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Other documents randomly have
different content
The aggregate force that came from Macala would have been
anything between 1,200 to 1,500 strong. Of these, probably not more
than 1,000 were in action, if so many.
Had the whole body entered the stronghold unperceived, the plan
was to rest a day, then begin attacking the surrounding Chiefs and
looting their stock. These Chiefs, although members of their tribes
had become rebels, had themselves refrained from joining. It was,
therefore, supposed that, on conclusion of hostilities, they would visit
their displeasure on those who had rebelled. Consequently, the
intention was to deal vigorously with and kill off these half-hearted
men; such were the tactics of Tshaka, for, after killing the leaders, the
ordinary people, it was found, flocked to the 'conqueror.' The policy,
furthermore, was to lie in wait for small parties of the Government
forces near, but especially in, the forests, and massacre them before
reinforcements could arrive, as, indeed, had almost happened at
Manzipambana.
The reader will naturally wonder what became of the newly-appointed
commanders, Macala and Mganu. Macala thought it wiser to push
into the gorge. He joined Mangati and Ndabaningi, leaving the
headstrong Mehlokazulu and Bambata to look after themselves.
Mganu, however, remained.
On Bambata and Mehlokazulu's suspicions being aroused, scouts
were sent out to examine the ridge on the west, occupied by part of
Barker's force. These returned a few minutes before the Maxim
opened to report troops were really there. The impi was speedily
roused and formed into an umkumbi, that is, the 'circle' Barker had
seen. Bambata then completely lost his head, so much so that
Mganu, in the absence of Macala, was called on to take general
command. He immediately gave such orders as appeared necessary
to meet the situation. His own regiment, Mavalana, was told to charge
at Barker in one direction, and the others to do likewise in another.
But before the men (already arranged in companies) could move
forward (not backward as McKay and Forbes had believed), the
Maxim began—not from the ridge suspected by the rebels, but from a
different one. What followed at this stage has already been related. It
remains to add that, when it became a case of sauve qui peut, the
majority turned and made over the neck in rear as hard as they could.
It flashed across the minds of those familiar with that part of the
country that Dobo was a snare; that being the case, there was
nothing for it but to run the gauntlet towards the waterfall. This, as
has been seen, many accordingly did.
And so, as far as the ordinary rebel could see, the great storm that
was to come turned out to be nothing more than a thunder of artillery
and hail of bullets, brought on by that very race against whom the
mysterious command had been specially directed. Truly, the manner
in which Dinuzulu had directed the elements left much to be desired.

FOOTNOTES:
[230] This word is dissyllabic, and pronounced 'maw-me' (the 'e'
being as in 'met').
[231] Owing to the insanitary state of his camp (the site having
recently been used by three columns), Barker got permission from
McKenzie to move about three miles to the south-east of the
grave, and out of sight of Macala. This had occurred on the
afternoon of the 8th. On the same day, all the supply waggons
(empty) trekked back to Fort Yolland. Little did Barker suppose that
this lucky move would make the enemy believe the column had
vanished as well.
[232] Some fifteen miles of difficult country had been traversed.
The feat was a noteworthy one; it had called for courage and
daring, and well deserved the Distinguished Conduct Medal
afterwards awarded to each of the men.
[233] The mouth of Tate gorge is about a mile west of the mouth of
Mome gorge, and is on the route along which, as hinted in
McKenzie's despatch, the enemy would probably travel. In
Barker's view, it was just possible the enemy, although bound for
Mome, would proceed thither through Tate. It will be seen later,
McKenzie, notwithstanding his written instructions, entertained
similar suspicions.
[234] This is the hill referred to on p. 246.
[235] Orders were given for the searchlight to be kept flashing
throughout the night, to give the enemy the impression that the
troops were quietly resting on Nomangci—a ruse that exactly
served its purpose.
[236] F company (Capt. Forsbrook) was, however, at Mangeni. It
joined the regiment on the 14th June.
[237] It so happened that a squadron of R.H., which, for a few
minutes had gone astray during the gallop on top, had already
been made by Major A.W. Fraser to occupy a portion of the
position in question, and so prevent escapes then already
beginning to occur.
[238] The battalion moved in line of companies, searching the
bush-covered gullies en route; a number of rebels was come
upon. A and H companies lined the river, whilst parties of D, E and
G lined one of the sides of Dobo bush as it was being driven. The
work done by the regiment, especially B and C companies, was
very useful.
[239] It is believed by some that this man escaped.
[240] Cd. 3888, p. 185.
 XV.
STATE OF AFFAIRS AT UMSINGA.—OPERATIONS BY
MURRAY-SMITH'S COLUMN.—FURTHER OPERATIONS BY
UMVOTI FIELD FORCE AND MACKAY'S COLUMN.

