This article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics.

This is the author's version which has not been fully edited and
content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCE.2024.3413768

Explorative Implementation of Quantum Key

Distribution Algorithms for Secure Consumer
Electronics Networks
Mritunjay Shall Peelam, Siva Sai, Vinay Chamola Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—Key distribution techniques are indispensable individual inputs. In consumer electronics, this could be
for maintaining privacy, preventing unauthorized access, relevant for scenarios like collaborative data analysis,
and safeguarding sensitive data in consumer electronics where multiple users want to analyze data collectively
networks. Several recent research works focused on developing
conventional key distribution protocols for consumer electronics without exposing their specific data points [3].
networks. However, conventional key distribution algorithms 3) Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic encryption
face several limitations in consumer electronic networks, like is particularly useful in scenarios where data privacy
key management complexity, key storage issues, and cost and is crucial. In consumer electronics, it can be applied
resource constraints with increasing consumer electronic devices. to secure data in the cloud, allowing computations to
Quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques overcome the
limitations of conventional key distribution techniques and have be performed on encrypted data without the need for
several advantages like eavesdropping detection, intercept-resend decryption. This can benefit applications like secure data
attack resilience, trusted party independence, etc. Despite such analytics and processing sensitive information on devices
advantages, no research has explored the potential of QKD with limited trust [4].
techniques in consumer electronics networks. Addressing this
research gap, in this work, we conduct a comparative analysis
between QKD techniques like BB84, BB92, and E91 and There has been significant research on key distribution
conventional key distribution techniques with a broad evaluation management in consumer electronics networks. For example,
framework that includes metrics including key generation rate, Choi et al. [5] employed key distribution techniques in a
error rate, security level, and time complexity. We have also firmware update in consumer electronics networks; Jiang et
analyzed the QKD algorithms regarding several resource usage al. [6] used key distribution techniques for set-top box and
parameters like CPU, memory, disk space, and network usage.
We also examine the principles, advantages, limitations, and smart card-based digital television broadcasting; He et al. [7]
applicability of securing web transactions in consumer electronics utilized key distribution techniques for enabling multi-factor
networks. authentication in universal serial bus-based consumer mass
Index Terms—Quantum cryptography, Quantum key storage devices; and Han et al. [8] employed key distribution
distribution (QKD), BB84, B92, E91. techniques for node authentication and key exchanges in smart
home networks. In the digital pay-TV system, conditional
access systems (CAS) play a crucial role by preventing
I. INTRODUCTION
unauthorized access to video or audio data, thus ensuring
EY distribution techniques play an essential role in
K establishing the functionality and security of consumer
electronics-based networks such as smart home appliances,
the benefit of the service providers. The key distribution
is an essential part of CAS. There have been several
studies involving key distribution techniques for CAS. Liu
home automation systems, and Internet of Things (IoT) et al. [9] and Jiang et al. [10] proposed key distribution
devices [1]. The key distribution techniques are indispensable schemes using hierarchical access systems, and Pal et al. [11]
for maintaining privacy, preventing unauthorized access, and proposed key distribution schemes based on elliptic curve
safeguarding sensitive data [2]. A few notable applications of cryptography. The conventional key distribution techniques
key distribution techniques in consumer electronic networks have several limitations in consumer electronic networks,
are: including key management complexity, key storage and
1) Device Authentication: Key distribution techniques key revocation issues with increased consumer electronic
prevent unauthorized devices from gaining access to the devices, user authentication, cost and resource constraints, and
network by allowing devices to authenticate one another interoperability. Quantum cryptography constitutes a segment
securely [1]. of cryptographic techniques that harness the principles of
2) Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC): SMPC can quantum mechanics and can be used to establish secure
be applied in scenarios where multiple parties want communication channels within consumer electronics. At
to collaborate on computations without revealing their its core, quantum cryptography employs quantum properties
to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the key
Mritunjay Shall Peelam, Siva Sai, and Vinay Chamola are with the exchange process [12]. Table I compares frequently utilized
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, BITS-Pilani, Pilani
Campus, India 333031. Vinay Chamola is also with APPCAIR. (e-mail: standard terms and their respective acronyms within the
{mritunjay.peelam, p20220063, vinay.chamola}@pilani.bits-pilani.ac.in.) manuscript. Table II shows the comparative analysis of

