United Nations Nations Unies

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SECURITY CONSEIL sic., 3/32./Be~1 .1
COUNCIL 18 k~lgU8t 19;~8
DE SECURITE ORIGINAIJ; EHGLmH

EESOLUTICNS ADOPTED BY TEE CO£@~ISSIQN AT ITS

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Par;o 2

lillSOLtJTION ADOPT.E:D BY TIIJ)l COMMISSION FOB C01'lVEl~TIONAL ATIMi\MEi'!!ltB

A'l' ITS 'J.l:B:n{TEENTH Iv1E;ETING, 12 AUGUST 1948

The Commission ror Convcn"t:.ol'l£l.l Armaments resolves to advise the

SecuritJ~ Councj.J.:

1. that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except

atomic vlea1l0ns and. vreapons of mass destruction, fall 1vitihin its
jurisdiction and that ,,,capons of me,ss des'~ruc'(jion should be defined
to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons,
lethal ohemical and biolog:i.cal weapons, and any weapons deve:!.opsd
in t.he future -which have chal"acteristics comparable in destructive
effect to those of' the atomic bomb or other 'weapons ment:!.oned
abOVE).

2. that it l?l"oIlOses to proceed vTith its 'tvork on the bas.is of the

above def'ini"c ion.

I·
i

IRFWOLUTION
 sic. 3/3'2./Rev.1
Page 3

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY TJ-..1E C01~HSS:r.ON FOR COlrJ"E~~TmNAI, ARlflANENTS

AT ITS'mmrrEEllTR NillETING, 12 AtlG1JST 1948

TBID COM:\1ISSIO!~ FOB CONVENTIONAL ABMAMEN'l'S RECOMMENDS that the

fOllo~ing principles s~ould govern the formulation of practical proposals
for the esta"bJ.ishDl0wt of a. system for' the reg1,llathm and redllctiol1 of
armaments e,.~d 81'ned forces g
1. A SjrstelU ral" t~:\e regulation 81.J.e reduction of emnaments anc1
al'wed fOl'C9S should p:t'ovi6.e for tJ:~e adhel'er,ce of all States.
Ini"iiiall~r it must include at le9.s.t all Sts,i;es ha\'i~)g Gubstantial
military resources.
2. A syste:n of reguls'tio:v. 8,':lr;. roL'l.uction of e.:rmame:etts anii al'm.eo.
1'o1'c68 Ct1.il only be put ir.to effect in 8,1l atmosphere of Int9r~1a.·i;ional

confide:nce and. security. Mea.sm...es for ~he regulation e.nd reduction

of armamelits which wm"lrl follow the establisr.=nent of tbe 11ecessa~r.y

deg:ree of cor.f1dellce might i.n turn be 6J1.-pected to increase co:~f.:l.de;.lce

and so justify f~~ther meast~es af regulation and reduction.

3. EXRmples of conditio!l.s essential to such confids21ce and secnL"ity
are:
(a) The establishme:ut of an adequate system of' e,greements under
Jl.1"ti.cle J~3 of the Charter. Until the egreeu forces aTe pl&cged
to the Secu'dty Council all essential' step ill esto.blis~ing a
ays'cP.-ID of collective secUZ'ity will not have been take",-,
(b) The establishment of international contl'pl of a'comic
energy. It is a basic assumption of the work of the Commission
for. CO:lVentiolla,l .Armaml;m:ts that the Atomic Energy Commission
will make specific proposals for the elimination frcm natiolml
armaments of atomic weapons aild other weapO!lS of mass
des'jjruction~

(c) The ccnclnsion of tl1e 'peace settJ,emsrtts with Germany a:Cld

Ja!le.n. Conditions of inter:l.1ational 'Pea~e and Security will
net be fully established uutil measures have been agreed upon
which 1:'1i11 p:r8vent these states fr.om unde::.-taking aggTl9ssive
action in. the future.
4. A system for the regulation and reduction of al'ma.."l1ents 6.nd
armed forces 1 in OI'Uel'? to make poosible the lee,s'!:; .diversion fer
armamen.ts of' the world 1 6 human and economic res,Durces pu:tDuant to
:
Article 26 of the Cha:;:-iier of t~e U::Jited NFl.tlons , mUf.\t limit I

armaments ,and al'~ed forces to those which are consistent with .,alId
indispensable to the maintene.nce of' 1ntel'na'~lonal peace and
secl..'Tity. Suqh armaments and armed forces should not exceed
Ithose necessary
 !3/C •3132/11ev.1
Page ~.

thoSG necessary for the implementht10n of. members' ob1ig~GiollS and

the protection of their t'ights under the Charter of the United Na.tions.
5. A system fOl:' the regulat~.on and red.uC'l:;ion of armamonts and armed
forces must il~cl'Ude an adequate system of sa,feguards} which by
including an agreed system of international supervision will ellsure
the observance of the provisions of the treaty or convention LW all
parties thoreto. A system of safeguards cannot be aa.equate unless
it possesses the following characteristics:
(a) it is technica.lly feasible and practical;
(b) it is capable of detecting promptly the occurrence of
violation.s;
(0) it causes the minimum interference With, and inwosos the
minimum burdens Ol?, any aspect of the life of individual
nations.
6. Provision must be made for effective enforcement action in the
event of violations.

/COMrUSSION

"'~
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 sit'" .,. /..,.J 'J,_/I,""£\ev •1
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Page 5

REVISED DBAFT OF THE fJL:CONJ) 1WJrOl~T OF 'Inn; COMMISSION FOR C01\JV]~NTrONAL

AIiIvJln~JEN~'S COVERIl\TG ~1ffE PEiUOD 16 J'UJ}[ J.947 - 18 AUGUS~P 191~87<-

Th!8 ~ev16od text, prepared by the Secretariat

emoodles all the alllendlnsllts and COl"recti.ons
£l:ppj;,'oved by' the COll1miasion at its fourteenth
and fifteenth meetil'J,gs C)l1 17 August 1948.
L The present !'eport of' the Comm:i.ssion for Conventional P.l'mallle::-lts to
the Secu:rity Counoil ac()omr>~l,1~i.~s the resolutions adopted by the Commjssion
on 12 August 1948 and covers i~<:s: 'Work rOl' the pe:-dod 16 Juljr 191~7 _
12 August 19~,8 c1tu'jng uhicb. it held i'our meot:1.ngs.
2. At its teuth n~eGting, on 16 July 1947, the CommissiOl1 for
Conventional Armaments Gstablished a ~lorking CO!IDllittee of the whole
whose terms of reference wQre the plan of work approved by the Security
Council at its one hundred Bnd fifty~second meeting. ~~hose terms of
reference vere the fo11~ring:

"l. Consider and make recommendations to the Security Council

concerning armaments and armea forces which fall within the
f jurisdiction of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

I 2. Consideration and determination of general principles in

connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and
armed forces.
3. Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means
of an international system of control operating through special
organs (ana. by other means) to protect complying ~ta-tes against
the hazards of violations and evasions.
4. Formulate practical proposals for the regUlation Ewd
reduction of armaments and armed forces.
5. Extension of the principles and proposals set forth in
1?2,ragraphs 2, 3 o,nd 4 above to states wh:Lch are not Membors ef
-che Unitecl Nations.
6. Submission of a report oV reports to the Security Council
including, if possible, a Draft Convention. 11
3. The \';orki;ng Committee of the Commission for Convertbional Armamonts,
'V1hioh met for the first time on 20 August 1947, has hetd t'fenty meetings,
all of them in closed session, in the period covered by this Report.

* N.B. The Commission decided at its thi:-toenth meetiD~ on .12. .!Wg~st 1.9hB
that its repor'c would accompany tne two resolu't:-..ous 1,rhlC.h J.t he.d .
adopted. The latter are, therefore J reproduced at the; head of .thls
draft.
'/4. . At the
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Page 6

4. At the f'ou:C'th meeting of the WOl"l~ing Comm:1.ttee on 9 September 1947?

it adopted a.nd transmitted to the Commissiol1 for Conventional Armaments
a resolution defining the armaments 'i7~'lich fall oU'cside the jurisdiction
of the Commission.
5. At the seventeenth meeting of the Horktog Committee on 26 July 1948,
it adopted and transmi·tted to the COllunission :E'Ol' Conventional .ill. mai.:lsouts
1

a resolution reconnnending the prinoiples which shlJuld govern the

formulation ai' practical proposals for the es"t·g,blishment of a systc,1!l
for the regulation al.'ld reduction of arnK~nlents and armed forces.
6. At Us e:tshbeel:l'th, nineteenth and twentie'bh meetings (4 August Dnd
9 August 1948), the W0:rking Committo8 considered and adopted a first
progress repol"t covering the worlt at.' its first seventeen meeti:lgs which
had been devoted to the substance of the problems involved in Items 1
and 2 of the plan of "lork.
7. The resolution under Item 1 of the plan of wo~k defines weapons of
mass destruction. In proposing that definition at the first meeting of
the VJorll:ing Committee, the delegation of the United States stated that I··.,•.,

such a definition was necessary to enable the Commission to dete:i:.'r:line

what weapons fell within its own jurisdiction. T;1e ~easons for the
opposition to that proposal of the delegation of tbe Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics were stated at the fourth meeting of the Working
Committee on 9 Se~tember 1947 to be the :following: (1) that it involved
El. separation of the general problem of the regnlation and reduction of
armaments into a ~roblem concerning atomic weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction and a problem concerning so~called cOlwentional
armaments which 101as artificial and lwuld divert the Commission from
the preparation of proposals for practical measures for the general
regUlation and reduction of armaments and armed forces into a blind
alley, and (2) -that measures for the regulation and reduction of'
armaments and armed forces should not only require the reduction of
conventional armaments, but also prohibi't ·the use of atomic weapons
end other "rea-pons of mass destruction, and require the destruct5.011 of
existing stocks of atomic weapons. The representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Rep1,.lblics also criticized as too rest;rictive the
Hmitation of wee,pons of mass destruction to those to be developed in
the future.
8. At -the thb:teenth meeting of the Workj.ng Committee on 21 JanuarY' 1948
'cllis matter was aa.verted to again by the representative of the Un:1.on of Sov:I.et

:::::~~6;.:~~:~~:6'::Or:::::~o:n:;:::.::~::a:::na;:.:h;O::::::::n::et::. Il
 slo .3/32!Dev.1
Pag(; 1

hand., ana. the proh1bition of ?tomic al"Ins 011 the o'cher hand; 'Has COl1t)~'ur'y to
the terms of the Resoluti,on of:' the General Assembly of 14 December 19!~6.
That separation ~TaS contained in the plan of 1vork. The Besolutj.ol1 adopted
by the General Ass81l11)ly J the re'Pl:.~esont(!.tive of the Soviet Un:Lo~1 stated,
not onl;r did nO'G place in oPDosition to one another the prohibition of the
atomic al'm and the gene:cal regl,llat±on an.d reduction of a1"mamonts r.nd al'Ill,3d
forces,; 011 the contrar~1'J it pla.ced these t~'TO in close relationshil'. 'I'he
artificial se:oaration of these t"io questions vras COl'ltra::.'y to t'be
Resolution adopted by the General Asse1l1b1.y~ H 1'Tculd constitute all obotacle
in the futul'e 'I"orl~ of thc COlllIllissiol? for Conventional Ar'maments and at' the
Security Council in this field; and would involve the collapse of the
efforts to implement the Gcueral Assembly's Resolution concernil'lg the
general regUlation and redv,ctJ'.Oll of armaments and axmGd forces 1'11th all its
consequonces. The Y'8prescntative of '~he Uni'!:ied states replied that the
problems of the Commission for Conventional Armaments were basical1:y"
different from those of the Atomic Energy Con~ission. In his opinion, the
fUl1d.amolltal reality with regard to the physical quality' of atomic energy
lrhich reqUired the consideration of the problem of contl"olling atomic
energ~1' to be separated. from tlle cons1.deratiou of the problem of conventional
armaments was that the production of power ill atomic energy reqUired at the
same tinle the production of the explosj.ves used in the atomJ.c bOUlb. It was
for that roason that the General Assembly Resolution had stated that it wus
the function of the Atomic Energy Commission to provide for the control
of atomic energy for peaceful purpos~s only.
90 The resolution on general principles (Item :2 of the plan of Hork)
is a composite of' proposals submitted by the delegations of P.ustr'aJ.io,
Canat'l.a, France, Syria, the Unitod Kingdom and the United S'tutes, \~llich

themselves derive from worlting papers concerning Items 2 and 3 of tbe

,!?lau of work (Item. 3 relates to sai'egus,rds vrhich have not yet been
considel'cd) submitted by the eleven delegE~tions represented in tho
Horking Committee in 192 n,
and sumD1~:.rizes 'the majority oplnlon re-;caled
by those working papers. ~
10. The gist of the resolution on g011eral p:dnciples is: (1) that a
system :for the regulation and red.uction of armaments and arlUed fO:l:'ces
shOUld embrace all States, though it may be initiated ~~:l"th "che a.cihorence
of all states haVing substantial mil.itary resources; (2) thnt to put
such a system into effect there must be inte:r.l'lational-confidence a:o.d
security, but that the regulation and reduction of armaments and 'Ghe
oXistence of' confidence are roc:i.prot:al; (3) that the conditions essential
to internatiollal confidence and security inclUde an adequate syst<:Jm of'
agreements under Article 43 of the Charter J an effective control o~
/atomiCl;?J1,f.:rgy ,
 S/C.3/32./Bev.l
Page 8

atomic energy, and the conclusion of peace settlements l'rith Germany and
Japan; (4) tha'c to conform with Article 2.6 of the' Charter ef the :1:
United Nations armaments and armed forces under such a system must be
limited to those consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance
of international peace and security and not exceed those necessary for I
the implementation of Members t obliga'bions and tlle :LJl'otectio::l of their
rights under the Charter; (5) that to ensure observance sl.':ch a system
must include adequate safeguarcs including an agreed system of
internation.al supe~;visionj and (6) that provision must be made fO:;'1
effective enforcement in the event of Violation.
11. The reasons for oppooition of the delegation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist R8Iltlblics to the resolubioll conce2'ning Item 2. of the plan of
work eventual1;;r adopted 'by the 'Harking Co::nmittee ~vTere stated by the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at several or
Jche meetings of the Working COlllIl1ittee as the resolution Undel"l'1ent
drafting changes. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics expressed tIle view', at the sev811teel.lth meeting of the ~7Oj."'king

Committee on 26 July 1948: (1) that the resolution did not aim to
implement the General Assembl J, resolution of 14 December 191~5 concerning
the general regulation and reducJ~ioll of armaments ana. armed forces but
to prevent its implementation, (2) that acceptance of it amou~ted to
a refusal to irlplement the General Assembly resolution; and (3) that
the consequence of adopting it would be a new armaments race, an increase
of armed forces, increased bUdgetary expenditures for military purPOS0s
and all the consequences that this would entail. The representRtiv0S of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviot Socialist
Republic have laid especial emphasis on their v:1.elf that the Gene:::-al
Assembly resolution of 14. December 1946 contains no canditions or
prerequisites to the prom.pt formulation and implementation of practical
measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments s,ud armed
forces and that there is no justificat;ion fa!' setting conditions or
prerequisites of any kind as pre1imj.naries to be satisfied before
proceeding to the prompt formUlation of practical measures for the
general regulation a~d reduction of armaments and a2'flod forces or the
I
implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 111, Deceniber 1946
inclUding the prohi1)l'tion of use and manufacture of atomic weapons and other
_ -"leapOl1S of' mnss dcst:~'lction e:'.1d the cles'(;ructiQ:n of existing stvcks of these.