Although Nkandhla had been selected by the rebel leaders as their

terrain, that was not to say outbreaks would not occur in other parts
of the Colony as well. Indeed, one of the objects of making
Sigananda's stronghold the principal rallying-point was to encourage
overt acts of rebellion in other parts from knowledge of the fact that,
so long as the fastness was held, it was available as a general
headquarters and place of refuge. As an illustration of this, the
disaffected men of Ngobizembe's tribe who, after being punished in
the middle of March by Leuchars—being by themselves powerless to
resist the troops—made off from Mapumulo and joined Bambata at
Nkandhla. Mehlokazulu and other Chiefs, as has already been seen,
broke from Nqutu and adjoining districts to do the same. The principle
upon which all these men acted seems to have been that, where local
confederates were not strong enough to offer resistance on the spot,
either from want of numbers or suitable fastnesses, they would move
to Nkandhla, but where the prospects were not unfavourable, as at
Umsinga and Mapumulo, each with a teeming Native, and sparse
European, population, they would resolve to try their chances there
and then, in the hope that, by creating additional and widely-
separated areas of disturbance, the difficulties of the troops would be
increased, when other tribes would follow one or other of the
alternatives referred to, always with the ulterior motive of causing the
country to rise en bloc.
In view of the importance of Umsinga and Mapumulo, both districts
being within forty to forty-five miles of Nkandhla by such routes as
Native pedestrians ordinarily travel, it is well to understand the
position at those places.
In Umsinga district there were, in 1906, ten tribes, by far the largest
being that of Kula. The total huts owned by members of his tribe was
upwards of 4,500.[241] The huts (in the same district) of the other nine
tribes together did not amount to 4,000. To so great an extent did
Kula over-shadow the other Chiefs, that it is unnecessary to make
more than passing reference to the latter.
Kula was a young man, grandson of Ngoza, once famous throughout
Natal and Zululand as Sir Theophilus Shepstone's principal induna.
Ngoza, after serving in a position of trust and responsibility for many
years, was appointed Chief over a tract of country vacated in 1858 by
a Chief Matshana[242] to escape arrest. The ward was 450 square
miles in extent, almost the whole falling within one magisterial
division.
The Poll Tax Act and regulations were promulgated to the Natives of
Umsinga in September, 1905, visits being paid by the Magistrate to
four centres for the purpose. The announcement was well received.
The only matter commented on by the Natives was that young men
and boys (over 18) were held liable for the tax, instead of their
fathers, as in the case of the hut tax. It was thought this would
promote greater independence than was already being exhibited
towards parents, and, at the same time, lead to youths retaining their
earnings, instead of handing them over to their fathers or guardians,
as up till then customary, on the plea of having to meet obligations of
their own towards the State.
Kula and the smallest local Chief, Nondubela, soon began to
influence their respective people against paying the tax. Their
intrigues were extended to other Chiefs near them, both in Natal and
Zululand. Early in December (1905), the same two tribes began to
prepare for rebellion. Supplies of assegais, shields and tshokobezi
badges were obtained. The young men of all the Umsinga Chiefs
were called on to pay the poll tax subsequently to 20th January,
though payment, it was explained, might be made at any time
between then and 31st May. Only one of the Chiefs made earnest
and successful endeavours to induce his men to pay, viz. Tulwana, a
man who had always been conspicuous for his loyalty to the
Government. Nondubela instructed his men not to pay, nor did any do
so until after the Rebellion had broken out and several reverses had
been sustained by the rebels. Kula advised his tribe to pay a few
pounds, and so throw dust in the eyes of the Government. £98 out of
£1,500 is all that was paid by his people.
In February, two of the same man's tribe, constables at Tugela Ferry,
were charged and convicted of conspiring to murder the European
police at that place and seize their arms and ammunition. The
conspiracy was exposed by one of Chief Sibindi's men—a fellow
constable.
Kula, a man of intemperate habits, had for long been a source of
annoyance. In 1898, he openly organized his tribe into regiments. He
was reproved for so doing by the Supreme Chief. Between 1898 and
May, 1906, he was repeatedly fined, either for refusing or neglecting
to supply labourers for the Public Works Department. In January, he
was warned by the U.S.N.A. to be more careful. "The Government,"
this officer said to him, "is lenient, but will not put up with annoyance
such as this for ever." In July, 1905, the Governor (Sir Henry
McCallum) paid a visit to Pomeroy. The Chiefs were summoned to
greet him. Kula arrived with a mounted cavalcade and deliberately
galloped past the King's representative without saluting. For this
gross disrespect he was cautioned by His Excellency in person.
