Cases for reading and discussion for March 2

1. Reyes Tracking Corp v People, G.R. No. 129029 (4/3/2000)

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is held subsidiarily liable for damages awarded in a
criminal case involving a reckless driving incident, highlighting the employer's civil liability
for felonies committed by their employees.
FACTS:
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is held subsidiarily liable for damages awarded in a
criminal case involving a reckless driving incident.
The incident occurred when Romeo Dunca, the accused, recklessly and negligently drove a
vehicle registered in the name of Rafael Trucking Corporation, causing it to hit and bump a
Nissan Pick-up driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr.
The accident resulted in multiple injuries, open wounds, abrasions, and the death of
Francisco Dy, Jr. The Nissan Pick-up also suffered damages amounting to P2,000,000.00.
Rosario P. Dy and Angelina M. Balcita, the offended parties, made a reservation to file a
separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged.
The offended parties filed a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as the employer of the accused driver, based on quasi delict.
The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the
separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a joint decision finding the accused guilty of the crime of Double
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law.
The trial court also held petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the
offended parties in the event of insolvency of the accused.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Petitioner appealed the decision, arguing that it cannot be held subsidiarily liable due to the
filing of the separate civil action against it.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case to the trial court for
determination of petitioner's civil liability as the employer of the accused driver in the civil
action quasi ex delicto.
The Court ruled that the separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner was
not waived by the filing of the criminal action and reservation to file a separate civil action.
The Court also held that the damages awarded in the criminal case were improper because
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action.
The Court emphasized that the offended parties cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
The Court ordered the trial court to re-open the civil case and determine the liability of
petitioner and the counterclaim of the plaintiffs.
The civil case in question was not brought to the Court of Appeals and was never brought to
the jurisdiction of the court.
The suspension of rules to accommodate the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 would
violate the rules and set dangerous precedents.
The judgment of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held petitioner, as the
employer of the offending driver, subsidiarily liable for the damages adjudged.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, as stated in Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Employers are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees, as stated
in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
The aggrieved parties in criminal cases may pursue their claims for damages either as
delictual damages or quasi-delictual damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code states that plaintiffs cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
The offended parties filed a separate action for damages under Article 2176 against
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the driver.
There was no separate civil action for damages arising from the felony, as it was deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action against the driver.
The civil case against petitioner alone was consolidated with the criminal case, where the
civil aspect arising from the delict was impliedly instituted against the driver.
The trial court dismissed the civil case for damages against petitioner, as it was already
made subsidiarily liable for the damages in the criminal case.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed no error in their judgments.
An act or omission, extra-contractual in nature, causing damage to another, can create two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender - civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex
quasi delicto.
The right to bring a civil action under the Civil Code must be reserved when a criminal
action is instituted, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute a separate civil action must be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence.
The pendency of the criminal case suspends the civil action, except in cases of
independent civil actions or pre-judicial questions.
An acquittal in the criminal case may bar any further separate civil action, except in cases
of independent civil actions or when the acquittal is based on a failure of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
The vicarious liability of an employer for the fault or negligence of an employee is founded
on specific provisions of law, including Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the employee is direct and primary,
subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
The enforcement of the judgment against the employer for an action based on Article 2176
does not require the employee to be insolvent, as the liability of the employer and employee
is solidary.
Due process requires that the employer be accorded full opportunity to be heard to dispute
the basic thesis upon which its liability is premised.
The employer takes no active role in the criminal proceedings but may be held subsidiarily
liable following the judgment of conviction.
The subsidiary liability of the employer can be shown to be clearly unwarranted or
unconscionable in highly meritorious cases.
In independent civil actions, a successful recourse in one would foreclose recovery in the
other.
The offended parties reserved the right to file a separate civil action arising from the offense
charged against the accused.
The filing of a separate civil action for quasi-delict against petitioner was without basis, as it
was contrary to the reservation made by the offended parties.
