Principle of Natural Justice is an established principle in India jurisprudence which is

established to adopt ‘fair procedure’ for ensuring justice in the judicial system. Two
fundamental principles of natural justice are entrenched in Indian jurisprudence:

(i) nemo judex in causa sua, which means that no person should be a judge in their own
cause; and (ii) audi alteram partem, which means that a person affected by administrative,
judicial or quasi judicial action must be heard before a decision is taken.

However the courts have established that the Principle of Natural Justice can be excluded in a
situation where it would cause more injustice rather than justice to the party therefore in such
a situations right to be fairly heard has been denied. The aim of natural justice principle for
the purpose of justice and fairness and hence the courts have extended to a position where the
principle can be excluded subject to the provisions of Art 14 and Article 21 of the
Constitution .

Exceptions to PNJ:

I. Implied Exclusion:
In the case of UOI V. W, N Chadha, AIR 1993 SC 1082, Hon’ble Supreme Court
laid down a few propositions as regards the exclusion of natural justice. This was
a criminal case where the matter in question was with regard to Sec 166A of
CrPC. In the present case the court held that principle of Natural justice can be
excluded under the following.
The court held that ‘The rule of audi alteram partem is a rule of justice and its
application is excluded where the rule will itself lead to injustice. There is
exclusion of the application of audi alteram partem rule to cases where nothing
unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present and meet a case.’
((Paras 80 and 81)

The rule of audi alteram partem is not attracted unless the impugned order is
shown to have deprived a person of his liberty or his property. Though there are
certain rights conferred on an accused to be enjoyed at certain stages under the
Code of Criminal Procedure such as Sections 50, 57 and 167 which are all in
conformity with the 'Right to Life' and 'Personal Liberty' enshrined in Article 21
and the valuable safeguards ingrained in Article 22 of the Constitution for the
protection of an arrestee or detenu in certain cases, but so long as the
 investigating agency proceeds with his action or investigation in strict compliance
with the statutory provisions relating to arrest or investigation of a criminal case
and according to the procedure established by law, no one can make any
legitimate grievance to stifle or to impinge upon the proceedings of arrest or
detention during investigation, as the case may be, in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Paras 77 and 96)

98. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in

every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would
frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands,
defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the
investigation lifeless, absurd and self-defeating. Further, the scheme of the
relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not
attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary .
(Para 98)

II. Principle of Natural justice is excluded if allowing such a right would

obstruct prompt actions:

1. In Tulsiram Patel V. UOI, (1985) 3 SCC 398 where the matter in question was
with regard to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court made a
remarkable observation that This principle of natural justice having been
expressly excluded by a constitutional provision, namely, the second proviso to
clause (2) of Article 311, there is no scope for reintroducing it by a side -door to
provide once again the same inquiry which the constitutional provision has
expressly prohibited. The court held that :

101. Not only, therefore, can the principles of natural justice be modified but in
exceptional cases they can even be excluded. There are well-defined exceptions to
the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also to the audi alteram partem rule. The
nemo judex in causa sua rule is subject to the doctrine of necessity and yields to it
as pointed out by this Court in J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa. So far as
the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England and in India, it is well
established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
 before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right
can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to
be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory
provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked
if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or
where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as
pointed out in Maneka Gandhi case3 at page 681. If legislation and the necessities
of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi
alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can a provision of the Constitution, for a
constitutional provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a
statutory provision.

2. Further in the case of Hira Nath Mishra and Ors v. Prinicipal Rajendra
Medical college, Ranch and Ors, 1973) 1 SCC 805 the court convicted the male
students for entering into the compound of girls hostel and walked without clothes
on them. The court in response to their claim of violation of PNJ affirmed the
following:

9. The High Court was plainly right in holding that principles of natural justice
are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. This Court has
pointed out in Union of India v. P. K. Roy, at page 202 that the doctrine of natural
justice cannot be imprisoned within strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its
application depends upon several factors. In the present case the complaint made
to the Principal related to an extremely serious matter as it involved not merely
internal discipline but the safety of the girl students living in the Hostel under the
guardianship of the college authorities. These authorities were in loco parentis to
all the students- male and female who were living in the Hostels and the
responsibility towards the young girl students was greater because their guardians
had entrusted them to their care by putting them in the Hostels attached to the
college. The authorities could not possibly dismiss the matter as of small
consequence because if they did, they would have encouraged the male student
rowdies to increase their questionable activities which would, not only, have
 brought a bad name to the college but would have compelled the parents of the
girl students to withdraw them from the Hostel.

12. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the
case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the
subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth.

13. Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions. We
know of statutes in India like the Goonda Acts which permit evidence being
collected behind the back of the goonda and the goonda being merely asked to
represent against the main charges arising out of the evidence collected. Care is
taken to see that the witnesses who gave statements would not be identified. In
such cases there is no question of the witnesses being called and the goonda being
given an opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses. The reason is obvious. No
witness will come forward to give evidence in the presence of the goonda.
However unsavoury the procedure may appear to a judicial mind, these are facts
of life which are to be faced.

