edlin, Dickinson College; John Hermann, Trinity
University; Susan Mezey, Loyola University of Chicago; Adam W. Nye,
Pennsylvania State University; and Jennifer Espronceda. I also appreciate the
support and work of Nancy Matuszak and Charisse Kiino at CQ Press.
As with earlier editions, I hope students will find these revisions and new
additions useful in understanding judicial processes as well as the work and
problems confronting courts. It is also hoped that the collection will continue to
engage them in the contemporary and enduring debates about competing judicial
philosophies and approaches to constitutional interpretation, judging, and the
role of courts in a democracy.
David M. O’Brien
January 2016
Introduction
Justices and judges appear to be more outspoken and in more venues than ever
before. All nine on the Roberts Court (2005–) participated in a C-SPAN special,
The Supreme Court: Home to America’s Highest Court,1 and granted interviews
to journalists for books on the Court.2 Chief Justice John G. Roberts gave a
prime-time interview to ABC’s Nightline; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg spoke to
CBS’s Mike Wallace, among many other interviews she granted; Justices
Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer have engaged in off-the-bench debates on
their different approaches to constitutional interpretation and the Court’s use of
foreign judicial decisions and law; and Justice Breyer promoted the 2015
publication of his book The Court and the World: American Law and the New
Global Realities3 in a series of media interviews, including on CBS’s The Late
Show with Stephen Colbert. Eight justices of the Roberts Court agreed to
interviews on the art of legal advocacy;4 their lectures and Q&As at law school
forums also now often reappear on YouTube. Indeed, some lower-court judges
and Court watchers now refer to them as “celebrity justices.”5
Justices and judges also have not been shy about speaking out on controversial
matters, including cases that have come before or are likely to come before the
Court. Justice Scalia, for instance, defended his refusal to recuse himself from a
case involving his hunting companion, Vice President Dick Cheney, who headed
an energy task force for President George W. Bush, responding, “For Pete’s
sake, if you can’t trust your Supreme Court justice more than that, get a life. . . .
I think the proudest thing I have done on the bench is not allowed myself to be
chased off that case.”6 That was not the first time. On another occasion Justice
Scalia criticized the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding
that the phrase “one nation, under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the
First Amendment. That decision was a mistaken attempt, in his words, to
“exclude God from the public forums and from political life.”7 When the
Supreme Court later granted review of that decision, Michael A. Newdow, who
had brought the suit Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004), asked
that Justice Scalia recuse himself from the case and forced him not to participate
in the decision because of his off-the-bench remarks. Justice Scalia has also been
outspoken about the direction of the Court and abortion,8 among other
controversial matters,9 such as same-sex marriages—even before the Court’s
ruling extending constitutional protection to such marriages in Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015).10 In his words, “If we cannot have moral feelings against
homosexuality, can we have it against murder? . . . Can we have it against other
things? I don’t apologize for the things I raise.”11 On and off the bench, Justice
Scalia has championed “textual originalism”—that is, as he put it in a
coauthored book, Reading the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012),12
judges should “look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text the
meaning that it has borne from its inception, and reject judicial speculation about
the drafters’ extra-textually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair
reading’s anticipated consequences.” In a lecture at the American Enterprise
Institute he thus explained that because he is a “textual originalist,” a lot of
controversies reaching the Court are “easy.” “The death penalty? Give me a
break. It’s easy. Abortion? Absolutely easy. Nobody ever thought the
Constitution prevented restrictions on abortion. Homosexual sodomy? Come on.
For 200 years, it was criminal in every state.”13
The American public nonetheless understands little about the courts and the
judicial process. To a reporter’s question of whether the average American
understands the judicial process, former congressman and later Federal Court of
Appeals judge Abner J. Mikva responded, “No. In a sense [people] know less
about the courts than they do about the Congress. They may have a lot of
mistaken views about Congress, but the problem with the courts is that they are
so mysterious. I worry about that a great deal. Some of my colleagues on the
bench think that is why the judicial branch is given a great deal of respect, that it
isn’t as well known as the other two branches. I hate to think that we’re only
beloved in ignorance.”22 Indeed, as retired justice Sandra Day O’Connor has
emphasized in interviews and lectures, opinion polls find that two-thirds of the
public can name at least one of the judges on the Fox television show American
Idol, but less than half can name even one justice on the Supreme Court.23
Whatever mystery surrounds the judiciary may stem in part from what Judge
Jerome Frank called “the cult of the robe”24 and Justice Felix Frankfurter
felicitously described as “judicial lockjaw.”25 A tradition of judicial lockjaw
evolved originally because of a number of institutional, political, and historical
considerations. Article III of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power in
one Supreme Court and in such lower federal courts that Congress may
establish, provides that the judiciary shall decide only actual cases or
controversies (see Appendix A). From the earliest days, federal courts have
therefore refused to render advisory opinions or advice on abstract and
hypothetical issues.26 Intimately related to the view that advisory opinions would
violate the principle of separation of powers and compromise judicial
independence, justices and judges contend that they should not offer off-the-
bench commentaries about their decisions and opinions. As Justice William J.