"
-I:·,

~,

/Tho setting .~
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Page 9

The sett:i.ng of such cond i tioDS in their, V:i.6~v leads the COD'.illl:J,ssion into a
vicious circle from which there is no escape, and they regard the
resulting failure on the part of the Un1,ted States and the United Kingdom
to implement the 06116raJ. AsseIllbly resolutio11 us a principal cause of i , ~

'"t
international mistrust and the worsening of international relations and
as espeoially deplorable in v:l.evT of the heavy 'burden of )?resent roili tary
expenditures throughout the world.
12. At the sev'enteel1th meeting of the i'lorking Committee on 26 Jnly 194.8,
the representative of the Union of. Soviet Socialist Republics introduced
nm-l' countel~-proposals which supplemen'bed a:t:l.d elaborated paragraph 1 of
the 'Horking paper submitted to -che ConJlllHtef,') by his delegation on
3 October 1947 in response to the Committee is reg,uest for written
expressions of view on Items 2 and 3 of its ;plan of work. That paper
had been submitted to the Conunission, before establishment of the
Horking Committee, to serve as a plan of work. The working paper read.:
111., The establishment of general principles for the I'educ~cion of
armaments and armed forces and for the determination of the
minimum requirements of each Sta'be vl:l.tl?- regard to all kinds of
armaments and armed forces (land, sea and air), taking into
account the prohibit:i.on of atomic weapons and other l,;inds of
armaments ad,aptable to mass destruction.
lf2. The establishment of the general principles which are to
serve as a bas is for the reduction of manufacturing war
production and the de'cermi,nation of the maximum capacity of vTsr
production for each State, with a view to permitting the
J?l'oduction and 1.1se of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
1'3. The extension of the principles set forth in paragraDhs 1
and 2 to States which are not Members of the United NaUons.
tl4. The establ1s1unent of limits for individual lcinds of armaments
and armed forces for each state, on the basis of the principles
set forth in paragraph 1.
"5 • The establishment of limits for vaI':!.ous k:l.nds of war·
J?roduction for each state, on the basis of the principles set
forth in paragraph 2.
"6. The determination of the l)rocedure and time-limits for
bring:i.ng the level of armaments and a,rmed forces and also of
war :production for each Sta.te into c,onformity wi.th the limits
set forth in paragraphs L~ and 5.
ri. Problems of
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Page 10

"7. Problems of the clistribuUon of armed forces and the

question of the reduction of networks of military, naval ana
air bases.
"8. Measures relating to the prohibition of the use of
non"military industry and 1l0IlMmilitary means of transport
for "pur~poses of w'ar, beyond the limits arising out of those
set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5.
"9. The organization and the l1rocedure for the establish.."'llent
of a system of control to implement measures regarding the general
reduction and regulation of armamerrbs and armed forces and also
of war industry and war producti,on, taking into account the
co"ordination of the aforementioned system of control with the
system of control over the use of atom:I.c energy.
tf 10. 'l'hev1Orl{ing out of a draft convent :I.On. n
13. The new proposals supplementing and elaborating paragraph 1 of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' working paper read as fol1ot,~s:

"1. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed

forces should cover all courrtries and all kinds of armaments and
armed forces.
112. The general regulati.on and reduction of armaments and armed
forces should provide for:
(a) Reduction of armies, naval and air forces both in
respect to streng'bh and a:r'maments •
.(b) Limitation of combat charac'terhltics of certain kinds
of armaments and theproh,ibition of separate kinds of
armaments.
(c) Reduction of war budgets and state expenditures on
production of armaments.
(d) Reduction of product:lon of w'ar materials.
lt3. The general regulation and. reduction of armaments and armed
forces should provide, :tn the first place, for the enttre
prohibition of production and use of atomic and ether kinds of
weapons designed for mass des-tructivn and the destru.ction of
stocks of such weapons which have been made.
"4. In order to ensure the carrying out of measures for the
regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces 'chere
should be established within the framework of the Security
Council and as a component part of the plan for such regula Hon
and, reduction, an interna"tiona1 system of control 1 which should
/protcct the
 P"

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:11
I
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S/C.3/32/Rev.1
Page 11

pro'bect the states, whioh fulfil their obligations, against the

d8.!Jger oi' vio},atiollS arid. evasions from the carrying out. of the
agreement on the rer'iuotion of armaments. 11
14. The represen'tati ve of tl:.e United Ste.tss stated at the nineteenth
me0ting of the Wo:rking Committ08 on 9 Aueus't 19118 that, in his op~,nion,

the matters (;m:bodied ~.n pare.gra:ph 1 of the 8u.pplemelltary Ul1i.on of Soviet

Socialis·t; 'Rep,ublics prol?osals a'bove had alrea.dy been thoroughJ.;y· discussed
dU:l"ing the consideration of pax'eJ.g1'aph 1 of the United Kingdom resolution,
and tha'l; the subject-matter of paragraph 4 of the supplementary Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics pro:Qosals above had been con8idered during the
discussion of pal'a,gl'aph 5 of the United Kingdom resolution, and that; the
United Kingaortl resolution had -peen approved by a majority vote. With
respeot t.o paragraph 3 of t~'le Union of Soviet Socialist Be:p.ubl:l.cs
proposals, the representative of the United states did not consider
this et new proposal.
15. The representative of the United states stated also that paragraph 2
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proIlosals eVidently fell
within the scope of Item 4 of the plan of work (i.e. practical proposals)
already adopted by the COlliIllission for Conventional Ar:rnaments and appr.oved
by the Security Counoil, and should be discussed when this item came up
for consideration.
On 17 August 1948 the representaM ve of the Union of Soviet
Social1.st Re:!?ublics requested the incluslon in the Commission BS Report
of the follOWing statement in explanation of the position taken by him
in the submission of the Soviet proposals set ou.t in paragraph 13 above:
"The Soviet delegatiorJ is firmly convinced that only if
these proposals are adopted will i t 'be pOssi"ble to give sf'fect to
the General Assembly resolution on the reGulation and .l"edu.ctioIJ
of al~aments and arD~d foro6s J and to reduce military budgets and
national eJ~enditur0 on the maintenance of a~ies and the
manufacture of armaments, without 'l'Tl""ich there can be no alleviation
01' the heavy buroen of taJcation borne by the people, no
improvement in their material well-being, and no s'trenethening of
peace and friendship between peoples.
IIThese proposals provide as a task of the first importance,
for the oomplete prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic
and other weapons dssigned for mass dBstruction, and the demolition
of existing stocks of such weapons. This should form the most
iropo~tant ingredient in the measures for general regUlat~on and
~eduction of armaments and armed forces.
!"The SO'\7iet
 sic .3/3 2/p.ev.1
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"The Soviet proposals also provide that the general regulation

and reduction of armaments and armed forcGs should apply to all
countries and all t:rpes of a:cmalllents. 011J.y thus will i t attain ita
aim. This Soviet proposal diffars fundamentally' from the vague
and ralO.bling A:rlglo~American proposal that at the outset only
countries possesalng substantial mHitary resources should be
covered by the system of regulation and reduotion of armaments and
armed forces. This Ang1o~American proposal is in direot contradiction
to the General Assembly reeolution, which says 'to assure that such
regulation and reduction of arllu:unen+..s and armed forces "Till be
geneJ;'ally ~bserved by all participants and not unilaterally by only
some of the participants, t
"Finall:l, the Soviet-1JrOposal provides for t118 establishment
of all interIla'Cional system of con'crol which should form part and
parcel of the plan for a general regUlation and reduction of
armaments and armed forces l and l operating within the framework of
the SeourHiy' Council l could protect States fUlfilling their
obligations as regards the regulation and reduction of armaments
and armed forces against the danger of violations and evasions
of the execution of an agreement on the reduction of armaments by
unscrupulous signatories to suoh agreements. lI
16, The Commission for Comren't:tonal Armaments was convened on 9 August 1948
to consider the first progress report ef the Working Committee and the
tMo resolutions adopted by it, At the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth
meetings of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, it considered tho
activities and accomplishments of the Working Oommittee to date and the
present position of the question of the general regulation and reduct::I.on
of' armaments.
17. The central issues of the discussion at the last three meeti!lgs of
the Conunission covered by this Report, as at the seventeen meetings of
the Working Committee, have been two: (1) the jurisdiction of the
Commission in relation to atomic weapons and other weapons of mass I
dest:r-uction, and (2) the relation bet"Teen the general regulation llnd
reduction ofax-maments and armed forces and the factors affecting the ~
~
I
Dresent state of internationa~ relations.
18, DiSCUSSion of these subjects in the Commission for Conventional
Armaments was initiated at the eleventh meeting in a statement by the
rep:resentative of the Uuited States (Annex II), Emd conMnued at the
twelfth meeting in statements by the representati7es of the Union of
I1
!Soviet Socialist Republics,
I
l
 sic .3!32!Eev.l
Page 13

Soviet Socialist Repu.blics, the Url! tad Kingdom, and the Ukrainian Sovia~

Sooia1ist Republio in that order (Annexes III, IV and V), and at the
thirteenth meeting in statements by the representatives of France and
China (.Annexes VI and VII).
19. The views of the majority of the Commission on these matters are
reflected in the two resolutiol1s which it b3.6 adopted. The grounds on
which the delegations which that majority comprises hold those views and
the grounds 011 which they are opposed have been set forth at length in
the discussions both of the Working Oommittee and of the Commission
itself. The stateill~nts by the representatives of Canada, China, France,
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, annexed to this
report, present a more oomplete picture of the difference~ of view on
'those qpestions than can be dra\vrJ here (Axmexes I - VII).
20. In the statement whioh initiated discussion of the First Progress
Report of the W'orking Coromi ttee and of the resolutions adapted by 1 t,
the representative of the U~itea States quoted the language of
Seoretary of State Ma~shal1 in an address to the General Assembly on
17 September 19~'7 wherein he stated the conviction of the Government of
the United Sta'ces that a \vorlcable system for the regulation of armaments
could not be put into effect until conditions of international confidence
prevailed, and-that the regulation of armaments presupposed the
settlement of peace te~ms ~ith Germany and Japan, the implementation of
agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the
Security COllil0il and an international agreement for the control of
atomic energy, (An:qex II).
21. At the twelfth meet:l.ng of the Commission for Conventional Armaments,
on 9 August 1948, the delegations of the Union 'of Soviet Socialist
RepUblics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic reiterated their
inability to accept the resolu.tions adopted by the Wo:rking Committee
under Items 1 and 2 of the plan of work for the following reasons:
(1) that the Oommission's resolution concerning its jurisdiction, by
excluding atomic weaIlons and other weapons of mass destruction from
its purview, cont:rBvened the General Assembly resolution of
14 December 1946, which according to their contention, treated the
regulation and reduction of armaments and armed foroes as a single
indivis~ble question and required the Commission to formul~te ~ractical

measures not merely for the regulation and reduction of oonventiopal

ar~ments but also for the prohibition of use and manuracture of atomic

!we{3.'J)ons
 sic .3/32/Rev.l
Page 11.,. '

weapons and other weB.pons. qf mass de.E?tl~uotion and for des·truction of

existing st.ocks of such ~e~po~s, aDd (2) that the Commission's resolution
on general prinoiples contravened the General Assembly ,reSol~tion of
14, December 1946 whioh, in the view of the representa ti ves of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Rspubl::'cs and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialis·t
Repuolio requires the Commission to formulate promptly practical measures
for the Ceneral regulation and reduction of armaluents and armed forces
and oontains no oonditionsor prerequisi tee for the formulation or
iDlIllsmentation of su.oh practical measures. (3) The representative of the
USSR especially stressed the vie1tl that the general regulation and reduction
of armaro.ents and a'rmed forces must necessarily provid e fOl' the cOIDIllete
prohibition of the atomic weapon as vTell 8.8 of other 'Weapons adaptable to
mass destruotion, and that the opposition of the Governments of the
United States and the United Kingdom to the prohibi~ion of the atomic
weapon prevented the taking of steps designated to "bring about a general
reduction of a:t~maments and. ,armed fo:rces. At the twelfth meeting the
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reintroduced
theproJ;Joeal.s submitted at the seventeenth meeting of the 1'Torlcing Committee
.
on 26 JUly 191~8 which aIlpear textually in paragraph 13 above (Annex III) .
22. At the twelfth meeting of the Commission for Oonventional Armaments
on 9 August 191~8 the representative of the United Kingdom" on whose draft
the resol~tton on general principles is based, stated that the resolution
did not signify that Illans for disarmament should not be worked out
even in the :present state of i11ternational l'slations, but that a
beginning, of implementation of those plans would require an easing of
eXisting conditions and that, thereafter, a degree even though small,
of disarmament might eneoux'age a feeling of security which in turn
might lead to further disarmament (Annex IV).
2'3. The repl"esentati-ve of the U1{rainian Soviet Socialist RepUblic
criticized the Ilosition of the delegations of the United Kingdom and the ,
'r
:

United States of America, which he said had delayed the implementation of

the resolution of the General Assembly relating to the general regUlation
and reduction of armaments, through the presentation of a whole series of 1
preliminary conditions, among which were a demand for a system of safeguards,
the conolusion of Ileace treaties ,With Germany and JaIlan, the adoption of the
United States plan for control of 'e,tom1c energy. and others. At the same
j
time" the representative of the Ulcra:l.nian Soviet Social:t.st Republic supported ,1
the proposals of the Soviet Union, 8S prov.iding the only effective way to 'f;
iIDIllement the resolution of the General Assembly,' The representative .of
/the
 s/c,3/32/ReV.1
Page 15

the Ula'ainian Soviet Socialist HepnbHc stated also that he believed that
the '-Torlc of the COIlllUission for Converltional Al"l'i1a)~()nts should be continued
and the. -t the Oommission should be empowel'ed to deal also with the
prohibitiOD of atomic weapons and the destruction of stocks of atomic
bombs (AnrJex V) •
2h. kG the th:lrteenth meeting of the Oommission on 12 Angust 1948, the
l'e-presontative of France took the :position that the :cegulatj,011 and reduction
of armaments should be progressive and balanced; he stated (a) that the
question of general disarmament was tightly 001)110 to colleot1 VE;! secul'i ty,
(b) that the study of the problem of conventional armaments could be
conducted 'by the Commission s6Ilara:bely from tha·t of atomic diaarlUElment
and (c) that vFh:l.le substantial progress could be obta:l.ned only in a
, ,,
general atmosphere of confidence, certain preliminary measures should be
tal~en evell in the present, oondi MOD (;)f interrJatiollal relations. (Annex VI) ,
~5. At the same meeting the re]?l"ssentative of China stated the.t
disarmament and internatiooal OlJnf:l.dence should go hand in hand, that a
a;ystem of' disarmament could not be put into operation while interna.tional
tension remained acute, and that international confidence could not be
achieved while nat10nsengaged in armaments races, The representative of
China stated further that Article l~ 3 should be implemented and a system
of collective security be established as soon as possible. That would go
a lone; way in helping to promote international confidence and to .expedi te
t11e "To~~lc of the Commission. (Almex VII),
26. The factors which, in the opinioll of the majority of the Commission,
'fOuld oontribute to tlle easing of the present tension are set forth in
Ilaragl."'aph 3 of the Commission's resolution.
27. At; the close of discussion .at the thirteenth meeting of the
Commission :for Conventional Armaments on 12 August 1948, it adopted
withaut change the two resolutdons which this report acoompanies. Tl1e
resolution whioh formulates' the Connnission I s conolusions concerrling its
Jurisdict:ton (Item 1 of' the plan of "Fork) was adopted "by a vote of eight
to t\'1O. The resolution which formulates the COITJmission's conclusions
concerninS general principles (Item 2 of the plan of work) ~'Jae adoptod by
a vote of nine to two.
28. At the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth meetingS of the Commission
a nUlnber of delegations stressed the importance of the Commission's task
and emphasized the necessity of carrying it to a successful conolusi on.
29. 'llhe delegation of China stated its 'belief that disarmament was a
f.undamental :part of the work of the United Nations. It thougllt that
/there were no

AY -p
 .-­
sic, 3/3 2 /Rev·.1
Page 16

there wax's' no differences of opjnion inca:pable of being overcome if a.ll.

re)?resEmtatives were \.rorldng sincerely for agree!J').ent in the spirit of
cOl1ciliatj.on proper to the United Nations. The Chinose delegation
would therefore not be the first to desps.ir of disarmament and maintained
that the Commission for ConvenM,onal Arm.aments should continue its work.
30. The 11'r8no11 delegation. believed that i t was essential to make
prsJ:1aratory studie,s in conformity with the resolution of the General
Assembly of 14· December 1946 alld that the dHftoulties enco"LU"ltered in
the field. of atomic energy control should not be allo\"ed to provent
progress in the field of the' reduction and Hmi tat/ion of conventional
e.rms.ments mld vice versa.
31. The deleGation of the Uniol1 of Soviet Socialist RellUblics pointed
out that 'che Soviet. Gov81'l1ment had been the first to take the in1tiat.i ve
of 'l'aising in the General Assembly in October 1946 the qv.estion of' the
need for a general reduction at' armament.s and armed foroes. In the
SeQurity Council the Soviet delegation had again taken the initiative in
urging on the Council immediate ste:gs to implement the Genera]. .AssembJ.y
resolution. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics declared that his delegation continued to insist on such
implementatiol1 for which purpose it introduced the proposals set out
in,paragraph 12 above.
32. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed the point that
plans for disarmament should be worked out even in llresent oircumstances.
For tb.at rea.son his Government, though with decreasing confid 8Iloe.r had
gone. on llartioipating in the work of the Commission deapi te the grave
dou.bts aroused in their minds by the disagreement on basic prinoiples
within the Co:mmission. His Government, the representative of the
United Kingdom added, would not wish "00 be the first to despair of
disarmams!)t so long as the present situation endured and ifould heartily
welcome any honest attempt at conciliation. They believed, however, the to
the General Assembly should be fUlly informed.
33. The z'epresentative of the United States sought to make abundantly
oleaI' the positi'on of his Government that the VTork of the C01l1J.'1l:l,ssion
shotud be continued with as little delay as :possible. The responsibility
of ,the Governments represented in the Commission, he added, arose from
Article 26 of the Charter and from previous actions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council. ~he position of his Government, the
rellresentative of the United States declared, had been best expressed
by Seoretary of St~te MaJ;'shall to the General Assembly on 17 September 1947,
/1fben he sala
 sic .3/32/Rev.l
Page 17

when he said that the United states recognized the im~ortanoe of regulating
conventional armaments and regl'>etted that muoh more progress had not "been
made in that field. Though the Governllient of the United states was
ined
convinoed, Secretary of State Marshall had said, that a workable system
rk.
for the regulation of armaments could not be put into effect un"toil
condi tiol1s of international oonfidenoe prevailed, he believed that the
Commission Should prooeed vigorously to develop a system for the
regulation and reduction of armamen"~s in the business-like manner
outlined in its plan of work.
34. The Commission and its Working Committee have now completed their
consideration of Items land 2 of the plan of work. It remains to aad
that, at the twentieth meeting of the Working Committee, it was agreed
V6
to proceed to a consideration of Item 3 of the plan of work.

in f
}

'{ ,

f
l
I
t
s.

tr···

t
~

t r
t
1r
r

1
/TABI.E OF ANIiJEXES

. i

\
-
.sic .3l3 2/Rev.l
:Page 18 ."

1:;­

TilBlli OF ANNEXES

Statement made by the representative of Canada at the fi±'teenth

meeting 0:1:' the Worldng Committee of the Commission for
Co;nventiona1 Armaments, 8 March 1948.

Annex II Statement made by the representative of the United ,States of

Amorica at the eleventh meetj.ng of the Commis sion for
Conventional ArrAam~nts, 2 Aug1.1.st 19~8. ,

Annex III Statement made, 'b;'i the J;>e:p:resGntative of the Unio11 of Soviet
Socialist Republics at the tlrel:fth meeting of' the Cormuissioll
for Conventiol1al Axmawmts, 9 August 1948.

A,nne::: IV Statement matle b~' the l'epl'esentative of the United Kingdom

at the tw'e1fth moo'pine; Qf the Co.rnmission for Conventional
Armament s , 9 .A:u.gt.'.s-b 194,8.

Annex V Statement made by the vepresentative of the Ukrainian Sov:i.et

Socialist Republic at the twelfth meeting of the Cmmnj,ssion
for Conventional Armaments, 9 August 1948.

Anne~:: VI statement m8cle by the representative of' France at the

thirteenth meeting of the Coramission for Conventional
Armaments, 12 August 1948.

Annex VII Statement ,made by the representative of CbJna at the

thirteenth meeting of the Corumission for Conventional
Armaments, 12 August 1948.

/ANNEX I
 _ --------~--------------
.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .- -~'lll'>:lP--..--..I>;.~
.......

S/C.3/3 2 /Rev.l
Pa.ge 19

ANN.EX I
'teenth STATEMCW1' IM.DE BY TEE REPRii:8ENTATI'ilE OF CANADA AT THE FIFTEEN1"H MEETING
OF TIO}] VluIUGHG COliEvlITTEE OF THE COMMISSION FOR COIWE:NTIONAJ... ARIvlAHENTS,
8 MARCH 19!~8

of 1. In conunent:1.l1g on the revised draft resolution whioh had been presented.

by the United Ki.ngdom delegation (the resolution referred to ITas the basis
for the resolution adopted by the Harking Commj.ttee of. the Commission for
et Conventional Armaments at it.s 17th mee·tlng on 26 July 1948, document
ion sic .3/8 C.3/18), I should 111:e to say that the Canadian delegati.on 1s in
agreer1l8nt l-Tith the Viel-TS embod:ted in it. In our vie", the principles
contained in the draft resolution must res'!; on the ass.umption that no
11
agreement on effective regulation for the red~ction of armaments and
armed forces is lilcely to bl) dovioed tUltil conditions exist which will
ma!<;:e it unnecessary for ne.tj.ons to depend Ol'.l national ro:mamen"bs solely
,et fO:l: their security and in ivhich eo.r.dit1(j~$ of internationaJ, confidence
eXist.
2. For this reason 1-76 attach :particular importance to the principle
contained in paragra~h 3 of the draft resolution.
3. He viei': l-Tith concern the fa,ct that no such agreements, or indeed
agreement on the initial steps to be taken in preparation for such agreements
has yet been reached. At the time the General Assembly unani,lllOU,9ly
ado~ted the resolution on the principles governing general regulation and
reduction of armaments in October 1946, the Canadian representatj.ve
expressed the attitude of the Canadian Government to the question in
the followinG words:
l~'lc are particularly concerned that the Security Council and
the l\lilitary Staff Committee have so far failed to make substantial
progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with
individual Nem'bers required to j.mplement Articles 1.1·3 e,nd those
follOWing of the Charter and thus mal{e armed forces and other
facilities available to the Security Council. We are all of us bound.
under the Charter to refrain from using armed forces except as
prOVided by the Charter. The Government and people of Canada are
anxious to !mOvT What armed forces, in COll1lllon 'With other Members of
the United Nations, Canada should maintain as our share of the
burden of plicting world force behind world law.
IIIt is only when the sIJ8cia1 agreements With the CO'l.lncil have
been concluded that we will be able to determine hoW large a
p:ropor~ion of the total annual produotion of ov.!' country can
/,pro"J)erlY
sic .3/32/Re7.1
Page 20

~roDerly be devoted to improving the living conditions of the

Cenactian people.
"Canada therefore urges that the SecuritJT Council and the
lUlita1. Ji- Staff Committee go aheaa. vl'ith all possible BIleed in the
1

constructive work of negoti~bing the special agreements and of

orc;anizj.ng the mj,litary and economj.c measures of enforcement,1f
l~. In the vievl of' the Canadian delegation, the i,mpJ.ementation of
Article J+3 is an essential step 100hic11 must be taken if '-18 are to move
forwa.rd towa:t'ds an effective system for the regulation all,d reductj.on
of national armaments and armed forces.
5. He also express entire COnClU'l"ence '-lith the principle expressed
in Secti,ol1 A, '];ls.ragraph 3 of the draft resolution. We believe that it
is an essential condition for the establishment of that full international
confidence v1hich is a necessary autec,edent to the regulation and ;
reduction of armaments and armed forces, that agreement be reached 011 1
a plan for the international control of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy
Commission, as 1'1e ImovT, is still engaged in worki:ng out sJ;:6cific proposals" 1
taking into accoUllt the special technical requirements which must be met
if the plan Of internation.al control is really to ensure that atomic
,I
'~

energy is used for peaceful purposes only, and nations are given
adequate safeguards and guarantees against possible violations and
ev~siol1s. That Connnission sho.uld be left to comple-be its task, and as 1
far as the vFOrk of the Commission for Conventional Armaments is concerned~

vTe should assume that this result "Till be available in due course. J
6. In short, r/l:r. Chairman, the Canadian delegation supports the draft
resolution because we are in agreement with the main premise on which
i'b is based. Ue bel:!.eve that if the resolution of the General Assembly
I
~
14 December 1946, to which we are endeavouring to give effect, is to be

I,
of
translated into J)ractical policy, we should, in formulating plans in this
Commis 9 ion, prOVide in proper sequence for the establishment of those
conditions of international confidence and peace, which are essential if
all nations a1 e to agree upon the reduction and regulation of natioLal
1

al'Il1amento al1d armed forces.

