Chapter 1 - Goal of A Firm and The Agency Problem
Chapter 1 - Goal of A Firm and The Agency Problem
Objective
• Identify the strategic financial objectives of a firm
• Appreciate why shareholder value maximization is the ultimate goal.
• Understand why profit maximization may not be prioritized.
• Understand the principal agency conflict between shareholders and
management.
• Appreciate the sources of conflict between Shareholders and Creditors.
➢ It looks at those aspects of finance that have a direct impact on the ultimate goal
of shareholders ie shareholder value maximization. These are mainly financing,
investment and dividend decisions.
➢ All financial decisions are guided by this main objective of shareholder value
maximization.
➢ The major questions becomes how is shareholder value maximized?.Is it possible
to maximize shareholder value in a perfectly competitive market?The development
of finance and its markets has also seen the function of liquidity management
playing a central role in creating value for shareholders
➢ Questions that decision makers constantly ask themselves include:
1. How should capital be raised? i.e debt or equity, How much of debt and how
much of equity?
2. How should it be invested? Or which investments should be undertaken?
3. How should profits be distributed? i.e pay them out as dividends, re-invest in
capital projects ? How much should be paid out and how much should be
retained without hurting shareholder value?
➢ The link between finance and strategy is a powerful tool in shaping a corporate
entity. Finance strategy has a bearing on the operations of all other functions of
an entity that include manufacturing, marketing, human resources management
and research and development. In most of the instances ,finance determines
what and how it can be done in all these functions without the same functions
have the same bearing
➢ Value creation and value destruction processes are a function of the interaction
between managers, non-financial stakeholders, and corporate governance
activities.
Financial Strategy
➢ Value can either relate to the underlying business or to value created for the
investors.
➢ Value may also relate to return generated over and above the required rate of
return.
Return
Risk
The vertical axis is strictly referred to as required return and horizontal axis as
perceived risk. There should be a return enough to compensate risk. Any financial
strategy that carries risk for the company should be able to generate a return
commensurate with the risk otherwise there will be shareholder value destruction. So
is it possible for a project or investment to generate a return which is not
commensurate with the risk taken???
Shareholders invest in
company
Company invest in
portfolio of projects
If the portfolio of investments achieves a return exactly equal to the return demanded by
shareholders, then there is no value created. In strategic financial management, effort
should be put in the top box.
➢ More often than not, the efforts of most business people concentrate in the lower
box ie trying to make the projects portfolio better investments ie making them a
better business.
➢ Financial strategy should focus on making projects better investments for
shareholders.
➢ In perfectly competitive markets, no shareholder value is created ie market forces
would dictate that all investments receive only their risk adjusted required rates of
return.
➢ Shareholder value is therefore created /increased by exploiting market
imperfections.
➢ From a risk perspective, the overall risk of the portfolio of investments should not
exceed the total sum of its parts, there would value erosion.
➢ The idea therefore is to create an equivalent portfolio with an equal overall return
but without necessarily increasing the business risk.
➢ Projects with high risk do not destroy value since high risk goes with high returns
but is the overall portfolio of projects which determines whether there is value
creation or not.
Return
Starting point
Risk
Agency Problem
The problem arises when the goals of principals and agents are not compatible. Agents
can make decisions that are meant to further their interest at the expense of principals.
Since principals are not involved in the day to day running of the company, managers
often benefit from information asymmetry making controlling their actions a daunting
task. Appreciating the root cause of agency conflicts plays an important role in trying to
reduce their impact on corporate value. Despite measures and controls often put in
place by owners, human nature and behaviour has proved to be the one of the most
sophisticated and dynamic.
➢ The goals of management may not necessarily result in achieving the shareholder
goals e.g building an empire is a management objective to better their CVs however
this could be undertaken by embarking in risky projects which affect the value of the
firm. Benefits could be increased at the expense of profitable projects etc
Corporate financial strategy should therefore ensure that the agency problem is
managed to reasonable levels so that shareholder value is enhanced.
