Brigham Young University

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Faculty Publications

1986

Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law

Noel B. Reynolds
Brigham Young University - Provo, [email protected]

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Original Publication Citation

"Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law," in Constitutionalism and Rights, G. Bryner and N.
Reynolds, (eds.), Provo, Brigham Young University, 1987, 79–104.

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation

Reynolds, Noel B., "Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law" (1986). Faculty Publications. 1469.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/facpub/1469

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for
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 CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
1986/87?
Noel B. Reynolds

Abstract:
Constitutionalism is the practical science of designing and balancing institutions of public
power and authority so as to prevent monopolies of power or the emergence of tyranny. In spite
of continuing attempts to ground constitutions in moralistic political theories, they are best
understood as formalizations of citizenry agreements to manage their affairs under the rule of law
following rules formulated by their legislatures and applied by their judges, all of which are to be
selected through established procedures. The emergence of rule of law in primitive societies and
in early modern European politics is noted, and the chief contributors to the twentieth century
discussion are identified.

Key Words: constitutionalism, rule of law, natural law, primitive law, F. A. Hayek, Francis
Wormuth, Ronald Dworkin, Charles McIlwain

The bicentennial of the Constitution of the United States of America invites our reflection

on the extraordinary historical success of this document and its attendant institutions. In the

history of mankind, it stands alone as the most successful of the sustained experiments in human

freedom and self-government.

Such reflections may take on some urgency when we note the reduced level of basic

constitutional wisdom which prevails among both the politicians, who are most directly

responsible for maintaining the Constitution, and the political theorists, who provide our political

culture with its self-understanding. It seems that the eighteenth century may have seen the high

tide of such understanding in the western world. And the American Founders were without peer

in their own day.

In this essay I will attempt to articulate the underlying principles which account for the

success of the American constitutional experiment and indeed for similar freedoms that have

been achieved in different degrees and for varying lengths of times in human polities throughout

the world. The same analysis, by contrast, will serve to illuminate failures to achieve freedom
elsewhere.

One indication of the decline in understanding of these matters over the last century

occurs in the current edition of an authoritative reference work. The author announces somewhat

disdainfully that "constitutionalism is the name given to the trust which men repose in the power

of words engrossed on parchment to keep a government in order."1 Armed with such a narrow

definition it is no wonder that the author is able to insist that "the rise of constitutionalism may

be dated from 1776."2 From this most unpromising beginning the author goes on to develop a

cynical account of the means by which clever lawyers and judges transform the doctrines of the

Constitution over time to make of the document a useful instrument of social control. As if the

Constitution had been intended as a repository or oracle for doctrines to settle all future questions

of fundamental law! The appalling ignorance reflected in this authoritative source is only one

indication of the widespread dearth of constitutionalist wisdom.

As difficult as some of our contemporaries seem to make the understanding of human

freedom, we can find numerous historical examples of its achievement within the framework of

rule of law and constitutional devices. This is important because it emphasizes the universality

of the solutions which were perfected by the American founders.

Primitive Societies

Rule of law through constitutional government is a recurring solution to an ageless

problem in human societies, the problem of controlling the rulers. That there should be no rulers

or government is a thought comprehensible only to a few theorists locked away in their ivory

towers. That rulers need to be restrained has been the eventual discovery of every society.

Constitutionalism is the science of such restraints.

2
 3

Because of their distance from modern society primitive cultures are often used to

identify those elements of human societies which are universal. Studies of primitive political

systems reveal constitutional arrangements which are designed to prevent the emergence of any

single individual or group as a tyrant, while simultaneously providing for the necessary

government to make orderly and beneficial decisions for communal action.

Our primitive brothers have access to one important control on their authorities that we

have lost in modern secularized society--the requirement that they maintain the approval of the

gods. The disapproval of the gods can be discovered by councils of priests consulting oracles or

interpreting natural or social events. As one might expect, there are always very practical

sanctions available to supplement the theological sanction of divine disapproval.

In most primitive societies political power is balanced and authority is distributed for the

various kinds of community decisions which must be made. Councils are used in most cases to

provide representative decisions. Elaborate rituals of rebellion are enacted annually in some

monarchical societies to remind the king of his dependence on the support of the people. And

without exception kings, chiefs, and councils are not authorized to change the laws and customs

of the people. Furthermore, they are required to enforce those laws and customs and to obey

them in the conduct of their own affairs. The common wisdom of primitive man seems to be that

law or rules must also govern the rulers.

It might be thought that these primitive constitutional arrangements are ageless as they

occur in different societies. This common western belief proves to be a myth as observers note

the ongoing shifting of such arrangements in almost all such societies. Primitive peoples have

never been immune to the dynamic forces of nature and society that impose continual change on
 4

their conditions of life. Wars, plagues, famines, and migrations disturb the important power

balances that have been worked out at any given point in time requiring that new arrangements

emerge.

Lucy Mair's studies of this process of change would support the conclusion that in times

of constitutional failure primitive peoples naturally adapt previously non-political organizational

elements of their societies to restructure their political system and regain constitutional balance.3

This is not to assert that such experimentation never misfires. But the politicization of social

clubs or councils and the transformation of functions of existing political institutions goes on

endlessly in the quest to balance power and authority within a continually changing society. The

suggestion for us is that the constitutional problem is an endless one never to be resolved once

and for all.

