CHAPTER 2

‘’
Subjectivism, Relativism, and Emotivism

Consider the following: Abdulla Yones killed his principles are rigid rules that have no exceptions
sixteen-year-old daughter Heshu in their apart- (a view known as absolutism) or that they must be
ment in west London. The murder was an example applied in exactly the same way in every situation
of an “honor killing,” an ancient tradition still and culture.
practiced in many parts of the world. Using a On the other hand, let us say that you assess the
kitchen knife, Yones stabbed Heshu eleven times case like this: “In societies that approve of honor
and slit her throat. He later declared that he had to killing, the practice is morally right; in those that
kill her to expunge a stain from his family, a stain do not approve, it is morally wrong. My society
that Heshu had caused by her outrageous behavior. approves of honor killing, so it is morally right.” If
What was outrageous behavior to Yones, however, you believe what you say, then you are a cultural
would seem to many Westerners to be typical teen- relativist. Cultural relativism is the view that an
age antics, annoying but benign. Heshu’s precise action is morally right if one’s culture approves of
offense against her family’s honor is unclear, but it. Moral rightness and wrongness are therefore rel-
the possibilities include wearing makeup, having ative to cultures. So in one culture, an action may
a boyfriend, and showing an independent streak be morally right; in another culture, it may be mor-
that would be thought perfectly normal through- ally wrong.
out the West. In some countries, honor killings are Perhaps you prefer an even narrower view of
sometimes endorsed by the local community or morality, and so you say, “Honor killing may be
even given the tacit blessing of the state. right for you, but it is most certainly not right for
What do you think of this time-honored way me.” If you mean this literally, then you are com-
of dealing with family conflicts? Specifically, what mitted to another kind of relativism called sub-
is your opinion regarding the morality of honor jective relativism—the view that an action is
killing? Your response to this question is likely to morally right if one approves of it. Moral rightness
reveal not only your view of honor killing but your and wrongness are relative not to cultures but to
overall approach to morality as well. Suppose your individuals. An action, then, can be right for you
response is something like this: “Honor killing is but wrong for someone else. Your approving of an
morally wrong—wrong no matter where it’s done action makes it right. There is therefore no objec-
or who does it.” With this statement, you implic- tive morality, and cultural norms do not make right
itly embrace moral objectivism—the theory that or wrong—individuals make right or wrong.
moral truths exist and that they do so indepen- Finally, imagine that you wish to take a differ-
dently of what individuals or societies think of ent tack regarding the subject of honor killing. You
them. In other words, there are moral facts, and say, “I abhor the practice of honor killing”—but
they are not human inventions, fictions, or prefer- you believe that in uttering these words you are
ences. However, you need not hold that objective saying nothing that is true or false. You believe that

20
 CHAPTER 2: SubjECTiviSm, RElATiviSm, And EmoTiviSm Á 21

despite what your statement seems to mean, you

’
are simply expressing your emotions. You there-
QUICK REVIEW
fore hold to emotivism—the view that moral
utterances are neither true nor false but are instead objectivism—The theory that moral truths exist
expressions of emotions or attitudes. So in your and that they do so independently of what
sentence about honor killing, you are not stating a individuals or societies think of them.
fact—you are merely emoting and possibly trying cultural relativism—The view that an action is
to influence someone’s behavior. Even when emo- morally right if one’s culture approves of it.
tivists express a more specific preference regarding Implications: that cultures are morally infallible,
other people’s behavior—by saying, for instance, that social reformers can never be morally right,
“No one should commit an honor killing”—they that moral disagreements between individuals
are still not making a factual claim. They are simply in the same culture amount to arguments over
expressing a preference, and perhaps hoping to per- whether someone disagrees with her culture,
suade other people to see things their way. that other cultures cannot be legitimately criti-
These four replies represent four distinct per- cized, and that moral progress is impossible.
spectives (though certainly not the only per- subjective relativism—The view that an action is
spectives) on the meaning and import of moral morally right if one approves of it. Implications:
judgments. Moreover, they are not purely theoreti- that individuals are morally infallible and that
cal, but real and relevant. People actually live their genuine moral disagreement between individ-
lives (or try to) as moral objectivists, or relativists, uals is nearly impossible.
or emotivists, or some strange and inconsistent emotivism—The view that moral utterances are
mixture of these. (There is an excellent chance, for neither true nor false but are expressions of
example, that you were raised as an objectivist but emotions or attitudes. Implications: that people
now accept some form of relativism—or even try to cannot disagree over the moral facts because
hold to objectivism in some instances and relativ- there are no moral facts, that presenting reasons
ism in others.) in support of a moral utterance is a matter of
In any case, the question that you should ask offering nonmoral facts that can influence some-
(and that ethics can help you answer) is not whether one’s attitude, and that nothing is actually good
you in fact accept any of these views, but whether you or bad.
are justified in doing so. Let us see, then, where an
examination of reasons for and against them will
lead.
objectively right (or wrong). It is right (or wrong)
relative to individuals. In this way, moral rightness
SUBJECTIVE RELATIVISM
becomes a matter of personal taste. If to Ann straw-
What view of morality could be more tempting (and berry ice cream tastes good, then it is good (for her).
convenient) than the notion that an action is right If to Greg strawberry ice cream tastes bad, then it
if someone approves of it? Subjective relativism is bad (for him). There is no such thing as straw-
says that action X is right for Ann if she approves berry ice cream tasting good objectively or gener-
of it yet wrong for Greg if he disapproves of it. Thus ally. Likewise, the morality of an action depends on
action X can be both right and wrong—right for Ann’s and Greg’s moral tastes.
Ann but wrong for Greg. A person’s approval of an Many people claim they are subjective relativists—
action makes it right for that person. Action X is not until they realize the implications of the doctrine
22 Á PART 1: FundAmEnTAlS