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 This article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. This is the author's version which has not been fully edited and
content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCE.2024.3413768

QKD algorithms in consumer electronics. There are many the uncharted realm of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
key distribution techniques that are not immune to the techniques, including BB84, BB92, and E91, which offer
potential threats posed by quantum computers. Researchers unique advantages such as eavesdropping detection. The
and practitioners are exploring various avenues, including significant contribution of this study lies in its comprehensive
post-quantum cryptography and quantum-safe cryptographic comparative analysis, evaluating key metrics and resource
algorithms, to develop more resilient security solutions for the usage parameters. Novelty is introduced through the
quantum era [13]. QKD techniques overcome several issues pioneering exploration of QKD techniques in consumer
with conventional key distribution techniques and have several electronics networks, addressing a research gap and providing
advantages, some of which are outlined below: insights into their viability, thus paving the way for enhanced
security measures in the interconnected world of consumer
TABLE I: Comparison of Common Acronyms and electronics. Despite the superiority of QKD techniques over
Descriptions used in the manuscript conventional key distribution techniques, there has been
Acronym Description no work analyzing the application and feasibility of QKD
QKD Quantum Key Distribution algorithms in the consumer electronics domain. Addressing
CPU Central Processing Unit
SMPC Secure Multi-Party Computation this research gap, in this paper, we present a comparative
IoT Internet of Things analysis of the QKD algorithms for consumer electronics
CAS Conditional Access Systems
QBKE Quantum-Based Key Exchange networks. We present a simulation-based comparative analysis
DPM Decoy Pulse Method analyzing various metrics such as memory usage, CPU usage,
SDM Space Division Multiplexing
ROCA Return of Coppersmith’s Attack
disk space usage, key generation rate, security level, error rate,
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman and time complexity. We also compare the QKD algorithms
OTP One-Time Pad with the conventional key distribution algorithms. The rest
BB84 Bennett-Brassard (BB84) Protocol
B92 Bennett Protocol (B92) of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes
E91 Ekert Protocol (E91) the preliminaries of quantum computing and quantum key
distribution. Section III presents the existing works on
1) Theoretical security guarantee: QKD algorithms conventional and quantum key distribution. Section IV
are theoretically secure even against robust future establishes the need for quantum key distribution techniques
supercomputers that could easily break conventional key through a case study. We discuss three QKD algorithms and
distribution techniques [14, 15]. one conventional key distribution algorithm in Section V. We
2) Eavesdropping detection: QKD techniques enable the put forward the comparative simulation results of the presented
detection of eavesdropping attempts without revealing QKD algorithms in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper
the key content. Whenever an eavesdropper attempts to and provide several future research directions in Section VII.
intercept the message, the quantum states will be altered,
thus enabling eavesdropping detection [16]. II. P RELIMINARIES
3) Intercept-resend attack resilience: QKD techniques
also detect intercept-resend attacks, where the attacker In this section, we provide the preliminaries that enable the
tries to capture, store, and replay the message [17]. reader to understand the quantum key distribution experiments
4) Trusted parties independence: QKD algorithms presented in the paper.
enhance security by eliminating reliance on trusted
parties [18]. A. Quantum Superposition
5) Perfect secrecy: QKD algorithms enable perfect
In quantum mechanics, a qubit can exist within a
secrecy where the key security is not dependent on
superposition of states, denoted by a linear combination of
algorithmic weakness and computational assumptions,
foundational states denoted as |0⟩ and |1⟩ [22]. A qubit’s state
unlike conventional algorithms [19].
is denoted by the quantum state vector |ψ⟩, and its general
6) Photon Loss and Attenuation: Photons used in QKD
form is given by:
can be lost as they travel through optical fibers due
to absorption and scattering. Long-distance transmission |ψ⟩ = α|0⟩ + β|1⟩, (1)
increases the likelihood of photon loss, which can
compromise the security of the key distribution [20]. Where: α and β are complex probability amplitudes, subject
7) Limited QKD Protocols for Long Distances: Some to the normalization condition.
QKD protocols are not well-suited for long-distance |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (2)
communication due to their susceptibility to various
environmental factors. Identifying and implementing
QKD protocols that are robust over long distances is an B. Quantum Entanglement
ongoing research area [21]. Quantum entanglement allows the correlation of qubits even
This work is motivated by the pressing need to bolster when they are far apart [23]. For two qubits A and B, the
privacy and security in consumer electronics networks while entangled state is given by:
grappling with limitations in conventional key distribution α|0⟩A |0⟩B + β|1⟩A |1⟩B
protocols. Recognizing these challenges, the research explores |ψ⟩AB = √ (3)
2