The civil action for quasi-delict against petitioner was dismissed because the civil action
against the driver had been re-instituted in the criminal case.
The civil action for quasi-delict against petitioner was merged with the criminal prosecution.
The trial court correctly determined petitioner's subsidiary civil liability for its driver's
negligence in the criminal case.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer can only be relieved if the driver is not
insolvent.
 The award of damages ex delicto in the decision of the trial court is final and cannot be set
aside.
The reopening of the case is not necessary as all parties have already been duly heard
before the trial court rendered its decision.
The majority's decision to remand the case to the trial court is unnecessary and sacrifices
legal rules.
The dissenting opinion affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals with the modification
that the case should be remanded to the trial court solely for the purpose of determining the
subsidiary civil liability of petitioner in the event of the driver's insolvency.
Issue:
Can Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused driver, be held
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded in the criminal case?
Ruling:
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation can be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded
in the criminal case.
Ratio:
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Employers are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees.
The offended parties filed a separate action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, but since Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation was the only defendant in that case, it
was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action against the driver.
There was no legal obstacle for the trial court to award damages in the criminal case and
make Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for the awards.
The civil liability of the employer is distinct and separate from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Civil Code.
The offended parties cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
The subsidiary liability of the employer is founded on specific provisions of law, including
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for the subsidiary liability of
employers for felonies committed by their employees.
Due process and the right of the employer to be heard are important in determining the
extent of its subsidiary liability.
Conclusion:
The court affirms the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, holding Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded in the criminal
case.
The court clarifies the legal basis for the subsidiary liability of employers and emphasizes
the importance of due process in determining the extent of such liability.
2. Casupanan, et al v Laroya, G.R. No. 145391 (8/26/2021)
In the case of Casupanan v. Laroya, the court ruled that an accused in a pending criminal case
can file a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant, and the
dismissal of the civil case by the lower court was erroneous.
FACTS:
The court ruled that an accused in a pending criminal case can file a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant, and the dismissal of the civil case by the lower
court was erroneous.
The case involves a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore
Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan.
Two cases were filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya
filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, while Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.
 The civil case was dismissed by the MCTC upon motion of Laroya on the ground of forum-
shopping.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Capas, Tarlac, but the RTC ruled that the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
The MCTC's dismissal of the civil case was without prejudice, as it did not expressly state that
it was with prejudice.
An order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable, and the proper remedy is to
file a special civil action under Rule 65.
Laroya claimed that the petition was defective and that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their
right to question the order of dismissal by not appealing it.
The court ruled that there was no forum-shopping in the case because the law and rules allow
the filing of a separate civil action that can proceed independently of the criminal action.
The court clarified that the civil action for damages based on quasi-delict filed by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper, as it is different from the criminal case based on reckless imprudence.
The court cited paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111, which allows the accused to litigate their
counterclaim in a separate civil action.
The court emphasized that the accused has a right to file a separate civil action for quasi-delict
and invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which is independent of the criminal action.
The court concluded that the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper, and the dismissal of the civil case by the MCTC was erroneous.
The court also noted that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, should be given retroactive effect in this case.
Issue:
Can an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?
Ruling:
The dismissal of the civil case by the MCTC was without prejudice, as there was no declaration
that the dismissal was with prejudice.
Therefore, the dismissal was not appealable, and the proper remedy was a special civil action
under Rule 65.
There was no forum-shopping in this case because separate civil actions can be filed
independently of criminal actions.
The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of
in the criminal case, as expressly allowed in the rules.
The court granted the petition and reinstated the civil case, ruling that the dismissal of the civil
case by the MCTC was erroneous.
Ratio:
The dismissal of the civil case by the MCTC was without prejudice, meaning it did not bar the
refiling of the case.
Since there was no declaration that the dismissal was with prejudice, it was not appealable.
The proper remedy in this case was a special civil action under Rule 65, which allows for the
review of judgments or final orders of lower courts.
The court clarified that there was no forum-shopping in this case because separate civil actions
can be filed independently of criminal actions.
