Supplemental Written Submission Volume I

ARBITRATION UNDER ANNEX VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
v.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
SUPPLEMENTAL WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES
16 MARCH 2015
ii
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
QUESTION 1.................................................................................................................................. 3
QUESTION 2.................................................................................................................................. 7
I. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation .....................................................................7
II. Other Bilateral Arrangements and Public Representations by the

Philippines..............................................................................................................10
QUESTION 3................................................................................................................................ 11
QUESTION 4................................................................................................................................ 15
QUESTION 5................................................................................................................................ 19
QUESTION 6................................................................................................................................ 23
QUESTION 7................................................................................................................................ 27
QUESTION 8................................................................................................................................ 37
QUESTION 9................................................................................................................................ 43
QUESTION 10.............................................................................................................................. 51
QUESTION 11.............................................................................................................................. 55
QUESTION 12.............................................................................................................................. 59
QUESTION 13.............................................................................................................................. 63
I. China’s Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea .....................................63
II. China’s Claims to Historic Rights or Historic Title in Maritime Areas

Other than the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea ...........................................68
A. Bohai Sea ...................................................................................................68
B. Qiongzhou Strait ........................................................................................72
III. China’s Reactions to Claims of Historic Rights or Historic Title

Advanced by Other States ......................................................................................73
A. China’s Endorsement of Claims to Historic Bays .....................................73
B. China’s Rejection of Viet Nam’s Claim to Historic Waters in the

Gulf of Tonkin ...........................................................................................73
QUESTION 14.............................................................................................................................. 79
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QUESTION 15.............................................................................................................................. 83
QUESTION 16.............................................................................................................................. 89
I. The Application of Article 7 to Dependent Archipelagos .....................................89
II. Whether the Spratly Islands Are Entitled to Archipelagic Status ..........................92
A. Pursuant to Other Articles of the Convention ............................................92
B. Pursuant to General International Law ......................................................94
C. Pursuant to Historic Rights and Titles .......................................................97
QUESTION 17.............................................................................................................................. 99
QUESTION 18............................................................................................................................ 109
I. Summary of the Law ............................................................................................109
II. Jurisprudence .......................................................................................................111
QUESTIONS 19 through 24 ....................................................................................................... 115
QUESTION 25............................................................................................................................ 121
QUESTION 26............................................................................................................................ 123
I. The Subject-Matter of the Arbitration Is Not Territorial Sovereignty .................125
II. Neither the 2002 DOC Nor Any Other of the Joint Statements China Cites
Operate to Impair the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction, or Affect the Admissibility
of the Philippines’ Claims, under Article 281 .....................................................131
A. The 2002 DOC Is a Non-Binding Political Instrument ...........................132
B. The DOC Does Not Exclude Recourse to Other Means of Dispute

Settlement ................................................................................................136
C. No Settlement Has Been Reached Pursuant to the DOC .........................138
D. In Any Event, China Is Not Entitled To Invoke the DOC Due to

Its Own Breaches .....................................................................................141
E. The Other Bilateral Documents China Cites Are Irrelevant ....................143
III. The Subject-Matter of This Dispute Is Not “An Integral Part of Maritime
Delimitation”........................................................................................................146
APPENDIX TO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 13 ..................................................................... 151
I. Early History ........................................................................................................151
ii
A. China ........................................................................................................151
B. Other Polities ...........................................................................................155
II. The Colonial Era ..................................................................................................157
A. Maritime Activities of the Colonial Powers ............................................157
B. Efforts To Combat Piracy ........................................................................161
C. Viet Nam’s Control of Part of the South China Sea ................................163
D. Chinese Activities During the Colonial Era.............................................165
III. The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries ...........................................166
IV. The Period Since World War II ...........................................................................169
APPENDIX TO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 14 ..................................................................... 175
I. Maps Produced by China .....................................................................................175
II. Maps Produced by the Other Littoral States of the South China Sea ..................183
A. Maps Predating the Mid-17th Century ....................................................183
B. Maps from the Mid-Seventeenth Century to 1800 ..................................185
C. World War II to the Present .....................................................................195
III. Oil & Gas Concession Maps ................................................................................199
iii
iv
INTRODUCTION
1. The Republic of the Philippines respectfully presents this Supplemental Written

Submission in response to the Tribunal’s 16 December 2014 “Request for Further Written
Argument by the Philippines Pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Rules of Procedure.”
2. The Philippines is grateful for the opportunity to provide its views on the matters
addressed in the Tribunal’s questions. It is mindful of the evident care and effort that went
into the preparation of the questions. It has therefore made every effort to respond to each as
clearly and as directly as possible. The Philippines is confident that when the Tribunal has
completed its review of the additional observations and information presented herein, it will
conclude that it has jurisdiction over the dispute the Philippines has submitted to it, and that
the claims of the Philippines are well founded in fact and law.
3. This Supplemental Written Submission is presented in twelve volumes. Volume I

contains the main text of the Philippines’ responses to the 26 Questions posed by the
Tribunal, together with relevant figures. For the Tribunal’s convenience, each of its questions
is restated and followed immediately by the response of the Philippines.
4. Volume II consists of an Atlas of Relevant Features in which the Philippines has

compiled the information concerning all of the features identified in the Tribunal’s Questions
19 through 24. The Philippines has chosen to proceed in this fashion because it considers that
the Atlas presents the information requested by the Tribunal in the most readily-accessible
and user-friendly format. The Atlas presents the relevant features in alphabetical order and,
for each, provides: a geographic and hydrographic description; its position on a locator map;
a satellite image; photographs; excerpts from sailing directions and nautical charts; and a
summation of the pertinent geographic and hydrographic information. Also included is
historical and anthropological information on the feature (if requested by the Tribunal), and
the views of the Philippines on its legal status under UNCLOS.
5. Volumes III, IV, and V consist of supporting materials cited in the Atlas of Relevant
Features.
6. Volume VI consists of copies in A3 format of the historical maps requested by the

Tribunal in Question 14. In addition to the copies reproduced in Volume VI, the Philippines
is also simultaneously depositing two sets of large-format paper versions of the historical
1
maps with the Registry. High-resolution digital copies of each map are also being provided to
the members of the Tribunal and to the Registry. Volume VII consists of copies in A3 format
of oil and gas maps. High-resolution digital copies of each map are also being provided to the
members of the Tribunal and to the Registry
7. Volumes VII - XI contain additional documentary exhibits, expert reports and other
supporting materials, and Volume XII (in electronic format only) contains additional legal
authorities.
8. In addition to these twelve volumes, the Philippines is also depositing with the
Registry two copies of a portfolio containing the large-scale nautical charts requested by the
Tribunal in Question 17. All other copies of the nautical charts are produced electronically
preserving their original resolution. In addition, the Philippines is submitting electronically in
their original file format the South China Sea Electronic Navigational Charts prepared by the
East Asia Hydrographic Commission as requested by the Tribunal in Question 17.
2
QUESTION 1
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that “[t]he 2002 DOC [ASEAN Declaration on
the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea] poses no obstacle to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction”. The Philippines is invited to elaborate on this issue, in particular with respect
to whether the Declaration on Conduct constitutes an agreement within the meaning of
Article 282 of the Convention.
Response:
1.1. The Philippines does not consider the 2002 DOC to be an agreement within the
meaning of Article 282 of the Convention. Before explaining why, the Philippines notes that
in its 7 December 2014 Position Paper, China presented, among other things, detailed
arguments concerning the 2002 DOC and why, in its view, it constitutes an agreement within
the meaning of Article 281. (In contrast, it did not make any argument concerning Article
282.) The Philippines responds to China’s arguments in regard to Article 281 in connection
with its response to Question 26 (at pp. 123-150) soliciting the Philippines’ views on China’s
Position Paper. In responding to the current question, the Philippines will focus exclusively
on Article 282 as the Tribunal has requested.
1.2. Article 282 of the Convention provides:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning

the interpretation or application of this Convention have
agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or
otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to
the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding
decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures
provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute
otherwise agree.1
1.3. There are two requirements for Article 282 to apply: (1) that there be an agreement;
and (2) that the agreement provide for “a procedure that entails a binding decision”. The 2002
DOC does not satisfy either condition.
1.4. With respect to the requirement that there be an agreement, the Philippines showed in
its Memorial that the DOC is a political undertaking only. It does not purport to create legally
1
(Emphasis added.)
3
binding obligations and is therefore not an agreement under international law.2 The
Philippines elaborates on these arguments more fully in response to Question 26.
1.5. With respect to the requirement that the agreement in question provide for “a
procedure that entails a binding decision”, the plain terms of the 2002 DOC make clear that it
does not do so. The two relevant paragraphs of the DOC are paragraphs 4 and 7. They
provide:
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial

and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting
to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and
negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in
accordance with universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea;
7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their

consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through
modalities to be agreed by them, including regular
consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the
purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency,
establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation,
and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them[.]
1.6. The only “procedures” contemplated (assuming they can be characterized as such) are
consultations, negotiations and dialogue. None of these entails a binding decision. Article 282
is therefore of no relevance and, as stated, China’s Position Paper makes no argument to the
contrary.
1.7. Indeed, the only phrase in the 2002 DOC that even hints at a procedure that entails a
binding decision is the statement in paragraph 4 that the governments concerned undertake to
resolve their “jurisdictional disputes” through consultations and negotiations “in accordance
with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea”. Paragraph 4 thus specifically contemplates that the
envisaged consultations and negotiations will be conducted in accordance with the
Convention, of which Section 2 of Part XV forms an integral part. Thus, far from requiring
that the Parties’ jurisdictional disputes should be settled by recourse to procedures other than
those provided for in Part XV, the 2002 DOC indicates that when negotiations fail — as in
2
Memorial, paras. 7.51-7.58.
4
the present case — the disputes should be settled in accordance with the binding procedures
specified in that Part.
1.8. Accordingly, the 2002 DOC provides no basis for an objection to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction based on Article 282 of UNCLOS.
5
6
QUESTION 2
The Philippines is invited to address the effect, if any, of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Philippines’
claims, in particular with reference to Articles 281 and 282 of the Convention. The
Philippines is also invited to elaborate on whether any other regional or bilateral agreement
or forum, or any public representation made by the Philippines regarding the resolution of
the Parties’ dispute, gives rise to any issue with respect to the admissibility of the
Philippines’ claims.
Response:
2.1. Neither the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (“Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation”)3 nor any other agreement or public representation by the
Philippines precludes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or affects the admissibility of the
I. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
2.2. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation provides that the Contracting
States “shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly
negotiations”. Article 14 further establishes a High Council comprising ministerial
representatives of all Contracting States4 “to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or
situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony”. In the event that no solution is
reached through direct negotiations, and provided that all parties to the dispute so agree, the
High Council is empowered pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 to “take cognizance of the
existence of the disputes” and “recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of
settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation”. In addition, the High
Council can, if the parties agree, also constitute itself as a committee of mediation, inquiry or
conciliation.5 Finally, Article 17 states:
3
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1025 U.N.T.S. 319 (24 Feb. 1976), entered into force 15
July 1976. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-185.
4
The parties to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, the European Union, France, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway,
People’s Republic of China, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Turkey, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
5
July 1976, Art. 15. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-185.
7
Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of
peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(l) of the Charter of
the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are
parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to
solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other
procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.6
2.3. Thus, the Treaty merely encourages the parties to a dispute to attempt to settle it by
negotiation. It provides for referral to the High Council only if the disputing parties agree to
do so, which the Philippines and China have not done in relation to the disputes the
Philippines has raised in these proceedings. Moreover, the Treaty expressly endorses recourse
to the modes of settlement contained in Article 33 of the Charter, which include binding
arbitration. Accordingly, whether analysed under Article 281 or Article 282 of the
Convention, the Treaty has no impact on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in this case.
2.4. Article 281 provides:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning

the interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed
to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their
own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only
where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such
means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude
any further procedure.
This provision operates to preclude the jurisdiction of a tribunal convened under Section 2 of
Part XV only when: (1) there is an agreement to seek settlement of a dispute by means other
than those provided for in Part XV, and (2)(a) either a settlement has been reached by
recourse to such means, or (b) the agreement precludes further procedures.
2.5. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation does not bar jurisdiction or undermine the
admissibility of the Philippines’ claims in the first instance because it does not constitute a
legally binding agreement to negotiate before having recourse to arbitration. Article 17 makes
clear that pre-arbitration negotiation is not mandatory when it provides that States “which are
parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly
negotiations”7 before having resort to the procedures listed in Article 33(1) of the U.N.
Charter. The use of the hortatory phrase “should be encouraged” is inconsistent with the
6
Id. The modes of peaceful settlement specifically listed in Article 33(1) of the U.N. Charter are negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or arrangements.
7
July 1976, Art. 17 SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-185 (emphasis added).
8
existence of a legal obligation. Indeed, the plain implication of Article 17 is that the States
Parties would be within their rights to resort to the procedures identified in Article 33(1) of
the U.N. Charter even before attempting negotiations.
2.6. Moreover, even if the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation could be construed as an
“agreement” of the sort envisioned in Article 281 — which it cannot — that Article does not
impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or affect the admissibility of the Philippines’ claims
because no settlement has been reached through the means contemplated in the Treaty (i.e.,
negotiation), and it does not exclude recourse to the procedures specified in Section 2 of Part
XV. Indeed, it expressly authorizes the procedures set forth in Article 33 of the Charter.
2.7. Chapter 3 of the Philippines’ Memorial described the extensive efforts the Parties
have made to settle their dispute through negotiations conducted over many years.8
Notwithstanding those efforts, no settlement has been possible. The Philippines has therefore
complied with any obligation it may have under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to
attempt to settle its disputes with China “through friendly negotiations”.
2.8. Negotiations having failed, nothing in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation precludes
recourse to the procedures in Part XV of the Convention. Quite the contrary. Article 17 of the
Treaty expressly contemplates that the Contracting States may have “recourse to the modes
of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(l) of the Charter of the United Nations”. These,
of course, include both “arbitration” and “judicial settlement”.9 Rather than excluding further
procedures, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation specifically contemplates them. Article 281
therefore does not bar the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or undermine the admissibility of the
2.9. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation also does not implicate Article 282 of the
Convention. None of the Treaty’s dispute settlement provisions establishes “a procedure that
entails a binding decision”. Failing negotiation, the High Commission is, at most, empowered
to “recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices,
mediation, inquiry or conciliation” and/or constitute itself as a committee of mediation,
8
9
Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945), Art. 33(1). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-181.
9
inquiry or conciliation.10 Even then, these procedures cannot be initiated “at the request of
any party to the dispute”, as Article 282 requires. Rather, they must be specifically agreed
upon by all parties in dispute — which has not happened here.
2.10. For all of these reasons, whether under Article 281 or Article 282, the 1976 Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia neither impairs the Tribunal’s jurisdiction nor
affects the admissibility of the Philippines’ claims. Indeed, China appears to agree. It makes
no argument concerning the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in its 7 December 2014
Position Paper.
II. Other Bilateral Arrangements and Public Representations by the Philippines
2.11. In contrast to its silence on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, China’s Position
Paper does point to several joint statements that, taken together with the 2002 DOC, it says
constitute an “agreement” by the Parties under Article 281 to settle their dispute through
negotiations to the exclusion of the compulsory procedures provided in Section 2 of Part
XV.11 Because these are arguments that China has specifically raised in its Position Paper, the
Philippines responds to them in its answer to the Tribunal’s Question 26.
2.12. As the Tribunal will read, the statements China invokes are political and aspirational
in nature; they are not legally binding. Moreover, even if they were binding (quod non), they
neither preclude recourse to further procedures nor provide for procedures entailing a binding
decision. As a result, neither Article 281 nor Article 282 is implicated.
10
July 1976, Art. 15. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-185.
11
People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the
Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (7 Dec.
2014) (hereinafter “China’s Position Paper”), paras. 31-38, 40. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 467. In particular,
China seeks to rely on Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the People’s Republic
of China, Agreed Minutes on the First Philippines-China Bilateral Consultations on the South China Sea Issue
(10 Aug. 1995). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 180; Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of
the People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement: Philippine-China Experts Group Meeting on Confidence
Building Measures (23 Mar. 1999), p. 2. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 178; Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and Government of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement: Framework of Bilateral
Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century (16 May 2000). SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 505.; Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and Government of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement: 3rd
Philippines-China Experts’ Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures, Manila, 3-4 April 2001 (4 Apr.
2001). SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 506.; Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the
People’s Republic of China, Joint Press Statement on the State Visit of H.E. President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to the People’s Republic of China, 1-3 Sept. 2004 (3 Sept. 2004). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 188; Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement (1 Sept.
2011). SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 507.
10
QUESTION 3
The Tribunal notes paragraph 7.23 of the Memorial, which provides as follows:
The fact that the Convention makes no specific reference to

“historic rights” of the kind China asserts does not mean that
its claim does not concern the interpretation or application of
the Convention. To the contrary, as detailed in Chapter 4,
claims to “historic rights” like those China asserts – that is, in
maritime areas that formerly were considered “high seas” but
were subsumed within the EEZ or continental shelf of a coastal
State – were specifically rejected by the drafters of UNCLOS
and superseded by it. The question of whether or not China’s
claim is consistent with UNCLOS, therefore, requires the
interpretation and application of the Convention, including but
not limited to the specific articles mentioned above.
The Philippines is invited to elaborate on these arguments.
Response:
3.1. The Philippines considers China’s assertion of “historic rights” within the maritime
areas encompassed by its nine-dash line to be manifestly inconsistent with UNCLOS.
Submissions 1 and 2 of the Philippines’ Memorial request the Tribunal to adjudge and
declare that:
1. China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of

the Philippines, may not extend beyond those permitted by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or
the “Convention); [and]
2. China’s claim to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to “historic

rights”, with respect to maritime areas of the South China Sea
encompassed by the so-called “nine-dash line” are contrary to the
Convention and without lawful effect to the extent they exceed the
geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements
under UNCLOS[.]12
3.2. China disagrees. It takes the view that the Convention “does not restrain or deny a
country’s right which is formed in history and abidingly upheld”,13 and that “China’s
12
Memorial, p. 271.
13
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s
Regular Press Conference on September 15, 2011 (16 Sept. 2011). MP, Vol. V, Annex 113.
11
maritime rights in the South China Sea were formed historically and are protected by
international law”.14
3.3. Determining which of the Parties is correct and deciding whether UNCLOS does or
does not “restrain or deny a country’s right which is formed in history and abidingly upheld”
is unmistakably a question concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention
over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction under Article 288(1).15 Indeed, the Philippines does
not understand China to contend otherwise. In its 7 December 2014 Position Paper, China
does not argue that the compatibility of its assertion of “historic rights” in maritime areas
beyond the limits of its entitlement under the Convention is a matter in respect of which the
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction.
3.4. Any such argument would be unsustainable. The Philippines showed in its Memorial
that UNCLOS was intended to, and does, constitute a “comprehensive constitution for the
oceans which will stand the test of time’”.16 The very first paragraph of the Preamble states
that the Convention seeks “to settle … all issues relating to the law of the sea”.17 The
Philippines also demonstrated that “under the Convention, coastal States have the exclusive
rights to the living and non-living resources in their EEZs and continental shelves, such that
no other State may enjoy ‘historic rights’ under the rules of general international law or
otherwise to the resources in those maritime areas”.18
3.5. Assessing these arguments, and adjudicating their merits, requires an analysis of text
and drafting history of Parts V and VI of the Convention, including, inter alia, Articles 55,
56, 57, 58 and 62, and Articles 76, 77 and 78. It necessarily requires the interpretation or
application of those provisions. The Philippines does not consider there to be any serious
argument that the Tribunal lacks the power to undertake that task (and, as stated, China itself
makes none).
14
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s
Statement Regarding Comments by an Official of the United States Department of State on the South China Sea
(8 Feb. 2014), p. 1. MP, Vol. V, Annex 131.
15
Article 288(1) provides: “A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with this
Part.”
16
Memorial, para. 4.46 (quoting Ambassador Tommy Koh, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 185th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.185 (26 Jan. 1983), para. 47. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-116.).
17
(Emphasis added.)
18
Id., para. 4.54.
12
3.6. The fact that China claims that its “historic rights” predate and exist independently of
the Convention does not alter this analysis. The Philippines’ claim is that UNCLOS is the
exclusive source of entitlement to maritime areas; that it does not permit claims to maritime
areas in derogation of the rights and freedoms of other States except as specifically provided
in the Convention (notably Articles 10 and 15); and that any such claims that predated the
Convention were extinguished by it. The Philippines calls upon the Tribunal to interpret and
apply the Convention, and specifically to determine whether it supersedes claims based on
alleged “historic rights” that are inconsistent with its terms. It is difficult to see how the
Philippines’ claim would not fall under Article 288(1).
13
14
QUESTION 4
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that “nothing in paragraph 1 of Article 297
impairs the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over this case” (Memorial, para. 7.105). The Philippines
is invited to elaborate further on this issue, in particular in light of its Submission 11.
[Submission 11: China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect
and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas
Shoal.]
Response:
4.1. Article 297(1) does not impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address Submission 11
with respect to Scarborough Shoal because the relevant waters constitute territorial sea, to
which Article 297 does not apply. It does not impair the portion of Submission 11 relating to
Second Thomas Shoal because China is not the “coastal State” in the area.
4.2. Article 297 is captioned “Limitations on the applicability of Section 2 [of Part XV]”.
Paragraph 1 provides that “[d]isputes concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention with regard to the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction
provided for in this Convention shall be subject to the procedures provided for in section 2”
in the categories of cases enumerated in the three subparagraphs thereof.19
4.3. The use of the phrase “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” is notable. It is generally
associated with the powers granted coastal States with respect to their EEZs and continental
shelves, not their territorial seas. The doctrine supports the view that Article 297 as a whole
applies the EEZ.20 Sohn, for example, has written: “Article 297 governs disputes relating to
the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Exclusive
19
The three categories of cases are disputes in which it is alleged that (a) a coastal State has contravened the
Convention’s provisions regarding “the freedoms and rights of navigation, overflight, overflight or the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines”, or regarding “other internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article
58”; (b) in exercising the aforementioned freedoms, rights or uses, a State has contravened the Convention or
the coastal State’s laws or regulations in conformity with the Convention and “other rules of international law
not incompatible with” the Convention; and (c) a coastal State has contravened “specified international rules and
standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment” applicable to the coastal State and
established by the Convention “or through a competent international organization or diplomatic conference in
accordance with” the Convention.
20
The Philippines recognizes that other readings are possible. Even if Article 297(1) were deemed applicable to
the territorial sea, the Philippines considers that the Tribunal would still have jurisdiction to adjudicate its
environmental claims relating to Scarborough Shoal. Article 297(1)(c) provides for jurisdiction in cases “when it
is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified rules and standards for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which have been
established by this Convention…”. In the view of the Philippines, Articles 192 and 194 can be deemed to
constitute “such specified rules and standards”.
15
Economic Zone”.21 Whatever their scope, the limitations provided for in Article 297(1) are
therefore of no consequence to disputes relating to matters arising in the territorial sea.
4.4. In such cases, courts and tribunals must be guided by the general rules relating to their
jurisdiction. In particular, Article 288(1) provides: “A court or tribunal referred to in article
287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention …”.22 The dispute the Philippines has presented to the Tribunal concerns, in
part, China’s violations of its obligations under Article 192 and 194 to protect and preserve
the marine environment in the territorial sea around Scarborough Shoal. It therefore falls
squarely within the jurisdiction Article 288 specifically confers on the Tribunal.
4.5. In this respect, the Philippines observes further that nothing in the language of either
Article 192 or 194 suggests that the obligations stated do not apply in the territorial sea. To
the contrary, the plain text of both provisions makes clear that they apply equally in all
maritime zones, whether it is the territorial sea, the EEZ, the continental shelf or the Area.
Article 192, for example, states: “State have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment”. Article 194(1) similarly provides: “States shall take, individually or jointly as
appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment …”. Neither article excludes or draws
any distinction among maritime zones.
4.6. Article 297(1) also has no application to China’s violations of its obligation to protect
and preserve the marine environment in and around Second Thomas Shoal, albeit for a
different reason. Article 297(1) applies, if at all, only to disputes concerning “the exercise by
a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction provided for in this Convention”.23
21
Louis B. Sohn, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the Way?”,
Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1983), p. 197. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-200. See also
Robin Churchill, “Some Reflections on the Operation of the Dispute Settlement System of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea During its First Decade”, in The Law of the Sea (D. Freestone, et al., eds. 2006), p. 407.
SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-210 (“Article 297 … provides … that disputes concerning the exercise by a coastal
State of its rights within its EEZ are exempt from compulsory dispute settlement under Section 2 unless the
dispute concerns the exercise of other States’ rights under the LOSC of navigation, overflight and the laying of
cables and pipelines, or the dispute concerns allegations that a coastal State has acted in contravention of
specified international rules for the protection of the marine environment”.); Hugo Caminos, “The International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: An Overview of its Jurisdictional Procedure”, The Law and Practice of
International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 5 (2006), p. 18. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-211 (“The language used
in [Article 297](1) is the same used in the Convention to describe the rights of the coastal State in the Exclusive
Economic Zone and over the continental shelf”).
22
(Emphasis added.)
23
(Emphasis added.)
16
China, however, does not have sovereign rights and jurisdiction over Second Thomas Shoal
and the surrounding areas, which constitute EEZ and continental shelf.
4.7. In its Memorial, the Philippines demonstrated that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide
elevation located 104 M from the Philippine coast on Palawan.24 The physical characteristics
of Second Thomas Shoal are further highlighted at pages 162-164 of the Atlas the Philippines
has presented with this Submission. Both the Atlas and Memorial demonstrate that Second
Thomas Shoal is not located within 12 M of any feature that is above water at high tide and
that none of the high-tide features within 200 M of Second Thomas Shoal over which China
claims sovereignty is capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf.25 As a
result, the Philippines, not China, is the coastal State entitled to exercise sovereign rights and
jurisdiction in the area.
4.8. Because Article 297(1) does not apply to the Philippines’ environmental claims
relating to Second Thomas Shoal, the Tribunal again is to be guided by general principles: the
dispute presented by the Philippines concerns the interpretation and application of Article 192
and 194; the Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction by virtue of Article 288(1).
4.9. Accordingly, as the Philippines first stated in its Memorial, nothing in Article 297(1)
impairs the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address Submission 11.
24
25
Id., paras. 5.60-5.61.
17
18
QUESTION 5
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that “Paragraph[]…3 of Article 297…[does]
not apply to any of the claims of the Philippines in this case” (Memorial, para. 7.108). The
Philippines is invited to elaborate further on this issue, in particular in light of its
Submissions 8, 9, and 10.
[Submission 8: China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the
sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources
of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
Submission 9: China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from
exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.
Submission 10: China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing
their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough
Shoal.]
Response:
5.1. Nothing in paragraph 3 of Article 297 impairs the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address
Submissions 8, 9 and 10. Only subparagraph (a) of paragraph 3 is relevant for present
purposes. It provides:
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the

provisions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be
settled in accordance with section 2, except that the coastal
State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to such
settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with
respect to the living resources in the exclusive economic zone
or their exercise, including its discretionary powers for
determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the
allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and
conditions established in its conservation and management laws
and regulations.
5.2. Article 297(3)(a) has two parts. The first provides that disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention “with regard to fisheries”
shall be settled in accordance with section 2 of Part XV. It thus states the general rule that
fisheries disputes are subject to compulsory jurisdiction. As Judge Keith observed in his
Separate Opinion in Southern Bluefin Tuna, “the general run of fisheries disputes…is not
19
subject to the limitations in Section 3 [of Part XV]. Section 2 [of Part XV] …continues to
apply to them in full (article 297(3))”.26
5.3. The second part of Article 297(3)(a) carves out a limitation that applies in the case of
disputes relating to (1) the sovereign rights of “the coastal State” with respect to (2) “the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone”. This limited exception does not apply to
Submissions 8, 9 or 10 for the reasons explained below.
5.4. Submission 8 concerns China’s unlawful interference with the Philippines’