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C. Quantum Measurement 1) The sender prepares a set of qubits in a specific state and
When a qubit undergoes measurement, it undergoes a sends them to the receiver.
state collapse, aligning with one of its fundamental states. 2) The receiver receives the qubits and randomly measures
The square of their respective amplitudes dictates these them on different bases.
probabilities. For instance, in the case of |ψ⟩ = α|0⟩ + β|1⟩, 3) The sender and the receiver publicly announced which
the likelihood of measuring |0⟩ corresponds to |α|2 , while the bases they used for each qubit.
probability of measuring |1⟩ corresponds to |β|2 [24]. 4) They discard the measurement results on the wrong base,
keeping only the matching measurements.
5) Through a classical channel, they compare a subset
D. Quantum Key Determination (QKD) Schemes
of their measurement results to detect eavesdropping
Quantum cryptography determines the key between the attempts (quantum communication is vulnerable to
endpoints by comparing the measurement properties of a certain types of attacks, and this step helps to ensure the
fraction of light particles. Light particles (photons) have three security of the key exchange).
bases of polarization: 6) Utilize error correction and privacy enhancement methods
1) Diagonal (45° or 135°) to produce a conclusive confidential key, ensuring
2) Rectilinear (horizontal or vertical) originality in the process.
3) Circular (left or right circular)
In quantum cryptography, only two processes are involved: III. BACKGROUND AND R ELATED W ORK
conversion and polarization. The information is converted into A. Key Distribution in Consumer Electronic Networks
0’s and 1’s and then transferred using polarized photons. When
the sender sends information in the form of photons, each Several research works have involved key distribution
photon will be in a particular quantum state, which will be techniques for consumer electronic networks. Choi et al. [5]
correctly observed by the receiver at the receiving time since proposed a secure firmware update and validation scheme
photons can be in one of the four polarizations: 0°, 90°, -45°, for consumer electronic devices in an in-home networking
45°. The receiver end receiver can distinguish this polarization environment. The authors use key derivation and ID-based
of the photons between a 0° and 90° polarization, or -45° and mutual authentication for the secure distribution of firmware
45° polarization [28]. There are three steps to determine the images. The authenticity of the fragmented firmware images
key, as given below: is guaranteed by firmware fragmentation with chaining. Liu
Step 1: When the sender sends the photons to the receiver et al. [9] proposed a novel key distribution scheme based
through a polarizer, there may be four possible polarizations: on grouping access control and a four-level key hierarchy.
The experimental results show that the proposed distribution
1) Bit "1" for vertical
scheme reduces the computation complexity and overhead by
2) Bit "0" for horizontal
a significant degree and is scalable in processing, leaving, and
3) Bit "1" for 45° right
joining subscribers. The authors conclude that the proposed
4) Bit "0" for 45° left
scheme is suitable and efficient for digital pay-TV systems.
Step 2: During transmission, photons use two beam Jiang et al. [10] also proposed a key distribution scheme
splitters: for CAS using hierarchical access systems. Pal et al. [11]
1) × for Diagonal proposed a key distribution protocol based on elliptic curve
2) + for Horizontal or Vertical cryptography for CAS. The proposed protocol minimizes
Step 3: When the stream of photons has been successfully communication and storage costs for subscribers and facilitates
sent to the receiver, the receiver wants to read these photons minimum communication costs and unrestricted channel
and tell the sender which beam splitter was used for each package composition. Jian et al. [6] proposed a key exchange
of the photons in the sequence. The sender then verifies the protocol for set-top boxes and intelligent card-based digital
information with the sequence of polarizers used to send television broadcasting systems using one-way has function
the key. All the photons are discarded and are read by the and Schnorr’s digital signature protocol. The experimental
wrong photon beam splitter; otherwise, photons become the results show that the proposed protocol is secure and dynamic,
key. When an eavesdropper tries to read or copy the photons, enabling mutual authentication and lower computations. It also
the state of the photons will change, and both the sender and prevents the McCormac hack problem and intelligent cloning.
receiver will detect it.
B. Quantum Key Distribution
E. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Process Quantum cryptography represents an innovative approach
In quantum key distribution, two parties, typically named to secure communications where the sender and the receiver
the sender and the receiver, share entangled qubits and perform generate a secret key based on a random mathematical function
measurements on their respective qubits. By exchanging the [30]. This domain has evolved through numerous algorithmic
results over a classical channel, they can establish a shared and protocol developments for secure web transactions.
secret key without disclosing it to potential eavesdroppers Zbinden et al. [31] implemented a system using quantum
(often referred to as Eve) [29]. The key steps of quantum cryptography to connect a 23-kilometer distance using optical
key distribution can be summarized as follows: fibers. Their system utilized single-photon interference for