’ Jesus said “Judge not that ye be not judged.” Some

Judge Not?

Midgley argues that Jesus was taking aim at

sweeping condemnations and vindictiveness:
have taken this to mean that we should not make
moral judgments about others, and many who he was not trashing the “whole faculty of judg-
have never heard those words are convinced that ment.” Indeed, Jesus is making the “subtle point
that while we cannot possibly avoid judging, we
to judge others is to be insensitive, intolerant, or
can see to it that we judge fairly, as we would
absolutist. Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain exam-
expect others to do to us.” This is part and par-
ines this attitude and finds it both mistaken and
cel, then, of justice as fairness, as a discernment
harmful. about a particular case and person and deed. Sub-
I have also found helpful the discussion of the jectivism in such matters—of the “I’m okay, you’re
lively British philosopher, Mary Midgley. In her okay,” variety—is a cop-out, a way to stop form-
book Can’t We Make Moral Judgments? Midgley ing and expressing moral judgments altogether.
notes our contemporary search for a nonjudgmen- This strange suspension of specific moments of
tal politics and quotes all those people who cry, in judgment goes hand-in-glove, of course, with an
effect, “But surely it’s always wrong to make moral often violent rhetoric of condemnation of whole
judgments.” We are not permitted to make anyone categories of persons, past and present—that all-
uncomfortable, to be “insensitive.” Yet moral judg- purpose villain, the Dead White European Male,
ment of “some kind,” says Midgley, “is a necessary comes to mind.*
element to our thinking.” Judging involves our
whole nature—it isn’t just icing on the cake of self- *Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Judge Not?” First Things,
identity. Judging makes it possible for us to “find no. 46, pp. 36–40, October 1994. Reprinted by permis-
our way through a whole forest of possibilities.” sion of the publisher.

that are at odds with our commonsense moral expe- innocent people, including six million Jews. If so,
rience. First, subjective relativism implies that in by the lights of subjective relativism, his facilitat-
the rendering of any moral opinion, each person is ing those deaths was morally right. It seems that
incapable of being in error. Each of us is morally infal- the totalitarian leader Pol Pot approved of his
lible. If we approve of an action—and we are sincere murdering more than a million innocent people
in our approval—then that action is morally right. in Cambodia. If so, it was right for him to mur-
We literally cannot be mistaken about this, because der those people. But it seems obvious that what
our approval makes the action right. If we say that these men did was wrong and that their approv-
inflicting pain on an innocent child for no reason is ing of their actions did not make the actions right.
right (that is, we approve of such an action), then the Because subjective relativism suggests otherwise, it
action is right. Our moral judgment is correct, and it is a dubious doctrine.
cannot be otherwise. Yet if anything is obvious about Another obvious feature of our commonsense
our moral experience, it is that we are not infallible. moral experience is that from time to time we have
We sometimes are mistaken in our moral judgments. moral disagreements. Maria says that capital pun-
We are, after all, not gods. ishment is right, but Carlos says that it is wrong. This
By all accounts, Adolf Hitler approved of (and seems like a perfectly clear case of two people dis-
ordered) the extermination of vast numbers of agreeing about the morality of capital punishment.
 CHAPTER 2: SubjECTiviSm, RElATiviSm, And EmoTiviSm Á 23