For example, the Iroquois suffered a major historical crisis when their ill-fated alliance

with the English in the Revolutionary War forced them to leave the United States. Originally the

Iroquois had no central government but only a ceremonial council of fifty chiefs. Because the

English would only deal with the Iroquois through a single authoritative leader in the making of

treaties, the Iroquois responded by conferring upon the council more and more specialized

political functions and claiming for that council a monopoly of the representative right in

dealings with the British. As time went on other problems emerged. The fur supply declined and

the Iroquois resorted to war with distant Indian tribes to protect their control of the fur trade. To

maintain these wars standing war chiefs were established. The British government first gave the

Iroquois a Canadian endowment which embraced 12,000 square miles, but they were later forced

onto a vastly smaller seventy square mile reservation. Again the council responded with the
 5

development of specialized offices. A welfare chief was appointed, then a forest warden, and so

forth.4

Succession is a central constitutional problem, especially in the well defined kingship

systems of many African tribes. Hilda Kuper found the constitutional arrangements of the Swazi

of South Africa focused on a form of dual monarchy in which the king, or Great Lion, shared

every prerogative with his mother.5 The queen mother, or Lady Elephant, had her own courts,

counselors, and troops, as well as some authority over the king. The queen mother actually

functioned as a court of appeal and would be replaced by her own sister or daughter should she

die. In addition to the balance of the dual monarchy there were permanent councils composed of

the heads of the various lineages that were also involved in decision making with the king.

Rituals of rebellion have been observed among certain African tribes and the Natchez

Indians of Louisiana. Max Gluckman reports that the king of the Zulu was required to make an

annual wandering through the villages of his kingdom naked and without arms or supplies.6 As

he appeared in each village he would be persecuted and even threatened with spears and abused

with language ordinarily reserved for the most vile members of this society. This ritual reminds

a king of the precariousness of his position and that a real rebellion may lead both to his death

and his replacement. If in fact he returns safely from the tour, he resumes his kingly regalia,

receives the praise of his people, and is reinstated in his position. But he has been sharply

warned that he must always remember to seek the welfare of his people.Classical

Constitutionalism

The failure to see the antiquity of constitutionalism is directly related to the failure to see

this institutional balancing of the social decision making process as its essence. Constitutional
 6

thought, in this sense, was explicitly developed among the ancient Greeks and Romans, as

evidenced not only in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and others, but also in political

institutions over a period of many centuries. It seems clear that Plato saw that a primary function

of government was to protect and maintain the law of the people.7 He furthermore explicitly

discussed the various institutional designs that might be used to achieve this, namely monarchy,

aristocracy, and democracy. His almost casual, yet sophisticated, treatment of these concepts

betrays his assumption that his contemporary audience understood these matters completely and

that little detailed explanation was necessary. As Plato went on to name the corrupted forms of

his three constitutional regimes, he clearly saw the source of corruption in their failure to

maintain the rule of law as they fell into tyrannical practices. Plato was not an optimist; he

seemed to believe that each of the good regimes bore within itself the seeds of its own

destruction--a view of all worldly constitutions which Bentham echoed in the nineteenth century,

asserting that only the constitution of the Anglo-American United States "affords a reasonable

promise of everlasting endurance."8

Because Plato wrote in dialogue form, his views in these matters are not as apparent as

those of his student, Aristotle, who used the philosophical treatise. To Plato's notion of a general

cycling through the different regimes and their corruptions, Aristotle added the idea of mixed

government wherein the democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical elements of the state could be

mixed into one regime which could have the potential for sustained balance of constitutional

power. The Aristotelian idea of mixed government formed the basis for classical constitutional

theory in conjunction with the commitment to the principle of rule of law.9 The idea was revived

and revitalized in modern Europe, particularly England, and even served as a guiding ideal to the
 7

American founding fathers who struggled with the problem of institutional balancing in a society

which did not have an aristocracy or a monarch.

Plato and Aristotle were writing within a tradition that had long treasured law and the

principle of rule of law. The early Greeks credited their laws to their divine ancestors and

therefore gave no earthly mortal a right to change those laws. The ancient poet, Pindar,

expressed that Greek view--"The law is king of all."10 In the early history of the Athenian

constitution the commitment to law was a constant. Over time a wide variety of political

institutions emerged to secure and maintain that law including monarchy, aristocracy, and

democracy. Even though none of these had authority to change the ancient law it was under

constant revision through one or another process of interpretation. But as late as the fifth century

the ancient Athenians maintained constitutional watch-dog bodies that could punish a magistrate

for acting beyond his legal authority.

We know more about the law of ancient Rome, but find in it the same type of

constitutional commitments used by the Greeks. Private law was the original source for all

Roman law. The public law, as it developed, was conceived as a form of generalized private

contract. Government structures were developed over time explicitly to maintain and enforce the

law. This pattern is strikingly analogous to that of English common law centuries later. But as

time went on and the Romans enjoyed international success they had to adapt their law to

imperial circumstances. They adopted new fictions which allowed the emperor to announce the

will of the people, the recognized ultimate basis of all Roman law.