On the 4th March, 1906, about fifty men of the tribe residing at Elands
Kraal, under headman Mabulawo, openly took up arms. This caused
all European farmers in the neighbourhood to flee precipitately from
their homes. The impi continued under arms and defied the local
police, with the result that thirty-six of the Police Field Force, under
Sub-Inspector C.R. Ottley, were sent to Umsinga to restore order.
Ottley, however, deemed it inadvisable to attempt more with so small
a force than camp near the court-house. On the 23rd, Kula held a
large beer-drink at his kraal within two miles of the magistracy. An
armed force was there assembled, it was said, for the purpose of
killing the police and court officials. On the night fixed for the
massacre, Kula, it seems, got drunk, when some of the more loyal
headmen of the tribe bound him up, thereby preventing him from
carrying his supposed threat into execution.
After these proceedings had been reported, Kula was summoned to
Pietermaritzburg by the Supreme Chief. He at first hesitated about
complying, but, on being pressed by his headmen, obeyed. Upon
being questioned at headquarters by the Minister for Native Affairs,
he denied everything that had occurred, but, in the face of irrefutable
evidence, was ordered to arrest Mabulawo and all who had been or
were still under arms. Twelve days later, the headman was brought to
the Magistrate, unaccompanied, however, by any of those who had
armed. On the 23rd April, a large impi was organized to release
Mabulawo. The latter was now driven off in Dr. Keith Murray's trap to
Pietermaritzburg. When the impi heard of this, and of the fact that
thirty of the Umsinga Reserves had been mobilized and posted at the
magistracy, they withdrew to their kraals.
Ever since the 4th March, the affairs of the district had been going
from bad to worse. Europeans and loyal Natives were assaulted by
disaffected Natives with impunity, so much so that the police were
directed to desist from attending beer-drinks in uniform, and not to
arrest any Native in the presence of others. By this time, Kula's tribe
had virtually become master of the district, doing whatever appeared
right in its own eyes.
It so happened the Magistrate (Mr. A.E. Harrington) was collecting hut
tax at Keate's Drift when Mr. Cross and party were fired on by
Bambata and others in Mpanza valley (3rd April). Chiefs Silwana and
Sibindi were ordered to arm and prevent the rebel Chief from
crossing into their wards. As soon as the message reached Sibindi,
he did all he could to assist, in fact most of his tribe in Umsinga
division were mobilized within two hours. Silwana's response was
half-hearted. About 11 p.m. the same day, Ottley and twenty men
arrived at the drift from Pomeroy, six hours after hearing of Bambata's
outbreak. The Magistrate, Umsinga, proceeded the next day (4th) to
collect taxes at Tugela Ferry, where, however, but few paid.
The unrest among the Umsinga Natives now became more
accentuated. Mtele, Kula's uncle and principal induna at Elands
Kraal, mobilized the whole of the people under his charge. Nondubela
joined him. The indunas of that portion of Ngqambuzana's tribe,
which was in Umsinga division, were reported by the Chief as
intending to cross into Zululand and join the rebels. All the Europeans
of the district went into lager at Helpmakaar, excepting the court
officials. The Umsinga Reserves were joined by those of Dundee,
Newcastle and Weenen early in May, together with a composite
Militia force under Major W. Murray-Smith, N.M.R.
Kula reported by messengers on the 4th May that Mtele was in open
rebellion. Harrington, in reply, remarked that he had two months
previously told Kula a portion of his tribe was in rebellion, but this had
been denied; "he sends only now to tell me what I knew two months
ago." Before receipt of this message, Kula had openly declared that
he would never come to the court again.
In consequence of a large number of Natives being expected at the
magistracy to pay taxes, a squadron N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray,
D.S.O.), with a few Reserves under Chief Leader D.C. Uys, was sent
there from Helpmakaar at 6.30 a.m. on the 8th, pending arrival the
same day of Lieut. G.R. Richards, M.L.A., and a squadron (100) N.C.
Kula, probably because he saw troops proceeding to the magistracy,
deemed it prudent to visit it too. Accompanied by a dozen of his
leading men, he arrived shortly before 11 a.m. Almost simultaneously,
Richards rode in with his men. Harrington conferred with the latter,
Rattray and Uys. He pointed out the degree to which Kula was
implicated in the Rebellion, and suggested the man should be
removed from the district. Richards, then in charge of the post,
though not senior officer, decided, with the concurrence of the other
officers, to transfer the Chief to make the statement he had already
made respecting disloyalty in his tribe to the Officer Commanding at
Helpmakaar. Kula was informed of the decision. A few minutes later,
he was required to proceed with Rattray and his men to Helpmakaar.