enjoyment and exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to the living and non-living
resources of its EEZ and continental shelf — i.e., the EEZ and continental shelf of the
Philippines. Article 297(3)(a) does not impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over this
Submission in the first instance because China is not “the coastal State” in those areas.
5.5. The Philippines demonstrated in its Memorial that it is entitled to a 200 M EEZ
measured from its archipelagic baselines and to a continental shelf extending to at least that
distance, except only to the extent that nearby features generate overlapping potential
entitlements.27 The Philippines also demonstrated that none of the insular features claimed by
China in the Southern Sector of the South China Sea generates entitlement to an EEZ or
continental shelf.28 As a result, the waters, seabed and subsoil within 200 M of the
Philippines, but beyond 12 M from any high-tide feature, constitute the EEZ and continental
shelf of the Philippines, not China. Article 297(3)(a) therefore does not preclude the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address Submission 8.
5.6. The jurisdictional exception stated in the second part of Article 297(3)(a) does not
apply to the portion of Submission 8 relating to China’s interference with the Philippines’
sovereign rights with respect to non-living resources for another reason. By its terms, the
exception applies only to disputes relating to a coastal State’s sovereign rights with respect to
“the living resources” in the EEZ. Non-living resources are not covered.
26
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Separate Opinion of Justice Sir Kenneth Keith, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (4 Aug. 2000),
para. 22. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-51.
27
Memorial, Ch. 5, Sections 1 & 2.
28
Ibid., Ch. 5, Section 2.
20
5.7. Submission 9 is directed at China’s failure “to prevent its nationals and vessels from
exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines”.29 The
relevant EEZ is that of the Philippines, not China. As in the case of Submission 8, the second
part of Article 297(3)(a) does not exclude jurisdiction because China is not the relevant
“coastal State”.
5.8. Finally, Submission 10 relates to China’s actions in preventing Philippine nationals

from pursuing their traditional fishing activities in the territorial sea around Scarborough
Shoal. Article 297(3)(a) does not impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address this submission
because the relevant limitations apply only “in the exclusive economic zone”, not the
territorial sea. Fisheries disputes concerning activities within the territorial sea remain subject
to the general grant of jurisdiction in Section 2 of Part XV and the first part of Article
297(3)(a).
5.9. Accordingly, nothing in Article 297(3)(a) operates to bar the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
over any aspect of Submissions 8, 9 and 10.
29
(Emphasis added.)
21
22
QUESTION 6
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ statement that “[f]or the avoidance of all doubt, the
Philippines does not seek any determination by the Tribunal as to any question of sovereignty
over islands, rocks or any other maritime features” (Memorial, para. 1.16). The Philippines
is invited to address (i) whether a determination that a feature constitutes a low-tide
elevation may implicitly involve a determination as to whether that feature may be subject to
a claim of territorial sovereignty or appropriation/acquisition, and (ii) the relevance, if any,
to the exceptions to jurisdiction under Article 298(1)(a) of the Convention.
Response:
6.1. The determination of whether a maritime feature is, or is not, an LTE is an issue that
plainly arises under the Convention. Article 13(1) provides: “A low-tide elevation is a
naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but
submerged at high tide”. The Philippines’ claims regarding the status of Mischief Reef,
Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughest Reef)
call upon the Tribunal to interpret and apply Article 13(1). Deciding whether a given feature
is an LTE therefore squarely presents a question concerning the interpretation or application
of UNCLOS over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction by virtue of Article 288(1). There is
nothing in Article 298(1) that would exclude the issue from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
6.2. The language from the Memorial quoted in the Tribunal’s question was intended to
make clear that none of the issues the Philippines has presented to the Tribunal require it to
decide between competing claims to sovereignty over features amenable to such claims. The
sentence in paragraph 1.16 immediately following the quoted language makes this clear. It
states: “The Tribunal is not invited, directly or indirectly, to adjudicate on the competing
sovereignty claims to any of the features at issue (or any others)”.30 The Philippines
understands that sovereignty questions of this kind are beyond the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal convened under Part XV.
6.3. This does not mean that the Tribunal must abstain from deciding questions concerning
the interpretation or application of Article 13(1), which it plainly has jurisdiction to do,
merely because its determination may incidentally affect the separate question of whether a
feature is susceptible of acquisition or appropriation under international law. Simply put,
LTE’s are not land territory under international law; they are part of the seabed, whose status
30
Memorial, para. 1.16.
23
is determined and regulated by the Convention. As such, as more fully elaborated in the
Philippines’ response to Question 18, sovereignty over them cannot be acquired by
occupation or appropriation. Rather, sovereignty over an LTE located in the territorial sea
belongs to the State in whose territorial sea it lies. An LTE lying beyond the territorial sea is
not subject to a claim of sovereignty by any State (although, if it lies within a coastal State’s
EEZ or continental shelf, that State enjoys the exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction with
respect to the LTE as provided for in Parts V, VI, and other relevant provisions of the
Convention).
6.4. Moreover, Part XV tribunals routinely make determinations in regard to LTEs, the
incidental result of which is that sovereignty over the feature vests in one of the parties. In
Bangladesh v. India, for example, the arbitral tribunal exercised its jurisdiction to determine
the maritime boundary in the territorial sea pursuant to Article 15 of UNCLOS. In so doing, it
incidentally attributed a disputed LTE to India by drawing the boundary in such manner as to
leave the feature on India’s side of the line.31 The tribunal’s award thus not only “implicitly
involve[d] a determination as to whether that feature may be subject to a claim of territorial
sovereignty or appropriation/acquisition”,32 it actually determined which State was sovereign
over the LTE. There could be no doubt of the tribunal’s jurisdiction to do so in respect of the
seabed of the territorial sea.
6.5. The same tribunal was also called upon to, and did, determine the precise location of
the land boundary terminus (“LBT”), which the parties had disputed. The determination was
necessary to fix the starting point of the maritime boundary. In fixing the LBT, the tribunal
necessarily determined where the two States’ territorial sovereignty ended and their territorial
seas began. This implicitly, but unavoidably, impacted the territorial sovereignty of both
States. Again, this did not compromise the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
6.6. One can also imagine, for example, a case in which one coastal State challenges the
straight baselines of another as incompatible with Article 7. If Part XV tribunals were barred
31
Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal
(7 July 2014), paras. 271-276. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-179. See also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 109, para.
22. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26 (allocating sovereignty over various LTE’s based on the location of the
territorial sea boundary); Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysia/Singapore), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, para. 299. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-31 (stating
“sovereignty over South Ledge, as a low-tide elevation, belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it
is located”.). See also id., paras. 297-298.
32
Tribunal’s Question 6.
24
from exercising their power to interpret and apply the Convention whenever their decisions
might have repercussions for questions of territorial sovereignty, no court or tribunal would
be able to hear the case. This is because, under Article 8, the landward side of a State’s
baselines constitute internal waters, which are assimilated to land territory.33 A decision on
the compatibility of a State’s baselines with the Convention would therefore constitute a
determination about whether certain areas are amenable to a claim of territorial sovereignty.
To suggest that a Part XV tribunal might be barred from exercising its jurisdiction to interpret
and apply the Convention merely because its conclusions may have incidental consequences
for matters of territorial sovereignty would be to impose a broad and unjustified constraint on
the power of UNCLOS courts and tribunals.
6.7. For these reasons, the Philippines considers that even if a finding that a feature is an
LTE implies that it may not be subject to a claim of territorial sovereignty, that would be
without consequence to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, especially since the Tribunal is not called
upon to determine which State, if any, is sovereign over the feature.
6.8. With respect to the second part of the Tribunal’s question concerning the relevance, if
any, of Article 298(1)(a), the Philippines considers that Article 298(1)(a) does not preclude
the Tribunal from determining whether a feature is an LTE. This is true whether or not that
determination implies that the feature in question may be subject to a claim of territorial
sovereignty.
6.9. The Article 298(1)(a) exception applies to “disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving
historic bays or titles …”. Since the determination of whether or not a feature constitutes an
LTE involves only the interpretation and application of Article 13 (and potentially Article
121), Article 298(1)(a) is not relevant. Articles 15, 74 and 83 are not before the Tribunal; nor
does the matter involve historic bays or titles.
6.10. For the reasons presented above, determining whether a feature is an LTE does not
fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
33
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed. 1988), pp. 60-61. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-
130(bis) (observing: “As a matter of international law the baseline divides a State’s land territory and the
internal waters which are assimilated to it from its territorial sea”); cf. Article 7(3) (providing that the areas lying
within straight baselines “must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters”.).
25
26
QUESTION 7
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that –
Article 298’s reference to “historic titles” does not apply in the

first instance because China is not claiming such title in the
South China Sea. To the contrary, as discussed in Chapter 4,
what China asserts is a more limited bundle of “historic
rights”, short of sovereignty. On the face of China’s claim,
Article 298(1)(a)(i) is therefore inapplicable.
(Memorial, para. 7.129)
The Philippines is invited to elaborate on these arguments. In particular, the Philippines is

invited to provide further argument on the scope and content of the phrase “historic bays or
titles” in Article 298(1)(a) of the Convention. The Philippines is also invited to provide
further argument on the effect, if any, of Article 298(1)(a) of the Convention on any claim
relating to China’s possible historic rights or titles, bearing in mind the drafting history and
non-English versions of that Article.
Response:
7.1. The Philippines does not consider there to be any argument that the South China Sea
forms an “historic bay”. The geographic characteristics of the area cannot be assimilated to
those of a bay. For purposes of responding to the Tribunal’s question, the Philippines will
therefore focus exclusively on the scope and content of the phrase “historic titles” as used
Article 298(1)(a).
7.2. The Philippines demonstrated in its Memorial that the words “historic title” have a
limited and specific meaning. They relate only to near-shore areas that are amenable to a
claim of sovereignty that arises by reference to activity and title in relation to land.34 The
concept does not cover assertions of rights short of sovereignty in distant maritime zones.
The Philippines supported this view by reference to the U.N. Secretariat’s 1962 study
Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays and other authoritative
sources.35
7.3. The Philippines has undertaken an exhaustive examination of the Convention’s

drafting history in preparing its response to the Tribunal’s question. Such discussion as there
34
See Memorial, para. 7.130.
35
Id., paras. 7.131-7.134.
27
was had a limited focus. The Philippines sets forth what it was able to find in the paragraphs
that follow.
7.4. As the Tribunal will note, the comparative dearth of discussion is explained by the
fact that the negotiating States’ understanding of the scope and content of the phrase “historic
titles” was informed by, and consistent with, the 1962 U.N. study. There was therefore no
need for extensive debate. The phrase “historic title” was understood, as it always had been,
to relate only to areas close to shore over which the coastal State exercised long, peaceful and
unchallenged sovereignty.
7.5. Early during the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1972, the Sea-Bed
Committee approved a list of subjects for negotiation. The item “[h]istoric waters” was
included as a sub-item for discussion under the rubric of negotiations concerning the
“Territorial Sea”.36 These issues were subsequently assigned to the Second Committee.
7.6. Two years later, in 1974, the Second Committee adopted a “Main Trends Working
Paper” that was intended, as its name suggests, to reflect the main trends that had emerged
during the negotiations to date.37 Part I of the Main Trends Working Paper was entitled
“Territorial Sea”.38 Issues relating to historic waters, including historic titles, were
summarized in two sections thereunder (Sections 2 and 3), and nowhere else. Each of these
sections merits attention and is addressed in turn.
7.7. Section 2 of Part I was entitled “[h]istoric waters” and contained two provisions.
Provision 2 stated:
The territorial sea may include waters pertaining to a State by

reason of an historic right or title and actually held by it as its
territorial sea.39
Provision 3 provided:
36
See U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Statement of activities of the Conference during its first and
second sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/REV.1 (17 Oct. 1974), p. 97. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-196.
37
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, “Working Paper of the Second Committee: Main Trends”, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/Rev. 1, Annex II, Appendix I (1974), p. 109. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-98.
38
Id.
39
Provision 1 is contained in Section 1 and is not relevant to the issues at hand.
28
No claim to historic waters shall include land territory or waters
under the established sovereignty, sovereign rights or
jurisdiction of another State.
7.8. These two proposals are significant because, consistent with the 1962 UN Study, they
reflect an understanding that (1) historic titles could relate only to maritime areas close to the
coast subject to a claim of sovereignty, and (2) the exercise of rights or jurisdiction by other
States in the area is incompatible with a claim to historic title.
7.9. Section 3 of Part I of the 1974 Working Paper addressed the limits and delimitation of
the territorial sea. It included three provisions relevant to the question now under
consideration. Provision 17 was captioned “Historic bays or other historic waters” and
contained what was labelled “Formula B”,40 which provided: “In the absence of other
applicable rules the baselines of the territorial sea are measured from the outer limits of
historic bays or other historic waters”.41
7.10. Provision 21 related to the delimitation of the territorial sea and paralleled Article
12(1) of the 1958 Convention by stating that “historic title” may constitute a special
circumstance justifying the departure from the median line in delimiting the territorial sea.
7.11. Finally, Provision 22 related to the breadth of the territorial sea and distilled three
formulae from the main trends that are relevant here:
Formula A
Each State shall have the right to establish the breadth

of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines drawn in
accordance with articles … of this Convention.
Formula B
Each State has the right to establish the breadth of its

territorial sea up to a distance not exceeding 200
nautical miles, measured from the applicable baselines.
40
Formula A of Provision 17 followed Article 8(6) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and excluded
“so-called ‘historic bays’” from the application of provisions governing juridical bays. It is therefore irrelevant
for the issue before the Tribunal. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, “Working Paper of the Second
Committee: Main Trends”, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/Rev. 1, Annex II, Appendix I (1974), p. 110. MP, Vol.
XI, Annex LA-98.
41
Id.
29
Formula C
The maximum limit provided in this article shall not

apply to historic waters held by any State as its
territorial sea.
Any State which, prior to the approval of this

Convention, shall have already established a territorial
sea with a breadth more than the maximum provided in
this article shall not be subject to the limit provided
herein.42
Formula C reflected the proposal of the Philippines,43 which sought to establish a special rule
exempting it from the emerging consensus in favour of limiting the breadth of the territorial
sea to 12 M based on the “unique nature and configuration” of the Philippines.44 The
Philippines explained the reasons underlying its proposal as follows:
We claim these waters [of the territorial sea] under historic and
legal title. Their outer limits were set forth in the Treaty of
Paris between Spain and the United States of 10 December
1898 and the Treaty of Washington between the United States
and Great Britain of 2 January 1930. These limits were
expressly acknowledged by the United States in our Mutual
Defence Treaty…of 20 August 1951 and its related
interpretative documents. We have existing legislation, both of
a constitutional and a statutory character, confirming those
limits. At one point—to show the peculiar character and
configuration of our territorial sea—the outer limit of these
historic waters is over 200 miles from the shore, but at several
other points it is less than three miles.45
7.12. Other States did not accept this proposal, and Formula C was abandoned. At the
concluding sessions of the Third UNCLOS Conference, the Philippines itself recognized that
the Convention prohibited it from claiming historic or legal title over waters beyond its
territorial sea, and that under UNCLOS it would be entitled only to sovereign rights in its 200
M exclusive economic zone:
Our problem on the matter of our territorial sea is a difficult

one indeed, but, in the opinion of our delegation and our
42
Id., p. 111.
43
See Republic of the Philippines, Revised draft article on historic waters and delimitation of the territorial sea,
U.N. Doc A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.24/Rev.1 (19 Aug. 1974). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-188.
44
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Plenary, 189th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.189 (8 Dec.
1982), para. 55. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-192.
45
Id.
30
Government, it is not insurmountable. … In the 200-mile belt
of water around our archipelago the Philippines will have
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the sea-bed, the sub-soil and the superjacent
waters. In addition, the Philippines would have sovereign rights
in the exclusive economic zone in regard to other activities of
economic exploitation and exploration—such as the production
of energy from waters, current and winds—as well as sovereign
jurisdiction over such matters as scientific research and the
protection of the marine environment.46
7.13. In light of the above, it is evident that the drafters of the Convention always
understood “historic title” to be a narrow concept applicable only to near-shore waters over
which the coastal State exercised sovereignty, whether they be internal waters or territorial
sea. It did not include the exercise of rights or jurisdiction short of outright sovereignty.
7.14. In the negotiations that followed, few of the provisions on historic waters, including
historic title, summarized in the Main Trends Working Paper were retained. The only ones
that survived and were ultimately incorporated into the final text of the Convention are those
relating to historic bays (Article 10(6)) and the delimitation of the territorial sea (Article 15).
7.15. Some effort to more clearly define the concept of historic waters was made during the
negotiation process. Although complete agreement was never reached and the effort was
ultimately abandoned,47 the main elements of the various proposed definitions deserve
attention. As in the case of the 1974 Main Trends Working Paper, the differing proposals
converge to the extent they underscore the limited scope of the concepts “historic waters” and
“historic title”.
7.16. An examination of the various “Blue Papers” on the subject reflects the following
consensus elements of any definition of historic waters and historic title. First, historic waters
were understood as “an area of the sea adjacent to a coastal State”.48 Second, the following
requirements must be met for such an area to constitute historic waters: (1) the maritime area
must have been subject to the effective exercise of sovereignty; (2) sovereignty must have
been exercised continuously, peacefully and for a long period of time; (3) the exercise of
46
Id., para. 58.
47
See U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1 (6 May 1976). MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-107.
48
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Bays and Other Historic Waters,
U.N. Doc. C.2/Blue Paper No. 3 (3 Apr. 1975), Art. 1. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-190.
31
sovereignty must have been expressly or tacitly accepted by third States, and in particular by
neighbouring States; (4) a State claiming historic waters must have vital interests, in
particular defence or economic interests peculiar to the area.49 And third, historic waters
could be claimed as either internal waters or as territorial sea, depending on the scope of
authority the coastal State had historically exercised.50
7.17. Viewed as a whole, the Convention’s negotiating history thus reflects an

understanding as to the scope and content of the words “historic title” articulated in the 1962
U.N. Study. In particular, it is clear that the concept applies only to near-shore areas that may
be (1) assimilated to internal waters (e.g., historic bays, straits or estuaries) or territorial sea
and (2) subject to a claim of sovereignty.
7.18. The fact that claims of “historic rights” short of sovereignty are different from
“historic title” is further confirmed by reference to the various authentic texts of the
Convention. The Philippines showed in its Memorial that the term for “historic title” used in
both Articles 15 and 298(1)(a) in the Chinese text is 历史性所有权 (li shi xing suo you
quan), which translates literally as the power of possession or ownership — in a word,
sovereignty.51 By contrast, what China has asserted since 1998 are 历史性权利 (li shi xing
quan li); that is “historical rights” short of sovereignty.52
7.19. This same distinction is reflected in the other official texts of the Article 298(1)(a), all
of which employ terms for “historic titles” that are different from “historic rights”. The
French version uses the phrase “titres historiques”; the Spanish uses “títulos históricos”. The
terms “titres” and “títulos” are to be distinguished from those used for the word “rights”
throughout the Convention: “droits” and “derechos” in French and Spanish, respectively.53
7.20. The Arabic text is to the same effect. In Article 298(1)(a), the Arabic phrase
corresponding to “historic titles” is “‫( ”ةيخيرات تادنس‬sanadat tarikhiyya), sanadat meaning
49
See U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Bays and Other Historic
Waters, U.N. Doc. C.2/Blue Paper No. 1/Rev.1 (25 Mar. 1975), § 1. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-189; U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. C.2/Blue
Paper No. 3/Rev.1 (9 Apr. 1975), Art. 1. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-191.
50
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Historic Waters, U.N. Doc.
C.2/Blue Paper No. 3/Rev.1 (9 Apr. 1975), Art. 2. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-191.
51
Memorial, para. 7.133
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., UNCLOS, Arts. 3, 17, 38, 52, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 69, 70, 72, 77, 79, 85, 90, 297.
32
“titles” in the sense of a legal instrument or deed signifying ownership, and tarikhiyya
meaning historic. The Arabic term for “rights” as used elsewhere in the Convention, for
instance, in Article 56 — “‫( ”قوقح‬huqooq) — is different.
7.21. The only one of the authentic texts of the Convention in which the distinction between
“historic title” and “historic rights” may not appear evident at first glance is the Russian. The
Russian version of Article 298(1)(a) employs the phrase “исторические правооснования”
where the English uses “historic titles”. The word “исторические” means “historic”. The
term “правооснования”, however, is a compound noun formed by two nouns: “право”,
which means “right”, and “основания”, which means “bases”.54 Nevertheless, it is clear that
the words mean “historic titles” in the sense of full sovereignty, not “historic rights” short of
sovereignty.
7.22. This conclusion is supported by the expert opinion of Dr. A. Zadorozhny, the head of
the International Law Department at Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv
(Ukraine), included as Annex 512 hereto. Dr. Zadorozhny did his international law training
during the Soviet era, and is fluent in both Russian and English. His expert opinion is based
on Russian-English dictionaries and relevant scholarly works.55
7.23. Among the reference works to which Dr. Zadorozhny refers is the Russian-English
Dictionary of Diplomacy, which covers international law terms, including those relating to
the Law of the Sea. This dictionary translates “правооснование” as “title”.56 Notably, it also
distinguishes “правооснование” (“title”) from the term “право”, meaning “right”, which has
a different normative content.57 The Russian-English Law Dictionary also translates the term
“правооснование” as “title (in the sense of ownership)”.58 The equivalency between “title”
and “правооснование” is further confirmed by the English-Russian Law Dictionary, in
54
The word “основания” is a plural form of “основаниe”, which means “basis”.
55
Dr. Alexander Zadorozhny, Expert Opinion on the Russian term “историческиеправооснования” in Article
298(1)(a)(i) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (8 Mar. 2015) (hereinafter
“Zadorozhny Report”), para. 5. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
56
Russian-English Dictionary of Diplomacy (K.V. Zhuravchenko, ed., 2006), p. 464. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-217. See also Zadorozhny Report, para. 7. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
57
See, e.g., “право навигации” = “navigation right”, id., p. 460; “право плавания под морским флагом” =
“right to fly a maritime flag”, id.; “право прохода” = right of passage”, id.; “право свободного доступа к
морю” = “right of free access to the sea”, id., p. 461. See also Zadorozhny Report, para. 7. SWSP, Vol. IX,
Annex 512.
58
Leonid L. Gousev, Russian-English Law Dictionary (2003), p. 308. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-215. See also
Zadorozhny Report, para. 8. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
33
which “title” is translated as “правооснование”.59 “Right”, in contrast, is translated as
“право”.60
7.24. The same views are reflected in Russian legal doctrine. In his opinion, Professor
Zadorozhny cites the authoritative work Qualification of Maritime Areas as Historic Waters
in Public International Law: Theory and State Practice, published in Russian and edited by
Professor A. Vylegzhanin, a leading Russian scholar on the law of the sea.61 In this study, the
terms “историческое правооснование” and “исторический титул” are used
interchangeably to mean “historical title”.62 A clear distinction is also drawn between these
two terms and that used for “historic rights” (“исторические права”). Professor Vylegzhanin
observes, for example, that unlike historic title (“историческое
правооснование”/”исторический титул”), historic rights (“исторические права”) are non-
exclusive and have nothing to do with claims of sovereignty over maritime zones.63 Professor
Vylegzhanin also notes that, unlike historic rights, which may exist farther ashore based on
fishing practice, historic waters claimed on the basis of a historic title must be adjacent to the
coastline of a State, and “a State may not have a historic title to a maritime area located near
the coast of other States”.64
7.25. The plain text of the Convention confirms the distinction between titles, on the one
hand, and rights, on the other. Where UNCLOS refers to “rights”, as distinguished from
“title”, the Russian word used is “право”. Examples include: Article 17 (“Право мирного
прохода” = “Right of innocent passage”); Article 53 (“Право архипелажного прохода по
морским коридорам” = “Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage”); Article 56 (“Права,
59
A.G. Pivovar & V.I. Osipov, English-Russian Legal Dictionary (2003), p. 799. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-
216. See also Zadorozhny Report, para. 9. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
60
A.G. Pivovar & V.I. Osipov, English-Russian Legal Dictionary (2003), p. 799. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-
216.
61
A.N. Vylegzhanin, et al., Qualification of Maritime Area as Historic Waters in Public International Law:
Theory and State Practice (2012). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-218. See also Zadorozhny Report, para. 12.
SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
62
Theory and State Practice (2012), p. 20. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-218. See also Zadorozhny Report, paras.
14-16. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
63
Theory and State Practice (2012), p. 29. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-218 (“Historical rights are also different
from ‘historic waters’ in that the latter do not constitute claims to jurisdiction or sovereignty in maritime
areas”.). See also Zadorozhny Report, para. 17. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
64
Theory and State Practice (2012), p. 30. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-218. See also Zadorozhny Report, paras.
14-16. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 512.
34
юрисдикция и обязянности прибрежного государства в исключительной
экономической зоне” = “Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive
economic zone”); and Article 58 (“Права и обязянности государств в исключительной
экономической зоне” = “Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic
zone”).65
7.26. Thus, in every authentic text of the Convention, there is a clear differentiation
between what China is claiming in the South China Sea — “historic rights” — and those
issues that may be excluded from jurisdiction under Article 298(1)(a) — “historic titles”.
Article 298(1)(a) therefore does not impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims
of the Philippines in this case.
65
See also, e.g., Article 70 (“Право государств, находящихся в географически неблагоприятном
положении” = “Right of geographically disadvantaged States”); Article 72 (“Ограничение на передачу прав”
= “Restrictions on transfer of rights”); Article 77 (“Права прибрежного государства на континентальный
шельф” = “Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf”); Article 90 (“Право судоходства” = “Right
of navigation”); Article 297(1) (“К спорам, касающимся толкования или применения настоящей
Конвенции в отношении осуществления прибрежным государством своих суверенных прав или
юрисдикции” = “Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention with regard to the
exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction … “.).See also Zadorozhny Report, para. 11.
35
36
QUESTION 8
The Philippines’s Amended Statement of Claim does not

present a dispute concerning the interpretation or application
of Article 15, 74 or 83, let alone a dispute relating to sea
boundary delimitation. The Tribunal is not called upon to
express any view on those articles. The dispute the Philippines
has submitted raises questions of entitlement, not the
delimitation of those entitlements.
(Memorial, para. 7.120).
The Philippines is invited to provide additional written argument on the extent of the
continental shelf beyond 200 NM in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea and the
implications, if any, of any possible continental shelf claim by China for the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction in light of Article 298(1)(a).
Response:
8.1. None of the existing or potential claims to a continental shelf beyond 200 M in the
South China Sea has any implications for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the Philippines’
claims. Nor does any existing or potential claim to an outer continental shelf raise issues
implicating Article 298(1)(a).
8.2. Two littoral States have already made Submissions to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”) in respect of areas of the South China Sea. On 6 May
2009, Viet Nam and Malaysia made a Joint Submission covering areas of the South China
Sea lying between the mainland coasts of the two States.66 The next day, Viet Nam also made
a separate Partial Submission in respect of areas of the South China Sea further north.67 The
area covered by these two submissions are shown in Figure S8.1 (appearing following page
38).
66
Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, in Respect of the Southern Part of the South China Sea (6 May 2009). MP, Vol. VII, Annex
223.
67
United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Receipt of the Joint Submission made by
Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, U.N.
Doc. CLCS.33.2009.LOS (7 May 2009). MP, Vol. VII, Annex 224.
37
8.3. On 12 May 2009, Brunei also submitted preliminary information indicative of the
outer limits of the continental shelf to the CLCS.68 Brunei’s preliminary information
indicated that it intended to make a full submission “within 12 months”.69 To date, however,
it has not yet done so. Although Brunei’s preliminary information does not contain a map
depicting the approximate location of the outer limit of the continental margin it intends to
claim, the text, read in conjunction with other materials, makes clear that it will be limited to
areas that overlap with the previously submitted Joint Submission by Viet Nam and
Malaysia.70
8.4. The Philippines made a Partial Submission in respect of certain areas east of the
island of Luzon in April 2009.71 It is currently in the process of preparing an additional
submission covering areas of the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea. The approximate
location of the outer edge of the continental margin that the Philippines intends to submit is
provisionally indicated on in Figure S8.2 (appearing following Figure S8.1).72
8.5. China made a Partial Submission relating to certain areas of the East China Sea in
December 2012.73 The Philippines has no information on whether or not China intends to
make any further submission (or submissions) in respect of areas of the South China Sea.
However, in order to be as fully responsive to the Tribunal’s question as possible, the
Philippines engaged the services of Dr Lindsay Parson, one of the world’s foremost experts
on matters relating to the continental shelf beyond 200 M who has, among other things,
advised over 30 States in the preparation of submissions to the CLCS. The Philippines asked
Dr Parson to examine the extent of the outer continental shelf, if any, that China might be
68
Brunei Darussalam, Preliminary Submission concerning the Outer Limits of its Continental Shelf (12 May
2009), SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 509.
69
Id., p. 5.
70
As reflected in the 2003 map depicting Brunei’s maritime claims, see Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General,
Map showing the limits of the territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of Brunei
Darussalam (Brunei, 2003). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M22, Brunei’s claims are confined to a parallel corridor
located in front of its coast.
71
Republic of the Philippines, A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer Limits of the
Continental Shelf of the Republic of the Philippines Pursuant to Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea: Executive Summary (8 Apr. 2009). SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 508.
72
The southern limit of the area covered by the forthcoming submission has yet to be fixed.
73
People’s Republic of China, Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of
the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea: Executive Summary (14 Dec.
2012). SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 510.
38
110° E
SUBMISSIONS WITH RESPECT TO A