The later reputation of Roman absolutism unjustly descends from this Justinian

formulation. But the true Roman doctrine which was reasserted in the Middle Ages was that the
 8

populace is the source of all law and that any public law and especially any tax must be based on

consent. One of the great twentieth century scholars of constitutionalism, Charles H. McIlwain,

concluded that "whatever our modern laws may be, Rome is the source of our jurisprudence, and

whatever our form of government, Greece has furnished us the main outlines of our political

science."11

Medieval Constitutionalism

The constitutional struggles of the Middle Ages were carried on at two different but

interrelated levels. On the international level the popes struggled with the emperors and the

kings while on the national level kings struggled with their own people. The story is far too long

and too complicated to be even summarized here, beyond noting that with respect to the papal

struggles the kings eventually won the right of approval for the appointment of bishops as well as

the right to rule over the bishops within their territory.12 Furthermore, as a concession to the

secular authorities, the selection of popes was finally regularized by a rule requiring the

agreement of two thirds of all the cardinals. The papal argument that all legitimate political

authority is derived from and subject to the pope and the view that all material goods in the world

are ultimately owned by the pope so that all earthly rulers are stewards to the pope--as advanced

in its latest form in 1301 by Giles of Rome--were ultimately overthrown.

John of Paris produced the most important constitutional analysis of the age. He

responded to this logical and perverse extreme, arguing that the pope is only a steward for the

Christian community and its properties. Following Aquinas, he saw in civil government intrinsic

dignity without any claim to ecclesiastical derivations, and concluded, therefore, in favor of a

meaningful separation of church and state as a matter of constitutional arrangement. John

 9

justified popes in their spiritual censuring of kings and encouraged the deposition of wicked

monarchs. But kings, he thought, could assist the cardinals in deposing an evil pope by force of

arms! John was successful in bringing to the constitutional theory of the middle ages a view

which was consonant with developments within the individual kingdoms. The best government

in both church and state is representative and responsible to the people and protective of their

laws.

The classic doctrine of a mixed state died out as a political institution during the Middle

Ages except in the Italian republics. Yet the idea was kept very much alive in literature as

medieval writers tended to recall the successes of the Roman Republic. Aquinas argued that

mixed government was the form of rule provided by God for the Israelites. John of Paris

continued the defense of mixed government in his constitutional writings. The anti-papal writers

in the Conciliar controversy even went so far as to argue that the Church should develop a form

of mixed government. And finally, the Renaissance writers such as Machiavelli and Erasmus

succeeded in making the notion of a mixed state commonplace, even though the medieval pattern

was kingship in almost every country.

The dualistic nature of medieval kingship probably resulted from the military

organization of the Teutonic tribes in the early Middle Ages. The kings, as military leaders, held

personal rule; and the business of government devolved upon the king as part of his household

responsibilities. Every subject was personally tied to his king with a bond of allegiance.

As the story is similar throughout Europe, the English experience can be representative.

Before the advent of feudalism, vast areas of life in England were organized without any

reference to the king. Land was owned outright by allodial tenure. The kings did not even enjoy
 10

the right of taxation until the tenth century. And folk courts carried the responsibility for law

enforcement serving almost like private arbitration boards or tribunals. Clearly the political

function of the king was extremely limited and the law of the people was the primary source of

social control.

The early feudal kings attempted to redefine their political relationship to their subjects in

terms of a divided land title and to convert kingship into a legal office. The late medieval

struggles between the kings and the barons resulted in kings retaining position as a personal

rulers entitled to personal allegiance--but with limited power. Property retained its traditional

autonomy so that taxation never became a royal right, but took the form of a voluntary grant

given through parliament to the king. By virtue of his office, the king assumed responsibility for

the administration of the law, but his judges could only enforce the existing rules and analogies

of land law. They could not carry out new conflicting orders of the king.

Scholars have attempted a variety of analyses to explain this form of limited monarchy

that occurred in these middle centuries. The English jurist, John Fortescue, saw this as a

combination of "royal and constitutional rule," or in other words, a monarchy in which the king

ruled and made laws only with the assent of his subjects. Fortescue used this constitutional

feature to distinguish between the royal rule of France and the limited monarchy of England.

One modern scholar of medieval political theory treats the same idea under the rubric of

"double majesty."13 Gierke believed the various theories of double majesty emerged as means of

imposing limits on kings. But in the Middle Ages, two of these were most prominent--both

deriving from Roman sources. It was characteristic of medieval writers to assert natural or

universal law as a limitation on the prince. This ancient Stoic view had some influence,
 11

especially with philosophers at different points in time. But the more compelling legal view was

the notion that law and the right to rule derive from the people in accordance with the ancient

principles of Roman law.

McIlwain prefers to use Bracton's medieval distinction between qubernaculum the king's

unlimited sphere of action, and jurisdictio, that sphere within which the king is bound by law,

whether it be natural law or custom.14 The Achilles' heel of limited government in England was

the absence of an institutional device that could restrain the king. What could the barons do

when the king exceeded the understood limits? History shows that rebellion was their only real

alternative. Their confrontation of John at Runnymede--resulting in the Magna Carta--was only

one of many such occasions in this general period.

McIlwain explains the breakdown of the medieval constitution as the outcome of a long

struggle between monarchs and subjects to extend their respective spheres of government at the

expense of the other. The tide of royal despotism crested in the sixteenth century with the royal

promotion of doctrines of unlimited obedience to kings and of divine right of kings. This trend

came to a head in the early seventeenth century with James I's assertion that the liberties of the

people were not a matter of right, but of royal grant.

McIlwain does not believe that constitutional limitation could have survived had it not

been for several unique characteristics of English political and legal life. The incredible

toughness of English common law proved adequate to resist the royal attack. Determined

English judges in the late sixteenth century refused to obey explicit orders from the monarch on

the ground that they were of no force being "against the law of the land," and got away with it

until the Stuarts gained control. The religious schisms of the times led dissenters, most notably
 12

Puritans, to revive old hostilities toward tyranny, bringing the defenders of law into an alliance

with the schismatics against the expanding prerogative of the crown.

