Reform, Rebooted: Building Long-Term Resistance to

Corruption
Michael Johnston

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 18, Number 2,

Summer/Fall 2017, pp. 3-9 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2017.0014

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Forum: cies where corruption has apparently been
brought under control. That approach is
tempting, yet those affluent societies have
Corruption not so much eradicated corruption as liber-
alized their institutions such that what once
might have encouraged corrupt tactics can
Reform, Rebooted now be done legally. In addition, the insti-
tutions and procedures by which outwardly
Building Long-Term successful democracies govern themselves
today are not necessarily what checked their
Resistance to Corruption corruption in the first place. Indeed, the his-
Michael Johnston tories of those societies suggest that corrup-
tion control is an outcome—at times a by-
product—of broad-based contention over
power and justice, not of amassing reform
Introduction: Reform’s “solutions.”
Indifferent Results

T
In addition, the institutions and
wo decades of anti-corruption ac-
procedures by which outwardly
tivity have produced only modest
successful democracies govern
results, particularly in developing
themselves today are not necessarily
societies.1 This is so for a number of rea-
what checked their corruption in
sons. First, in an age when national corrup-
the first place.
tion rankings, along with numerous other
international indicators, have driven many
discussions of governance, corruption has
been treated as a single phenomenon—es- Too many anti-corruption efforts thus
sentially the same wherever it occurs and take the form of process-oriented
varying only in amounts or pervasiveness. institutional changes driven by external
Second, it has been thought of as devi- agencies, frequently on short timelines,
ance, as a law-enforcement issue, or as a or civil-society oriented efforts usually
problem to be “tackled” or “fixed,” rather focused on familiar NGOs based in
than as a systemic consequence of deeper national capitals.
institutional weaknesses and opportunities.
Too many anti-corruption efforts thus take
the form of process-oriented institutional Most “anti-corruption toolkit” ap-
changes driven by external agencies, fre- proaches give little guidance as to what to
quently on short timelines, or civil-society do and when to do it, or which targets to
oriented efforts usually focused on familiar aim at; how to assess impacts; and—above
NGOs based in national capitals. Third, the all—how to avoid doing harm in the name
way forward has been assumed to emulate of reform. This article offers a quite different
“best practices,” often of affluent democra- approach, long-term and often indirect in

Michael Johnston is the Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science, Emeritus at Colgate University. He specializes
in comparative and American politics, public policy, corruption, and development.

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M IC HAEL JOHNSTON

nature, aimed more at political transforma- trol over the long term. We conclude with
tion rather than at policing corrupt actions, a short discussion of some larger questions
and seeking “deep democratization”2: en- that are often not given sufficient thought
abling citizens to resist official exploitation by reformers.
by political means. It begins with the no-
tion that there are several contrasting syn-
dromes of corruption reflecting different Contrasting Syndromes
combinations of deep influences. Unlike of Corruption
many reform strategies that seek to insulate There are some societies where corruption is
government from politics, deep democra- a routine expectation, while elsewhere it is
tization draws essential energy from self- the exception. But much more is involved
interested political contentions. It conceives than just contrasting “more” with “less”4: in
of better government not as more efficient some places corruption disrupts economies
administration but rather in terms of fair- and institutions, while in others it helps
ness and justice. Getting to that goal may unify diverse elites into self-serving net-
involve improvements to institutions, laws, works that can foster stability and growth.
and enforcement, but they in turn require Sometimes corruption is an alternative to
sustained social and political demand that violence (why storm Government House
reforms and controls be implemented effec- when you can buy off a few officials?),5 while
tively. That “deep democratization” approach in others it finances, protects, and is carried
is of necessity long-term, indirect, and risky, out via organized crime, drug cartels, and
but it has the potential to recapitulate long- armed “enforcers.” Much corruption oper-
term conflicts and political developments in ates in defiance of the law, but elsewhere
societies where corruption has been brought corrupt figures and law enforcement col-
within workable limits. The timelines will lude. In other cases, activities many see as
necessarily be long—positive change, when corrupt are legal and protected by public
it comes, may happen quickly, but longer- policy.6 It makes little sense to conclude
term developments have usually prepared that corruption is the same thing in Den-
the ground for it—and causal connections mark and (say) Bangladesh, with Denmark
indirect,3 meaning that sustained social sup- just having less of it. Yet that view implicitly
port is essential. underlies much of what we think we know
Let us look, first, at four qualitatively dif- about corruption.
ferent syndromes of corruption we can ob-
serve across a range of countries. Then we
will turn to the role of political contention It makes little sense to conclude that
in checking corruption and demanding just corruption is the same thing in Denmark
and effective government. Following that is a and (say) Bangladesh, with Denmark
discussion of ways to encourage and sustain just having less of it. Yet that view
effective political opposition to corruption implicitly underlies much of what we
in the context of each syndrome; as we will think we know about corruption.
see, that approach to corruption control is
not intended to generate specific responses
to specific corrupt practices but rather to My research, by contrast, points to four
strengthen citizens’ ability to demand better contrasting syndromes of corruption, each
government and effective corruption con- reflecting a particular pattern of weakness,