The accused has the right to file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case.
This is expressly allowed in the rules, specifically in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, the dismissal of the civil case by the MCTC was erroneous, and the court granted
the petition to reinstate the civil case.
3. Manliclic v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157 (1/25/2007)
 A collision between a Philippine Rabbit Bus and an owner-type jeep leads to a legal battle as
the Supreme Court upholds the decision that the bus driver and the bus company are liable for
damages, despite their claims of negligence and due diligence.
FACTS:
The collision occurred on July 12, 1988, along the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan.
The jeep, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza, was
traveling from Pangasinan to Manila.
The bus, owned by petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) and driven by petitioner
Mauricio Manliclic, was heading from Concepcion, Tarlac to Manila.
The front right side of the bus collided with the rear left side of the jeep, causing extensive
damage to both vehicles.
Respondent Calaunan suffered minor injuries and was brought to the Manila Central University
Hospital for treatment.
He filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
A criminal case was also filed against Manliclic for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries.
The trial court found Manliclic negligent and held both Manliclic and PRBLI solidarily liable for
damages.
The court awarded respondent actual damages for the towing and repair of his jeep, as well as
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's
decision.
Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, raising several errors in the Court
of Appeals' decision.
Issue:
Who is liable for the collision between the bus and the jeep?
Ruling:
Petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI are held solidarily liable for damages.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court first addressed the admissibility of the transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) from the criminal case in the civil case. The Court ruled that petitioners had waived
their objection by failing to raise it during the trial. Therefore, the TSNs were admitted as
evidence.
The Court considered the conflicting versions of the parties regarding how the collision
occurred. After reviewing the evidence, the Court agreed with the trial court's finding that
petitioner Manliclic was negligent in driving the bus, causing the collision. The Court
emphasized that it would not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless there were
exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case.
Regarding petitioner PRBLI's defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, the Court found that PRBLI failed to prove that it had exercised the required
diligence. The presence of investigators after the accident was not sufficient to demonstrate
proper supervision. The Court held PRBLI solidarily liable with Manliclic for the damages.
Finally, the Court modified the awards of damages. The actual damages awarded for the
towing and repair of the jeep were upheld. However, the moral damages and exemplary
damages were reduced to P50,000 each. The attorney's fees and expenses of litigation were
deemed appropriate and upheld.
4. Air France v Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-21438
Air France is ordered to pay Rafael Carrascoso damages and attorney's fees after wrongfully
expelling him from his first class seat and forcing him to sit in the tourist class, with the Court of
Appeals finding that Air France breached the contract and acted in bad faith.
 FACTS:
The lack of specific averment of bad faith in the complaint was cured by notice to the defendant
of what the plaintiff intended to prove and by evidence presented without objection.
Testimony regarding an entry in a notebook made by the purser of the plane is admissible as
part of the res gestae and does not violate the best evidence rule.
The breach of contract by Air France in wrongfully expelling Carrascoso from his first-class
seat constitutes a quasi-delict, and damages are proper.
Air France is responsible for the tortious act of its employee, and exemplary damages are
awarded because Air France acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.
The grant of exemplary damages justifies an award of attorney's fees, and the court's
discretion in granting attorney's fees should not be disturbed.
Passengers have the right to be treated with kindness, respect, courtesy, and due
consideration by the carrier's employees, and any rude or discourteous conduct gives the
passenger an action for damages against the carrier.
The act that breaks a contract may also be a tort, and in this case, the wrongful expulsion of
Carrascoso from his first-class seat constitutes a tort.
"Bad faith" is defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
The Court of First Instance sentenced Air France to pay Carrascoso moral damages,
exemplary damages, the difference in fare between first class and tourist class, attorney's fees,
and costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket but
affirmed the trial court's decision in all other respects.
The Supreme Court reviewed the case on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Carrascoso was entitled to a first class seat.
Whether Air France acted in bad faith.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals found that Carrascoso had a confirmed reservation for a first class seat
and was entitled to it.