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TABLE II: Comparative Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Algorithms for Consumer Electronics Networks
Algorithm Year Founder Complexity Principal Security Polarization No. of DoS Middle PNS Beam-Splitting
States Attack Man Attack Attack
Attack
BB84 1984 Bennett and Low Heisenberg Good Orthogonal 4 Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable
[25] Brassard for long
distance
B92 [26] 1992 Bennett Extra High Heisenberg Average Non 2 Vulnerable Robust Vulnerable Vulnerable
Orthogonal
S09 [27] 2009 Eduin High Public, Best for Bit, Phase Arbitrary Not Robust Not Not Possible
Esteban Private small flip State Possible Possible
Hernadez Key distance
Serna

secure key generation in real-time. It constructed a QKD in quantum cryptography. BB84, B92, and QKD algorithms
system for free-space line-of-sight transmission, which was are available.
further used in secure web transmission. Bourennane et al.
[32] implemented a system based on quantum cryptography V. Q UANTUM K EY D ISTRIBUTION A LGORITHMS
to transmit data over 40 km. Utilizing the BB84 protocol, This section describes three quantum key distribution
they significantly enhanced the secure key generation process, algorithms considered for consumer electronics networks.
overcoming various technological challenges. The first We also describe the One-time pad technique (conventional
proposal for quantum key transmission over 1.6 km in the air encryption) for establishing a comparative analysis with the
was put forth by Hughes et al. [33]. Subsequent breakthroughs QKD algorithms. A typical QKD system is presented in Fig. 2.
included the first Quantum-Based Key Exchange (QBKE) for Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses light particles (photons)
secure financial transactions over an 87 km distance by Sanwar to transmit information from sender to receiver using an optical
Ali et al. [34] and the introduction of the Decoy Pulse Method fiber cable [37].
(DPM) to reduce the photon number splitting attacks for the
BB84 QKD protocol by Hwang et al. [35]. Gobby et al. [36]
proposed QKD over standard telecom fiber across 122 km
using the BB84 protocol.