Six headmen were allowed to accompany the Chief. On arrival at
Helpmakaar, Kula was closely examined by Lieut.-Col. A.T.G. Wales,
who, in his turn, resolved to keep him in custody pending receipt of
orders from the Government.
The Government was naturally placed in an awkward position by
these unexpected and unusual proceedings. Richards, of course, had
made no actual arrest, and, in referring the question of the
advisability of Kula's continued presence in the district to the officer at
Helpmakaar, had done so because the point at issue appeared to be
one not for him but for some higher authority to decide. The
Commandant was surprised at Richards' action, and could he at once
have got into communication with the responsible officers, the
probabilities are that Kula would not have been either arrested or
detained, as everything pointed to his committing himself sooner or
later, when he would have been either captured or shot as a rebel.
Under the circumstances, in view of the then greatly disturbed
condition of the country, the Government caused the Chief to be
conveyed on the 9th from Helpmakaar to Pietermaritzburg, where he
was detained, though not in custody.
Those best competent to judge, firmly believe the arrest or enforced
removal of this important Chief at that particular moment checked the
spread of rebellion in those parts. This, indeed, was subsequently
realized by the Government. Thus, though there was irregularity in
the way in which Kula was removed, the step was justified by peace
being maintained at a time when a rising was imminent in the thickly-
populated district over which he had control.[243]
Kula's brother, Manuka, tried to usurp control of the tribe after the
former's departure. On such endeavour being detected, he was
promptly placed under arrest.

Simultaneously with the dispatch of the Zululand Field Force to

Nkandhla (1st May), squadron A (with the Sydenham troop of B),
N.M.R. (about 110), under Lieut.-Col. H. Sparks, V.D., were detailed
for Mapumulo, whilst the remainder of the regiment (160) proceeded
viâ Dundee to Helpmakaar, under Major W. Murray-Smith. A force,
[244] under the command of Murray-Smith (with Capt. G.T. Hurst as
Staff Officer), left Dundee for Helpmakaar on the 5th. It reached its
destination on the 6th, but moved on the 7th to a new site two miles
off, where a strong lager of wire entanglements was speedily erected.
It was from the foregoing column that the detachments proceeded to
garrison Pomeroy, as already noticed in connection with Kula's
removal. Patrols, too, were sent out in various directions. These
obtained intelligence in confirmation of Mtele and Nondubela being in
open rebellion.
When Wales left for Pietermaritzburg on duty (11th), Murray-Smith
took over the command. Finding the Natives referred to were actually
in rebellion, Murray-Smith decided to attack and prevent them from
inducing others to take up arms. An armed body of 200 to 300 was
discovered at a kraal in a valley some four or five miles from the
camp. As, however, the Commandant's instructions were that the
column should simply proceed to Helpmakaar and, having fortified
itself, await Mackay's arrival, it became necessary for permission to
assume the offensive to be obtained. This Colonel Bru-de-Wold, after
carefully considering the situation, gave in a few hours by telephone.
On the following day (12th May), Rattray was accordingly detailed to
take command of the mounted troops, viz. 60 to 80 N.C. (Lieut. P.W.
Stride); 60 to 80 N.M.R.; about 150 Newcastle, Ladysmith, Dundee
and Estcourt Reserves; and 8 Umsinga Reserves under Chief Leader
A. Müller, the latter being guides and scouts.
Leaving camp before daybreak, the force moved towards Elands
Kraal, some ten miles away. About 9 a.m., the scouts got in touch
with the enemy and exchanged a few shots. Rattray, close at hand,
pushed on at a gallop up a hill and attacked Mtele's impi, about 150
to 200 strong, the latter partly concealed in bushes. The impi, making
neither charge nor stand, was forthwith driven into an adjoining valley,
through which they were promptly pursued by N.C. and N.M.R. as far
as the Buffalo (about two miles), as well as in other directions. On
reaching the river, the Natives scattered more than they had already
done, some crossing into Zululand, whilst others concealed
themselves in as extraordinarily rough country on the Natal side.
The Reserves, with a Maxim (N.M.R.), took ground where the enemy
had first been seen. From such position, a continuous fire was kept
up, which proved very effective in breaking down any opposition that
might have been offered in such extremely rugged and out-of-the-way
country.
The main force with Murray-Smith had, in the meantime, occupied
high ground overlooking the Elands Kraal settlement and the Buffalo
valley. Here the N.F.A., supporting and covering Rattray, opened and
kept up a shrapnel fire on groups of retreating Natives. Such,
however, was ineffective on account of the long range.
The whole action, including pursuit, lasted about two hours. The
troops suffered no casualties; of the rebels, twenty-nine were killed,
eight prisoners were taken, and thirty cattle captured.