Subjective relativism, however, implies that such treachery, surgically remove the clitorises of young
disagreements cannot happen. Subjective relativ- girls for no medical reason, kill one’s elderly par-
ism says that when Maria states that capital punish- ents, have multiple husbands or wives, and make
ment is right, she is just saying that she approves of up for someone’s death by murdering others.
it. And when Carlos states that capital punishment Among some people, it has been considered mor-
is wrong, he is just saying that he disapproves of it. ally acceptable to kill those of a different sexual
But they are not really disagreeing, because they orientation, lynch persons with a different skin
are merely describing their attitudes toward capital color, and allow children to die by refusing to give
punishment. In effect, Maria is saying “This is my them available medical treatment. (These latter acts
attitude on the subject,” and Carlos is saying “Here have all been practiced in subcultures within the
is my attitude on the subject.” But these two claims United States, so not all such cultural differences
are not opposed to each other. They are about dif- happen far from home.) It is only a small step from
ferent subjects, so both statements could be true. acknowledging this moral diversity among cultures
Maria and Carlos might as well be discussing how to the conclusion that cultures determine moral
strawberry ice cream tastes to each of them, for rightness and that objective morality is a myth.
nothing that Maria says could contradict what Car- The philosopher Walter T. Stace (1886–1967)
los says. Because genuine disagreement is a fact of illustrates how easily this conclusion has come to
our moral life, and subjective relativism is inconsis- many in Western societies:
tent with this fact, the doctrine is implausible. It was easy enough to believe in a single absolute
In practice, subjective relativism is a difficult morality in older times when there was no anthro-
view to hold consistently. At times, of course, you pology, when all humanity was divided clearly into
can insist that an action is right for you but wrong two groups, Christian peoples and the “heathen.”
for someone else. But you may also find yourself Christian peoples knew and possessed the one true
morality. The rest were savages whose moral ideas
saying something like “Pol Pot committed abso-
could be ignored. But all this changed. Greater
lutely heinous acts; he was evil,” or “What Hitler knowledge has brought greater tolerance. We can
did was wrong”—and what you mean is that what no longer exalt our own moralities as alone true,
Pol Pot and Hitler did was objectively wrong, not while dismissing all other moralities as false or
just wrong relative to you. Such slides from sub- inferior. The investigations of anthropologists have
jective relativism to objectivism suggest a conflict shown that there exist side by side in the world a
between these two perspectives and the need to bewildering variety of moral codes. On this topic
endless volumes have been written, masses of evi-
resolve it through critical reasoning.
dence piled up. Anthropologists have ransacked the
Melanesian Islands, the jungles of New Guinea, the
CULTURAL RELATIVISM steppes of Siberia, the deserts of Australia, the for-
ests of central Africa, and have brought back with
To many people, the idea that morality is relative them countless examples of weird, extravagant,
to culture is obvious. It seems obvious primarily and fantastic “moral” customs with which to con-
because modern sociology has left no doubt that found us. We learn that all kinds of horrible prac-
tices are, in this, that, or the other place, regarded
people’s moral judgments differ from culture to
as essential to virtue. We find that there is nothing,
culture. The moral judgments of people in other
or next to nothing, which has always and every-
cultures are often shockingly different from our where been regarded as morally good by all men.
own. In some societies, it is morally permissible Where then is our universal morality? Can we, in
to kill infants at birth, burn widows alive with the face of all this evidence, deny that it is nothing but
bodies of their husbands, steal and commit acts of an empty dream?1
24 Á PART 1: FundAmEnTAlS

Here, Stace spells out in rough form the most A good argument gives us good reason to
common argument for cultural relativism, an infer- accept its conclusion, and an argument is good if
ence from differences in the moral beliefs of cul- its logic is solid (the conclusion follows logically
tures to the conclusion that cultures make morality. from the premises) and the premises are true. So
Before we conclude that objectivism is in fact an is the foregoing argument a good one? We can
empty dream, we should state the argument more see right away that the logic is in fact solid. That
precisely and examine it closely. We can lay out the is, the argument is valid: the conclusion does
argument like this: indeed follow from the premises. The question
then becomes whether the premises are true. As
1. People’s judgments about right and wrong
we have seen, Premise 1 is most certainly true.
differ from culture to culture.
People’s judgments about right and wrong do
2. If people’s judgments about right and wrong vary from culture to culture. But what of Prem-
differ from culture to culture, then right and ise 2? Does the diversity of views about right and
wrong are relative to culture, and there are no wrong among cultures show that right and wrong
objective moral principles. are determined by culture, that there are no uni-
3. Therefore, right and wrong are relative to culture, versal moral truths? There are good reasons to
and there are no objective moral principles. think this premise false.

