Journal of Governance and Development, 20, No.

1 (Jan) 2024, pp: 105-127

JOURNAL OF GOVERNANCE
AND DEVELOPMENT
https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/jgd

How to cite this article:

Ogunwa, S. A., & Abasilim, U. D. (2024). Democracy, federalism and governance
in Nigeria. Journal of Governance and Development, 20(1), 105-127. https://doi.
org/10.32890/jgd2024.20.1.4

DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM
AND GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA
1
Samuel Adetola Ogunwa & 2Ugochukwu David Abasilim
1
Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Crawford University, Nigeria
2
Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Covenant University, Nigeria
2
Corresponding author: [email protected]

Received: 9/4/2024 Revised: 24/4/2024 Accepted: 25/4/2024 Published: 8/7/2024

ABSTRACT

Nigeria became one of the federal societies under the supervision of

the British colonial government in 1954. Federalism and democracy
ceased when the military government usurped and suspended the
Republican Constitution in 1966. The periods of military rule
witnessed over-centralization of power at the centre, while the
federating states became Lilliputians. The usurpation of jurisdictional
competencies and centralization of power made the federating
states and local governments default on their socio-economic
responsibilities. The paper aims to elucidate the intricate relationship
between federalism and democracy in Nigeria, shedding light on
the repercussions of their erosion during military rule. Through a
comprehensive review of historical events and constitutional changes,
this study examined the consequences of over-centralization and
jurisdictional encroachments during military governance. The paper
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revealed that the institutionalization of federalism once embraced

without due consideration, led to detrimental adjustments and crises
during military rule, significantly impeding socio-economic and
political development. The paper concluded that democracy and
federalism are twins ‘brothers’ and will remain relevant and last long
when Nigerian leaders, particularly elected representatives, undertake
constitutional reforms that prioritized power devolution to states and
local governments. This adjustment, rooted in justice and fairness,
will rejuvenate the symbiotic relationship between democracy and
federalism, ensuring lasting relevance.

Keywords: Constitutional reform, democracy, federalism,

governance, military rule, Nigeria, power devolution, socio-economic
development.

INTRODUCTION

The incessant demand for socio-economic and political justice in

heterogeneous states has shifted attention to the utility of federalism as
a political formula. The federal arrangement was touted and suitable
for the challenges of centrifugal and centripetal forces confronting the
various nationalities within the geographical zones. Yet, federalism
insisted on unity within diversities, while at the same time was a
system of government that recognizes the division of powers among
the levels of government in a polity (Jinadu, 1979; Watts, 1999;
Yusoff & Rajanthiran, 2017). The division of powers itself ensured
the competencies and jurisdictional capacities for the delivery of
minimum goods and services to the people within and beyond.

In developed federal societies, a review of constitutional provisions

constantly offered new hope for both tiers of government in the areas
conflicting with the citizen’s interest. Addressing multinationals’
interests, the national governments have sorted ways and means for
the lower governments with sufficient resources and collaborative
efforts towards responsible governance to their people. This initiative,
according to Watts (1999, p. 3), in many political systems, political
leaders including political scholars, journalists increasingly referred
to federalism as a form of political organization that liberates and
encourages positive economic growth and development in modern
times as a form of government that articulates sensibility, division
and diversity of the plural people.
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Interestingly, the hope it offers, the federal citizens still believed in

the system, and stand to preserve their socio-economic, cultural and
political interests with great expectations (Pickel & Pickel, 2023;
Watts, 1999). In Nigeria, the idea of federalism was muted to preserve
the nitty-gritty and cultural diversities of the geopolitical zones
made up of the Hausas, the Igbos, and the Yorubas as well as the
minorities within these major ethnic groupings. The arrangement was
then designed and distributed powers to the two levels of government
(Oyediran, 2007). In the beginning, it started smoothly, until the
Nigeria military usurped the power of elected representatives in
1966 and introduced what scholars described as a federal military
government (Babawale & Olasupo, 2000; Sule & Sambo, 2024).

The usurpation of power by the military turned what used to be ‘true’

practice of the federal system upside down with the centralization
of powers on the Federal Military government. Needless to say, the
civilian governments beginning from Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the
Second Republic (1979-1983) and now (1999-2023) have made
conscious efforts at incremental adjustments to the national constitution
in favour of the federating states. Despite several adjustments to the
national laws, good governance has eluded the people of Nigeria.
This study is designed to interrogate democracy, federalism and the
place of governance in the country to assess the over-centralization of
power and implications on the socioeconomic development among or
within the federating states.