On an examination of the scene being made, two camps of war-huts
were found (about a mile apart). Food and clothing belonging to the
insurgents were discovered at the back of the hill on which they were
first sighted.
Two days later, Murray-Smith took a force (including N.C. at Pomeroy,
then having been relieved by N.R.R.) to Nondubela's kraal, at a hill
called Nqoro, near Buffel's Hoek, but the rebels, on the alert in
consequence of the action at Elands Kraal, escaped to Zululand. It
was on the same day that Mackay crossed into Natal at Rorke's Drift.
[245] Had it been possible for him to co-operate, Nondubela and his
force might not have escaped as cheaply as they did. As it was,
Murray-Smith went with a section of his force to Rorke's Drift, then
down the right bank of the Buffalo, whilst another section, under
Rattray, proceeded by road viâ Elands Kraal valley, and, after
crossing Mazabeko stream, converged with the main body on Nqoro
bill (below Fugitives' Drift). On this occasion, all kraals that were
come across belonging to rebels were destroyed. Over forty miles
were covered during the day. The feature of the day's operations,
however, was the splendid performance of the guns (N.F.A.) under
Wilson, which travelled a distance of not less than forty miles.
In addition to tshokobezi badges, it was noticed that strips of white
goat-skin, about an inch broad and tied round the neck, were used by
Natives of these parts to indicate being in rebellion. The prisoners, as
well as the killed, were found wearing them.
As soon as Mackay arrived, he took command and operated as
already described in Chapter XII.
Orders were received from the Commandant on 16th May for 100
N.M.R. and 100 N.R.R.[246] under Murray-Smith, to escort a convoy
of fifty-one waggons (supplies, etc.), from Dundee to Nkandhla.
Leaving on the 17th, the escort, strengthened at Vant's Drift by 100
N.C. under Richards, arrived at Nkandhla viâ Nqutu, Nondweni and
Owen's store, on the 24th. On the following day, the escort, less the
N.C.—detached to become bodyguard to Colonel McKenzie—was
ordered to return with the empty waggons to Dundee and join the
Umvoti Field Force (then under command of Major W.J.S. Newmarch,
U.M.R.) at Greytown, and do so viâ Tugela Ferry. Murray-Smith left
Nkandhla on the 26th and, returning viâ Nqutu, reached Dundee on
the 30th.
The night the escort reached Nqutu (28th May), an absurd scare
arose out of a belief that Mehlokazulu intended attacking the village
the same night. The Basutos had, in consequence, mobilized and
taken refuge at the gaol. As, at this time, Mackay was camped
sixteen miles away at Isandhlwana, it is difficult to understand how
the scare arose.
On arriving at Dundee, Murray-Smith got orders from Leuchars to
proceed by rail to Greytown, leaving N.R.R. at Dundee. He
accordingly entrained on the 1st June, reached Greytown 6 a.m. on
the following day, and joined the U.F.F. at Spitzkop on the 3rd,
temporarily taking command.
Shortly after, Mackay moved into Nqutu district, Zululand (27th May),
to co-operate with Leuchars. Lieut.-Col. J. Weighton was appointed to
command at Helpmakaar.
On being appointed (29th May), to the command of all troops south of
Tugela and in Nqutu district, Zululand, i.e. the whole of Natal plus
Nqutu, Leuchars, as has been seen, visited Helpmakaar to direct
operations from there. He arrived at that place on the 2nd June to find
that 1,000 of Chief Silwana's men had suddenly, and without
reference to the Commandant of Militia, or to himself, been called out
by the Minister for Native Affairs, with orders to be at Pomeroy on the
3rd. Efforts were at once made to secure a European leader. The
men displayed no enthusiasm whatever and were barely civil.
Although called out under the authority of the Native Code as an
ordinary levy, they asked to be armed with rifles and supplied with
blankets. The applications could not be entertained. Warnings were
received that the levy was not to be trusted. It was freely stated that
Silwana had forbidden the men to cross into Zululand. At Gordon
Memorial mission station they looted a European house. On a false
alarm occurring one night, a number of the younger men sprang to
arms with the war-cry, "Usutu!" Under these circumstances, Leuchars
decided to send them back to Weenen. Urgent requests, however,
came from Government and the Magistrate of Weenen to give them a
trial. Mr. G.A. Jackson, who knew the people, was accordingly
appointed to lead them. The order to return to their homes was
withdrawn. They were told Jackson would take them next day (7th) to
a locality where a number of returned rebels of Manuka's section was
in hiding. As there was a tribal feud of long standing between
Silwana's and Kula's people, it was thought the levy would have
undertaken the duty with alacrity. Jackson went to Helpmakaar to
arrange for supplies. On getting back to Pomeroy next morning to
lead the levy on, he found no less than 600 had deserted during the
night. Although about 100 of those remaining volunteered to go
forward, they were carried away by the majority, who, packing up their
bundles, made for their homes. After expressing regret at the
behaviour of their men, the indunas proceeded to do likewise.[247]
By way of facilitating control of the forces in Umsinga and Nqutu
districts, those under Mackay, less the Reserves sent back to
Helpmakaar, were separated from the Helpmakaar Field Force and
formed into a distinct column, with instructions to confine their
operations to the basin of the Buffalo and the north-west portion of
Qudeni mountain. Mackay's column then consisted of the N.C., Right
and Left Wings; N.R., one company; N.F.A., one battery (six guns);
and N.N.H., one squadron.