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 R EF O R M , REB O O T ED

imbalance, or strength in political and eco- Elite Cartels frequently develop in con-
nomic participation on the one hand and solidating or reforming democracies with
in key institutions on the other. These syn- liberalizing markets and only moderately
dromes, derived from both data analysis and strong institutions. Elites—business, po-
case studies,7 are best seen as ideal types in- litical, military, media, and others—seek-
dicating predominant patterns in the ways ing to check rising political and economic
people pursue, use, and exchange wealth competitors form powerful coalitions uni-
and power in contrasting settings. They are fied by corruption. For example, in South
not “system types” as such, do not embody Korea between the 1980s and late 1990s,
a developmental sequence, and do not sug- large family-owned business conglomerates
gest that corruption is identical in all coun- called chaebol funded political campaigns
tries experiencing a given syndrome, or in and deployed cash and gifts in exchange for
all parts of any one society. Instead, they favorable financing and regulation. Other
are intended to highlight lasting contrasts contemporary cases include Italy and Bo-
in the major corruption problems that con- tswana. Electoral competition may well
front different societies and to indicate long- take place but, in light of behind-the-scenes
term strategies for building anti-corruption linkages among elites, can be more apparent
strength. than real. Elite Cartel corruption can coex-
The four corruption syndromes differ in ist with significant economic growth, as the
important ways. elite coalitions underwritten by corruption
provide de facto predictability that partially
Influence Market corruption often emerges compensates for institutional weaknesses.
in mature democracies with open markets That does not mean, however, it is “good
and strong political and economic institu- corruption”: in a time of crisis, those coali-
tions. Corruption comes mostly through tions may not so much bend as break.
influence peddling, as private interests
seek specific decisions—e.g., alterations in Oligarchs and Clans corruption often
a provision of the tax code—via networks emerges in recently liberalized systems
of political intermediaries such as lobbyists where official markets and governance pro-
and legislative staff. Alternatively, elected of- cesses operate poorly and institutions are
ficials trade access and influence for politi- very weak. With major political and eco-
cal funding. Much of this influence trading nomic stakes out on the table and few ef-
takes place through fully legal, publicly dis- fective restraints, political and economic
closed political contributions, not outright competition can be intense and violent as
bribery. Other examples include “revolving oligarchs and their clans—sometimes po-
door” personnel practices and corporations litical factions, sometimes literal families—
that underwrite “research” and testimony plunder both public and private sectors (a
geared to build support for their products. distinction that may make little difference).
Ironically, the strength of political and ad- A climate of impunity and insecurity en-
ministrative institutions makes influence hances oligarchs’ incentives to move quickly
within them worth paying for: a decision and protect corrupt gains and enforce deals
that has been made is likely to be carried through violence while weakening social
out. The United States is a prime example of and political opposition. In Mexico, for ex-
Influence Market corruption; others include ample, opportunities created by the end of
Germany and Japan. the old PRI political monopoly, liberaliza-