IV. N EED FOR QKD ALGORITHMS : A CASE STUDY

This section establishes the need for QKD algorithms
in consumer electronic networks. The predominant means
of conducting online monetary exchanges are through
debit and credit card transfers and online banking in
consumer electronics. Safeguarding these transactions on Fig. 2: Architecture of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
conventional computers is primarily entrusted to the RSA System
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) algorithm. Because it is possible
to keep tabs on the “CVE-2017-15361” vulnerability that
allows for attacks against public key cryptography (PKC), A. BB84 Protocol
it is feasible to launch a ROCA (Return of Coppersmith’s
In 1984, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard pioneered
Attack) attack using an RSA-generated key, as shown in
the field of quantum key distribution. The groundbreaking
Fig. 1. Hence, the conventional key distribution algorithms
work of Bennett et al. laid the foundation for the BB84
protocol, which remains a cornerstone of QKD. At the heart
of the BB84 protocol is the ingenious concept of encoding
every secret key bit into the polarization state of individual
photons, ensuring that these bits remain secure by not being
measured, thereby preventing eavesdropping attempts and
safeguarding information integrity. The BB84 protocol consists
Fig. 1: Feasibility of a ROCA (Return of Coppersmith’s of a rectilinear basis (horizontal or vertical) and a diagonal
Attack) on an RSA-Generated Key basis (45°or 135°). BB84 protocol consists of four states of
polarization of photons.
fail to offer unbreakable security in the above scenario. In 1. 0° Polarization (Rectilinear Basis represents binary 0)
QKD algorithms, the key is exchanged between the transmitter 2. 45° Polarization (Diagonal Basis represents binary 0)
and the recipient using quantum cryptography methods and 3. 90° Polarization (Rectilinear Basis represents binary 1)
algorithms, which provide robust security and are safe. 4. 135° Polarization (Diagonal Basis represents binary 1)
Quantum key distribution (QKD) helps to disseminate the key In this protocol, the sender measures the result with predefined

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bases and sends it back to the receiver, so this protocol is basis (X) in diagonal basis (X) then finally receiver write 0
also known as the Measure and Send Protocol. When the for the message.
receiver receives the polarized photons, the receiver tries to
find the initial state of the polarized photons to decode the 2) Photon polarization in B92 protocol: In the B92
actual message. Also, during the decoding process, the receiver protocol, the sender prepares a stream of single photons in
chooses random bases. The BB84 algorithm is outlined in one of four possible polarization states:
Algorithm 1. • Horizontal polarization (|H〉): Represented as a photon
with its electric field oscillating horizontally.
Algorithm 1 BB84 Protocol • Vertical polarization (|V〉): Represented as a photon with
Input : Message to be sent (M)
Output: Shared secret key
its electric field oscillating vertically.
Sender (the sender) Algorithm: • +45° polarization (|+〉): Represented as a photon with
for each bit b in M do
Randomly choose a basis B from {{|0⟩, |1⟩}, {|+⟩, |×⟩}}
its electric field oscillating at a 45-degree angle to the
if b is 1 then horizontal.
Apply a π 2 rotation to the qubit before preparation
Prepared qubit: |ψ⟩ = Rz π