115°E 120°E
CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 M

105°E
BY VIETNAM AND MALAYSIA CHINA

Mercator Projection 25°N
Datum: WGS-84
(Scale accurate at 15°N)
0 100 200 300
Nautical Miles
0 200 400 600
Pescadores Taiw an
Kilometers
Coastline sources: NGA charts 71027, 91004, 91005, 91010, 92033, 93030, 93036, 93044, 93045, 93046, 93047, 93049, 93520 and
BA charts 94, 3482, 3483, 3488 and 3489.
Prepared by: International Mapping
e
Lin
sh
Da
e n
Ni
a’s
in
Pratas I.
Ch
Batan Is.
20°N 20°N
Gulf SOU TH
of Ha in a n Babuyan Is.
Tonkin
C H INA
SEA
THE
Paracel
Islands PHILIPPINES
Macclesfield
Bank
LAOS
Scarborough L u z on
Shoal
15°N 15°N
Vietnam’s Partial
Submission
CAMBODIA Mindoro
Northern Sector
12°N 12°N
Southern Sector Reed
VIETNAM Bank
10°N 10°N
n
Vietnam / Malaysia a
w
Joint Submission
Spratly la
a
P
Islands
Sul u
Ardasier
Bank
Sea
Disputed
200 M limit
Territory
5°N 5°N
Natuna
Besar
BRUNEI
Celebes
Sea
M A L AY S I A
105°E
I N D O N E S I A
I N D O N E S I A 110° E 115°E 120°E
Figure S8.1
110° E
THE PHILIPPINES’ FORTHCOMING

115°E 120°E
SUBMISSION WITH RESPECT TO A

105°E
CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 M CHINA

Mercator Projection 25°N
Datum: WGS-84
0 100 200 300
Nautical Miles
0 200 400 600
Pescadores Taiw an
Kilometers
BA charts 94, 3482, 3483, 3488 and 3489.
e
Lin
sh
Da
e n
Ni
a’s
in
Pratas I.
Ch
Batan Is.
20°N 20°N
Gulf SOU TH
Tonkin
C H INA
SEA
THE
Paracel
Islands PHILIPPINES
Macclesfield
Bank
LAOS
Shoal
15°N 15°N
Philippines’ Forthcoming
CAMBODIA Submission Mindoro
Northern Sector
12°N 12°N
VIETNAM Bank
10°N 10°N
n
a
w
Spratly la
a
P
Islands
Sul u
Ardasier
Bank
Sea
200 M limit
Disputed
Territory
5°N 5°N
Natuna
Besar
BRUNEI
Celebes
Sea
M A L AY S I A
105°E
I N D O N E S I A
I N D O N E S I A 110° E 115°E 120°E
Figure S8.2
able to claim from the features over which it claims sovereignty in both the Northern and
Southern Sectors of the South China Sea.74
8.6. Dr Parson’s expert report is attached hereto as Annex 514. Its contents are easily
summarized. In the Southern Sector (i.e., the areas below 12° N covering the Spratly Islands),
no issues arise. The outer edge of the continental margin determined in accordance with
Article 76(4) of the Convention lies considerably within 200 M.75 Thus, even if any of the
insular features in the Spratly Islands were capable of generating entitlement to maritime
zones beyond 12 M, which the Philippines denies (as does Viet Nam: see response to
Question 12), no additional considerations involving a continental shelf beyond 200 M would
be implicated.
8.7. Neither do any significant additional issues arise in the Northern Sector. For purposes
of analysing this aspect of the issue, the Philippines asked Dr Parson to consider the potential
continental shelf claims beyond 200 M China might make from (1) the coasts of the Chinese
mainland, Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands in the northeast; and (2) the coast the Pratas
Islands in the north.
8.8. The Philippines does not consider either the Paracel or the Pratas Islands to be capable
of generating entitlements beyond 12 M. Nevertheless, it recognizes that the status and
potential entitlements of the two island groups are not at issue in this arbitration. For purposes
of this exercise therefore, and in order to adopt a maximally conservative approach, it asked
Dr Parson to assume that the Paracel and Pratas Islands were capable of generating
entitlement to a continental shelf.
8.9. Proceeding on that basis, Dr Parson concludes that both from the mainland, Hainan
Island and the Paracel Islands, and from the Pratas Islands, China may have potential claims
to a continental shelf beyond 200 M.76 In both instances, however, the approximate limits of
those claims only somewhat exceed 200 M. In the case of the mainland, Hainan and the
Paracel Islands, for example, the limit of the continental margin extends to 237 M from the
74
The Philippines would have no objection if the Tribunal were to determine that it wishes to engage its own
expert to confirm the contents of Dr. Parson’s report.
75
Dr. Lindsay Parson, The potential for China to develop a viable submission for continental shelf area beyond
200 nautical miles in the South China Sea (Mar. 2015), para 4.1. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 514.
76
See id., paras. 2.1, 3.1.
39
Paracels. In the case of the Pratas Islands, the limit of the continental shelf extends to 230 M
(and most of this lies within 200 M of Taiwan).
8.10. Both potential claim areas are depicted in Figure S8.3 (following page 40). As the
Tribunal can see, substantial area of indisputable Philippine continental shelf (and EEZ)
remains. The limits of China’s potential submission remain fully 94 M (in the case of the
mainland, Hainan and Paracels) and 178 M (in the case of the Pratas) from Scarborough
Shoal.
8.11. Figure S8.4 (following Figure S8.3) reflects all the existing and potential submissions
with respect to a continental shelf beyond 200 M from any of the littoral States on the South
China Sea.
8.12. With respect to the portion of the Tribunal’s question concerning the implications of
China’s possible continental shelf submission(s) in light of Article 298(1)(a), the Philippines
considers that there are no such implications.
8.13. Article 298(1)(a) provides in relevant part that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction
over “disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to
sea boundary delimitations”. As the Philippines made clear in its Memorial, no questions
concerning any aspect of these three articles, including those portions relating to sea
boundary delimitations, are before the Tribunal. Nothing about China’s possible
submission(s) with respect to a continental shelf beyond 200 M alters the analysis.
8.14. First, as described above, China has no possible claim from the Spratly Islands in the
Southern Sector. And even in the Northern Sector where hypothetical claims may exist, those
claims do not materially enlarge upon China’s putative 200 M entitlements and do not
impinge significantly on the maritime areas claimed by the Philippines, including especially
on the area around Scarborough Shoal.
8.15. Second, submissions concerning the location of the outer edge of the continental
margin determined in accordance with Article 76(4) and (5) raise only issues of potential
entitlement. They do not raise issues of delimitation. The outer edge of the continental margin
represents the maximum seaward limit of the area a coastal State may be entitled to claim
under UNCLOS. It does not, however, resolve the issue of overlapping continental shelf
entitlements of two or more coastal States. That wholly separate determination is a function
40
110° E
CHINA’S POTENTIAL SUBMISSIONS WITH

115°E 120°E
RESPECT TO A CONTINENTAL SHELF

105°E
BEYOND 200 M IN THE CHINA

NORTHERN SECTOR 25°N
Mercator Projection
Datum: WGS-84
0 100 200 300

Pescadores Taiw an
Nautical Miles
0 200 400 600
Kilometers
BA charts 94, 3482, 3483, 3488 and 3489.
e
Lin
sh
Da
e n
Ni
a’s
in
Pratas I.
Ch
Batan Is.
20°N 20°N
China’s Potential
Gulf SOU TH Submissions
Tonkin
C H INA
SEA
THE
Paracel
Islands 200 M limit from PHILIPPINES
Paracels and Pratas
Macclesfield
Bank
LAOS
Shoal
15°N 15°N
CAMBODIA Mindoro
Northern Sector
12°N 12°N
VIETNAM Bank
10°N 10°N
n
a
w
Spratly la
a
P
Islands
Sul u
Ardasier
Bank
Sea
200 M limit
Disputed
Territory
5°N 5°N
Natuna
Besar
BRUNEI
Celebes
Sea
M A L AY S I A
105°E
I N D O N E S I A
I N D O N E S I A 110° E 115°E 120°E
Figure S8.3
110° E
SUBMISSIONS AND POTENTIAL 115°E 120°E
SUBMISSIONS WITH RESPECT TO A

105°E
CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 M

IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
CHINA
25°N
Mercator Projection
Datum: WGS-84
0 100 200 300
Nautical Miles
Pescadores Taiw an
0 200 400 600
Kilometers
BA charts 94, 3482, 3483, 3488 and 3489.
e
Lin
sh
Da
e n
Ni
a’s
in
Pratas I.
Ch
Batan Is.
20°N 20°N
China’s Potential
Gulf SOU TH Submissions
Tonkin
C H INA
SEA
THE
Paracel
Islands PHILIPPINES
Macclesfield
Bank
LAOS
Shoal
15°N 15°N
Vietnam’s Partial
Submission
CAMBODIA Philippines’ Forthcoming Mindoro

Submission
Northern Sector
12°N 12°N
VIETNAM Bank
10°N 10°N
n
Vietnam / Malaysia a
w
Joint Submission
Spratly la
a
P
Islands
Sul u
Ardasier
Bank
Sea
200 M limit
Disputed
Territory
5°N 5°N
Natuna
Besar
BRUNEI
Celebes
Sea
M A L AY S I A
105°E
I N D O N E S I A
I N D O N E S I A 110° E 115°E 120°E
Figure S8.4
of the delimitation process, no aspect of which is before the Tribunal. Although this
observation is true generally, it applies with particular force in the context of the South China
Sea, a semi-enclosed sea strewn with insular features and surrounded on by many coastal
States.
8.16. Accordingly, no questions concerning the interpretation or application of Article 15,

74 or 83 are implicated.
41
42
QUESTION 9
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that none of its claims “raise issues involving
military or law enforcement activities in any way. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction over them is
therefore unaffected by Article 298(1)(b)” (Memorial, para. 7.145), and further that –
The claims of the Philippines relate only to the existence of

these rights, not their exercise. Moreover, the Philippines’
claims only concern areas where China has no entitlement to
an EEZ or continental shelf. The law enforcement activities
exception is therefore inapplicable to these proceedings.
The Philippines is invited to elaborate further on these issues, in particular with respect to
the Philippines’ Submissions 8-11 and 13-14. In the course of such elaboration, the
Philippines is invited specifically to address the applicability, if any, of Article 298(1)(b)
within the potential maritime zones of a feature whose status as a submerged feature, low-
tide elevation, rock, or island is disputed or within the potential maritime zones of a feature
whose sovereignty is disputed.
[Submission 8: China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the
sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources
of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf;
Submission 9: China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from
exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
Submission 10: China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing
their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough
Shoal;
Submission 11: China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect
and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas
Shoal;
Submission 13: China has breached its obligations under the Convention by
operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of
collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal;
Submission 14: Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China
has unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things:
(a) interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at,
and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal;
(b) preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed

at Second Thomas Shoal; and
43
(c) endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel
stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.]
Response:
9.1. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction over Submissions 8-11 and 13-14 is unimpaired by the
exception set forth in Article 298(1)(b). The Philippines does not understand China to
disagree. In its 7 December 2014 Position Paper, China makes no mention of Article
298(1)(b); still less does it invoke it to argue that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over
any aspect of the Philippines’ claims.
9.2. China’s silence is significant. By its terms, the Position Paper “is intended to
demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal … does not have jurisdiction over this case”.77 China
also subsequently characterized its Position Paper as “comprehensively explain[ing] why the
Arbitral Tribunal … manifestly has no jurisdiction over the case”.78 Its failure to invoke
Article 298(1)(b) would therefore appear to be both considered and intentional. For the
reasons discussed below, it was also appropriate.
9.3. Article 298(1) permits a State Party to the Convention to “declare in writing that it
does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to”
the categories of disputes listed in subparagraphs (a) through (c). Subparagraph (b) covers
disputes concerning military activities, including military

activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-
commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement
activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or
jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal
under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3[.]
9.4. Article 298(1)(b) thus excludes from jurisdiction two different types of disputes: (1)
disputes concerning military activities; and (2) disputes concerning law enforcement
activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from
jurisdiction by Article 297(2) or (3).
77
China’s Position Paper, para. 2. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 467.
78
Letter from H.E. Ambassador Chen Xu, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in The Hague, to H.E.
Judge Thomas A. Mensah (6 Feb. 2015), para. 1. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 470.
44
9.5. As regards the so-called “military activities exception”, the Philippines demonstrated
in its Memorial that the Convention distinguishes between military and law enforcement
activities.79 Whether a given activity is properly categorized as “military” or “law
enforcement” depends on the nature and purpose of the activity itself, not on the identity of
the actor.80
9.6. As regards the “law enforcement activities exception”, it bears note that not all law
enforcement activities are excepted. Rather, the excluded activities are only those “in regard
to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal under Article 297, paragraph 2 or 3”. The Virginia Commentary explains:
Only disputes concerning the enforcement of provisions

relating to marine scientific research or fisheries, which are not
subject to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal because of the
express exceptions in article 297, paragraphs 2 and 3, can be
excepted by a declaration under article 298.81
Accordingly, the scope of the law enforcement activities exception is anchored to Article
297(2) and (3). When the latter exceptions do not apply, neither does the former. 82
9.7. As discussed above in the Philippines’ response to Question 5, Article 297(3) excepts
from jurisdiction disputes relating to a coastal State’s exercise of its sovereign rights with
respect to the living resources in its own EEZ. The article therefore does not preclude
jurisdiction over disputes concerning (1) the purported exercise of sovereign rights by one
State in the EEZ of another; (2) the exercise of sovereign rights relating to non-living
resources; or (3) the exercise of sovereign rights relating to living resources in the territorial
sea.83 Consequently, disputes concerning law enforcement activities relating to any of the
above three categories are not excluded from jurisdiction.
79
80
Id., para. 7.148.
81
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 5 (M. Nordquist, et al., eds.,
2002), p. 137. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-148(bis). See also Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands
v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, ITLOS Reports 2013, para. 45. MP,
Vol. XI, Annex LA-45; Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Award
on Jursidiction, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (26 Nov. 2014), paras. 73-77. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-180.
82
The Article 297(2) exception concerns marine scientific research and is therefore not relevant to the
submissions identified in the question.
83
See supra Response to Question 5.
45
9.8. In the paragraphs that follow, the Philippines will address each of Submissions 8-11
and 13-14, and show that neither the military activities exception nor the law enforcement
activities exception impairs the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address any of them.
9.9. Submission 8 concerns China’s unlawful interference with the Philippines’

enjoyment and exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to the living and non-living
resources of its EEZ and continental shelf.
9.10. The military activities exception does not limit the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address
this submission because none of the activities about which the Philippines complains can
properly be considered “military” in nature. Virtually all the disputed conduct was
undertaken by law enforcement vessels from the China Coast Guard (“CCG”), China Marine
Surveillance (“CMS”) or China’s Fisheries and Law Enforcement Command (“FLEC”)
carrying out prototypical law enforcement activities.84 On those very few occasions when
vessels of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) were present, they were there to
support the CCG, CMS and FLEC in their law enforcement role.85 The activities relevant to
Submission 8 are therefore properly considered law enforcement activities.
9.11. The law enforcement activities implicated by Submission 8 are non-excluded

activities for two reasons. First, with respect to China’s interference with the Philippines’
exercise of sovereign rights over both living and non-living resources86, the Philippines has
shown that China is not the relevant “coastal State”. As discussed, none of the relevant
maritime features, wherever located, generates entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf.87
The waters, seabed and subsoil within 200 M of the Philippine coast but beyond 12 M from
any high-tide feature therefore constitute the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines. In
those areas, the Philippines — not China — enjoys the sovereign rights that UNCLOS
accords. Submission 8 therefore does not implicate China’s exercise of its sovereign rights as
“the coastal State”, as Articles 297(3)(a) and 298(1)(b) would require.
84
See Memorial, paras. 6.16-6.26, 6.50-6.65.
85
See id., para. 6.63.
86
See id., paras. 6.15-6.38.
87
See supra para. 5.5.
46
9.12. Second, with respect to Chinese law enforcement vessels’ interference with the
Philippines’ exercise of its sovereign rights over non-living resources88, these too are not
excluded from jurisdiction. By its plain terms, Article 297(3)(a) — and thus also the law
enforcement component of Article 298(1)(b) — applies only to “living resources”. There is
therefore no bar to jurisdiction.
9.13. Submission 9 concerns China’s failure to prevent its nationals and vessels from
exploiting the living resources of the Philippines’ EEZ. This submission also does not run
afoul of either the military activities or the law enforcement activities exceptions.
9.14. The former exception is not implicated both as a matter of principle and as a matter of
fact. First, as a matter of principle, preventing one’s own nationals from conducting illegal
fishing activities in the maritime zones of another State is intrinsically a law enforcement, not
a military, activity. Second, as a matter of fact, China has deployed its law enforcement
vessels to monitor Chinese fishermen exploiting living resources in the relevant areas of the
South China Sea.89
9.15. The law enforcement activities exception also does not apply because, for the reasons
previously stated, China is not the relevant “coastal State” whose exercise of fisheries law
enforcement authority is shielded from jurisdiction by Articles 297(3)(a) and 298(1)(b).
9.16. Submission 10 concerns China’s actions to prevent Philippine nationals from pursuing
their traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal. This submission is not covered by the
military activities exception for the same reasons as Submission 9. That is, as a matter of
principle, preventing the nationals of other States from fishing in a given area is intrinsically
a law enforcement, not military, activity. Moreover, as a matter of fact, China’s actions at
Scarborough Shoal were carried out by CMS and FLEC vessels.90
9.17. Submission 10 is also not covered by the law enforcement activities exception
because China’s conduct occurred in the territorial sea around Scarborough Shoal. By virtue
of Article 297(3), the law enforcement component of Article 298(1)(b) applies only in the
88
See Memorial, paras. 6.15-6.28.
89
Id., para. 6.29-6.38.
90
Id., paras. 3.53-3.54.
47
EEZ. It therefore does not impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over law enforcement activities
relating to the living resources within 12 M of a high-tide feature.
9.18. Submission 11 concerns China’s violations of its obligations to protect and preserve
the marine environment at Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals. Article 298(1)(b) does
not bar the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over this submission any more than it does the others
discussed above. The environmentally destructive conduct at both Scarborough and Second
Thomas Shoals were carried out by non-governmental Chinese-flagged ships91 operating
under the watchful eye of CMS and FLEC vessels.92 The relevant activities were not military
in nature, rendering that prong of Article 298(1)(b) irrelevant.
9.19. The law enforcement activities exception is equally inapplicable. Providing cover to
fishing boats engaged in environmentally destructive practices is plainly not a law
“enforcement” activity. Moreover, even if it were, the exception would still not apply. In the
case of Scarborough Shoal, the relevant activities occurred in the territorial sea, to which the
limitation in Article 297(3)(a) — and with it the law enforcement exception in Article
298(1)(b) — does not apply.
9.20. In the case of Second Thomas Shoal, the law enforcement activities exception does
not apply because that feature is located some 104 M from the nearest point on the Philippine
island of Palawan, and substantially more than 200 M from any feature claimed by China that
is capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ. China’s activities were therefore not
conducted within its own EEZ, as Articles 297(3)(a) and 298(1)(b) require, but rather that of
the Philippines.
9.21. Submission 13 concerns China’s breach of its obligations under the Convention by
operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision
to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.
9.22. The military activities exception does not impair the Tribunals’ jurisdiction to address
this submission because the underlying mission in which the Chinese vessels were engaged
— attempting to drive away the fishing boats of other States — is intrinsically law
91
Id., paras. 6.50-6.61.
92
Id., paras. 6.52-6.54, 6.62. In one instance at Second Thomas Shoal, the CMS and FLEC vessels were
accompanied by a PLAN ship. Id., para. 6.63. Even so, the military activities exception does not apply because
the PLAN vessel was assisting the Chinese CMS vessels in their purported law enforcement activity.
48
enforcement in nature, as evidenced by the fact that the conduct at issue was carried out by
CMS and FLEC vessels.93
9.23. The law enforcement activities exception also does not deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction because China’s unlawful actions all took place in the territorial sea around
Scarborough Shoal, in which zone the exception does not apply.
9.24. Submission 14 concerns China’s unlawful aggravation and extension of the dispute
after the commencement of this arbitration by, among other things: (1) interfering with the
Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, and adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal; (2)
preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at Second Thomas
Shoal; and (3) endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at
Second Thomas Shoal.
9.25. This submission does not implicate the military activities exception because the
conduct at issue is more appropriately considered in the nature of law enforcement activities,
as evidenced by the fact that it was largely carried out by CCG and CMS vessels seeking to
enforce China’s purported “jurisdiction”. To be sure, in one instance, a PLAN missile frigate
was also present.94 That bare fact is insufficient to transform a purely law enforcement
activity into an excluded military activity, especially since the PLAN frigate was there merely
to provide support to the law enforcement vessels.
9.26. Moreover, even if the conduct to which Submission 14 is addressed could be

characterized as military in nature (quod non), the Tribunal’s jurisdiction would remain
unaffected. Submission 14 relates to conduct post-dating the Philippines’ Statement of Claim
that has had the effect of aggravating and extending the dispute previously brought before the
Tribunal. It therefore does not, technically speaking, present a distinct dispute over which the
Tribunal must separately determine that it has jurisdiction. Rather, it raises issues consequent
to the original dispute. Provided only that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over that original
dispute, it also has jurisdiction to address Submission 14. Put another way, Submission 14
does not itself present a “dispute concerning military activities” within the meaning of Article
298(1)(b).
93
Id., paras. 6.114-6.127, 6.140-6.146.
94
Id., para. 3.60, 6.63.
49
9.27. Adopting any other view would open a dangerous loophole in the international
adjudicatory regime. The obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute is of singular
importance. It ensures the integrity of the judicial and arbitral process.
9.28. The law enforcement exception is equally without consequence to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction in respect of Submission 14. Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation
substantially more than 12 M from any high-tide feature. It is subject to the sovereign rights
of the Philippines in respect of the EEZ and the continental shelf. As a result, China is not
“the coastal State” entitled to invoke the law enforcement activities exception in the area of
Second Thomas Shoal.
9.29. The law enforcement activities exception does not apply for another reason as well. In
particular, the exception applies only to claims involving marine scientific research or fishing
in the EEZ. Submission 14 addresses neither subject.
9.30. Article 298(1)(b) therefore does not impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address any
of Submissions 8-11 or 13-14.
50
QUESTION 10
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ provision of satellite images installations on six maritime
features in the South China/West Philippine Sea and its submission 12 in relation to Chinese
activities on Mischief Reef. The Philippines is invited to elaborate on the nature of the
installations located on Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef
(including Hughes Reef), Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef, and on whether military personnel
are known to have been currently or previously involved in the construction or operation of
such installations. The Philippines is further invited to elaborate on the implications of any
involvement of military personnel with these facilities for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in
particular by reference to Article 298(1)(b).
[Submission 12: China’s occupation and construction activities on Mischief Reef
(a) violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands, installations
and structures;
(b) violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine environment under the
Convention; and
(c) constitute unlawful acts of appropriation]
Response:
10.1. The Philippines presented all the information available to it concerning the
construction and operation of the Chinese facilities at Mischief Reef in its Memorial. As
described there, the Philippines first confronted China over reports of Chinese construction
activities at the feature in 1995. China responded by asserting that the structures were not
military in nature, but rather intended as a shelter for its fishermen.95 Three years later, when
China substantially expanded its initial structures, it again underscored “the civilian nature of
the facilities”.96 In 1999, China added a helipad, wharves and additional communication
equipment. Still, it maintained its stance, stating: “The new facilities are meant for civilian
use and not for military purposes”.97
10.2. Consistent with its officially stated position that the facilities at Mischief Reef were
constructed for civilian purposes, China’s 7 December 2014 Position Paper does not invoke
95
96
Id., paras. 6.95-6.96.
97
Id., para. 6.97 (citing Memorandum from Ambassador of the Republic of Philippines in Beijing to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, No. ZPE-18-99-S (15 Mar. 1999), p. 1. MP, Vol.
III, Annex 38.).
51
the military activities exception to challenge the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address
Submission 12 or, indeed, any other aspect of the Philippines’ claims.
10.3. Intelligence available to the Philippines, which was cited in the Memorial, suggests
that Mischief Reef is now occupied by personnel associated with the Chinese military. That
fact is, however, insufficient to render China’s initial occupation of and construction
activities at the feature beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. By China’s own cognizance, those
acts were undertaken for civilian purposes. It is by reference to that time that the applicability
of Article 298(1)(a) must be judged. And since they were not then military activities, Article
298(1)(a) does not operate to preclude the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. There is therefore no bar to
the Tribunal’s competence to determine whether China’s construction activities at Mischief
Reef violated the provisions of the Convention concerning: (1) the construction of artificial
islands, installations and structures; (2) the duty to preserve and protect the marine
environment; (3) and the violation of the Philippines’ sovereign rights within its EEZ and
continental shelf.
10.4. The Philippines has not made similar Submissions about the other features identified
in the Tribunal’s question (Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef
(including Hughes Reef) and Subi Reef). Its specific Submissions in regard to those features
concern their status under the Convention; that is, whether they are low-tide elevations under
Article 13 or islands under Article 121; and, if the latter, whether they are “rocks” under
Article 121(3).98
10.5. In regard to those features, and in response to the Tribunal’s Question 10, the
following additional facts can be added to what the Philippines previously stated in its
Memorial.
10.6. At Cuarteron Reef, China has completed construction of a reef fortress and supply
platform, which has anti-aircraft guns, naval guns, search radars and radio communications
equipment. PLA personnel are stationed there but the number is not publicly available.99
98
Memorial, p. 271 (Submissions 4, 6 & 7). The Philippines reserves its right to amend its Submissions at a
later date as appropriate.
99
David Jude Sta Ana, “China builds more Spratly outposts”, The Philippine Star (24 May 2011). SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 562.
52
10.7. At Fiery Cross Reef, there are reported to be approximately 200 Chinese PLA
troops.100 Beginning in 2014, China has undertaken significant land reclamation activities to
expand its existing installation. It appears to be preparing to construct an airstrip and port.101
10.8. At Johnson Reef, the Chinese facilities prior to 2014 included a small concrete
platform housing a communications facility, a garrison building and a pier. Beginning in
2014, China has undertaken land reclamation activities to create an artificial island that
currently measures approximately 400 m across and covers some 0.1 km2.102
10.9. At McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), China’s installation is garrisoned by

