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A Review On Cloud Security Challenges and Issues

Review on Cloud security

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Balaji Karnam
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
18 views5 pages

A Review On Cloud Security Challenges and Issues

Review on Cloud security

Uploaded by

Balaji Karnam
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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ISSN (Print) : 0974-6846

Indian Journal of Science and Technology, Vol 9(43), DOI: 10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i44/104390, November 2016 ISSN (Online) : 0974-5645

A Review on Cloud Security Challenges and Issues


K.Balaji* and P. Sai Kiran
Department of CSE,KL University, Vijayawada – 520001, Andhra Pradesh, india
[email protected], [email protected]

Abstract
Background/Objectives: Cloud computing offers various services with minimum management effort while provisioning
resources via internet. Cloud clients are allowed to store their personal data at data centers, it will minimize storage
maintenance in local systems. Methods/Statistical Analysis: Cloud computing environment facing huge issues with
hardware and software vulnerabilities in maintenance and resources provisioning process. These vulnerabilities pose
huge loss of data, confidentiality, privacy and availability. Findings: In this paper, we studied and concentrated on various
attacks in Virtualization environment and the possible attack scenarios in each platform. Application/Improvements: In
the final section, we studied and described all types of attacks.

Keywords: Confidentiality, Integrity, Privacy, Provisioning, Virtualization.

1. Introduction multiple users and scalability i.e., Content Security Policy


(CSP) can increase or decrease Virtual Machine (VM’s) in
Cloud computing has been defined by National Institute dynamic environment3.
of Standards and Technology (NIST) as “a model for
enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or cloud provider interaction”. Cloud
computing integrates various technologies to provide
effective and efficient services to the cloud clients1. The
NIST cloud computing definition is most widely accepted.
The NIST cloud computing model provides the three
parts of cloud services such as (i) Essential characteristics
(ii) Service models (iii) Deployment models. In this paper
we concentrated on cloud virtual environment and its
vulnerabilities. Virtualization is a promising technology
which enable us to virtualize various resources in cloud
environment. Virtualization provides an isolation
a) Para Virtualization
environment, resource on-demand sharing among

* Author for correspondence


A Review on Cloud Security Challenges and Issues

device module or the hypervisor and if in case the attacker


gains access of the hypervisor all the data of the virtual
machine including the kernel states as well as the inputs
from the keyboard will be compromised8,9.

2.1Unauthorized Access to Hardware


A ring0 authorized domain or administrator gives a
privileged access to lower level domains in the virtual
environment in improper way. It leads to vulnerability
Figure 1.b) Full Virtualization of entire system and access granted system can directly
utilize the hardware resources of host OS or hypervisor.
The full virtualization is a process of hosting guest It leads to a system failure and denial of service attacks.
operating system’s on Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) These attacks are entitled as “confused deputy attack”10.
or hypervisor. Through hypervisor any guest VM An example of this attacks are [CVE-2005-0204], [CVE-
can access the physical resources in cloud computing 2007-5633] states that OS or hypervisor wrongly grants
environment2,4. The VMM contains a special domain that the access permissions to unauthorized domains in the
acts as a root level or host operating system to control virtual environment and provides an open access to
other operating system’s ie. , domain’s. Figure 1 a) gives hardware access such as Port I/O,MSR, etc10.
a brief idea about the Para virtualization and it prevents
users to execute some dangerous system calls on physical
resources. This leads to prevention of denial of service 2.2Hardware Reflected Injection Attack
attacks on physical resources. The full virtualization A cloud user may store malicious data (worm, virus, etc)
provides an infrastructure to run VM’s with full access on store location of cloud service provider side. When it
of physical resources in virtual environment. Figure traverses from client to storage media it does nothing,
1 b) shows, virtualization technique provides a direct later when it is accessed by higher privileged user it
access to the physical resources so that it can execute any causes a vulnerability in data processing. It targets specific
instruction without any involvement of host Operating software on CSP side and performs malicious activities
System (OS). It leads to denial of service attacks on once it gets triggered. These attacks pose great risk to CSP
physical machine5-7. The benefits of virtualization are such as data breach, data corruption and denial of service
resource sharing, dynamic and scalability, cost effective, attacks. An example of these attacks is: [CVE-2010-4530].
reduces power consumption, isolation and it helps CSP to
manage resource in effective manner. 2.3 Access by a Parallel Executing Entity
The paper organized as follows: section 2, gives the The cloud provider contains many platforms to make
details of vulnerability in various hardware platforms it characteristics to possible to client and resources are
that describes Trusted computing Failures in cloud executed in parallel and/or independent manner. Some
environment and section 3 described about possible resources, like servers having a possibility of parallel
security vulnerability in software which is actually located execution with multiple core CPU’s by using hardware
at cloud infrastructure. In section 4, we described possible assisted threads. A server shares features like memory,
attacks while execution live migration of VM from one CPU, etc. In this regards, we are considering memory
cloud environment and finally concluded about the paper as a major component for implementing these attacks.
in the conclusion. Suppose client wants to execute or access memory
location, CSP has to ensure that all other clients are
passive for that memory location when legitimate client
2. Security Issues in Cloud is trying to access. All other client usages are temporarily
Infrastructure blocked by CSP to prevent illegal access of memory
location. An attack [CVE-2005-0109] specifies how
The entire state of the virtual machine is exposed to the it is possible to access high privileged resources with