Although Parliament had not yet come into existence as an independent institution,

defenders of law such as Coke and Wentworth asserted as early as 1621 that Parliament was the

voice of the people--the essential premise of government on the Roman legal model. As the

courts began to cave in to the Stuart monarchs, giving them discretion to make gubernaculum

supreme over jurisdictio, double majesty was abandoned and revolution appeared to be the only

course left open to the parliamentarians. How else could they deal with the star chamber denials

of due process and the extra-parliamentary tax assessments?

Modern Constitutionalism

Francis Wormuth has given us an outstanding analysis of the twenty years of

constitutional speculation spawned by the English civil wars.15 The Cromwellian years were

characterized by experimentation and discussion of ideas including popular sovereignty, written

constitutions, constitutional limitations, separation of powers, checks and balances, and

bicameralism, among many other principles and institutional devices. Though written at this

early date, James Harrington's Oceana served as a major inspiration for the American founders,

and notably John Adams. Many of the constitutional ideas which later came to fruition in the

American experience first had a serious hearing in England at this time. But they were largely

premature and unsuccessful in their own time.

With the demise of the Commonwealth in 1659 monarchy returned to England.

Republican thinking was not eliminated, but was preserved more in the principles than in the

institutions of politics. The Glorious Revolution formalized this arrangement in 1688 bringing to
 13

an end once and for all the claims of English monarchs to any absolute right of rule.

Unfortunately, there was not sufficient foresight to provide against Parliament's filling the

vacuum.

There is little doubt that eighteenth century America was the setting for the historical high

point of constitutionalism. Never before or probably since have such broad segments of a single

population understood and valued the essential principles of the rule of law and the notion that

the arrangement of political institutions can best serve as the fundamental device for protecting

the law from tyrannical governors.

It is a commentary on our own times that we so frequently misrepresent the intellectual

views of the men who produced the constitution of 1787. A few years ago I had the opportunity

of conversing at some length with a noted English historian and political theorist who made some

comments on the American revolution and constitution. But his account sounded more like a

description of the French experience after 1789. With some gentle probing I established to my

dismay that my friend actually believed that the American Constitution features abstract

announcements of natural law principles, and that the basic rationale used by the Americans for

declaring their independence was an appeal to nature and political theory. He was astonished and

even somewhat incredulous as I tried to point out that at no point does the American constitution

advance any principle of natural law or political theory, that it only specifies the respective

functions of and limitations on the various governmental agencies which it creates, and that the

revolution itself was quite deliberately justified in terms of the violation of the colonists' legal

rights as Englishmen by the Crown in abuse of its lawful authority. The opening sentence of the

Declaration announcing that all men are created equal cannot outweigh all the rest. It is certainly
 14

true that the American founders did hold ideologies which included various principles of natural

and divine law. But their constitutional documents do not mention these, and certainly do not

rest on them directly as did the French parallels.

The debates over the American Constitution provide us with some of the best discussions

of the basic rationale for constitutionalist theory, and James Madison provided the clearest and

most widely used examples of that rationale.16 Scholars are at least partially correct in tracing the

intellectual inspiration of American political thinkers to such writers as Locke, Montesquieu, and

the English radicals. But they are only now coming to realize the extent to which the Scottish

philosophers, and particularly David Hume, produced the theoretical insights which guided the

founders. The Constitution is not a Lockean contract. Rather it is an attempt, in the American

context, to achieve the kind of institutional balancing and protection of law so esteemed by

Hume in his History of England and Political Essays.17 One author has found throughout

Madison's and Hamilton's writings repeated references and borrowings from Hume, even beyond

the point where his arguments were relevant to the American context.18

A decade of experience with themselves and the Articles of Confederation had disabused

these American luminaries of any unwarranted optimism about their own abilities to stand aloof

from self-interest that might have been generated during their remarkable revolution. As they

drew themselves reluctantly back into the folds of Hume's philosophy, Madison's lament that

men are not angels became again an American commonplace. That basic assumption about the

nature of man or the expectations that we might have for human behavior lies at the very root of

constitutionalist thought. For if men will not abuse power and are capable of error free decision

making, there is no need of a constitution. Madison certainly did not claim that every man would
 15

necessarily abuse power when given the opportunity. But, from a statistical point of view, he

would say that any institution which permitted or rewarded the abuse of power would eventually

degenerate into tyranny.

Political Theory and Constitutionalism

This assumption about man shapes constitutionalist thought at several levels. Whether

articulated or not it is the insight that compels all human societies to recognize that laws are

essential for human interaction. Not only are men generally incapable of coming to a full

agreement on general moral principles of conduct, but they are even less capable of consistently

adhering to those principles once established. And so, law becomes necessary to make life in

society tenable. Law becomes a substitute for that moral and intellectual ideal which the human

imagination continually generates anew. Given the nature of man, law is the highest form of

social organization to which we can in fact achieve.

At a second level, law requires enforcement and enforcement agencies. Governments

with coercive power create a second level on which human selfishness and power lust can act out

their course. Constitutionalist thinkers have recognized the necessity of institutional constraints

on public authorities to prevent them from corrupting the rule of law. Legal rules limiting the

officials are of no value if there are no institutional procedures and balancing arrangements that

check them from corrupting the rules through arbitrary and self-interested interpretations.