PLA personnel and equipped with anti-aircraft guns. As it has at a number of other features
— indeed, at all the other features listed in the Tribunal’s question — China is in the process
of substantial land reclamation activities at McKennan Reef (which began in 2013). The
Philippines has no official information about whether military personnel are involved in these
works.
10.10. Finally, the information concerning China’s presence at Subi Reef is especially
limited. To the information stated at paragraphs 5.73-5.75 of the Memorial, the Philippines
can add only that 200 PLA troops are reported to be stationed at the feature.103
10.11. The apparent involvement of Chinese military personnel at these facilities is of no

consequence to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the military activities prong of Article
298(1)(b). Other than Submission 12 concerning Mischief Reef and addressed above, the
Philippines has to date made no claims concerning China’s construction activities at any of
Cuarteron, Fiery Cross, Johnson, McKennan or Subi Reefs.104 The military activities
exception is therefore of no consequence to any of the Philippines’ claims. The absence of
any reference to that exception in China’s 7 December 2014 Position Paper suggests that
China agrees.
100
David Jude Sta Ana, “China reclaiming land in 5 reefs?”, The Philippine Star (13 June 2014). SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 564.
101
See Memorial, p. 271 (Submissions 4, 6 & 7). See also Letter from Francis H. Jardeleza, Solicitor General of
the Republic of the Philippines, to Judith Levine, Registrar, Permanent Court of Arbitration (30 July 2014).
SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 466.
102
J. Hardy & S. O’Connor, “China advances with Johnson South Reef construction,” IHS Jane’s Defence
Weekly (19 Sept. 2014). SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 549.
103
David Jude Sta Ana, “China reclaiming land in 5 reefs?”, The Philippine Star (13 June 2014). SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 564.
104
See Memorial, p. 271 (setting for the Submissions of the Philippines).
53
54
QUESTION 11
China’s toleration of its fishermen’s environmentally harmful

activities at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal,
including its failure to prevent them from harvesting
endangered species, or from using dynamite or cyanide to
extract fish, clams or corals at these features, constitute
violations of its obligations under the [Convention on
Biological Diversity].
The Philippines is invited to elaborate on the relationship between alleged violations of the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention. In particular, the Philippines is
invited to elaborate, by reference to Articles 281, 282, 288(1), 288(2), and 297(1) of the
Convention, on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to address alleged violations of the Convention on
Biological Diversity.
Response:
11.1. The Philippines demonstrated in response to Question 4 that the Tribunal has
jurisdiction to adjudicate its claims concerning China’s violations of its obligations under
Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at
Scarborough and Second Thomas Shoals.
11.2. The evidence proving China’s breaches of its obligations under Articles 192 and 194
is set out in the Memorial.105 In summary, the evidence shows:
• Chinese government vessels tolerated and actively supported the environmentally

harmful fishing practices by Chinese nationals in the in the waters around
Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.
• Chinese government vessels failed to prevent Chinese nationals from releasing

cyanide into the waters around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal,
which constitute rare, fragile ecosystems.
• These actions led to the destruction of the fragile coral reef at Scarborough Shoal
and to the depletion of endangered species, such as giant clams and corals.
11.3. The Philippines considers China’s actions (and failures to act) to be inconsistent with
the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”), for the reasons stated in
105
Id., paras. 6.73-6.74; 6.80-6.81.
55
its Memorial.106 That is not to say, however, that the Philippines has presented a claim arising
under the CBD as such. It has not. The Philippines considers instead that the normative
content of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention should be informed by reference to the
provisions of the CBD relating to the protection of endangered species.107
11.4. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically
contemplates such an approach to the interpretation of treaties. It provides that, in interpreting
a treaty, account shall be taken of “[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties”. Both the Philippines and China are States Parties to the CBD.
The provisions thereof therefore constitute “relevant rules of international law” applicable in
relations between them.
11.5. Moreover, looking to the provisions of the CBD to inform the interpretation and
application of Articles 192 and 194 is consistent with the language and structure of the
Convention as a whole. The Virginia Commentary observes that Article 192 “explicitly
proclaim[s] in positive terms, as a general principle of law, that all States have the obligation
to protect and preserve the marine environment, and implicitly (in negative terms) the
obligation not to degrade it deliberately (or perhaps even carelessly)”.108 It represents “the
first occasion on which a disposition of this character has been included in a general
international treaty of a comprehensive and universal scope”.109 Similar observations apply
equally to Article 194’s obligation to prevent the pollution of the marine environment.
11.6. Both Articles are, however, worded in a general fashion. When the Convention was
adopted, it was anticipated that their normative content would be developed further in other
international instruments. Article 197 of the Convention, for example, provides:
States shall cooperate on a global basis … in formulating rules,

standards and recommended practices and procedures
106
See id., paras. 6.82-6.89.
107
See Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Doc.
No. WT/DS58/AB/R (12 Oct. 1998), paras. 130-131. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-178. (referring to, inter alia,
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity in order to interpret the 1947 GATT Agreement).
108
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 4 (M. Nordquist, et. al., eds.,
2002), pp. 39-40. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-147.
109
Id., p. 40.
56
consistent with this Convention, for the protection of the
marine environment ….110
11.7. It is significant that the CBD itself takes note of the Convention’s provisions relating
to the protection of the marine environment. In particular, Article 22(2) of the CBD provides
that it must be implemented “with respect to the marine environment consistently with the
rights and obligations of States under the law of the sea”. The CBD’s norms are therefore
specifically intended to be “consistent with this Convention”. In this respect, the Philippines
notes that UNCLOS Article 293(1) expressly provides: “A court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law
not incompatible with this Convention”.
11.8. Using the CBD to inform the scope and content of China’s obligations under Articles
192 and 194 in the manner suggested by the Philippines would therefore be entirely
consistent with the scheme of UNCLOS.
11.9. Inasmuch as the Philippines invokes the provisions of the CBD to inform the Parties’
dispute concerning interpretation and application of Article 192 and 194, the issue is one over
which Article 288(1) expressly gives the Tribunal jurisdiction.111 Because no dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the CBD per se is presented, Article 288(2) is
irrelevant.112
11.10. Irrelevant too are Articles 281 and 282. These two provisions could only apply if the
dispute settlement mechanisms of the CBD were deemed to constitute an agreement to settle
disputes “concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention” — i.e., UNCLOS
— by recourse to means other than those provided for in Section 2 of Part XV. They are not.
By their terms, the CBD’s dispute settlement procedures apply only to disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of that different Convention.113 Yet, as discussed above, the
110
See also, e.g., Articles 207, 208 & 210.
111
Article 288(1) provides: “A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with this
Part”.
112
Article 288(2) provides: “A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this
Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement”.
113
See Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter “CBD”), 1760 U.N.T.S. 19 (5 June 1992), entered into
force 29 Dec. 1993, Art. 27. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-82.
57
issue now before the Tribunal concerns only the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, not
the CBD.
11.11. An analogous issue arose in the MOX Plant case. On the request for provisional
measures Ireland submitted to ITLOS pending constitution of the Annex VII tribunal, the
United Kingdom challenged the tribunal’s prima facie jurisdiction on the grounds that the
same matter was pending before an OSPAR arbitral tribunal as well as the European Court of
Justice. ITLOS unanimously rejected the U.K.’s challenge, stating:
[T]he dispute settlement procedures under the OSPAR

Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty deal with
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of those
agreements, and not with disputes arising under the
Convention;
… [E]ven if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the

Euratom treaty contain rights or obligations similar to or
identical with the rights set out in the Convention, the rights
and obligations under these agreements have a separate
existence from those under the Convention;
[T]he Tribunal is of the opinion that, since the dispute before

the Annex VII arbitral tribunal concerns the interpretation or
application of the Convention and no other agreement, only the
dispute settlement procedures under the Convention are
relevant to that dispute[.]114
Articles 281 and 282 are therefore without consequence to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
11.12. Finally, Article 297(1) does not operate to impair the Tribunal’s jurisdiction for the
reasons previously stated in response to Question 4.
11.13. The Tribunal therefore has the jurisdiction to look to the CBD to inform its
interpretation and application of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention.
114
The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001,
ITLOS Reports 2001, paras. 49-50, 52. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-39.
58
QUESTION 12
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ Submission 5, requesting a declaration that “Mischief
Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf
of the Philippines”. The Philippines is invited to address the implications, if any, on the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of this submission of any overlapping claims or undelimited
entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf on the part of governments
that are not parties to this arbitration.
Response:
12.1. There are no overlapping claims or undelimited entitlements of any States that are not
parties to this arbitration that are relevant to the issues raised in Submission 5. There are
therefore no implications for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction or its exercise.
12.2. Neither Viet Nam nor Malaysia, which claim sovereignty over insular features in the
Spratly Islands, has claimed an EEZ with respect to any such feature.
12.3. Further, by their conduct both Viet Nam and Malaysia have demonstrated that they do
not claim a continental shelf in regard to any of the Spratly features over which they claim
sovereignty. This is evidenced by their 6 May 2009 Joint Submission to the CLCS in respect
of the continental shelf beyond 200 M in the southern part of the South China Sea. The Joint
Submission covers the area reflected in Figure S12.1 (on page 60), an annotated reproduction
of a sketch-map that appears in the Executive Summary to the Joint Submission.
12.4. The area covered by the Joint Submission is well within 200 M of several of the
features addressed by the Tribunal in its Questions, which are claimed and/or occupied by
Viet Nam and Malaysia. These include, inter alia, Itu Aba and Namyit (claimed by Viet
Nam), and Amboyna Cay and Investigator Shoal (claimed by Malaysia). If either State
considered that these features, or any others over which they assert sovereignty claims,
generated entitlement to a continental shelf, the Joint Submission would have been
redundant; the area covered is already encompassed within the notional 200 M entitlements
generated by those features. Thus, there is no EEZ or continental shelf entitlement claimed by
either State that overlaps Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal.
59
Joint Submission
Area
Figure S12.1: Viet Nam-Malaysia Joint Submission Area

(annotated)
12.5. In its December 2014 Statement submitted the Tribunal, in which it set forth its
positions on various matters in dispute in this arbitration, Viet Nam stated expressly that it
does not claim entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf from any of the features identified
in the Philippines’ Statement of Claim:
Viet Nam is of the view that none of the features mentioned by

the Philippines in these proceedings can enjoy their own
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf or generate
maritime entitlements in excess of 12 nautical miles since they
are low-tide elevations or “rocks which cannot sustain human
60
habitation or an economic life of their own” under Article
121(3) of the Convention.115
12.6. By the same logic, none of the other features in the Spratlys “can enjoy their own
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf or generate maritime entitlements in excess of
12 nautical miles since they are low-tide elevations or ‘rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or an economic life of their own’ under Article 121(3) of the Convention” — as
demonstrated in the Atlas and the Report of Professors Prescott and Schofield, attached to the
Submission as Volume II and Annex 513, respectively.
12.7. Malaysia has likewise made clear that it does not claim entitlement over areas that
overlap with either Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal. In 1979, it published the Peta
Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia (the “Map Showing the
Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia”), a copy of which is
reproduced in full as Annexes M82 and M83 hereto. The map indicates the limits of
Malaysia’s maritime claim in the vicinity of Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal. As the
annotated excerpt included as Figure S12.2 (on the following page) demonstrates, Malaysia
makes no claim in the area of the two features.
12.8. Accordingly, there are no overlapping claims or undelimited entitlements to an EEZ

or continental shelf on the part of governments that are not parties to this arbitration in the
area of Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal. There are therefore no implications for the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction arising from such claims or entitlements.
115
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam Transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal in the Proceedings Between the Republic of the Philippines and the
People’s Republic of China (14 Dec. 2014), para. 4(ii). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 468.
61
Mischief Reef
Second Thomas Shoal
Limits of
Malaysia’s claim
Figure S12.2: Annotated Excerpt of Malaysia’s Map (1979)
62
QUESTION 13
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that ‘even under pre-Convention legal
standards, China would have no valid claim of ‘historic rights’ anywhere beyond its
UNCLOS entitlements, let alone within the Philippines EEZ’ (Memorial, para. 4.84). The
Philippines is invited to provide further written argument on this issue, in particular with
respect to whether China has exercised continuous sovereignty, sovereign rights, historic
title, or historic rights over the maritime areas within the nine-dash line. The Philippines is
also invited to address, as a point of comparison, any Chinese claims to historic rights or
historic title in maritime areas other than the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea, as well
as any Chinese reaction to claims of historic rights or historic title advanced by other States.
Response:
13.1. Section I responds to the Tribunal’s invitation to the Philippines to provide further
written argument on China’s claim of “historic rights” beyond its UNCLOS entitlements. It is
supplemented by an Appendix in which the Philippines presents additional, more detailed
historical evidence showing that China has not exercised continuous sovereignty, sovereign
rights, historic title, or historic rights over the maritime areas within the nine-dash line; and
that China did not even claim such rights or title before 2009, at which time its claim was
opposed by the Philippines, Viet Nam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Section II addresses China’s
historic claims in other maritime areas; namely, the Bohai Sea and the Qiongzhou Strait.
Section III describes China’s rejection of Viet Nam’s historic claims in the Gulf of Tonkin,
and shows that the reasons presented by China for that rejection apply with even greater force
to its own claims in the South China Sea.
I. China’s Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea
13.2. China has not exercised continuous sovereignty, sovereign rights, historic title, or
historic rights over the maritime areas within the nine-dash line.
13.3. To begin with, China’s claim to possess historic rights in the South China Sea is of
recent vintage.116 Although China first published a map with a dashed line encompassing
much of the South China Sea in 1948 (based on a map circulated internally within the
government in 1947),117 it was intended only to demarcate the islands over which China
116
117
See Z. Gao and B.B. Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications”,
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, No. 1 (2013), p. 102. MP, Vol. X, Annex 307. The 1947 map
on which that 1948 map is based is produced in the Memorial as Figure 4.5 and in Volume VI as Annex M20.
63
claimed sovereignty. It did not claim historic rights over the maritime space enclosed by the
dashed line.118
13.4. Nor did China assert such rights in its 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea,
which recognized that the islands south of Hainan that it then claimed, including the Spratly
Islands, were “separated from the mainland … by the high seas”.119 This was reaffirmed in its
1992 law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which defined China’s “territorial
land” as “the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated islands
including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly)
Islands and other islands that belong to the People’s Republic of China”. 120 The 1992 law
proclaimed a 12 M territorial sea and a 12 M contiguous zone, but did not claim a more
extensive maritime entitlement, let alone sovereign rights over all the waters within the nine-
dash line.
13.5. It was not until 1998 that China first enacted legislation (the Law on the Exclusive
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf) that claimed any historic rights, and even then China
did not purport to claim any such rights in the South China Sea.121 The Law simply stated in
general terms: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People’s
Republic of China”.122 There was no explanation of what those rights were, or where they
were located.
13.6. It was not until 7 May 2009, when China submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General
maps depicting its nine-dash line, that it first claimed historic rights in the South China
Sea.123 In contrast with its conspicuous silence on the matter prior to 2009, it has done so
with increasing assertiveness ever since.
118
See id., pp. 102-105.
119
People’s Republic of China, Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s
Territorial Sea (4 Sept. 1958), in Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China
(3rd ed. 2001), para 1 MP, Vol. V, Annex 103.
120
Memorial, para. 3.15. See also People’s Republic of China, Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone (25 Feb. 1992), Art. 2. MP, Vol. V, Annex 105.
121
People’s Republic of China, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (26 June 1998). MP, Vol.
V, Annex 107.
122
People’s Republic of China, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (26 June 1998), Art. 14.
MP, Vol. V, Annex 107.
123
Boundary Department of the Ministry of Interior, Nanhai shu dao wei shi tu [Map Showing The Location of
The Various Islands in The South Sea] (China, 1947). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M20. See also Memorial, Figure
1.1.
64
13.7. The fact that China did not, until very recently, claim any historic rights in the
South China Sea reflects its lack of any such rights. In order for a claim to historic rights to a
maritime area to prevail, even under pre-Convention standards, there must be (1) “exercise of
authority over the area by the State claiming the historic right”, (2) “continuity of this
exercise of authority … for a considerable time”, and (3) either “acquiescence of other
States” or “absence of opposition by th[o]se States”.124 China, however, never exercised
authority over the area within the nine-dash line, much less continuously.125 Nor did other
States acquiesce to any such claim by China, and when the claim was first made on 7 May
2009, it was swiftly opposed by other littoral States: the Philippines, Viet Nam, Indonesia and
Malaysia.126
13.8. China’s claim to historic rights in the waters of the South China Sea is thoroughly
disproven by the historical record. Put simply, China did not at any time, let alone
continuously, exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights, historic title, or historic rights over the
South China Sea or its maritime features, south of Hainan Island. As detailed in the Appendix
submitted with this Response, the historical evidence establishes the following:
13.9. First, during the period preceding the entry of Europeans to the South China Sea
region, China was only one of many littoral polities that made use of the area for shipping,
trade and fishing purposes.127 Unlike the other polities, which dominated trade and controlled
various sections of the Sea,128 China periodically banned its subjects from navigating these
waters,129 believing the maritime realm to be the province of barbarians. The edicts of its
various Emperors, some of which were in force for many decades, to refrain from navigating
124
United Nations, Secretary General, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc
No. A/CN.4/143 (9 Mar. 1962), para. 80. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-89.
125
See generally infra Appendix to Response to Question 13.
126
Memorial, para. 4.9. See also Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 86/HC-2009 (8 May 2009). MP, Vol.
VI, Annex 193; Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, No. HA 24/09 (20 May 2009), p. 1. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 194; Note Verbale from
the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 (8 July 2010), pp. 1-2. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 197; Note Verbale from
the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, No. 000228 (5 Apr. 2011), p. 1. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 200. It has also been specifically opposed
by the United States. See United States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, “Testimony of Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at
the U.S. Department of State” (5 Feb. 2014). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 170.
127
128
129
See, e.g., infra Appendix to Response to Question 13, paras. A13.6; A13.9-10; and A13.37.
65
in the South China Sea completely negate the hypothesis of “continuous” exercise of
sovereign or historic rights or title.
13.10. Second, when Europeans arrived in the South China Sea, they operated without
interference by or protest from China. They shipped goods across the Sea and patrolled its
navigational routes to safeguard those shipments.130 Their naval forces surveyed the Sea in
detail to mitigate the dangers of traversing the Sea,131 and they cooperated to combat the
threat of piracy,132 which was a pervasive and long-standing problem that China did not
effectively address.133 Moreover, during this time, the independent Vietnamese polity
exercised a degree of authority in part of the South China Sea.134 The historical record
evidences no Chinese objections to any of these activities. To the contrary, China’s
involvement in the South China Sea was sporadic and minimal for centuries. Even during
periods when Chinese vessels from the coastal Fujian region were permitted to carry out trade
with the littoral States and polities of the South China Sea, they did so without claim of right
or title to the waters or insular features south of Hainan.135
13.11. Third, in the nineteenth century, European States, such as Britain and France,
began to claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and certain individual features in the
Spratlys,136 while Spain claimed sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal.137 There is no record
of China, then under the Qing Dynasty, having protested any of these claims, or of claiming
any insular features south of Hainan Island, except for the Paracels.138 Likewise, there is no
record of China protesting the activities of the European colonial powers in these waters, or
of claiming, let alone exercising, any sovereign or historic rights in those maritime areas.
13.12. Fourth, in the twentieth century, prior to World War II, as the European colonial
powers and Japan intensified their interest in the South China Sea, including patrolling it with
130
131
See, e.g., infra paras. A13.20-23; A13.39-41; and A13.43.
132
See, e.g., infra paras. A13.29-A13.31.
133
See infra paras. A13.27-A13.32.
134
See, e.g., infra paras. A13.33-13.35.
135
136
See, e.g., infra paras. A13.40-A13.41.
137
Antonio Remiro Brotóns, Spain in the Philippines (16th - 19th Centuries) (19 Mar. 2014), p. 24. MP, Vol.
VII, Annex 238.
138
See, e.g., infra para. A13.45.
66
warships.139 China continued to acquiesce to these activities. When, under its Republican
government, China finally showed an interest in the South China Sea, it surveyed the
historical evidence and concluded that that “the southernmost territory of China is Triton
Island of Xisha [Paracel] Islands”.140 It made no attempt to claim sovereignty over, or rights
in, any features south of the Paracels or the maritime space within the nine-dash line. It was
not until 1947 that China, for the first time, publicly asserted a claim to the islands within the
dashed line.141 But even then, as President Ma of the Taiwan Authority has recently
confirmed, China’s claim was only to the islands themselves, not to all the waters
encompassed by the line. 142
13.13. Fifth, between 1946 and 2009, China made no attempt to exercise sovereignty,
sovereign rights or historic rights in the waters of the South China Sea south of Hainan
Island, except for those immediately appurtenant to the Paracels. Its actions during that
period were consistent with a claim of sovereignty only over particular insular features. The
Republic of China seized uninhabited Itu Aba in the Spratlys in 1946 and subsequently
abandoned it. The Taiwan Authorities returned to occupy it militarily in 1956.143 The
People’s Republic of China did not occupy any of the features in the Spratlys until 1988,
when it seized Fiery Cross Reef. Between then and 1995, it occupied six other tiny features:
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), Subi
Reef and Mischief Reef, the latter four of which are under water at high tide.144 Meanwhile,
35 other features in the Spratlys were occupied by Viet Nam (20), Malaysia (6) and the
Philippines (9), whose access to them was unimpeded.145 These facts belie a claim that China
139
140
Republic of China, National Defense Committee Secretariat, Statement of Opinions Based on Research of
Military Relevance and Methods Regarding the Nine French-Occupied Islands (1 Sept. 1933), reprinted in
Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(1):072
(Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee ed.) (1995). SWSP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 475.
141
See Zou Keyuan, “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal
Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands”, International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, Vol. 14, No. 27 (1999), p. 33. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 264; L. Jinming and L. Dexia, “The Dotted
Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note”, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 34,
No. 3-4 (2003), p. 290. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 275.
142
See infra Response to Question 15.
143
Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (2014), p. 70. SWSP, Vol. V, Annex 459;
Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (1982), pp. 76-77. SWSP, Vol. V, Annex 246(bis).
144
See Memorial, paras. 5.63-5.76, 5.89-5.94.
145
67
exercised sovereignty, sovereign rights, or historic rights or title over the maritime areas
between or surrounding the Spratlys, all of which lie within the nine-dash line.
13.14. In short, there is no support for China’s claim to have historic rights in the South
China Sea, even under pre-UNCLOS legal standards. It has not continuously exercised
sovereignty, sovereign rights, historic title or historic rights within the nine-dash line. Even if
China had attempted to do so, quod non, the activities of other States demonstrate that
China’s “claim” was not accepted or acquiesced to.
II. China’s Claims to Historic Rights or Historic Title in Maritime Areas Other
than the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea
13.15. This section responds to the part of Question 13 that invites the Philippines to
address “any Chinese claims to historic rights or historic title in maritime areas other than the
South China Sea/West Philippine Sea” by describing China’s claims in the Bohai Sea and the
Qiongzhou Strait.
A. Bohai Sea
13.16. As shown in Figure S13.1 (following page 68), the Bohai Sea (渤海) is a large
gulf of the Yellow Sea located off the northeastern coast of China near Beijing. It is bounded
by the Liaodong Peninsula in the north and the Shandong Peninsula in the south. It covers
approximately 100,412 km2 and is one of the busiest seaways in the world.
The Bohai Sea is defined by the International Hydrographic

Organization as follows:
The Bo Hai is situated in the northwest part of the Yellow Sea

and bounded by the coast of China. Its limits are the following:
On the East:
A line joining the mouth of Liugu He [River] (40°16’N -

120°30’E), in Liaoning Province, southeastward to the western
extremity of Changxing Dao [Island] (39°33’N - 121°14’E), on
the western coast of Liaodong Bandao [Peninsula] (the common
limit with the Liaodong Wan [Gulf], see 7.4.2);
thence following the western coast of the Liandong Bandao, in

China, to Laotieshen Xijiăo (38°44’N – 121°08’E), the
southwestern extremity of Liadong Bandao;
68
BOHAI SEA
Mercator Projection
WGS-84 Datum
Scale accurate at 38°N
0 50 100 150 200
Nautical Miles CHINA

0 100 200 300 400
Kilometers
Huludao
Yingkou
40°N 40°N
Qinhuangdao
Beijing
Liaodong
Peninsula
Tangshan
Tianjin
Bohai
Dalian
Sea
Beihuangcheng Dao
Nanhuangcheng Dao
Cangzhou
Dazhushan Dao
Dongying
Yantai
Shandong
Peninsula
Weitang
Ye llo w
CHINA
Sea
35°N 35°N
120°E
Figure S13.1
thence southward to Penglai Xijiăo (37°50’N – 120°45’E), the
northern extremity of Shandong Bandao (the common limit with
the Yellow Sea, see 7.4).
On the West:
From Penglai Xijiăo, westward, northward and northeastwards,

along the coast of China to Lingu He.146
13.17. In its 1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea, China claimed the Bohai Sea as
“inland waters”.147 Specifically, China asserted that that the Bohai Sea was “inside the
baseline” “composed of the straight lines connecting base-points on the mainland coast and
on the outermost of the coastal islands”.148
13.18. In 1959, China published “an official explanatory pamphlet … to justify” the 1958
declaration,149 entitled Regarding the Issue of Territorial Waters of China. It claimed that the
Bohai Sea “should absolutely be considered an internal bay of China” on the basis of three
arguments.150 First, when a State adopts straight baselines, as China did in its 1958
declaration,151 and a bay is within those baselines, “then the bay should be an internal bay of
146
International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas: North Pacific, Special Publication No.
23 (Draft 4th ed. 2002), § 7.4.1. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 511.
147
(3rd ed. 2001), p. 197, para. 2. MP, Vol. V, Annex 103. The observant reader will note that the term used to
refer to the Bohai Sea in the Declaration is 渤海湾 (bo hai wan), see id., which is the term used in
contemporaneous Chinese maps for a smaller inlet of Bohai Sea known in English as Bohai Bay, see China
Cartographic Publishing House, Hanging Map of the People’s Republic of China (1956). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M4. It is also the term used in the official explanatory pamphlet, see Fu Zhu, Regarding the Issue of
Territorial Waters of China (1959), p. 17. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 485. The Bohai Sea, on the other hand, was
(and still is) referred to as 渤海 (bo hai), see China Cartographic Publishing House, Hanging Map of the
People’s Republic of China (1956). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M4; China Cartographic Publishing House, “Map of
the People’s Republic of China” (Jan. 2013). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M19. Notwithstanding this naming issue,
China almost certainly intended to refer to the Bohai Sea (渤海) in its declaration; the explanatory pamphlet, for
example, describes the entrance of the body of water being discussed as “connects Liaodong Peninsula and
Shandong Peninsula” with an “entrance [of] 45 nautical miles”, with a series of “islands at the entrance of the
bay, forming entrances”, including Beihuangcheng Island. Fu Zhu, Regarding the Issue of Territorial Waters of
China (1959), p. 18. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 485. These all refer to the Bohai Sea (渤海), not the Bohai Bay (
渤海湾).
148
(3rd ed. 2001), p. 197, para. 2. MP, Vol. V, Annex 103.
149
Zou Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice”, Ocean Development &
International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2001), p. 156. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-144.
150
Fu Zhu, Regarding the Issue of Territorial Waters of China (1959), p. 17-18. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 485.
151
69
the country”.152 The Bohai Sea, according to China, “is completely within the baseline of
[China’s] territorial waters”,153 although China has apparently never officially announced its
baselines.154
13.19. Second, China claimed that even though the mouth of the Bohai Sea is “45 nautical
miles, there are a series of islands at the entrance of the bay, forming eight entrances”.155 The
publication suggested that Article 7(4) the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone156 permits the drawing of a
straight line … between the low-water marks, to be referred to

as the closing line; the waters within the closing line are
internal waters, and the bay becomes an internal bay of the
coastal country. If there are many islands in the mouth of the
bay, in turn forming several entries, each entrance shall be
computed based on the above method.157
On the basis of this method, China contended that because there was a “series of islands at
the entrance of the bay, forming eight entrances”, and each of those entrances measured less
than 24 M, “Bohai Bay should be recognized as Chinese internal waters based on this
calculation method as well”.158
13.20. Third, China claimed that the Bohai Sea is “a historic bay of China”. In support,
China stated as follows:
For several thousand years, it has continuously and historically

been under the actual jurisdiction of China. China has always
treated it as internal waters, which has been publicly recognized
in international society. For instance, during a war between
152
Fu Zhu, Regarding the Issue of Territorial Waters of China (1959), p. 17. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 485.
153
Id., p. 18.
154
China declared some straight baselines in 1996, see People’s Republic of China, Declaration of the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the baselines of the territorial sea (15 May 1996). SWSP,
Vol. VIII, Annex 490, but those did not extend to include the Bohai Sea, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, “Straight Baseline Claim: China”, Limits in the
Seas, No. 117 (9 July 1996), p. 2. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 501.
155
156
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (29 Apr. 1958), entered into force
10 Sept. 1964, Art. 4(4). MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-76 (“Where the method of straight baselines is applicable
under the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic
interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a
long usage”.).
157
158
Id., p. 18.
70
Prussia and Denmark, the SMS Gazelle captured a Danish
vessel in Bohai Bay. At the time, the Chinese government
issued a protest to the Prussian government based on the
rationale that Bohai Bay was the internal waters of China,
forcing the Prussian government to release the Danish vessel.
This was the most significant example of international public
recognition that Bohai Bay was Chinese internal waters over a
hundred years ago.
It is even more evident that Bohai Bay has extremely important

economic and national defensive roles for China. For example,
in terms of national defense, Bohai Bay is the Chinese gate to
the north, and is highly important for the defensive security of
Beijing, the capital. Historically, imperialists have initiated
several invasions and wars against China, such as the 1857
invasion of China by the Anglo-French Alliance, and the 1900
invasion of China by the Eight-Nation Alliance. In both
instances, the invading forces landed at Dagukou in Bohai Bay,
in order to directly threaten Beijing and Tianjin, in turn forcing
the Qing Dynasty to sign the unequal treaties, Treaty of
Tientsin [Tianjin] and the Boxer Protocol. According to
historical records, among the six invasions initiated by
imperialists against the Qing government (Opium War of 1842,
the two Anglo-French Alliance wars of 1857 and 1860, the
Sino-French War of 1884, the First Sino-Japanese War, and the
Eight-Nation Alliance War), imperialist forces landed at
Dagukou in Bohai Bay three times (other than the two times
mentioned above, there was also the second Anglo-French
invasion of China in 1860). During invasions by Japanese
imperialists, Bohai Bay was also used as an important channel
for supplying materials. Furthermore, during the second
Chinese Civil War, the United States helped Chiang Kai-shek’s
“suppression of the rebellion” by using landing vessels with
Kuomintang forces in northern and northeastern China, for
which Bohai Bay was used as a docking location. Today, even
though these historical facts have forever become the past, the
one important lesson is that Bohai Bay must be fully controlled
by the Chinese people to enable true guarantees for the national
defense security of China.159
The term used for historic bay, li shi xing hai wan (历史性海湾), is the same term used in
Article 298(1)(a)(i).
13.21. Without commenting on the validity of China’s claim in regard to the Bohai Sea,
the Philippines points out that the claim of historic right or title pertains to a maritime area
appurtenant to the mainland coast that China regards as internal waters.
159
Id., p. 18-19.
71
B. Qiongzhou Strait
13.22. China’s 1958 declaration claimed “the Chiungchow Straits” as “Chinese inland
waters”.160 As shown in Figure S13.2 (following page 72) the Qiongzhou Strait (琼州海峡),
also known as the Hainan Strait, separates Hainan Island from the Leizhou Peninsula on the
Chinese mainland. It is, on average 15.5 M wide, and 20 M at its widest. It runs east-west for
44 M.
13.23. China’s 1958 declaration explained that the Qiongzhou Strait was “inside the
baseline” “composed of the straight lines connecting base-points on the mainland coast and
on the outermost of the coastal islands”.161
13.24. The 1959 explanatory pamphlet justified claiming the Qiongzhou Strait as “inland
waters” in the following terms:
When a coastal country uses the straight baseline method to

delimit the width of territorial seas, if the strait is within the
baseline for territorial sea, then the strait should be strait within
the internal waters of the coastal country. Qiongzhou Strait is
this type of strait, because it is within the territorial sea baseline
of our country, our declaration on territorial sea proclaimed that
it is part of the internal water of China.
China has many internal straits, the largest of which is