Brennan Jr. once recounted,
The lessons of history have also inclined members of the judiciary to refrain
from voicing their views not only on matters pertaining to the judicial process
and law but also on politics more generally. During the founding period, judges
in fact engaged in intensely partisan debates about differing views of
constitutional principles. Chief Justice John Jay ran for the governorship of New
York but did not campaign, as did Justice William Cushing in running for that
office in Massachusetts; and Justice Samuel Chase campaigned for the election
of John Adams as president.34 By the late 1840s and 1850s, however, there
emerged considerable opposition to judges’—specifically Justice John McLean’s
—active participation in partisan politics.35 Yet throughout the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, justices and judges continued to undertake some
extrajudicial roles and activities, such as arbitrating boundary disputes and
heading special commissions. Charles Evans Hughes resigned from the bench to
run for the presidency against Woodrow Wilson in 1916, and Chief Justice
William Howard Taft advised the Republican Party on a range of matters;
Justices Frankfurter and Louis D. Brandeis had long, close relationships with
President Franklin Roosevelt. Members of the Court have also, in extraordinary
circumstances, accepted extrajudicial assignments; notably, Justice Owen J.
Roberts headed a presidential commission to investigate Pearl Harbor, and
Justice Robert H. Jackson served as chief prosecutor of Nazi leaders at the
Nuremberg trials. Chief Justice Earl Warren reluctantly headed an investigation
of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. And, as constitutionally
required, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist presided over the Senate’s
impeachment trial of Democratic president Bill Clinton.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, the principal forum for judges’
pronouncements on judicial and political issues was provided by Congress’s
requirement that justices of the Supreme Court travel to the various circuits and
sit on cases as well as deliver charges to grand juries there. Although most
members of the Court confined their grand jury charges to discussions of their
views of constitutional principles or newly enacted legislation, others used the
occasion to issue political broadsides and thus enter into the heated debates
raging between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans. This practice
culminated in 1805 in the impeachment and trial of Justice Samuel Chase for
“disregarding the duties and dignity of his judicial character.” Specifically, the
eighth article of impeachment charged the justice with “pervert[ing] his official
right and duty to address the grand jury . . . on matters coming within the
province of the said jury, for the purpose of delivering to the said grand jury an
intemperate and inflammatory political harangue, . . . a conduct highly
censurable in any, but peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in a judge of the
supreme court of the United States.”36
Whereas justices and judges, like other political actors, reserve their most
personal observations for private correspondence, they communicate their views
and insights in numerous and diverse forums: from university and law school
commencements to celebrations, annual meetings of law-related organizations,
and bar association conventions; in newspaper, magazine, and broadcast
interviews; and in articles and books. Occasionally, judges have written to
members of Congress and testified before Congress on pressing issues
confronting the courts and the country.55
The topics addressed by justices and judges are no less numerous and diverse;
they range from rather rare comments about specific decisions to more frequent
observations about the operation of the judiciary and the administration of
justice. Despite the self-imposed credo that members of the bench “should not
talk about contemporaneous decisions,”56 judges have occasionally sought to
clarify, explain, or defend their rulings. Chief Justice John Marshall, writing to a
newspaper under the pseudonym “A Friend to the Union,” defended his
landmark decision in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819),57 and in 1979 five justices
sought to explain their ruling in a controversial case involving public access to
judicial proceedings.58 More typically, judges who publicly address matters of
public law—such as the constitutional protection afforded private property,59 the
meaning of the First Amendment,60 or the evolution of administrative law and
regulatory politics61—do so from a historical and doctrinal perspective.62
There are, however, some matters, such as judicial administration and legislation
affecting the courts, on which, as Judge Irving Kaufman observed, “judges must
speak out.”63 Indeed, in recent years not only the chief justice, who has
responsibility for overseeing the federal judiciary, but an increasing number of
state and federal judges have voiced their views on rising caseloads, the
“bureaucratic justice,” evolving federal-state court relations, the operation of
different aspects of the judicial process, and the administration of justice more
generally. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, for instance, began an annual practice
of issuing a year-end report on the federal judiciary to highlight judicial reforms
and the impact on the judiciary of pending legislation. And Chief Justices
Rehnquist and Roberts continued that practice.