IAN.NEX lr
 s ic "' ....3JI~,) IPe~r'
.J{"·/~\ ... IS
1
Page 21

STNlTHLEH'l' 1IADl:: BY TIlE m~p.8ESF,Nrr_~CrJ]~ O:ll TIll UNI~(lJj;:U ;;'iTATES 0]' AMERICA AT
Tm~ EIE\TJil:NTR MK(i}I':\:ITG OF TfIE COJ:,IJ\1IGSION FOR
COl~-\j:eN'l':::0Ni\IJ J'JTh1f'J.\1ENTS, 2 AUGUST 1948

The United States Goverruiler!;; ·\\7j.8].188 to dra1;v the attedciol:L of the

COT,:J:nis;;" Jon to the action '1'lhich i~ tool: in approving the United. K:L::'[jclom
resoh1 ('J.ol1 on rr.dnc iples at the letst meeting of '~he 'I'lO::J:'lcinG com:m:L ttee,
8,).1<1 to mal\8 a:bl.l,.'1dar;,l:;J.y c:_ear its pos:t:t:l.o:n Jchat the "'lOr:: of this body
shoulc1 he c01'1tirmea. The responsi.biJ,i1j3r oi' ID3T gn"81"nmellt arId other
gOV8rl.illlents rerCCeS8.ll"teC.l. on the COIIDnission arises from JU'ticle 26 of the
Charter rn~d prcn io1,1s actions of the General Assembly allCl SeC'l.lri't J7 CounciL
r:;.a1 Artj.cle 26 of the G:harter pl"ovi.J.es t.hat "The SecUl'ii:;y Council shall
be respollsi'iJle for forml1].a·l~i!lg plm-j,s to be sdl'Jmi';~t8d to the mETC~JBrS of
the United. ha:c::'ons for t~!8 esce.bl::i shT".e:.lt of: a. system :f;'Oj.' 'che reg1.lJ.ati.on
o:f arll:aments 11 •

~lS, In t11.G 0831e1'8J. AsseJi'~bly reso;!.u,tio:rl of 14 DecemiJer J.9!~6, the Assenibly

reCG111Ulencled to the ConneD. that it giV'iS "'P'.t6l:lJ?t considera~ion to
:t'or·lUt1l.e:tj'.l'.~ the p'8,ctical meamlres, 8,ccordirlg 'bo their priority, whIch
are ecser:t.LD.l ijo :provide for gC:le~ca':. reg1,11ation ar:d redl:.ction of

COUJ."lcil shall be SU:J~i1:1.tted by the SeG:L~e-ljar3'~Genere,:~ to the memb0rs of the

d.1 U:r..i tea. JlTati.ons •••• 11

The Security Council ;:,'esoJ.uti,on establish:i.ng th:l.s Comm:i.ssion provided
tl1a~'""..J
the CO"";"i"'Sl'C""
,'lull ....> . T'Tl'l',!~ ...""ll)Iitl-l···
010_". 'i-o :'-'[""
_,.'.1.J o,J •• ,-," CI"'('·\·,··
W ......... l.l ·;·'\7
/.'..I u
'''D1IDC],''
\,.,? 1)'''o'po,,·olR
...L..,1.: .... l(.;vL. (a) f'or
c.; _.

the rf:~c.:l.lft'~:i J~l al1'i reduc\.iol1 ot' £JT'mal.!Snts uml aY'l.led fm.'ces, and (0) for
pr8c·C1.crt:L. and effective 8af'egu£t1:'ds. in connection 'Ivith the genera.! ~"'~
.." "

reGulation und reduc-t.io:c1. of a:l'm,aments.

The plEm of' 'Iro:l:'l,: for the Conmlission for Conventional Am.E1ments
a·Ilproved by t:18 Security Council on 8 JUly 191}7, contains t.he fol1ovri.ni7,

I,'··. ~
te:r.'li16 :
I
la Consider and make recoTIunendations to the Security Council
concerning aJ:'roaments and armed forces which fal]. within the
ju:.'iscUc-cion of the Co:mmi ss ion :for CO:i:lventi.onal Al'l:np..:ments.
I 2. Consideration colla. determ.ination of BeneI'al principles in

t cOl1nect.:l.on with the regulation and rectuction ofaxr;;'Elmen"js and armed

fOl'ees.
3. Cons:i.dera:tion of IJractical and. effective safeguards by means
of an international sJr'stem of control operating tlu'ough special
/organs
=-,.".,..---------.....------.....---. . . - ..---=--­ ""'--- - - ---

s,Ic .3/3 2 / EG v.1

Pt:tge ~2

o:r:ge.ns (ancl b;)r other means) to prot.ect complJring states p.,gai.nst

1;l1e ha~~8.1~c:ls of violations and evasions.
,l~. Formulate the liI'acticeJ.. propose,ls for the reeulaticll and.
reduction of ar!J1e.ments and armed fo:rces.
5. Ex.tension of -the principles ancl proposals set forth in
paraGraphs 2) 3 and !~ ap0ye to sta:ces \·rh~ch are not members
of the Hni ted Natj.O:U8.
6. report or repox'ts to the Security Council
·SlJ.bmission of 8,
•
inclucUng, if Ilossi'ble, a draf'c convent:i.on.
The '~'lorldllg COlll1Ilittee of the Co!nm:l.ssion for Conventional Armaments
has 1101'f completed its consideratioll of items 1. and 2 of this plan of vTorlc ..
. The ChEdrman of the Conun:i.ssion has suggested that the ConnniEs~.()n Gubmit
1;:1,n interim pror;J:'ess report to the Security eou.ncil indicating the status
of its 'lWI'll:.

21:.c United States will S'u1'IJ(x:,-t t;:1e proposal of the Cba:l.rrnal1 for
the Cnbli]j.ssion of an interim status report to the Security COl.lLciJ.. At
the saJ.1J.e time, I WOl.lld JJ.ke to mal;:e it cleaJ.~ that the positj.Oll of tl~e

Un:i.ted S'batcs is that the work ef the COJmn:tssion should continue WiUl
as little c1cla,y as poss:1.ble. The pos:i.tion of .the UnHed States is bes'c
eXJ?res~ed in the 1·rortls of Secretary of Ste.te Marshall to the General Assen::.l.2.y
on 1"'r Sel)tGmber 19)1·7:
"11he United. States •••• recognj.ze the :i.mportance of regulating
convent:~onal armaments. He l'egret that luuch rt.ore progresS has
not been'made in this field. It is very easy to pay Hp service
to tbe sil1ce:ce aspirations of all peop:Les for the limitatj.on and
:::-eclnction of armed forces. This is a serious matter vThich should
not be the subject of clemagoGj.c appeals and irresponsible propagantla.
"r say f:CEmkJ.y to the General Assembl~v that it is the I
convictj,on of my Government tha.t a ilOr~;:a.ble

::"eGu10:/.;10n of armaments ca1"..not be put. j.nto 0I'e::ation until

conditions of international confia.elloe prevail.
system for ·the •

We have
I
consistl3:..tG1y ar:d repeatedly mt'(de it clear th~t't the l~egulation

of armaments presuIJIloses enOUGh "lnternational' understanding

to make possible the settlement of peace terms with Gern:.any and
I.TaJ?an, the implementation of agreemetrts putting military fo:cces
and facUities at the disposal of the Security Council, and an
international arrangement for the control of atomic energy.
"Nevertheless, we believe it is important not to delay the·
forI!lulat:i.on of a system of al'ms regulation for implementation
/vThen conditionS
I.·
if­
 sjc. 3/32/1:'8".1
Page 23

lv-hen cOl:.ditions l?e:cmj:Go The Security Council has accepted a

locsi0al pl8.11 of IfCJ.ck for tXle Commii:lsion for Convenl:ij,onal Armaments.
'He 'bel~_eve that the Commission should proceed ,,:I.gorou~ly to develop
a s3rstem fm.' the regulation 0'1:' armaments in the business··like
r'1al1.'l'ler outHn6d in its plan of \lOrl~o 11 '!

Cl!he i:lOrl;; of the COTJ1roisoiol1. has continued. to be hampered by "demagogic

r 8.ppeals and irl'8sponsj.bJ.e pr 0 I.laganda." :. vIe call11O"G hut note regretfully

t. ·;. ~
that the Soyj,et system of o'bstructionis:m, in this Commission is the same
"
:'.,3 that employ-ed 1);)i' them in the At,omic Enel'gy COlTJIllission. NeYe:r,theless I
"
the United States believes that the COlnmj.s3iol1 must proceed with its worl~ •
.,'II.or
~. *

. ,

c,::h!.y

....

I
~

/ANNEX'III
 '."";7I'd!{J\'i,r#i;;i'-,
I
i

S/C .3!32!Bev.l
:I?age 24

Al'JIITEX lit
S'l'ATElI1ENT ~IJAD~B~ BY, TIJE BEPRESENTATrifE OF ~rEE llNION OF sov_mr,r
SOCIALIST REPUBJ":CCS AT TEE TWE:tF~H MEETING OF TEE
COMMISSION FOR COWv~If.rIONAL ARl~EN~,

9 AUGUST 19 1+8

The Comm1,ssion ±~Ol" Conventional Armaments established ."ay the

Security Council on 13 February 1947 now has before it the report of' its
Horking CO'llli'littee on the Committee '8 'WOY'k between August 194.'"( aud
J'uly 19,'+8.
As is ·t-)e~"l kl.lo~lm, by its decision of 13 Feoruary J.947 the Security
Council gave the ConlIJlissiol1 for COIl:IJ€n.'l.'bio:'1.al Armaments a definite task ~

that of lJl'erra:dng ana. submitting to the Sectl~ity Council within a period

/

not exceeding three 1lloxl.ths pract;bcal proposals for the general regulation
al'),d reduction of' arilliJ.me:;:rhs a,ud fU'med forces. In adopt:i.ng this resoh:tion
the Secnrity Council i'1aS guided by Jahe General Assembly resolution of
J)j. Decem'ber 19!~,6 on the principles determinillg the general regulation
and. reduction of a;cmaments" ancl re ;w:;n:'-zed 'that the general l'egulat:i.on
and. rednc·bion of armaments and armed forces was a most important means
of strengthening international peace and security, and that the
1.mplemerltatiol1 of the General Aosemhly's resolution 6n this question
1'18.8 one of the most fundamental and important tasks confronting the
Security Council.
Quite a long ttme has passed since then, and a still longer Ume
since the adoption of' the General Assembljr resolution in question. The
implementation of the General Assembly's resolution on the regulation
and reduction of armaments and armed forces has, however, not moved a
single step forward. For almost one and a half years the Commission for
Conventional Armaments and its ~Jorh::J.ng Committee have been marking time,
and today they haye returned to the original pas it ion from i'1hic11 they
started out. The question naturally arises, what are the rea.sons for
this? Who is responsible for prevel~ing the implementation of the
decisions of the General Assembly, which recognized that in the interests
, I '

of the strengthening of' international peace and secu.rity, and in

accordance with the purposes and principles of the United. Nations, it is
essential that a general regulation and reduction of armaments Hnd armed.
forces be carried out as quickly as possible?
The General Assembly recolllmended to the Security Council to p:-··oceed
immediately to formulate
, the practical measures essential for securing
the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces} and

Iror
 In 3/"''') IRev tl 1
t."'
l-;Ji',Jl:l./Jc..,~\..

IJage 25

for ensuring tha'b th"lr3 X'egulEre--lO!l a."l{1 :rooucti6n, of. armnment.s should be
car:t'ied old; by all partici:gants "tr.r~hout exception., 8.1111 n\:1t ull1.1ateJ:-all,y
b J o'illy a f~w of' them"
In i t.s tU.en ·(;1'.e SBem:1:"':J~V·<mnci."L, ge,va the C01limission for OUl1ven't:Ltlw.l1
A:rmaments the task of :pre:paring and 81..10mi tting to the COl,;:.l:lcil concrete
proposals 'f'01' the speediest execution of the AssHrflbly 1 a ref:lOl1Ition
0:'-1 the regulation and relluGt.ion ofa:cmarilents and. armed forces. Instead
ts
of proceed,ing urgontJ.::;' and vithout delay to f01'.rm.llate, i11 -c.be C<iIDJillsS1.00.
fol' Convontional Arma.U1e.ats. 8.:110.. its WOIldL.g Committee, pl'actical measU:C0S
fOl' the red1.1.ctiol1. cd' arl1lBl):,\m't,s an) al"Illsd. fOl'ces and their regult:J:hion, tille
d e legtl,'tions of' the USA an.d t:ce Ul1:t.ted. Kingd0m began ass5.G.lR"'1J.sly to
look :ec·r and fODt!u.J.ute all l"iuc2's Q1' conJ.i~~ions nnd proDvsals whi.ch they
od ~

thOl1ght~ v10uld clemo!\st:rate t.~:tm:D0s:s~ljn':Lt~T of iru:;'l",smenting tIle

ion
GeHsral AssGmbJ.yls :re801ution ·on 'tihe ge118I'lll !'0eU~.D'tio:tl awl 1"'Jo.l.:~·t:ton
ion
(~E' arm.2J1lon-t s •

Ft'om "the very beg:Lnuitlg). "when the, -terlllS of :reference of ):;1:-:.e

Commission Cl'Go.tea. by the tkl\~'4·:i.'i:;y CO';ltlCil we:te- being c1isCl1Sz.ea. , iil1e
USA l1.(;)lei.:;a't'ion n~o'I/'€d a, reraoJ.ut:Ltla :~iUtt -I;b.at Commission should dec.1. only
with the so~c8,lJ.ecl con.ventional anuaments aJ.1d. a~ed. forces, and ShOl:l1o.
n~')t conce:r.'n i'l:iseH' with eli.!td.na'ti.u.g t.he.
atomic a.n.d other kiwis of
weapons of' IDess destruction from the $phere of nationaJ. e!~aments ~
Leo} that i t should not- 'be .Qonc8!"YJ.ed wi.ththe prohi'bition of atomic
w'capons • In this ma:l:its1 the" U2A 'd.e:le..g's:i:;.ion was supported by the
4

Ul1.i:ted Kir~gcloro. delega.tion..