The Mapumulo garrison was detached from the U.F.F. and became a
separate column under Sparks, with authority to turn out 200 from
each of two loyal tribes to assist in searching for and arresting
returned rebels of Ngobizembe's tribe.
The H.F.F. was now made up of the garrisons of Pomeroy, Fort
Murray-Smith,[248] Helpmakaar, Paddafontein and Dundee. Wales
was appointed to command vice Weighton, who had been ordered to
take over court-martial duties.
Further proof was given by the Transvaal at this juncture of an
earnest desire to assist Natal in her trouble. That patriotic and well-
known organization, the Lancaster and York Association,
Johannesburg, conceived the idea of offering Natal the services of
150 men (twenty-five of them mounted). On approaching the
President, Mr. (now Sir) Abe Bailey, K.C.M.G., the latter not only
approved the proposal, but undertook to defray all expenses of
equipment, clothing, saddlery, etc.—excepting only salaries and food
supplies—out of his own pocket. This generous offer was most
gratefully accepted by the Natal Government. So enthusiastically did
Mr. Joe Bell, Mr. W. Beachy-Head and other members of the
Association take the matter up, ably assisted by the Staff of the
Transvaal Volunteer Headquarters, that after beginning to enrol on
the 1st June, the corps, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Thomas
Peakman, C.M.G., with Capt. G.H. Helbert, as Adjutant, actually
presented itself for inspection at 3 p.m. on the 3rd,[249] and, moving
off by train at 5.15 p.m., reached Dundee at 9.30 a.m. on the
following day, prepared for any service that might be required.
The greatest pains had been taken to select only the most efficient
out of the 1,500 applications handed in. The rapidity with which the
men were enrolled, clothed, equipped and entrained was as
surprising to the people of Johannesburg as it was to the Colony of
Natal. The L and Y, or 'Rosebuds,' as the corps was more familiarly
styled, were directed to attach themselves to Mackay's column. This
they did at Mangeni on the 9th June. Peakman was appointed
second in command of the column, and he and his contingent
remained with it until the end of the operations in Zululand.

Intelligence was received by McKenzie (at Nomangci) on the 9th

June of the presence of a strong rebel force at Kotongweni mountain
(i.e. close to the Tugela, above Watton's Drift). This was probably the
force whose expedition was referred to on p. 315, although the
expedition there dealt with was confined to the neighbourhood of
Watton's Drift. McKenzie ordered the U.F.F. to make a night march on
12th and, crossing next morning near Ngubevu Drift, to work down
Mfongozi valley, where a column from Nkandhla would be ready to
co-operate. Leuchars thereupon re-mobilized the 1st and 2nd
Krantzkop Reserves, instructing van Rooyen to march down the
Dimane valley to the Tugela and prevent the enemy from breaking
into Natal from Kotongweni, on their being pressed on the Zululand
side. The O.C. Helpmakaar, moreover, was directed to co-operate on
the north-west by moving a force of Reserves, N.R.R. and D.L.I. to
look out at the Buffalo for any of the enemy who might be returning to
their homes in that direction. It was at this time (10th), it will be
remembered, that the Mome action took place.
The U.F.F., joined by Sibindi, who had again voluntarily mobilized his
men, crossed at Ngubevu and proceeded to Mfongozi valley, where
touch was got with Mackay, but, in spite of constant efforts,
communication could not be opened up with the column from
Nkandhla until 11 a.m. on the following day. Leuchars operated in
Mfongozi valley both on the 13th and 14th, capturing many cattle.
After he had conferred with Colonel McKenzie, a decision was come
to for both columns to operate at Kotongweni on the following day.
Five hundred of Sibindi's men accordingly went down Mfongozi river
to the Tugela, whilst McKenzie operated from the top of the mountain.
The operations, however, proved unsuccessful.