• -45° polarization (|-〉): Represented as a photon with
2 |b⟩, where Rz (θ) is the rotation gate
around the z-axis by angle θ its electric field oscillating at a -45-degree angle to the
end
else horizontal.
Prepared qubit: |ψ⟩ = |b⟩
end
These four states form a basis set known as the rectilinear
end basis (|H〉, |V〉) and the diagonal basis (|+〉, |-〉). When the
Send the prepared qubits to the receiver through the quantum channel.
sender sends a photon to the receiver, he randomly chooses to
Receiver (the receiver) Algorithm:
for each received qubit do encode it in either the rectilinear basis or the diagonal basis,
Randomly choose a basis B ′ from {{|0⟩, |1⟩}, {|+⟩, |×⟩}} and the receiver randomly chooses a measurement basis as
Measure the qubit in the chosen basis
if B and B ′ match then well. The rectilinear basis corresponds to measuring in the |H〉,
Measurement result (bit value): b |V〉 basis, while the diagonal basis corresponds to measuring
end
else in the |+〉, |-〉 basis. If the sender and the receiver choose the
Measurement result (bit value): ∅ ; // Discard the measurement same basis for measurement, the receiver will get the same
end
′
Note down the basis B used for each measurement but keep the measurement result as the state the sender prepared. For example, suppose
end
results secret the sender sends a photon with horizontal polarization (|H〉),
After the sender announces the basis B used for each transmission, reveal the bases B ′ and the sender and the receiver measure rectilinearly. In that
used for each measurement
Discard measurement results for which the bases do not match.
case, the receiver will measure |H〉 and get the same result
Construct the shared secret key K with the sender from the matching measurement as the sender prepared. If the sender and the receiver choose
results (b)
return Shared secret key K
different bases, the receiver’s measurement outcome will be
random and not correspond to the state the sender prepared.
The key idea behind the protocol is that if an eavesdropper
B. B92 Protocol tries to intercept and measure the photons sent by the sender,
he will disturb their polarization states, leading to detection by
The B92 protocol, or the Bennett-Brassard 92 protocol, is a the sender and the receiver during the error-checking phase.
QKD protocol designed to establish a secure key between two The algorithm for the B92 protocol is given in Algorithm 2.
parties over a quantum channel. B92 is a modified version
of the BB84 protocol in which only two states of photon
polarization are necessary: 0° polarization (rectilinear basis C. E91 Protocol
represents binary 0) and 45° polarization (diagonal basis The E91 protocol, also called the E91 key distribution
represents binary 1). protocol, constitutes another QKD method aimed at securely
1) Steps in B92 protocol: Step-1 : The sender sends facilitating the exchange of cryptographic keys between
messages between {0, 1} randomly but 0 must be on a two entities, the sender and the receiver. This protocol
rectilinear basis (+) and 1 must be on a diagonal basis (X). relies on quantum entanglement, a phenomenon in quantum
Step-2 : The receiver chooses randomly either a rectilinear mechanics. Quantum entanglement, as described before in
basis (+) or a diagonal basis (X) for decoding the messages. Section II, enables two particles, typically photons, to become
Step-3 : If the receiver obtains vertical polarization in correlated so that one particle’s state is interconnected
rectilinear basis (+), then it means it can not be horizontal with the other’s, irrespective of the physical separation
polarization, and finally, the receiver writes 1 for the message, between them. This inherent property plays a pivotal role in
and again, if the receiver obtains horizontal polarization in secure key distribution, as any attempt to intercept quantum
rectilinear basis (+) it means it could be diagonal Basis, so communication disrupts the entanglement, alerting the
the receiver ignores this bit. communicating parties to potential interference. In the E91
Similarly, if the receiver uses diagonal basis (X) for decoding protocol, photon pairs are created in a maximally entangled
their messages and finds diagonal basis, it means it is the state, and due to the interconnection between the photons,
diagonal basis, but if the receiver uses diagonal basis (X) it is possible to get the secure key as well as able to detect
for decoding their messages and find horizontal basis then eavesdroppers. After generating maximally entangled photons,
the receiver ignores the bit and if the receiver finds diagonal the sender measures one photon, and the other is sent to the