The court found that Air France's manager in Bangkok threatened Carrascoso and forcibly
ejected him from his first class seat, which constituted bad faith.
Air France was ordered to pay Carrascoso damages and attorney's fees.
Ratio:
The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the ticket issued and the need for stability
in the relations between passenger and air carrier.
The court found that Carrascoso had a confirmed reservation for a first class seat and was
entitled to it, regardless of seat availability.
Air France's manager in Bangkok threatened Carrascoso and forcibly ejected him from his first
class seat, which constituted bad faith.
Air France failed to prove that the white man who took Carrascoso's seat had a better right to
it.
Air France's actions constituted a violation of a public duty and a case of quasi-delict.
The court awarded moral damages and exemplary damages, as Air France acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The amounts awarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals were deemed reasonable.
Airlines should treat passengers with kindness, respect, and due consideration.
5. Dalen, et al. v. Mitsui OSK Lines, G.R. No. 194403 (7/24/2019)
A complaint for damages filed by the spouses Dalen against non-resident corporations involved
in the sinking of a vessel is dismissed by the Supreme Court due to lack of jurisdiction and the
validity of settlement agreements.
FACTS:
The complaint for damages was filed by the spouses Dalen and other petitioners against non-
resident corporations Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and Diamond Camellia, S.A. for the sinking of the
vessel MV Sea Prospect.
The vessel was chartered by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines and owned by Diamond Camellia, S.A., both
non-resident corporations not doing business in the Philippines.
The sinking of the vessel occurred on August 26, 1998, resulting in the drowning of 10 crew
members and the rescue of 11 others.
The petitioners, who are heirs and beneficiaries of the missing seafarers, received full payment
of death benefits based on the employment contract and a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) governing the employment of the seafarers.
The petitioners signed settlement agreements, affidavits of heirship, and receipts of payment
before the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), releasing the respondents from
all liabilities, including those based on tort, arising from the sinking of the vessel.
The petitioners demanded further compensation and threatened to file an action in Panama if
their demand was unheeded.
The respondents filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Approval of the
Compromise/Settlement Agreement against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 46.
The Supreme Court of Panama dismissed the petitioners' case for lack of jurisdiction based on
forum non conveniens.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondents and prescription of action.
The LA found that the action filed by the petitioners had already prescribed and referred the
case back to the Maritime Court of Panama.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed the appeal, stating that the claim,
even if based on tort, was already included in the quitclaims executed in favor of the
respondents.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that the complaint for damages was filed out of time
and that the settlement agreement barred the petitioners from filing the complaint.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, stating that the LA had no
jurisdiction over the case and that the settlement agreements signed by the petitioners were
valid.
Issue:
Whether the heirs' cause of action has prescribed.
Whether the settlement agreements barred the heirs from filing the complaint.
Ruling:
The Labor Arbiter lacks jurisdiction over tort cases.
The settlement agreements signed by the heirs were valid and binding.
Ratio:
The claim for damages based on tort filed by the heirs before the Labor Arbiter was not within
the ambit of the labor court's jurisdiction.
The claim for damages arising from the sinking of the vessel was a quasi-delict, which falls
under the jurisdiction of the regular court.
The settlement agreements were voluntarily entered into by the heirs with the assistance of
their chosen counsel.
The agreements released the respondents from all liabilities, including those based on tort,
arising from the sinking of the vessel.
 There was no evidence that the agreements were unconscionable or that the heirs were tricked
into signing them.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
complaint for damages filed by the heirs.
The Court held that the Labor Arbiter lacks jurisdiction over tort cases and that the settlement
agreements signed by the heirs were valid and binding.
6. Cerezo v Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538 (3/23/2004)
A collision between a bus and a tricycle leads to a lawsuit, where the Supreme Court rules that the
trial court had jurisdiction and the bus owner is liable for damages, with interest.
FACTS:
The Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
trial court.