➢ The divergence of management and shareholder objectives can be managed
through;
1. Market forces
2. Agency costs
3. Organisational structuring
Market forces
Market forces are credited for ensuring an efficient allocation of resources as well as
putting in place controls on firm performance.
Business failure
➢ When management concentrate on their personal goals, the business usually
performs badly because most of these are short term, unsustainable objectives.
➢ The implications of business failure such as loss of jobs, humiliation, force
management to act in the best interest of shareholders.
➢ Shareholder goals, if adhered to usually result in the business performing well.
Corporate control
➢ More often than not, failure to maximise the value of the firm makes a company a
good candidate for hostile takeovers
➢ The firm becomes cheap that, for listed entities, potential investors will consider
undertaking hostile takeovers.
➢ Takeovers come with change of management; existing management is either
fired or lowered to junior positions.
➢ The fear of these consequences force management to work towards shareholder
goals which avoid takeovers.
Organisational Structuring
These methods of eradicating the agency problem include:
1. Share option schemes- gives management part ownership of the firm.
2. Committees that evaluate management actions.
3. Bonding managers ie insurance taken by firm to cover firm against actions of
dishonest managers.
Discouraging management to pursue their own goals is a very complex process. Some
measures put in place may not be effective or may not work at all. Some school of
thought is that management should be starved of financial resources hence
shareholders should demand significant dividends so as to leave little resources for
abuse. Information asymmetry however limits the actions of shareholders ie managers
usually have superior information than shareholders.
Managers more often than not aim at profit maximisation than maximising shareholder
value. The debate surrounding profit maximization and wealth maximisation is still going
on. The major aspect becomes, is maximising profits a sinister objective or rather
concentrating on maximising profit is the problem. Factually speaking companies need
to make profits for them to survive and grow, so how then does profit maximising
becomes an inferior objective. Profit maximisation is an inferior objective because of the
following reasons:
1. Timing.
➢ Profits are sometimes made when they are least desired.
➢ Profits add much value when generated at a point when the firm has capital
projects especially for expansion to undertake.
➢ In the youthful stage, profits are needed mostly to invest in expansion
➢ Profits are however generated at maturity stage when the firm has already
borrowed at penal rates to finance projects.
2. Risk
➢ When profit is made the ultimate goal, managers are tempted to take up risky
projects as they hunt for profits.
➢ Risky projects increase the overall risk of the firm and hence affect the value of
the firm negatively.
3. Cash flows
➢ Profits do not always imply a cash flow to shareholders in the form of
dividends.
➢ Dividends may not always be declared despite good profits.
4. Short term Profits.
-In pursuit of high profits, management may cut down on critical expenditures such
R&D.
-This affects the long term operations of the firm despite making the short term
profits.
-this explains why EPS growth may not be an appropriate measure of good
performance by management.
Corporate governance seeks to ensure a fair return on the investment and it also
establishes incentives and procedures that meet the interests of shareholders while
respecting other stakeholders’ interests in the organization.
➢ The recent economic crisis, financial scandals and collapse of many companies in
the developed and developing markets have attracted the attentions of
researchers and business people to improve the corporate governance
➢ Agency theory has been extensively used in explaining the conflict of interest
between investors as the principles and the managers as agents. This theory
implies that agents will be driven by self interest rather than willingness to
maximize the profit for shareholders.
➢ In order to solve this problem an independent board of director is expected to solve
this problem (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996).
➢ Agency theory suggests mechanism that rewards managers for maximizing
shareholders profit. Such schemes typically include plans whereby executive
managers obtain reduced share prices to align the interest of managers with those
of shareholders.
➢ Poker (2011) suggest that managers are interested to disclose information if the
company is performing well to receive bonuses and incentives.
➢ The Agency problem and the need for an independent board is more significant in
emerging market as majority shareholders of corporations are family and boards
can become redundant when activist shareholders are family or
government(Turnbull, 1997).
➢ Adequate regulatory systems need to be put in place to promote corporate
governance.
➢ Zimbabwe is a good example of the impact poor corporate governance can have
on the public sector. Government spearheading efforts to craft a public and private
sector corporate governance framework.