Also, as the country is presently constituted, the development

envisaged may continue to affect negatively on the country. With
the present situation, can socio-economic justice and dividends of
democratic governance reach the people who themselves are the
purpose of governance? The rest of the paper including the concept
of federalism and democracy, a brief history of Nigeria, theoretical
framework, federalism and distributive governance and conclusions
are the next line of interrogation.

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM

Federalism was a political ideology that combines elements of shared

rule and regional self-rule to preserve the unity and diversity of different
groups within a single polity (Asobie, 1998; Babawale, 2000; Watts,

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1999; Yusuf, 2000). It was an institutional system that resembled a

sovereign state and differs from other states only because the central
government legally includes regional entities in some decision-
making processes. In a federation, there were two sovereignties: the
central, federal or general-purpose government, and the regional
components, federating state or specific purpose government. The
federal government exists when the powers of government for a
community were significantly divided by the notion that there was
a single independent authority for the entire area concerning some
matters and that there were independent regional authorities for other
issues, each set of authorities being coordinated and not subordinate
to others within its own prescribed sphere.

The federal government was accorded with the specific rule, the shared
rule along common institutions, including incorporating different
nationalities that comprised the federation in its cabinet. In Nigeria,
for instance, the election of the president and members of the National
Assembly (NASS) was usually conducted by the Electoral Body
every four years. On the day of the election, the component states
go to the polls through the platform of political parties to elect the
president and the members of the national lawmakers. The president
and the NASS’s powers covered the whole federation and represent
the general interests. The elected NASS members also represented the
component states through election. Election played a significant role
in federal policies, especially in securing the shared-rule government.

According to Wheare (1963), democracy was a kernel for a federal

government, dictatorship, with its one-party government and its denial
of free election, was incompatible with the working of the federal
principle. He argued that federalism demands form of government
which have the characteristics usually associated with democracy
or free government. There was a wider variety in the forms, but the
main essentials were free elections and a party system, guaranteeing
a responsible opposition. The sustenance and durability of the federal
system were placed on democratic principles along with the rule of
law, equality, one man, one vote, freedom, liberty, accountability,
transparency, and election devoid of manipulations and falsehoods. In
essence, in ‘true’ democracy and federalism, there was the tendency
to checkmate the phenomena of the forces of centrifugalism and
centripetalism and do away with pathological disorders as well
as to preserve the unity in diversity or diversity in unity on which
federalism is built upon.
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Philosophically, since it was the federating states that unanimously ab

initio agreed to federate for the common good and elected the general
government as the head of the union, they also decide the place (home)
and location for the general government to carried out the allotted
responsibilities. However, the federal government and component
states were housed in the same political territory but live in different
regions due to their various functions. The central government
functions on behalf of the union government, including defence,
currency, and foreign affairs. Each level of government must exercise
power, autonomy, and independence according to constitutional
provisions. Power-sharing between the two sovereignties was
essential for the sustenance of the federal government. For each level
of government to function without encumbrance, powers must be
shared behaviourally or politically.

The need to federate was peculiar to all federations, such as the desire
for union, ethnic independence, geographical continuity, absence of
inequality, homogeneity, political antecedent, economic resources,
historical and political antecedent, tradition, common language,
and relations. The federal system’s sweetness, utility, and political
tolerance must be a reasonable balance that ensured all units maintain
their independence within their allocated sphere and no one can
dominate the others. It was the task of those who frame and work a
federal government to ensure that every unit is manageable.

UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY

Historically, democratic government took its root in the ancient city

of Greece where the people gathered together and made decisions on
matters of general interest. Since then, democracy as a concept in the
lexicon of political science has been accepted generally as a form of
government through which citizens can freely choose those to lead
them through election. The acceptance of democracy as one of the
vocabularies of political science gave rise to several definitions that
have accorded the term ‘democracy’ (Mahajan, 2013; Shively, 2008;
Valsangiacomo, 2022). Defining democracy from where it originated,
the Greek Philosopher Cleon in 422BC said “that shall be democratic
which shall be of the people, by the people, for the people” (quoted in
Mahajan, 2013, p. 719). Cleon resisted the definition of a ‘democratic
state’ or country that has attained democratic status as well as the
people therein.
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The notion of a democratic state was further expanded by former