The trial court issued an order on November 14, 1994, directing the Cerezo spouses to file their
answer within fifteen days.
The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer, and Tuazon filed a motion to declare them in default.
The trial court declared the Cerezo spouses in default on February 6, 1995, and authorized
Tuazon to present his evidence.
On May 30, 1995, the trial court ruled in Tuazon's favor and ordered Mrs. Cerezo to pay him actual
damages, loss of earnings, moral damages, and costs of suit.
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on June 25, 1995, and filed a petition for relief from
judgment on July 10, 1995.
The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment on March 4, 1998, stating that Mrs.
Cerezo could have availed of the remedy of appeal.
Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court's
denial of the petition for relief from judgment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on January 21, 1999, and denied the
motion for reconsideration on January 20, 2000.
Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, which was denied
on April 13, 1999, for failure to comply with requirements.
Mrs. Cerezo filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on July 6, 1999,
which was denied on October 21, 1999.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration on January 20, 2000.
Mrs. Cerezo filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court on
February 7, 2000.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari on March 23, 2004, affirming the
dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment.
The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Cerezo had other remedies available to her, such as an appeal,
a motion for new trial, or a petition for certiorari, but she failed to avail of them.
The Supreme Court also held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case and that Foronda
was not an indispensable party.
The Supreme Court modified the interest rate on the damages awarded by the trial court,
increasing it from 6% to 12% per annum upon finality of the decision.

Issue:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case due to the lack of service of summons
on Foronda.
Whether Tuazon failed to reserve his right to file a separate civil action for damages.
Ruling:
The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and Foronda was not an indispensable party.
Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in a quasi-delict is primary and direct, and she can be held
liable even without the presence of the employee.
The Cerezo spouses' participation in the proceedings before the trial court waived any irregularity
in the service of summons.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed, with the modification that the amount due shall earn legal
interest at 6% per annum computed from the date of the trial court's decision.
Upon finality of the Supreme Court's decision, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per
annum until full payment.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case and that Foronda was
not an indispensable party. The Court explained that Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in a
quasi-delict is primary and direct, and she can be held liable even without the presence of the
employee.
The Court also noted that the Cerezo spouses' participation in the proceedings before the trial
court waived any irregularity in the service of summons.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that the amount
due shall earn legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the date of the trial court's decision.
Upon finality of the Supreme Court's decision, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per
annum until full payment.
7. Victory Liner v. heirs of Malecdan, G.R. No. 154278 (12/27/2002)
Victory Liner, Inc. is held liable for damages in a case where their bus driver was found guilty of
gross negligence and the company failed to prove proper selection and supervision of their
employees. The Supreme Court affirms the decision with modifications on the amounts of
damages awarded.
FACTS:
The petitioner is Victory Liner, Inc., a common carrier.
The respondents are the heirs of Andres Malecdan, who was killed in an accident involving a
Victory Liner bus.
The accident occurred on July 15, 1994, in Barangay Nungnungan 2, Cauayan, Isabela.
Andres Malecdan was a 75-year-old farmer who was crossing the National Highway when he was
hit by the Victory Liner bus driven by Ricardo Joson, Jr.
The bus driver bypassed another bus that had stopped to allow Malecdan to cross the highway.
Malecdan was thrown off the carabao he was riding, and both he and the carabao sustained
injuries.
Malecdan was taken to the hospital but died a few hours later.
The incident was witnessed by Malecdan's neighbor, Virgilio Lorena, who provided a sworn
statement to the police.
A criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was
filed against the bus driver.
The heirs of Malecdan filed a civil case for damages against Victory Liner, Inc. and its driver.
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, found the driver guilty of gross negligence and
Victory Liner, Inc. guilty of gross negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The trial court ordered Victory Liner, Inc. and its driver to pay damages to the heirs of Malecdan.
The damages awarded by the trial court include death indemnity, actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit.
Victory Liner, Inc. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the amount of attorney's
fees awarded.
Victory Liner, Inc. filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, raising several issues.