Qiongzhou Strait. Since it is located between Mainland China
and Hainan Island, it is an important maritime passage
connecting Mainland China and Hainan Island, as well a
maritime shortcut to Southeast Asian countries. It is extremely
significant to Chinese in economic and national defense terms.
Historically, it has always been under Chinese sovereign
jurisdiction and an inseparable component of Chinese territory.
Since liberation, China has long managed it as an internal
strait. The declaration on territorial sea by our government is
merely a reiteration of historical fact.162
160
161
Id. As with its claim to the Bohai Sea, China’s 1996 straight baselines claim does not completely include the
Qiongzhou Strait, although it “cuts off the eastern approaches to” the Strait. See U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, “Straight Baseline Claim: China”,
Limits in the Seas, No. 117 (9 July 1996), p. 8. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 501.
162
Fu Zhu, Regarding the Issue of Territorial Waters of China (1959), pp. 20-21 (emphasis added). SWSP, Vol.
VIII, Annex 485.
72
QIONGZHOU STRAIT
Mercator Projection
WGS-84 Datum
CHINA
Scale accurate at 20°N
0 25 50 75
Nautical Miles
0 50 100 150
Nansan Dao
Kilometers
Weizhou
Dao
Xieyang Naozhou Dao

Dao
Leizhou
Peninsula
Gulf
Loudou Sha
of Str
ait
ou
Qio ngzh
Tonkin
20°N 20°N
Hainan Island
South
China
Sea
110°E
Figure S13.2
13.25. Here again, it is worth noting that China’s claim of historic right pertains to a
maritime area appurtenant to its coast that it claims to have treated historically as inland
waters. Except for its recent claim in regard to the waters encompassed by the nine-dash line,
China has never claimed historic rights or title in any maritime area far removed from its
coast and beyond any possibility of characterizing as inland waters.
III. China’s Reactions to Claims of Historic Rights or Historic Title Advanced by

Other States
13.26. In this section, the Philippines addresses the Tribunal’s invitation to describe “any
Chinese reaction to claims of historic rights or historic title advanced by other States”.
A. China’s Endorsement of Claims to Historic Bays
13.27. In support of its claim that the Bohai Sea and the Qiongzhou Strait are Chinese
internal waters, China’s 1959 explanatory publication stated that “there are many …
examples [of historic bays] in international practice”.163 It cited three: Norway’s Varanger
Fjord; Canada’s Hudson Bay; and France’s Bay of Cancale.164 China also referred to Russia’s
Peter the Great Bay, although it is unclear whether China agreed that it qualifies as an historic
bay.165
13.28. China did not explain why it considered Varanger Fjord, Hudson Bay and the Bay
of Cancale to be historic bays, although it expressed the view that historic bays must have
“important national defense and economic value for a coastal country”, and that a State must
have “continuously exercised jurisdiction over the bay”.166
B. China’s Rejection of Viet Nam’s Claim to Historic Waters in the

Gulf of Tonkin
13.29. As far as the Philippines is aware, the only other case in which China has reacted
to a claim of historic rights or title is in regard to Viet Nam’s claim that the Gulf of Tonkin is
163
Id., p. 17
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
73
an historic bay. As detailed below, China rejected this claim for reasons that apply equally to
its own claim in the South China Sea.
13.30. In 1974, during bilateral negotiations with China over their land and maritime
boundaries, Viet Nam asserted that the Gulf of Tonkin constituted an historic bay, a claim
that China rejected.167
13.31. The basis for China’s objection was articulated in a speech delivered in 1979 by
Han Nianlong, the Head of the Government Delegation of China at the fourth plenary
meeting of the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations at the vice-foreign minister level, where he
addressed what he referred to as Viet Nam’s “unreasonable proposition” that the Gulf of
Tonkin is an historic bay.168
13.32. Mr. Han observed that Viet Nam’s claim was of recent vintage, stating that it was
“news to [China]”, which had “no knowledge at all about such a declaration by previous
Governments of the two countries at any time”.169 As Mr. Han explained:
167
Epsey Cooke Farrell, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Law of the Sea: An Analysis of Vietnamese
Behavior within the Emerging International Oceans Regime (1998), p. 70. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 527. In 1982,
Vietnam nonetheless declared that “the maritime frontier in the gulf [of Tonkin] between Viet Nam and China is
delineated according to the June 26, 1887 convention … signed between France and the Qing Dynasty of
China”, and that “[t]he part of the gulf appertaining to Viet Nam constitutes the historic waters and is subjected
to the juridical regime of internal waters of … Vietnam”. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Statement by the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Viet Nam (12 Nov. 1982),
reprinted in Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 1 (1983), p. 74 (emphasis omitted). SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 500. China
responded by stating that “the Sino-Vietnamese boundary Delimitation Convention signed between China and
France in 1887 did not in any way delimit the maritime area in the [Gulf of Tonkin]”, and that “the so-called
boundary line … as asserted by the Vietnamese Government is illegal and null and void”. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Spokesman’s Statement of 28 November 1982 (28 Nov. 1982),
reprinted in Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 1 (1983), p. 76. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 489. Although China’s
formal objection “left aside the legal status of the gulf”, Epsey Cooke Farrell, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam
and the Law of the Sea: An Analysis of Vietnamese Behavior within the Emerging International Oceans Regime
(1998), p. 71. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 527, it is clear that China continued to object to both “[t]he Vietnamese
historic waters claim and the delimitation line in the 1887 Border Treaty”. Zou Keyuan, “The Sino-Vietnamese
Fishery Agreement on Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin”, Ocean Development and International
Law , Vol. 36 (2005), p. 15. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 536.
168
Letter from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (14 May 1979), reprinted in U.N. General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session,
Report of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/34/235 (14 May 1979) (with attachment), p. 7. SWSP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 486. See also “May 12, 1979 Speech by Han Nianlong, Head of the Government Delegation of China, at
the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Sino-Vietnamese Negotiations at the Vice-Foreign Minister Level”, reprinted
in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 21 (25 May 1979), p. 17. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 487.
169
74
As for the Vietnamese side’s assertion that for nearly a hundred
years the Governments of the two countries have always
exercised their sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with
the above-mentioned longitude, it is not at all based on facts.
Everyone knows that the previous governments in China and
the French colonial authorities observed the three-nautical-mile
principle in regard to the territorial sea. The government of the
People’s Republic of China declared a 12-nautical-mile
territorial sea in September 1958. China has never exercised
sovereignty over or jurisdiction in the Beibu Gulf sea area
beyond its territorial sea. In September 1964, the Vietnamese
Government also declared its territorial sea to be 12 nautical
miles wide and published a map showing its territorial sea
boundary in the Beibu Gulf. If, as the Vietnamese side claims,
the vast sea area in the Beibu Gulf west of 108°3’13”E was its
inland sea long ago, why did it draw another territorial sea
boundary within its own inland sea? The Vietnamese assertion
is absurd from the viewpoint of international law and is
illogical and self-contradictory. Has any ship had to ask for
permission from the Vietnamese authorities for entry into the
sea west of 108°3’13”E? The “sea boundary line”, a brain-child
of the Vietnamese authorities, has never existed either in
historical agreements or in reality. As for the assertion that the
Beibu Gulf is “a historical gulf” belonging to China and Viet
Nam, it is really news to us. We have no knowledge at all about
such a declaration by previous Governments of the two
countries at any time. Vietnamese insistence on this
unreasonable proposition prevented any results in the
negotiations, which went on for three months in vain. The
division of the Beibu Gulf sea area between the two countries is
still an unresolved issue.170
13.33. China reiterated its rejection of Viet Nam’s claim in an article published in the
Guangming Daily in November of 1980. It stated that “[f]or China as one of the coastal
nations”, Viet Nam’s claim that the Gulf of Tonkin had been a historic gulf “[f]or several
centuries” was “news previously unknown”, and “completely without historical or legal
basis”.171
170
Report of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/34/235 (14 May 1979) (with attachment), pp. 6-7.
171
Chen Tiqiang and Zhang Hongzeng, “The Issue of Delimiting the Beibu Gulf Sea -- Rebuttal of Vietnamese
Errors from the Perspective of International Law”, Guangming Daily (2 Dec. 1980), p. 1 of translation. SWSP,
Vol. VIII, Annex 488.
75
13.34. China further stated:
In 1958, during the Convention on the High Seas, the United

Nations Secretariat prepared the ‘Historic Bays: Memorandum
by the Secretariat of the United Nations,’ listing the key
historic bays in the world. As a significant bay, [The Gulf of
Tonkin] was not included, yet no one raised any objection to
this.172
China also observed that Viet Nam’s Declaration on Vietnamese Territorial Waters,
Contiguous Zones, Exclusive Economic Zones, and Continental Shelf “did not mention that
[the Gulf of Tonkin] was a Vietnamese ‘territorial gulf’”.173
13.35. With respect to the fact that Viet Nam had not exercised sovereignty over the Gulf
of Tonkin, China stated that “[i]n internal waters, foreign merchant ships must first obtain
special permits before sailing through”, and that “tens of thousands of foreign vessels [in the
Gulf of Tonkin had] always enjoyed all freedoms of international waters”.174
13.36. If Viet Nam’s claim to historic waters in the Gulf of Tonkin is, as the head of the
Chinese delegation put it, “self-contradictory”,175 then China’s claim to historic waters in the
172
Errors from the Perspective of International Law”, Guangming Daily (2 Dec. 1980), p. 6 of translation. SWSP,
Vol. VIII, Annex 488. See also Zou Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice”,
Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2001), p. 157. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-144. (“In
China’s view, Vietnam’s claim is untenable in international law for a number of reasons”, including the fact that
“in French practice, the Gulf of Tonkin was never mentioned in the context of historic waters at a time when
France regarded other bays as historic waters such as the Bay of Cancale with a breadth of 17 nautical miles at
the entrance”.).
173
Errors from the Perspective of International Law”, Guangming Daily (2 Dec. 1980), pp. 7-8 of translation.
174
Id., pp. 5-6 of translation. See also id., p. 7 (“Since 1957, the governments of China and Vietnam established
three fishery agreements. The most recent agreement line was twelve nautical miles from the baseline between
the parties. Vessels of one side crossing over the other’s agreement line required permission, while the Beibu
Gulf region outside of the agreement line had long been common fishing grounds for both sides”.); and Zou
Keyuan, “Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice”, Ocean Development & International
Law, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2001), p. 158. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-144. (noting China’s claim that “in Vietnamese
practice, the fishery agreements signed with China created 12 nautical mile zones within which foreign fishing
required special permission, and beyond that the waters in the Gulf of Tonkin were a common fishing zone for
both sides”.).
175
76
South China Sea is as well. All of China’s reasons for objecting to the Gulf of Tonkin as an
historic bay apply to the South China Sea.
13.37. First, China’s complaint that it had “no knowledge at all about such a declaration
by previous governments of the two countries at any time”176 applies to the South China Sea,
where, until China submitted the nine-dash line map to the United Nations in 2009, it had
never asserted historic rights or title.
13.38. Second, like the Gulf of Tonkin, the South China Sea was not mentioned in the
1958 memorandum on historic bays prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations, and its
omission was not objected to by China.177
13.39. Third, just as China observed that the French colonial authorities had claimed only
a three mile territorial sea in the Gulf of Tonkin and that Viet Nam had claimed only a 12 M
territorial sea, without claiming historic title or rights in either declaration, China’s 1958
Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sea
claimed only a 12 M territorial sea and recognized waters between the Chinese mainland and
its South China Sea islands as “high seas”.178
13.40. Fourth, China has not “continuously exercised jurisdiction over”179 the area
encompassed by the nine-dash line. China’s observation that “tens of thousands of foreign
vessels [in the Gulf of Tonkin had] always enjoyed all freedoms of international waters”180
176
in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 21 (25 May 1979), p. 17. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 487; Zou Keyuan, “Historic
Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice”, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 32, No. 2
(2001), p. 157 (“In China’s view, Vietnam’s claim is untenable in international law for a number of reasons”,
including the fact that “in French practice, the Gulf of Tonkin was never mentioned in the context of historic
waters at a time when France regarded other bays as historic waters such as the Bay of Cancale with a breadth of
17 nautical miles at the entrance”.). MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-144.
177
See generally United Nations, Secretary General, Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/1 (30 Sept. 1957). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-183.
178
See generally People’s Republic of China, Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China
on China’s Territorial Sea (4 Sept. 1958), in Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People’s
Republic of China (3rd ed. 2001). MP, Vol. V, Annex 103.
179
180
Errors from the Perspective of International Law”, Guangming Daily (2 Dec. 1980), pp. 6-7 of translation.
SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 488. (“Since 1957, the governments of China and Vietnam established three fishery
77
applies to the South China Sea, which for centuries has served as a vital conduit for maritime
traffic. China’s observation that it would have been “inconceivable” for China and France to
have regarded “such an expanse of the high seas as the Gulf of Tonkin as an inland sea”, can
equally be said about the much larger South China Sea.181
agreements. The most recent agreement line was twelve nautical miles from the baseline between the parties.
Vessels of one side crossing over the other’s agreement line required permission, while the Beibu Gulf region
outside of the agreement line had long been common fishing grounds for both sides”.). See also Zou Keyuan,
“Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice”, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol.
32, No. 2 (2001), p. 158. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-144 (noting China’s claim that “in Vietnamese practice, the
fishery agreements signed with China created 12 nautical mile zones within which foreign fishing required
special permission, and beyond that the waters in the Gulf of Tonkin were a common fishing zone for both
sides”.).
181
in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 21 (25 May 1979), pp. 16-17. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 487.
78
QUESTION 14
The Tribunal notes that the Philippines’ Submission 9 relates to “China’s claims to sovereign
rights and jurisdiction, and to ‘historic rights’, with respect to the maritime areas of the
South China Sea encompassed by the so-called ‘nine-dash line.’” The Philippines is invited
to provide copies of historic maps of the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea prepared by
any of the littoral States, covering to the greatest extent possible the areas and periods of
time that are potentially relevant to the question of Chinese historic rights or titles. The
Philippines is also invited to provide any further reference material or sources that would
assist the Tribunal in interpreting historic maps of the area.
Response:
14.1. In response to Question 14, the Philippines has endeavoured to obtain historic
maps of the South China Sea prepared by the littoral States and their colonial predecessors
that cover as wide a time frame as possible. For the Tribunal’s convenience, these 218 maps
are reproduced as the historic atlas found at Volume VI, and in the atlas of oil and gas maps
found at Volume VII. In accordance with the 5 March 2015 letter from the Registry, the
historic maps appearing in Volume VI are also reproduced in large format, two copies of
which have been deposited with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
14.2. Within the historic atlas, the maps are organized by littoral State and presented
chronologically. They include maps prepared by:
• China;
• The Philippines;
• Spain (the colonial predecessor of the Philippines);
• The United States of America (the colonial predecessor of the Philippines);
• Malaysia;
• Brunei;
• The United Kingdom (the colonial predecessor of Malaysia and Brunei);
• Viet Nam;
• France (the colonial predecessor of Viet Nam);
• Indonesia;
• The Netherlands (the colonial predecessor of Indonesia);
79
• Portugal (the colonial predecessor in Malacca and Macao); and
• Japan (which had colonial pretensions in the South China Sea).182
14.3. Each entry in the historic atlas contains a copy of the entire map, an enlargement of
the relevant area, and pertinent information, including the source and date of publication.
14.4. Question 14 also requests that the Philippines provide “further reference material
or sources that would assist the Tribunal in interpreting historic maps of the area”. In addition
to the scholarly works cited in the response to Question 13, the Philippines has identified and
annexed the following academic publications that address historic cartography in the South
China Sea and which may assist the Tribunal in interpreting the maps presented in the
historic atlas. They are, in chronological order:
• Annex 517: J.F. Baddeley, “Matteo Ricci’s Chinese World-Maps, 1584-1608”,

The Geographical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct. 1917) (produced in Volume IX of
the Philippines’ Supplemental Written Submission);
• Annex 518: Nobuo Muroga, “The Philippines in Old Chinese Maps”, Philippine
Historical Review, Vol. 2 (1969) (produced in Volume IX of the Philippines’
Supplemental Written Submission);
• Annex 253: Cordell D.K. Yell, “Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of
Westernization” in The History of Cartography, Vol. 2, Book 2 (J.B. Harley and
D. Woodward, eds. 1994) (produced in Volume VII of the Philippines’
Memorial);
• Annex 261: D. Hancox and V. Prescott, Secret Hydrographic Surveys in the

Spratly Islands (1999) (produced in Volume VIII of the Philippines’ Memorial);
• Annex 528: excerpts from Thomas Suárez, Early Mapping of Southeast Asia: The
Epic Story of Seafarers, Adventurers, and Cartographers Who First Mapped the
Regions Between China and India (1999) (produced in Volume X of the
Philippines’ Supplemental Written Submission);
• Annex 265: Anthony Reid, Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia
(2000) (produced in Volume VIII of the Philippines’ Memorial);
• Annex 539: Hyunhee Park, “A Buddhist Woodblock-printed Map in 13th Century

China”, Crossroads: Studies on the History of Exchange Relations in the East
Asian World, Vol. 1/2 (2010) (produced in Volume X of the Philippines’
182
The Philippines has also presented pre-1800 maps published in Italy, which during that period was
significant centre for cartography. See Thomas Suárez, Early Mapping of Southeast Asia: The Epic Story of
Seafarers, Adventurers, and Cartographers Who First Mapped the Regions Between China and India (1999), p.
130. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 528.
80
• Annex 540: excerpts from Carlos Quirino, Philippine Cartography: 1320-1899
(3d ed., 2010) (produced in Volume X of the Philippines’ Supplemental Written
Submission);
• Annex 544: Greg Wood, “Successive States: Aaron Arrowsmith’s Chart of the
Pacific Ocean, 1798-1832”, The Globe: Journal of The Australian and New
Zealand Map Society Inc., No. 70 (2012) (produced in Volume XI of the
Philippines’ Supplemental Written Submission);
• Annex 308: Laura Hostetler, “Early Modern Mapping at the Qing Court: Survey
Maps from the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong Reign Periods” in Chinese
History in Geographical Perspective (Y. Du & J. Kyong-McClain, eds., 2013)
(produced in Volume X of the Philippines’ Memorial);
• Annex 547: Robert Batchelor, “The Selden Map Rediscovered: A Chinese Map of
East Asia Shipping Routes, c. 1619”, Imago Mundi: The International Journal for
the History of Cartography, Vol. 65, No. 1 (24 Jan. 2013) (produced in Volume
XI of the Philippines’ Supplemental Written Submission); and
• The following bibliographic records of the U.S. Library of Congress for certain
maps produced in Volume VI:
o Annex 567: U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Junheng Zuo,

Map of Tian di tu (1601), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626725/
(accessed 4 Feb. 2015) (produced in Volume XI of the Philippines’
o Annex 568: U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Hua yi

tu Map (Stone) (circa 1933), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005081/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2015) (produced in
Volume XI of the Philippines’ Supplemental Written Submission);
o Annex 569: U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Da Ming

yu di tu (Plate) (circa 1547), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626776 (accessed 4 Feb. 2015) (produced in
o Annex 570: U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Xia lan
zhi zhang (Plate) (circa 1647), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626721/ (accessed 5 Feb. 2015) (produced in
o Annex 571: U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Huang

yu quan lan fen sheng tu (Plate) (1721), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626779/ (accessed 6 Feb. 2015) (produced in
81
14.5. To further assist the Tribunal, the Philippines includes as an appendix to its
response to Question 14 the Philippines’ interpretation of the maps presented in the historic
atlas.183
183
See infra Appendix to Response to Question 14.
82
QUESTION 15
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ Submission 2, requesting a declaration that –
China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to “historic rights”, with
respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called
“nine-dash line” are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime
entitlements under UNCLOS;
The Philippines is invited to comment on the relevance, if any, to the interpretation of the
“nine dash line” of the remarks of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, Mr. Ma
Ying-jeou, on 1 September 2014 on the occasion of the opening ceremony of an exhibition of
historical archives (available at
http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514).
Response:
15.1. As indicated in the Tribunal’s question, on 1 September 2014 the President of the
Taiwan Authority of China, Mr. Ma Ying-jeou, addressed the opening ceremony of the
“Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China”.
15.2. President Ma’s speech clarifies Taiwan’s interpretation of the nine-dash line,
which is of considerable importance given that the dashed line first appeared on a map
internally distributed by the Republic of China in 1947.184 As detailed below, President Ma
makes three points that are relevant to matters at issue in this arbitration. First, he explains
that the 1947 map depicting the line was a claim to the islands encompassed by it, not to all
of the enclosed waters.185 Second, in connection to maritime claims in the South China Sea,
President Ma refers to the principle that the land dominates the sea, making clear Taiwan’s
position that maritime claims must be based on entitlements generated by land, rather than on
free-standing rights to waters.186 Finally, President Ma accepts that the spatial extent of
maritime claims is determined by international law, and that at the time the dashed line was
first published, this restricted China’s claim to between 3 and 12 M of its claimed insular
features.187
184
See infra para. A14.22.
185
See generally infra Section 15.I.
186
See generally infra Section 15.II.
187
See generally infra Section III.
83
15.3. President Ma is a distinguished public international law scholar and expert on the
law of the sea. He received his S.J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1980, where he wrote his
dissertation on law of the sea issues in the East China Sea. He subsequently published at least
two monographs on the law of the sea: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in
the East China Sea, and The Tiao-Yu-T’ai (Senkaku) Islets and the East China Sea
Delimitation: A Review Under the New Law of the Sea.
15.4. President Ma’s speech was described by Taiwan on its official government website
in both English188 and Chinese189, and was the subject of a press release issued by the
Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.190 He later addressed the dashed line in an interview
with The New York Times.191
15.5. Counsel for the Philippines accessed the website referenced in the Tribunal’s
question on 29 December 2014. Sometime thereafter, between 29 December 2014 and 15
January 2015, the video at the link referred to by the Tribunal192 was edited to remove certain
statements. However, the Philippines has located elsewhere on the Internet what appears to
be an unabridged recording of President Ma’s speech. It is to this video, attached to this
submission as Annex 493 on the USB containing the annexes to the Philippines’
Supplemental Written Submission, that the Philippines will therefore refer in Response to the
Tribunal’s question.193 For the Tribunal’s convenience, the Philippines also provides at
188
See Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “President Ma attends opening ceremonies of
Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014),
available at http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=33215&rmid=2355 (accessed 25
Feb. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 496.
189
See Transcript of Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, President Ma Ying-jeou,
“Excerpts from Remarks at Opening Ceremony for the Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern
Territories of the Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514 (accessed 27 Jan. 2015).
190
See Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Malaysia, “President Ma vows Taiwan will play important role
in South China Sea talks” (2 Sept. 2014). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 497.
191
“Transcript of New York Times Interview With President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan”, New York Times (31
Oct. 2014). SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 566.
192
Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “Excerpts from Remarks at Opening Ceremony for
the Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014),
available at http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514 (accessed 27 Jan.
2015). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 494.
193
Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “Opening Ceremony for the Exhibition of
Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China”, YouTube Video (remarks of
President Ma Wing-jeou begin at 47:10) (1 Sept. 2014), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h89dhJWqViw (accessed 27 Jan. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 493. A
transcript and translation of this video may be found at Transcript of Office of the President of the Taiwan
84
Annex 495 a transcript of both videos, with the parts of President Ma’s remarks that were
removed indicated by highlighting in the unabridged version.194
15.6. President Ma’s remarks clarify the interpretation of the nine-dash line in three
ways.
15.7. First, in regard to the original intent of the line, President Ma states:
… the point we want to stress in this exhibition is that we had