American President Abraham Lincoln when he said that “democracy
is the government of people, by the people and for the people”. The
emphasised of Lincoln’s concept of democracy is centred on the people
who elect the government by themselves as the citizens of the state.
When we combine the two positions with democracy, both are largely
in agreement that democratic people in a democratic state will elect
the representatives to govern them. This was not different from what
the Greek city-state witnessed except that their kind of democracy
was a direct democracy because of the smaller population of the city
(Fowler, 2020: Johari, 2009). In this sense, Mills in his Representative
Government quoted in Mahajan (2013, p. 719) observed that in a
democracy “the whole people or some numerous portions of them,
exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected
by themselves”.

Seeley quoted in Johari (2009, p. 330) summed up democracy as “a

government in which everyone has a share”. Indeed, democracy was
a government of everybody because it allows people to participate.
However, it was at the level of participation that citizens usually
expressed themselves through the electioneering process. After the
election, the electorates (those who voted) withdraw to their tents,
unless something triggers them to line up on the major roads to
demand or protect against draconian policies being made against their
socio-economic and political interests. Little wonder that Macpherson
(1976) observed that democracy was just a mere mechanism for
electing as well as authorizing government for laws and political
decisions made for the society. Again, the beauty of democracy in
democratic states were the basic principles such as universal adult
suffrage, free, fair and periodic election, multiparty system, presence
of civil society organizations, freedom of press and mass media,
independence of the judiciary, freedom of association, free speech,
political tolerance, persuasion, legitimacy, human rights, sovereignty
of people, equal opportunity, constitution and constitutionalism, and
so on.

These elements, Burns (1935) opined “democracy is a word, with

many meanings and some emotional colour. It is not an algebraical
symbol, but a flag or the call of a trumpet for some; and for others
an obsolete mythology which has undesirable connections with
capitalism and imperialism” (quoted in Mahajan, 2013, p. 718). In

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the realm of party politics, the will of the people was not recognized
because the political parties are infused into the Iron Law of Oligarchy
that has pervaded all social organizations particularly the party system
(Michels, 1962). Although, democracy gave birth to party institutions,
yet it is indispensable to the working of democracy. According to
Mahajan (2013), it lowers moral standards and carries national
divisions into local elections. The operation of the party machinery
denied the individual any opportunity or freedom to use his judgement.

He must select one or more candidates from a pool of potential

knaves, none of whom he cares about, and one or more concerns, none
of which are acceptable to him. However, there was a relationship
between democracy and the party system. Political parties present
their candidates, while democracy stands as a method of electing such
candidates during elections. In the words of Mosca (1939), democracy
results in the tyranny of the majority, while the minority only aired
their view.

NIGERIA: A BRIEF HISTORY

The conquest and treaties of friendship with different mosaic tribes

by the rampaging British imperialists beginning in 1861 ventured into
the formal birth of Nigeria in 1900 and it’s naming and amalgamation
in 1914. The formal amalgamation in the first instance was for
economic and administration conveniences (Olaniyan, 2003). After
the amalgamation, the British-led colonialists settled down to govern.
From the amalgamation was the introduction of indirect rule. The
indirect rule was a system adopted by Lord Lugard (the first Governor-
General in Nigeria) to govern the nationalities. The people hitherto
lived differently, while the policy of amalgamation brought them
together as a country. Although, the policy of indirect rule partially
succeeded in the Yoruba territory, successful in the North, but was
miserable in the Eastern part of Nigeria.

What accounted for the failure was largely due to differentiations,

peculiarities and diversities of culture, language, ancestry, history,
tradition, religion, territory and the system of government. The socio-
economic and political diversities of Nigerian peoples were well
acknowledged and understood by the British officials. However, the
permutations of how the entities should be divided as well as forms

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of government were suggested by Lugard’s lieutenants. For instance,

Temple and Morel advised the division of the country into smaller
units or four provinces (Olaniyan & Alao, 2003). These suggestions
were vehemently rejected. The differences between the North and
the South as well as political agitations by the nationalists led to the
constitutional making under the imperial government, Britain.