For a society to maintain its laws over time, it must agree in advance on the procedures

and officials by which future disputes under the law will be decided. The community must also

determine how those officials will be selected at any point in time. These are constitutional

choices. But the science of constitutionalism focuses most importantly on a third choice--the
 16

arrangements for balancing governmental institutions to prevent them from degenerating into

perverse instruments for advancing the private fortunes of government officials or a privileged

class.

Francis Wormuth was one of the first to help contemporary scholars see that the essence

of constitutionalism is this concern with "auxiliary precautions" as they were called by James

Madison or "contrivances which not only describe but confine government, at least in its

everyday activities."19 F. A. Hayek eventually came very close to this when he defined

constitutional law as a superstructure erected to secure the maintenance of the law, rather than

the source of all other law.20 McIlwain was less sensitive to the problem of institutional devices

in his definition of constitutionalism as "the limitation of government by law," although his

studies of the English constitution clearly indicate that he saw the weakness of the English

constitution in its failure to develop institutions which could balance the governing authority of

the king over a period of four centuries.21 Much less appreciation for this definition is evident in

the writings of Tom Paine, for example, who saw constitutions as "antecedent to a government"

and believed that governments were "only a creature of a constitution."22

Because constitutions set the conditions for law making, it is commonly assumed that

laws are somehow derivative from and subsequent to constitutions. But the opposite view is

more easily defended from the historical record which shows that law usually precedes a

constitution. It is specifically to preserve the law and the regular administration of law that

constitutions have been designed. The whole point of a constitution is to protect the law of the

people which seems to be threatened by their rulers. The examples of the endless series of

medieval charters such as Magna Carta comes to mind where the people would rise up--not to
 17

overthrow the king--but to compel him to promise to maintain and respect the law or "the

liberties of the people." History credits those wise conquerors who have preserved the law of the

conquered nations. This was the wisdom of the Romans and the Norman invaders of Britain.

The least comprehending definition of constitutionalism is one that sees it as an exercise

of moralistic political theory committed to the task of discovering the correct fundamental

principles for reconciling liberty and equality. This latter moralistic enterprise has virtually

consumed the attention of our political and legal philosophers today. Few of these are concerned

to identify practical institutional devices that would prevent the kinds of inequities or violations

of right on which they focus. Rather their concern is to find some philosophical principle which

defines just law from a moral point of view.

I do not question that this is an interesting and worthwhile enterprise. But to see its

connection with reality, we must remember that legal and constitutional thought have to start

from a recognition that people do not always act on the basis of disinterested moral principle.

Our experience teaches us that they act from self-interest and that before morality can become a

guiding feature of social life, self-interest must be controlled in practical ways. We will not pave

the way to Utopia by finally discovering the true philosophical account of justice. Rather, Utopia

could only be possible in a world where men had ceased to pursue self-interest at the expense of

others, where they had ceased to be men, and had become angels.

Much of the contemporary failure to recognize institutional safeguards as the true basis of

our freedoms stems from our uncritical acceptance of the claims of the moralistic enterprise.

One European historian praises the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 specifically

because it "is concerned with the rights of man, not the rights of the citizen." In other words it
 18

focuses on "universal human rights" which focus will in time produce "the new man" and "the

new citizen."23

De Ruggiero gives us here a marvelous example of the naivete of the extreme liberal

view that once people hear the moral truth, they will naturally conform their lives and social

institutions to it. Where would the Americans be today if Madison had believed that?

It is not likely that we could find in the eighteenth century a document which reflects a

stronger commitment to the principles of freedom under law than does the French Declaration of

the Rights of Man. Yet the French Revolution failed to produce that freedom. My argument is

that a significant part of the reason for that failure is that the announcement of true political

principles in a constitution accomplishes nothing and may be counterproductive. For if the

government is not properly designed and balanced to prevent the emergence of a tyrant, the

principles will be interpreted by officials who are free to use the power of government to pursue

their own ends, and the principles will be as nothing. James Madison repeatedly referred to

constitutional articulations of general constitutional principles as "mere parchment barriers."24

Certainly the Americans believed in most of the principles announced so confidently to the world

by the French. But they mention none of them in their own Constitution. Upon reflection we can

see in their work profound evidence of the genius and effectiveness of centuries of constitutional

experience in England and colonial America. The Americans set their hands directly to the

problem of designing an internal balance and complication of decision making processes that

would prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single faction.

There is among English speaking populations a simple rule for dividing a cake which

epitomizes their constitutional wisdom. The rule does not say the cake must be divided evenly or
 19

that it should be divided on some other principle of fairness. The rule simply says, "He who cuts

the cake must choose his piece last." This rule is no less concerned with equality and fairness

than is the liberal French rhetoric. But without mentioning such principles it brings them far

more effectively into reality.

No legal theorist has attracted more attention in the last twenty years than has Ronald

Dworkin.25 Yet Dworkin has publicly urged the Supreme Court and judges generally to see their

responsibility to reach behind the law to the unquestionably true principle of equality to guide

them in the resolution of difficult cases.26 This dangerous course can only serve to provide

rationalizations for those that would promote their own political and moral views through law

and in the process create legal confusion and destroy our ability to predict the legal implications

of our actions, as the rule of law requires.

And so I emphasize my conclusion that natural law, or any moralistic theory of

constitutionalism, fails radically to see that the root of law is not moral truth. It is rather

convention, agreement, which may or may not be derived from the popular morality, but it is

emphatically not natural law. This may be a pessimistic view; but it is nonetheless true that it is

the lot of men in communities to live by law as a substitute for moral truth.