IV. Express Statutory exclusion -

In the case of Charanlal Shahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 the
constitutionality of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,
1985 was questioned. The Supreme Court held that for legislation enacted by
Parliament, the application of principles of natural justice is not necessary, as long
as such legislation falls within the legislative competence.

102. It was, then, contended that the Central Government was not competent to
represent the victims. This argument has been canvassed on various grounds. It
has been urged that the Central Government owns 22 per cent share in UCIL and
as such there is a conflict of interest between the Central Government and the
victims, and on that ground the former is disentitled to represent the latter in their
battle against UCC and UCIL. A large number of authorities on this aspect were
cited. However, it is not necessary in the view we have taken to deal with these
because factually the Central Government does not own any share in UCIL. These
are the statutory independent organisations, namely, Unit Trust of India and Life
Insurance Corporation, who own 20 to 22 per cent shares in UCIL. The
Government has certain amount of say and control in LIC and UTI. Hence, it
cannot be said, in our opinion, that there is any conflict of interest in the real
sense of matter in respect of the claims of Bhopal gas leak disaster between the
Central Government and the victims. Secondly, in a situation of this nature, the
Central Government is the only authority which can pursue and effectively
represent the victims. There is no other organisation or unit which can effectively
represent the victims. Perhaps, theoretically, it might have been possible to
constitute another independent statutory body by the government under its control
and supervision in whom the claim of the victims might have been vested and
substituted and that body could have been entrusted with the task of agitating or
establishing the same claims in the same manner as the Central Government has
done under the Act. But the fact that that has not been done, in our opinion, does
not in any way affect the position. Apart from that, lastly, in our opinion, this
concept that where there is a conflict of interest, the person having the conflict
should not be entrusted with the task of this nature, does not apply in the instant
situation. In the instant case, no question of violation of the principle of natural
justice arises, and there is no scope for the application of the principle that no
man should be a judge in his own cause. The Central Government was not judging
any claim, but was fighting and advancing the claims of the victims. In those
circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any violation of the principles of
natural justice and such entrustment to the Central Government of the right to
ventilate for the victims was improper or bad. The adjudication would be done by
the courts, and therefore there is no scope of the violation of any principle of
natural justice.

In Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1802 the Supreme
Court ruled that no principles of natural justice were breached when the
Government issued a notification to fix prices of certain drugs. The Court
reasoned that since the notification stemmed from a legislative act rather than an
administrative one, the principles of natural justice were not applicable.
 5.Legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not subject to rules of natural
justice. In the case of Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In
the case of subordinate legislation, it may happen that Parliament may itself
provide for a notice and for a hearing in which case the substantial non -
observance of the statutorily prescribed mode of observing natural justice may
have the effect of invalidating the subordinate legislation. But, where the
legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist
upon it and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into such legislative
activity. (Para 5)

27.The price fixation under paragraph 3 of the Order being a legislative activity,
the principles of natural justice are not attracted. Nor is there anything in the
scheme or the provisions of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order which otherwise
contemplates the observance of any principle of natural justice or kindred rule,
the non-observance of which would give rise to a cause of action to a suitor. (Para
27)

V. Exclusion in case of purely administrative matter:

In the case of Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B.M. Vijay Shanker,
when the commission nullified a candidate's examination due to the candidate
violating rules by writing their roll number on every page of the answer-sheet, the
Supreme Court ruled that the principles of natural justice did not apply.
The Court emphasized that in academic matters, the rule of hearing should be
strictly interpreted. Ignoring this would not only be against public interest but
also undermine the societal sense of fairness. However, this exemption does not
extend to disciplinary matters or instances where the academic body performs
non-academic functions, such as granting prosecution sanctions, which are purely
administrative in nature. Similarly, the cancellation of a bid due to failure to
execute a lease deed and deposit security amounts was also deemed not to invoke
the principles of natural justice.

VI. No prejudice
 Panch Mahal Badodaru Gramin Bank v. D.M Parmar, (2011) 15 SCC 310.
Hon’ble supreme court held that non supply of documents is not violation of
principles of natural justice.

14. Mr Joshi also relied on the decision of this Court in UT of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad wherein it has been held that exercise of discretion in
imposition of punishment is dependent on a host of factors such as gravity of
misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent,
responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds previous penalty, if any, and
the discipline required to be maintained in the department bor establishment he
works. He submitted that all these factors have not been taken into consideration
by the disciplinary authority by imposing the punishment of dismissal from
service.

16. As has been held by this Court A Narinder Mahan Arya v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. cited by Mr Joshi, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rules
of principles of natural justice which depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis.

VII. Exception in case of public interest

In the Balco Employees’ Union v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350, the
Supreme Court ruled that natural justice principles do not apply to long-term
economic policy decisions, such as government disinvestment in public -sector
undertakings. The court stated that such decisions can only be contested if they are
deemed capricious, arbitrary, illegal, or uninformed, and do not contradict existing
laws.