The Supreme Court found that Victory Liner, Inc. was negligent in the selection and supervision of
its driver.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications on the
amounts of damages awarded.
Issue:
Whether or not Victory Liner, Inc. exercised proper supervision and diligence in the selection of its
employees.
Ruling:
The law provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict committed by an
employee.
Employers are responsible for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their
duties.
The injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their
employees.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility if they can prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Employers have the burden of proving that they have exercised such diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
Victory Liner, Inc. failed to present proof of Joson, Jr.'s driving experience and attendance in
driving safety seminars conducted by the company.
The company also failed to establish the speed of its buses during daily trips or submit evidence of
trip tickets, speed meters, and reports of field inspectors.
The trial court did not err in finding Victory Liner, Inc. negligent in the supervision of its driver,
Joson, Jr.
Ratio:
Employers are primarily responsible for the negligence of their employees.
Employers can be relieved of responsibility if they can prove that they exercised proper diligence
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Victory Liner, Inc. failed to provide evidence of proper selection and supervision of its driver.
Lack of proof of driving experience and attendance in driving safety seminars shows negligence in
the selection process.
Failure to establish the speed of buses and submit necessary evidence indicates negligence in
supervision.
The trial court's finding of negligence against Victory Liner, Inc. is upheld.
Damages:
The amount of actual damages awarded to the heirs of Andres Malecdan was reduced due to lack
of proof of the actual amount of loss incurred.
The award of moral damages was also reduced.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees was upheld.
Overall Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications on the
amounts of damages awarded.
Victory Liner, Inc. was ordered to pay death indemnity, reduced actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit to the heirs of Andres Malecdan.

8. Imperial v Heirs of Spouses Bayaban, G.R. No. 197626 (10/3/2018)

A negligent act by an employee leads to a presumption of employer negligence, making the
employer solidarily liable for damages in the case of Imperial v. Heirs of Spouses Bayaban.
FACTS:
The Court of Appeals made a decision on March 18, 2011, and a resolution on July 11, 2011, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 93498.
The accident in question occurred on December 14, 2003, at around 3:00 p.m. along Sumulong
Highway, Antipolo City.
The vehicles involved in the accident were a van with plate number USX 931 owned by Imperial
and driven by Laraga, and a tricycle with plate number DU 8833 driven by Mercado.
The Bayaban Spouses, who were on board the tricycle, sustained injuries in the accident.
Neil Bayaban suffered fractures in his tibia, femur, and knee joint, while Mary Lou Bayaban
suffered fractures in her radius, ulnocarpal/ulnoradial joint, and humerus.
The Bayaban Spouses had to undergo therapy and post-medical treatment for their injuries.
The Bayaban Spouses demanded compensation from Imperial, Laraga, and Mercado for their
hospital bills and loss of income during therapy and post-medical treatment.
When their demand was not heeded, the Bayaban Spouses filed a complaint for damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, naming Imperial, Laraga, and Mercado as defendants.
In their complaint, the Bayaban Spouses sought compensation for actual damages, lost earnings,
moral damages, and attorney's fees.
Imperial denied liability and claimed that the van was under the custody of another person,
Pascua. He also argued that Laraga was acting outside the scope of his duties as it was his rest
day.
Neil Bayaban died on May 23, 2006, and was substituted by his heirs in the case.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bayaban Spouses, finding Laraga negligent and the
proximate cause of the accident. It also ruled that Imperial failed to prove due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Laraga.
The Regional Trial Court awarded the Bayaban Spouses actual damages for medical expenses,
but found the certificates of employment inadequate to prove the amount of their lost earnings. It
also awarded moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Imperial appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but his liability was maintained. The Court
of Appeals found that Imperial failed to prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of
Laraga.
The Court of Appeals deleted the award of temperate damages but affirmed the other damages
awarded by the Regional Trial Court.
Imperial filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Imperial then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court found that Laraga was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the
time of the accident, based on the evidence presented.
