091120186MA7WNDBRiskAssessmentwithAnnex_Nov09-sed

7 RISK ASSESSMENT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
7.1 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
This section summarises the results of the consequence analysis from potential
hazards associated with the MPT Central Processing Terminal, RGT Processing
Terminal, Well Pads, intra-field pipelines after capacity upgradation from
300,000 BOPD to 400,000 BOPD and 165 MMSCFD to 750 MMSCFD within
existing RJ Block in Rajasthan, India and natural gas export pipeline of 500
MMSCFD capacity from RGT in Rajasthan to Bhogat in Gujarat. Accidental risk
involves occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of an
event or sequence of events resulting into fire, explosion or toxic event which
poses risk to human health and environment.
The RA process outlines rational evaluations of the identified risks based on

their significance and provides the outline for appropriate preventive and risk
mitigation measures. The output of the RA will contribute towards
strengthening of the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) in order to prevent
damage to personnel, infrastructure and receptors in the immediate vicinity of
the plant. Additionally, the results of the RA can also provide valuable inputs
for keeping risk at As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and arriving at
decisions for mitigation of high risk events.
The following section describes the objectives, methodology of the risk

assessment study and assessment for each of the potential risk separately. This
includes identification of major hazards, hazard screening and ranking,
frequency and consequence analysis for major hazards. The hazards have been
quantitatively evaluated through a criteria base risk evaluation matrix. Risk
mitigation measures to reduce significant risks to acceptable levels have also
been recommended as a part of the risk assessment study.
7.2 RA STUDY OBJECTIVE
The overall objective of this RA with respect to the proposed project involves
identification and evaluation of major risks, prioritizing risks identified based
on their hazard consequences and using the outcome to guide and strengthen
both onsite and offsite ERP. Hence in order to ensure effective management of
any emergency situations that may arise during the de-bottlenecking and
expansion activities, the following specific objectives need to be achieved.
 Review the detailed project design for the risk assessment study;
 Identify release scenarios for escape of flammable chemicals and gases from
facilities, platforms and pipelines;
 Review historical databases to arrive at possible likelihood of such risk
scenarios;
 Verify and present estimated damage distances for the accidental release
based on different scenarios through Maximum Credible Accident analysis;
ERM EIA STUDY FOR THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF ONSHORE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION - CAIRN OIL & GAS (VEDANTA LTD.)
PROJECT # 0423192 FROM RJ-ON-90/1 BLOCK, BARMER, RAJASTHAN, NOVEMBER 18
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 Review and present suggestion of risk mitigation measures for process
equipment based on consequence analysis;
 Review the adequacy of existing Disaster Management Plan for the
proposed upstream and midstream expansion Project components.The Plan
is already in operation to tackle onsite and offsite emergencies at MPT, RGT
and associated facilities.
7.3 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
The risk assessment process is primarily based on likelihood of occurrence of

the risks identified and their possible hazard consequences particularly being
evaluated through hypothetical accident scenarios. With respect to the
proposed project, major risks viz. leaks and rupture of major and critical
equipment, atmospheric storage tanks and pipeline have been assessed and
evaluated through a risk matrix generated to combine the risk severity and
likelihood factor. Risk associated with the proposed expansion and
debottlenecking activities have been determined semi-quantitatively as the
product of likelihood/probability and severity/consequence by using order of
magnitude data (risk ranking = severity/consequence factor x likelihood/probability
factor). Significance of such project related risks was then established through
their classification as high, medium, low, very low depending upon risk
ranking.
The risk matrix is widely accepted as standardized method of risk assessment

and is preferred over purely quantitative methods, given that it’s inherent
limitations to define a risk event is certain. Application of this tool has resulted
in the prioritization of the potential risks events for the existing operations and
proposed expansion thus providing the basis for drawing up risk mitigation
measures and leading to formulation of plans for risk and emergency
management. The overall approach is summarized below in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 Risk Assessment Methodology
7.3.1 Data Collection and Review
For the proposed upstream and midstream project compinents following

information was reviewed:
 Details on processes and storages (inventories);
 Design and operating conditions;
 Material properties; and
 Sensitivie features prevailing in area surrounding the upstream and
midstream project components (as identified through baseline section).
7.3.2 Hazard Identification
A hazard is an undesired event, which may cause harm to people or to the

environment or damage to property.
System Definition
The study is primarily concerned with the identification and evaluation of
accidental events associated, which have potential to cause major incident with
proposed expansion related operations comprising of:
 Upstream project components i.e. MPT, new RGT and Enhanced Oil
Recovery of crude oil and satellite gas well pads; and
 Midstream operations of inter and intra field pipelines and cross country
new 30 inches natural gas pipeline.
The major incident is defined as:

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 A fire, explosion due to release of a dangerous substance like flammable
fluid or natural gas resulting from a work activity which could result in
death or serious personal injury to people within the area of activity;
 Hazards associated include uncontrolled release (liquid and gas) and
subsequent fire due to accidental loss of containment.
A structured and systemic approach to hazard identification has been adopted

in this study to identify all potential major hazard scenarios which can lead to
fatalities, injuries including damage to property and environment. Typically,
the potential major hazardous incidents arising from the proposed project and
its associated supporting facilities are mainly related to the leaks and rupture
of hazardous liquids and gases processed in equipment, stored in tanks and
transported through pipelines. Lists of hazards identified included in Table 7.1,
Table 7.2 and Table 7.3.
Table 7.1 Description of Key Equipment
S. Location Equipment Equip- Equip- Operating Operating Remarks

N. Type ment Dia, ment Temp. ºC Pressure,
m Length, m kPa g
1 MPT Slug Catcher (V- 4.5 16 64-70 350 Rated Capacity
1201) of Slug Catcher
80,000 BOPD
2 SUPP Slug Catcher (V- 4.6 20 100 10,000 Rated Capacity
102) of Slug Catcher
150,000 BOPD
3 RDG Slug Catcher (SP 12.0 110 30-50 4,650 -
981 )
4 Well Head Test Separator 2.2 4.5 60 4,550 Rated Capacity
Platform P- 05 (V-111) of Test Separator
15 MMSCFD
5 Gas fields Gas Scrubber 1.8 6.0 43 1,200 -
KW-6 Dimensions V-
301
6 Raag Wellpad 2-Phase Separa- 0.968 3.5 85 350 -
#1 Satellite Oil tor – Slug
Field Catcher V-212
Note: The number of leak or rupture scenarios for the above locations and equipment type are
included in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13
Table 7.2 Description of Proposed Tanks
S. Location Equipment Type Tank Tank Tank Operating Operating Tank

N. Dia, m Height, Type Temp. ºC Pressure, Inven-
m kPa g tory m3
1 RDG Propane storage 2.2 7.1 Vertical 45 2100 27
Tank ((V-851)
2 Raag Wellpad Export oil storage 2.4 12.5 Vertical 85 ATM 60
#1 Satellite Oil vessel (V-851)
Field
3 Mobile Trucks Tube cylinder 0.7175 11.514 Hori- Amb 25000 2.25
cascade zontal
Note: The number of leak or rupture scenarios for the above locations and tanks are included in
Table 7.12 and Table 7.13
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Table 7.3 Description of Midstream Pipelines
S. Location Equipment Type Pipe Operating Operating Pipeline Length

N. line Temp. ºC Pressure, km
Dia, m kPa g
1 RDG Wellpad RDG Wellpad (HP from 8 60 5,500 1.960
Development WP-08 to WP 05)
Project
2 RDG Wellpad RDG Wellpad LP 20 80 9,500 4.960
Development Production Header - line
Project size 20" from WP-05 to
RGT & RDG
3 RDG Wellpad Stabilized Condensate 8 80 9,500 7.630
Development Pipeline RDG Terminal
Project (New) to AGI_5 Existing
4 RGT to Bhogat New gas pipeline (500 30 65 9,500 600.000
MMSCFD) Note* (Emergency
Shutdown valves
given at every 20
km interval)
Note: The number of leak or rupture scenarios for the above locations and pipelines are included
in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13
7.3.3 Frequency Analysis
The frequency analysis of the hazards identified with respect to the proposed
project was undertaken to estimate the likelihood of their occurrences during
the project life cycle. Hazard frequencies in relation to the proposed project
were estimated based on the analysis of historical accident frequency data and
professional judgment. Based on the range of probabilities arrived at for
different potential hazards that may be encountered from equipment, storage
tank and pipeline failures with respect to the proposed project, the following
frequency categories and criteria have been defined (Refer Table 7.4).
Table 7.4 Frequency Categories and Criteria
Likelihood
Criteria Ranking (cases/year) Frequency Class
Ranking
5 Likely to occur often in the life of the project, with a Frequent
probability greater than 10-1
4 Will occur several times in the life of project, with a Probable
probability of occurrence less than 10-1, but greater than 10-2
3 Likely to occur sometime in the life of a project, with a Unlikely
2 Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of a project, with a Remote
1 So unlikely it can be assumed that occurrence may not be Improbable
experienced, with a probability of occurrence less than 10-6
Source: Guidelines for Developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria – Centre for Chemical
Process and Safety
7.3.4 Consequence Analysis
In parallel with the frequency analysis, hazard prediction / consequence

analysis exercises were undertaken to assess the likely impact of project related
risks on onsite personnel, infrastructure and environment. In relation to the
proposed project as well as the existing activities, the estimation of the
consequences for each possible event has been based on either accident
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frequency, consequence modeling or professional judgment, as appropriate.
Overall, the consequence analysis takes into account the following aspects:
 Nature of impact on community;
 Occupational health and safety;
 Asset and property damage;
 Corporate image; and
 Timeline for restoration of property damage.
The following criteria for consequence rankings (Refer Table 7.5) have been
drawn up in context of the possible consequences of the risk events that may
occur during the proposed project operations:
Table 7.5 Severity Categories and Criteria
Consequence Ranking Criteria Definition