It was on this 'b~"S1E1 tl1a't th8'·-d.~16gF.i:G:1ons of' tbe tlSA and '\ills
1.Tnited K:i.ng<.lQffi began thei~~ '1~jrk in "b.he Com;nission for COJ:J.venti.onal
Armaments sot up by the Hecu,:i:'i't.:'lCOUl'lciL· The single and inflivisible

-~ .'
quest ton of the gell.et'al reg'l~let:!.an m"a. r-educ-L ion of a.rm"3JW~nts Clonde.r.ll:ed
forces and the DrohibitiCil.1. <5..1" ·l1tolJ.ic 'HeapOl1S wld other mea.ns of !Il"3.1JS

aeetruction vras artif'ici~ll'::~'£:p1iij up by thom. This was an Elvi.dent

violation of tile resQluti.on 'b:l tIle General Assembly, b-e').ause, as eve:r.'ybody
kno'Ws, that 1'e801'..1:Gi011. does ·no'c· 0:[.];1038 [,tomic 1fea:fiV!.~,9 "Gf':> other. ktnds
oS
of v;eapons. Consequentl.y) ~o· s:fllit up and dra:t.v a.istincrt:ionz betllsen
cl:L1,es'l:;,ions rela·ting to the ~':';'tal....reduct·ion of armam.ent.s a:wl to the
Irrohibition of atomic waa.J;JOT.US i:,; CQl1tl't1l'y to the decisions of the
, General Assembly. The. Gena:c'f.1.1 p.3p..i:';n1:'ly no'(j anl;'t d.id not· 0llPG9€ tlle .
. lJroblem of '[.ll"ohibi ting a,-tome 'l'TCla!?,,')::I1S and controlling a tomic ene~:2;Y to
the p:f'oblem of the general ~duct,io:n()f arm.areSl1ts J. but resa.rdec. 'both
th~se :problBIlls as intet.t-~,~e~l:.ent.and. cloB.ely e-onooeted.,

\
 .
. ..
~-;: -J"....",,,-~---.-./.,. - ... o""."$"",',,.~.,.· ."",J~,....
"-A _ _,..".",,,...,...------~~-~-
­

sIc] .3/32/ReV'.1
P'lge 26

Thl.lG )frO)11·the point of \f:i.e.. .' of the! task8 faeing the Hni ted Net ions
in the s:r?he:~e ai' the gen.eral ]:,egulation and rec.l.uction of armaments and
armed f'O:CCi3S J H 'beCOly,eS Cl,ui.te clear that the thesis accord.:tng to ,,,hich
atomic vrGS'pGrJf3 siJ.uulJ. be cons lc1ered sellarately from the so.. called
conve:nt:i.onaJ. a:cmaments VIas only ::J.eedea. in. order to dela~l and Ultimately
disruJ?t the work of elaborating :!;:JJ..' BcticaJ. pro]Josd.ls for implementing the
G'3neral Asserlibly' s reso':'.odion all the ger"ere.l regulatio:!l and reduction of
arlilwnents and. armed forces. B~;' se};J-9.Z'at i.ng these two quest::'olls, the USA
delegation dealt a main DlmV' to the p'rosIlects of implementing the General
[-\,Ss8i1l1:;ly I,.:,; rGsoJ..utio:'l.
In l'esolutel:v o'bjec'tj,ng to the cepar'at:!.on of <~llf~se tW'o inseperably­
COXlnecteel questions, the deJ.egat:i.o~l of the Sovtet Union has relJeatedly
'::,'intecl out that such a suggestion corrtr.e.dicts the decision of the
Goneral ASS8111bJ.y'y and 'iina't the sepa;l.'ation ()f these two Questions '~jould
involve not D:,8:1','cly a post:pOi.le:mi31rt o:i: the reduction of armaItlel1'lis:l but also
the creation of obstacles wl1ich iY'Ould tend to upset the :l.mplem8n"::a'bion
of' the GGneral Asseraoly I S :;:oesoluUons on the geveral reduction of a:;.'maments

I
and armed forces~ The Union of Soviet Socialist BeDublics de:egation
elllphasizes eSli8cially -Chat the ge:nerctl regulaMol1 and reduction of
a!'maments ancl armed farces should p:l~oviC'..e as a matter of obligation for the
complete p:robi.b1.tion of atomic 'Weapons and all other weapons of mess
d.estruction" ana. 'bhat the opposition of the goveTl'll'nents of the United States 1
ana. the United Kingdom to the pl'ol1ibition of atomic '\Veapons is preventing
the carl'ying-out of the measures on the general reduc-tJ.on of armaments
and armed forces. The further conrse of' events in the· COIlllilission a:i:'ld its
,1- H01"1':.ing Committee have fully confirmed the cor:cectness of the position
thus adopted by ·the Sovi.et delegatton.
':l,1alting ad:\Tantage of the voting procedure in the Commission and the
HOl'king Committee, the USA delegation has imposed the separation of those
t'\'IO questions, ana.. has thus prevented the C01TJmissioy.J J set up by the
Security Council to ela.borate practical proposals for i1l'plement:l.ng the
(1·cneral Assembly's resolution on the general redUG'bion of armarr.ents and
armed. f'ol'ces, from carryin.g out its i'rork on the prep/'l:cation of pl'oposa.ls
for eliminating atomic w'ea}?cns from nat:Lo:nal armaments - i.• e., :proposals
1'01' llI'ohi.'b'lting the use of' atomic weapons and other means of mass
destruc'bion for military purposes, as laid down in the Assembly resolution.
During the considera'tion of the question in the Comnrissiol1 and the
Worlting COnmli'ttee, the tactics emploY,ed by 'the USA delegation became more
clearly a.efined. HsV'i,ng artific ially separated these two questions" and
created a. distinction beti,reen thcm, the USA delegation together with the
United Kinga.om delegation, at th~ same time introduced the question' of
 S/C, 3/32!Rev 01
Page 27

so-called inte:':."IiatioJ:lGl couX':i.dCl1M anri .security, affirming that no echenG

for ree;ulatillg and I'ed.uc:Lng arlnl?meni;s and. armed forces cou1l1 be Gal'i"iea out
11111e88 inte:c:nat:tonal confi,iellce and sa.f'egual'ds fm" security were established
in ao.vance. Amongst the safeguards or conditions essential in the opinion
of these delega'ti.ons for the estaolishment of such conf1.dence and. security
was '1:;l1e eS"GablislJlliexl'b of control ove:;.' atomic energy" The mat'cer 11'as
stated as follows: Bef'o';:e the Atomic Energy Commission has ~mrked ant
pToposals for the ccnti1"ol of atomic e:c.er~y, any reduction of armamenJvB
and a::."mer1 forces is quite illlPOS S ible •
Thus the question 01 the gem:;:re.l rednction of armaments and arm€'cl
t'­ fo:cces 811d the :r.rohib:i:t:i.on of a'tol!l:Lc energ~', i,ras. first e:rtifioielly spl;i:{;
up, and tlllen the general re{l-l.lc·';ion of al"UlElments and armed forces and the
corrtrol of ato~ic energy were made coru~itional upon each other.
Little more remaineO. for 'bhe USA o,elegal;i_on to do to bloc};: solution
.!JO ()'~ the problem of the general reduction and regulation of armaments and
armed. forces. All the,t was necess£\l'Y ''l'as to interrupt the 11Or1<;: of the
Atomic Energy Commis s iO!.l a,:n~l th(ot.!, ~ttLte tha,t J since there Ims no con:l:irol
of atom:i.c ene:cg',Y'" OD,e of the C01Jr'litioXlS 01' 9afeguards for the €s-fjflbl::'shment
of international conf~dence and secu~ity did not exist, and that
therefore the general reo_uction of armaments and ex'meo. fc-rces could no"l:;
be ca:"l'ied out. One can only regard such p:'.;'etexts 88 attempts to evade
both the l'eduction of arme,merrts a~1a. armed. forces and the prohfbition
of El, tomic loTeapons.
Evor~Tolle knOVlS that the v1O:t.'1C of the Atomic Energy COIDmiss1.o.tj. was
sabotaged by the delega'tions in that COlumission of the United States
and the United ICingctom, and :now; in the COlflmiss ion created to formula,te
:pxopose.ls for the general reduction of armaments and armed. forco:::} these
same delegat::'oils, ref'erri.ng in particulal.' to 'the absence of contl'ol over
atolilic energy, are cringing matters to a stage at wh:i.ch the work of th:ts
Cormuission also ~ill have to be interrupted.
After artificially separating the questions of conventional
arm~.'ffients and of atomic weapons, the deJ.9gations ()f 'phe USA and the
United Kingdom have introduced an,:)ther series of conditions p:rece<'J.ent
:)1' sa'feg1.la:cds 'I'1hich they allege to 1)e essential to guarantee inte:cnaJt,iional
confidence and security before any attempt can ba fiade to put into practice
the General Assembly's resolution on. the general reduction of e,rmaments
ana. a:-clTted fOl'ces. These guarantees include, :for example, the COEJlus ion

of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, and the organization of armed
forces in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.
ThUS, during discussions on the reduction of arme..ments and. armed
forces , t~o new obstacles have been introduced as conditicns precedent

/by tee
sIc ;3/.32/Bev.l
P,~ge 28

'oy the delegaG:1.cns of the USA a,nel the United Kingdom. QU5.te clearly these
cona.it.ions i'To?:ce elevised exclm·d.v'aly us ad.d5.tionaJ. ohstaoles to the
hJrJ.0d:~ate :l.rrll)lementaticn of' the GC:Li,'3rel Assembly's resoluti on on "':;:':le
gcr.et'aJ. regula'tiol.1 and. l'educt"lon of armaments and armed fOi'c8s. Everyone
1".110'176 that GerlUan.y an.d Japan, which not long ago ivere c.al1.gero1.1s and
pctwerful enemies, are li.OW defeated and. under the control of -the
conquerors. These countries have b8en dise.rmec1 8:DQ. a. con!3iderable part
of their war industry has been destroyed. No great armed forces are
req'Llired to ensure the mili.tary cont:col 0:' these countri.es UL"'ltil the
conclusion of peace treaties with them, or to prevent aggression by tl1Gnl
after the conclusior~ of the peace trea"t:i.sfJ.
ConoeCluently the neceesHy and justific'3..t1on for maintaining inflated
armies, navies and air forces ha,s lapsed, as has likewise the need for the
el1crmOUG mUi·ca:ry budgots ·tqhich aX'El such a h'3Elvy burden on the shoulders
of the peoples 'W~10 bore the hw;'dships of the past war.
"By maldllg the relluc"bic.n of armanle:a"ts conditi.onal on the conclusion o:f
l1eace treaties with GermullY and Japan, the Gove:cr.une:;;rts of the USA and the
Uniteti Kingd.cr.l are violating the de0.2i):!.ons of the Fotsd.am Conferen.ce, end
l~;r cloing so postponing indefinitely the conclusion of peace treaties w::.tll
~,hose countries 0 And here we ob:=:'aY've the same techniqne, i'ihich consists
in a.:r.tificially conllecting ana. mal~il1g deIl811deriG upon each other two
different q~e8tions having no direct relation to each other, while a~ the
same time delaying the solution of one of them and then disruptillg the
solution of the other on the prete~b that, as the first is not settled,
the second can a130 not be settled.
Tha i.ih:.'..l'c.l :prfn';~;;:,uic:ae 0:':' safeguard vThich the United States and
United Ki"ng':"lon de:'.'eG:1.'t:lox.G a1:".0g.::J mm;t pre,)ede the reduction of armaments
and ax:med fc.:r.-;es is the 9.:,;lEistion of placing armed forces at the disposal
of the Sec'llxity C")1.lr.(;il lJ;1.{ier A:t<i..icle 1,3 of the Chltrter. This sugges"tion ­
viz. that tJ:i.e CSll':::ral A:::sc:libly resoJ..u[;"lon on the reduction of armaments
.and armed forces c.a.l.l.r.;,ot tto .r:JU"l.; tnto 0fr'ect, :ll1til tbe agreements provided
for by Article 43 ef the C11':l'rtcr have 'oeen G~nc!.ud()d - is in direct
opposition to the Glu8r,":.. liss':.r:i';)'Ly· re;,;,";lutio.:"L of 14 December 19!}6, which
recoE!,D.ized the nec~)~~oit~~ ;Jf an ea:rl~l general regulation and reduction of
armaments and armed force.:3 and reconJr.1erl,".ed the Securit;'l Council to give
prompt cono:W.eration to formulating the practical Til.easures on the
general regulatj.on and reduction of armamEmts and al'med forces ~ In
that reFiolutiQn the General Assemblj· stressed tIle need for the early
wioption of measures to make available to the Security Council
, the
armed forces mentioned in ArticJ.8 ~·3 of the Charter.
1
11 :.18 General Assemi')1.y dj.c:' no·t;, h(swnver,
, make the aG.oIrt1.on of IT..9aSUl''es
for a g~nel'al regulation a.n.<l re'l'llc"tion of. arne.ments e,nd ar1T.ed. fOl'ces
 sIc r3!3 2 /Revel
Pa,ge ~:!9

theso conditional 1..1::!on, the prelim:inury obter,Hon of intel'nat1..o11al gual"a11tees such

as are nOvT imJlsteo. 011 by 'bhe tTn,ited S'bates a:nd United IUngdom re:r;Ji.~8sentativ(;s.
On the con't:t'ary-' the resolution, unanilJl.ously ado:pted 'by the General Assembly,
I
~
refers to the necessity of an ea1?ly e,ene:ral l"eguletion and reduction of
armaments £ll1.d o:r the p:>:'ompt :fol'm;'11ation of' prectical measures to that
end, considering that the ac1.o11tioll of' lU8aS11reS for a genex'al reduction
t't of armaments and armed forces 'I;·ro'.1J.d au."coL'la't"lcaJ.l:T further the
strengthening of :tnternational secm"i ty ana mutual con:fj.dence bet1veel1
nations anCl. peoples. The:9l'o1)osals of tho Unj.ted S·tates and the
Uni ted rangclom regarding the gt:arantees sa:i.d. "to be l"eq1,.l"lred for 'the
reduction of Elrmamen'Gs conflict ,'1i th the General Assembly :i:'esolution.
Lated As is well 1o.10v;;n, the United S'Gates ana. United Kingdom c.elegations tried
~ the as far ba-ck as the 1946 General ASS811101y to lay dOH:l a number of preliminary
condi tions. All the proposals for p:<ereq,uj,;:Ji':jes or' safegtlEJ.rds, however,
v;,;'lre rejected by the General Assembl~r, ,·rbich 1man"lmously ado:9ted a
i~ of l"ssolution l'egarding the necessity of' an early general regllJ.a'c1.on and
the Tcduction 0::' a:l.'1naments ann. al':!lled :;~c:~lces, m.d, impcsed no cOJldition
cr.d pl'ece(tOYrl:; •