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M IC HAEL JOHNSTON

tion of the economy, and the drugs trade fu- and political contributions often enjoys
eled contention and violence. More recent legal or constitutional protection. There,
Oligarch-and-Clan cases include Afghani- transparency—think public reporting of
stan, where foreign assistance helped fuel campaign contributions and receipts, which
systemic corruption. ironically provides publicly subsidized tar-
get lists for both donors and candidates8—
Official Moguls corruption is found in set- may only help influence markets thrive.
tings of authoritarian rule, dysfunctional Most mainstream reform strategies envision
markets, and weak official institutions. Un- a role for civil society, but in the first two
like Oligarch-and-Clan situations, where it syndromes above such activity can be futile
can be unclear whether anyone is in charge, or dangerous; in the latter two, civil society-
in Official Moguls cases power is monopo- based corruption campaigns too often fall
lized by a dictator, family, or junta control- victim to collective-action problems because
ling political and economic opportunities they portray corruption control as a public
for themselves and cronies. Corruption-re- good—“better government for all”—and
lated violence is less common because there thus do not engage citizens’ self-interests.
is no doubt who is in charge, but unlike In-
fluence Markets or Elite Cartels, power and
corruption are based on personal loyalties, The Contentious Politics
not official roles and duties. Senior Com- of Reform
munist Party officials in China and their Emulating and adopting “best practices” as
“princeling” offspring, “big men” in a num- a corruption-control strategy in developing
ber of African states, and the monarchies societies is to get history backwards. While
in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait exemplify this today’s outwardly well-governed societies re-
syndrome in various ways. Russia, once an semble each other in many ways—generally
Oligarchs-and-Clan case, now more closely they have strong, high-capacity state and
resembles an Official Moguls pattern. political institutions, largely liberalized mar-
Where Moguls operate with impunity, kets, competitive elections, a free press and
or where Oligarchs and Clans contend in independent judiciary, and relatively strong
a climate of insecurity, the new legislation civil societies—those attributes are not
and transparency provisions central to most necessarily what brought their corruption
anti-corruption scenarios will likely accom- problems under control in the first place.
plish little. In such situations corruption is More often that process took place through
not deviance but rather is the system itself. the sorts of lasting, and often bitter, politi-
Countervailing forces that might elsewhere cal contention outlined above. The Magna
put transparency and laws to use are very Carta, for example, was hardly the dawn
weak, and challenging the regime can be of democracy in England; instead it was a
dangerous. Indeed, for those at the top anti- bill of grievances and limits on the Crown’s
corruption measures can be useful ways to power, drawn up by a small number of bar-
repress dissent. In Elite Cartels situations, ons who spoke only for themselves, signed
mainstream reforms may be helpful but can by a reluctant king who sought resources for
encounter opposition from powerful elite yet another war in France.
networks. Paradoxically, in Influence Mar- How can we help developing societies
ket societies, where the rule of law is rela- encourage that sort of political contention,
tively strong, influence trading via lobbying particularly when those in charge had rather

6 G EORGETOWN JOU RNA L O F INTE RNA TIO NA L A F F AI R S

 R EF O R M , REB O O T ED

it did not occur? And can these societies steps toward building social foundations for
withstand the stresses contention will in- reform. In many cases those steps do not
evitably produce? There is no master plan, begin with a direct assault on corrupt prac-
but the key is gradual and indirect change tices and people—an approach that may
making way for such contention to emerge culminate in disaster for citizens and reform
within society, driven by issues and griev- groups—but rather take the form of long-
ances people care about. That often means term, indirect ways of empowering and sup-
refraining from directly challenging corrupt porting political opposition to corruption.
interests (which, in many instances, may In Official Moguls situations dominated
well include the military) as early priorities, by an authoritarian inner circle, anti-cor-
emphasizing instead a longer-term trend to- ruption action might begin with efforts to
ward increasing political pluralism (Official secure even modest civil liberties that have
Moguls), and opening up safe, valued po- been shown to contribute to better imple-
litical and economic space (Oligarchs and mentation of development-aid projects even
Clans). Ironically, most countries—even in undemocratic settings,9 to reduce police
the most apparently corrupt—have anti- and military oppression of citizen groups,
corruption legislation on the books already, and to bring more interests into political
even if the penalties are often outdated. But life. Corruption may well be the last issue
even the best reform ideas will wither if to be raised directly. Perhaps it is better for
they lack sound social and political founda- farmers to talk about the problems of ag-
tions—people and groups demanding that riculture, teachers to raise issues in public
corruption controls be put in place and en- education, and the like. The point is to en-
forced. Those sorts of demands will be transi- hance pluralism by bringing more voices into
tory unless they are linked to citizens’ own the arena.
interests—better housing, job opportuni- Oligarch-and-Clan situations may fea-
ties, public services, and fair treatment by ture many more voices, but it is unlikely
officials. Democratizing contention will of- that they are those of citizens. Reform pri-
ten be messy business but can lead to politi- orities in these situations revolve around cre-
cal settlements (or at least useful stalemates) ating a safe and valued political and economic
over the sources and limits of power—settle- space within which citizens and businesses
ments that can solidify into accepted limits can articulate and defend their interests.
and institutions if they protect the interests Basic law enforcement and security of legal
and well-being of significant segments of so- rights will be high priorities; so, too, will be
ciety. sound currency and banking and building
an independent and accessible legal system.
Here, too, corruption will likely be only one
There is no master plan, but the key is of many issues to drive contention and de-
gradual and indirect change making way bate, but underlying most such issues will
for such contention to emerge within be questions of accountability and fairness.
society, driven by issues and grievances Elite Cartel corruption marks societ-
people care about. ies that have at least a measure of strength
in official institutions and that often have
growing economies. There it will be ad-
Therein lie the connections between the vantageous—at last it might be said—to
four corruption syndromes and significant encourage citizen and business opposition