To live by moral truth as a community seems beyond us. And as every primitive society

and historical culture that has achieved freedom under a constitution has discovered, that

freedom has come through institutional design and balance and not through philosophical or

ethical discoveries.

The kind of attack that I have made on constitutional articulations of abstract rights or

metalegal principles is easily misunderstood and may need clarification. In the first place I
 20

should stipulate that it is not an attack on the idea or the existence of rights. Rather, most

constitutionalists do assume that people have rights. Furthermore, I strongly endorse moral

philosophy as an important enterprise in helping us see the implications of different theories of

rights. I believe that pro rights propaganda efforts are a very positive contribution to political

society and provide necessary encouragement for the maintenance and protection of those rights

through constitutional devices.

However, on the basis of practical considerations we must reject the abstract rights

approach to constitutionalism. The constitutional problem is the practical problem of preventing

public authorities from corrupting the law. It is the law which articulates our liberties or rights.

Abstract statements of rights or constitutional principle are worthless in constitutions. My

argument is based on the observation that only institutional balancing has any real effect.

Furthermore, I would argue on the negative side that statements of abstract rights are potentially

very mischievous, this because an unchecked authority can interpret such general statements of

right to suit its own interest and then exploit the sweeping substantive language. The liberals

who do not believe this should remind themselves of the substantive due process reasoning

developed by conservative American judges near the end of the last century.

A further practical reason for avoiding the abstract rights approach is that it requires

theoretical agreement on the content and justification of the rights protected for adoption.

Political agreements on policies to be pursued or institutional devices to be used in decision

making can be reached between parties which might never be able to reach agreement on their

reasons or justifications for those policies, or their theories about rights. A moralistic approach

to constitutions which seeks to preserve rights by incorporating abstract or principled

 21

articulations thereof in constitutional documents has far lower prospects for developing adequate

popular support for any single theory to be adopted. We can agree much more quickly on

institutional and policy statements than on theoretical ones.

My argument therefore is not against the enterprise of moralistic, political philosophy.

This has an essential and positive function. The error of many moralistic philosophers lies in

their uncritical jump from abstract moral thought to constitutional theorizing. I do not

necessarily disagree with their moral views. But I believe they are too often naive about

constitutions. They do not exhibit adequate understanding of constitutionalism.

The most frequent mistake of the moralistic philosophers in making that jump is the

assumption of benevolence which sneaks in unnoticed. Rawls, for example, acknowledges that

there will be strains placed on the contract from the poor, but he does not anticipate the strains

which will come from the better off, who are being taxed to help the poor. The assumption of

benevolence is not recognized or discussed. And this is characteristic of the moralistic

approaches to constitutions, which overlook the problem of human nature at its crucial point of

application.

The constitutional problem is a permanent feature of human society which can never,

even in principle, be finally solved once and for all. There will never be one perfect institutional

design which will solve the problem of tyranny forever. As described above, human nature is

such that inventive men seeking their own interests will always find ways to work new angles

and corrupt or undermine institutional arrangements which may have functioned successfully in

the past. Natural or external events can also dramatically affect the artificial balances of a

constitution as migrations bring cultural mixing, or as famines, wars, and plagues change the
 22

configuration of populations and the conditions of life. Economic growth has a similar effect.

All of these can have constitutional consequences. Because constitutionalism addresses a

permanent problem, it is essential that we pay attention to it in a systematic way and preserve the

wisdom that the centuries have brought us for dealing with these changes.

Finally, all constitutionalist thought assumes that law is the appropriate response to the

problems of human nature and community. The rule of law creates the context of freedom

whereby individual men may pursue moral perfection as they understand it without inflicting

their own views of perfection on others. Law is the means by which we prevent arbitrary or

willful interventions in the lives of individuals by those who must necessarily be chosen to

enforce the rules of the game.

Public Virtue and Constitutionalism

It could reasonably be argued that the beliefs of ordinary people influence the fortunes of

constitutional government more than the theories of philosophers. A universal feature of

successful constitutional regimes has been a cultural commitment to rule of law. For a

constitution to succeed the community belief systems must support its aims. There must be a

commitment to the law and rule of law. "Constitutionalism means that all power rests on the

understanding that it will be exercised according to commonly accepted principles."27

It is the absence of that cultural commitment among the people themselves which

explains the ongoing failure of Latin American attempts to imitate the American constitution. In

too many countries, the oppressive culture of the strong man is ingrained in the people. Even

when the peasants successfully revolt and come to power, they turn the tables and become

themselves oppressors, not only of their vanquished predecessors but of their own class, in a
 23

cycle which has played itself out now for two centuries. Solzhenitsyn attributes the amazingly

successful imposition of strong communist rule on a compliant Russian citizenry to a similar

cultural defect.28

The eighteenth century Americans, on the contrary, had the benefit of cultural

expectations built up through centuries of English commitment to rule of law and

constitutionalism. A century of benign neglect had allowed them to develop de facto institutions

for self-government as well as inflated views of what their legal rights as Englishmen might be.

When the central government undertook to restore firm control over the colonies after 1760, it

was too late. And when the newly independent Americans undertook to form a new government,

they remembered that good government requires some private sacrifices. The Americans of the

late eighteenth century enjoyed a unique heritage in that they understood the dependence of

freedom upon rule of law and constitutional government, while they were also willing to make

some personal sacrifices to establish and maintain a republican form of government. Most of

their eighteenth and nineteenth century imitators were not so fortunate.