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Algorithm 2 B92 Protocol Sender uses 0°, 45°, and 90° angles randomly for
Input : Quantum Channel, Photons direction measurement and lets the measurement of direction.
Output: Shared Key
Step 1: Quantum States Preparation (x1 , x2 , x3 ) with corresponding angle ( 0°, 45°, 90° )
the sender prepares a sequence of single photons in one of the four possible polarization
states: Horizontal (|H〉), Vertical (|V〉), +45° (|+〉), and -45° (|-〉).
represented as: ϕsender
1 = 0°, ϕsender
2 = 45° and ϕsender
3 =
Step 2: Quantum States Ensemble 90°. At the receiver end, the receiver uses 45°, 90°, and
The quantum states ensemble prepared by the sender is denoted as: Q = 135° angles randomly for direction measurement and lets the
{|H>, |V >, | + >, | − >}
Step 3: Quantum State Superposition measurement of direction (y1 , y2 , y3 ) with corresponding
the sender prepares the photons in the following superposition state |ψ> before
transmission over the quantum channel:
angle ( 45°, 90°, 135° ) represented as: ϕreceiver
1 = 45°,
ϕreceiver
2 = 90° and ϕreceiver
3 = 135°. Algorithm 3 outlines
1
|ψ> = √ (|H> + |V > + | + > + | − >)
4
the E91 protocol.
Step 4: Random Basis Choice
The sender and the receiver randomly choose a measurement basis for each photon. Algorithm 3 E91 Protocol
The two possible bases are the rectilinear basis (|H〉, |V〉) and the diagonal basis (|+〉, Input : Quantum Entangled Particles, Measurement Bases
|-〉). The choice of basis for the ith photon is denoted by Bi . Output: Secret Key
Step 5: Quantum State Measurement Step 1: Sender measures qubits with vector (measurement of direction) (x1 , x2 , x3 )
Upon receiving the photons, the receiver measures each on a randomly chosen basis and similarly for the receiver, it will be (y1 , y2 , y3 ).
Bi . The measurement outcome of the ith photon is denoted by Mi , where Mi can Step 2: The measurement of computational basis starts with {|0⟩, |1⟩} and spin by
take one of the four values (|H〉, |V〉, |+〉, |-〉). angles (0°, 45°, 90°) for the sender and (45°, 90°, 135°) for the receiver.
Step 6: Measurement Outcomes Step 3: Sender generates pairs of photons that are maximally entangled; the sender
The measurement outcomes of the N photons received by the receiver are denoted as measures one photon, and the other is sent to the receiver. Whenever the receiver
the sequence: receives the photon, they start measuring the photon.
M = (M1 , M2 , ..., MN ) Step 4: After the measurement is done, the results are publicly announced, and then they
are combined to find the degree of maximum entanglement with the same basis with
Step 7: Public Discussion (Error Check) (x2 , y1 ) and (x3 , y2 ) as the secret key.
the sender and the receiver publicly communicate the basis for each photon, Bi . They Step 5: The empirical value of the correlation coefficient (S) of both the sender and
do not disclose the measurement outcomes Mi yet. receiver can be calculated.
Step 8: Error Estimation Step 6: If the empirical coefficient (S) of both the sender and
√ value of the correlation
√
To estimate the error rate, the sender and the receiver compare the bases used for each receiver lie within 2 2, i.e., S ≈ 2 2 (Bell inequalities), it means both the sender
photon. For the photons where Bi matches the sender and the receiver, they keep the and receiver
√ are perfectly anti-correlated, indicating the key is a secret key. If it is not
measurement outcomes Mi corresponding to those photons. S ≈ 2 2, an eavesdropper is eavesdropping the message, and hence the protocol
Step 9: Error Rate must be aborted.
The error rate E is then estimated as the ratio of the number of discrepancies in Bi End of Algorithm
between the sender and the receiver to the total number of photons where Bi matches:
Number of discrepancies in Bi
E=
Total number of photons with matching Bi
Step 10: Threshold Check D. One Time Pad (OTP) or Vernam Cipher
if E > acceptable threshold then
Abort the protocol and report suspicious activity (possible eavesdropping or high The One Time Pad (OTP) algorithm is a conventional
noise in the channel). symmetric encryption method that guarantees absolute
else
Proceed to Step 11. confidentiality when employed appropriately. It relies on a
Step 11: Key Distillation secret and randomly generated key, which is of the same
To distill a final secure key, perform error correction and privacy amplification length as the message, to combine with the plaintext and create
techniques on the matching measurement outcomes M .
if Secure key is invalid then the ciphertext. Decryption requires the same key used for
Handle the situation appropriately (e.g., restart the protocol or terminate with an
error message).
encryption. It is an extended Vigenère cipher, so the generated
else key is as long as the plaintext. OTP is an unbreakable cipher
Proceed to Step 12. because the key is as long as the given message, and it is
Step 12: Secure Key Generation random and auto-generated. Once the key is generated and
After error correction and privacy amplification, the remaining bits form the secure,
shared key that the sender and receiver can use for secure communication using used, it will be destroyed by both sides, meaning each key
conventional encryption techniques. has two copies. The key and plaintext are calculated using
mod2, mod10, and mod26. The OTP key is made of random
symbols and should be used only once.
receiver whenever the receiver receives the photon; then, the
receiver starts measuring the photon, after which the results VI. E XPERIMENTAL A NALYSIS AND D ISCUSSION
are combined to find the degree of maximum entanglement. A. Theoretical Comparative Analysis
E91 protocol uses the Bell state measurement. In Bell state
measurement, two entangled qubits are represented as - Table III presents a theoretical comparison between the
key distribution algorithms under discussion. One Time Pad
1 provides perfect secrecy but faces challenges with large key
|ϕ+ ⟩ = √ (|00⟩ + |11⟩) (4)
2 management. BB84 offers information-theoretic security but is
1 sensitive to environmental noise. B92 and E91 show promise
|ϕ− ⟩ = √ (|00⟩ − |11⟩) (5) but need further development due to higher error rates and
2
technological demands. BB84 is the most practical option for
1 current quantum technology to ensure secure web transactions.
|ψ + ⟩ = √ (|01⟩ + |10⟩) (6)
2 One Time Pad relies on pre-shared symmetric keys, while
1 BB84, B92, and E91 employ quantum key distribution.
|ψ − ⟩ = √ (|01⟩ − |10⟩) (7) All algorithms provide information-theoretic security against
2
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TABLE III: Comparative Analysis of Proposed Quantum Algorithms