2 Vol 9 (43) | November 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology
K.Balaji and P. Sai Kiran

least privileged clients on their locations using parallel while communication with local system. This allows
execution of resources on cloud infrastructure. All the cloud user to launch a denial of service attacks. These two
security codes, hardware failure, reasons & loses are more methods pose unintended threats to linux machine:
mentioned in below Table 1. PTRACE_SETREGSET and PTRACE_GETREGSET.
This attack impacts on confidentiality, integrity, access
Table 1. Hardware vulnerabilities
complexity and availability of data storage system and
Code Hardware Reasons Impact Loses
authentication is never required to exploit a vulnerabilities
failure (10)
of system12.
CVE- Confused Assigning of 7.8 Confi-
2007-5633 Deputy root access dentiality,
rights to Integrity, 3.3. Xen Hypervisor Vulnerability
cloud client Availability Xen hypervisor 4.1 has much vulnerability as specified in10
to pooled and it has a lot of security aspects of a guest user (Domain
resources U). When Domain U using PCI based pass-through on
CVE- Reflected Hardware 8.1 Integrity, VT-d chipset that doesn’t remains interrupts remapping
2010-4530 Injection failure that as- Availability technique, it leads guest OS users to gain privileges by
signs root level
raising Message Signalled Interrupts (MSIs) that leads
access other
to write interrupt injection registers. Once domain U
clients
CVE- Parallel Unautho- 9.8 Confi-
obtains a privilege that provides an evidence of losing
2005-0109 execution rized access dentiality, confidentiality, authentication and availability of other
threat of resource Integrity domain user data in cloud environment13.
while blocking
resource for 3.4. Sparc Hypervisor Vulnerability
specified client A sun micro system’s Sparc hypervisor firmware 6.6.3
3. Software Based Security to 7.1.3 on ultra-sparc processors T1 to T2+ system
processors allows guest users to access the memory via
Attacks unknown vectors with any need of authentication bypass
on root level system. This attack leads to severe problem
3.1 Allow User to Access Root Level to cloud computing when it is configured with sparc
SVGAlib zgv 3.0 allows user gain root level access via hypervisor system. This attack makes the loss of data
a privileged leak of the iopl privileges to child process availability and confidentiality14.
[CVE-1999-1482]. This allows cloud client to access root
level resources without any barriers from security group.
This attack leads to failure of complete confidentiality, 3.5. VMM Vulnerability
integrity and availability. This attack doesn’t require any In Microsoft virtual machine server 2005 Release 2 SP1
authentication and access complexity is very low11. doesn’t maintain root level privileges for all host level
machine instruction execution. This allows guest VM to
execute malware code in kernel level and obtain other
3.2 Denial of Service Attack VM privileges within the virtual environment via special
In Linux kernel 3.2.10 and earlier, the regset method software like aka. This poses great issue to the entire
doesn’t manage .set and .get methods in case absence

Vol 9 (43) | November 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 3
A Review on Cloud Security Challenges and Issues

virtual environment such data breaches, data loss, data message contains authentication tokens those used for
confidentiality and privacy15.Software vulnerabilities earlier communication and it sniffed by the intruder or
with different parameters are mentioned in Table 2. attacker to launch a replay attack. These attacks can be
mitigated through the nonce values in authentication
messages and continues changing of message content. It
Table 2. Software vulnerabilities takes an intruder to analyze message content from the
Code Attack Reasons Im- Loses original data format but random generation of nonce
pact(10) values provide more secure for replay attack. In cloud
CVE- SVGAlib Allows cloud 7.4 Confi- environment, cloud user and cloud service provider
1999-1482 client to dentiality,
has authenticated the user before start the session and
access root Integrity
the session will be established by synchronizing with
level resources
each other. It is highly difficult to implement timestamp
without any
barriers concept in distributed cloud computing environment
CVE- Denial of Allows cloud 6.8 Integrity, and it poses huge risk in terms of replay attacks. In live
2012-1097 service user to launch Availabil- VM migration, control messages are sent in unprotected
attack a denial of ity mode and attacker can access the credentials and reply
service attacks to live migration process by sending its VM to actual or
CVE- Xen MSI inter- 8.3 Confi- host OS. Possible platforms to implement an attack are
2011-1898 injection rupts that dentiality, Xen hypervisor and Micro soft Hyper-v17.
attack leads to write Integrity,
interrupt Availabil-
injection ity 4.3.Masquerading
registers A masquerader attack refers to a way to obtain legitimate
CVE- Sparc Authentica- 7.8 Integrity, credentials from actual user with fake identity. Detection
2008-4992 vulnera- tion bypass Availabil- of these attacks made by analyzing the masquerader
bility on root level ity activities on victim resource in cloud paradigm. After
system obtaining the credential of host OS, an attacker simply
CVE- VMM obtain other 7.6 Confi- launch an attack on VM migration module to stop or
2009-1542 host VM privileges dentiality, suspend current migrating VM process and attacker
access within the Integrity VM acts like an original source of a system18. Possible
virtual envi- platforms to implement an attack are Xen hypervisor and
ronment
Oracle Virtual box17.

5. Conclusion
4. Possible Attacks on VM
Migration Cloud computing provides an effective way of delivering
services over an internet with various service models and
4.1Software vulnerabilities different infrastructure resources those are configured
An intruder can use several software vulnerabilities in and pooled. In this paper, we investigated and studied
VM migration like integer overflow, stack overflow and various practical attacks on cloud infrastructure with
heap overflow to launch several attacks in migration code possible attack vectors. We identified hardware level and
module. Possible platforms to implement an attack are software level threats and possibility of attack nature in
Xen hypervisor and Oracle virtual box16. cloud infrastructure.

4.2. Replay Attack 6. References


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4 Vol 9 (43) | November 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology
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Vol 9 (43) | November 2016 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 5

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