Catastrophic 5  Multiple fatalities/permanent total disability to more than
50 persons.
 Net negative financial impact of >10 crores
 International media coverage
 Loss of corporate image and reputation
Major 4  Single fatality/permanent total disability to one or more
persons
 Net negative financial impact of 5 -10 crores
 National stakeholder concern and media coverage.
Moderate 3  Short term hospitalization & rehabilitation leading to
recovery
 Net negative financial impact of 1-5 crores
 State wide media coverage
Minor 2  Medical treatment injuries
 Net negative financial impact of 0.5 – 1 crore
 Local stakeholder concern and public attention
Insignificant 1  First Aid treatment
 Net negative financial impact of <0.5 crores.
 No media coverage
Risk Evaluation
Based on ranking of likelihood and frequencies, each identified hazard has been
evaluated based on the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of
consequences. The significance of the risk is expressed as the product of
likelihood and the consequence of the risk event, expressed as follows:
Significance = Likelihood x Consequence
The Table 7.6 below illustrates all possible product results for the five likelihood
and consequence categories while the Table 7.7 assigns risk significance criteria
in three regions that identify the limit of risk acceptability. Depending on the
position of the intersection of a column with a row in the risk matrix, hazard
prone activities have been classified as low, medium and high thereby
qualifying for a set of risk reduction / mitigation strategies.
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Table 7.6 Risk Matrix
Likelihood →
Frequent Probable Unlikely Remote Improbable
5 4 3 2 1
Catastrophic 5 25 20 15 10 5
Major 4 20 16 12 8 4
Consequence →
Moderate 3 15 12 9 6 3
Minor 2 10 8 6 4 2
Insignificant 1 5 4 3 2 1
Table 7.7 Risk Criteria and Action Requirements
S.N. Risk Significance Criteria Definition & Action Requirements

1 “Risk requires attention” – Project HSE Management need to
High (16 - 25) ensure that necessary mitigation are adopted to ensure that
possible risk remains within acceptable limits
2 “Risk is tolerable” – Project HSE Management needs to adopt
necessary measures to prevent any change/modification of
Medium (10 – 15)
existing risk controls and ensure implementation of all practicable
controls.
3 “Risk is acceptable” – Project related risks are managed by well-
Low (5 – 9) established controls and routine processes/procedures.
Implementation of additional controls can be considered.
4 “Risk is acceptable” – All risks are managed by well-established
Very Low (1 – 4) controls and routine processes/procedures. Additional risk
controls need not to be considered
Storage Tank Failure Causes

In order to understand the possible causes of storage tanks failure necessary
efforts were made towards analyzing the information provided in the research
article titled “A Study of Storage Tank Accidents” by James I. Chang & Cheng-Chung
Lin published in Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. The study
identifies lightning as the major cause of tank accident followed by operational
error, equipment failure, sabotage, crack and rupture, leak and line rupture,
static electricity, open flames etc. The fish bone diagram highlighting the
possible causes of storage tank failure as obtained from the above discussed
research article has been presented in Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2 Fish Bone Diagram of Storage Tank Incident Causes
Potential Hazards – Storage Tank & Pipeline Failures

Storage tank failure may lead to the following possible hazard consequences as
discussed below:
 Pool fire;
 Jet fire;
 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE);
In case of pipelines, jet fire has been identified as the possible consequences
resulting from failures such as leaks and ruptures.
The aforesaid outcomes following rupture or leak scenarios depend on many
factors such as the material, its phase, the operating conditions, tank and
pipeline design specifications and the location of the release. More details on
such outcomes have been discussed below.
Fire
A fire caused by inflammable chemical is a complex chain reaction where a fuel

combines with oxygen to generate heat, smoke and light. Thermal radiation is
the primary hazard associated with industrial fires. However, if it goes out of
control, such fire hazards can also result in an explosion. In addition, as fire is a
chemical reaction that mainly yields smoke and soot, it may also result in the
formation of a number of gaseous by-products which can be hazardous.
Industrial fires can be categorized:
 Pool Fire: A pool fire occurs when a flammable liquid spills onto the
ground and is ignited. A fire in the liquid storage tank is also a form of pool
fire. A pool fire may also occur on the surface of flammable liquid spilled
onto water.
 Jet fire: A jet fire, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs when a flammable
gas or gas liquefied under pressure is rapidly released from an opening in
a container and immediately catches on fire.
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 Vapour Cloud Explosion: Explosions are generally considered as the worst
case possible hazardous outcome (relative to the other outcomes such as Jet
Fires, Pool Fires, Flash Fires) due to the destructive nature and potential
escalations. The extent of the explosion will depend on the inventory
forming the explosion, its location and the result of any subsequent
structural or process damage.
Thermal radiation from industrial fires is capable of damaging to both life and
property. The determination of thermal radiation hazard zones involves the
following three steps:
 Geometric characterization of fire, i.e., the determination of the burning rate
and the physical dimensions of the fire;
 Characterization of the radiative properties of the fire, i.e., the
determination of the average radiative heat flux from the flame surface; and
 Calculation of radiant intensity at a given location.
The vulnerability of humans exposed to thermal radiation depends on the

intensity of the incident radiation and the duration of the exposure. Thermal
radiation is measured in terms of energy flux and expresses in units of power
per unit area. However, the potential to cause damage is measures by the
dosage of thermal radiation that a receptor or person is exposed to and is a
combination of the intensity of radiation and the time of exposure.
The level of concerns considered for different events resulting in radiation

intensity for the proposed project related identified significant hazards
consequences is provided in Table 7.8:
Table 7.8 Levels of Concern for Thermal Radiation Intensity
Element of Concern LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3

(potentially lethal (2nd degree burns (Pain within 60 sec)
within 60sec) within 60 sec)
Radiation Intensity 10.0kW/sq. m 5.0kW/sq. m 2.0kW/sq. m
Source: Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis and Procedures; FEMA
Explosion
Explosion is a sudden, intense release of energy that generates a pressure wave

because of rapidly expanding gases and is often accompanied with a loud noise,
high temperatures and flying debris.
One of the major hazards associated with any explosion is overpressure. Over
pressure, also called a blast wave refers to the sudden onset of a pressure wave
after an explosion. This pressure wave is caused by the energy released in the
initial explosion and travels at the speed of sound radiating outward like a large
burst of air with its strength weakening as it moves away from the source. If he
pressure wave has sufficient power, it can cause widespread damage to both
human life and property.
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The levels of concern used for overpressure from identified events’
consequence analysis for the proposed project is provided in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9 Levels of Concern used for Vapour Cloud Explosion
Element of Concern LOC-1 (Destruction of LOC-2 (Serious Injury LOC-3 (shatters glass)
buildings) Likely)
Overpressure (psig) 8.0 3.5 1.0
Source: F.P Lees (1980) Loss Prevention in Process Industries
7.3.5 Storage Tank & Pipeline Failure Frequency Analysis
Frequency analysis of storage tank failures (leak and fire) for the proposed
project has been established based on the International Oil & Gas Producers (OGP)
– Risk Assessment Data Directory (RADD) on Storage Incident Frequencies and
Purple Book. The leak frequencies for storage tanks based on type of release as
obtained from the aforesaid OGP document have been presented in the Table
7.10 below.
Table 7.10 Historical Storage Tank Leak Frequencies by Release
S. Leak Frequency Frequency

Tank Type Release Type
N. (per tank year)
1 Fixed/Floating Roof Instantaneous release of the 3 X 10-6 Remote
(single containment) complete inventory
directly to the atmosphere
2 Fixed/Floating Roof Liquid spill outside tank 2.8 X 10-3 Occasional/
Rare
3 Pressurised Catastrophic rupture 4.7 X 10-7 Improbable
Tank/Vessels
4 Pressurised Leak (3mm to 10mm hole 1.2 X 10-5 Remote
Tank/Vessels dia)
Source: International Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) – Risk Assessment Data Directory (RADD) on
Storage Incident Frequencies
Thus, the probability of storage tank failure with respect to the proposed
expansion is identified to be primarily as “Remote” (Refer Table 7.3).
The pipeline failure frequency viz. leaks or rupture for the proposed Gas and
condensate pipeline is established based on the interpretation of the database
of European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG) representing almost 2
million kilometer year of pipeline operations. The failure rate reported by EGIG
for on-shore gas pipeline with design pressure greater than 15 bar is 4.76 x 10-4
km/year. Full Bore Rupture (FBR) represents 13% of the cases (6.188 x 10-5
failure /km/yr) and 87% of the cases represents Leaks (4.14 x 10-4 failure
/km/yr).
The frequency of pipeline failure computed for the both proposed and existing
pipelines based on EGIG failure frequency is presented in the Table 7.11 below.
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Table 7.11 Pipeline Failure Frequency
S. Pipeline Failure Case EGIG Failure Pipeline Project Pipeline Frequency