The Supreme Court also found that Imperial failed to dispute the presumption of negligence in his
selection and supervision of Laraga.
The Supreme Court ruled that the official receipts of the medical and hospital bills presented by
the Bayaban Spouses were competent evidence of the actual damages they incurred.
The Supreme Court reinstated the award of temperate damages for the Bayaban Spouses' loss of
earning capacity.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with the modification of
reinstating the award of temperate damages.
The Supreme Court ordered Imperial to pay the Bayaban Spouses actual damages, temperate
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The total amount awarded to the Bayaban Spouses would earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent per annum from the finality of the Supreme Court's decision until full payment.
Issue:
Whether Imperial should be held liable for the damages suffered by the Bayaban Spouses.
Ruling:
Imperial is solidarily liable with Laraga for the damages suffered by the Bayaban Spouses.
Ratio:
The court applied the principle of vicarious liability, stating that when an employee's negligent act
is performed within the scope of their assigned tasks, the employer is presumed to be negligent.
The employer must then prove that they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of the employee to avoid liability.
In this case, Imperial failed to dispute the presumption of negligence and failed to provide
sufficient evidence of due diligence in the selection and supervision of Laraga.
Issue:
The admissibility of the official receipts of the medical and hospital bills as evidence of the actual
damages.
Ruling:
The official receipts, being public documents, do not require authentication and are admissible as
evidence.
The court reinstated the award of temperate damages to compensate for the loss of earning
capacity suffered by the Bayaban Spouses.
Ratio:
The court recognized the official receipts as public documents, which are self-authenticating and
do not require further proof of their authenticity.
The official receipts serve as sufficient evidence of the actual damages incurred by the Bayaban
Spouses.
The court also acknowledged the loss of earning capacity suffered by the Bayaban Spouses and
awarded temperate damages to compensate for this loss.
Conclusion:
Imperial is solidarily liable with Laraga for the damages suffered by the Bayaban Spouses.
Imperial failed to dispute the presumption of negligence and failed to provide sufficient evidence of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of Laraga.
The official receipts of the medical and hospital bills are admissible as evidence of the actual
damages.
The court reinstated the award of temperate damages to compensate for the loss of earning
capacity.
9. Aguila, et al. v. Baldovizo, et al., G.R. No. 163186 (2/28/2007)
The court rules that the petitioners do not have the right to appeal the amended decision,
reinstating the original decision holding them jointly and severally liable for damages in a case
involving a pedestrian accident.
Facts:
Marlun Lisbos, driving a van registered under the name of petitioner Danilo D. Reyes, sideswiped
Fausto Baldovizo on April 19, 1993, while he was walking along the pedestrian lane in Caloocan
City.
Fausto suffered injuries and later died on July 6, 1993.
Fausto's wife, Carmen Baldovizo, and his children, Edgar and Carmelo Baldovizo, filed a
complaint for damages against Marlun Lisbos, Danilo Reyes, petitioner Emerlito Aguila (the actual
operator and possessor of the van), and Times Surety and Insurance Company (the insurer of the
van).
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision after the original decision
had become final and executory.
Ruling:
The petitioners do not have the right to appeal the amended decision.
The original decision, which held the petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages, became
final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing an appeal.
The subsequent amended decision, which excluded Marlun Lisbos from the parties held liable, is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
The liability of the petitioners as the employer and registered owner or possessor-operator of the
van is direct and primary, regardless of the inclusion of the driver in the original decision.
Therefore, the original decision holding the petitioners liable is reinstated.
Ratio:
The court based its ruling on the principle of immutability of final judgment, which states that a
judgment can only be amended or altered before it becomes final and executory.
After a judgment becomes final and executory, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend or alter it,
except for certain exceptions such as correction of clerical errors or when the judgment is void.
In this case, none of the exceptions apply.
The court emphasized that the petitioners' petition for relief from judgment was not the proper
remedy and did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing an appeal.
