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OX F O R D E N G L I S H M O N O G R A P H S
General Editors
h e l e n b a r r d av i d b r ad s h aw pau l ina k ewe s
h e r m io n e l e e l au r a m a rc u s d av i d n o r b ro o k
f i o n a s taf f o rd
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Conscience and the
Composition
of Piers Plowman
SARAH WOOD
1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Sarah Wood 2012
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First edition 2012
Impression: 1
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Printed in Great Britain
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ISBN 978–0–19–965376–8
Acknowledgements
Bibliography 167
Index 181
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List of Abbreviations
Any study that attempts, as this does, to deal with the implications of
Piers Plowman’s existence as a series of versions inevitably faces certain
methodological issues, not least of which is the choice of an edition. Be-
cause it is the only edition to present the full corpus of variants, I have
adopted the Athlone Piers Plowman, and in general I have assumed the
accuracy of its representation of what Langland wrote (though I also note
some possible objections where these occur).1 Of course, any critical edi-
tion must be but one interpretation of the manuscript evidence, and any
conclusions about Langland’s processes of composition and revision based
upon it must therefore be provisional. But since the Athlone edition has
proved especially controversial, some of the particular difficulties associ-
ated with its use should be indicated briefly here.
The Athlone B text is especially problematic, because George Kane and
Talbot Donaldson’s belief that the B archetype is seriously corrupted led
them to extensive emendation by comparison with the other versions of
the poem. Kane had not admitted the testimony of the parallel readings
in the other versions when editing A, but by the time Kane and Donald-
son came to edit B they assessed, and frequently felt able to emend, its
archetypal readings against the parallel readings of A and C. Whilst in
theory an unobjectionable procedure, its practical consequence, as Robert
Adams shows, was that Kane and Donaldson were led to displace ‘many
strongly attested B manuscript readings’.2 Kane and Donaldson assumed
that agreement between A and C against B ‘sets up a presumption that no
revision occurred at that point’.3 But as Adams and others have pointed
out, the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that Langland changed his
mind when revising from A to B only to change it back again when revis-
ing B into C.4 As Thorlac Turville-Petre suggested in his review of the
Athlone B text, nor are all of B’s unique readings demonstrably inferior to
1
Piers Plowman: The A Version, ed. George Kane (London: Athlone Press, 1960); Piers
Plowman: The B Version, ed. George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson (London: Athlone
Press, 1975); Piers Plowman: The C Version, ed. George Russell and George Kane (London:
Athlone Press; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Unless otherwise stated, all
references to Piers Plowman are to these editions. All translations from the Vulgate bible are
from the Douay Rheims Version, revised Bishop Richard Challoner (Rockford, IL: Tan
Books, 1989). Unless another source is given, all other translations are my own.
2
Adams (1992; 31).
3
The B Version, p. 76.
4
Adams (1992; 54) and cf. Brewer (1996; 390).
xii Note on the Text
those of AC.5 In cases where Kane and Donaldson emend on the evidence
of A alone, their B text is especially problematic. In numerous instances
where a reading rejected as scribal in Kane’s A text turned out also to be
the reading of the B archetype (and sometimes of C as well), Kane and
Donaldson emended in favour of the reading selected by Kane in editing
A, giving the Athlone B text the unfortunate appearance of having been
emended to protect Kane’s edition of A.6
The Athlone B text, in particular, is therefore not an unproblematic
choice as the basis of an investigation into the versions of Piers Plowman.
Kane and Donaldson’s belief that they could correct the presumptively
corrupt B archetype by collation against the A and C versions means that
their edition of B most likely under-represents the frequency of small-
scale revision between the versions where the three texts run in parallel.
However, this remains, I hope, a largely hypothetical problem here, since
my own argument tends in any case to focus on larger configurations of
character and action rather than the individual lection.