47. Process of disinvestment is a policy decision involving complex economic

factors. The courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic
decisions as it has been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative
disposition and unless the economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is
demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or legal limits on power or so
abhorrent to reason, that the courts would decline to interfere. In matters relating
to economic issues, the Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial
 and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within limits of
authority. There is no case made out by the petitioner that the decision to disinvest
in BALCO is in any way capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed. Even though
the workers may have interest in the manner in which the Company is conducting
its business, inasmuch as its policy decision may have an impact on the workers'
rights, nevertheless it is an incidence of service for an employee to accept a
decision of the employer which has been honestly taken and which is not contrary
to law.

The court further held that - 48. Merely because the workmen may have protection
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, by regarding BALCO as a State, it does
not mean that the erstwhile sole shareholder viz. Government had to give the
workers prior notice of hearing before deciding to disinvest. There is no principle
of natural justice which requires prior notice and hearing to persons who are
generally affected as a class by an economic policy decision of the Government. If
the abolition of a post pursuant to a policy decision does not attract the provisions
of Article 311 of the Constitution as held in State of Haryana v. Des Raj Sangar on
the same parity of reasoning, the policy of disinvestment cannot be faulted if as a
result thereof the employees lose their rights or protection under Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. In other words, the existence of rights of protection under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot possibly have the effect of vetoing
the Government's right to disinvest. Nor can the employees claim a right of
continuous d consultation at different stages of the disinvestment process.

VIII. In case of confidentiality

In the case of Malak Singh v. State of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 760,
the Supreme Court of India established that there's an exception where public
policy necessitates withholding specific information in the state's possession for
the sake of state security. The court ruled that the police's surveillance register is
confidential, inaccessible to both the individuals listed in it and the general public.
Moreover, the court argued that applying principles of natural justice in such
instances could undermine the purpose of surveillance, potentially hindering
rather than facilitating justice.
 7. As we said, discreet surveillance of suspects, habitual and potential offenders,
may be necessary and so the maintenance of history sheet and surveillance
register may be necessary too, for the purpose of prevention of crime. History
sheets and surveillance registers have to be and are confidential documents.
Neither the person whose name is entered in the register nor any other member of
the public can have access to the surveillance register. The nature and character
of the function involved in the making of an entry in the surveillance register is so
utterly administrative and non-judicial, that it is difficult to conceive of the
application of the rule of audi alteram partem. Such enquiry as may be made has
necessarily to be confidential and it appears to us to necessarily exclude the
app'ication of that principle. In fact observance of the principles of natural justice
may defeat the very object of the rule providing for surveillance. There is every
possibility of the ends of justice being defeated instead of being served. It was well
observed in Re K (Infants) at page 238: "But a principle of judicial inquiry,
whether fundamental or not, is only a means to an end. If it can be shown in any
particular class of case that the observance of a principle of this sort does not
serve the ends of justice, it must be dismissed; otherwise it would become the
master instead of the servant of justice."

IX. In the case of K I Shephard v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 431, the Court had to
decide on determining the legality of merger schemes formulated by the RBI, which
involved the amalgamation of three private banks with nationalized banks. During the
merger, certain employees of the private banks were not retained by the transferee banks due
to allegations of misconduct against them. Despite the statutory requirement for completing
the entire amalgamation process within six months, the Court ruled that this timeframe allows
for providing affected employees with an opportunity to be heard.

15. Fair play is a part of the public policy and is a guarantee for justice to citizens. [……] We
do not think in the facts of the case there is any justification to hold that rules of natural
justice have been ousted by necessary implication on account of the time frame. On the other
hand we are of the view that the time limited by statute provides scope for an opportunity to
be extended to the intended excluded employees before the scheme is finalized so that a
hearing commensurate to the situation is afforded before a section of the employees is thrown
out of employment.

In the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 380 , the court
addressed the matter of government takeover of a company under the IDR Act, 1951
following a thorough investigation into the company's affairs. The central question was
whether the report of an investigating body appointed by an administrative authority should
be provided to the affected party before the authority makes a decision based on that report.
In establishing a general principle, the court noted that certain circumstances may necessitate
furnishing the investigation report to the concerned party to allow for effective representation
regarding the proposed action.

21. In our opinion it is not possible to lay down any general principle on the question as to
whether the report of an investigating body or of an inspector appointed by an administrative
authority should be made available to the persons concerned in any given case before the
authority takes a decision upon that report. The answer to this question also must always
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not at all unlikely that there may be
certain cases where unless the report is given the party concerned cannot make any effective
representation about the action that Government takes or proposes to take on the basis of that
report. Whether the report should be furnished or not must therefore depend in every
individual case on the merits of that case. We have no doubt that in the instant case non-
disclosure of the report of the Investigating Committee has not caused any prejudice
whatsoever to the appellants.

The above cases provides exceptions and exclusions to natural justice principles that are vital
for balancing procedural fairness with practical and societal concerns. These exceptions offer
decision-makers flexibility in complex legal situations but should be applied with fairness,
transparency, and accountability in mind. The overarching aim of any legal framework should
be to uphold the rule of law, protect individual rights, and advance the public interest.