’ CRITICAL THOUGHT: “Female Circumcision” and Cultural Relativism

In recent years many conflicts have flared between is defended by some who say that it prepares girls
those who espouse universal human rights and those for their role in society and marriage and discour-
who embrace cultural relativism. One issue that has ages illicit sex.
been a flash point in these contentious debates is a Public health officials regard FGC as a serious
practice called female genital cutting (FGC). Other health problem. It can cause reproductive tract
names include female circumcision and female infections, pain during intercourse, painful men-
genital mutilation. struation, complications during childbirth, greater
In FGC, all or part of the female genitals are risk of HIV infection, bleeding, and even death.
removed. The procedure, used mostly in Africa International health agencies denounce FGC, but
and the Middle East, is usually performed on girls many say that no one outside a culture using FGC
between the ages of four and eight, but sometimes has a right to criticize the practice.
on young women. A report in the Yale Journal of Do you think that FGC is morally permissible? If
Public Health states that in Sudan, 89 percent of you judge the practice wrong, are you appealing to
girls receive FGC and that the cutting tools used some notion of objective morality? If you judge it
“include knives, scissors, razors, and broken glass. permissible, are you doing so because you are a cul-
The operation is typically performed by elderly tural relativist? In either case, explain your reasoning.
women or traditional birth attendants, though
increasing numbers of doctors are taking over *Sarah Cannon and Daniel Berman, “Cut Off: The
these roles.”* The practice occurs for various rea- Female Genital-Cutting Controversy,” Yale Journal of
sons, including religious and sociological ones, and Public Health 1, no. 2 (2004).
 CHAPTER 2: SubjECTiviSm, RElATiviSm, And EmoTiviSm Á 25

Premise 2 says that because there are disagree- that in the culture we are considering, those who
ments among cultures about right and wrong, belong to it believe (a) that at the moment of death
there must not be any universal standards of right one enters heaven; (b) one’s physical and mental
condition in the afterlife is exactly what it is at the
and wrong. But even if the moral judgments of
moment of death; and (c) men are at the peak of
people in various cultures do differ, such differ- their physical and mental powers when they are
ences in themselves do not show that morality is sixty. Then what appeared at first to be peculiari-
relative to culture. Just because people in different ties in moral outlook on the part of the cultural
cultures have different views about morality, their group in question regarding the sanctity of life and
disagreement does not prove that no view can be respect for parents, turn out to be located rather in
objectively correct—no more than people’s disagree- a nonmoral outlook of the group. A man in that
culture who kills his father is doing so out of con-
ments about the size of a house show that no one’s
cern for the latter’s well-being—to prevent him, for
opinion about it can be objectively true. Suppose
example, from spending eternity blind or senile.
Culture 1 endorses infanticide, but Culture 2 does It is not at all clear that, if we shared the relevant
not. Such a disagreement does not demonstrate nonmoral beliefs of this other culture, we would
that both cultures are equally correct or that there is not believe with them that sons should kill their
no objectively correct answer. After all, it is possible fathers at the appropriate time.2
that infanticide is objectively right (or wrong) and
that the relevant moral beliefs of either Culture 1 or To find similar examples, we need not search for
Culture 2 are false. the exotic. In Western cultures we have the famil-
Another reason to doubt the truth of Premise iar case of abortion, an issue hotly debated among
2 comes from questioning how deep the disagree- those who at first glance appear to be disagreeing
ments among cultures really are. Judgments about about moral principles. But in fact the disputants
the rightness of actions obviously do vary across agree about the moral principle involved: that mur-
cultures. But people can differ in their moral judg- der (unjustly killing a person) is morally wrong.
ments not just because they accept different moral What they do disagree about is a nonmoral factual
principles, but also because they have divergent matter—whether the fetus is an entity that can be
nonmoral beliefs. They may actually embrace the murdered (that is, whether it is a person). Disagree-
same moral principles, but their moral judgments ment over the nonmoral facts masks substantial
conflict because their nonmoral beliefs lead them agreement on fundamental moral standards.
to apply those principles in very different ways. If The work of several anthropologists provides
so, the diversity of moral judgments across cultures some evidence for these kinds of disagreements
does not necessarily indicate deep disagreements as well as for the existence of cross-cultural moral
over fundamental moral principles or standards. agreement in general. The social psychologist Solo-
Here is a classic example: mon Asch, for instance, maintains that differ-
ing moral judgments among societies often arise
[T]he story is told of a culture in which a son is when the same moral principles are operating but
regarded as obligated to kill his father when the lat- 3
the particulars of cultural situations vary. Other
ter reaches age sixty. Given just this much informa-
observers claim that across numerous diverse cul-
tion about the culture and the practice in question
tures we can find many common moral elements
it is tempting to conclude that the members of that
culture differ radically from members of our cul- such as prohibitions against murder, lying, incest,
ture in their moral beliefs and attitudes. We, after and adultery and obligations of fairness, reciproc-
all, believe it is immoral to take a human life, and ity, and consideration toward parents and chil-
4
regard patricide as especially wrong. But suppose dren. Some philosophers argue that a core set of
26 Á PART 1: FundAmEnTAlS