Analysis of Rule of Law

At mid-century it might well have seemed that serious interest in the idea of rule of law

was almost dead among intellectuals. The concept had fallen into disuse, and the understanding

of that concept was certainly in decline among legal and political philosophers. The ideology of

democracy and equality had taken over center stage in the discussions of academicians.

However, in 1960 F. A. Hayek published an analysis of rule of law that went beyond anything

developed by earlier thinkers.29 Since Hayek's book other notable scholars have made further

statements on the subject. In 1964 Lon Fuller identified certain principles, or norms, which
 24

constitute an "inner morality of law"--principles including generality, publicity, clarity,

coherence, and possibility.30 In 1966 J. R. Lucas published an important elaboration of the

analysis of rule of law that was also partially derived from Hayek's discussion.31 Finally in 1975

John Rawls used the notion to bolster his process theory of justice, even though he treats the

subject from a moralistic point of view.32 In his 1980 book, John Finnis used the idea of law to

try to bridge the classic gap between accounts of natural law and natural rights.33 And in 1983

Michael Oakeshott published the essay which brings formal discussion of the issues to its highest

level.34 But most political and legal philosophers continue to ignore this issue and do not put

much emphasis on an analysis of the concept.

Because the notion of rule of law is crucial for an understanding of constitutionalism, it is

essential that we develop an adequate account of the concept. On the face of it there are

discrepancies of serious magnitude between the various accounts mentioned above and within

each individual account. Even Hayek's ground breaking account fails to make certain elementary

and essential distinctions. The question then seems to be, how can we lay out the logical

elements of the concept to provide some coherent order for its attendant principles, assumptions,

and implications? The following paragraphs are only a summary of preliminary points that

should be considered before taking on this larger creative project.

Any discussion of rule of law begins with the assumption that liberty is desirable, that

there is a need to protect a sphere of individual freedom. That may be regarded as a moral value,

but it may also be regarded as a simple preference. People want to have freedom for themselves.

As we begin to answer the question of how that freedom might be obtained, we need to make a

further assumption about the nature of the world in which we live, particularly the nature of man
 25

himself. What kind of a creature is it that we want to make free? This is not a metaphysical

question. Rather it is an empirical inquiry which asks what tendencies should we expect to

observe in human behavior.

There are several answers that might be given to this. We might, for example, assume

that men are naturally cooperative and respectful of the rights of one another, in which case we

would then conclude that some form of anarchy or possibly a moral utopia of some sort might be

possible to achieve. If we assume with the more conservative tradition in western thought, that

men will generally pursue their own self interest--even, in many cases, at the expense of innocent

third parties--and that we cannot expect men to either know or discover the truth, then we will

conclude that a society of law offers the best practical alternative political regime. On that view,

laws would be the practical substitute for moral principles in a regime in which it is recognized

that general adherence to true moral principles is not a rational expectation.

We can define the society of law, or the rule of law, as an arrangement in which the

individual is able to plan his own life by adhering to rules by which he will avoid all penalties

enforced by law. Such a definition entails several assumptions.

1. It assumes generality, that rules lay down general standards of conduct for all

citizens equally.

2. It assumes that the rules will be stated with sufficient clarity, that there is little or

no question what forms of behavior are permitted or prohibited by the rule.

3. It assumes that the rules are coherent, that is, that there is an established hierarchy

to determine which rules govern in cases of conflict and that there are not

conflicts in the rules governing the same situations.

 26

4. It assumes that the rules are public, that they are available and known to the

citizens.

5. It assumes that the rules are possible, that they can be followed, that they do not

require impossible or even unreasonable behavior.

6. It assumes that the rules are prospective, that they refer to their own future and not

to the past.

7. It assumes that the rules are backed by authoritative enforcement, that there is

governmental structure responsible for determining cases of conflict under the

rules.

Once we have identified these necessary characteristics of the rules themselves, we can

inquire into the characteristics of the institutions which might be expected to maintain and

enforce this kind of rules without interjections of arbitrary will. Recognizing the natural

institutional tendency toward tyranny inherent in our assumption about human nature, we could

recommend that the government have the following general characteristics:

1. It should be based on a separation of powers. The power to make laws must be

separated institutionally from the power to enforce the laws. This is

fundamentally a restriction that legislators may not enforce their own rules.

2. Every individual must have equal legal rights as he confronts the enforcement of

law.

3. The government must be subject to the periodic approval of the people which it

rules. The point is to prevent tyranny through responsible government. Consent

should be achieved in two ways. There is assumed at a most fundamental level a

 27

constitutional agreement. The second level is the consent to officials who will

decide on the laws and the enforcement of law. Republicanism was a modern

theory of consent.

4. An independent judiciary seems to be necessary in principle to protect rule of law

from potentially tyrannical governments.

5. Hayek has pointed out that there must always be provision for exceptions to any

of the above principles or to laws that may be valid in a given polity. But in

principle, such exceptions must be both justified and compensated at the time.

The principles listed above and others not mentioned seem to include rules which are

enjoined on legislatures and judges. But the rules are not self-enforcing. There needs to be

institutional devices that will carry the rules into effect. The actual devices used in any particular

political system might vary widely. Some devices will be more successful than others. But the

rules themselves will often appear ambiguous in concrete situations. It is therefore necessary to

institute procedural standards as the only effective way of enforcing the guidelines. As one

examines the provisions of the American constitution one is struck by the fact that none of the

principles of rule of law are announced or explained, or even set forth. Rather the document only

lists the procedures and the devices by which the founders hoped to achieve the effect of the

principles identified here.