It should also be acknowledged here that the central hypothesis upon
which the Athlone Piers Plowman is based—that there are but three ver-
sions, composed in the order A, B, C by a single poet—commands major-
ity but not universal support. This traditional view of the number and
sequence of the versions I share with the Athlone editors, but I discuss
some of the opposing arguments as these arise.
5
Turville-Petre (1977).
6
See Adams (1992; 49–50) and Brewer (1996; 394–404).
Introduction
Conscience and Personification
in Piers Plowman
Conscience has long attracted critical attention as one of the most inter-
esting figures in Piers Plowman. He plays a central role in some of the
most memorable scenes in the poem, from his debate with Meed in
passus 3, to his banquet with Patience and the corpulent Doctor of
Divinity in passus 13, all the way to the poem’s final scene in which he
presides over the collapse of Unity. He thus occupies an important posi-
tion in Langland’s exploration of major themes such as the relation of
labour and reward, the value of academic versus more pragmatic forms
of knowledge, the sacrament of penance and its contemporary abuses,
and the role and responsibilities of the secular and ecclesiastical powers.
He also engages interest in terms of the poem’s formal design. Like other
figures always perceived as central, Will and Piers, but unlike most of the
poem’s other personified figures, Conscience appears across passus and
vision boundaries; like Piers, he seems to transform as his role is devel-
oped and refined during the course of the poem, from the accuser of
Meed to the guardian of Unity. Moreover (unlike Piers), Conscience’s
role expands not only during the course of the narrative of the poem, but
also during the course of Langland’s revisions. Langland gives Conscience
a prominent place in several of his new poetic initiatives in the C text,
including his interpolation of the ‘autobiographical’ episode in C 5 and
the new passages on Hophni and Phineas in the Prologue and on gram-
mar in passus 3. In C especially, as Andrew Galloway has observed,
Conscience commands ‘a wide range of languages and levels of style, per-
haps . . . the widest of any figure in the poem’.1
Yet the very diversity of his appearances that makes Conscience such an
intriguing figure also manifests in particularly acute form the difficulties
attending any interpretation of Langland’s personified figures, and the
1
Galloway (2006; 127).
2 Conscience and the Composition of Piers Plowman
2
Mary Carruthers (Schroeder)’s well-known essay manages to combine both approaches.
See Schroeder (1970).
3
Lawton (1987; 1–2).
4
Hort (1938); Dunning (1980). Dunning’s first edition was published in 1937.
5 6
See Potts (1980; 1–60). Morgan (1987; 351).
Introduction 3
So Hort argues, for instance, that Langland aligns himself with Aquinas’s
discussion in that ‘Conscience does not teach of itself, it is guided by
Reason’; hence Reason, not Conscience, preaches before the confessions of
the seven deadly sins in the second vision (although this particular argu-
ment will not of course hold for A, where Conscience is the preacher).7
More recently, Morgan has offered various modifications to the earlier dis-
cussions, but Langland’s Conscience remains in his account ‘the applica-
tion of knowledge to act . . . distinguished by Aquinas from synderesis’.8
One might raise some objections to this broad consensus, however, and
some indeed have been lodged in the past. Britton Harwood, for instance,
points out that the claim that Conscience represents an act of the practi-
cal reason seems hardly borne out by the action of the poem itself: in the
C-text version of the banquet scene in passus 15, Conscience continues to
act even when Reason disappears.9 One might also argue that since Lang-
land never uses the term ‘synderesis’ or a readily recognizable translation,
it is difficult to support the confidence with which Hort asserts that the
poem reflects ‘the Dominican view of synderesis, which makes it the high-
est principle of the cognitive part of the soul’, as opposed to the Francis-
can, which placed synderesis in the affective part of the soul, the will.10 As
David Aers suggested in his earlier work on Piers Plowman, Langland
perhaps had in mind at the end of the poem a discussion of conscience
such as that of Aquinas, in which conscience is both fallible and yet nev-
ertheless binding.11 Still, one must consider seriously the possibility that
scholastic moral psychology is entirely irrelevant to the depiction of Con-
science and Reason in passus 3–4 (that part of the poem most typically
read in the light of scholastic discussions), and perhaps more generally as
well. John Alford’s authoritative account of Reason demonstrates that
Conscience’s partner in the first vision denotes eternal law rather than the
faculty of reason or intellect (for which, according to Alford, Langland
prefers the term ‘wit’ or ‘kind wit’).12 Galloway’s recent discussion of
7
Hort (1938; 81–5). Dunning (1980; 24–7, 73) shares essentially the same view as
Hort. Morton Bloomfield (1962; 167–9) also argued that Langland’s Conscience was con-
sistent with scholastic discussions of the faculty, although he suggested that in the later
parts of the poem Langland turned to an older, monastic conception of Conscience.