moral values—including, for example, truth telling subjective relativism, it has several implications
and prohibitions against murder—must be univer- that render it highly implausible.
sal, otherwise cultures would not survive. First, like subjective relativism, cultural relativ-
These points demonstrate that Premise 2 of the ism implies moral infallibility—that a culture sim-
argument for cultural relativism is false. The argu- ply cannot be mistaken about a moral issue. If it
ment therefore gives us no good reasons to believe approves of an action, then that action is morally
that an action is right simply because one’s culture right, and there is no possibility of error as long as
approves of it. the culture’s approval is genuine. But, of course,
For many people, however, the failure of the cultural infallibility in moral matters is flagrantly
argument for cultural relativism may be beside the implausible, just as individual infallibility is. At one
point. They find the doctrine appealing mainly time or another, cultures have sanctioned witch
because it seems to promote the humane and burning, slavery, genocide, racism, rape, human
enlightened attitude of tolerance toward other cul- sacrifice, and religious persecution. Does it make
tures. Broad expanses of history are drenched with any sense to say that they could not have been
blood and marked by cruelty because of the evil of mistaken about the morality of these actions?
intolerance—religious, racial, political, and social. Cultural relativism also has the peculiar con-
Tolerance therefore seems a supreme virtue, and sequence that social reformers of every sort would
cultural relativism appears to provide a justifica- always be wrong. Their culture would be the ultimate
tion and vehicle for it. After all, if all cultures are authority on moral matters, so if they disagreed
morally equal, does not cultural relativism both with their culture, they could not possibly be right.
entail and promote tolerance? If their culture approved of genocide, genocide
We should hope that tolerance does reign in a would be right, and antigenocide reformers would
pluralistic world, but there is no necessary connec- be wrong to oppose the practice. In this upside-
tion between tolerance and cultural relativism. For down world, the antigenocide reformers would
one thing, cultural relativists cannot consistently be immoral, and the genocidal culture would be
advocate tolerance. To advocate tolerance is to the real paragon of righteousness. Reformers such
advocate an objective moral value. But if tolerance as Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Mary
is an objective moral value, then cultural relativism Wollstonecraft (champion of women’s rights), and
must be false, because it says that there are no objec- Frederick Douglass (American abolitionist) would
tive moral values. So instead of justifying tolerance be great crusaders—for immorality. Our moral
toward all, cultural relativism actually undercuts experience, however, suggests that cultural relativ-
universal tolerance. Moreover, according to cul- ism has matters exactly backward. Social reform-
tural relativism, intolerance can be justified just ers have often been right when they claimed their
as easily as tolerance can. If a culture approves of cultures were wrong, and this fact suggests that cul-
intolerance, then intolerance is right for that cul- tural relativism is wrong about morality.
ture. If a culture approves of tolerance, then toler- Where cultural relativism holds, if you have a
ance is right for that culture. Cultural relativists are disagreement with your culture about the right-
thus committed to the view that intolerance can ness of an action, you automatically lose. You are
in fact be justified, and they cannot consistently in error by definition. But what about a disagree-
claim that tolerance is morally right everywhere. ment among members of the same society? What
At this point we are left with no good reasons does such a disagreement amount to? It amounts
to believe that cultural relativism is true. But the to something very strange, according to cultural
problems for the doctrine are deeper than that. Like relativism. When two people in the same culture
 CHAPTER 2: SubjECTiviSm, RElATiviSm, And EmoTiviSm Á 27

disagree on a moral issue, what they are really dis- carried out his orders). Then Hitler’s final solution
agreeing about—the only thing they can rationally was morally right; engineering the Holocaust was
disagree about—is whether their society endorses a morally permissible. If you are a cultural relativist,
particular view. After all, society makes actions right you cannot legitimately condemn these monstrous
by approving or disapproving of them. According deeds. Because they were approved by their respec-
to cultural relativism, if René and Michel (both tive societies, they were morally justified. They
members of society X) are disagreeing about capital were just as morally justified as the socially sanc-
punishment, their disagreement must actually be tioned activities of Albert Schweitzer, Jonas Salk, or
about whether society X approves of capital pun- Florence Nightingale. But all this seems implausi-
ishment. Because right and wrong are determined ble. We do in fact sometimes criticize other cultures
by one’s culture, René and Michel are disagreeing and believe that it is legitimate to do so.
about what society X says. But this view of moral Contrary to the popular view, rejecting cultural
disagreement is dubious, to say the least. When we relativism (embracing moral objectivism) does not
have a moral disagreement, we do not think that entail intolerance. In fact, it provides a plausible
the crux of it is whether our society approves of an starting point for tolerance. A moral objectivist
action. We do not think that deciding a moral issue realizes that she can legitimately criticize other
is simply a matter of polling the public to see which cultures—and that people of other cultures can
way opinion leans. We do not think that René and legitimately criticize her culture. A recognition of
Michel will ever find out whether capital punish- this fact together with an objectivist’s sense of falli-
ment is morally permissible by consulting public bility can lead her to an openness to criticism of her
opinion. Determining whether an action is right is own culture and to acceptance of everyone’s right
a very different thing from determining what most to disagree.
people think. This odd consequence of cultural We not only criticize other cultures but also
relativism suggests that the doctrine is flawed. compare the past with the present. We compare
One of the more disturbing implications of the actions of the past with those of the present
cultural relativism is that cultures cannot be legiti- and judge whether moral progress has been made.
mately criticized from the outside. If a culture We see that slavery has been abolished, that we no
approves of the actions that it performs, then those longer burn witches, that we recognize racism as
actions are morally right, regardless of what other evil—then we judge that these changes represent
cultures have to say about the matter. One society’s moral progress. For moral relativists, however,
practices are as morally justified as any other’s, as there is no objective standard by which to com-
long as the practices are socially sanctioned. This pare the ways of the past with the ways of the pres-
consequence of cultural relativism may not seem ent. Societies of the past approved or disapproved
too worrisome when the societies in question are of certain practices, and contemporary societies
long dead. But it takes on a different tone when approve or disapprove of them, and no transcul-
the societies are closer to us in time. Consider the tural moral assessments can be made. But if there
1994 genocide committed in Rwanda in which a is such a thing as moral progress, then there must
million people died. Suppose the killers’ society be some cross-cultural moral yardstick by which we
(their tribe) approved of the murders. Then the can evaluate actions. There must be objective stan-
genocide was morally justified. And what of Hitler’s dards by which we can judge that actions of the
“final solution”—the murder of millions of Jews in present are better than those of the past. If there are
World War II? Say that German society approved no objective moral standards, our judging that we
of Hitler’s actions (and those of the men who are in fact making moral progress is hard to explain.
28 Á PART 1: FundAmEnTAlS