N. Frequency Length Failure Freq-
(per km.year) (km) uency (per year)
1 Well fluid HP Production 6.188 x 10-5 1.96 1.21E-04 Remote
Header from WP-08 to WP 05)
Rupture
2 Well fluid HP Production 4.14 x 10-4 1.96 8.11E-04 Remote
Header from WP-08 to WP 05)
Leak
3 Well fluid LP Production 6.188 x 10-5 4.96 3.07E-04 Remote
Header (Line Size ) 20" from
WP-05 to RGT & RDG Rupture
4 Well fluid LP Production 4.14 x 10-4 4.96 2.05E-03 Occasional
Header (Line Size ) 20" from /Rare
WP-05 to RGT & RDG Leak
5 Stabilized Condensate Pipeline 6.188 x 10-5 7.63 4.72E-04 Remote
RDG Terminal (New) to AGI_5
Rupture
6 Stabilized Condensate Pipeline 4.14 x 10-4 7.63 3.16E-03 Occasional
RDG Terminal (New) to AGI_5 /Rare
Leak
7 RGT to Bhogat new gas 6.188 x 10-5 20 1.24E-03 Occasional
pipeline (500 MMSCFD) /Rare
Rupture
8 RGT to Bhogat new gas 4.14 x 10-4 20 8.28E-03 Occasionl
pipeline (500 MMSCFD) leak /Rare
Thus, the probability of pipeline leak and rupture with respect to the proposed
and existing pipeline is identified mostly to be as “Remote” respectively.
7.4 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT OF IDENTIFIED PROJECT HAZARDS
As mentioned in the previous section, four major categories risk has been
identified in relation to proposed expansion and deottlenecking project. A
comprehensive risk assessment study has been undertaken to assess and
evaluate significance of identified risks in terms of severity of consequences and
likelihood of occurrence.
The consequence scenarios associated with the proposed project were modelled
to determine their potential impact on the existing site infrastructure and
surrounding area. The modelling took into account the chemical properties of
the chemicals and fuel released from tanks and/or vessels, pipelines and the
predominant meteorological conditions, where applicable. The risk scenarios
have been modeled using ALOHA and interpreted in terms of Level of Concern
(LOC) for Radiation Intensity and Overpressure. Risk assessment outcome for
various scenarios have been summarized in the Table 7.12 below:
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Table 7.12 Equipment, Storage Tanks & Pipelines – QRA Output for Radiation Intensity
End point (m) for Radiation Intensity Risk Significance for Highest LOC
S.N. Location Equipment Scenario Scenario Event
No. LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3 Likelihood Consequence Risk
10.0 kW/sq.m 5.0 kW/sq.m 2.0 kW/sq.m Ranking Ranking Significance
1. MPT Slug Catcher (V-1201) 2 Liquid Spill Out Pool Fire 20 24 33 2 3 6
2. MPT Slug Catcher (V-1201) 3 100mm leak Pool Fire 18 22 30 2 2 4
3. RDG Slug Catcher (SP 981 ) 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 39 55 85 2 3 6
4. RDG Slug Catcher (SP 981 ) 2 Liquid Spill Out Pool Fire 138 182 265 2 3 6
5. SUPP (Slug Catcher) Slug Catcher (V-102) 1 Liquid Spill Out Pool Fire 15 18 25 2 2 4
6. RDG Propane Storage Tank (V-851) 2 100mm leak Jet Fire 99 139 213 2 3 6
7. Well Head Platform P05 Test Separator (V-111) 2 100mm leak Jet Fire 30 42 65 2 2 4
8. Gas fields KW-6 Gas Scrubber Dimensions V-301 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 15 20 31 2 2 4
9. (RAAG WELL PAD#1) Sattelite Oil Field 2 Phase Separator (Slug Catcher) V-212 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 10 10 11 2 2 4
10. (RAAG WELL PAD#1) Sattelite Oil Field 2 Phase Separator (Slug Catcher) V-212 2 Liquid Spill Out Pool Fire 14 17 23 2 2 4
(RAAG WELL PAD#1) Sattelite Oil Field
11. Export Oil Storage Vessel V-213 4 Liquid Spill Out Pool Fire 21 27 37 2 2 4
RDG Well Pad Development Project RDG WELL PAD (HP from WP-08 to WP
12. 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 18 25 39 2 2 4
05), Line size 8" (natural gas)
13. 2 25 mm leak Jet Fire 10 13 20 3 2 6
14. 3 Rupture Fire 43 60 93 1 2 2
RDG Well Pad Development Project RDG WELL PAD
15. LP Production Header (Line Size ) 20" 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 23 32 50 2 2 4
from WP-05 to RGT & RDG (natural gas)
RDG Well Pad Development Project RDG WELL PAD
16. LP Production Header (Line Size ) 20" 2 25 mm pin hole Jet Fire 12 17 26 3 2 6
from WP-05 to RGT & RDG (natural gas)
17. Mobile Trucks Tube Cylinder cascade (natural gas) 2 25mm leak Jet Fire 39 55 85 2 3 6
Well fluid HP Production Header from HP Production Header from WP-08 to
18. 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 18 25 39 2 2 4
WP-08 to WP 05) WP 05) (8" dia) (natural gas)
19. 2 25 mm leak Jet Fire 10 13 20 3 2 6
20. 3 Rupture Fire 43 60 93 1 2 2
Well fluid LP Production Header (Line LP Production Header (Dia 20" )from WP-
21. 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 23 32 50 2 3 6
Size) 20" from WP-05 to RGT & RDG 05 to RGT & RDG (natural gas)
Well fluid LP Production Header (Line LP Production Header (Dia 20" )from WP-
22. 2 25 mm leak Jet Fire 12 17 26 3 2 6
Size) 20" from WP-05 to RGT & RDG 05 to RGT & RDG (natural gas)
23. RGT to Bhogat New gas pipeline (500MMSCFD) (30”) 1 100 mm leak Jet Fire 23 33 51 2 3 6
24. RGT to Bhogat New gas pipeline (500MMSCFD) (30”) 3 Rupture Fire 311 432 666 2 5 10
Note:
Material considered in case of Gas Fields – Methane
Material considered in case of Oil Fields – n-Heptacosane
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Table 7.13 Equipment, Storage Tanks & Pipelines – QRA Output for Overpressure
End point (m) for Overpressure Risk Significance for Highest LOC
Scenario
S.N. Location Equipment Scenario Event LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3 Likelihood Consequence Risk
No.
8.0 psi 3.5 psi 1.0 psi Ranking Ranking Significance
1. RDG Slug Catcher (SP 981 ) 3 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 242 1 3 3
2. RDG Slug Catcher (SP 981 ) 4 100mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 158 2 3 6
3. RDG Propane Storage Tank (V-851) 1 100mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded 168 293 2 3 6
4. RDG Propane Storage Tank (V-851) 5 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded 264 346 2 3 6
5. Well Head Platform P05 Test Separator (V-111) 1 100mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 88 2 3 6
6. Well Head Platform P05 Test Separator (V-111) 3 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 637 1 4 4
7. Gas fields KW-6 Gas Scrubber Dimensions V-301 2 100mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 37 2 2 4
RDG Well Pad (HP from WP-08 to WP
8. RDG Well Pad Development Project 4 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 157 1 4 4
05), Line size 8"
RDG Well Pad (HP from WP-08 to WP
9. RDG Well Pad Development Project 5 100mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 71 2 3 6
05)
RDG Well Pad
10. RDG Well Pad Development Project LP Production Header (Line Size ) 20" 3 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 1,000 1 5 5
from WP-05 to RGT & RDG
11. Mobile Trucks Tube Cylinder cascade 1 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 77 2 3 6
12. 4 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 157 1 4 4
WP-08 to WP 05) WP 05) (8" dia)
13. 5 100mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 71 2 3 6
WP-08 to WP 05) WP 05) (8" dia)
Well fluid LP Production Header (Line LP Production Header (Dia 20" )from
14. 3 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 1,000 1 5 5
Size ) 20" from WP-05 to RGT & RDG WP-05 to RGT & RDG
15. RGT to Bhogat New gas pipeline (500MMSCFD) (30”) 2 100 mm leak VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 100 2 3 6
16. RGT to Bhogat New gas pipeline (500MMSCFD) (30”) 3 Rupture VCE LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 1,100 2 5 10
Note:
Material considered in case of Gas Fields – Methane
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7.5 RA OUTCOME
The review of the RA results for equipment, storage tanks and pipelines
indicates that in most of the scenarios involving leakages leading to pool/jet
fire, the risk significance assessed to be “very low” to “low”. The risk was
assessed as ‘Medium’ for both fire and explosion due to pipeline rupture for the
new 30” gas pipeline.
For scenarios with low risk significance, the effective distance for damage in
terms of radiation intensity (Pool / Jet fire) and overpressure for the considered
LOCs is given below:
Consequence Distance (m)

Scenarios LOC 1 LOC 2 LOC 3
Radiation Intensity 10 to 138 10 to 182 11 to 265
Overpressure LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded to 264 37 to 1,000
Source: Extract from Table 7.12 and 7.13
Hence, damaging effect is evaluated to be limited to neighbouring process

equipment’s and machineries, and may include occupation injuries/fatalities to
site personnel and workers operating in the immediate vicinity. These risks can
be mitigated through well-established controls (leak detection) and routine
response processes/procedures already practiced at Cairn as discussed in the
subsequent sections.
Medium risk significance includes catastrophic failures of 30” new gas pipeline
(500 MMSCFD) from RGT, Rajasthan to Bhogat, Gujarat. For medium risk
significance, the effective distance for damage in terms of radiation intensity
and overpressure for the LOCs are given below:
Consequence Distance (m)

Scenarios LOC 1 LOC 2 LOC 3
Radiation Intensity 311 432 666
Overpressure LOC never exceeded LOC never exceeded 1,100
Source: Extract from Table 7.12 and 7.13
Any potential emergencies arising from pipeline failure need to be effectively

managed through emergency resources available within Cairn and assistance
of mutual aid groups. The midstream 30” natural gas will be buried and
provided with emergency shut down valves at appropriate locations.
The Consequence Analysis mapping is included as Annex G.
7.6 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN
Emergency Response Philosophy: Cairn Emergency Response Philosophy is to

provide "reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken in
the event of an incident or emergency." The added feature of emergency
planning provides that, even in the unlikely event of an incident or release to
the environment, there is reasonable assurance that actions can be taken to
ERM INDIA EIA STUDY FOR THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF ONSHORE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
CAIRN OIL & GAS (VEDANTA LTD.) FROM RJ-ON-90/1 BLOCK, BARMER, RAJASTHAN, NOVEMBER 18
14
preserve life, prevent injury to people, damage to plant or the environment. To
respond effectively to emergencies and incidents, an agreed and approved pre-
established organization, on-call and capable of mobilizing and responding
effectively need to be in place. Cairn is staffed with competent individuals,
organized into teams, with allocated and clearly defined roles and
responsibilities. Based on the Disaster Management Plan (DMP) case studies,
following are the scenarios where Plant / Operation abandoning is required:
• Oil/Gas Well Blow out
• Pipeline major leakage
• Earthquake
• Flood
• Any other cases where received the directives from the District & Central
Government.
Cairn Incident and Emergency Management Organizations: Cairn emergency

management procedure for Rajasthan and Gujarat uses four primary
organizations for response and management of incidents and emergencies.
These are:
1. Incident Response Team (IRT) based at the each operating and or
associated fields such as MPT, RGT, Bhagyam, Aishwariya, Saraswathi,
Guda, Viramgam terminal, Bhogat terminal etc.,
2. Emergency Response Team (ERT) based in the town of Barmer in Rajasthan
and Viramgam Terminal, Gujarat.
3. Emergency Management Team (EMT) based in the Cairn head office in
Gurgaon.
4. Crisis Management Team (CMT) based in the Cairn head office in
Gurgaon.
Cairn’s Rajasthan and Gujarat operations have a support organization the

Emergency Response Team (ERT) based in Barmer and Viramgam Terminal,
Gujarat. Details of the linkages between the organizations and how assistance
is provided to the IRT by the ERT and EMT is given in the IRP document
number RJ/QHSE/PLA/021.
Incident Response Teams (IRT): Whenever IRT is mobilized, ERT team leader
is notified. Incident Response Team comprise of two main organizations these
being:
 Incident Control Team, (ICT) responsible for management and control of
the incident
 Forward Response Team (FRT) responsible for at the scene response
Emergency Response Team (ERT): The Barmer and Viramgam Terminal,

