IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COLUMBIA DIVISION

Pamela A. Baker, ) C/A No.: 3:24-cv-04303-JDA

)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ANSWER
)
Leon Lott in his official capacity as the ) (Jury Trial Demanded)
Sheriff of Richland County Sheriff’s Office; )
the Richland County Sheriff’s Office; and )
Deputies Matthew Smith, Michael Dillard )
and Bryan Hodge, )
)
Defendants. )
)

The Defendants Leon Lott in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Richland County

Sheriff’s Office, the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (hereinafter, RCSD”), Matthew Smith,

Michael Dillard, and Bryan Hodge hereby answer Plaintiff’s Complaint as follows:

FOR A FIRST DEFENSE

1. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be

granted. The Defendants reserve their right to file a motion pursuant to Rule 12, Fed. R. Civ. P.

FOR A SECOND DEFENSE

2. The Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Complaint not

hereinafter specifically admitted, qualified, or explained.

3. That as to the first sentence of Paragraph One (1), the Defendants admit same

upon information and belief. That as to the second sentence of Paragraph One (1), the

Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff has alleged federal constitutional violations pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants specifically deny that they have personally taken any

action or instructed anyone to commit any act or omission that resulted in a violation of

Plaintiff's constitutional rights.

1
 4. That as to Paragraph Two (2), the Defendants admit same upon information

and belief.

5. That as to the first two sentences of Paragraph Three (3), the Defendants deny

that the Defendant Richland County Sheriff’s Office (“RCSD”) is a legal entity of the State but

assert that the proper entity is the Sheriff of Richland County in his official capacity. Further

answering, the Defendant Sheriff of Richland County alleges that at all relevant times to this

action, he was a constitutional officer and thereby a state agency pursuant to the South

Carolina Constitution and the Laws of the State of South Carolina. Moreover, this Defendant

asserts that his office constitutes a governmental entity as set forth pursuant to the South

Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq. and is under the

jurisdiction of said Act. That as to the third sentence of Paragraph Three (3), Plaintiff has set

forth legal conclusions upon information and belief which can neither be admitted nor denied

and, therefore, the Defendants crave reference thereto. That as to the fourth sentence of

Paragraph Three (3), the Defendants recognize that Plaintiff is not seeking punitive damages

for her state court claims as they are not recoverable under the common laws of the State of

South Carolina or the SCTCA, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-120(b).

6. That as to the first sentence of Paragraph Four (4), the Defendants admit same.

That as to the last sentence sof Paragraph Four (4), the Defendants recognize that Plaintiff

is seeking certain damages under federal law. Further answering, the Defendants assert that

Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested in the Complaint, or any other relief against the

Defendants.

7. That as to Paragraphs Five (5), Eleven (11), Thirteen (13), Fourteen (14),

Fifteen (15), Seventeen (17), Eighteen (18), Nineteen (19), Twenty-three (23), Twenty-five

(25), Twenty-nine (29), Thirty (30), Thirty-one (31), Thirty-three (33), Thirty-four (34), Thirty-

five (35), Thirty-six (36), Thirty-seven (37), Thirty-eight (38), Forty (40), Forty-one (41), Forty-

2
two (42), Forty-three (43), Forty-five (45), Forty-six (46), Forty-seven (47), Fifty (50), Fifty-one

(51), Fifty-two (52), Fifty-three (53), the Defendants deny same in their entirety and demand

strict proof thereof.

8. That as to Paragraphs Six (6), Nine (9), Ten (10), Twenty (20), and footnote

no. 1, the Defendants lack sufficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth

and veracity of same, and therefore, deny these paragraphs and footnote and demand strict

proof thereof. To the extent that these paragraphs and footnote contain factual allegations

against the Defendants, the Defendants expressly deny same and demand strict proof

thereof.

9. That as to Paragraphs Seven (7), Eight (8), Twenty-four (24), and Twenty-six

(26), the Defendants only admit that at the relevant times, RCSD deputies initiated a

suspicious vehicle stop of Byron Pringle based on multiple grounds, whereupon Mr. Pringle

failed to yield and evaded deputies at a high rate of speed. Further answering, Pringle began

to drive in the opposite lanse of travel on Greystone Boulevard before taking the on-ramp to

I-126 inbound toward downtown Columbia, South Carolina. Upon information and belief,

Pringle’s vehicle then proceeded over the median and began driving at an excessive speed

into oncoming traffic on I-126. It was at that point in which Pringle’s vehicle collided head on

with the Mercedes vehicle operated by Plaintiff. Except as stated herein, the Defendants deny

these paragraphs and demand strict proof thereof.

10. That as to Paragraphs Twelve (12), Twenty-two (22), Forty-nine (49), Plaintiff

has set forth legal conclusions upon information and belief which can neither be admitted nor

denied and, therefore, the Defendants crave reference thereto.

11. That as to Paragraphs Sixteen (16) and Twenty-one (21), the Defendants

expressly deny same as stated and demand strict proof thereof.

3
 12. That as to Paragraphs Twenty-seven (27) and Twenty-eight (28), the

Defendants lack sufficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth and veracity

of same, and therefore, deny these paragraphs and demand strict proof thereof. Further

answering, the Defendants crave reference to the official medical and treatment records for

the most accurate evidence of what is contained therein.