Finally, there is a fundamental difficulty con- noncognitivist view is emotivism, which says that
cerning the application of cultural relativism to moral judgments cannot be true or false because
moral questions: the doctrine is nearly impossi- they do not make any claims—they merely express
ble to use. The problem is that cultural relativism emotions or attitudes. For the emotivist, moral
applies to societies (or social groups), but we all utterances are something akin to exclamations that
belong to several societies, and there is no way to simply express approving or disapproving feel-
choose which one is the proper one. What soci- ings: “Violence against women—disgusting!” or
ety do you belong to if you are an Italian Ameri- “Shoplifting—love it!”
can Buddhist living in Atlanta, Georgia, who is a The English philosopher A. J. Ayer (1910–1989),
member of the National Organization for Women an early champion of emotivism, is clear and blunt
and a breast cancer support group? The hope of about what a moral utterance such as “Stealing
cultural relativists is that they can use the doc- money is wrong” signifies. This sentence, he says,
trine to make better, more enlightened moral
expresses no proposition which can be either true
decisions. But this society-identification problem
or false. It is as if I had written “Stealing money!!”—
seems to preclude any moral decisions, let alone where the shape and thickness of the exclamation
enlightened ones. marks show, by a suitable convention, that a spe-
What, then, can we conclude from our exami- cial sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which
nation of cultural relativism? We have found that is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing
the basic argument for the view fails; we therefore said here which can be true or false. . . . For in saying
that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am
have no good reasons to believe that the doctrine
not making any factual statement, not even a state-
is true. Beyond that, we have good grounds for
ment about my own state of mind.5
thinking the doctrine false. Its surprising implica-
tions regarding moral infallibility, moral reformers, If moral judgments are about feelings and not
moral progress, the nature of moral disagreements the truth or falsity of moral assertions, then ethics
within societies, and the possibility of cross-cultural is a very different sort of inquiry than most people
criticism show it to be highly implausible. The crux imagine. As Ayer says,
of the matter is that cultural relativism does a poor
[A]s ethical judgements are mere expressions of
job of explaining some important features of our
feeling, there can be no way of determining the
moral experience. A far better explanation of these validity of any ethical system, and, indeed, no
features is that some form of moral objectivism is sense in asking whether any such system is true. All
true. that one may legitimately enquire in this connec-
tion is, What are the moral habits of a given per-
son or group of people, and what causes them to
EMOTIVISM have precisely those habits and feelings? And this
enquiry falls wholly within the scope of the exist-
The commonsense view of moral judgments is
ing social sciences.6
that they ascribe moral properties to such things
as actions and people and that they are therefore The emotivist points out that in addition to
statements that can be true or false. This view of expressing feelings and attitudes, moral utter-
moral judgments is known as cognitivism. The ances also function to influence people’s attitudes
opposing view, called noncognitivism, denies that and behavior. So the sentence “Stealing money is
moral judgments are statements that can be true wrong” not only expresses feelings of disapproval
or false; it holds that they do not ascribe prop- but can also influence others to have similar feel-
erties to anything. Probably the most famous ings and act accordingly.
 CHAPTER 2: SubjECTiviSm, RElATiviSm, And EmoTiviSm Á 29