Gujarat based Emergency Response Team (ERT) will provide support to the
facilities teams in the event of an incident or emergency. Particularly for any
Tier 1 & 2 events.
Emergency Management Team (EMT) – Tactical Response: Based in the Cairn

Gurgaon Office, the Emergency Management Team (EMT) is responsible for
15
providing tactical response, support, assistance and advice to all Tier 2 & 3
incident and emergency situations.
Crisis Management Team (CMT) - Strategic Response: The Crisis

Management Team is the Cairn corporate body located in the Corporate Office
in Gurgaon with the responsibility for defining response strategy for major Tier
3 incidents. As well as having support from the Gurgaon based EMT and CMT,
Cairn Rajasthan and Gujarat operations are also supported by a regional
Emergency Response Organization based in the Barmer and Viramgam. Mutual
assistance is provided to the concerned Team by the adjacent teams such as
drilling, operations, construction groups etc.
IRT Organization support: The IRT is competent to manage all identified

incidents or emergency situations which may occur at any time. The roles of
various teams and support matrix is illustrated below in Figure 7.3.
16
Figure 7.3 IRT Organizational Support Matrix
Source: Cairn
17
7.6.1 Management and Control of Emergencies
The Installation Manager / DGM / GM shall assume command and control of

any emergency occurring within the area of Terminal and Well pads. The
Terminal and well pad is provided with certain features to limit or prevent the
escalation of accidents, incidents these include:
 Separation of equipment to prevent potential escalation
 Fire Resistance Protection for critical structures
 Fire retardant and Low Smoke cables
 Automated Fire & Gas Detection System
 Automatic water spray system and Foam pourer system
 Dedicated Fire water hydrant system
 Sequential Blow Down system
 Remotely operated shutdown valves
 Surface shutdown valves at Well Pads
Evacuation, Escape and Muster: Cairn is committed to providing adequate

arrangements, facilities, resources and training to facilitate the safe mustering,
evacuation and escape of personnel from the facility in the event of any life
threatening emergency and or the integrity of the facility. Muster Points or
temporary safety areas must be clearly identified and personnel must muster at
these areas when the emergency alarm or signal is activated. Muster Points are
detailed in the facilities emergency locations plans and at each locations. The
Muster Points are situated in areas which provide some distance from the
effects of the incident or emergency. Refer to Fire Contingency Plan (RJON-
RGF-HSS-PLN-0001) for more details. Muster Checkers are provided with
radio’s to allow uninterrupted communications with the Incident Control
Centre (ICC). In the event of an incident in any area of the facility where
entrapment is possible, local escape and evacuation facilities are in place to
allow personnel to move away from that area.
Emergency Signals and Alarms: The Terminal and Well Pads facilities will
have a recognizable and identifiable emergency signal and or alarm to notify all
personnel on the facility that an incident or emergency situation has occurred.
Where applicable, alarm tones and the duration comply with the requirements
of OISD – STD – 189.
Escape: The terminal and Well Pads has clearly marked primary and alternative
escape routes. These are described in the safety induction and demonstrated as
part of the facilities orientation process.
Muster: All personnel working or visiting the Terminal and Well Pads shall be
allocated a Muster Point which is clearly identified in the facilities safety
induction process. On hearing the Emergency Alarm, personnel shall report to
their allocated muster point, on arrival at the muster point they must give their
name to the Muster Checker. If personnel are unable to get to their allocated
muster point they should report to the nearest alternative muster point.
Instructions will be in place for Muster Checkers and those in charge of the
18
Incident and Medical Response Teams to account for and report to the Muster
coordinator the status of the muster.
Muster (Accounting for Personnel): The method used for accounting of

personnel is by use of a Register / Electronic system (most of the locations
access card with thumb impression already provided including visitors) where
people’s movements are tracked. The register will be maintained by the security
team who will hold an up-to-date record of all those on the facility. In the event
of an incident on the facility the Register / Electronic system will be marked to
show each person accounted for from the muster roll call. All non-emergency
personnel shall report on foot to their nearest muster point on hearing the
alarm, unless instructed to do otherwise via, radio or agreed alternative method
of communication. No vehicles, including emergency vehicles, will be utilized
after a Facilities Alarm has been initiated unless under the direct instructions of
the Incident Controller or their designated team member. All personnel with
emergency duties, including the Incident Controller, must ensure they can
safely gain access to their respective emergency response locations; if unable to
do this, they should report to the nearest Muster Point, contact the Incident
Control Centre or, failing this, advise the most senior member of staff and
respond in accordance with the instructions given.
Evacuation: The Installation Manager will decide to evacuate the facility of all
personnel if, following an incident, he deems the facility is becoming unsafe.
This will be done in a controlled manner using all available means of
evacuation.
Medical Evacuation: In the event of a medical evacuation being required the

medical team shall immediately notify the Incident Controller of the need to
evacuate a patient or patients, the Incident Controller or their nominated
deputy shall immediately inform the ERT Leader. The company doctor will
ensure the medical and logistical support organizations are prepared. The
company doctor in consultation with the facilities doctor will determine the
method of evacuation and location for treatment.
Abandon Plant: If the emergency continues to deteriorate, the procedure
authorizes the Incident Controller, through a series of process to abandon the
facility.
Medical Facilities and Support: To ensure prompt response and minimize

delays in the treatment and transportation of patients needing hospital care,
medical facilities such as clinics or first response units such as mobile clinics or
ambulances are available. For 24 hour operations the Installation Manager will
ensure sufficient medical support are available to cover the period of the
operation.
Emergency Communications: Reliable communications equipment and

support are available for use during an emergency situation and enable
communications to be made throughout the Rajasthan Field and Gujarat
pipeline operations, with neighboring facilities and the regional emergency
center and Gurgaon. The radio center is located inside Terminal.
19
Communications facilities available at the primary control center include the
following:
 UHF radio
 Telephone Network (PSTN- Public Switched telephone Network)
 IP phones (operations facilities)
Drills and Exercises: Details covering drills and exercises are provided in the
Rajasthan, Gujarat (Pipeline Operations and Terminals) Incident Response Plan
and as mentioned in the annual HSE plan. The workforce will be practiced in
reacting to any reasonably foreseeable event which could occur.
Arrangements: In all foreseeable circumstances the prior arrangements are

provided for the management of emergency or incident response. These
arrangements include:
 The prevention, detection, control and mitigation of incidents.
 Manual intervention.
 Informing all personnel of what their response to emergencies should be
 Informing all personnel of hazardous conditions; their response, and
accounting for all personnel following an incident.
 Partial or full facility evacuation.
 Firefighting and rescue.
 Co-ordination of the response and the co-operation of all those involved.
 External support and response.
As part of the planning and consultation process, arrangements are mad in

place with the Cairn Gurgaon Office Emergency Management Team so that
they will respond promptly if additional logistical, medical, environmental,
media or business continuity assistance is required.
Preparation and Planning: Cairn Management have an obligation under

various statutory regulations to identify, so far as is reasonably practicable, all
hazards and their risks which could affect activities and personnel are put in
place measures which will reduce these risks to levels considered to be 'As Low
As Reasonably Practicable' (ALARP). By recognizing and assessing these
residual risks and what the potential results of incidents could be, adequate
prior arrangements - preparation and planning - can be put in place so that if
there is an incident, there will be an immediate and appropriate response.
Detection of Incidents: Incidents and potential incidents are detected by either

Fire and Gas automatic gas detection system and or Personnel working at the
facility.
Environmental Response: Some incidents can result in environmental damage,

these will primarily result from spillage or leak of crude oil, Condensate,
propane, diesel, chemical, however, many actions associated with response to
hydrocarbon incidents, such as isolation and depressurization, also provide
mitigation against environmental damage. Further information is provided in
the Cairn Oil Spill Response document RJON-RX-HSS-PRO-0034.
20
Security Incidents: The well Pads, Terminal and Pipeline is a remote site and
exposed to potential security incidents. How to manage security incident, e.g.
unauthorized entry to the facility, extortion, kidnapping etc. is covered by the
Cairn Emergency Management Manual.
External Support: The corporate Cairn Crisis Management Plan provides

details of the Cairn Crisis Management Team’s activities in support of the field
response teams in such aspects as the involvement of external emergency
services i.e. Police, public and media enquires etc.
Rajasthan and Gujarat Incident Response Organizations and Links: The

formations of the Incident Response Organizations for Rajasthan and Gujarat
(four incident response are fundamentally the same for each facility; the
facilities Incident Control and Forward Response organizations and numbers
are determined by the size of the facility, location of the facility and
organization in relationship to the Field Emergency Response Team and
supporting groups. There are clear links between the facilities Incident
Response Teams, the Emergency Response Team and the Gurgaon Emergency
Management Team. With the exception of technical support, the regional
Emergency Response Team provides the external support in the event of an
incident.
Figure 7.4 Rajasthan and Gujarat Operations Emergency Response Links Diagram
Source: Cairn
7.6.2 Reporting and Notification Reporting
Incident Reporting: All incidents and emergencies must be reported and

investigated in order to establish what happened and the causes of the incident
21
or emergency in order to introduce measures to prevent the incident or
emergency occurring again. The incident reporting procedure is contained in
the document CIL/HSE/08/000566. Details of the reporting process/protocol
and forms to use are contained in the Incident Response Plan.
Incident Controller, must firstly notify the Emergency Response Team Leader
and they must ensure they also notify the Emergency Management Team Duty
Manager.
Media Communication: In the event of an incident or emergency there will

inevitably be some media interest. Details covering the process for responding
to the media are covered in the Incident Response Plan.
Emergency Response Procedures: There is no single procedure or process that

if followed will ensure a successful outcome for those managing an incident or
responding to an emergency, they are not a guarantee that the incident will be
contained, controlled or prevented from escalation. These procedures can at
best be a guide to the team managing the incident or emergency situation. The
most effective method for ensuring a successful outcome is by training and
practice by those charged with the responsibility of responding to and
controlling incidents and emergencies.
Roles and Responsibilities: The composition and mobilization of the IRT and
ERT will vary depending upon the nature of the incident or emergency. The
duty ERT Leader will decide on any additional support required. A situation
may arise where the ERT Leader or team members may require mobilizing
additional Cairn staff to assist them in responding to an incident or emergency
situation. The role and responsibility covering each member of the IRT and ERT
are located in the Incident Response Plan. Duty IRT members will be identified
on a duty rota which will be issued weekly or whenever there is a change made
to the IRT. The initial actions for the first person(s) to arrive in the Emergency
Control Centre are to initiate the actions contained within First to Arrive Check
List and to ensure that:
• Telephones and communications systems are set up and functioning
• Establish and maintain communications with the incident or emergency
location
• Identify the facts of the emergency and ensure that they are written up on
the status boards
• Continue with actions as laid down in the arrival check list
7.6.3 Community Based Disaster Management Plan
Community Based Disaster Management Plan

Disaster Management is a planned and systematic approach to minimize
damage to life, property and environment. It involves the systematic
observation and analysis of measures relating to disaster prevention,
mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, rehabilitation and
reconstruction. It is also to be realized that disaster management involves
community preparedness so as to achieve desired objective of minimization of
22
damage. Community preparedness involves all pre disaster planning to reduce
the loss.
Community Based Disaster Management Plan was prepared district wise.