To assuage the demands of the educated elites that turned nationalists,

the Richard Constitution of 1922 was promulgated with elective
principles. The Constitution provided for the formation of political
parties by politically inclined Nigerians. Under British rule, the
constitution was expected to cover the whole country that is, the
North and the South (as the country was known then), but the New
Council put in place only legislated for the Southern Provinces,
while the Governor made laws and orders for the Northern Provinces
(Oyediran, 2007). In other words, for twenty-four years (1922-1946),
the North and the South never sat together to deliberate on the matters
that concerned them as one people and one country. They lived as
different people and countries but in the same territory.

Oyedele (2020) opined that Lugard did not set out to build a Nigerian
nation and never intended to prepare the people for any future
leadership role. The British government only succeeded and used
the resources of the South to better the lots of the North (Agbaje &
Adebanwi, 2003; Olaniyan & Alao, 2003). The politics of division or
separation perpetuated by the colonial government attracted criticism
from Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. According to him, in the aftermath
of amalgamation in 1914, “Nigeria … existed as one country only
on paper” (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 1947 quoted in Oyediran,
2007, p. 8). The realization of the deep division between the South
and the North, the Richard Constitution was promulgated in 1946. In
the words of Richard, the Constitution became necessary to bring the
people together and to unite them.

The provisions included: promoting the country’s unity; providing for

diversities of the country including all the elements that is, the North,
the East and the West; and finally, ensuring greater participation by
Nigerians in their own socio-economic and political affairs (cited in
Oyediran, 2007, p. 12). Undoubtedly, unity was absent among the
hitherto called Nigerian peoples despite the political amalgamation
carried out 32 (1914-1946) years after. While the Richard constitution
attempted to bring the people together, political pundits such as
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Oyediran (2007) and Olaniyan (2003) observed that the constitution

instituted and institutionalized regional politics in the three
geopolitical zones made up of Nigeria. Two years later (1948) the
Eastern region became an entity. Still, under the constitution, the two
tribal associations were rechristened political parties.

For instance, Egbe Omo Oduduwa became the Action Group (AG)
and the Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa turned out to be the Northern
Peoples Congress (NPC). Before this time, the NCNC which
dominated the political scene since 1944 after the collapse of NYM
has become the Igbo party. The politics of regionalism coordinated by
the colonial government continued at the General Ibadan Conference.
The conference was meant to chatter a new constitution against the
Richard Constitution of 1946. Olaniyan (2003, p. 12) opined that the
constitution that was, Macpherson “full of landmines that eventually
over-dramatized and exacerbated ethnic awareness, suspicion and
hostility”. Under the supervision of the British government, the 1951
constitution politically reconfigured the Nigerian state. The North
had threatened to pull out of Nigeria unless she got 50 percent of
the legislative seats at the national legislative council. Kirk-Greene
(1971, p. 9) posited that the concession to the half of Nigeria that is,
to the north “was one to dominate the sharing of Nigeria’s political
culture until the First Republic exploded sixteen years later”.

The constitution, indeed, instead of emancipating both the two

halves of the country (North and South), emphasized the inability of
Britain to eliminate unhealthy rivalry among the regions and sealed
the hope of the “emergence of ethnic-based political parties” as well
as “all patriotic agenda for the total emancipation of the Nigerian
state” (Olaniyan & Alao, 2003, p. 14). The lacuna in the Macpherson
constitution influenced the agitations for another constitution. Although
the constitution bequeathed the federal system of government to the
country, yet, it did resolve partially the challenges that accompanied
the amalgamation. Also, accorded more autonomy, and sovereignty
to the regional governments, while the centre remained politically
imbalanced. With political independence in 1960 and the attendant
challenges of the first Republic in 1963, Nigeria was still regarded as
a “grotesque artificiality of the state”.

Nigeria as a counterfeit and nonindigenous object, Awolowo (1947, p.

47-48) observed that “Nigeria is not a nation… is a mere geographical
expression”. Even, Lugard (1965, p. 100) himself buttresses the fact
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that the amalgamation exercise was a scheme “designed to involve

as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible”. Indeed, the
amalgamation of the peoples even with central institutions “were
merely formal and did not create a common forum for all the
components of the amalgamated Nigeria” (Ifidon, 2003, p. 34). With
political and administrative disparities forced on the Nigerian people
by the imperialists, Tamuno (1991, p. 400) argued that the policy
of bringing Nigerian people into the country ab initio “lacked the
essential ingredients of stability in nations, developing or developed
…” and devoid of “trust, justice, and peace”.

