How Bright is the Future of Constitutionalism in the European Union
How Bright is the Future of Constitutionalism in the European Union
How Bright is the Future of Constitutionalism in the European Union
Individual assignment
Lecturer: Student:
Prof. Dr. Amelia Díaz Igor Stojilovic
European Union (EU) as the global actor today. In addition to its often-questioned influence on
the broader international level, internal processes of the Union, including but not limited to the
disparities of post-enlargement processes, questions surrounding the European identity, the rise of
Euroscepticism, lack of participation, issues related to the balance of power and judiciary
implications, and others, catalyze the long-existing debate on the European Constitution. Although
the metaphorical assumption of resistance towards it is often described as trying to "push the
toothpaste back into the tube."1, Haberman's counterquestions of the desirability and practicality
prove a valid point jointly with addressing the problem of the democratic deficit.2
Having in mind partly implemented reality of the European Constitution on one side, and the
execution concerns on the other, this paper highlights main aspects of the formal and functional
character of the Lisbon Treaty (LT) and its effect on the (future) EU constitutional debate.
Additionally, I will place my assumption according to afore described goal. Finally, I will argue
that the choice of constitutional building approach from the ground up in contrast to the top-down
The topic of European Constitutionalism is not a newly invented initiative but rather a
reintroduced process that has always been present jointly with any idea of continental unification.
However, among different potential forms of the political and economic union, a post-war
decision on the format of the new alliance, pleased the anti-federalists, leaving them to conduct
"one-eye patrols"3 for the capital C (Constitution) in any future legislative change4.
Consequently, slow-paced reform responded to the political reality of European integrations and
supported the request for a more profound and structured outline from 1950-1990. Nevertheless,
it was just after 2000. that constitutional idea was openly presented in both legislative and political
1
Weiler and Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking Glass’ (1996) 37
Harvard International Law Journal 411, at 423;
2
Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012;
3
Conduction a reseach with basic and minimum attention;
4
Mads Andenas & John Gardner (2001) Introduction: Can Europe Have a Constitution?, King's Law Journal, 1-4;
sense, formed firstly in the unratified Constitutional Treaty (2004), and successively, Lisbon
Treaty (2007). With it, the conversation discourse quickly shifted from Should Europe have to
Does Europe have a constitution, as researchers continued to assess its de jure and de facto role
in the wide EU legal framework. One of them, Prof. Dr. Christine Reh, a published author in the
area of European Politics, analyzed the Lisbon Agreement on its constitutional form and function.
5
She concluded that although the Agreement provides basic assumptions towards the Constitution
of Europe in a formal sense, it lacks wider public acceptance and recognition to become more than
just "lawyers' law." She recognized the expansion of the European Parliament, European Council,
and European Central Bank's role and argued that LT imposes supranational elements (for
example, the role of the Court of Justice), thus undermining the sovereignty of member states in
both functional and formal sense. Here, I partly agree, as the main incentive was to strengthen the
internal structure of EU bodies rather than weaken national institutions' role. In contrast, Prof. Reh
also stated that LT has (minor) symbolic meaning while opposing the growing Euroscepticism6,
lack of broader acceptance (for instance, the Supreme Court had to approve it in Germany, Latvia,
and the Czech Republic), and wail of doubts of its real intention.
Despite the above-listed conclusion, I believe that the Lisbon Treaty is a prime example of a
practical policy designed to enhance the EU towards the Constitution. There are three main
arguments why. For one, even though LT enabled provisions on the exemption from the rule and
opt-out options that seemingly eroded its constitutional power, the differentiated integration
instrument will consolidate member states in a short period towards a closer alliance.7. Second,
the existing provisions that list and describe the symbols of the EU were erased in the LT.
This allowed the document to be presented more seriously, Constitutional-like. This was also done
so it would not oppose constitutions of a national state. Of course, that does not affect the content
5
Reh, Christine. (2009). The Lisbon Treaty: De-Constitutionalizing the European Union?. Journal of Common
Market Studies. 47;
6
Neumayer, L (2008), Euroscepticism as a political label: The use of European Union issues in political competition
in the new Member States. European Journal of Political Research, 47;
7
Ever Looser Union? Differentiated European Integration, Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen, Oxford
University Press, 2020;
of the Treaty in sense of its form or power, but it does underline the detail attention. Finally, I find
it comparable and plausible that based on the functionalist theory of integration that emerged after
the second world war, EU continues to follow the constitution process of the United States of
America. There, Bill of Rights shepherd the finalisation at the campaign for the acceptance of the
could present a similar stepstone for the future United States of Europe.
In the expectations for new perspectives on the LT and/or tectonic disturbance in the Treaty, one
might ask: what will happen next for the slow-moving constitutional snail? Professor of
Constitutional law, Dr. Leonard Besselink responds in asking for patience - it is a slow-moving
pointing out that the Agreement from Lisbon inherited the expectations substance of the
Constitutional Treaty and that it was successful from the fact that it was not focused on the
assuming that the writers of the Lisbon Treaty firstly reviewed, rewrote, reduced, and just then
advertised flexibility, openness to ground-up approach, and understanding of the historical and
political contexts of the national Constitution. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the Ireland
referendum forced a last-minute Constitutional change. Based on that, I would argue that Lisbon
Treaty at this point presents not only a jointly accepted legal platform with constitutional elements,
but a successful exercise of participation. This will be crucial in the next constitutional chapter,
which is expected to occur in the near and very bright future of Constitutionalism in the European
Union.
8
Besselink, Leonard F. M., The Notion and Nature of the European Constitution after the Reform Treaty (January
18, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086189;
9
Kurpas, Sebastian, The Treaty of Lisbon - How Much 'Constitution' is Left? An Overview of the Main Changes
(December 11, 2007). CEPS Policy Brief, No. 147, December 2007, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1334072;