There are totally nine districts, where the upstream and midstream operations
are involved. These include two districts in Rajasthan state they are Barmer and
Jalore, and seven districts in Gujarat state, they are Ahmedabad, Banaskantha,
Patan, Surendranagar, Rajkot, Jamnagar and Devbhumi Dwarka.
The districts en-route of the facilities and pipeline are with diverse socio-
economic and geographical profiles. Some of them have harsh desert
environment, erratic climatic conditions, coupled with poverty, illiteracy of the
community, drought conditions, occasionally flood conditions with impact to
human life, economy and environment. Therefore the Community Based
Disaster Management Plan was prepared to minimize the potential risk by:
1. Identifying the potential hazards and its impacts in on-site and off-site
areas
2. Providing measures resources to minimize the incidents and the damage
3. Prepare and implement developmental plans to provide resilience to such
disasters
4. Developing early warning strategies
5. Mobilize resources including communication and medical services and
6. To help in rehabilitation and post disaster reconstruction
Thus the developed community based DMP document reviews all Maximum
Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS) and presents the systematic plan with suitable
framework for engagement and role of the communities and local
administration in disaster preparedness and response. The following are the
documents to be referred for community based disaster management plan
prepared district wise.
1. MDPP-MPX-HSS-PLN-ABS1-0003-A7-Community Based Disaster
Management Plan Midstream Facility Ahmedabad District, Gujarat.
Management Plan Midstream Facility Banaskantha District, Gujarat.
Management Plan Midstream Facility Patan District, Gujarat.
Management Plan Midstream Facility Surendranagar District, Gujarat.
Management Plan Midstream Facility Rajkot District Gujarat.
Management Plan Midstream Facility Jamnagar District, Gujarat.
Management Plan Midstream Facility Jalore District, Rajasthan
Management Plan Midstream Facility Barmer District, Rajasthan.
23
7.7 BLOW OUT PREVENTER INSTALLATION AND PHILOSOPHY
Drilling operations in hydrocarbon exploration and production is hazardous in

nature, which can pose risk to life and property in an unlikely event of sudden
release of hydrocarbon due to unsafe acts and conditions.
In order to address the risks posed by these activities, policy framework has
been developed to ensure that integrity of the wells are properly accounted in
the design, planning and operations preventing any uncontrolled influx of
formation fluid into the wellbore. The framework describes
 Well Delivery Process Manual
 Well Constructions and Operations Minimum Standards Policy
 Well Integrity management system and Well Integrity management
manual
Well delivery process manual defines the entire process of well delivery. The
5 stages of the Well Delivery Process (WDP) are: Scope> Design > Plan >
Operations > Closeout.
Design, planning and operations phases are critical in preventing the

occurrence of well control events. A ‘Statement of requirement (SOR) is
prepared stating the surface drilling locations, subsurface targets along with the
details of geological hazards and the data related to pore pressures and fracture
pressures of the various layers in lithology. Based on the SOR, a specific well
plan and design to penetrate the reservoir targets is prepared. The selection of
rig, various drilling tangibles and equipment depends upon the expected
pressures that need to be withstood during the entire well construction process
and life cycle of the well. Risk assessment for each stage of well delivery process
is carried out and risk registers are maintained.
Well construction & operations minimum standards policy outlines the

minimum requirements for well construction, testing, completion, well
intervention and related rig operations. The requirements set out are based on
regulatory and international best practices such as:
 Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) - Standards and recommended
practices (as applicable);
 American Petroleum Institute (API) standards (as applicable);
 ISO standards (as applicable); and
 International Oil & Gas industry best practices and standards such as
NORSOK D-010, BSEE Well Control Rule Apr 2016 etc. as applicable on
case to case basis.
For the prevention of any potential well control incident, the ‘Well
Constructions and Operations Minimum Standards Policy’ states the minimum
requirements are well barriers, primary and secondary well control, and
pressure testing requirements of casings and well control equipment among
other requirements. Few key elements of the policy are:
 Well integrity barriers: During all well construction/ well intervention
operations, a minimum of 2 independently verified barriers are
24
maintained, of at least one is a mechanical barrier for potential flow such
as annular BOP, Ram BOPs, Blind/Shear ram BOPs, Casing pack-off seals,
cement behind casing etc. API STD 53 & API RP 53 are followed for the
BOP equipment systems.
 Minimum overbalance requirement: a minimum 200 psi or 0.8 ppg
overbalance, whichever is lower is maintained above the formation
pressure during the entire drilling process to prevent any formation fluid
influx in the wellbore during the well construction process.
 Casing design for the mechanical and pressure integrity: Casing grades/
weights/ metallurgy are selected such that they provide complete
mechanical and pressure integrity to the well during well construction
using the latest design methods and HSE guidelines. As per international
practices, safety factors are taken into account while selecting
casings/tubings, where the mechanical and hydraulic integrities are
ensured.
1.00………………for partial evacuation
Collapse
0.85 …………….for complete evacuation
Burst 1.10
Tension 1.60
Tri-axial 1.10
 Casing pressure tests: All casing strings are pressure tested for
mechanical and pressure integrity at pressure 500 psi + maximum
anticipated load during the life of the well.
Well blowout prevention: Well blowout is uncontrolled flow of formation

fluids from a well. This happens because of the failure to maintain any of the
above mentioned barriers. If well blowout occurs, then it cannot be contained
using previously installed barriers and require specialized services
intervention. A blowout may consist of water, oil, gas or a mixture of these.
Blowouts may occur during any types of well construction operations or well
intervention.
Prevention of blow outs rests on control of any kick/ influx in the well bore. It
is achieved by maintaining primary well control. In case the primary well
control fails, then secondary well control measures are applied by closing the
rams of the well control equipment called Blowout Preventer (BOP) and
subsequently circulating the kick (influx) out of the wellbore.
Primary well control: This is achieved by overbalance of hydrostatic pressure

of the drilling fluid over and above the pore pressure at the corresponding
drilling depths.
 Conventional drilling, completion and work over activities must be carried
out with a kill weight fluid column in the hole to prevent an influx of
formation fluids. Kill weight is defined as providing a minimum 200 psi or
0.8 ppg overbalance, whichever is lower.
 As a minimum, the following kick detection equipment are used for
operational of the wells. The includes active pit volume monitors, flow
indicator equipment, gas detection at header box, Rate of penetration
recorder (during drilling phase), Mud weight in and out (mud balance) and
trip Tank
25
Secondary well control: This is implemented when primary well control has
failed to prevent the influx from formation to the wellbore. Secondary well
control measures are applied by closing the rams of the well control equipment
called Blowout Preventer (BOP) and subsequently circulating the kick out of the
wellbore.
 The BOP stack and wellhead in place at any point during the course of the
well must be of sufficient working pressure to contain 10% above
maximum anticipated surface pressure from the total depth of the current
open hole section.
 Kick detection and shut-in drills shall be held once per week with both
crews.
 The Company preferred procedure for shutting-in a well is the HARD
SHUT-IN (HCRs closed /Shut- in on Annular) method.
 Wells will be killed with the drill string as near to the bottom of the well as
conditions dictate. The constant bottom hole circulation method will be
used to kill the well.
In case of failure to maintain primary and secondary well control, which may
result in a blowout, then ‘Blowout contingency plan and recommended
practices’ are adopted. Cairn has an contract for Emergency Well Control and
Firefighting with Wild Well Control Inc, a contractor of international repute to
deal with any contingency situation.
Well control equipment: This includes the diverter system, BOP stack, BOP
control system, wellhead, wellhead connector, Kelly cocks, drill string safety
valves (inside BOPs), the kill and choke lines and manifold and all associated
pipework and valves. All the well control equipment are regularly tested and
inspected for its effectiveness. For onshore wells in Rajasthan, diverter for the
surface hole drilling and BOP stack for the intermediate & production hole
drilling, are used as the blowout prevention equipment.
Diverter equipment and minimum requirements: The diverter is used when

the well cannot be shut in because of fear of formation breakdown or lost
circulation due to shut in of BOP. All onshore wells, where shallow gas hazard
have been identified have a diverter system installed for the surface section
drilling. The diverter is installed on a conductor casing with large diverter pipe
pointing to a downwind area.
26
Rotary Table
Bell Nipple
Annular Preventer
Diverter Spool
Ground Level
Spacer Spool
Conductor Casing
Landing Ring
Cellar Bottom
BOP and minimum equipment requirements: In a well, after the surface

casing, blow-out prevention (BOP) equipment is installed and maintained
before resuming drilling. A typical BOP stack contains a number of ram
preventers like Annular BOP, Pipe ram, Shear ram and Blind ram etc. the
configuration of the BOP stack depends upon the well depth and expected
pressures. A typical 5 ksi BOP is shown below in Figure 7.5
 An annular-type blowout preventer can close around the drill string,
casing or a non-cylindrical object, such as the Kelly.
 Pipe rams close around a drill pipe, restricting flow in the annulus (ring-
shaped space between concentric objects) between the outside of the drill
pipe and the wellbore, but do not obstruct flow within the drill pipe.
 Blind shear rams are intended to seal a wellbore, even when the bore is
occupied by a drill string, by cutting through the drill string as the rams
close off the well.
The minimum requirements are as follows:

 5,000 psi or less systems Onshore:1 x Annular and 2 x Rams (1 x pipe and
1x blind shear ram)
 10,000 psi Onshore: 1 x Annular (5 ksi) and 3 x Rams (1 x blind and shear)
 15,000psi systems: Onshore: 1 x Annular (10 ksi) and 3 x Rams (1 x blind
and shear)
Personnel Requirements
 The well site supervisor ensures that all personnel of cadre ‘Driller’ and
above have a valid ‘IWCF Well Control Certification’. ‘
27
 The well site supervisor maintain a separate mud material inventory and
ensures that adequate weighting up material is available on the rig site at
all times for well control requirements as stated in the well construction
and operations minimum standard policy.
 All the well control equipment atr inspected and certified as per OEM
recommendations as well as to comply with the OISD requirements.
 The wells control equipment’s are installed and tested to the required
capacities duly witnessed by the Cairn representative.
Figure 7.5 Illustrative 5 ksi BOP
Bell Nipple Rotary Table
Annular Preventer
Variable Pipe Ram
Blind & Shear Ram
Drilling Spool
Top of mud board
Ground Level
Spacer Spool
BOP Adaptor
Wellhead
Conductor Casing
Cellar Bottom
Source: Cairn
28
7.8 OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN
There are three different oil spill response plan prepared by the competent
authorities in consultation with Cairn existing procedure and system. OSRP
prepared separately for Rajasthan operations (covers all activities within the
Rajasthan Block), midstream pipeline operations (covering pipeline and three
terminals – Radhanpur, Viramgam and Bhogat) and Bhogat marine operations.
Prevention of oil accidental spillage is first priority. To support this strategy, all
land based production and drilling facilities are designed, installed and
operated to avoid possibility of oil spills. Facilities and resources supplied by
third parties are also required to meet national pollution prevention guidelines
and operation standards.
Cairn shares the community’s concern for the protection of the natural
environment from oil spills. Cairn also work and consult with appropriate
government bodies and the local community to address any issues relating to
oils spills. Cairn is committed to integrating into its plans and operations a
process to identify oil & chemical spill risks and to implement appropriate spill
response and clean-up strategies. This Oil & polymer Spill Response Plan
details Cairn’s organizational framework for preparedness and response to oil
& chemical spill incident that may arise from its upstream operations in
Rajasthan and pipeline operation both in Rajasthan and Gujarat. In addition
separate oil spill response plan is prepared for Bhogat marine operations. The
principal strategy is for rapid Response, Containment and Clean–up.
7.8.1 Rajasthan and Midstream Pipeline Operations (OSRP)
The area of operation is extremely large with a very wide range of natural
conditions and circumstances which may be encountered. Oil & chemical spills
are unique events and will require individual assessment and development of
response actions specific to the conditions encountered at the time of the
incident. Cairn has adopted the recognized national / international standard
for defining oil spill size by use of Tier levels for onshore activities. The
definitions of the tiers within Cairn with respect to spill quantities are as
follows:
 Tier 1 event: A small local spill (100T) requiring no outside intervention
and can be dealt with on site by local staff and stockpiled equipment.
 Tier 2 event: A large spill (>100T but <1,000T) that would require
additional outside resources and manpower, such as an oil spill response
contractor. The oil spill response contractor with the spill containment
resources is already placed both in Rajasthan and Gujarat. A separate oil
spill response contractor is in place at Bhogat terminal for marine
operations.
 Tier 3 event: A large (>1,000T) possibly ongoing spill which will require
additional regional and possibly government resources. Such spills are
very rare and would only occur through full diameter pipe rupture or
storage tank collapse or spillage from vessel during loading of oil at SPM
location. The response to clean up operation for a Tier 3 event will be
augmented by additional resources from an external contractor. Cairn has
29
a contract in place with the international oil spill and response limited
organization, Singapore for any marine related spills.
Incident Response: The Rajasthan Incident Response Plan (RIRP) document no.
RJ/QHSE/PLA/921 provides the foundation for incident response. Oil &
chemical Spill Response is integral within Cairn Crisis Response System. The
emergency classification and details of the tier levels is shown below in Figure
7.6 and is based on the Cairn Risk Evaluation guidelines.
Figure 7.6 Emergency Classifications and Details of Tier Level
Source: Cairn
Cairn defines emergency situations in three tiers of severity, related to the scale
of the incident and the capability of the organization to respond effectively. The
Site Incident Controller is responsible for coordinating the on-site tactical
response to any Oil & chemical Spill emergency that may occur within
Rajasthan Field. The Incident Controller will notify and liaise with the
Emergency Management Team Leader in Gurgaon via Emergency Team Leader
based at Barmer. The Installation Manager is designated as site Incident
Controller for oil spill emergencies. The relationships between the various
response organizations is shown below in Figure 7.7.
30
Figure 7.7 Incident Response Activation Based on Tier Levels
Source: Cairn
7.8.2 Oil Spill Support agencies
Tier 1 Contractor: Cairn is into an agreement with a third party service provider
capable of providing such services to respond to Tier-1 level of oil spills. Based
on the software simulation models, it has been identified that the maximum
credible oil spill scenario may result from Bhagyam-MPT trunk line and
accordingly the oil spill response has been established to manage and recover
spills up to 700 MT of well fluids/450 MT of crude oil. This service will cover a
entire Rajasthan operations. In case of major oil spill or leak, the spill response
team will be backed up by Cairn’s forward controller team and Incident
Response Team based in each fields. The resource for the Tier 1 response such
as boom, skimmer, oil dispersant, oil absorbing socks/pads, working tools,
PPEs etc., is located at MPT (refer Table 7.14 for details of containment and clean
up material)and shall be dispatched on need basis to various locations.
Table 7.14 Containment and clean up material available at site (each at MPT and
Viramgam)
S. N. Items Description Quantity Capacity

1. Bunk container (20’x8’x8) with 04 nos. 1 no. -
2. Truck 4x4 for OSR equipment’s 1 no. -
3. Power pack unit for the Supplies air to 1 no. 24.8 HP
air bottle
4. Air Compressor 1 no. 200 Liters
5. High pressure jet cleaner unit for surface 1 no. 3.88 kW
cleaning
6. DG single phase - for s i te for electrical 1 no. 5kV/230 V
lighting.
7. Hose 3” (12 nos., 15 m each) for 12 nos. 15 m each
transferring Oil from pump to
portable tanks
8. Air hoses 20 mm connection to 1 no. 110 m
compressor and Weldon pump
9. Hydraulic hand/pallet - Lifting of 1 no. 2.5 T
equipment and shifting
31
S. N. Items Description Quantity Capacity
10. Engine driven gear pump For 1 no. 20TPH
transferring Oil
11. Sala roll power pack unit 1 no. 10TPH
12. Sala roll pump Transferring Oil to 1 no. -
portable tanks
13. Weldon pump Transferring Oil to 2 nos. 15TPH
portable tanks
14. Fire Extinguisher For first Aid Fire 1 no. 5 kg
Fighting
15. Medical first Aid box 1 no. -
16. Open storage tank - Consist of Angular 10 nos. 10 T each
pipe- 40 nos., T types pipe - 40 nos., C
type pipe - 80 nos. and Straight pipe - 40
nos.
17. Chain pulley 5 M 01 nos. 03 T
18. Road barrier/safety cone 06 nos. -
19. Halogen light 04 nos. -
20. “D” shackles 16 nos. 3¼ T
21. Lifting belt 3mtrs 08 nos. 02 T
22. Wooden Planks 11 nos. -
23. LEL meter dual gas detector 01 nos. -
24. Foot pump - Used for filling of air in 01 nos. -
tyres
25. Petroleum remediation powder - Used 200 kg
for bioremediation
26. Wind sock with 06 m pipe 06 nos. -
27. Red flag 3x2 with 10 ft. pipe 06 nos. -
28. Shovel, bucket, tarpaulin each 15 nos. -
29. Brush skimmer 01 10 TPH
30. Floating tank 05 nos. 10 T each
31. Cleaning soda 01 nos. 50 kg
32. Foam filled boom 01 no. 500 m
33. Plastic sheet 01 no. 100 m
34. PVC bag 15 nos. -
35. PVC sag 45 nos. -
36. Rag piece 01 no. 200 kg
37. Nose mask 60 nos. -
32
Figure 7.8 Emergency Organizations and Relation ship
Source: Cairn
Tier 2 & 3 Contractor: Cairn has a membership with an organization namely

“Oil Spill Response (OSR)” at Singapore who is the world’s largest international
oil spill preparedness and response organization. They provide technical
response and resources to mitigate Tier 2 and 3 oil spills. In addition to the
supply of equipment, they also provide experienced personnel to assist in the
response. The Incident Controller can notify ERT / EMT to activate OSR’s
services from Singapore, during major oil spill related incident and place them
on alert. It is the Emergency Management Team Leader’s responsibility to
initiate the mobilization of the contractor.
‘Oil Spill Response Decision Tree’ is shown below in Figure 7.9. It provides a
guide to the Installation / Site Management team in formulating their response
to an oil spill. Effective response to an oil spill requires rapid mobilization of
resources depending on a number of factors, one of the most critical of which is
the time taken to activate this plan and mobilize equipment and resources to
the scene of the spill. To ensure efficiency of response, a Tiered approach is
employed by Cairn in line with national guidelines. This OSRP takes into
account the response time needed to mobilize, transport and deploy increasing
amounts of resources to the scene of a spill for spills of different sizes and
locations.
33
Tier 1: Mobilization of Cairn's field based land oil spill equipment and response
personnel to deal with operational spills of up to 100 tons within 6 hours
particularly for those spills that are associated with the interfiled pipelines.
Tier 2 & 3: Mobilization of spill control team, response equipment and

personnel plus assistance from local resources within 24 hours to deal with
spills up to 1,000 tons. The availability of these resources and the response time
are to be ascertained.
Figure 7.9 Oil Spill Response Decision Tree
Source: Cairn
Disposal of Oil and debris: The recoverable oil in Rajasthan shall be put back
in to off-spec tank at MPT for further processing. Recovered oil and oily debris
in RJ field will be sent at dedicated captive hazardous waste landfill at MPT and
or towards co-processing to the cement industry along with other type of waste
disposal (mainly drill cuttings). The oil spill waste collected in Gujarat will be
disposed to the authorized TSDF.
Training, Drills and Exercises: To ensure the effectiveness of the OSRP, Chief
HS officer of RJ operations will develop the mock drill calendar for various
34
scenarios of oil spillage to be conducted annually. Also there shall be training
calendar to train the site personnel on OSRP.
7.8.3 Bhogat Marine Operations OSRP
The Bhogat Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP) is developed for
personnel dealing with an unexpected discharge of oil from the marine facilities
of Bhogat terminal. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the implementation of
the necessary actions to stop or minimize the discharge and to mitigate its
effects. The plan has been prepared for marine oil spills, ranging from local
through to international significance, based on the tiered response concept. The
development of the Bhogat Marine OSCP is guided by the OISD (Oil Spill
Industry Directorate of India) Guidelines for Preparation of Oil Spill Response
Contingency Plan, India NOSDCP (National Oil Spill Disaster Contingency
Plan) Circular No:02/2012 and the IPIECA (International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association) recommended format.
OSRL carried out various oil spill modelling scenarios of crude oil and LFO spill
in the SPM and other locations. Based on the spill outcome, the minimum
equipment’s required to contain the spill if any was finalized.
Tiered Response Approach: The concept of Tiered Preparedness and Response