The lack of these three fundamental principles for nationality

integration was a sign that the British stooges were primarily driven
by their peculiar interests and their love of the nation’s resources
rather than by the socioeconomic and political advancement of the
domestic government and its citizens. There was proof that merger
was first and foremost advocated to make sure the imperial possession
in Nigeria brought the crown and its government in Britain the most
benefits possible. This may help to understand why British attitudes
and actions did not take the peculiarities of Nigeria, its land, and its
people into account. Nigeria’s nation-building was not approached
holistically by Britain, and the country’s future political growth
received little attention (Olaniyan & Alao, 2003). The political and
socio-economic contradictions in Nigeria speak volumes of the crises
that attended the creation of Nigeria.

The three major ethnic nationalities that were Igbo, Hausa/Fulani,

Yoruba and other minority nationalities are at loggerheads with
one another as enmity, rivalry and disharmony are the order of the
day. The country was still battling with interethnic and intra-ethnic,
religious, and political rivalries, and revenue allocation, among others
(Fashagba, 2021). These contradictions were products of direct and
deliberate failure by British colonial masters and Nigerian leaders
to lay a solid foundation for the country. On the part of the Nigeran
political elites, the submission of Nicolson (1989, p. 302) was that
despite challenges before independence in 1960, “the main root
system of Nigeria’s present … is to be found in the first half of the
twentieth century, and particularly in the early years of that period”.
Sir Arthur Richard had explained to his London audience in answer to
the Nigerian issue that Nigeria was just one country by mistake due
to British suzerainty.

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In terms of society or even the economy, it was still far from being
one nation or country. Between the main tribal tribes, there were
significant social and political distinctions. They represented various
stages of cultural development, do not share a common language, and
have wildly varied customs and lifestyles (Kasai, 2024). Little wonder
that as old as Nigeria state was, born in 1900 became independent in
1960 and attained statehood in 1963, the country is still crawling.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Thomas Hobbes’ (1588–1679) political philosophy was where

the power theory originated. He contended that man naturally and
continuously craves power and ever-increasing power in a single
appetite, as opposed to the accumulation of many isolated cravings
brought on by countless isolated perceptions. According to him,
the primary driver of interpersonal rivalry was the pursuit of fame
and power. The man’s persistence for power, he notes, is that when
the interests of individuals or groups meet in the pursuit of ever-
increasing riches, honours, and commands, the competitors resort to
killing, subduing, displacing, and repelling their rivals. According to
Johari (2009, p. 11), “it is also true that men like to lie in peace to
enjoy the iota of power they possess, it disposes them to live under a
common power”. The power battle between rival political groups was
undoubtedly ongoing.

The nature of power was relational to civil society that everyone,

whether moderate or immoderate engages in a perpetual struggle
to possess power over others. Macpherson (1976, p. 37) observes
that it “is necessarily pulled into a constant competitive struggle for
power over others, or at least to resist his powers being commanded
by others”. The nature of politics in plural societies confirms
that connections between the rulers and the governed, including
subordination, dominance, and submission, were the core components
of power. These interactions were the subject of political science.
These connections have an impact on how political power is shaped
and distributed while also having an influence (Lasswell & Kaplan,
1950, p. xiv). Power was a built-in mechanism of the state that is
made evident through its machinery. The state was made up of these
institutions: the legislative, executive branch, armed forces, police,
bureaucracy, and judicial system.

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Political authority demonstrated by the manner these state-run

organisations operated and how they carried out government orders.
Political parties, pressure groups, elite faction leaders, and other
informal agencies or organisations wield control over a variety
of decisions. Both the state and nonprofit apparatus can influence
the political system in some way. Therefore, Gauba (2009, p. 283)
asserted that the formal state organs do not possess exclusive authority
over politics and that these organs were receptive to environmental
inputs. Marxists believed that power is centred on and connected with
a class (the dominant class) that detests its alternation. The power
exercised by this class led to exploitation and expropriation of the
non-dominant class because, in an aristocracy, a smaller group of
activists made the policies published in the name of all the aristocrats,
and in a democracy, the sovereign electorate was controlled by the
politicians (Parry, 1971).

A king’s decisions were always made with the cooperation of his

advisors. The school noted that the working class must seize political
power from the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, for the non-dominant
class, notably the working class, to be freed from the exploitation of
the capitalists. Because “government in a democracy was certainly
of the people, it might even be for the people, but it was never by the
people but only by the ruling class” (Parry, 1971, p. 25), the masses
must fight for their redemption. Politics entails the use of power
but also the welfare of the public, according to the power theory.
Accordingly, politics as a practice served the interests of the greatest
number of people (Bentham, cited in Sabine and Thorson, 1973, p.
612). According to Laski (1967), people can use power to accomplish
goals that lead to everyone’s satisfaction.