13. That as to Paragraphs Thirty-two (32), Thirty-nine (39), Forty-four (44), and

Forty-eight (48), the Defendants reassert and reallege all previous allegations and defenses.

14. The Defendants deny the allegations and relief sought as set forth in the prayer

of Plaintiff’s Complaint to the extent Plaintiff seeks any such relief herein.

FOR A THIRD DEFENSE

15. The Defendant Richland County Sheriff’s Office is not a legal entity and,

therefore, is not amenable to suit and is not the proper party defendant in this case.

Furthermore, the Defendants assert that the proper entity is the Sheriff of Richland County in

his official capacity and that his office constitutes a governmental entity as set forth pursuant

to the SCTCA, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq. and is under the jurisdiction of said Act.

FOR A FOURTH DEFENSE

16. To the extent that any state law claims are asserted against them, the individual

Defendant deputies allege that at all relevant times they were acting within the scope of their

official duties as police officers, pursuant to lawful authority, and therefore are immune from

suit pursuant to the SCTCA, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(c).

FOR A FIFTH DEFENSE

17. The Defendants allege that they are immune from suit and liability under the

doctrine of sovereign immunity.

4
 FOR A SIXTH DEFENSE

18. The Defendants are entitled to immunity under Long v. Seabrook and its

progeny.

FOR A SEVENTH DEFENSE

19. The Defendants allege that at all times herein that RCSD deputies were acting

within the course and scope of their employment in a discretionary manner, in good faith,

without bad faith or malicious motives in the performance of their official duties, and therefore,

the Defendants are immune from suit.

FOR AN EIGHTH DEFENSE

20. The Defendants assert the Public Duty Rule as a bar to Plaintiff’s allegations,

in whole or in part.

FOR A NINTH DEFENSE

21. The Defendants Smith, Dillard, and Hodge at no time violated any clearly

established constitutional rights which were known or should have been known to them, and

therefore, are entitled to immunity.

FOR A TENTH DEFENSE

22. The actions of the Defendants Smith, Dillard, and Hodge were objectively

reasonable in light of the existing law, and therefore, they are entitled to immunity.

FOR AN ELEVENTH DEFENSE

23. To the extent sued in their official capacities, each Defendant alleges that he

is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, as such, is not subject to suit.

FOR A TWELFTH DEFENSE

24. The Defendants, upon information and belief, allege that any injuries or damages

allegedly suffered by Plaintiff, without admitting same to be true, are due to and caused by the

negligence, recklessness, willfulness, wantonness, carelessness, and gross negligence of

5
Plaintiff, which combined and concurred with that of the Defendants, if any, which negligence of

the Defendants is specifically denied, and contributed to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries or damages

as a proximate cause thereof and without which the accident and damages would not have

occurred, this contributory negligence, recklessness, willfulness, wantonness, carelessness,

and gross negligence of Plaintiff constituting a complete bar to Plaintiff’s attempted recovery

from the Defendants.

FOR A THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

25. The Defendants allege that any injury or damages alleged in Plaintiff’s

Complaint were due to, occasioned by, or caused by intervening acts of omission or

commission on the part of someone other than the Defendants, without which acts and/or

omissions Plaintiff would not have sustained any injuries or damages as are set forth in her

Complaint, all of which the Defendants plead as a bar to this action.

FOR A FOURTEENTH DEFENSE

26. The Defendants assert that any injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff as

alleged in the Complaint were due to and caused by the intervening criminal acts of a third party

over which the Defendants had no control.

FOR A FIFTEENTH DEFENSE

27. Any injury or damage sustained by Plaintiff as a result of the matters alleged in

the Complaint were caused and occasioned by events over which the Defendants had no

control and/or right of control, thereby relieving the Defendant from any liability or

responsibility herein.

FOR A SIXTEENTH DEFENSE

28. The Defendants are absolutely immune from Plaintiff’s tort claims pursuant to

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-40 and/or 15-78-50(b) of the SCTCA.

6
 FOR A SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE

29. The Defendants are immune from suit pursuant to pertinent portions of the

SCTCA, South Carolina Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq., and specifically, § 15-78-60 (3), (4),

(5), (6), and (20).

FOR AN EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE

30. To the extent that the Complaint seeks punitive or exemplary damages, it

violates the right of the Defendants to procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and therefore fails to state a

cause of action upon which either exemplary or punitive damages can be awarded.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint of Plaintiff, the Defendants Leon

Lott in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Richland County Sheriff’s Office, the Richland

County Sheriff’s Office, Matthew Smith, Michael Dillard, and Bryan Hodge pray that the

Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, for the costs of this action, and for such other and

further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Finally, the Defendants signal their intent to

seek attorney’s fees and costs associated with the filing of this motion under all available

avenues, including Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P., 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the South Carolina Frivolous

Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, and the Court’s inherent power.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert D. Garfield

Robert D. Garfield, Fed. ID 7799
Steven R. Spreeuwers, Fed. ID 11766
CROWE LAFAVE GARFIELD & BAGLEY, LLC
2019 Park Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
803.999.1225
[email protected]
[email protected]

Counsel for Defendants

Columbia, South Carolina
August 12, 2024