8
Morgan (1987; 353–6).
9
Harwood (1992; 198, n. 3).
10
Hort (1938; 72, 82). For the suggestion that Langland in fact adopts the Franciscan
view of the faculty, see Clopper (1997; 187). I cite Bonaventure’s view of conscience in
connection with B 13 in Chapter 2, although without suggesting that Langland had neces-
sarily read or intended to allegorize it.
11
Aers (1980; 203–4, n. 69) and cf. Potts (1980; 54–60). In his more recent work, Aers
has retracted his reading of Conscience in the 1980 title as a ‘mistakenly individualist ac-
count of this power’, but Aquinas remains central to his reading of the figure. See Aers
12
(2004; 230, n. 138). Alford (1988b; 205).
4 Conscience and the Composition of Piers Plowman
13
Galloway (2006; 103–4, 378).
14
See Wittig, J. (1972; 212–13). Walter Skeat first made the identification with the
passage from Isidore: see Skeat, Parallel Text, II, 215, n. 201.
15
See Dunning (1980; 73–74) and Morgan (1987; 351).
16
Wittig, J. (1972; 213, n. 9).
17
MED, s.v. ‘chepen’, 1. Cf. Haukin’s description of the activity at B.13.379.
18
Alford (1988a, s.v. ‘chalangen’). For Conscience as legal witness or accuser, see Alford
(1988a, s.v. ‘conscience’).
Introduction 5
19
‘Deme domes’ in the description of Conscience’s companion in the first vision,
Reason (Ratio), is another legalism; see Alford (1988a, s.v. ‘demen’), ‘To preside over a
court . . . to judge’.
20
Justice (1996; 132, 137).
21
See Whitworth (1972; 4). Whitworth argues that Langland revised the three versions
of his poem to reflect his ‘increasing knowledge of and attention to theological
distinctions’.
22
Aers (1975; 78 and passim); Lawton (1987).
6 Conscience and the Composition of Piers Plowman
23
Zeeman (2006; 132, 103, 105, 65–6). Compare also the approach of Harwood
(1990) and (1992; 91–2).
24
Frank (1953).
25
Frank (1953; 237).
26
Frank (1953; 243, 244, n. 23, 245). A more sophisticated account of the names and
naming of personifications may be found in Paxson (1994). While Frank is confident that
personifications ‘have only one meaning’, Paxson shows that Piers Plowman ‘explores ways
in which the name of a personification figure can work to represent a being that may be
more than a monolithic concept’ (1994; 131–3).
27
For notable exceptions see Griffiths (1985), esp. p. 59, and, more recently, Scanlon
(2007). Scanlon critiques the conventional view of allegory in which it ‘becomes the
stable signifier par excellence’ (p. 3). In Piers Plowman, he argues, ‘the allegorical and the
mimetic constantly converge, and the trope which most characteristically effects that con-
vergence is personification’ (p. 22). The figures in the poem are often personifications and
characters at the same time (p. 24)—not simply the allegorical ‘name’ which Frank
emphasizes.
Introduction 7
28 29
Lawton (1987; 2, 10). Zeeman (2006; 84).
30
Galloway (2006; 115).
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