published a map of the islands of South China Sea as early as
1935, and that in 1947, after our victory against Japan, we
recovered many islands from Japan and published the map of
the islands of South China Sea and their locations. We can
therefore say that our claim over the South China Sea islands
began a long time ago. Furthermore, no country protested or
expressed a different opinion when we made the claim. This is
because there is in fact copious historical evidence that these
islands were used by the people of our country in ancient times.
I think that this is the most salient point that these historical
archives of our southern territory show, and we must strengthen
this point further.195
15.8. President Ma herein refers to the 1947 map as being a “map of the islands of [the]
South China Sea and their locations”,196 which in his view, supports Taiwan’s position that its
“claim over the South China Sea islands began a long time ago”.197 President Ma does not
suggest that the dashed-line was intended to claim any rights to the maritime space
encompassed by it.
15.9. Other statements by the Taiwanese authorities confirm the position articulated by
President Ma that the line was originally intended to claim islands, not maritime spaces. An
Authority of China, President Ma Ying-jeou, “Excerpts from Remarks at Opening Ceremony for the Exhibition
of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514 (accessed 27 Jan. 2015).
194
Transcript of Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, President Ma Ying-jeou, “Excerpts
from Remarks at Opening Ceremony for the Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the
Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514 (accessed 27 Jan. 2015)
(hereainfter “Transcript of President Ma’s Speech”). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 495.
195
Transcript of President Ma’s Speech, pp. 4-5. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 495.
196
Transcript of President Ma’s Speech, p. 4. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 495. (emphasis added). See also Rodolfo
C. Severino, Where in the World is the Philippines? Debating Its National Territory (2011), p. 76 (“In 1947, the
Nationalist government of China published a map, the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands, in which
nine bars or an ‘interrupted line’ enclosed the South China Sea”.). MP, Vol. IX, Annex 298.
197
Transcript of President Ma’s Speech, p. 4. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 495. (emphasis added).
85
official Taiwanese press release on President Ma’s remarks states that the 1947 map
referenced by President Ma “includes a U-shape line to demarcate the islands as [Taiwanese]
territory”.198 The official Taiwanese governmental webpage similarly states that “the
[Republic of China] back in 1935 issued [the] Map of Chinese Islands in the South China Sea
to advocate [the Republic of China’s] sovereignty over the islands in the area”.199
15.10. Second, President Ma confirms that maritime claims in the South China Sea are
governed by what he refers to as the “basic principle” that “land determines the sea”.200 In a
subsequent interview with The New York Times, President Ma repeated that
“[t]here is a basic principle in the Law of the Sea, that land dominates the sea”, and went on
to observe: “Thus marine claims begin with land…”201 Taiwan’s acceptance of this
foundational principle of the law of the sea is reiterated by the official Taiwanese government
webpage describing President Ma’s remarks in English,202 as well as by the official Chinese
text found beneath the video referred to by the Tribunal.203
198
Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Malaysia, “President Ma vows Taiwan will play important role in
South China Sea talks” (2 Sept. 2014), p. 1. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 497. (emphasis added).
199
Feb. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 496. (emphasis added). In fact, China has interpreted a similar line as
denoting the allocation of islands, rather than as a delimitation of maritime space. This is what China suggested
when disputing Vietnam’s assertion, discussed in question 13, that the so-called “red line” in the map attached
to the 1897 Sino-French Border Convention was a maritime delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin rather than a line
allocating islands. See, e.g., Chen Tiqiang & Zhang Hongzeng, “The Issue of Delimiting the Beibu Gulf Sea --
Rebuttal of Vietnamese Errors from the Perspective of International Law”, Guangming Daily (2 Dec. 1980), p.
193. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 488. (“Regardless of the treaty text, the names on the map, or the islands shown
on the map all clearly showed that the red line only involved land and coastal islands on the two sides of the
line…. Thus, we know that the 1887 Convention Concerning the Delimitation of the Border between China and
Tonkin had absolutely no intention of delineating the entire Beibu Gulf”.)
200
Transcript of President Ma’s Speech, p. 8. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 495.
201
“Transcript of New York Times Interview With President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan”, New York Times (31
Oct. 2014), p. 7. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 566.
202
Feb. 2015), p. 4. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 496. (“The principle that ‘sovereignty over land determines
ownership of the surrounding waters,’ which is set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
applies to disputes concerning sovereignty over both land and sea, [President Ma] stated, explaining that this is
why nations are seeking to occupy islands and reefs in the South China Sea”.).
203
See Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “The President Attended the Opening
Ceremony for ‘Republic of China Southern Historical Exhibition’” (1 Sept. 2014), p. 4. SWSP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 492. (Summarizing President Ma as stating that “the principle of ‘the land dominates the sea’ in United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea still applies to the disputes over territorial sovereignty or over
territorial waters, thereby resulting in various countries fighting over the islands and reefs in the South China
Sea”.).
86
15.11. The necessary consequence of President Ma’s acceptance that the “land dominates
the sea” and that “maritime claims begin with land” is that President Ma—speaking on behalf
of Taiwan—accepts that international law recognizes maritime claims only insofar as a State
has title to land that generates maritime entitlements. Claims to maritime space that are
unconnected to claims to land may not be made.
15.12. Finally, and consistent with his observations concerning the relationship between
land and maritime claims, President Ma clarifies that the spatial extent of a maritime
entitlement is governed by general international law. In that connection, President Ma
correctly observes that, at the time the 1947 map was published, the “concept of territorial sea
was 3 nautical miles”. He goes on to say that, “[i]f there was smuggling, [Taiwan] would try
to capture the smugglers at twice the distance or at most 12 nautical miles”.204 According to
President Ma, there “was no claim at all on other so-called sea regions”.205 President Ma’s
position on this point is affirmed by the official summary of his remarks, which states that
“when the [Republic of China] issued the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands in
1947, aside from the concept of territorial waters, no other concepts regarding maritime
zones existed, nor had any claims been made”.206
15.13. Taken together, President Ma’s remarks accept that the original dashed line was
intended to be a claim to the insular features enclosed by it. Since maritime claims are
governed by the principle that the land dominates the sea, China’s maritime claims at the time
the line was first published were limited to between 3 and 12 M of the surrounding maritime
space, which was the outer limit of a maritime entitlement then recognized by international
law. Since the maximum extent of maritime claims under modern international law is
determined by UNCLOS, no State can claim maritime rights beyond those permitted by its
provisions. President Ma’s statement therefore constitutes a rejection of the claim first
204
Transcript of President Ma’s Speech, p.7. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 495.
205
Id. (emphasis added).
206
Feb. 2015), p. 3. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 496. (emphasis added.) See also Office of the President of the Taiwan
Authority of China, “The President Attended the Opening Ceremony for ‘Republic of China Southern Historical
Exhibition’” (1 Sept. 2014), p. 4. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 492. (Stating that, when Taiwan published its “Map
of South China Sea Islands and Their Locations” in 1947, “other than the territorial waters, there were no other
claims and concepts of maritime space”.) (emphasis added).
87
asserted by the authorities in Beijing in 2009 that China is sovereign, or enjoys sovereign
rights over, all of the waters within the nine-dashed line.
88
QUESTION 16
The Philippines is invited to address whether, as a matter of international law, an

archipelago not pertaining to an Archipelagic State (as defined by Article 46 of the
Convention) may be subject to a system of straight baselines surrounding the archipelago as
a whole. The Philippines is likewise invited to address whether the Spratly Islands may be
such an archipelago pursuant to the application of the Convention, of historic rights or titles,
or of general international law.
Response:
16.1. The short answer to the first question is yes: an archipelago not pertaining to an
Archipelagic State (as defined by Article 46 of the Convention) may be subject to a system of
straight baselines surrounding the archipelago as a whole, but only if it conforms to the
criteria for employing straight baselines set out in Article 7 of the 1982 Convention.
16.2. The short answer to the second question is no: the Spratly Islands are not such an
archipelago pursuant to the application of the Convention, of historic rights or titles, or of
general international law. There is no basis for drawing straight baselines around the Spratlys
as a whole, nor have China or the Philippines applied their respective systems of straight
baselines and archipelagic baselines to the Spratly Islands. Nor has Viet Nam, which claims
sovereignty over all of the Spratly features, endeavoured to apply a system of straight
baselines to them.
I. The Application of Article 7 to Dependent Archipelagos
16.3. Article 7 of UNCLOS allows for the drawing of straight baselines around coastal
archipelagos in the following terms:
1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut

into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity….
3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any

appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and
the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal
waters.
89
16.4. The case law on Article 7 takes a restrictive approach.207 In the Qatar/Bahrain case
the International Court of Justice concluded that Bahrain was not entitled to draw straight
baselines connecting its outermost islands and low-tide elevations. It had neither declared
itself to be an archipelagic state, nor could Article 7 be applied to the geographical
configuration of Bahrain.208
16.5. Article 7 might be relied upon to justify drawing a system of straight baselines
around an oceanic archipelago which consists of a few larger islands fringed by other smaller
islands in their immediate vicinity, or which has a deeply indented coastline. The first of
those conditions was satisfied in the Eritrea/Yemen Maritime Delimitation.209 The arbitrators
described the Dahlak Islands as a “tightly knit group” or “‘carpet’ of islands and islets” that
formed “an integral part of the general coastal configuration”.210 They also found that “[t]he
relatively large islet of Tiqfash, and the smaller islands of Kutama and Uqban further west,
all appear to be part of an intricate system of islands, islets and reefs which guard this part of
the coast. This is indeed, in the view of the Tribunal, a ‘fringe system’ of the kind
contemplated by Article 7 of the Convention, even though Yemen does not appear to have
claimed it as such”.211
16.6. A “fringe” implies more than one island; the Special Rapporteur of the
International Law Commission sessions that prepared what became Article 4 of the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea says simply: “the Commission interpreted the International
Court of Justice’s decision [in the Fisheries Case] as meaning that a single island would not
207
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 212. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26 (“The Court observes that the method of
straight baselines, which is an exception to the normal rules for the determination of baselines, may only be
applied if a number of conditions are met. This method must be applied restrictively. Such conditions are
primarily that either the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or that there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity”.) See also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 133-139. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-2 (requiring evidence of consistent and uninterrupted
usage).
208
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, paras. 213-215. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26.
209
Eritrea v. Yemen, Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation), Award (17 Dec. 1999), para.
140. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-49 (“[T]he Dahlak fringe of coastal islands is also suitable for the application not
of the ‘normal baseline’ of the territorial sea, but of the ‘straight baselines’ described in Article 7 of the
Convention (as there distinguished from the ‘normal’ baseline described in Article 5). The straight baseline
system is there described as ‘the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points’. Yemen appears to
have little difficulty in agreeing that the Dahlaks form an appropriate situation for the establishment of a straight
baseline system”.).
210
Id., para. 139.
211
Id., para. 151.
90
be enough to justify the application of the straight baseline rule, but that a certain number of
islands were necessary”.212 Once again a few very small rocks or islets may not constitute a
fringe: “the exact number of islands will depend partially on size; three large islands might
constitute a fringe where three islets over the same [sea] area would not”.213
16.7. Article 7 has to be applied to the facts of each island group, however, and may not
always justify straight baselines enclosing the whole archipelago. It will most likely be
inapplicable to archipelagos consisting of a few similarly sized islands or small islands that
are widely spaced.214 As Kopela observes: “The applicability of Article 7 for dependent
outlying archipelagos is rather limited”. 215
16.8. The State practice must be viewed cautiously, therefore.216 Examples of State
practice which relies, at least in part, on Article 7 include the Falkland Islands, Spitsbergen,
and the Faroes.217 These island groups each comprise closely-spaced clusters of islands that
appear to meet the requirements of Article 7, including the close land/water linkage of Article
7(3). They are to some degree both deeply indented and fringed by smaller islands.
16.9. The Spratly Islands, however, are neither “deeply indented and cut into”, nor can it
be said that they constitute a fringe of islands grouped around or in the immediate vicinity of
one or more larger islands. The extensive sea areas surrounding these very tiny features do
not meet the requirement of being “sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be the
subject to a regime of internal waters”. The ICJ’s reasoning in paragraph 214 of the
212
International Law Commission, “317th Meeting”, in Report of the International Law Commission Covering
the Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (22 June 1955), p. 205, para. 40. SWSP, Vol.
XII, Annex LA-182.
213
Peter Beazley, Maritime Limits and Baselines: A Guide to their Delineation (1987), p. 13. SWSP, Vol. XII,
Annex LA-201.
214
Peter Beazley, Maritime Limits and Baselines: A Guide to their Delineation (1987), p. 14 argues that
“[w]here the territorial waters measured from the low-water line around individual islands spaced along the
coast do not overlap, those islands are unlikely to constitute a fringe”. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-201. See also
W.M. Reisman & G. Westerman, Straight Baselines in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation (1992),
pp. 88-89. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-204.
215
Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013), p. 259. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-
213.
216
See Id., chs. 2, 3; W.M. Reisman & G. Westerman, Straight Baselines in International Maritime Boundary
Delimitation (1992), ch. 5. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-204; J. Roach & R. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims
(2012). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-212.
217
See Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013) pp. 122-124, 195-200. SWSP, Vol.
XII, Annex LA-213.
91
Qatar/Bahrain case appears equally applicable here: the features are tiny and widely
scattered and there is no cluster or system around a main island.218
16.10. Article 7 cannot justify the drawing of straight baselines around this archipelago,
and neither China nor the Philippines (nor Viet Nam) has suggested that it could. It follows
that a system of straight baselines could be applied only if the Spratlys form part of an
archipelagic State, and only insofar as the conditions specified in articles 46 and 47 are met.
II. Whether the Spratly Islands Are Entitled to Archipelagic Status
A. Pursuant to Other Articles of the Convention
16.11. For the purposes of the Convention Article 46 defines an archipelagic State to
mean “a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other
islands”. It also defines an “archipelago” to mean “a group of islands, including parts of
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated
that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic
and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such”. The Spratly Islands
meet neither part of this definition.
16.12. The first part of this definition excludes — and was intended to exclude —
dependent archipelagos not pertaining to an archipelagic State,219 i.e. those archipelagos that
are not themselves States but are simply part of a continental or mainland State. A distinction
between an archipelagic State and a State with archipelagos is thus fundamental to Part IV of
UNCLOS.220 The former is entitled to draw archipelagic straight baselines in accordance with
the special rules set out in Article 47 of the Convention. The latter is entitled to employ
straight baselines only within the narrower terms of Article 7 of the Convention. Neither
218
Itu Aba would be the principal island.
219
Prompted in part by the Bahamas which in 1975 introduced a key document entitled “18 Principles for
Inclusion in Archipelagic Articles”. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary,
Vol. 5 (M. Nordquist, et al., eds., 2002), pp. 402, 405, where the document is reproduced. SWSP, Vol. XII,
Annex LA-148(bis).
220
See especially, D.P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Vol. 1 (1982), pp. 237, 256-258. SWSP,
Vol. XII, Annex LA-199; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 5 (M.
Nordquist, et al., eds., 2002), pp. 401-404. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-148(bis); Clive R. Symmons, The
Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (1979), p. 6. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-198; Sophia Kopela,
Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013), pp. 25-37. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-213.
92
China nor Viet Nam, the only two States that claim sovereignty over all of the Spratly
features, is an archipelagic State.
16.13. The second point which follows from the definition of an archipelago in Article 46
is the need for the interconnecting waters, islands and other features to be “so closely
interrelated” as to constitute “an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity”. The
closeness of the geographical connection was emphasized at UNCLOS III.221 Amerasinghe
set out the prevalent view of advocates of archipelagic status “…The mere existence of
several islands in the ocean would not make them an archipelago”.222
16.14. For archipelagic States Article 47 establishes the maximum ratio of water to land at
9:1; a 100 NM limit on the length of baselines, or exceptionally 125 NM; and a requirement
that “the drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago”.223 The maximum ratio of water to land was intended to
exclude widely-spaced archipelagos such as Tuvalu and Kiribati because of the very large sea
areas that would be enclosed.224
16.15. The Spratlys as a whole comprise no more than 5 km2 of land territory. 225 They
encompass more than 410,000 km2 of maritime space,226 a water/land ratio of approximately
82,000:1. They would fail the test of Article 47 even if, quod non, dependent archipelagos
could constitute archipelagic States. Part IV does not apply to such a collection of features so
small and widely scattered that they lack a close relationship with each other and with
interconnecting sea areas. That, too, would exclude the Spratlys from having any form of
archipelagic status even if Part IV did apply to archipelagos that do not pertain to
archipelagic States.
221
The Mauritian delegate explained that an archipelagic State must “[constructively] form a single physical and
economic entity”. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Summary Records of the 37th
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37 (12 Aug. 1974), p. 269. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-187. The
Cuban delegate said that “remote and isolated islands” in mid ocean could not be grouped together and regarded
as archipelagos”. Id.
222
C.F. Amerasinghe, “The Problem of Archipelagos in the International Law of the Sea”, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 23 (1974), pp. 539, 564. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-197.
223
Art. 41(1) – (3).
224
V. Prescott & C. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed., 2005), p. 176. SWSP,
Vol. XII, Annex LA-208.
225
United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Spratly Islands”, CIA World Factbook (28 May 2014). SWSP,
Vol. IX, Annex 502.
226
Id.
93
B. Pursuant to General International Law
16.16. There are examples of States drawing straight baselines around dependent oceanic
archipelagos notwithstanding that they appear not to meet the criteria laid down in Article 7,
and the States concerned are not entitled to rely on Part IV.227 Self-evidently, the legal
justification for this practice cannot be Articles 7 or 46 of UNCLOS. The argument, such as it
is, would have to be that customary law has developed since 1982 and that, in effect, it has
supplanted the 1982 Convention.228 It would be based on the false premises that the
Convention does not regulate the drawing of straight baselines by non-archipelagic States
around dependent archipelagos, that UNCLOS leaves the question open for subsequent
evolution through State practice,229 and that the matter is therefore governed by general
international law.230
16.17. The objections to this argument are as obvious as they are compelling. First, it is
simply inconsistent with the 1982 Convention. The Convention does not leave the matter
open for further development: it regulates it definitively.231 Article 5 provides that “Except
where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth
of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts
officially recognized by the coastal state”. The drawing of straight baselines is “otherwise
provided” for in Articles 7, 9, 10, and 46 of the Convention. Unless the drawing of straight
baselines can be justified by reference to one or more of those provisions, the normal baseline
referred to in Article 5 applies. Anything else is contrary to the Convention.
16.18. Second, as noted earlier, the extension of archipelagic status to dependent oceanic
archipelagos was discussed at UNCLOS III and rejected. The limitation of Part IV to
archipelagic States was part of the consensus package deal.232 It is not open to States Parties
227
See Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013), ch. 3. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-213.
228
Id., p. 157.
229
Id., p. 259.
230
Id., pp. 154-155.
231
Contrast Articles 74 and 83, which do leave open the possibility of further development of the law on
maritime boundary delimitation through customary international law.
232
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Summary Records of the 37th Meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37 (12 Aug. 1974), p. 267, para. 11. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-187. See also C. Ku,
“The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in Southeast Asia Case Western Reserve”, Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 23 (1991), pp. 471-474. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-202.
94
to derogate unilaterally from the Convention’s agreed terms.233 The regime of straight
baselines and archipelagic waters set out in Parts II and IV of UNCLOS has not been
amended by the States Parties; it is not the subject of any implementing agreement; there are
no relevant UN General Assembly resolutions or informal understandings of the States
Parties; there are no inter se agreements dealing with the matter.
16.19. Third, even if it could be accepted (but only for the sake of argument) that State
practice could in theory evolve into customary law displacing provisions of the Convention, a
change of this kind cannot be brought about unilaterally, any more than Iceland could change
treaty provisions on fisheries jurisdiction unilaterally.234 It would require, if not the
agreement of other States, then at least their tacit consent or acquiescence. There is no such
tacit consent or acquiescence to any extension of the archipelagic waters regime. Inter alia,
the US, UK, and Germany have protested at the straight baselines drawn around the
Galapagos Islands.235 The US, Philippines and Viet Nam have protested the straight baselines
China has drawn around the Paracels.236 The US has also objected to straight baselines drawn
around the Faroe Islands and the Azores.237 At the same time, the United States has
conspicuously refrained from drawing straight baselines around the Hawaiian Islands;238
France has similarly not done so around Polynesia.239
16.20. Fourth, the practice of States which have drawn straight baselines around
dependent archipelagos is not sufficiently consistent, uniform or widespread to establish
233
See Articles 309-311; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, paras. 211-214. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26.
234
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, paras. 67, 59.
MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-8.
235
See Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013), pp. 200-207. The U.S. position is
reproduced at United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas No 112: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (9 Mar.
1992). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-203.
236
Daniel J. Dzurek, “The People’s Republic of China Straight Baseline Claim,” IBRU Boundary & Security
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1996), pp. 80-85. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 525; United States Department of State, Bureau
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas No 112: United States
Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (9 Mar. 1992). SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-203.
237
United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
Limits in the Seas No 112: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (9 Mar. 1992). SWSP, Vol.
XII, Annex LA-203.
238
Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013), pp. 141-142. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-213.
239
Id., pp. 252-255.
95
customary international law on the subject.240 On the contrary, the contours of the alleged
rule are fundamentally uncertain. Is it an expression of the requirements of Article 7? Or of
Article 47? Or of some mélange of the two? Or is it stricter than either of those provisions?
Or less strict? Or just different? Without some authoritative articulation of the rule, State
practice alone is not capable of expressing consistent normative content. Moreover, if the
practice of non-parties is considered significant, then it supports the consensus agreed at
UNCLOS III, not the evolution of some new rule.241
16.21. Fifth, if on the other hand we interpret the practice of the States using straight
baselines around dependent archipelagos as largely confined to groups of closely linked
islands, where not much ocean space is enclosed, and sea routes normally used for
international navigation are not affected,242 then it is clear that the Spratly Islands would fall
outside any such rule on all three counts. The features which might be used as archipelagic
basepoints are tiny and widely dispersed. There is simply no scenario where a series of
straight baselines could cordon off a maritime area whose water/land ratio is anywhere near
9:1. The total land area for the entire Spratly Island region is less than 4 square kilometres,
which means that any straight baseline system could only enclose within these features a total
of 36 square kilometres of water — less than the territorial sea to which the high-tide features
are already entitled. Moreover, the South China Sea, including the area straddled by the
Spratlys, is a major international shipping lane, not a remote area of unused ocean.
Preventing the enclosure of areas of this kind was exactly the reason for the opposition of
maritime States to extending the archipelagic waters regime to dependent archipelagos.243
240
Id., p. 185: “However, a problem which cannot be addressed clearly from state practice concerns the issue of
the conditions for the application of this regime and particularly the question of which groups of islands could
be beneficiaries of such [a] regime”.
241
The most relevant non-party is the United States, with several dependent archipelagos, including Hawaii, the
US Virgin Islands, and the Aleutian Islands.
242
Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013), p. 185, offers this as a possible
analysis. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-213.
243
E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea: Introductory Manual, Vol. 1 (1994), p. 108: “[T]he
distinction drawn in the UN Convention between archipelagic states and archipelagos is more the result of the
opposition of the principal maritime powers to the proliferation of archipelagic waters than of any objective
consideration of the need to unify the scattered parts of the non-State archipelago”. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-
205. See also D.P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Vol. 1 (1982), ch. 6. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-199.
96
C. Pursuant to Historic Rights and Titles
16.22. The simple answer to the question whether historic rights and titles may justify
straight baselines around the Spratlys is that China has not extended its system of straight
baselines to the Spratlys: even if the islands themselves were Chinese, China cannot claim
any historic basis for employing straight baselines there.244 At no time has any State treated
the Spratlys as an archipelago for the purpose of drawing straight baselines around the whole
archipelago. Regardless of whether historic rights not consistent with UNCLOS continue to
exist after entry into force of the Convention, there is no case for relying on them in this
context.
16.23. Part IV of UNCLOS applies only to archipelagic States as defined in Article 46 of

the Convention. Oceanic archipelagos that are not archipelagic States may be enclosed by
straight baselines only if they conform to the requirements of Article 7 of UNCLOS. Article 7
cannot justify the drawing of straight baselines around the Spratly Islands, and neither China
nor the Philippines (nor Viet Nam) has suggested that it could.
16.24. Even if there were an applicable rule of customary law on dependent oceanic
archipelagos — and neither China nor the Philippines nor Viet Nam has suggested that there
is — it is clear that the Spratlys would fall outside any such rule, however defined, because
they are so small and so widely scattered. China has not extended its system of straight
baselines to the Spratly Islands and it cannot claim any basis — historic or otherwise — for
doing so in conformity with UNCLOS, or under general international law.
244
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 133-139,
where the Court required evidence of constant and long practice. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-2. Contrast Denmark
which first employed straight baselines around the Faroes in 1903 and Ecuador which first employed them for
the Galapagos in 1934.
97
98
QUESTION 17
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ reference to certain maritime features in the South China
Sea/West Philippine Sea. The Philippines is invited to provide current maps or large-scale
nautical charts for all maritime features in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea that are
relevant to the Parties’ dispute. The Tribunal would welcome receiving copies of the most
recent editions of such maps and charts as prepared by different government mapping
authorities, including but not limited to those of:
‐ The People’s Republic of China;

‐ The Republic of the Philippines;
‐ The Taiwan Authority of China;
‐ The Republic of Indonesia;
‐ Malaysia;
‐ The Socialist Republic of Vietnam;
‐ Japan;
‐ France (Service hydrographique de la marine);
‐ The Russian Federation (Glavnoe Oupravlenie Navigatsii i Okeanografi);
‐ The United Kingdom (British Admiralty);
‐ The United States of America (U.S. Hydrographic Office, Defense Mapping
Agency).
The Philippines is also invited to provide the Tribunal with the South China Sea Electronic
Navigational Charts prepared by the East Asia Hydrographic Commission.
Response:
17.1. The Philippines has obtained all of the nautical charts prepared by government
mapping agencies requested by the Tribunal. In accordance with the Registry’s letter to the
Parties dated 5 March 2015, they are provided in loose-leaf as Annexes NC1-NC66. Digital
files of all nautical charts are submitted with this Supplemental Written Submission.245
17.2. In additional, the Philippines provides excerpts of the pertinent nautical charts for
each maritime feature mentioned in Questions 19-24 in the Atlas presented as Volume II of
this Supplemental Written Submission.
17.3. For the Tribunal’s convenience, the table below lists all of the nautical charts
submitted by the Philippines, organized by State and year of publication.
245
Annexes NC1-NC7 were submitted with the Memorial.
99
Producing Agency Title of Chart Year of Annex
Production Number
JAPAN
Japan Coast Guard Chart No. W1676 (Northern 2005 NC7
Part of Philippine Islands
and Adjacent Seas)
Japan Coast Guard Chart No. W1500 (Taiwan 2008 NC8
Strait to Mindoro Strait)
Japan Coast Guard Chart No. W1501 (Hainan 2008 NC9
Dao and Adjacent Seas)
Japan Coast Guard Chart No. W1502 (South 2008 NC10
China Sea: Southern Portion,
Western Sheet)
China Sea: Southern Portion,
Eastern Sheet)
Japan Coast Guard Chart No. W1677(A) 2009 NC4
(Southern Part of Philippine
Islands and Adjacent Seas)
China Sea)
MALAYSIA
Malaysia National Chart No. MAL 6 (Sabah - 1996 NC13
Hydrographic Sarawak)
Centre
Malaysia National Chart No. MAL 781 2013 NC14

Hydrographic (Peninjau) (2013)
Centre
Malaysia National Chart No. MAL 885 (Beting 2013 NC15

Hydrographic Mantanani - Selat Balabac)
Centre
Malaysia National Chart No. MAL 884 2014 NC16

Hydrographic (Terumbu UBI - Terumbu
Centre Laksamana)
CHINA
Navigation Chart No. 18400 (Zhenghe 2005 NC17
Guarantee Qunjiao to Yongshu Jiao)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
100
Production Number
Navigation Chart No. 18500 (Nanfang 2005 NC18

Guarantee Qiantan to Haikou Jiao)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 00104 (South 2006 NC2

Guarantee China Sea)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 10019 (Huangyan 2006 NC3

Guarantee Dao (Minzhu Jiao) to
Department of the Balabac Strait)
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 10017 (Zhongsha 2006 NC19

Guarantee Qundao to Bashi Chan)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 10018 (Xisha 2006 NC20

Guarantee Qundao to Nansha Qundao)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 18050 (Northern 2006 NC21

Guarantee and Central Portions of
Department of the Nansha Qundao)
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 10021 (Kep. 2008 NC22