S U M M ER / F AL L 2 0 1 7 , V O L UM E X VI I I , N UM B ER I I 7
M IC HAEL JOHNSTON

to corruption and to back the sorts of ad- ing reasons, but they are an example of how
ministrative and procedural reforms (trans- to bring the effects and possible benefits of
parency, accountability, professionalization, reform home to citizens’ everyday lives.
opening up paths of access to officials) in
order to enable the burgeoning potential
challengers to pursue their own interests of Conclusion: What Do We
many sorts. Really Want?
Finally, it is tempting to conclude that A final question needs much more critical
Influence Markets have “arrived” in terms thought than it has received. It is that there
of reform, but such is hardly the case. Many is remarkably little consensus over what
such systems have political and economic “anti-corruption” should mean in practice.
processes that are less open and competitive “Good governance” is often discussed in
than they may seem and from which many apolitical, technocratic terms—as an ef-
citizens feel excluded (viz. the rise of anti- ficient administrative regime in which the
system populism in many democracies). state is little more than a referee in an open
Anti-corruption reforms will be of value, social arena. By contrast, successful efforts
but the larger challenge is to push for po- to resist corruption in the past have been
litical processes and economic policies that energized by basic questions of power and
are, and are seen to be, more open and com- justice—dimensions missing from many
petitive and less dominated by wealth and contemporary visions of reform. A full ex-
its influence. Campaign finance arrange- position of this issue, much less any tenta-
ments—a complex bundle of issues in their tive answers, lies well beyond the scope of
own right—will be high priorities, as will this article. However, not only in develop-
taking a fresh look at lobbying practices and ing societies but in those countries and or-
the reasons for mass political estrangement ganizations claiming to want to help them,
from the system. Thinking of the “deep de- effective reform will require frank conversa-
mocratization” agendas of Influence Market tions and tough choices about the sorts of
societies in terms of the need to rebuild so- people and societies we want to be, how
cial and political trust will give some sense people can and should govern themselves,
both of the directions of needed changes and and about how more immediate policy goals
of the scale of the challenges that lie ahead.10 such as growth, stability, and efficiency can
In all of these settings it will be impor- obscure—even become tradeoffs against—
tant for reformers to demonstrate progress, fundamental justice. Those values will be of
and for that the trends in country-wide little or no importance to entrenched cor-
corruption perception indices will be of rupt interests around the world, whichever
little help.11 It may be far better to gather syndrome they may embody. But as a guid-
and benchmark indicators of government ing principle of reform—particularly if we
performance—how long it takes, and how broaden our focus from corruption within
many steps are involved to get a license, societies to that which spreads through the
how reliable and expensive are public utili- workings of global economic dealings both
ties, how “negotiable” are tax assessment legitimate and illicit—it is of the utmost im-
and inspection functions—and, where pos- portance, and indeed it is essential if anti-
sible, to publish such data regularly. Both corruption efforts are to develop and retain
authoritarian and democratic government the broad base of support they need.
officials may resist such practices, for differ-

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 R EF O R M , REB O O T ED

Notes 6. Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Re-

1. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Corruption: Diag- form, chap. 7.
nosis and Treatment,” Journal of Democracy 7. Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, chap. 3.
17:3 (2006), 86–99. 8. Bertram J. Levine and Michael Johnston,
2. Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption “The Compliance Equation: Creating a More
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Uni- Ethical and Equitable Campaign Financing
versity Press, 2005), 186–220; Michael John- System by Blinding Contributions to Federal
ston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Candidates,” in Blinding as a Solution to Bias:
Power of Deep Democratization (Cambridge Strengthening Biomedical Science, Forensic Sci-
and New York: Cambridge University Press, ence, and Law, ed. Christopher T. Robertson
2014). and Aaron S. Kesselheim (Cambridge, MA:
3. On the indirect causal linkages involved in Academic Press, 2016), 277–296.
the emergence of corruption, and in trends 9. Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant
reducing it, see Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Pritchett, “Civil Liberties, Democracy, and
Government: The Political Economy of Corrup- the Performance of Government Projects,”
tion, Social Trust and Inequality in an Inter- World Bank Economic Review 11 (2000),
national Comparative Perspective (Chicago: 219–242.
University of Chicago Press, 2011). 10. Bo Rothstein and Eric M. Uslaner, “All for
4. For a critique of the World Governance In- All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.”
dicators, and more generally of efforts to World Politics 58:1 (2005), 41–72.
capture complex developmental and political 11. Indeed, such indices are in some respects
situations with a single index, see Melissa A. counterproductive; see Staffan Andersson and
Thomas, “What Do the Worldwide Gover- Paul M. Heywood, “The Politics of Percep-
nance Indicators Measure?” European Journal tion: Use and Abuse of Transparency Interna-
of Development Research (July, 2009). tional’s Approach to Measuring Corruption,”
5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Political Studies 57:4 (2008), 746–767.
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1968).

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