Algorithm Key Distribution Key Exchange Quantum Bit Security Against Key Re-usability Practical Implementation
Error Rate Eavesdropping
One Time Symmetric key, N/A N/A Unconditionally secure Keys can’t be reused Challenging, requires large random
Pad shared in advance keys
BB84 Quantum key Secure key exchange <5% error rate Information-theoretically Keys can’t be reused Challenging, sensitive to
distribution (QKD) secure environmental noise
B92 Quantum key Secure key exchange <11% error Information-theoretically Keys can’t be reused Challenging, vulnerable to photon
distribution (QKD) rate secure number splitting
E91 Quantum key Secure key exchange <25% error Information-theoretically Keys can’t be reused Extremely challenging, requires
distribution (QKD) rate secure entangled photon sources

eavesdropping. However, practical implementation varies, with security level. BB84 demonstrates the lowest quantum bit
One Time Pad requiring large random keys and BB84, B92, error rate (< 5%), while B92 (< 11%) and E91(< 25%)
and E91 being sensitive to noise and demanding entangled face challenges due to higher error rates and vulnerability to
photon sources. specific attacks. Both B92 and E91 protocols have a higher
security level (9.0) compared to the one-time pad algorithm.
B. Time Complexity Analysis The E91 algorithm shows the highest key generation rate,
which is better than the one-time pad’s key generation rate.
The time complexity analysis of the QKD algorithms
regarding secure web transactions is shown in Fig. 3 The
One-time pad, with O(n) time complexity, excels in providing
perfect secrecy, ideal for transmitting highly confidential
data, but the requirement of equally long keys limits its
practicality. BB84 and B92 quantum protocols, with O(n2 )
time complexity, leverage quantum mechanics to detect
eavesdropping, offering strong security for transactions like
online banking, but efficiency could be a concern for large
transactions. E91, another quantum protocol with the highest
O(n3 ) time complexity, provides robust security through
entanglement-based key distribution, suitable for highly secure
systems like military communications, but its efficiency is
lowest.
Fig. 3: Comparison of QKD algorithms time complexity
C. Resource Usages
The comparative analysis of resource usage for the quantum
cryptography protocols (One-time pad, BB84, B92, and E91)
reveals interesting insights, as shown in Fig 4. Among all
the protocols, E91 exhibits the highest CPU usage (50%),
making it more computationally intensive. BB84 demonstrates
a balanced resource allocation with the least CPU (45%)
and moderate memory (40%) usage. B92 stands out for
its relatively high memory usage (55%) compared to other
protocols. Surprisingly, the One-time pad requires the least
resources overall, with the lowest CPU (30%), memory (60%),
and disk space (20%) usage. In conclusion, while the One-time
pad emerges as the most resource-efficient protocol, E91
appears to be the most resource-demanding, making it the least
favorable choice. Fig. 5 compares four quantum cryptography
protocols. E91 exhibits the highest key generation rate (0.92)
and the lowest error rate (0.03). It also demonstrates the Fig. 4: Resource Usage Comparison of QKD Protocols
highest security level (9) among all protocols. The one-time
pad has the lowest key generation rate (0.9), and BB84 has
the highest error rate (0.08). VII. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
This paper comprehensively examines four quantum
D. Performance comparison cryptography techniques: One Time Pad, BB84, B92, and
Fig. 5 compares the QKD protocols in terms of three E91, specifically in the context of ensuring secure web
performance metrics: key generation rate, error rate, and transactions within consumer electronics networks. While

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 This article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. This is the author's version which has not been fully edited and
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