provides a structural approach to design and build levels of oil spill
preparedness to respond to an incident in such a manner that additional
resources can be called upon and integrated into a response operation as an
incident grows in severity. Indian legislation identifies three tiers for the control
and management of oil spills. These are as follows:
Tier 1: Operational Spills up to 700 tons that can be dealt by individual ports or
oil handling facilities
Tier 2: Spills up to 10,000 MT that may require the pooling of government or
privately owned resources at a local level
Tier 3: A major or catastrophic oil spill incident of more than 10,000 MT, where
additional assistance is sought from governmental or international
organizations for oil spill response
7.8.4 Oil Spill Response Resources
Tier 1 Capability: Cairn has in-house capability to handle Tier 1 spills. The Tier
1 equipment available at the Bhogat Terminal & OKHA port warehouse. The
response inventory is positioned on SPM support vessel along with trained
personal during tanker operations. The complete inventory lists of Tier 1 is as
per the NOSDCP guidelines. The activation of Tier 1 resources would be by the
Incident Controller of IRT.
Tier 2 Arrangements: Cairn has Tier 2/ mutual aid agreement in place for CIL’s
Bhogat Marine Terminal facilities. The oil spill response equipment held by
operators in the same area such as ESSAR and reliance would be utilized based
on need basis.
35
Tier 3 Arrangements: Cairn has an associate member agreement with OSRL for
Bhogat Marine facilities, which are covered under the membership agreement
with OSRL. In the event of an incident from the Bhogat Marine facilities, Cairn
may have to activate Third Party Agreement with OSRL in consultation with
EMT/CMT leader. The details of Notification and Activation procedure for
OSRL and the complete list of response equipment available can be found in
the OSRL website; www.oilspillresponse.com. In the event that OSRL is
activated for response support for a Tier 3 oil spill incident from Bhogat Marine
Terminal and associated facilities, the resources would most likely be mobilized
from OSRL’s Singapore Operational Base. To be able to respond as quickly as
possible OSRL will mobilize its equipment using its own Hercules aircraft from
Singapore. The nearest port of entry identified is the Ahmadabad International
Airport. Upon receiving the necessary customs and immigration clearance, the
aircraft will then fly to Porbandar airport. The approximate time it will take to
fly from Singapore to Porbandar, excluding clearance of immigration and
customs is 18-20 hours.
Figure 7.10 Response Strategy Decision Flow Chart
Source: Cairn
Reference:
1. Oil and Polymer Spill response Plan - RJON-MRX-HSS-PLN-0002, June 2017
2. Oil Spill Response and Containment Plan prepared for midstream pipeline operations,
2005
36
3. Marine Oil Spill Contingency Plan prepared by OSRL, Singapore - MDPP-BRX-OSC-
REA-OSR1-0001, Rev.03, September 2014.
7.9 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
Cairn has developed a guideline document no. Document No:

CIL/HSEQ/GDL/16/000008 for “Pre-employment & periodic medical check-
up”. As per this guidelines, the scope of pre-employment, periodical medical
examination and exit medical examination Protocols, periodicity and fitness
forms are maintained at RJ-ON-90/1 Block as per the Mines Act, 1952, Mines
Rules, 1955; whenever Radiography activities and Radioactive source are used,
Atomic Energy Act, 1962 read with Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection)
Rules, 2004 are applicable and accordingly Pre-Employment& Periodic Medical
Examinations are conducted. Whereas for the midstream pipeline operations in
Gujarat state, the Factory act 1948 and Gujarat Factory Rules are followed.
The pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and periodical medical

examination process is applicable for the following categories prior to their
appointment and after continuing the services in the company:
 National Employees
 National Direct Consultants
 Third Party Consultants and Contract workers
 Tenure/ Term based Staff
 Graduate/Management Trainees
 Expat Employees
 Expat Consultants (Short Term Expat Contract)
Periodicity of medical examination has been prescribed as per - Statutory

requirements as below.
Type of medical Employee to be covered Periodicity

examination
Pre-employment  National Employees Prior to the employment.
medical  National Direct Consultants
examination  Third Party Consultants and
Contract workers
 Tenure/ Term based Staff
 Graduate/Management Trainees
 Expat Employees
 Expat Consultants (Short term
expat contract)
Periodic medical For all Cairn employees below 35 Once in 3 years.
examination as per years of age.
Cairn medical For all Cairn employees 35 years & Annually
procedure above 35 years of age.
Periodic medical For all third party consultants and Up to 10% of employees are to
examination as per contract workers. (As per OMR: be examined in a particular
Oil Mines medical examination is to be done year or once in 5 years as per
Regulations & once in 5 years or 10% of employees the statutes. However, if the
37
Type of medical Employee to be covered Periodicity
examination
Mines act – 1952, are to be examined in a particular contract validity is for 3 years,
OISD rules 2008. year.) PEME will be done initially
during employment and PME
is to be done once in every 3
years or whenever contract
changes. If contract period is
below 3 years PEME shall be
conducted.
Periodic medical For all daily casual workers Annually
examination (for
daily casual
workers)
Periodic medical For all personnel (mentioned under Annual medical check-up,
examination as per section 2.1) engaged in pipeline including Chest X-Ray. Half
the Gujarat Factory operations - non- hazardous locations. yearly medical checkup (chest
Rules For all personnel (mentioned under X-Ray not required). However
section 2.1) engaged in pipeline in annual medical check-up
operations - hazardous locations. Chest X-Ray is required.
Intermediate For those Employees who have Intermediate medical
medical suffered from major diseases / examination.
examination accidents or in specific cases requiring
medical investigation.
Source: Cairn
 Medical examination will be conducted at Cairn approved Hospitals /

FHPL tie-up hospitals. Corporate Medical Advisor who will be the
authority to certify a candidate as medically fit/ unfit/ temporarily fit/
unfit in respect of all employments in the company.
 The Corporate Medical Advisor will forward the medical fitness certificate
to the HR SPOC, declaring the candidate- "Fit", “Fit with recommendation”,
“Conditionally fit”, "Temporarily unfit" or “Unfit”. Where a candidate has
been declared "Temporarily Unfit" by reasons of short term sickness, which
is curable within a period of not more than thirty days, the candidate will
be required to undergo a re-examination within thirty days from the date of
his/her being declared "Temporarily Unfit". At the time of re-examination,
he/she will be required to produce proof of treatment and certificate of cure
from the Doctor who treated him/her. After submission of medical fitness
post short term sickness, the Corporate Medical Advisor will certify the
candidate as medically fit. The period may be relaxed depending upon the
job requirement or as per the mutual agreement of the respective
management. However the Corporate Medical Advisor has the authority to
discuss with the Specialist Doctor, giving the fitness certificate prior to
declare him/her fit on Company roles / as assigned.
Occupational health surveillance program: Cairn adopts the occupational