As a result, the use of power in politics encompassed more than just

the exercise of influence, the settling of conflict, and the pursuit of
common objectives for the good of all. Sometimes, the use of power
forcefully disrupts normality or peaceful co-existence in society
“unless it is made subservient to the common will. Within society it
is only the clumsy and the stupid people who seek to attain their ends
using force” (Johari, 2009, p. 13). The concern of politics was about
power and the state vis-à-vis government exercises power (Anifowose,
2008). And “… consequently, it includes not only the legal and
formal but also the extra-legal and informal processes involved in
government. … power as the central concept is that political science

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pays greater heed to man, especially the political man, as a basic unit
of analysis” (Curtis quoted in Johari, 2009, p. 8).

Thus, the concept of power cannot be separated from discussions of

politics or political parties. Although the topic of power theory was
as old as politics itself, its significance in the modern era cannot be
understated. Power has been the core premise of politics in modern
governments, especially in pluralist societies. The antagonistic
and competitive behaviour of individuals and their groups, such as
political parties, labour unions, and religious organisations, was a
manifestation of the reality of power. As a result, factions were vying
for dominance over one another. The domination of a group over the
other assumes the fact that such a group exercises power or dominion
over other groups. The relevance of the power theory to the political
system, the socioeconomic and political decisions of the Nigerian
governments especially in the current fourth Republic has continued
to widen the gap between the haves and have-nots.

The fruit of democratic government has turned into the non-availability

of essential infrastructure like good roads, potable water, and
employment. Thus, more often than not policy decisions of the federal
government have quantumly affected all the levels of government and
hindered their performance vis-a-vis to perform creditable well.

FEDERALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE GOVERNANCE

Federalism as an ideological system of government was an instrument

designed to protect and preserve unity in diversity among nationals
in heterogeneous societies. Federalism served as a distributive
justice, and fairness for governance matters as well as to make
commonwealth available to the nationals irrespective of colour, race,
language, customs, history and culture. It offered collaborations
between all levels of government for socioeconomic growth and
development. Federalism is perceived as an engine solution and
positive development of political organizations. The Nigerian state
after several permutations settled for a federal system of government
in 1954. This did not come easily, but with negotiations among the
regional leaders under the supervision of the colonial government,
Great Britain (Akinyemi, 2003; Amuwo et al., 2004; Okeke &
Omojuwa, 2022; Saidu & Rasheed, 2016).

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The Igbo in the East, Hausa/Fulani in the North, and Yoruba in the
West made up the three regions that made up the federation at the
time. The areas initially harboured mistrust for one another. No state
should be so strong in comparison to the others that it could match the
combined strength of many of them, according to Mill (1960, p. 367-
8). If there is such a one and only one, it will insist on dictating the
conversations; if there are two, they will be impossible to resist when
in agreement; and whenever they dispute, everything will be resolved
by a struggle for domination between the rivals. Dudley (1968, p.
272) agreed with Mill’s assertion that the regional leaders in Nigeria
“started by uncritically accepting the Wheare’s model of federalism”.
The manner in which the regional leaders adopted federalism implies
that they might not have known the type of nation-state they wished
to establish.

The leaders agreed to the unbalanced, unfair political framework on

behalf of all Nigerians. As Ijalaye (1979, p. 141) rightly observed the
North alone was as great, if not greater both in population and size
than the rest of the three other regions including the Mid-west put
together. With an imperfect political structure, the country attained
political independence in 1960. At independence, party politics took
the central stage with the regions generously guiding their spheres
and attempting at usurpation of other regions into their spheres. This
led to the creation of the Midwest from the Western region. The pre-
independence and attendant political crises, although, did not delay
the national independence in 1960, but suddenly reappeared after the
partial departure of the colonial government. These and other crises
such as the motion for self-government, census crisis, Kano riot in the
north, NCNC crisis in the East, Action Group and the Western regional
election, and the Federal election of 1964, among others culminated
in the dismissal of the first Republic in 1966 by the Nigerian military.