Many of these principles are implemented at least partially through specific prohibitions

on the powers of government or specific institutional devices. For example, the principle of

generality is supported by the prohibition on bills of attainder; the principle of prospectivity is

implemented by the prohibition on ex post facto laws. Some of Fuller's principles such as clarity,
 28

coherence, and possibility, tend to be implemented primarily through judicial rules of

interpretation. We find laws which are unconstitutionally vague to be unacceptable in our

system. We have a supremacy clause which gives some hierarchy and coherence in the legal

system as a means of supplementing judicial rules of interpretation. Publicity is protected by the

prohibitions on the infringement of free press and speech as well as the requirement that

legislatures publish their proceedings and that legislatures and courts deliberate in the public

view.

The principle of separation of powers is implemented with a large collection of

constitutional devices. Most notable among these are the division of the operation of

government into three branches and the further division of the legislative branch into two parts.

Institutions such as judicial review and the various checks and balances protect the independence

and integrity of the three branches, thus indirectly supporting the notion of separation of powers.

Madison called this the doctrine of partial agency.

Formal equality is implemented in specific provisions prohibiting creation of royalty and

nobility as well as rules guaranteeing equal legal rights to citizens of every state. The principle

of consent is primarily implemented through the mechanisms of representative government, as

well as the provisions for the ratification of the constitution and subsequent amendments. An

independent judiciary is provided through prohibitions on juggling either the tenure or the

salaries of judges during their service. Protection from exceptions occurs in the eminent domain

clause.

Summary

In this essay I have briefly looked at the political institutions of a wide variety of societies
 29

to demonstrate the universality of both the political problem (the tendency to tyranny) and the

best human solution (rule of law under the protection of constitutional arrangements.) As an

antidote to the decline in our understanding and appreciation for the idea of rule of law I have

argued that constitutions should be seen as collections of institutional devices or arrangements

designed to prevent the emergence of tyrants in the process of settling private or public disputes,

and not as pronouncements of general principles of political morality.

Secondly, I have insisted that not every collection of institutional devices will constitute

an adequate constitution. To succeed a constitution must preserve and promote the rule of law,

the point of which is to make official response to private action as predictable and avoidable as

possible for the citizen. No amount of moralizing or breast-beating will compensate for a well

conceived system that provides practical barriers to factional takeover of the powers of the state.

And inappropriate reliance on moral principle as law can give factional interests the weapon they

need to implement their despotic programs.

Finally, I have recognized that the possibility that any particular polity will be able to

achieve and maintain a system of law depends as well on the extent to which the political culture

includes a commitment to law as a means of creating that individual sphere of freedom to pursue

the good. Rule of law, by refusing to nationalize moral truth, makes its universal pursuit at the

individual and voluntary association level a concrete possibility.

 30

NOTES

1. Walter H. Hamilton, "Constitutionalism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 4

(London: Macmillan, 1930-1935), 255.

2. Ibid.

3. Lucy Mair, Primitive Government (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1962).

4. I am grateful to Merlin G. Myers for sharing these observations based on his dissertation
research.

5. Hilda Kuper, "The Swazi: A South African Kingdom," George and Louise Spindler
(eds.), Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston,
1963).

6. Max Gluckman, Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa (Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 1954).

7. See Noel B. Reynolds, "Plato's Defense of Rule of Law," in the forthcoming proceedings
of the World Congress for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Athens, 1985,
where I defend this controversial claim about Plato. That Plato understood and defended
the idea of rule of law as an appropriate ideal for human societies is clear in all the
epistles and in almost all of the dialogues. The exception is Republic, which gives an
ironic defense of philosophical totalitarianism, which many commentators have
mistakenly taken at face value.

8. This comment was originally published in Jeremy Bentham, "Leading Principles of a

Constitutional Code for any State," The Pamphleteer, No. 44 (London, 1823.), II, 7 n. It
can now be found in John Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), 273.

9. See the excellent and very brief discussion in Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.,
"Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law," Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 8
(1985): 323-326.

10. Pindar, De Pindar: The Odes of Pindar, Including the Principal Fragments, Intro. and
trans. by Sir John Sandys, edited by T. E. Page, Loeb Classical Library (London: William
Heineman, Ltd., 1946), 169. The Greek text reads, "nomos ho panton basileus."

11. Charles H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (London: Macmillan,
1932), 3.
 31

12. See Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1964).

13. Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1900).

14. Charles H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell
UP, 1947), 77-79.

15. Francis D. Wormuth, The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism (New York: Harper,
1949).

16. James Madison, The Federalist Papers.

17. Frederick G. Whelan, Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985), 348-373 is an excellent new study which thoroughly
vindicates the eighteenth century Americans' reading of Hume.

18. Garry Wills, Explaining America (New York: Doubleday, 1981).

19. Wormuth, The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism, 3.

20. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

21. McIlwain, Constitutionalism, 21.

22. Ibid., 14.

23. Guido de Ruggiero, History of European Liberalism, trans. R. G. Collingwood (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1927).

24. See The Federalist Papers, Nos. 47-51.

25. Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).

26. Ronald M. Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law (London: The British
Academy, 1980), 282.

27. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960),
181.

28. See especially the opening chapters of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 3,
trans. H. T. Willetts (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

29. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 205-219.

 32

30. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (1969; New Haven: Yale University Press,
1964), 33-94.

31. J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 106-162.

32. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 235-243.

33. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 266-290.

34. Michael Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," On History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983),
119-164.