health surveillance as per the applicable statutory requirements and Cairn
procedure, which are detailed below in Table 7.15
38
Table 7.15 Details of OHS Surveillance Program
S.N. Title of Acts/ Rules/ Reference Requirement Description as per the Act Frequency Form/Records to
Requirement Regulations Clause be maintained
1 Initial medical Mines Act, 1952 Rule 29B(a) Every owner, agent and manager of mine shall Initial (Pre- Form-O
examination for and Mines Rules, 1955 arrange initial medical examination of persons employment
employees employed in the mine )
2 Medical Mines Act, 1952 Rule 29B Every owner, agent and manager of mine shall Every 5 years Form-M
examination of and Mines Rules, 1955 clause b, arrange periodical medical examination of every
employees Rule 29D, person employed in the mine every 5 years.
Sub-rules Note: a notice at least 20 days prior to the person to
1&2 be examined should be provided in Form M and
send a copy of the notice to the examining authority
3 Retention and Mines Act, 1952 Rule 29G(1) Every owner, agent and manager of mine shall
transfer of and Mines Rules, 1955 maintain all medical examinations history
medical depicting occupational dust exposure profiles of
certificates persons employed till a person is employed and ten
years thereafter
4 Issue notice to Mines Act, 1952 Rule 29J, Every owner, agent and manager of mine shall Form-R
person who is not and Mines Rules, 1955 Sub-rule issue a notice in Form R to the person who has failed
present for 2(b) to submit himself for reexamination without
Medical furnishing any reasonable cause
reexamination
5 Cost of medical Mines Act, 1952 and Rule 29O Every owner, agent and manager of mine shall bear
examination Mines Rules, 1955 the complete cost of all the medical examinations
prescribed under these rules
6 Health Atomic Energy Act, Rule 25 The employer must ensure to provide services of a Every 3
Surveillance of 1962 read with Atomic physician to undertake occupational health Years
workers Energy Radiation surveillance of classified workers. Health
Protection) Rules, 2004 surveillance of workers shall be carried on. Workers
on employment and thereafter shall be subject to
medical examination once every 3 years.
7 Responsibilities Atomic Energy Act, Rule 20 The employer must ensure to cater to the following Annual/Ter
of an employer 1962 read with Atomic responsibilities – mination
1. As mentioned below
39
Energy (Radiation a) ensure that provisions of these rules are
Protection) Rules, 2004 implemented by the licensee, Radiological
Safety Officer and other worker(s),
b) provide facilities and equipment to the licensee,
Radiological Safety Officer and other worker(s)
to carry out their functions effectively in
conformity with the regulatory constraints,
c) prior to employment of a worker, procure from
his former employer, where applicable, the dose
records and health surveillance reports,
d) upon termination of service of worker provide
to his new employer on request his dose records
and health surveillance reports,
e) furnish to each worker dose records and health
surveillance reports of the worker in his
employment annually, as and when requested
by the worker and at the termination of his
service,
f) inform the competent authority if the licensee or
the Radiological Safety Officer or any worker
leaves the employment, and
g) Arrange for health surveillance of workers as
specified under rule 25.
2. The employer shall be the custodian of radiation
sources in his possession and shall ensure
physical security of the sources at all times.
3. The employer shall inform the competent
authority, within twenty four hours, of any
accident involving a source or loss of source of
which he is the custodian.
8 Conducting Atomic Energy Act, Rule 7 (j) The licensee shall ensure to arrange for pre- Annual/
medical 1962 read with Atomic employment and post termination/ Termination
examination of Energy (Working of the Retirement medical examination of all employees.
the workers Mines, Minerals and Only after declaring fit post medical examination
Handling of Prescribed shall a worker be employed and he must be subject
Substances) Rules, 1984 to annual medical examination including Chest X -
40
Ray, general laboratory investigations such as
examination of blood and excreta, and special
investigation such as examination of skin, hands,
fingers, finger nails, ears and eyes.
9 Maintenance of Atomic Energy Act, Rule 7 (k) The licensee shall ensure to maintain complete and Prescribed Form
records 1962 read with Atomic up-to date records of personal, medical and
Energy (Working of the occupational histories of radiation workers and
Mines, Minerals and workers in mines in prescribed form.
Handling of Prescribed
Substances) Rules, 1984
10 Occupational Mines Act, 1952 and Rule 82 Every owner, agent and manager of mine shall pay
diseases- Mines Rules, 1955 the medical practitioner a fee not exceeding Rupees
Payment of fees sixteen for every clinical examination or X-ray
of the medical examination made.
practitioner
11 Making available Factories Act, `1948 & Rule 68-R The occupier of every factory involving a Six Month/
health Gujarat Factories Rules 'hazardous process' shall make accessible the health Termination
records to records including the record of
workers worker's exposure to hazardous process or as the
case be, the medical records of any worker for the
perusal under the following conditions:
a) once in every six months or immediately after
the medical examination whichever is earlier;
b) if the Factory Medical Officer or the Certifying
Surgeon as the case' may be, is of the opinion
that the worker has manifested signs and
symptoms of any
c) notifiable-disease as specified in the Third
Schedule of the Act;
d) if the worker leaves the employment;
e) if any one of the following authorities so direct :-
- The Chief Inspector of Factories;
- The Health Authority of the Central or State
Government;
- Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation;
41
- The Director General, Employees State
Insurance Corporation;
- The Director. Employees State Insurance
Corporation (Medical Benefits); and
- The Director General, Factory Advice Service
and Labour Institutes.
12 Medical Factories Act, Rule 68-T 68-T. Medical examination- Six Month Form-32 & Form-
Examination `1948 & Gujarat 1. Workers employed in a 'hazardous process' 33
Factories Rules shall be medically examined by a qualified
medical practitioner hereinafter referred to as
Factory Medical Officer, in the following
manner:
a) Once before employment, to ascertain physical
fitness of the person to do the particular job;
b) Once in a period of 6 months, to ascertain the
health status of all the workers in respect of
occupational health hazards to which they are
exposed: and in cases where in the opinion of
the Factory Medical Officer it is necessary to do
so at a shorter interval in respect of any
workers;
c) The details of pre-employment and periodical
medical exam, carried out as aforesaid shall be
recorded in the Register in Form No. 32.
2. No person shall be employed for the first time
without a certificate of fitness in Form No. 33
granted by the Factory Medical Officer. If the
Factory Medical Officer declare a person unfit
for being employed in any process covered
under sub rule (1), such a person shall have the
right to appeal to the Inspector who shall refer
the matter to the Certifying Surgeon whose
opinion shall be final in this regard. If the
Inspector is also a Certifying Surgeon, he may
dispose of the application himself.
42
3. Any findings of the Factory Medical Officer
revealing any abnormality or unsuitability of
any person employed in the process shall
immediately be reported to the certifying
Surgeon who shall in turn, examine the
concerned worker and communicate his
findings to the occupier within 30 days. If the
Certifying Surgeon is of the opinion that the
worker so examined is required to be taken
away from the process for health protection, he
will direct the occupier accordingly, who shall
not employ the said workers in the same
process. However, the worker so taken away
shall be provided with alternate placement
unless he is in the opinion of the Certifying
Surgeon, fully incapacitated in which case the
worker affected shall be suitably rehabilitated.
4. A Certifying Surgeon on his own motion or on
a reference from an Inspector may conduct
medical examination of a worker to ascertain
the suitability of his employment in a
hazardous process or for ascertaining his
health status the opinion of the Certifying
Surgeon in such a case shall be final. The fee
required for this medical examination shall be
paid by the occupier.
5. The worker taken away from employment in
any process under sub rule (2) may be
employed again in the same process only after
obtaining the Fitness Certificate from the
Certifying Surgeon and after making entry to
that effect In the Health Register.
6. The worker required to undergo Medical
Examination under these rules and for any
Medical Survey conducted by or on behalf of
43
the Central or the State Government shall not
refuse to undergo such a medical examination.
13 DGMS Returns XIth Conference on S. No. 1.8.2 The contractor shall submit to DGMS returns Quarterly/ DGMS
by Contractors Mine Safety (i) indicating – Name of his firm, Registration number, Monthly returns
(Implementation of Name and address of person heading the firm,
Recommendations) – Nature of work, type of deployment of work
email July 2015 persons, Number of work persons deployed, how
many work persons hold VT Certificate, how many
work persons undergone IME and type of medical
coverage given to the work persons. The return
shall be submitted quarterly (by 10th of April, July,
October and January) for contracts of more than one
year. However, for contracts of less one year,
returns shall be submitted monthly.
14 Medical fitness of Petroleum and Natural Rule-39 The operator shall ensure that-(a) minimum Initial (Pre-
offshore going Gas (Safety in Offshore physical efficiency criteria are laid down to employment
employees Operations) Rules, maintain and enhance safety standards; and(b) only )
2008. medically fit persons who meet the minimum
physical efficiency standards are allowed to work
on the installation.
15 Medical Petroleum and Natural Reg. 42 The operator shall ensure that the employees are PME
examination Gas (Safety in Offshore offered periodic medical check-up to ascertain any
of the Operations) Rules, long term effects of working environment causing
employees 2008. occupational diseases and take remedial measures.
References: Medical surveillance program is carried out as per the Mines Act – 1952; Oil Mines Regulations (OMR); Gujarat Factory
Rules; Atomic Energy Act, 1962 read with Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004; Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in
Offshore Operations) Rules, 2008; and OISD standards.
44
Annex G
Consequence Analysis Map

Figure 1 Scenario 2 - MPT Slug Catcher V-1201 (100 mm Pool Fire)
Figure 2 Scenario 3 - MPT Slug Catcher V-1201 (100 mm Jet fire)
Figure 3 Scenario 5 - SUPP Slug Catcher V-102 (Pool fire)
Figure 4 Scenario 11 - RDG Slug catcher SP 981 (100mm jet fire)
Figure 5 Scenario 12 - RDG Slug catcher SP 981 (pool fire)
Figure 6 Scenario 14 - RDG overpressure contours from a 100mm leak case slug catcher SP 981 (VCE)
Figure 7 Scenario 22 - RDG over pressure from instant release from propane storage tank V-851 (Rupture- VCE)

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7 RISK ASSESSMENT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

7.1 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

The RA process outlines rational evaluations of the identified risks based on

The following section describes the objectives, methodology of the risk

7.2 RA STUDY OBJECTIVE

7.3 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY

The risk assessment process is primarily based on likelihood of occurrence of

The risk matrix is widely accepted as standardized method of risk assessment

7.3.1 Data Collection and Review

For the proposed upstream and midstream project compinents following

7.3.2 Hazard Identification

A hazard is an undesired event, which may cause harm to people or to the

The major incident is defined as:

A structured and systemic approach to hazard identification has been adopted

Table 7.1 Description of Key Equipment

S. Location Equipment Equip- Equip- Operating Operating Remarks

Table 7.2 Description of Proposed Tanks

S. Location Equipment Type Tank Tank Tank Operating Operating Tank

S. Location Equipment Type Pipe Operating Operating Pipeline Length

7.3.3 Frequency Analysis

Table 7.4 Frequency Categories and Criteria

7.3.4 Consequence Analysis

In parallel with the frequency analysis, hazard prediction / consequence

Table 7.5 Severity Categories and Criteria

Consequence Ranking Criteria Definition

Significance = Likelihood x Consequence

Table 7.7 Risk Criteria and Action Requirements

S.N. Risk Significance Criteria Definition & Action Requirements

Storage Tank Failure Causes

Potential Hazards – Storage Tank & Pipeline Failures

A fire caused by inflammable chemical is a complex chain reaction where a fuel

The vulnerability of humans exposed to thermal radiation depends on the

The level of concerns considered for different events resulting in radiation

Table 7.8 Levels of Concern for Thermal Radiation Intensity

Element of Concern LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3

Explosion is a sudden, intense release of energy that generates a pressure wave

Table 7.9 Levels of Concern used for Vapour Cloud Explosion

7.3.5 Storage Tank & Pipeline Failure Frequency Analysis

Table 7.10 Historical Storage Tank Leak Frequencies by Release

S. Leak Frequency Frequency

S. Pipeline Failure Case EGIG Failure Pipeline Project Pipeline Frequency

7.4 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT OF IDENTIFIED PROJECT HAZARDS

2. MPT Slug Catcher (V-1201) 3 100mm leak Pool Fire 18 22 30 2 2 4

3. RDG Slug Catcher (SP 981 ) 1 100mm leak Jet Fire 39 55 85 2 3 6

Consequence Distance (m)

Hence, damaging effect is evaluated to be limited to neighbouring process

Consequence Distance (m)

Any potential emergencies arising from pipeline failure need to be effectively

The Consequence Analysis mapping is included as Annex G.

7.6 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN

Emergency Response Philosophy: Cairn Emergency Response Philosophy is to

Cairn Incident and Emergency Management Organizations: Cairn emergency

Cairn’s Rajasthan and Gujarat operations have a support organization the

Emergency Response Team (ERT): The Barmer and Viramgam Terminal,

Emergency Management Team (EMT) – Tactical Response: Based in the Cairn

Crisis Management Team (CMT) - Strategic Response: The Crisis

IRT Organization support: The IRT is competent to manage all identified

The Installation Manager / DGM / GM shall assume command and control of

Evacuation, Escape and Muster: Cairn is committed to providing adequate

Muster (Accounting for Personnel): The method used for accounting of