The amended decision, which substantially affected the final and executory judgment, is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction.
The court reiterated that the liability of the petitioners as the employer and registered owner or
possessor-operator of the van is direct and primary, making them solidarily liable for damages.
The court denied the petitioners' plea for substantial justice, emphasizing that litigants should
adhere to the rules and procedures of the court.

10. R Transport Corp. v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161 (2/18/2015)

R Transport Corporation is held primarily and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
negligence of their employee, who hit and ran over a pedestrian resulting in her death, despite not
being the registered owner of the vehicle involved.
FACTS:
The case originated from a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition seeks to reverse the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 84175, dated September 9, 2005, and August 8, 2006, respectively.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: a. On December 12, 1993, Loreta J. Yu was hit
and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who was then employed by petitioner R
Transport Corporation. b. Loreta was pronounced dead on arrival at the Medical City Hospital. c.
On February 3, 1994, respondent Luisito G. Yu, the husband of the deceased, filed a Complaint
for damages against R Transport, Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport Corporation
(MMTC). d. MMTC denied liability, stating that it is merely the registered owner of the bus and that
R Transport is the actual owner and operator. e. R Transport claimed that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and drivers and that its buses are in
good condition. f. Antonio Gimena was declared in default for failing to file an answer to the
complaint.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of respondent Yu, holding R Transport
primarily and solidarily liable for damages.
The RTC also held MMTC solidarily liable with R Transport, stating that it would unduly prejudice a
third person who is a victim of a tort to look beyond the certificate of registration and prove who the
actual owner is in order to enforce a right of action.
The RTC ordered R Transport and MMTC to pay damages to respondent Yu, including actual
damages, loss of income, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision with modification, making
Antonio Gimena solidarily liable for the damages caused to respondent.
The CA held that R Transport, as the employer of Gimena, may be held liable for the damage
caused by its negligent employee, even if it is not the registered owner of the bus.
The CA denied R Transport's motion for reconsideration.
R Transport filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising the argument
that the CA erred in affirming the RTC's ruling of liability without sufficient evidence.
The Supreme Court disagreed with R Transport's argument, stating that the determination of
negligence is a question of fact, and the findings of the trial and appellate courts on negligence are
binding unless certain exceptional circumstances are present.
The Supreme Court reviewed the records of the case and found no reason to reverse the rulings
of the lower courts.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts' findings that driver Gimena was negligent in
hitting and running over the victim, and his negligence was the proximate cause of her death.
The Supreme Court noted that the records showed Gimena was running at a reckless speed and
failed to take necessary precautions in a busy area where pedestrians were crossing the street.
The Supreme Court also agreed with the CA's finding that R Transport failed to present evidence
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, making it liable for the quasi-
delict committed by its negligent employee.
The Supreme Court cited previous rulings that both the registered owner and the actual operator
of a vehicle can be held jointly and severally liable for damages arising from the negligent conduct
of the driver.
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision and resolution, holding R Transport primarily and
solidarily liable for the damages caused by its employee's negligence.
Justices Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes concurred with the decision.
Issue:
Whether R Transport Corporation should be held liable for damages caused by the negligence of
its employee.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA, holding R Transport primarily and solidarily
liable for damages.
R Transport failed to prove that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision
of its driver, Gimena, who was found to be negligent in hitting and running over the victim.
The fact that R Transport was not the registered owner of the bus does not exempt it from liability.
The registered owner and the actual operator of a vehicle should be jointly and severally liable for
damages caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle.
Ratio:
The Court based its decision on the principle of negligence, stating that whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact.
The lower courts' findings on R Transport's negligence were supported by the evidence presented.
R Transport failed to present any evidence of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
The liability of the registered owner and the actual operator of a vehicle is joint and several.
R Transport cannot escape liability for the negligence of its employee.
This principle is meant to protect the public and prevent unscrupulous transferees of vehicles from
evading liability for their own negligent acts.
Therefore, R Transport was held primarily and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
negligence of its employee.