Guarantee Natuna to Balabac Strait)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 17310 (Huangyan 2012 NC23

Guarantee Dao)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
101
Production Number
Navigation Chart No. 18600 (Yinqing 2012 NC24

Guarantee Qunjiao to Nanwei Tan)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 18100 (Shuangzi 2013 NC25

Guarantee Qunjiao to Zhenghe
Department of the Quojiao)
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 18200 (Liyue 2013 NC26

Guarantee Tan)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 18300 (Yongshu 2013 NC27

Guarantee Jiao to Yinqing Qunjiao)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Navigation Chart No. 18700 (Wumie 2013 NC28

Guarantee Jieo to Huanglu Jiao)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
PHILIPPINES
Navigation Chart No. 18800 (Haikou 2013 NC29
Guarantee Jiao to Yuya Ansha)
Department of the
Chinese Navy
Headquarters
Philippine Coast Chart No. 200 (Republic of NC30
and Geodetic the Philippines)
Survey
Philippine National Chart No. 4200 (Philippines) 2004 NC31

Mapping and
Resource
Information
Authority
102
Production Number
Philippine National Chart No. 4803 2006 NC32

Mapping and (Scarborough Shoal)
Resource
Information
Authority
Philippine National Chart No. 4723 (Kalayaan 2008 NC33
Mapping and Island Group)
Resource
Information
Authority
Philippine National Chart No. 4723(A) 2011 NC5
Mapping and (Kalayaan Island Group and
Resource Recto Bank including Bajo
Information De Masinloc)
Authority
RUSSIA
Russian Main Chart No. 60360 (Pacific 2000 NC34
Department of Ocean: Philippines Islands,
Navigation and Luzon Island)
Oceanography

Department of Ocean: Northern Part of
Navigation and South China Sea)
Oceanography

Department of Ocean: Northern Part,
Navigation and Southeastern Part of South
Oceanography China Sea)
Russian Main Chart No. 61137 (South 2005 NC37
Department of China Sea and Sulu Sea;
Navigation and Approaches to Balabac
Oceanography Strait)
Department of Ocean: Western Part, Luzon
Navigation and Island to Kalimantan Island)
Oceanography
Department of China Sea: 11°21’N to
Navigation and 14°40’N, 112°35’E to
Oceanography 117°10’E)
Department of China Sea: 7°01’N to
Navigation and 11°30’N, 112°12’E to
Oceanography 115°35’E)
103
Production Number

Department of China Sea: Philippines;
Navigation and Palawan Island and Palawan
Oceanography Pass)
Department of China Sea: Philippine
Navigation and Islands; Busuanga Island to
Oceanography Luzon Island)
Department of China Sea: Luzon Island;
Navigation and Arboledan Point to Palauig
Oceanography Point)
UNITED KINGDOM
United Kingdom Chart No. 967 (South China 1985 NC44
Hydrographic Sea; Palawan)
Office
United Kingdom Chart No. 3488 (Song Sai 1997 NC45
Hydrographic Gon to Hong Kong)
Office
United Kingdom Chart No. 3489 (Manila to 1998 NC46
Hydrographic Hong Kong)
Office
United Kingdom Chart No. 3483 (South 2002 NC1
Hydrographic China, Sulu and Celebes
Office Seas; Mindoro Strait to
Luconia Shoals and Selat
Makasar)
United Kingdom Chart No. 4508 (South 2003 NC47

Hydrographic China Sea)
Office
United Kingdom Chart No. 3482 (Singapore 2012 NC48
Hydrographic Strait to Song Sai Gon)
Office
United Kingdom Chart No. 4411 (Cabra 2012 NC49
Hydrographic Island to Cape Bojeador)
Office
UNITED STATES
United States Chart No. 93061 (Reefs In 1944 NC50
Defense Mapping the South China Sea)
Agency
United States Chart No. 93043 (Tizard 1950 NC51
Defense Mapping Bank South China Sea)
Agency
104
Production Number
United States Chart No. 93046 (Indonesia; 1982 NC52

Defense Mapping South China Sea; Palawan
Agency Passage; Mantangule Island
to Eran Bay)
United States Chart No. 93048 (Duhu 1982 NC53
Defense Mapping Ansha to Kimanis Bay)
Agency
United States Chart No. 93044 (Indonesia 1983 NC6
Defense Mapping South China Sea: Yongshu
Agency Jiao to Yongdeng Ansha)
United States Chart No. 93045 (Heng Jiao 1984 NC54

Defense Mapping (Livock Reef) to Haima Tan
Agency (Routh Shoal/Seahorse
Shoal)
United States Chart No. 93047 (South 1984 NC55
Defense Mapping China Sea: Yongshu Jiao to
Agency P’o-Lang Chiao)
United States Chart No. 93042 (Plans In 1985 NC56
Defense Mapping the South China Sea)
Agency
United States Chart No. 92033 (Palawan, 1986 NC57
Defense Mapping Philippines)
Agency
United States Chart No. 92006 (Philippine 1989 NC58
Defense Mapping Islands: Southern Part)
Agency
United States Chart No. 91005 1996 NC59
Defense Mapping (Philippines: Central Part)
Agency
United States Chart No. 93030 (Mui Da 1996 NC60
Defense Mapping Nang to Mui Bai Bung)
Agency
United States Chart No. 93049 (Vanguard 1997 NC61
Defense Mapping Bank to Spratly Island)
Agency
United States United States Defense 1998 NC62
Defense Mapping Mapping Agency, Chart No.
Agency 71027 (Pulau Bintan to Mui
Ca Mau Including North
Coast of Borneo and
Adjacent Islands)
United States Chart No. 91004 (South 2012 NC63
Defense Mapping China Sea: Scarborough
Agency Shoal)
105
Production Number
Vietnamese Chart No. I-1000-04 (Cam 2008 NC64

People’s Navy Ranh - Quần Đảo Trường
Sa)
Vietnamese Chart No. I-2500-01 (Việt 2010 NC65
People’s Navy Nam)
Vietnamese Chart No. I-2500-04 (Phi- 2010 NC66
People’s Navy Líp-Pin Và Dao Dài Loan)
17.4. The Philippines has also obtained the South China Sea Electronic Navigational
Charts (“ENCs”) prepared by the East Asia Hydrographic Commission and requested by the
Tribunal. The ENCs are submitted electronically herewith in their original file format. They
represent the second edition of this dataset.246
17.5. The ENC files can be viewed using an Electronic Chart Display and Information
System or other, similar software. This particular dataset includes:
• EA200001.000
• EA200002.000
• EA200003.000
• EA200004.000
17.6. The “.000” files are of S-57 file type; each represents a different section of the
South China Sea. For example, “EA200002.000” includes the Kalayaan Island Group but
does not extend far enough north to include Scarborough Shoal. Scarborough Shoal is
included within “EA200001.000”. To view the South China Sea in its entirety, all four files
must be loaded into the software viewer.
17.7. It is possible to view the ENCs with a number of different pieces of software. One
is CARIS Easy View, which was created by a reputable name in the hydrographic and marine
community, and is available free of charge.247 S-57 files are loaded into Easy View software,
and the “View” and “Selection” toolbars are used to navigate, zoom to features and query
data contained in the ENCs. The “Layers” window shows the S-57 ENC files that are
currently loaded in Easy View.
246
They are available at http://scsenc.eahc.asia.
247
The software can be downloaded at http://www.caris.com/products/easy-view/.
106
17.8. When an interactive element is selected, it appears highlighted bright blue, and
information pertaining to that element is populated in the “Properties”, “Attributes” and
“Selection” windows. This information might include the type of feature selected, and any
attribute information (such as names or comments) associated with it.
107
108
QUESTION 18
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ Submission 4, requesting a declaration that “Mischief
Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations … and are not features that
are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise”. The Philippines is invited to
address whether, as a matter of international law, low-tide elevations constitute territory and
are subject to appropriation pursuant to the rules and principles of territorial acquisition.
Response:
I. Summary of the Law
18.1. The short answer to the question is no: low tide elevations (LTEs) do not constitute
territory and are not subject to appropriation pursuant to the rules and principles of territorial
acquisition. That was the clear conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua/Colombia) Case.248
18.2. The Nicaragua/Colombia Case follows a consistent line of earlier judgments.249

Effectivités, however strong, will not establish sovereignty over or title to low-tide
elevations.250 In this respect LTEs cannot be compared to islands or rocks that are
permanently above water. The more appropriate comparison is with the seabed, and title to
the seabed does not depend on occupation, effective or notional.251 Instead, the sovereignty of
248
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, para. 26.
MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-35. (“It is well established in international law that islands, however small, are capable
of appropriation (see, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 102, para. 206). By contrast, low-tide elevations cannot
be appropriated, although ‘a coastal State has sovereignty over low-tide elevations which are situated within its
territorial sea, since it has sovereignty over the territorial sea itself’ (ibid., p. 101, para. 204) and low-tide
elevations within the territorial sea may be taken into account for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea (see paragraph 182 below)”.). Id.
249
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, paras. 205-209. MP Vol. XI, Annex LA-26;
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 659, paras. 141-142. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-177;
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, paras. 295-297. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-31.
250
Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Points of
Substantive Law, Part II”, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 32 (1956), pp. 46-47. SWSP, Vol. XII,
Annex LA-193 (“It is a well-established rule of international law that territory, in order to be capable of
appropriation in sovereignty, must be situated permanently above high-water mark, and not consist e.g., of a
drying-rock, only uncovered at low tide, unless it is already within the territorial waters of appropriable
territory”.).
251
See Hersch Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas”, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol.
27 (1950), pp. 394, 415-419, 423, 431-432. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-194; Gilbert Gidel, The Continental
Shelf in the Law (1951), p. 124. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-195; D.P. O’Connell, The International Law of the
109
the coastal state extends by operation of law to the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea.252
An LTE within the territorial sea will thus be subject to the sovereignty of the state of whose
seabed it forms part.253 Sovereignty in these cases is a function of proximity to land territory.
It follows location, not occupation or appropriation.254
18.3. Although the point has never been explicitly addressed in the case law, it should
follow that, within the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, an LTE will be subject
to the regime provided for in Articles 56(3) and 77 of UNCLOS.255 Sovereign rights over
natural resources and the jurisdiction attributed by Article 56 will belong to the appurtenant
coastal state.256 This conclusion is consistent with the treatment of non-proximate LTEs in the
Nicaragua/Colombia case.257 The Court applied the same logic to all LTEs, whether located
on the continental shelf or EEZ, or within the territorial sea, i.e. that they are not capable of
Sea Vol. 1 (1982), pp. 472-475. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-199. The point is explicit with respect to the
continental shelf in Article 77(3) of UNCLOS. In the North Sea Cases, the Court held that: “the rights of the
coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory
into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an
extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its
natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right”. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic
of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para.
19. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-4.
252
UNCLOS, Art. 2(2); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 101, para. 204. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26; Bay of Bengal
Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (7 July 2014),
para. 191. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-179; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, paras. 193-194. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-
12.
253
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia /Singapore),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 12, para. 299. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-31.
254
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 12, paras. 295-299. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-31; Roberto Lavalle,
“The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal Analysis”, International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014), pp. 468-469. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-214.
255
Clive R. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (1979), p. 140. SWSP, Vol. XII,
Annex LA-198 (“So it may at most be argued that a low-tide elevation, situated on the continental shelf, is in
essence part of the seabed and of the same juridical status”.). The same conclusion was reached by the U.S.
Court of Appeals in United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 20 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Cir. 1970). SWSP, Vol.
XII, Annex LA-219. See also Roberto Lavalle, “The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal
Analysis”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014), p. 476. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-214.
256
See Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea concerning sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the
area between the two countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, and related matters (“Torres Strait
Treaty”), 1429 U.N.T.S. 208 (18 Dec. 1978), entered into force 15 Feb. 1985, Art. 1(1)(i). SWSP, Vol. XII,
Annex LA-186, (treating low-tide elevations as a part of the seabed, stipulating that: “‘seabed jurisdiction’
means sovereign rights over the continental shelf in accordance with international law, and includes jurisdiction
over low-tide elevations, and the right to exercise such jurisdiction in respect of those elevations, in accordance
with international law”.).
257
See infra para. 18.7.
110
appropriation.258 That had been Nicaragua’s argument in the case, and the Court was
evidently responding positively to it. Since even the coastal state lacks sovereignty over the
seabed beyond 12 NM, it follows that no state may claim sovereignty over an LTE located
within the EEZ or continental shelf.259
18.4. Beyond areas of national jurisdiction an LTE would become part of the deep
seabed, subject to the regime set out in Part XI of the Convention. Article 89 of UNCLOS
would preclude any state from purporting to subject such elevations to its sovereignty.260
II. Jurisprudence
18.5. In the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) case Bahrain claimed sovereignty over Fasht ad Dibal, a low-tide
elevation. It argued that it had carried out “acts of authority” on the elevation, and that this
was sufficient to confer title. The Court rejected this argument, holding instead that low-tide
elevations are not subject to the normal rules on appropriation of land territory.261 It gave
three reasons. First, the apparent absence of widespread and uniform state practice supporting
the claim that LTEs may be appropriated by “acts of authority”.262 Writers have not
subsequently identified any state practice that casts doubt on the Court’s conclusion.263
Second, unlike islands, LTEs are not entitled to a territorial sea unless they are located within
the territorial sea of the mainland or of an island.264 When they are located beyond that
distance they have no territorial sea of their own.265 Third, the rules on straight baselines in
UNCLOS and the Territorial Sea Convention do not apply to LTEs unless lighthouses or
258
MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-35. See also Roberto Lavalle, “The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal
Analysis”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014), p. 473. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-214.
259
Roberto Lavalle, “The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal Analysis”, International Journal
of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014), p. 476. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-214.
260
Id., p. 477.
261
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, paras. 205-206. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26.
262
Id., para 206.
263
See, e.g., Roberto Lavalle, “The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal Analysis”, International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014), p. 462. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-214.
264
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 207. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26; UNCLOS, Art. 13(1).
265
UNCLOS, Art. 13(2).
111
similar installations have been built on them.266 The court emphasised that “the difference in
effects which the law of the sea attributes to islands and low-tide elevations is
considerable”.267
18.6. In the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), the Court held that “a low-tide elevation
belongs to the State in the territorial waters of which it is located”.268 This conclusion —
which echoes Qatar/Bahrain — is not consistent with the idea that LTEs within 12 NM of
the baseline may be appropriated in the same way as islands or other land territory. It
supports the theory that sovereignty over LTEs within the territorial sea is a function of
proximity, not of occupation.
18.7. Unlike the earlier cases, the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua/Colombia) judgment involved LTEs some of which lay beyond 12 NM from the
low water line of the nearest land269 — what the literature calls “non-proximate elevations”.
In that context it is significant that the Court nevertheless followed the reasoning relied upon
in the Qatar/Bahrain Case and that it unambiguously affirmed that “low-tide elevations
cannot be appropriated”. Here the court recognizes explicitly that LTEs located beyond 12
NM cannot be the appropriated as territory by any state.
18.8. There is one further precedent that deals with sovereignty over low-tide elevations
— the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration. In that case Eritrea claimed territorial sovereignty over
“islands, rocks and low-tide elevations” in the Red Sea.270 The tribunal went on to hold, inter
266
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 208. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26; UNCLOS, Art. 7(4); Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (19 Apr. 1958), entered into force 10 Sept. 1964, Art
4(3). MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-76. In the Bangladesh/India Arbitration, the arbitrators also held that “base points
located on low-tide elevations do not fit the criteria elaborated by the International Court of Justice in the Black
Sea case and confirmed in more recent cases”. However, there are special rules in UNCLOS Article 47 allowing
“drying reefs” to be used when drawing straight baselines around archipelagic states. Bay of Bengal Maritime
Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (7 July 2014), para. 261.
SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-179.
267
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 206. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-26
268
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, paras. 295-299. MP, Vol. VI, Annex LA-31.
269
MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-35.
270
Eritrea v. Yemen, First State of the Proceedings (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Award (9
Oct. 1998), paras. 30, 75. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-48.
112
alia, that “after examination of all relevant historical, factual and legal considerations, the
Tribunal unanimously finds in the present case that the islands, islet, rocks, and low-tide
elevations forming the Mohabbakah islands, including but not limited to Sayal Islet, Harbi
Islet, Flat Islet and High Islet are subject to the territorial sovereignty of Eritrea”.271 It made
similar findings of sovereignty with respect to other groups of islands, islets, rocks and low-
tide elevations.272 The award says nothing about the basis on which sovereignty over low-tide
elevations was determined. Unlike the Nicaragua/Colombia case it does not say which
features are LTEs, nor is it possible to identify their precise location in relation to adjacent
land territory or islands. But the dispositif and the relevant paragraphs all refer to groups of
“islands, islets, rock and low-tide elevations”, as if each group formed a contiguous whole.
The implication appears to be that, as in the ICJ cases, sovereignty over LTEs follows
location and is a function of proximity to islands or land territory.273 Correctly understood,
this case is not out of line with the ICJ judgments.
18.9. It follows that in the present case China cannot have sovereignty over any LTE
within the area in dispute unless that LTE is located within 12 NM from Chinese islands or
land territory. It also follows that the Philippines necessarily enjoys sovereignty over those
LTEs which are within 12 NM of its own territory. Sovereign rights over LTEs within the
Philippines’ continental shelf and EEZ are exercisable only by the Philippines, but no state
can acquire full territorial sovereignty by any means over LTEs located beyond 12 NM from
the nearest land.
271
Id., para. 475.
272
Id., paras. 482, 508, 524. See also Id., para. 527 (the dispositive).
273
Roberto Lavalle, “The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal Analysis”, International Journal
of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014), p. 473. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-214; W. Michael Reisman,
“The Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Republic of Yemen Award of the Arbitral
Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999), p. 680.
SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-206; Yoshifumi Tanaka, “Low-tide Elevations in International Law of the Sea:
Selected Issues”, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 20 (2006), p. 190. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-209.
113
114
QUESTIONS 19 THROUGH 24
19. The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ reference to nine maritime features in the South
China Sea/West Philippine Sea and its position that –
Scarborough Shoal … is permanently below water, except for

six small protrusions that are above sea level at high tide, and
which are properly classified as “rocks” under Article121(3)
that do not generate entitlement to an EEZ or a continental
shelf.
[…] Second Thomas Shoal, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef – are
low-tide elevations under Article 13, which are part of the
seabed and subsoil, are not subject to appropriation and do not
generate any maritime entitlement, even to a territorial sea… .
McKennan Reef and Gaven Reef, are also low-tide elevations
but because they are situated within 12 M of small, high-tide
features they may each serve as a base point for the
measurement of the high-tide feature’s territorial sea… .
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef – are
“rocks” that do not generate entitlement to an EEZ or a
continental shelf under Article 121(3).
(Memorial, paras. 5.2, 5.3)
The Philippines is invited to provide further detailed geographic and hydrographic

information, photographs, and any other technical data relevant to the assessment of the
status (as a submerged feature, low-tide elevation, rock, or island) of the following features:
– Scarborough Shoal;
– Second Thomas Shoal;
– Mischief Reef;
– Subi Reef;
– McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef);
– Gaven Reef;
– Johnson Reef;
– Cuarteron Reef; and
– Fiery Cross Reef.
20. The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ argument that “none of the features in the Spratlys –
not even the largest among them – is capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ or a
continental shelf” (Memorial, para. 5.96). The Philippines is invited to provide additional
115
historical and anthropological information, as well as detailed geographic and hydrographic
information, regarding the following features:
– Itu Aba;
– Thitu; and
– West York.
21. The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ Submission 6, requesting a declaration that “Gaven
Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) … may be used to determine the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is
measured.” The Philippines is invited to provide historical and anthropological information,
as well as detailed geographic and hydrographic information, regarding Namyit and Sin
Cowe. The Philippines is also invited to elaborate on the implications of the proximity of
Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) to Namyit and Sin Cowe.
22. The Tribunal notes the Philippines Submissions 4 and 5, requesting a declaration that –
4) Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-
tide elevations that donot generate entitlement to a territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and are not
features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or
otherwise;
5) Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the

exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the
Philippines;
The Tribunal further notes the Philippines’ Submission 8 and 9, relating to rights claimed by
the Philippines to the living and non-living resources of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf and the alleged violations of these rights by China in the area of
Scarborough Shoal and Reed Bank, and in areas designated as Philippines oil blocks “Area
3” and “Area 4” (Memorial, paras. 6.15-6.47).
The Philippines is invited to provide written argument on the status (as a submerged feature,
low-tide elevation, rock, or island) of any maritime feature claimed by China – whether or
not occupied by China – that could potentially give rise to an entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone or to the continental shelf extending to any of Mischief Reef, Second Thomas
Shoal, Subi Reef, Scarborough Shoal, Reed Bank, or the areas designated as Philippines oil
blocks “Area 3” and “Area 4”. In so doing, the Philippines is invited to provide historical
and anthropological information, as well as detailed geographic and hydrographic
information, regarding at least the following features:
‐ Spratly Island;
‐ Northeast Cay (North Danger Reef);
‐ Southwest Cay (North Danger Reef);
‐ Nanshan Island;
‐ Sand Cay;
‐ Loaita Island;
‐ Swallow Reef;
116
‐ Amboyna Cay;
‐ Flat Island;
‐ Lankiam Cay;
‐ Great Discovery Reef;
‐ Tizard Bank reefs (e.g., Petley Reef; Eldad Reef);
‐ Union Bank reefs (e.g., Collins Reef; Whitsun Reef; Grierson Reef;
Landsdowne Reef);
23. The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ account of a meeting in which Chinese officials
allegedly took the position that Scarborough Shoal “is part of Zhongsha ‘islands’
(Macclesfield Bank) over which China has an indisputable claim based on historical and
jurisprudential grounds” (Memorandum from Rodolfo C. Severino, Undersecretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, to the President of the
Republic of the Philippines (27 May 1997) (Annex 25)), and the Philippines’ position that
“[n]otwithstanding China’s reference to it as the Zhongsha ‘Islands’, no part of Macclesfield
Bank is above water” (Memorial, para. 2.10). The Philippines is invited to provide detailed
geographic and hydrographic information regarding Macclesfield Bank, as well as any other
technical data relevant to the assessment of its status (as a submerged feature, low-tide
elevation, rock, or island).
24. The Tribunal notes the Philippines argument that China has “interfere[d] with the lawful
exercise of [the Philippines’] sovereign rights in the area of Reed Bank”. The Philippines is
invited to provide detailed geographic and hydrographic information regarding Reed Bank,
as well as any other technical data relevant to the assessment of its status (as a submerged
feature, low-tide elevation, rock, or island).
Response:
1. In response to the Tribunal’s Questions 19 through 24, the Philippines is pleased to

provide all of the information requested pertaining to each of the maritime features identified
in these Questions. Specifically, the response of the Philippines includes the geographic and
hydrographic information sought by the Tribunal in all six Questions, as well as the historical
and anthropological information sought in Questions 20 through 22. In addition, based on the
geographic, hydrographic, historical and anthropological information that is presented in its
responses to the Tribunal’s Questions, and in the Memorial, the Philippines provides its
views on the status of each feature under UNCLOS (i.e., whether it is a submerged feature,
low-tide elevation, rock or island).
2. For the Tribunal’s convenience, all of the requested information is provided in the
Atlas that is submitted herewith as Volume II to the Philippines’ Supplemental Written
Submission. The Atlas lists every feature mentioned in the Tribunal’s Questions 19 through
24 in alphabetical order, and for each feature provides: a geographic and hydrographic
description, including its coordinate location, distance to the Philippines (either to Luzon or
117
Palawan, depending on which is closer) and China (to Hainan Island or the Chinese
mainland, whichever is closer); distance to the nearest high-tide feature; its position on a
locator map; a satellite image; photographs; excerpts from various sailing directions and
nautical charts; a summation of the pertinent geographic and hydrographic information by Dr.
Robert W. Smith, an expert who served as Geographer for the United States Department of
State from 1975 to 2006 and who was co-author of its Limits in the Seas studies274; historical
and anthropological information on the feature (if requested by the Tribunal); and the views
of the Philippines on its status under UNCLOS. The Philippines considers that the Atlas
presents all of the information requested by the Tribunal in the most readily-accessible and
user-friendly format.
3. In evaluating the status of the different features under UNCLOS, the Philippines has
adhered faithfully to the language of the Convention, especially Articles 13 and 121, and has
applied the relevant text to the particular geographic, hydrographic, historical and
anthropological facts pertaining to each feature to form a view on whether it is a submerged
feature, low-tide elevation, rock or island. In forming its views on the status of the features,
the Philippines has also benefitted from the Appraisal of the Geographical Characteristics
and Status of Certain Insular Features in the South China Sea prepared by Professors Victor
Prescott and Clive Schofield, with the assistance of Dr. Robert van de Poll, attached as Annex
513 to this Submission. Professors Prescott and Schofield are two of the world’s leading
academic authorities on the islands of the South China Sea. Professor Prescott is Professor
Emeritus of Geography at the University of Melbourne (Australia) and was elected a Fellow
of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia in 1979. Professor Schofield is Professor and
Director of Research at the Australian Centre for Ocean Resource and Security at the
University of Wollongong (Australia). He is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and
serves as an International Hydrographic Office-nominated Observer on the Advisory Board
on the Law of the Sea. Their curricula vitae are attached to their report.
4. The views of the Philippines in regard to the status of each of the features named in
Questions 19 through 24 are consistent with the conclusions reached by Professors Prescott
and Schofield in regard to all but two features: Central London Reef and Erica Reef.
274
Dr. Smith’s curriculum vitae is attached to this Submission as Annex 573, in Volume XI.
118
5. In regard to Central London Reef, the Philippines concludes, on the basis of nautical
charts and the sailing directions, that the feature is a low-tide elevation.275 Professors
Schofield and Prescott note that “[s]ailing directions indicate the presence of a sandbank that
covers at high tide” on the feature. They further note that “construction activities have
occurred” making it “unclear to what extent a naturally formed feature above high tide
existed prior to such artificial interventions taking place”.276 They conclude that it would “be
appropriate to, at most, treat this feature in the same manner as an UNCLOS Article 121(3)
rock. … Further investigation including fieldwork may be required to ascertain if the feature
met with the terms of Article 121(1) prior to island-building activities taking place there”.277
6. Finally, the Philippines concludes, on the basis of nautical charts and sailing
directions, that Erica Reef is a low-tide elevation.278 Professors Schofield and Prescott’s
“[a]nalysis of satellite imagery … suggest[s] the presence of drying areas and, potentially,
rocky areas … that may be elevated above high water”. Accordingly, they believe “this
feature is an Article 121(3) ‘rock’ at most”.279
7. In regard to the status of all other features named in Questions 19 through 24, the
views of the Philippines and Professors Prescott and Schofield match.
275
See SWSP, Vol. II, p. 100.
276
C. Schofield, et al., An Appraisal of the Geographical Characteristics and Status of Certain Insular Features
in the South China Sea (Mar. 2015), p. 60. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 513.
277
Id., p. 61.
278
See SWSP, Vol. II, p. 46.
279
C. Schofield, et al., An Appraisal of the Geographical Characteristics and Status of Certain Insular Features
in the South China Sea (Mar. 2015), p. 74. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 513.
119
120
QUESTION 25
The Tribunal notes the Philippines’ comment that it “would not oppose a decision by the
Tribunal to request Viet Nam’s opinion as to whether the disputed features in the South
China Sea are capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ or a continental shelf.”
(Memorial, para. 5.135 n. 588). The Philippines is invited to elaborate further on the
participation or intervention by Viet Nam or other interested States in these proceedings.
Response:
25.1. The Philippines submitted its observations concerning the participation or