Moreover, other judges have sharply attacked the more conservative directions
taken by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
judge John T. Noonan, a Reagan appointee, lamented the Rehnquist Court’s
rulings expediting the implementation of capital punishment and even suggested
that the Court’s rulings compel lower federal courts to commit “treason to the
Constitution.”65 Another appellate judge on the Ninth Circuit castigated
“Supreme Court decisions [for] subordinating individual liberties to the less-
than-compelling interests of the state and stripping lower federal courts of the
ability to protect individual rights.”66
In recent years there has been a noticeable trend toward more judicial
speech; at the same time, there remains a firmly entrenched view
within the federal judiciary that judges should remain wholly “above
the fray” and avoid revealing any of their beliefs or fundamental
values to the public, except to the extent that they are necessarily
disclosed in published opinions. It is this concept of judicial abstinence
that needs careful examination—and ultimately puncturing.
I believe that judges should venture boldly into this in-between area—
that we should speak forthrightly about the role of courts in American
society, about the relationship between law and justice, about the true
meaning of the Constitution and some of its principal provisions, and
about our own personal visions of justice and judging. We should do
so in specific as well as general terms. . . . We should reveal to the
American public how the courts handle death penalty cases and just
what the impact is on the judicial system. We should be willing to
acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment is being sacrificed in our
eagerness to fight the war against drugs, and that such a sacrifice is
inconsistent with our constitutional heritage. . . . These are
controversial issues indeed. But I do not think that we should shy away
from speaking about them for that reason. In fact, I think it is precisely
because these issues are controversial and difficult that we should
share our special knowledge and experience with the public.69
Furthermore, not only will off-the-bench commentaries continue, but they are
likely to remain sometimes acerbic and engage justices and judges in
occasionally rather bitter debates over constitutional and statutory interpretation,
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body; a projection from the thoracic side-pieces, forming a long
pouch, into which a fold on the inner side of the elytra fits, the two
being subsequently locked by the action of some special projections.
This arrangement is similar to that which exists in the anomalous
family of water-beetles Pelobiidae. In order to make this mechanism
more perfect the side-pieces in Belostoma form free processes.
Martin has informed us that the young have the metasternal
episternum prolonged to form a lamella that he thinks may be for
respiratory purposes.[499] About twelve genera and upwards of fifty
species of Belostomidae are known. None exist in our isles, but
several species extend their range to Southern Europe. In the waters
of the warm regions of the continents of both the Old and New
Worlds they are common Insects, but as yet they have not been
found in Australia.
Song.—Cicadas are the most noisy of the Insect world; the shrilling
of grasshoppers and even of crickets being insignificant in
comparison with the voice of Cicada. Darwin heard them in South
America when the Beagle was anchored a quarter of a mile from the
shore; and Tympanoterpes gigas, from the same region, is said to
make a noise equal to the whistle of a locomotive.[503] A curious
difference of opinion prevails as to whether their song is agreeable
or not; in some countries they are kept in cages, while in others they
are considered a nuisance. The Greeks are said to have decided in
favour of their performances, the Latins against them. Only the
males sing, the females being completely dumb; this has given rise
to a saying by a Greek poet (so often repeated that it bids fair to
become immortal) "Happy the Cicadas' lives, for they all have
voiceless wives."[504] The writer considers the songs of the
European species he has heard far from unpleasant, but he is an
entomologist, and therefore favourably prepossessed; and he admits
that Riley's description of the performances of the seventeen-year
Cicada is far from a satisfactory testimonial to the good taste of that
Insect; Riley says, "The general noise, on approaching the infested
woods, is a combination of that of a distant threshing-machine and a
distant frog-pond. That which they make when disturbed, mimics a
nest of young snakes or young birds under similar circumstances—a
sort of scream. They can also produce a chirp somewhat like that of
a cricket and a very loud, shrill screech prolonged for fifteen or
twenty seconds, and gradually increasing in force and then
decreasing." The object, or use of the noise is very doubtful; it is said
that it attracts the females to the males. "De gustibus non est
disputandum!" perhaps, however, there may be some tender notes
that we fail to perceive; and it may be that the absence of any
definite organs of hearing reduces the result of a steam-engine
whistle to the equivalent of an agreeable whisper. No special
auditory organs have been detected[505] as we have already
intimated; and certain naturalists, amongst whom we may mention
Giard, think that the Insects do not hear in our sense of the word, but
feel rhythmical vibrations; it is also recorded that though very shy the
Insects may be induced to approach any one who will stand still and
clap his hands—in good measure—within the range of their
sensibilities. There is a good deal of support to the idea that the
males sing in rivalry.