Ake (1996, p. 4-5) correctly observed that the Nigerian political

leaders, although united against the colonial regime, however, “their
relationship was never free from tension and conflict” because “as
they pulled apart, they placed more value on capturing political
power, for themselves and grew increasingly fearful about… the
grave consequences of losing to their rivals in the competition for
the control of state power”. As attention to power and control of state
and its largesse increased, politics became a do-or-die activity “by
politicizing national, ethnic and communal formations …” and as

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well as “appealing to … and even religious loyalties”. The attitudes

and dispositions of a few politicians to the country’s nascent freedom
deliberately influenced the military to usurp the power of the people
vested into the hands of the civilian leaders.

A spate of military coups that followed essentially formalised a

situation that was already firmly established, according to Ake (1996,
p. 6), despite the fact that the military was generally considered as
an anomaly in politics when it comes to newfound independence,
freedom, and statehood. By interfering in politics, the military did
not bring about military rule in Africa in relation to Nigeria; rather, it
was the nature of politics as well as politicians that spawned military
rule by degenerating into conflict, ultimately elevating the experts in
warfare to the forefront. The way and manner Nigerian politicians
were buried in the quest for political offices accounted for the political
instability and uncertainty that the Nigerian military was left with no
other option than to save the state and send the elected public officials
back to their respective homes. However, democracy, federalism and
governance under the military regimes took a different dimension in
Nigeria.

The military as an institution was not trained to govern but they were
trained to protect a country from disintegration and where necessary
to ensure law and order as in the cases of recent coups in the world
particularly in Africa. As argued earlier the military were not trained
for governance, but their usurpation of government was contrary to the
ethos of democracy. Under the military, unitarism and centralization
of power was the order of the day. The military, as well as military
government, was centred on the esprit de corps. The presence of the
military in Nigeria’s federalism represents the first crack and obstructs
the working and operation. This was followed by promulgation of the
Decree No. 34, 1966 which turned the country into a unitary state.
The Decree says “Nigeria shall on the 24th May 1966 … cease to be
a federation and shall accordingly as from that day be a republic by
the name of the Republic of Nigeria, consisting of the whole territory
which immediately before that day was comprised in a federation”
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1966, p. A153).

Perhaps, one should be said that the intension of the military regimes
particularly that of General Aguiyi Ironsi is that the Decree was meant
“to remove the last vestige of intense regionalism of the recent past

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and to produce that cohesion in the government structure which is

so necessary for achieving and maintaining the paramount objective
of the National Military Government, … national unity” (quoted
in Elaigwu, 1979, p. 163). The two cited quotations above both in
theory and practice abolished the intention of the federal government
in Nigeria, with the National government replacing the Federal
government. The military rule between 1966 to 1979 and 1983 to
1999 punctured and visited oppression on the country’s federalism
especially on the federating states’ quest for deliverable governance.
Nigeria’s federalism has constitutionally promulgated, “merely
consolidated the centralization of power in the hands of the Federal
Government” (Babawale, 1998, p. 18).

Asobie’s stance (1998, p. 18) clarifies that starting in 1963 but

particularly since 1976, the federal government has demonstrated an
increased ability to unilaterally alter the current distribution of power
between it and the regional governments and, in fact, among the
various levels of government. The scope and amount of the coercive,
bureaucratic, ideological, and financial resources that the component
entities (or states) directly had available to them for carrying out
their constitutional obligations have continuously decreased while
increasing in the hands of the federal government. Additionally,
there has been an increasing accretion to the federal government of
duties formerly assigned to the regional government. Since 1963,
but particularly since 1976, the federal government has shown an
increased capacity to unilaterally change the current distribution of
power between it and the regional governments and, in fact, among
the various levels of government.

There has also been an increasing accretion to the federal government

of functions previously assigned to the regional (or state) government.
In this instance, the state became “lilliputian today” and the federal
government was transformed into a “titan” (Elaigwu, 2000, p. 28).
As Babawale (1998, p. 78) infused “As the strength of the Federal
Government increased, it assumed the status of a Frankenstein with
its finger in every pie. This development invariably translates into a
dilution of Nigerian federalism”. It was instructive to know that the
military created the 36 states including the Federal Capital Territory,
774 local governments across the federation. Specifically, the 1999
Federal Constitution (as amended) ascribed sixty-eight (68) functions
to the government at the centre and still legislates on the thirty (30)
functions between it and the federating states.
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All these specified responsibilities not only increased or bloated the

power of the federal government but at the same time reduced the
powers and responsibilities of state governments including the power
to initiate, legislate and implement policies for development in their
respective states. According to Soyinka (2003), the truth was that after
Nigeria’s first four years of independence, the federal principle was
merely abandoned, and a deliberate effort was made to subvert the
state’s rational relations to the centre, upsetting the balance between
the federal government, the state, and even local government. This
undesirable trend was caused by the way Nigeria’s federal system
of government was established. A federation was formed by the 13
colonies that had previously lived politically, independently, and
separately in various federations, most notably the United States of
America.