At the General Assemb13r the United States and United ICj.ngdoiil

ts delegations also voted alo).1g w'1'1;h all the other delegations for the
resolution on the general l"eguletion ana. X'Gauctiol1 of armame~1ts and, EJ.:..'med
the forces. In this Commission, hOl-rever, which hus been given the tasle of
elaborating practical measures to implement the Assembly's resolution,
the United states and t:r..e United Kingdom delegations have made it their
business to search for all kino.s of pTeregptsites, their object plainly
being nut to iAJ1Illement the Genera: Assembly resolution but to void it. :~l.·.
v.
I
ts All these so-called prior conditions vlere incorpox'ai;ed by the United States
1 and. United Kingdom delegations in the draft resolution fo:rced by ·bhem on
on ­ the Working Committee and now submitted to the Com~ission for
Conventional Arme,DlE:nts.
What, for exerrplo, is the point of the view put fOTward by the
United States and United Kingdom representatives i~ ~aragraph 2 of the
resolution that a system of regulation and reduc'cion of' armaments and
armed forces can only be put il1to effect in an atJ;"ospbere of inte:C113.tional
,:..:onfidellce and security? It is intended, in t118 first rJ.ace, 1:0 provicle
some justification for the reft<fJfj,l to i:rc.:plement the Gen8ral Assembly
resolution immediately and ~di'th('~l.rt 8::1y preUminary conc.'itions} an?, in
the second place to show some ca.use for the sabotage of the work of the
Commission for Conventional ArmameLts. At the Working Committee's meeting
of 26 JUly the Soviet delegation put the following question to
Sir Alexander Cadogan, the rep:reser.:tative of the Ui'lited Kingdom: tirs
paragra.ph' 2 of the AnglO-Am€Jy:i.can tJraf'f'; resolution to be ur.derstocd. as
!I'lssning
i'

o/c .3/32/.2.ev.1 .
Peige 30 r~

meaning that p unttJ. the a'bn1osphere of 1:nternat1.onaJ. co~f':i.dence ana. sAcurity

which you invoke has Deen created, th8re can 'be no question of red~cing
armaments and armed forces? In oth.er word.s, is this Anglow,A.mel'ican
proposal to be understood as meaning the t, until an atmosphere of'
confidence bas been created, you cons:i.cJer there is no possibili.t~r of even
beginning to implement the Genex'al Assemhly resoltrc:j on on a general
l'ecluc'bion of armaments ana. armed forces? Is that the sense of this proposal
p L~i:; f01'W81'd by the United Kingd,om Govermuent? It

, i
Sir Alexander Cadogan repHetl: "Yes, to my Governmenti it
certa:tnly is. 1I
Tl1e United Sta"t8s d01eg~tiol1 associated itself with
that Vie'i-l and voted for the resolu·tioll.
It is quite clear, the:i:'efore, t}1at this thesis of the establis}l..rnen'(j
of tnternational confidence and security was advanced essentially in
order that no efforts should be made towards the reduction of armaments
and armed :forces :i.n ol"der to Dreach the General Assembly resolution,
to prevent its impleme:ptation, and to justify all this by high-sounding
phrases about international c011f:tdence and security. That is the
essence of the matter.
]'l'om the very out$et of the work of the Commission f'or Conventional
Armaments, and. throu.ghout the deliberat:Lons of the Working Committee,
it has been Quite clear that the United States and United Kingdom
d.elegations have aimed not at the pronlptes't implementation of' the
General Assembly resolution, but have tried to delay and "\'lreck the 1'1Ork
of general reduction of armaments and armed forces.
Let us take a second aspect of this question of creating international
\

confidence. and security. Let us examine, for example, what the

'C',,1'.Ltecl States Government is doing to create and strengthen international
confidence and security, bearing in mind that Hs representatives in
the Cormniss ion for Conventional Arxnaments and the Working Committee speak
60 often and 80 indu.striously alJout -the need for creating :l.nterna sional
confidence and security as the main prerequisite and prior condition
for stal'ting on a reduction of armaments and armed forces. Is ·the
Uni ted States Government possibly taking, or has it already tal~el1,

any measures to reduce its armed forces, to decrease appropriatj.olls for

military eX]?enditure? Is it pe1'ha11s taking no part in :form:t.ng WEt.r blocs and
alliances? Is it perhaps endeavouring in the organs of the United Nations
to see that prompt action is taken under Article 43 of the Charter, to
maks armed forces available to the Security Council? Is it perhaps
working along with the other great Powers to hasten the conclusion of
poace treaties with Germany ap.a. Japan? Finally, are measures being taken
in the United States of Ame:r:'j,ca, in exectJ.tion of the General Assembly
/resolution
 sic .3!32/Rev.1
Page 31

resolution of 3 November 1947, to combat the vile and dangerous activities

of the "larm0i1 3e rs who, espee iall~l' in the United Sta tes, are carrying on
I
thei~ unb~idled war propaganda and trying to create war hysteria, to
blaclilllail and intimidate the population with all kinds of inverlted
stories abont war?
TIle actnal facts l'etllrn only a negative anS1oJ'er to all these questions.
The United States G~vernmGnt and its delegation in the Commission for
Conventional ArmaJl'.ents have directed their efforts not tm.ards the proIDll te st
implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the general regulation
and reduction of armaments and armed forces, but to delaying ita fulfilment,
to voiding and wrecl,ing the resolution. They are d.irecting thei.r efforts
not to :I.'educing but to eX};lond:l.ng the size ofaxmed forces, both nabionally
and as regards the total strength of' the arLled forces and armaments to
be made available to the Seeul'it;-r Council by its five permanent Members
under Art 1ele l;J of the Charter.
I shall give son~ details on these two points only. They are highly
instructive. One need only consult United States press data to realize
quite clearly what has been done in the United states with regard to the
size of its armed forces all the while the United States representatives
in the Cowmission for Conventional Armaments were discussing the reduction
of armaments and Q11lled forces and declaiming ebou'l:; the necessity of
establishing international confidence as a condition precedent to such
reduction.
De'bails published in The New York Times ,of 27 June show that in the
budge'bary year 191J.8-1~9 the armed forces of the United States have been
e},.'];landed by 25~~ in compa.rison vith the previous budgetal'y year 1 while the
land forces alone have been expanded by 44~. It must be clear to any
intelligent and unprejudiced person that any expansion of armed forces
in any country, let alone the United States, can only increase
international distrust and destroy confidence among nations. Conversely,
only a reduction of armaments and armed forces would have the effect of
(
increasing and strengthening confidence and security.
To see h0101 the United States is also attemp't1.ng to inflate the
numbers of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council
under Article 43 of the Charter by its five permanent Members - the USSR,
the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and China - one
need only turn to the discussion, in the Security Councilts Military
Staft Committee, of the numbers and composition of thes~ armed forces.
For reasons which you w:lll understanc1" I shall not quote figures or give
many examples. I can only say that "there are many such examples. I she,ll

/confine
 : I

sIc .3/32/Rev'·.1
Pa 3e 32

confine myself 'bo the COI!l:pal~8tive figures 011 f:Lghter planes. The
Un:Lted States delegation in the Mili"Gary Staff COll1IDi'ttee proposes and
stubbornly insists on a num1)er of fighter planes, to be included in the
. I~ I .
forces ·tHO and a half times as great as the number of fighters 12!2~

5lnd'p'g~~:..~O; on by the other four a.elegations in the Military Staff Committee

.the USSR, the Ul1i.ted Kingdom, France and China.
It is obvious th~t in view of the obstinacy with which the
United S'bates delegat1.on is insi.sting on the acceptance of its clearly
exaggerated and inflated fighter-planef1.gures - and of its figure.s for
. a nmnber of other types of armaments also - no agreed decision is possible.
As' a cOl'lseq1.,ence the Militar;y" Staff' Committee's work on calculating the
aggregate strength and compos5.. ti.on of the eI'Dled ,forces to be made
available by' the five Powers to the Security Council under· Article LIJ
of the Charter has reached. an impasse. 0:1:', it vlould be more truthful
1···"
to say, has in fact been wrecked by the UnHed States "delegation, the
:policy of which has been to inflate alrtled tOl'ces and armaments, not only
na.tionally but also with regard to the aggregate strength of the armed
forces t'o be made available to the Security Council.
~iJhy did the Un1.ted states delega'bion in the Military Staff Committee
insist on such an exaggerated number of fighter planes? The reply to
that c.;.uestton becomes obvious if we read carefully paragraph 4 ot the draft
resolution submitted to the Working Committee by the United States, and
the . Untted Kingdom dele gat tor1S •
That paragraph includes the following pas,sage:
!lA system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and arm~d

tOl'ces ••••• mus·c l:l;mi't armaments and. armed forces to those which are
consistent ~-lith a11d indisFensable to the maintenance' of internationa~
pe'ace and secl.lrity.l1
The:t proposal at·tempts, - by invoktng tl10 maintenance of international
peace and security (the reference is to Article l~3 of the Charter), to
justify the ma.:i.ntenallce of'national armaments'based, of course, on the
former high levels.
i·lhen tM.s "QI'oposal was put to the Commiss16n for Conventional
Armaments by one United states representative, another United states
representative made a parallel proposal of which I have spo~en, to the
Military Staff CO!llIlltttee. Th:i.s called for a number of fighter planes
in tho overall strength of the armed forces contemplated by Article 43
of the Charter for the mairltenance of internation.al peace and security,
two and a half' tirues greater tha-n the nmpber jointly agreed upon as necessary J
by the other four delegat-ions on the ,Military Sta,ff Commi:btee. A comps.rison

lof these I
 s/o .3/32/It8v.1
Page 33

of these tvlO proposals makes t.he object sought "by the authors of these .
proIlosals sUfficiently clear. It is, by lnvoking the IJEJEld for a larger,
Uol SO,,
'9:'"
10<
... ~~
.,.' ......... an o"bviously exaggerated and inflated, armed force at the dtsIlosal of the
".
~,"I
~ :~;:>;o.~ ~":"
'M
Seoul'i ty C01.U1cil, ostensibly for the mainteDElnce of international peace
and aeauri t~r, to justify the maintenance of large inflated arllled foroes on
the !)ational 1eve11 and in reaHty to evade executing the Genel'aI Assemblyts
resolution for the general reduction of armaments and armed foroes.
The Soviet delegation categorically objected to proposals of this
..
"~,,

' \.
... !~

...}
..."t',~.,..
... '.4olo ..... so:r.t; it voted against them. both in the Military Staff Connni ttee and in
the HOl'ldng Comm:l.ttee, and 1Nill vote against them in the Oommiss:7.oo for
. .
loO" ••
~

CODventionnl Armanents •
Frelm 0.11 that has been said it becomas comprehensible and obvious
why the delegations of the United sta..t.es and the United Kincdom in the
Commission for Conventional Armaments and in the Working Oommittee found
.... .;,... "."
~ N .~ .. ,,' it necessary to put fOl~ard ~ seri~s of prior conditions or safeguards
which it was alleged, had to "be realized before proceeding to i~plement

the General Assembly's resolution on the general reduction of a~maments

and armed f~rces. These conditions were needed so that they could
evade eJ:ecuting the Assembly's decision, could wreck and "bury it, and have
a free hand to engage in a continued armamen'ts race and increase their
armed forces. The same o'bject is pursued in the resolution forced upon
the I'lorlcing Connnittee "by the delegations of the United states and the
Uni ted Kingd om on 26 July. The atatelne11t by the United States
representative on 2 August to the Oonunlssion for Conventional Armaments
does not 8ubstantially alter the :posit,ion of the United states Gov8rIlment
towards the General Assem'blyfs resolution on the genel'al regulation and
reduction of armaments and armed forces. The United States Government
in thls statement again affirms its view that no reduction of armaments
is possible until international oonfidence is established. We have often
heard this said by the United States representative; it is no novelty
to us.
The Soviet delegation opposes the Anglo-Amerioan resolution as
contradicting and violating the General Assembly's decision.
The Soviet Government, as is well known, was the first to take the
initiative of raising in the General Assembly the question of the need
for a general reduotion of armaments and armed forces. It was 00 the
initiative of the Soviet Government and of Mr. V. M. Molotov, the head
of the Soviet delegation at the first session of the General Assembly,
that the Clues'bion of general reduction of armaments and armed forces was
!raised in
 " ,
1

S/o.3/3 2 /Hev,l
Page 3!~

'. i

raised ill October 1946. The General Assembly, and also the peoples
. ; , 'of 'bhe -';'11101e vTOrld, ,.,ho aI'S vitally interested in reducing the heavy
burden of military expenditure and in strengthenhlg peace and friendship
,
r ~ ,
'between the :peoples, ,qarmly 8UJ?ported the p::.'oposal of the Soviet Government.
,I
As a result the General Assembly on IJ~ December 1946 lmanimouslyadopted
a rssolut:i.on on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and
Lll'med forces. The Soviet delegation on the Security COll11cil, in its
. , ":1i "'
'.­
. ~ ,
turn, "Tas the fi~st to talte the initiative in raising in the Counci.1 the
Clues't:i.on that the Council illlDlsdlately and ~rgently proceed to implement
the General Assembly resolv:bion on the formulation of practical meBIJUreS
for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
In the Security Council, in the Conurdssion for Conventional Armaments,
and in the HOl'king Committee of this Commission, the Soviet delegation
firmly and continually stressed the need 'for the speediest and
unoondi tional implementation of the Gen6ral Assembly resolution, and
proposed praotical measures to this end.
The Soviet delegation insisted, Bnd insists, on an immediate
implmilentat.:l.on of the General Assembly' s resolution for the general
regulaMon and reduction of armaments and armed forces, 8S well as on
a reduction of military budgets and State expenditure on the production
of arrnElll\en t, s •
In st:dct conformity with the Assembly resolu'tion, and in exeoution
of that resolution, the Soviet delegation submitted the following
resolution to the Working Committee, and submits it for the consideration
of the CO~~lission for Conventional Armaments:
"1. The gSl'leral regulation and reduction of armsmel'j'GS ar.ld armed
forces should cover all o01mtriee and all kinds of B:l:'maments and
armed forcss.
"2. '1'he general regUlation and reducMon of armaments and armed
forces should provide for:
(a) Bedu.ction of armies, naval a,nd air forces both in respect
to strength and armaments;
(b) LimHe:tion of oombat characteristics of certain k:tnds of
armaments and the prohibition of separate ki11ds of armaments;
(c) Reduction of war ,budgets and State e:~penditures on
:prodnction of armaments;
(d) Reduction of production of war mater:l,als.
113. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed
forces should prOVide, in the ,first place, for the entire prohibition
lof production and
 sic .3/3 2 /Rev.1
Page 35

of production and use of atomtc and 'other kJ.nr1s of weapons designed

foi:' mass destruotion' and the destruction of stocks of sll,ch weapons
which :have been made.
"4. In order to ensure the carrying out of meaSl).res for the
'; !lI',,...• !"" ~-f&.",,,,:-."
...... * ... .:: .. ,,-...
regl.1J.atlon and reduction of armaments and armed forces there shOt1.ld
be established within the fram8work of the Seouri toy COUliOil and as
a compoll(~nt part of the plan for such reduction and regulat:!.on, an
~-; .... ,'
., ,. ~ ...:..:.." ;..
~'

international system. of control, which should J)rotect the S'ca'tea

1'$ ,'V I _."'''j .;:;......~.,I'!.
, ,I.­ __ ..-..... i, ...
which fulfil their obligations, against the danger of violations
and evasions from the carrying out of the agreement on the
reduction of armame1.1ts."
The Soviet delegation is firmly cOl1Yinced that O~)ly if these proposals
are adopted 1.;111 i t be .possible td gj:ve effect to the General Assembly
",., ,!
resolution on the regulation and reduction of aTmaments and armed forces,
;; ,', ~ ,.,;~.:,
'~ ::'~. ~-;, ,f# <,'1' ... _....
and to redu.ce milital"'y bUdgets ano netional expend!ture on the ma:l.ntenanoe
of arm.i.es and the manufactW:-6 of armaments, '111 thout which there can be
no alleviation of the heavy burden of taxation borne by the people, no
improvament in their material well- beirJg, and no strengthening of
peace and friendship between ~eoples.