The O.C. Troops now directed Leuchars to return to Broeder's Hoek,
about twelve miles from Krantzkop magistracy, keeping his own force
in the vicinity of Kombe forest. Mackay was instructed to remain on
Qudeni mountain during a three days' armistice which was
proclaimed at the same time, to afford rebels an opportunity of
surrendering. Captive women were utilized to make the proclamation
known to those who were in hiding.
The U.F.F. marched viâ Ngubevu to Broeder's Hoek. The Reserves at
Helpmakaar were demobilized on 16th and 17th June, with exception
of those of Umsinga, who were retained as garrison at Helpmakaar
lager, it being still unsafe for the women and children who had taken
refuge there to return to their farms.
With the object of relieving some of the men of Mackay's force, two
squadrons B.M.R. and one squadron N.C.(D), were mobilized, and
sent under Arnott to Dundee on the 18th.[250] Major Moe proceeded,
at the same time, with the whole of the N.N.H. to Pomeroy, in order to
bring rebels of Kula's tribe to book, also escort to Pomeroy Chief
Makafula of Nqutu district whom Mackay had been directed to arrest.
The arrest, however, was not made, as Mackay, who had been in
close touch with the Chief, had good grounds for believing he was not
disloyal, as supposed to be the case by those at a distance. In this
view, Mackay was supported by the Magistrate.
Whilst contemplating a demonstration in Silwana's location by
Mackay's column from the Umsinga side, and by the U.F.F. from that
of Greytown, Leuchars received a wire from O.C. Mapumulo reporting
that his convoy had been attacked on the morning of the 19th at
Oglesby's store, near Otimati, when one man had been killed and
another wounded. He thereupon caused his forces to concentrate at
Mapumulo as speedily as possible.
Before describing the position at Mapumulo, a thickly-populated
district which now became the principal focus of rebellion, it will be
necessary to take up the threads once more at Nkandhla and narrate
what happened between the action at Mome gorge (10th) and the
outbreak at Mapumulo just referred to.

FOOTNOTES:
[241] Giving, roughly, a population of 18,000 souls, or about 2,500
fighting men.
[242] The man referred to frequently in this history as Matshana ka
Mondise.
[243] Kula's uncle, Mtele, with the portion of the tribe that rebelled
with him, formed part of the force that attacked Leuchars at
Mpukunyoni.
[244] It was made up of 200 N.C., Right Wing (Major A.C.
Townsend); 160 N.M.R. (Capt. P.M. Rattray); N.F.A. (four guns)
(Major C. Wilson); 55 N.R.R. (Lieut. A. McKenzie); and
departmental details. When en route to Helpmakaar, it was joined
by the following Reserves: 80 Newcastle (Chief Leader Adendorff);
200 Estcourt (Chief Leader A.F. Henderson, C.M.G.); 55 Dundee
(Chief Leader D.C. Uys).
[245] His and Murray-Smith's men met near the Buffalo and
moved back together to the latter's camp.
[246] N.R.R. were relieved at Pomeroy on the 16th by D.L.I. (100)
(Capt. W.P.M. Henderson), the latter having arrived at Helpmakaar
on the preceding day from Dundee with a convoy of supplies.
[247] Report, Colonel G. Leuchars, C.M.G., 23rd Nov. 1906.
[248] That is, the lager, consisting chiefly of wire entanglements,
erected about two miles from Helpmakaar.
[249] By the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.
[250] Only, as will appear later, to proceed at once to Stanger.
 XVI.
CONCLUDING OPERATIONS, NKANDHLA.—VISIT OF
DINUZULU'S INDUNAS TO PIETERMARITZBURG.—
POSITION AT MAPUMULO.—ACTIONS AT OTIMATI AND
PEYANA (HLONONO).

Reference was made towards the close of the preceding chapter to

a combined move by Leuchars, Mackay and a column from Nkandhla
in the direction of Kotongweni on the 15th June. The object was to
drive the enemy with his stock from Qudeni mountain into the valley
of the Mfongozi river. The Nkandhla column, commanded by
McKenzie, consisted of the 'divisional troops' shown at the foot of the
page.[251]
The transport and N.F.A. (pompoms), with an escort of N.R. (three
companies, A, D and E, Major Boyd-Wilson), proceeded on the 12th
viâ Nkandhla and Ensingabantu to Ntingwe. On the same day, the
remainder of the divisional troops and R.H. (temporarily detached
from Royston's Brigade), visited and thoroughly searched Ofeni gorge
and ridge en route. Ofeni[252] is a remarkable chasm, about five miles
to the south of Empandhleni. A small stream that rises there and
descends rapidly to the Insuze, has the same name. The sides of the
chasm, which are over 300 feet in height, are linked together by
means of a tiny, natural bridge but a few feet in width. Makahleleka,
one of Sigananda's many and more important sons, was declared to
be in hiding at this uncanny place. The search, however, resulted in
practically no rebels being found. The troops afterwards proceeded to
Titlestad's store, at Ntingwe, where they bivouacked for the night.