Emotivists also take an unusual position on different function. Here reasons are intended not
moral disagreements. They maintain that moral to support statements (because there are no moral
disagreements are not conflicts of beliefs, as is the statements) but to influence the emotions or atti-
case when one person asserts that something is tudes of others. Because moral utterances express
true and another person asserts that it is not true. emotions or attitudes, “presenting reasons” is a
Instead, moral disagreements are disagreements in matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influ-
attitude. Jane has positive feelings or a favorable ence those emotions and attitudes. Suppose A has
attitude toward abortion, but Ellen has negative a favorable attitude toward abortion, and B has an
feelings or an unfavorable attitude toward abor- unfavorable one (that is, A and B are having a dis-
tion. The disagreement is emotive, not cognitive. agreement in attitude). For A, to present reasons is
Jane may say “Abortion is right,” and Ellen may to provide information that might cause B to have a
say “Abortion is wrong,” but they are not really more favorable attitude toward abortion.
disagreeing over the facts. They are expressing This conception of the function of reasons,
conflicting attitudes and trying to influence each however, implies that good reasons encompass any
other’s attitude and behavior. nonmoral facts that can alter someone’s attitude.
Philosophers have criticized emotivism on On this view, the relevance of these facts to the
several grounds, and this emotivist analysis of dis- judgment at hand is beside the point. The essen-
agreement has been a prime target. As you might tial criterion is whether the adduced facts are suffi-
suspect, their concern is that this notion of disagree- ciently influential. They need not have any logical
ment is radically different from our ordinary view. or cognitive connection to the moral judgment
Like subjective relativism, emotivism implies that to be changed. They may, for example, appeal to
disagreements in the usual sense are impossible. someone’s ignorance, arrogance, racism, or fear.
People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because But we ordinarily suppose that reasons should be
there are no moral facts. But we tend to think that relevant to the cognitive content of moral judg-
when we disagree with someone on a moral issue, ments. Moreover, we normally make a clear dis-
there really is a conflict of statements about what tinction between influencing someone’s attitudes
is the case. Of course, when we are involved in a and showing (by providing reasons) that a claim is
conflict of beliefs, we may also experience conflict- true—a distinction that emotivism cannot make.
ing attitudes. But we do not think that we are only The final implication of emotivism is also prob-
experiencing a disagreement in attitudes. lematic: there is no such thing as goodness or bad-
Emotivism also provides a curious account of ness. We cannot legitimately claim that anything
how reasons function in moral discourse. Our com- is good or bad, because these properties do not
monsense view is that a moral judgment is the kind exist. To declare that something is good is simply
of thing that makes a claim about moral properties to express positive emotions or a favorable attitude
and that such a claim can be supported by reasons. toward it. We may say that pain is bad, but badness
If someone asserts “Euthanasia is wrong,” we may (or goodness) is not a feature of pain. Our saying
sensibly ask her what reasons she has for believing that pain is bad is just an expression of our unfavor-
that claim. If she replies that there are no reasons able attitude toward pain.
to back up her claim or that moral utterances are Suppose a six-year-old girl is living in a small vil-
not the kinds of things that can be supported by lage in Syria during the civil war between President
reasons, we would probably think that she mis- Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist government and rebel
understood the question or the nature of moral- forces. Assad’s henchmen firebomb the village,
ity. For the emotivist, “moral” reasons have a very destroying it and incinerating everyone except the
30 Á PART 1: FundAmEnTAlS