Those colonies having fought the British imperialists and won the
battle for political independence were together between 1776 and 1787
at the Florida conference and agreed in favour of the federal system
of government. Beer’s (1993, p. 9) observation was that the creation
of the American federation was made possible by “the people’s
constitution, the people’s government, made for the people, made by
the people and answerable to the people”. Close to 300 years now,
the American Constitution has been a living document, with spheres
of influence for legal competencies for both the federal government
and state governments. The uniqueness and separateness of the states
from the general government was noticeable in the preference of each
state distinguishing itself in what it produces on the comparative
advantages.

From the American federal system scenario, the position of the general
government was clear in the sense that the federal government is
distinct and did not create the states, the states had existed before the
federal government was created. The various states unanimously and
vehemently subscribed to the idea of federalism. And concurrently
unambiguous of the kind of nation-state they desired and wanted to
build, while conscious efforts were made to define the power and the
authority of the federal government with the constitutional backing
and the power and authority of the states were delineated. In the
case of Nigeria, Soremekun (2000, p. 16) observes that the central
government created the constituent states. This view was reiterated by
Dudley (1968). His observation was that the Nigeria else-while leaders

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were too quick to accept the federalism without proper negotiation

and without bearing in mind a nation-state being anticipated under a
federal structure.

A federation must be conceived by the states and “indeed all political

systems that are of the origin of union, the locus of its guarantee, and
the use to which union should be put” (Agbaje, 2000, p. 11). The
union or constituent units decide the place of the general government,
while the organic law decides who performs what and how and
specifies jurisdictional competencies. A democratic government was
touted to be a government centred on the people and the common
good for the democratic citizens. But the nature of the Nigerian state
as well as that of the federalism have put the federal government to
assume all responsibilities and the position of all-in-all in the country.
By and large, politicians were attracted to covet power at the centre.
The centralization of power reduced many responsibilities of the
federating states including the local governments.

They all depend on the centre for national largesse in the form of
money from the federation pool every month. This reliance on the
federal government caused the state governments to default on their
constitutionally mandated duties because a large country with widely
disparate regions or federating states cannot be effectively governed
from one town in this case, the Federal Territory far away in Abuja
which monopolises decision-making. even if political factors are not
included. Decentralising decision-making to those in the field was
essential for effective administration. Therefore, a redistribution of
responsibilities between central and subordinate authorities is greatly
needed, regardless of any issue with federalism (Gberevbie, 2024).

CONCLUSION

The study highlighted that the acceptance of federalism in Nigeria was

influenced by a lack of critical thinking on the part of regional leaders,
particularly in the Eastern and Western regions. The 1954 Lyttleton
Constitution, aimed at preserving unity in diversity, eventually resulted
in unfairness, alienation, suspicion, and division among the diverse
Nigerian peoples. The military’s seizure of power further exacerbated
the centralization of authority, contrary to the principles of federalism.
This deviation from the idea of equal representation for justice and

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fairness, as proposed by Mills in 1960, led to governance crises.

Furthermore, the study acknowledges that democratic governance
is an ideal but emphasizes the need for a genuine devolution of
power. It contends that elected representatives, since 1999, bear the
responsibility to rectify issues of over-centralization, especially by
empowering state and local governments.

This shift would empower local governments to play a more significant

role and make the people active participants in governance. The study
also underscores the importance of equitable representation in the
creation of states and local governments, emphasizing the need for
their autonomy to be upheld. This approach, the study argued, will
address tribalism, and marginalization, and promote fairness when
distributing federal resources among federating states. The study
suggests that for democracy and federalism to improve governance
and address governance crises, a substantial focus must be placed
on current socio-economic and political realities. Treating fellow
Nigerians with fairness, justice, and tolerance is emphasized as
essential for progress.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency.

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