These proposals prOVide, as a task of 'che first im~ortance, for

the complete prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic and other
\-,espons desisned for mass destruction, and the demolition of eXisting
stocks of such weapons, This should form the most important ingredient
in the meaSl~es for general regulation and reduction of armaments and
armed foroes.
The Soviet proposals also provide that the general regulation
and reduct:lOll of armaments and armed forcee should apply to all countries
and all types of e.rmaments. Only thus will it attain its aim. This
Soviet :pro:posal differs fundamen'cally from the vague and rambling AZlglo­
f( American proposal that at the outset only countries possessing substantial
!r~i l~t:Sre·ct t'
military resources should be covered by the system of regUlation and
reduction of armaments and armed forces. This Anglo-American proposal
is in direct contradictioQ to the General Assembly resolution, whioh says
"to assure that such regUlation and reduction of armaments and armed forces
will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally
by only some of the participants ll • ,

Finally" the Soviet proposal provides for the establishment of an

internationa1 system of oontrol wh;l.ch should form part emd :parcel of the
prohfMt!on plen fo~ a general regulation and reduotion of armaments and armed
'ticD and /forces
 •.. ::w:+

sic .3/J2./Rev.l
Page ~6

:forces, and, operating within the framevTork of the Security Council,

could protect states fulfillillg their obligations as regards the regulation
and reduotion of' armaments and armed forces against the dallger of
v:iolations and evasions of the execu.tion of an agreement on the reduction
of armaments by unscrupulous signatories to such,agreements.
The report of the Working Committee, the substance of t~e resolution
eubmitted by that Committee, and the year's experience of the '\>Tork of the
Committee clearly show that the principal foes of an inJl1led iate and
unconditionalfulfillment of the General Assembly resolution on the
general reGulation and 'reduction of armaments and armed forces are the
Governments of the United statef~ of !:merica and the United Kingdom and
their delegations in the Commission for Conventional Armamerlts,
and :in that C01ll!niss1on'svTorking Co:mmittee.
1. '. These are the facts and the results of the work achieved by the
GonIDliBSion for Conventional iu'~ments in the ~ast eigllteen months. They
shovr t>Tho is really su.pporting the regUlation and reduction of armaments
and anned forces and the execution of the General Assembly resolution
on tha:(j me.tter, and who i,s vj.olating that resolution arld is mainiy
responsible for the failure to implement the decisions of the
Genera~ Assembly on the general regUlation and reduction of armaments
and, armoQ;foJ:~ces.

~ '~' ..
': '

I
! ,

·'i

.' .
f ~:.L

!' if ":""'-''''
"
:'::_'r
"" ~'-..
 S/C. 3/32!Rev.1
Page 37

ANrll3:X IV

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPBESENTATrm OF T:B:E UNIIJ.:mb KINGDOM AT ·T)-~J ~~~"ELFTR

MFEETING OF TIrE COL>1MISSI01'T FOR CONVENTION A!,1{l\MEN1'S, 9 AUGUST 1948

In the ordina~y way, the achlevement of agreement on this fundamental

part of our 'WO!'k ilOuld be a source of sa"c:;'sfaction.l' C.J,ual:!.fiea. o):).l~r b~l t:l.e
fact that it has taken the Committee just over a year to dispose of the
first two items of its :plan of 'Work.. EU'~ my Delegation Cal1.. 1. ot pretend
that it feels encou~aged by this result 60 long as the minority consisting
of the two represe~tatives from 'the S~viet Union maintain a dogged and
completely unyieldii,lg OPIlClsition to t}1e view of the large majority.
end
Those re·pJ.'esenta:tives have seen fit to u:.l·ge the adoption by the Co:nrmittee
of an alternati:tve ;proposal (doctUuer:b 8/0.3/SC.3/17 of 26 July 1948) b::Lsed
directly UPOil pax'ag:;,-s::;;lh 1 of the Soviet draf'l; plan of 'work which, a.l·~hough
.he
rejected by the Comm.j.soion on 18 J'tR1.e 1947" a~d by 'the SecvrUy Council
itself on 8 July, was :ceintroduced as a fresh p~oposal in tbe Horki.ng
Committee on 13 October 19~·7. I leave it to my Soviet colleagues, who are
fond of the wo:;,"d "daruocracyll, to expl{;1,in how this unusual manoeuvre can be
reconciled wi~h any kn~wn form of democratic procedure. For n~ part I
wish only to beg tile indulgence of the Commission while I recall briefly
~he argume1lts on which tlle d.~aft l'esolution now before it is based.

are not ne'tV' argumex:rt.s;, bu.t neither are the o'bjections to which ~ie ha~le

eighteen months.
They

been listening, in the CO!llll1ission and the 1·Jo:J;.~Jdl.Jg Commit'bee, for the last :,
..
\'
'.
,

lv.hen I had the honour to explain to the Commission, at its first

meeting on 24 Ma~ch 1947, the reasons which led my Gover~ent to welcome
its establishment, I laid em!Jl'lasis, 8.S the record shows, on. precisely
the f'eatur'es which are basic to the lil'esent d.raft l"esolutiio:n a,nd. 'which
can be summed up in ·blle aoct:t"i~Je that disar.ll13.mer!"~ is impossible wi.thout
~i .

confidence. By that I did nut p of course) Esan, as our Soviet colleagues

have constan.tly tried to ir..sinuate, that some Utopian cond:i:tion ef c,:>mr 1ete
security must be e,c.hieved befo:ce Emything call be done, or even begun, in
regard to disarm3.ment. I have said more ol;han Oi-10e "t:hat disarmame:'lt and
security must go hand in hand. Does anyo:ne da.).'e to maintain that the
situation in the 1>JO~ld at this momeut is Oi.1e that fa'iI'(,l.:u.·S Clisa1"IilSment1 But
I do believe that an easing of the te:"ision might ena1:<:.e a beg::i.!ll'ling to be
made. T~1en, if it cCI~ld be obtai!~ee., e degree, even though sxne.ll, of
disarmament might encourage a fee1il1g of secu;:,'ity which, in i'~s turn, might·
lead to ftlrther disarmament, and so Oll - a progress that might be s3.ow but
for all that noue the less sure.
/our Soviet
 S/Co3/3 2/nev.l
Page 38 .

OU1~ Soviet colleagues have fastened on this thesis as a confession of

hypocrisy; and they havo used an easy appeal to the "peoples of the world"
who, as they truthfuJ.ly say, are tired of the crushing and tnl11ecessary
burden of armaments. But I ven'bm'e to say th8;C there is one th~l1g of
which the peoples of the lTorld are still more tired - al1d that is the
broodil1g, hopeless atmosphere of in'~ernational suspicion and unrest which
now prevails~ three years after we hoped to have exercised such fears forever.
If the Soviet representatives had been able to show that their country had
been in no way responsible for this state of things, then perhaps we
might have listened to them with a good grace when t~ey su~mon us to
abandon ou!' convictions and accept the dictation of the u8u.al minority.
Let us examine for a moment the contention on which the minority view
is based: that the countries of the world, or rather the wicked
monopolists who govern mast of them according to the Soviet mythology, have
only to disarm at once and confidence will follow of itself. That is
indeed delightful~ simple, It is} in fact, almost as simple as the
frame of mind '\-7hich led certain countries before and during the war to
succumb to the hypnosis of Fascism - countries, I would add, not to be
found only in Western EUl~ope. It may be that in some count~ies; despite the
devastation. and misery of war, the lesson of "no disarmamont 'I'1ithol.lt
security" has not been learnt. But that is not true of my country; facts
seem to shoW' that it is not true of the Soviet Union. The "peoples of the
"I'10rld" ma;y- be sj.mple-minded in the estimation of my Soviet colleagues; but
they are not 80 simple-minded as that.
~f.hat, after all,.is confidence? St~ely it is a state of mind based
on sure lrnowledge; and what certainty' of security could be based on a mere
paper convention, suc~ as the Soviet draft resolution offers us? It is
true that that draft resolution speaJm of a syste:n ot' llcon'troll!, to
operate Within the f'rameHork of the Security C01.mci1; and those of us who
have foJ.lO'l\Tod the history of the Secu~lty C011l1cil and the deb€1tes on a
similar llroblem in the Atomic Energy Commission, will know how nluch
comfort to derive from that. But there J.s n.ot a vestige of recognition)
in the Soviet paper, of the fact that no person on earth can have any
confidence in a paper system of 'disarmament, l.,hatever the excollence of
its prOVisions, unless and until there is some eVidence in the world about
him of international good faith and the readiness of those primarily
concerned 'to sink d:l.:fferences and co",operate for the achievemont of purposes
which they have solemnly undertaken. In the specific language of the draft
resolution before you, this means, amongst other things, the conclusion of
!leace with Gerlllany and Japa.n, the creation of a system of collective security
/under Article 43
 S/C.3/3 2 !Rey.• l
Page 39

~:3ion or under Article 1~3 of the Charter! and, last but not least, the control of
atomic energy - a task whose pl'iority 'Has acknowledged by the Assembly of
the Un.ited Nations at' its very first session in London. I am not: nOI'T
of allocating blame for the failure to accoIirplish those tasksj but I ask
whether anyolle can seriously 'bolieve that, while they remain unaccomplished,
wh:"cb a scherr,e of II coJ:lventional ll disermamel1t will be "Worth the papol' it is
l"S forever", i'1r:i.tton on.
try hed This does not mean - I stressed this point also in nw speech of.
March 19J.n - that E.l~~ for disarII1~ment, as opposed to the putting into
o effect of disarmament i,tsel!, should not be worked out even in present
i t:,r • circmnstances. Of COl~SO they should} and that is why my Government though
:y vil3l1 [ With decreasing confidence} have gone on participating in the work of
the Disa:.~malJlent Committee. But they caotlo't conceal the.? fact that the
f disagreement of the Soviet minority on basic principles has aroused in
.$
I ~heil' minds very grave doubts of the utility of going on idth the
Crnmnission's work. There are more ways than one to frustrate the hopes
to of the· "peoples of the ,.;orld ll with ~Thom my Soviet colleagues seem :to be in
, 1

be such close touch; and one of them is to permit the continuance of a body
pite tha such as this, solemnly dedicated to a great and humane purpose which it has,
uru1appily, every reason to believe itself incapable of fulfilling.
t\acts Naturally, my Government do not wish to prejudge such ?n important
:;.f tho question as this within the forum of the present meetingj they would not
3; but Wish to be the first to despair of disarmament so long as the present
i
[ situation lasts and they would heartily welcome any honest attempt a;t
cOl1ciltation. But they believe that the Genero.l Assembly.• "(qhi.ch
~ cere insti?e.ted the stUdy of disarmament almost t1-TO years ago, should be fully
is ....nfor'mcd of the state to vrhich this guestion has nOif bee11 brought; and
toot in the meantime all concorned should aok themselves whethGr
deliberatj.C!U3. tn this body can be usefully pursued so long as the Ulll1ctPPY
division upon general principles, to 'Which I ha.ve alluded, is prolonged.