Although the foregoing movement was carried out expressly with the
object of co-operating on the 13th with Leuchars and Mackay, then
near Kotongweni and Qudeni respectively, the plan, in so far as
McKenzie was concerned, was disturbed through receipt of
intelligence to the effect that Bambata, Cakijana and Mangati had
taken refuge in the bush at Macala. To surround the mountain by
daybreak on the 13th then, of course, became the immediate object.
Barker was ordered to co-operate. He was to take up positions on the
south, whilst McKenzie would do likewise in other directions. When
dawn broke and the latter's troops were in the positions assigned,
Barker was found exactly where it was desired he should be, i.e. at
the lower end of Macala bush. The fastness, which lay in a bush at
the top of the mountain, consisted of great masses of rock lying one
on top of the other in such a way as to form, below the surface of the
ground, a network of dark passages, the one communicating with the
other. Only with the greatest difficulty could people who had taken
refuge there be found and, when this occurred, the searchers, on
account of the irregular formation of the labyrinth and its narrow
passages, ran serious risks when dealing with a desperate enemy,
especially one who had reduced the length of his assegai to enable it
to be used with the best effect. A Native levy which had accompanied
the column, was instructed to drive the bush, whilst being supported
by the troops. During this operation, a rebel, who was concealed
under the rocks, stabbed one of the levy in the leg. On the drive,
which was partially successful, coming to an end, the underground
passages were entered and thoroughly searched by the N.C., with
the result that a number of other rebels was killed. It afterwards
transpired that these Natives, when at first they had found
themselves surprised by the troops, ran to the rock 'warren,' never
dreaming "people with boots on," as they put it, would venture to
explore so dark and perplexing a spot. The principal object of the
quest, however, was not attained, though Bambata's witch-doctor,
Malaza, was among the slain. Some 450 cattle were captured during
the day. McKenzie withdrew to Ntingwe, and Barker to near
Cetshwayo's grave.
Whilst the foregoing operations were in progress, the Z.M.R., under
Vanderplank, proceeded to the hill Jokwana, west of Macala, to get in
touch with Leuchars and Mackay, and to advise the former of what
was taking place at Macala. He was, moreover, to co-operate as well
as he could in carrying out the original plan. Owing, however, to the
haze, communication could not be established.
On the day following, 14th June, McKenzie moved up towards Kombe
forest, where he succeeded in getting into communication with
Leuchars. A drive of the combined forces through the valley that lay
between them was accordingly arranged and took place the same
day, but without result. Colonels McKenzie and Leuchars met, when
further combined operations were arranged to take place on the 15th
at Kotongweni, where Mangati and Cakijana were then alleged to be
hiding in caves. On the departure of the O.C. Troops from Nomangci,
Lieut.-Col. J.S. Wylie, D.L.I., was placed in charge of the camp.
Hedges, Calverley and Titlestad were, at the same time, instructed to
try and locate Sigananda, with a view to bringing about his capture or
surrender. One or other of these alternatives appeared imminent. As
a result of the untiring and well-directed efforts of these officers, not
only was the rebel leader's whereabouts discovered, but, on his being
persuaded to surrender, he did so forthwith, not, however, to Wylie,
but to an officer of lower rank. The latter's action, with Wylie in camp,
was inexcusable, and his acceptance of the surrender irregular and
invalid, as, of course, the only person competent to announce the
terms of surrender was the O.C. Troops. Unfortunately, the last-
named did not receive a notification as to what had happened until
twenty-four hours later. He decided that the surrender was to be
unconditional and be accompanied with those of all the Chief's
people, together with their arms. To this Sigananda agreed. On the
16th, he was conveyed by the balance of R.H. at Nomangci to
Empandhleni.
Boyd-Wilson, by making a creditable forced march with the transport,
succeeded in joining McKenzie at Kombe on the 14th.
The combined operations at Kotongweni (15th) proved disappointing.
In the neighbourhood of the camp, however, where the bushes were
searched by N.R., thirteen rebels were shot, whilst a large quantity of
goods, probably looted from European stores in the vicinity, was
discovered. Owing to Mackay not having got in touch with McKenzie
on the 13th, his column was unable to take part in the operations.
In the meantime, reliable intelligence had reached Nomangci of
Bambata having been killed during the action at Mome. Because of a
rumour circulated on the day of the action that he had escaped with a