girl, who is burned from head to toe and endures CHAPTER REVIEW
excruciating pain for three days before she dies.
Suppose that we are deeply moved by this tragedy
as we consider her unimaginable suffering and we SUMMARY
remark, “How horrible. The little girl’s suffering
7
was a very bad thing.” When we say something Subjective relativism is the view that an action is mor-
ally right if one approves of it. A person’s approval
like this, we ordinarily mean that the girl’s suffering
makes the action right. This doctrine (as well as cul-
had a certain moral property: that the suffering was
tural relativism) is in stark contrast to moral objectiv-
bad. But according to emotivism, her suffering had
ism, the view that moral truths exist and that they
no moral properties at all. When we comment on
do so independently of what individuals or societ-
the girl’s suffering, we are simply expressing our
ies think of them. Subjective relativism, though, has
feelings; the suffering itself was neither good nor
some troubling implications. It implies that each per-
bad. But this view of things seems implausible. Our son is morally infallible and that individuals can never
moral experience suggests that some things in fact have a genuine moral disagreement.
are bad and some are good. Cultural relativism is the view that an action is mor-
The philosopher Brand Blanshard (1892–1987) ally right if one’s culture approves of it. The argument
makes the point in the following way: for this doctrine is based on the diversity of moral judg-
ments among cultures: because people’s judgments
[T]he emotivist is cut off by his theory from admit-
ting that there has been anything good or evil in about right and wrong differ from culture to culture,
the past, either animal or human. There have been right and wrong must be relative to culture, and there
Black Deaths, to be sure, and wars and rumours are no objective moral principles. This argument is
of war; there have been the burning of countless defective, however, because the diversity of moral views
women as witches, and the massacre in the Katyn does not imply that morality is relative to cultures. In
forest, and Oswiecim, and Dachau, and an unbear- addition, the alleged diversity of basic moral standards
able procession of horrors; but one cannot mean- among cultures may be only apparent, not real. Societ-
ingfully say that anything evil has ever happened. ies whose moral judgments conflict may be differing
The people who suffered from these things did
not over moral principles but over nonmoral facts.
indeed take up attitudes of revulsion toward them;
Some think that tolerance is entailed by cultural
we can now judge that they took them; but in such
relativism. But there is no necessary connection
judgments we are not saying that anything evil
occurred. . . . [Emotivism], when first presented, has between tolerance and the doctrine. Indeed, the cul-
some plausibility. But when this is balanced against tural relativist cannot consistently advocate tolerance
the implied unplausibility of setting down as mean- while maintaining his relativist standpoint. To advo-
ingless every suggestion that good or evil events cate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value.
have ever occurred, it is outweighed enormously.8 But if tolerance is an objective moral value, then cul-
tural relativism must be false, because it says that there
Obviously, emotivism does not fare well when are no objective moral values.
examined in light of our commonsense moral Like subjective relativism, cultural relativism has
experience. We must keep in mind, though, that some disturbing consequences. It implies that cultures
common sense is fallible. On the other hand, we are morally infallible, that social reformers can never
should not jettison common sense in favor of be morally right, that moral disagreements between
another view unless we have good reasons to do so. individuals in the same culture amount to arguments
In the case of emotivism, we have no good reasons over whether they disagree with their culture, that
to prefer it over common sense—and we have good other cultures cannot be legitimately criticized, and
grounds for rejecting it. that moral progress is impossible.
 CHAPTER 2: SubjECTiviSm, RElATiviSm, And EmoTiviSm Á 31

Emotivism is the view that moral utterances are 9. According to the text, how is it possible for
neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions people in different cultures to disagree about
or attitudes. It leads to the conclusion that people can moral judgments and still embrace the same
disagree only in attitude, not in beliefs. People can- fundamental moral principles? (pp. 25–26)
not disagree over the moral facts, because there are no 10. Is there a necessary connection between cultural
moral facts. Emotivism also implies that presenting relativism and tolerance? Why or why not?
reasons in support of a moral utterance is a matter of (p. 26)
offering nonmoral facts that can influence someone’s 11. What does cultural relativism imply about the
attitude. It seems that any nonmoral facts will do, as moral status of social reformers? (p. 26)
long as they affect attitudes. Perhaps the most far- 12. What is the emotivist view of moral
reaching implication of emotivism is that nothing is disagreements? (p. 29)
actually good or bad. There simply are no properties of 13. According to emotivism, how do reasons
goodness and badness. There is only the expression of function in moral discourse? (p. 29)
favorable or unfavorable emotions or attitudes toward
something.
Discussion Questions
1. Are you a subjective relativist? If so, how did
KEY TERMS you come to adopt this view? If not, what is
objectivism (p. 20) your explanation for not accepting it?
cultural relativism (p. 20) 2. Suppose a serial killer approves of his murderous
subjective relativism (p. 20) actions. According to subjective relativism, are
emotivism (p. 21) the killer’s actions therefore justified? Do you
believe a serial killer’s murders are justified? If not,
EXERCISES is your judgment based on a subjective relativist’s
perspective or an objectivist perspective?
Review Questions
3. Are you a cultural relativist? Why or why not?
1. Does objectivism entail intolerance? Why or 4. Suppose a majority of the German people
why not? (p. 20) approved of Hitler’s murdering six million Jews
2. Does objectivism require absolutism? Why or in World War II. Would this approval make
why not? (p. 20) Hitler’s actions morally justified? If so, why? If
3. How does subjective relativism differ from not, why not—and what moral outlook are you
cultural relativism? (p. 20) using to make such a determination?
4. What is emotivism? How does emotivism differ 5. When cultural relativists say that every culture
from objectivism? (p. 21) should embrace a policy of tolerance, are they
5. How does subjective relativism imply moral contradicting themselves? If so, how? If cultural
infallibility? (p. 22) relativism were true, would this fact make wars
6. According to moral subjectivism, are moral between societies less or more likely? Explain
disagreements possible? Why or why not? your answer.
(pp. 22–23) 6. If you traveled the world and saw that cultures
7. What is the argument for cultural relativism? differ dramatically in their moral judgments,
Is the argument sound? Why or why not? would you conclude from this evidence that
(pp. 23–26) cultural relativism was true? Why or why not?
8. Does the diversity of moral outlooks in cultures 7. According to a cultural relativist, would the
show that right and wrong are determined by civil rights reforms that Martin Luther King Jr.
culture? Why or why not? (pp. 24–26) sought be morally right or wrong? Do you think