~bout

I •

ll"poses
dr:.ft
n of'
ecurity
!A]UWX V .
3
I
: .!
,\ i
"I
~
 sic .3/32/Rev.1
Page ~.O

STA'lTEHEJ:JT MADE BY THE BEPRESElIjTATIVE OF. TIllil mmAIIHAN SOVIET

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AT TEE THElli'TH ,MEETING OF TRill CONly:iISSIOl\f
FOR CONVEW.rIONAL PRNJ'J~NTS, 9 AUGUST 1948
The Union of Soviet Socialist P.epublics proposal made all

26 October 191~6 by lvlr. V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the general reduction
and re~ulation of armaments, which i'nu:; der>igned to ease the burden of
public ta:~atiol1, to utilize the mat~rial resources thus released for
improvinG the material and cultural standards of the masses, and to
strenGthen cOl~idence and hence the cause of peace and security between
the natio~1s, met 1'lith ifarm support from world. public opinion and lvaS
adopted after discussion by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946.
I'llthough the decision of the 'General Assembly' vras taken unanimously
and not a sj.nc;le Government or:enly objected to the USSR proposal, the Soviet
delecetj.ons foresavr that the execution of the General Assembly's resolution
would be bitterly resiBted by those financial groups who are interested
in the armaments race and regard, war as a profit-making bush1.ess, those
groups l'TOuld therefore do all they could to sabotage the noble action
initiated by the USSR.
In SUbmitting its proposal for the general reduction and reGulation
of armaments, the USSR Government envisaged all types of modern arm81nents,
including atomic :lVeapons, Which ivere subject to prohi1?ition and elimination
frolll national armaments as weapons of mass destruction directed primarily
against peacefuL populations - weapons not of defence but of aggression.
The United States delegation, hOlvever, bas from the very outset 'taken
the line of 1:llocldng -the resolutions of the General Assembly of
14. December 191f6, each time advancing neiv conditions and piling up ne'.;
obstacles. At the very begilll1ing of the vTork of the Cornrflission for
Conventional Arrilalllsnts, the United States delegation demanded that the
question of atomic weapons shotud be withdrawn from the competence of the
Commission and made the SUbject of the work of a special commission and a
special convention. The fate of the USSR proposal for the general
limitation and regulation of armaments i'Tas thereby made to depend on 1vhether
the United States delegation would agree to give 'effect to the above tyro
resol~tions for the ~rohibition of atomic weapons. Ho~ever, since official
United States c:Lrcles had no intention of complying With any resolutions
J

prohibitinG the l)l'oduction and employment of atomic weapons, they thereby

also doomed to failure the vrork of the Cornmissipl1 for Conventional .Armaments.
/The proof of
 sic. 3/32!nev.l.
Page 41

The llroof of this is not far to seel{. 'Wh:i.le UnHed States representatives
on the Atomic Energy Commission or the Commission for COllventional Armaments
'\'Ters talldng abouc Un:i.ted States willingness to carry out the decisions
f
t of the General Assembly, the walls of the United States Congress were
I ringing '\vith speeches of a different character. The most responsible

,. , ....
I
f'
Govermnent and mil:i.tary officials '\orere openly declaring that the United States
of America could not envisage any limitation of her armame:nts, that atomic
't'1'saIJons must be l:ept in the armament of the United States forces, and that
the United Sots,tes must possess such military strength as would enable her at
any moment to start military operations.
The ussn Government was demobilizing its armies, class by class;.
abolishinG the death penalty in view of the e~1.d. of the war and the
r
i·

establishment of a state of psacej concentrating all its energies on the

1­
J?roblems of l,eaceful econom:i.c recor"stru.ction. And all the While) in the

!
\
United States of America, Congl'ess 'Was being asked to appropriate more
billions for arlllBments and it aPJ?l"opl'j.a"bed them.
Sovi.et
To cloal: their mili tari stj.c fever and justify the utterly 1.U1justifiable
armaments race, United States military circles are zealously cultivating
the leGend that the United States of Jbnerica is 'being tbreatellsd by a
potential a.Ggressor 1.,ho is only waitiIl.g fo;l.~ an excuse to invad.e her across
the oceans and the icy wastes; although the Whole Ivorld knot-Ts that, whereas
no State threatens the United states of America, aggressive circles in the
United States of America are threatening the integrity end independence of
otheJ,~ states in various parts of the world. Hith the help of this legend)
which j.8 untenable either :politically or militarily, those in the United States
of America 'l-7ho are interested in an armaments. race have artificially created.
a war ]?sychosis tending to ~roduce uncertai~ty and anxiety throughout the
't-rorld. HQ'tv can such actions be reconciled with vlords about United. States
Willingness to limit armaments and prohibit the production and employment
of atomic weapons? In the face of these uncontrovertible facts the United
States delegation ·cannot escape responsibility for the disruption of 'the
work of the Atomic Energy Oommission and for lead.ing the Commission for
he
Conventional Al'maments into an iml?asse.
It is said that to secure general regulation and reduction of' armaments
confid.ence and f3a:feguards for security are needed.. To :put the matter thus is
really to defy common sense and to reverse the universally applicable rules of'
101310. After all) general regulation and red.uotion of armaments and the
l?l"ohibitioll on atomic weapons are among the most essential cond.itions for
t~e strengthening of' oonfidence between nations and the creation of wArable
J
safeGUards for security between them,
ents.
lIt is said
 sic .3/32/Rev.l
Page 42

It :1.8 said that an essential condition for genere.l reg'ulation and

red'l'cti.oD. of 6rme,lUel'1ts is the conclusion of a. peace settlement i'1ith Gel"mfu"1.y
f1.nd JaJ:l.lll. But i.,hy not tb.e other i-ray rO'Lmd? Hhen peace settlements with
Germany and J'apan Gome to be negotiatfld, shall we not be told that general
regulation aDd l~eduction of armaments is a pl'erequisite of the stabiJ.i-t~l
emd durabUi ty of such settlements, since 1~G is a guarantee of aGcurity?
'VTill not the very' feet of the non-implementation of the General Assembly
resolut:i.ol1; a fact which i.s Undel:'lll:i,ning tnternational confidence, be used
to defer the co~clusion of peace settlements With these two c~urGries? I~

it is argued that the disrupGioll of the wo),'l{ of the Atom:I.c Energy Commission,
which has impaired intern~Gional conf:aenc8 J predetermines the failure o~

'bhe Commission for Conventional Armaments ~ .will not this fa:'lure be used
as an excuse to bury once and. ±'or all the q~estj,on of the prohibition of
atomic iveapons and. the employment of t'l.toraic energy exclusively for peaceful
purposes? vie thus fall into a vicious cj,;r'cle, artificially created in
order 'bo 'confuse
,
by casuistic an;uments, the l:erfectly clear question of the
general reGula.tion ancl reduc'lJion of armaments, and to' divert us from our goal.
The mechanism of these "safegLlards for security 1t is thus very simple.
It only needs an expert hand to block one such safeguard ~nd the i'lhole
mechanism of safe.guaJ."d.s is w.rec};:ed, leaVing nothine behind but the mistrust
which the.. Anglo-American bloc needs to maj,ntain the armaments race and the
continued IJro(1u~tion of' atomic "reapons.
Mor'e than that, it should be emrhasized that the very notion of
"confidence 'I is one of those elastic expressions vThich you can interpret
in any way you like When you want 'co vTreck an agreement. Even if all
snfeCuards remained intact, it '\Vou.ld be Gnough for the party desiring to
,.,recl;: 'the aGreement to sg~leeze i.nto the formula of 11 c'ol1fj~dence 11 for :J.nstance,
the acceptance of the Narshall Plan, the recognition of the partition of
G~rr)Umy, or allY other simj.lar condition to bring the 1'1'11.ole question of a
general recule,tion and reduction of armaments bacl{ to the initial stage of
discussion.
Noreove~, . it' the expression llconf'idence" is taken in its strict and
6:x.act meaning, even that l.najority H11ich usually votes for the proposals of
t11.e United States delegation may contain some seeds of distrust, suspicion
an~ caution among its members. one S'tate may mistrust another because the
latter is driVing it out of the Near', Middle or Far East. There are States
~hich may quite justifiably consider themse~ves disadvantageo, by, for
~. " '.
~nstal1ce, the creation of the Western German State J which three,tens their
frontiers and thei'r security. There EIre States in the south6xn part of the
Americ~n continent which are alarmed by the threat of economic ezgression
/by their
 sic .3/32!Bev.1
Page 43

.~ a;td by their IJol-Terful northern neighbour. International confidence based o:nly

"~O oa~'!na::f'
<I'll..... '11
on the fact that several governments are united in conunon hosti1:lty tOl-Tards
the Soviet Union cau be neither a solid nor a lastj.ng llositive factor in
international life and collaboration. Such II confidence" cennot lead very
far.
And yet) by means of this "confidence ll device, the An.glo~American l?arty
:eJ,;'b1Y has broucht the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments to a
GC u 5 i:d standstill. The United States representative n~w takes the liberty of
ier;.1 If describin~ retrospectively the USSR proposal on 'the reduction of armaments
as a weapon of Goviet propaganda without noticing th~t such allegations
completely betray both himself and the United States official circles that
1 stand behind him as the enemies and violators of the General A.ssembly
10;1 o'f I resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 191~6. All these shifts throw
ter;cefuJ. ! an even stranger light on the statement made by the United States
i~ in t representative that the United States Government is in favour of continuing
'':l ex!.' the 1
the work of the Comm.ission for Conventional .A1.'maments. But the question is:
what are vTe to do with these famous safeguards :tor international confidence
which) accordinc; to the AngloyAmerican party, do not as yet exist? What
.ole are we to do with the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission has ceased to
function, s:l,nce its succeSB woula, truly have been one of the fundamental
safeauexds for intel~national confidence? To demand an anSlfer to these
questio~s from the United States representative would be superflUOUS, for
his o'Vm statement - ivhich :f'lasrantly contradicts the fiction of confidence
safeguards - is nothinG less than another clumsy trick to try to free the
United States representatives from the respollsibility for the virtual wrecking
lG to r of the work of the Commissions on all types of armaments, including a;tomic
weapons.
HhiJ,e pIecinG' the responsibility for the non-fulfilment of the General
Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946 on the United States
and United Kinac10m delegations, the Ul{rainian delegation believes that the
WOI'll: of the Commission for Conventional ArllleJnents should be continued. and
that the Commission should be empower~d to deal also With the prohibition
of atomic WeapOl'lS and the destruction of stocks of atom bombs. The
Ukrainian deleGation supports the USSR Government's proposal for the
regulation and reciuction of armaments :put forward here by the USSR
representative in conformity With the previous proposals made by the USSR
delegation on the gU6stion under discussion in the Commission.

Cof tht)
SiOJl
('
/ANNEX VI
 sic .3!3 2!Rev.1
Page 4!f

:' , ... ANNEX VI

STAT.H::MENT lA.ADfJ: BY THE BEPRESJiJNIJ.1.ATIIJE 0]' F.HANCE AT THE THIRTEENTH MEETING

0]' THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENr.l'IONAL ARMPJV.lENTS, 12 AUGUST 1948

At the moment when the Commission for COllventional Armaments is taking occ
its bearings after :p.earl~" a year of act:1.vity, t110 French delegation would Un!
lilt8 to state the leading ideas 'Which have gUided it 'in this ,mrlc. The
regulation ana, reduction of arlllaments must be progressive and balanced.
Although it is undeniable that substantial progress in this field can be "
obtained only in a genel'al atmosphere of confidence the French delegation
believes that it is essential to make preparatory studies in conformity
llith the Resolution of' the General Assembly of December 1946, and that
oertain preliminary measures should be taken even in the :present condition
of international relations.
The adoption of these measures looking .togener~l disarmament would
cont:ribute greatly to the development of that international confidence
needed for the successful completion of our 'Work. The question of general
disarmament is tightly bOUlld to collective security. No important
disarmament measures can be carried out before a mechanism of collective
secUl'ity has been set up. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance
that the Security Council, which is seized of the differences which have
arisen in the Military Staff COl1llnittee on the pasic principles fo:;,' the
organization of the armed forces to be placed at ~ts disposal, should as
soon as possible take every useful step to facilitate the achievement of
real progress in the organization of collective security.
In the third place, the study of the reduction of conventional
armaments can and should be conducted independently of study of the
J;.rohibition of atomic weapons. This principle was made clea.r in the
discussions of the General Assem.bly of 1946. Moreover, the area of study
is different, since atomic energy is c~pable of practical application and
offers a new field in which everything remains to be done, whereas
conventional armaments constitute a purely .military domain, long since
incor~orated into the life , of nations. Finally, it should be remembered
,

that though atomic weapons and weapons of mass d~struction are to be

absolu"'~ely prohibited, conventional armaments are onl;y- to be reduced and
liluited. The two questions, that of atomic energy and that of conventjonal
,
: ",I,··

armaments, have absolutely 'distinct/characteristics, and each has its own 1

s:phere which doe's not trespass on that of the other.
I
It 'Would be deplorable 1 therefore, if in linking these two questions
it were not possible to avoid allOWing the difficulties encountered in one
Iriold
 sIc .3/32/Rev.1
:Page 45

field to prevent progress in the other field. The discussions which have
to.l(en place in the Commission for a-bout a year have not revealed any factor
of a kind to change this positiol'l of the French delegation which means to
remain faithful in the future to its principles, already expounded on many
occasions in the General Assembly and in the different organs of the
r1 would Unitea. Nations,

nd1ticn

..ould
lCU

tive
nca
he.ve

as
of

.,~

an.d

Id
cnal
loin

me /ANNEX VII
.d
 sic .3/32/Rev.1
Page 46
s
c
ANNEX VII

STATEIl1ElljI'.fl l'vIADE BY TEE REFRESENTATIVE OF CHINA AT THE TIIIR'l'EENTH ~!EETING

..
OF TEE COMMISSION l!'OR CONVENTIONAL ABM.I\.MElII'rS, 12 AUGUST 194.8

The Commission for Conventional Armaments is nOYT considering -che first

:)J

I
Proc;ress Report of its Wo:r'king Committee. The Chinese delegation regrets
that the Committee has not been able to do more than disposing of only
t"ro items of its plan of wOl'k. A "torhole year has passed since the ./
·1

Ho:-ddng Committee began its work on 20 August 1947. It is regrettable

that important differences of opinion have developed during the discussion. t{:
····l;·'·j
.\
'·r
These differences are chiefly rosponsible for the slow progress of the , <)

Wor}r of the Committee. '\

i ~t~te]
The Chinese delegation believes that disarmament is a fundamental
l1art of 0111" vOr'k in the Unitod Nations.
No differences of opinion cunnot 1
~
be OVerCOln.0 if all the representatives are sinc0rely worl~in8 for an
agreement. The suocess of the United Natj~us itself depends upon a spirit
of conciliation. The Chinese Government certainly would not be tho first
.
to dos]?aiX' of disarmament. l'le i'1i11 support. the proposel of submitting
the first Progress Report to the Security Council. We maintain that the
Conunisston for Conventional Armaments should continue its ,fOrk.
The ChineEje delegation believes that disarmament and international
confidence should go hand in hand. No system of disarmament can be put
into operation if international tension remains acute. It is equ~lly true
that international confidence cannot be achieved while nations era engaged
in an armament race. A break must be made somewhere, either by easing
of the tension, or by carrying out a small degree of disarmament. One
will encourage the other, and vice versa. During discussions in the
I'lorking; Cormnittee, I h....ve repeatedly emphasized this point. It is the
belief of my delegaJ~ion that a break to this effec'b can be mado if only
there is the will.
Further, the Chinese delegation believes that any workable syst8m for
the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must include
an adequate system of safee~a~ds to protect complying States against the
hazards of violation and evasions. Without practical and effective
safeguards} no system of regulation of armaments can hope to gain the
confidence of the various nations which traditionally do not trust each
other.
Lastly, the Chinese delegation beU.eves that Article 43 of the
Cllarter shoUld be implemented, and that a system of collective security
shoUld be ostabl1shed as soon as possible. This will go a Ions way in
helping to promote international confidenoe and to expedite the l.,m.~k of
this Commission.
-- ... ,..­