intervention by Viet Nam in its 26 January 2015 letter responding the Tribunal’s 11
December 2014 letter soliciting the Parties’ views on the Statement Viet Nam submitted to
the Tribunal. The Philippines respectfully incorporates the contents of its 26 January letter
into this response by reference. For the Tribunal’s convenience, a copy of the Philippines’
letter is attached again hereto as Annex 469.
25.2. In the view of the Philippines, the most important point to note on the subject of
Viet Nam’s potential participation or intervention is that Viet Nam is not an indispensable
third party. Viet Nam itself underscored this fact in its December 2014 Statement in which it
expressly stated that it “has no doubt that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in these
proceedings”,280 and encouraged the Tribunal to render a decision
providing a legal basis for the parties in this case to settle their
disputes, contributing to clarifying the legal positions of the
parties in the present case and interested third parties, and
contributing to preserving and maintaining peace and stability,
maritime security and safety and freedom of navigation and
overflight in the South China Sea.281
25.3. The Philippines echoes these views.
25.4. In addition to Viet Nam, the Tribunal’s question also asks about the participation
or intervention by “other interested States”. For the avoidance of doubt, the Philippines
wishes to make clear that the views expressed in its 26 January letter concerning the
participation or intervention by Viet Nam apply equally to any other interested State.
280
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet
Nam Transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal in the Proceedings Between the Republic of the Philippines and the
People’s Republic of China (14 Dec. 2014), para. 1. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 468.
281
Id., para. 1.
121
122
QUESTION 26
The Tribunal notes that, although China has not submitted a Counter-Memorial, some issues
relating to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the merits of the dispute have been publicly
addressed by Chinese government officials and by others. The Philippines is invited to
comment as it considers appropriate on any statements that have been made on any aspects
of the dispute.
Response:
26.1. On 7 December 2014, shortly before the Tribunal communicated its Request for
Further Written Argument by the Philippines, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a
formal “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of
Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Issued by the Republic of the Philippines”
(the “Position Paper”). Paragraph 2 of the Position Paper states: “This Position Paper is
intended to demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal established at the request of the Philippines
(‘Arbitral Tribunal’) does not have jurisdiction over this case”. In a letter to the Tribunal
dated 6 February 2015, China underscored that its Position Paper “comprehensively explains
why the Arbitral Tribunal … manifestly has no jurisdiction over the case”.282
26.2. The Philippines considers China’s Position Paper to be significant and helpful in at
least two respects. First, insofar as China has now made its views on the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction explicit, the Tribunal is no longer in a position of having to surmise what China’s
position may be. This is especially true given that China itself has described its Position
Paper as “comprehensively” explaining why the Tribunal has no jurisdiction. That being the
case, the Tribunal need not look beyond the views stated in China’s Paper for the purposes of
determining whether it has jurisdiction.
26.3. In this respect, the Philippines takes note of the recent Award on Jurisdiction
rendered by the Annex VII tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case. Like China here, the Russian
Federation elected not to participate in the proceedings. Nevertheless, it presented its views
on jurisdiction to the tribunal in a 27 February 2014 Note Verbale to the Registry, appending
an earlier Note Verbale to the Netherlands.283 In the latter note, the Russian Federation stated
282
Letter from H.E. Ambassador Chen Xu, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in The Hague, to H.E.
Judge Thomas A. Mensah (6 Feb. 2015), p. 1. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 470.
283
Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Award on Jursidiction,
UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (26 Nov. 2014), para. 9. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-180.
123
its position that there was no jurisdiction by virtue of its statement upon ratification of
UNCLOS that it does not accept compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions under
Section 2 of Part XV with respect to disputes concerning “law enforcement activities in
regard to the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction”.284 In its Award on Jurisdiction,
the Annex VII arbitral tribunal (which had been constituted without Russia’s participation)
referred to Russia’s Note Verbale as “Russia’s Plea Concerning Jurisdiction”, which it
addressed — and rejected — under the heading “Submissions of Russia” in Part III(A) of the
Award.285 The Philippines considers that it would be appropriate to treat China’s 7 December
2014 Position Paper in the same manner here.
26.4. Second, China’s Position Paper is as notable for what it does not argue as for what
it does. Among the points that China does not deny are the following:
• That there is a dispute between the Parties over China’s claim to “historic rights”
beyond the limits of its potential entitlements under UNCLOS in all areas located
within the nine-dash line;
• That China is not claiming “historic title” over any maritime areas in the South
China Sea, as distinguished from “historic rights”286;
• That the optional “historic bays or titles” exception does not apply to any aspect of
the Philippines’ claims;
• That there is a dispute between the Parties over the extent of the potential
entitlements that the insular features in the South China Sea generate;
• That the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the Philippines’ claims concerning China’s
violations of its obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment;
• That the law enforcement activities exception does not apply to any aspect of the
Philippines’ claims; and
284
Id.
285
Id., para.48.
286
Indeed, China makes clear that it is not claiming historical title — i.e., sovereignty — over the maritime
areas in the South China Sea when it states: “It should be particularly emphasized that China always respected
the freedom of navigation and overflight enjoyed by all States in the South China Sea in accordance with
international law”. China’s Position Paper, para. 28. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 467.
124
• That the military activities exception likewise does not apply to any aspect of the
26.5. Rather than dispute any of the points listed above, China’s Position Paper limits
itself to making three arguments: (1) the “essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is
territorial sovereignty”;287 (2) there is “an agreement between China and the Philippines to
settle their disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations”;288 and (3) the subject-
matter of the arbitration is “an integral part of maritime delimitation” excluded by virtue of
China’s declaration under Article 298.289 The Philippines will address each of these points in
turn.
I. The Subject-Matter of the Arbitration Is Not Territorial Sovereignty
26.6. The Philippine Memorial made clear that this case does not require the Tribunal to
decide among competing claims to territorial sovereignty. It stated:
For the avoidance of all doubt, the Philippines does not seek
any determination by the Tribunal as to any question of
sovereignty over islands, rocks or any other maritime features.
The Tribunal is not invited, directly or indirectly, to adjudicate
on the competing sovereignty claims to any of the features at
issue (or any others).290
26.7. Nevertheless, China contends that that the “subject-matter of the Philippines’
claims is in essence one of territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South
China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern the
interpretation or application of the Convention”.291 China is wrong.
26.8. As a threshold matter, the Philippines observes that, China’s objection appears to
misconceive the nature of international adjudication. The Philippines does not deny that its
disputes with China in the South China Sea have more than one layer. It also does not dispute
that one of those layers relates to competing claims of sovereignty over a number of features
287
Id., Section II.
288
Id., Section III.
289
Id., Section IV.
290
Memorial, para. 1.16 (emphasis added).
291
125
in the area. That fact is, however, without consequence to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate the law of the sea matters the Philippines has submitted to it.
26.9. In the case concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,
Iran (which also chose not to appear formally in the case) submitted a letter to the ICJ setting
forth its views on why the Court did not have jurisdiction. Among other things, it argued that
“the case submitted to the Court by the United States is ‘confined to what is called the
question of ‘the hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran’”.292 Iran went on to contend
that
this question represents only a marginal and secondary aspect

of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied
separately ….
The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the

United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the
application of the treaties on which the American Application
is based, but results from an overall situation containing much
more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently,
the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced
from its proper context ….293
26.10. The Court rejected Iran’s argument without hesitation. Referring to its own prior
Order on Provisional Measures in the case, the Court observed that it had “made it clear that
the seizure of the United States Embassy and Consulates and the detention of internationally
protected persons as hostages cannot be considered as something ‘marginal’ or ‘secondary’,
having regard to the importance of the legal principles involved”. 294 Referring again to its
Provisional Measures Order, the ICJ stated:
The Court, at the same time, pointed out that no provision of

the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline
to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because
that dispute has other aspects, however important.295
292
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, para. 35. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-175.
293
Id.
294
Id., para. 36.
295
Id.
126
26.11. This observation has been echoed in a number of cases since296 and applies fully to
the dispute the Philippines has submitted to this Tribunal. As described more fully below, the
Philippines has presented only those of the Parties’ disputes that relate to law of the sea
matters over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The questions concerning the interpretation
and application of UNCLOS presented in this case cannot be considered either marginal or
secondary. The fact that the Parties also have territorial sovereignty disputes, “however
important”, is not pertinent to the determination of the matters over which the Tribunal does
have jurisdiction.
26.12. China’s argument about the essence of the Philippines’ case being territorial
sovereignty is presented by reference to “three categories” of the Philippines’ claims.297
China characterizes the first category of claims as relating to “China’s assertion of the
‘historic rights’ to the waters, sea-bed and subsoil within the ‘nine-dash line’ (i.e., China’s
dotted line in the South China Sea) beyond the limits of its entitlements under the Convention
…”.298 According to China, “whatever logic is to be followed, only after the extent of China’s
territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on
whether China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea have exceeded the extent allowed
under the Convention”.299
26.13. China has failed — whether intentionally or otherwise — to correctly appreciate

the true nature of the Philippines’ claims. The “essence” of the Philippines’ position is that
even assuming that China is sovereign over all of the insular features it claims, its claim to
“historic rights” within the areas encompassed by the nine-dash line exceeds the limits of its
potential entitlement under the Convention. They are therefore inconsistent with, and violate,
UNCLOS. In other words, China’s claim to historic rights within the areas encompassed by
the nine-dash line exceeds its potential entitlement under UNCLOS regardless of what view
one takes on questions of territorial sovereignty. The Tribunal therefore has no need to
address or resolve competing claims to territorial sovereignty to address this issue.
296
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 431, para. 105. MP, Vol. XI, Annex
LA-13.
297
298
Id.
299
Id., para. 10.
127
26.14. China characterizes the second category of the Philippines’ claims as relating to
“China’s claim to entitlements of 200 M and more, based on certain rocks, low-tide
elevations and submerged features in the South China Sea …”.300 As China sees it, “the
nature and entitlements of certain maritime features in the South China Sea cannot be
considered in isolation from the issue of sovereignty”.301 China continues: “without
determining the sovereignty over a maritime feature, it is impossible to decide whether
maritime claims based on that feature are consistent with the Convention”.302
26.15. Here too, China is mistaken. The status of a given maritime feature as a low-tide
elevation, rock or island capable of generating entitlement to an EEZ and continental shelf is
a matter of interpreting and applying Articles 13 and 121 of UNCLOS, a task that is plainly
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by virtue of Article 288(1). There is nothing in the text
of either provision that suggests that the determination of a feature’s status is in any way
dependent on which State is sovereign over it. To the contrary, the plain terms of both
provisions make clear that the matter is one for objective determination by reference to the
physical characteristics of the features in question. The maritime entitlement that feature may
generate is therefore also a matter for objective determination. Simply put, the same feature
could not be a “rock” if it pertains to one State but an island capable of generating entitlement
to an EEZ and continental shelf if it pertains to another. The issue of sovereignty is wholly
irrelevant.
26.16. In connection with making its argument that the status of any given feature “cannot
be considered in isolation from the issue of sovereignty”, China also contends that “in order
to determine China’s maritime entitlements based on the Nansha [Spratly] Islands under the
Convention, all maritime features comprising the Nansha Islands must be taken into
account”.303 The Philippines offers two responses to this assertion.
26.17. First, it is of no relevance in the Northern Sector. In that area, there is only a single
insular feature at issue in these proceedings that is claimed by China: Scarborough Shoal (the
maritime entitlements of which the Philippines has directly placed at issue in this arbitration).
Scarborough Shoal is, moreover, substantially more than 200 M from the nearest other high-
300
Id., para. 8.
301
Id., para. 15.
302
Id., para. 16.
303
Id., para. 21.
128
tide feature over which China claims sovereignty (Flat Island, located at a distance of 280
M). There is therefore no impediment to the Tribunal’s determination of China’s, or the
Philippines’, maximum possible entitlements in the Northern Sector.
26.18. Second, with respect to China’s contentions about the Spratly Islands in the
Southern Sector, the Philippines showed in its Memorial that none of the insular features in
the Spratly area are capable of generating a potential entitlement to an EEZ or continental
shelf.304 This includes even the “largest” among them, like Itu Aba, Thitu and West York. At
the Tribunal’s request, the Philippines has elaborated on these views in connection with its
responses to Question 20. Also at the Tribunal’s request, it has shown in response to
Questions 21 and 22 that none of the other features in the Southern Sector can be
characterized as anything more than Article 121(3) rocks. There is therefore no obstacle to
the Tribunal declaring that China has no entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf anywhere
in the Southern Sector of the South China Sea.
26.19. China also argues that the Tribunal is precluded from addressing the Philippines’
so-called second category of claims relating to “China’s claim to entitlements of 200 M and
more, based on certain rocks, low-tide elevations and submerged features” because, it says,
“whether or not low-tide elevations can be appropriated is plainly a question of territorial
sovereignty”.305 The Philippines has already addressed this issue in its response to Question 6
above, in which it demonstrated that even if this question can be said to implicate questions
of territorial sovereignty, they are not the sort of territorial sovereignty questions which could
be argued to be beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Rather than repeat those arguments again
here, the Philippines respectfully incorporates its response to Question 6 by reference.306
26.20. China also contends that determining “whether or not low-tide elevations can be
appropriated is not a question concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention”.307 Even accepting this as true (quod non), it is irrelevant to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. The Tribunal undoubtedly has jurisdiction under Article 288(1) to determine
whether the various maritime features are low-tide elevations under Article 13 or islands
(including rocks) under Article 121. To be sure, a consequence of the Tribunal’s
304
305
306
See supra paras. 6.1-6.10.
307
129
determination may be that certain features — those it deems low-tide elevations — will not
be capable of appropriation; but that product of its decision cannot deprive the Tribunal of its
jurisdiction to decide. Moreover, the Tribunal is specifically authorized by Article 293(1) of
the Convention to apply not only the rules specifically stated in UNCLOS but also “other
rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention”.308 The rule against the
appropriation of low-tide elevations plainly constitutes such a rule.
26.21. Lastly, China characterizes the third category of the Philippines’ claims as relating
to “the legality of China’s actions in the waters of the Nansha Islands and Huangyan Dao
[Scarborough Shoal]”.309 According to China, “[u]ntil and unless the sovereignty over the
relevant maritime features is ascertained and maritime delimitation completed, this category
of claims of the Philippines cannot be decided upon”.310
26.22. Here once more, China is mistaken. It is incorrect in the first instance because
quite apart from the sovereignty issues, China’s purported exercise of sovereign rights and
jurisdiction beyond the limits of its maximum permissible entitlement under the Convention
(even assuming it has sovereignty over everything it claims) is plainly inconsistent with the
Convention. Where China has no potential entitlement under the Convention, it has no basis
on which to assert sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make that
determination cannot seriously be questioned.
26.23. China’s assertion is also incorrect even as to those areas where China’s claim to
potential entitlements may not exceed those permitted by the Convention. In the territorial sea
around Scarborough Shoal, for example, the Philippines challenges China’s actions in three
respects: (1) its violations of its obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment;
(2) its dangerous navigational practices that have run serious risk of collisions at sea; and (3)
its prevention of Philippine fishermen from pursuing their traditional livelihood in the waters
around Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines explained the basis of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
over these claims in its Memorial,311 and China makes no effort in its Position Paper to refute
any of the Philippines’ arguments as set forth therein. The Philippines has also elaborated
308
The full text of Article 293(1) provides: “A court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall apply
this Convention and other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention”.
309
310
Id., para. 27.
311
130
further on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over these issues in response to other questions, to
which it respectfully refers the Tribunal.312
26.24. For all of these reasons, the dispute the Philippines has submitted to the Tribunal
neither concerns competing claims to territorial sovereignty nor requires the Tribunal to
express any views on those issues. To the contrary, this dispute concerns China’s assertion
and exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction where UNCLOS gives it none, and, indeed,
where the Convention gives entitlements only to other States. And even in those limited areas
that are the subject of the Philippines’ claims and where China may have entitlement, the
Tribunal has jurisdiction to address China’s violations of the Convention.
II. Neither the 2002 DOC Nor Any Other of the Joint Statements China Cites
Operate to Impair the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction, or Affect the Admissibility of the
Philippines’ Claims, under Article 281
26.25. In its Memorial, the Philippines explained that the 2002 DOC, and in particular
paragraph 4 thereof,313 poses no obstacle to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 281 for
four reasons. First, the DOC is political document only. It does not create legal rights and
obligations, and hence does not constitute an “agreement” under Article 281.314 Second, even
if the DOC could be considered an “agreement” falling within the ambit of Article 281, no
settlement has been reached through the means contemplated in it (consultations and
negotiations).315 Third, the DOC neither expressly nor impliedly excludes recourse to the
dispute settlement procedures established in Part XV of the Convention.316 Fourth, and in any
event, China cannot assert rights under the DOC due to its own actions in flagrant disregard
of the requirements of the DOC.317
312
See supra Responses to Questions 3, 4 and 9.
313
The provision reads: “The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes
by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and
negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”. Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (4 Nov. 2002), para. 4. MP, Vol. V, Annex
144.
314
315
Id., paras. 7.59-7.63.
316
Id., paras. 7.64-7.73.
317
Id., paras. 7.74-7.76.
131
26.26. In its 7 December 2014 Position Paper, China takes issue with the above, and
maintains its objection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction based on the DOC and Article 281 of the
Convention.318 According to China, the DOC and certain other joint statements are “mutually
reinforcing and form an agreement between China and the Philippines … to settle their
relevant disputes through negotiations”.319 The Philippines addresses the import of the other
instruments invoked by China in Section II(E) below. Because the heart of China’s argument
concerns the DOC itself, the Philippines will first focus on that document.
A. The 2002 DOC Is a Non-Binding Political Instrument
26.27. China bases its argument that the DOC constitutes a binding agreement on the fact
that paragraph 4 thereof “employs the term ‘undertake’, which is frequently used in
international agreements to commit the parties to their obligations”.320 China cites as support
the Judgment of the ICJ in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
case, where the Court observed that the word “undertake” is “regularly used in treaties setting
out the obligations of the Contracting Parties”.321
26.28. The Court’s observation is correct but inapposite to the 2002 DOC. The status of
the Genocide Convention as a source of legal obligations was not questioned by the parties in
that case; nor indeed could it be seriously be disputed in any case.322 The mere fact that the
DOC employs a term that is also sometimes used in treaties that state legal obligations does
not, by itself, warrant the conclusion that paragraph 4 of the DOC too is legally binding. The
318
China’s Position Paper, paras. 41-42, 44. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 467.
319
Id., para. 39. This argument has been a consistent theme of China’s objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
over the Philippines’ claims. See Memorial, paras. 7.45-7.47 and statements cited therein.
320
321
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 162. SWSP, Vol.
XII, Annex LA-176.
322
The term “undertake” appears in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention. The Court analyzed this and the
other terms of that provision in order to identify whether Article 1 “creates obligations distinct from those which
appear in the subsequent Articles”. Id., para. 162.
132
crucial question is, as China itself admits,323 whether the DOC was intended to create legal
rights and obligations.324
26.29. The intention of the parties may be inferred from (1) the terms of the instrument
itself; (2) the circumstances of its conclusion; and (3) the subsequent acts of the parties. Ex
post statements of intent made in the context of litigation are irrelevant.325
26.30. As regards the language of the DOC, including paragraph 4, it is notable that it
does not use the term “agree”. This omission reflects an intent not to create legally binding
obligations. In two cases where, unlike the Genocide case, the legal status of an international
instrument was disputed, the ICJ seized on the specific use of that word to infer an intent to
be legally bound.326
26.31. In any event, even if the terms of the DOC do not entirely foreclose formalistic
arguments like the one China now makes, the circumstances of the document’s conclusion
and the subsequent conduct of the parties, taken individually and together, do. In this respect,
the Philippines notes that China does not deny that, as the Philippines discussed in its
Memorial,327 the DOC was intended to be a political stop-gap measure to reduce tensions in
the area in light of the inability of the ASEAN countries and China to achieve consensus on a
323
324
This requirement is widely thought to be subsumed in the definitional element of a “treaty” in Article 2(1)(a)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that it must be “governed by international law”. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, entered into force 27 Jan. 1980, Art. 31.
MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-77. See also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session (4 May-19
July 1966), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II (1966), p. 189. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex
LA-184. (“The Commission concluded that, in so far as it may be relevant, the element of intention is embraced
in the phrase ‘governed by international law’, and it decided not to make any mention of the element of
intention in the definition”.).
325
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 112, para. 27. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-21. See
also Memorial, para. 7.51.
326
Id., p. 112, para. 25. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-21; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 410-
412, para. 214, p. 429, para. 263. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-27.
327
See Memorial, para. 7.50-7.55.
133
legally-binding code of conduct,328 which is specifically anticipated in paragraph 10 of the
DOC.329
26.32. In its Memorial, the Philippines referred to a 2010 article authored by the former
Secretary-General of ASEAN, Rodolfo Severino, stating that a range of disagreements over
the geographic scope of a code of conduct, the parties’ modus operandi vis-à-vis occupied
and unoccupied features, the conduct of military activities in the area, and the treatment of
fishermen fishing in disputed waters reduced the originally envisioned legally binding code
of conduct to a mere “political declaration”.330
26.33. Neutral commentators agree. In an article published in March-April 2003 shortly

after the DOC’s conclusion, the Taiwanese scholar, Professor Song Yann-huei, gives a
detailed account of the origin and development of the DOC. As regards the nature and status
of the instrument, Professor Song is explicit:
[The DOC] is not a legal instrument and therefore does not

have legal binding force.331
Professor Song explains the reasons for adopting a non-binding instrument. Among these is
the fact that “the governments of member states of ASEAN and the PRC simply [did] not
want to be bound and pinned down as it were to a definite legal commitment”.332
26.34. China itself has consistently expressed the same view, at least until the initiation of
this arbitration. The record is replete with examples of China stating that the DOC was not
intended to create legally binding obligations. In a 30 August 2000 statement published,
among other places, in the China Daily, for example, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs stated unequivocally: “The Code of Conduct will be a political document
to promote good neighborliness and regional stability instead of a legal document to solve
328
China argues that “its positions on negotiations was made clear and well known to the Philippines and other
relevant parties during the drafting and adoption of […] the DOC”. China’s Position Paper, para. 40. SWSP,
Vol. VIII, Annex 467. China, however, points to no evidence to that effect.
329
The provision reads: “The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South
China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus,
towards the eventual attainment of this objective”. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (4 Nov. 2002), para. 10. MP, Vol. V, Annex 144.
330
Rodolfo Severino, “ASEAN and the South China Sea”, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2010), p. 45. MP,
Vol. IX, Annex 293.
331
Yann-huei Song, “The South China Sea Declaration on Conduct of Parties and Its Implications: Taiwan’s
Perspective”, Maritime Studies (Mar.-Apr. 2003), pp. 13-17. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-207.
332
Id. (emphasis added).
134
specific disputes”.333 In keeping with these views, during the 16th ASEAN-China Summit in
October 2010, H.E. Li Keqiang, then Premier of China’s State Council, characterized the
DOC as “an important political agreement reached among China and ASEAN countries”.334
26.35. China was still articulating these same views as late as 22 July 2012, six months
before the Philippines initiated this arbitration. In an interview with the New Straits Times,
China’s Ambassador to ASEAN Tong Xiaoling was asked for China’s views on the code of
conduct, then and still under negotiation. His response included the following statement:
Disputes over the South China Sea should be settled peacefully

through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign
states directly involved. This is a major consensus reached by
China and ASEAN countries in the DOC. The DOC and COC
are not dispute settlement mechanisms. Rather, they are
confidence building measures intended for greater cooperation
and mutual trust as well as peace and stability in the South
China Sea.335
26.36. China’s views on the political, not legal, character of the DOC reflect the
consensus of the signatory States. A 21 December 1999 internal memorandum from the
Philippine Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Asia and Pacific Affairs to the
Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs contains the following comments on a recently
received Chinese draft of the DOC:
The draft of the Chinese side (early last October 1999) is

positive and constructive. It covers comparatively an extensive
sphere and general content, providing a guideline for
developing relations and cooperation among countries in the
region of South China Sea in the new century. This is in
accordance with the consensus that the Code should be a
political document of principle.336
333
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Spokesperson’s Comment on China-Asean
Consultation” (30 Aug. 2000), p.1. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 491.
334
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Remarks by H. E. Li Keqiang, Premier of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, at the 16th ASEAN-China Summit (16 Oct. 2013), p. 2. MP,
Vol. V, Annex 128 (emphasis added).
335
“‘We should find our own solutions’“, New Straits Times (26 May 2012), p. 2 (emphasis added). SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 563.
336
Memo of China’s Position Regarding the Latest Draft Code of Conduct by the ASEAN (December 18,
1999), para. 2 (emphasis added). Enclosed in Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs for
Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
the Philippines (21 Dec. 1999). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 471.
135
26.37. The same consensus view is reflected in a Meeting Report on the Third Meeting of
the Working Group of ASEAN-China Senior Officials on the Code of Conduct on 11 October
2000 in Ha Noi, Viet Nam. Among other things, the Report states:
The Meeting reaffirmed that the Code of Conduct is a political

and not legal document and is not aimed at resolving disputes
in the area. It would serve as a political guideline for behavior
and conduct of activities among parties concerned which will
make an important contribution to confidence-building and
good neighborliness between ASEAN and China.337
26.38. Beyond the evident intent of the parties not to create a legally binding instrument,
their subsequent conduct confirms that the DOC reflects only political commitments.338 As
described in the Philippines’ Memorial, in paragraph 10 of the DOC the signatory States
undertook to continue working toward the “the adoption of a code of conduct in the South
China Sea [that] would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work,
on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective”.339 They have
been working towards that objective ever since, so far without success.340 If the DOC itself
was intended to bind the parties to legal commitments, why would ASEAN member States
and China invest more than 10 years of effort negotiating the subsequent code of conduct
contemplated by the DOC?
26.39. It is therefore clear that the DOC does not constitute a legally binding agreement to
seek settlement of the dispute “through friendly consultations and negotiations”, let alone an
agreement to exclude the compulsory procedures in section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS, as
shown in the following section.
B. The DOC Does Not Exclude Recourse to Other Means of Dispute

Settlement
26.40. China argues that despite the absence in the DOC of an express exclusion of other
dispute settlement procedures, the DOC “obviously ha[s] produced the effect of excluding
337
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Report of the Third Meeting of the Working Group of ASEAN-China
Senior Official Consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (11 Oct. 2000), para. 3 (emphasis
added). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 498. .
338
See also Memorial, Chapter 3, Section IV.
339
Id., para. 7.57 (citing ASEAN Declaration of Conduct, para. 10. MP, Vol. V, Annex 144.)
340
Id.
136
any means of third-party settlement”.341 The Philippines does not consider this obvious at all.
To the contrary, as discussed in the Philippines’ response to Question 1 above, the fact that
paragraph 4 of the DOC specifically refers to UNCLOS suggests that it is intended to be read
consistently with the Convention, including Section 2 of Part XV.342 Notably, the only
support China cites is the arbitral tribunal’s decision in Southern Bluefin Tuna finding that,
when it comes to determining whether a dispute settlement procedure was intended to
exclude others, the “absence of an express exclusion of any procedure … is not decisive”.343
26.41. The Philippines showed in its Memorial that the reasoning of the Southern Bluefin
Tuna tribunal is inconsistent with that of ITLOS in its provisional measures order in the same
case.344 It is therefore not surprising that Judge Keith filed a very forceful dissenting opinion
to the Award, pointing out that the ordinary meaning of the term “exclude” in Article 281(1)
requires specific “opting out” from the dispute settlement mechanisms in Section 2 of Part
XV, not merely positive agreement to another procedure by “opting in”.345 Judge Keith
supported this conclusion by reference to the well-established “presumption of … parallel
and overlapping existence of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes” in
international law,346 the context, and the travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS.347 It is Judge
Keith’s dissent, and not the arbitral tribunal’s decision, that has been favoured in subsequent
jurisprudence and academic commentary.
341
342
343
Admissibility, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (4 Aug. 2000), para. 57. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-50.
344
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of
27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, para. 55. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-37 (“Considering that, in the view of
the Tribunal, the fact that the Convention of 1993 applies between the parties does not preclude recourse to the
procedures in Part XV, section 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Sea”.).
345
para. 17. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-51.
346
Id., para. 18. Such presumption renders imperative that when States intend to exclude a certain class of
disputes from adjudication or settlement in any other fora, they state so expressly. See Memorial, para. 7.70
(referring to Article 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, see Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 55, p. 47
(2012), Art. 344. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-83.
347
paras. 19-29. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-51.
137
26.42. Lastly, in addition to all the above, the Philippines observes that the Southern
Bluefin Tuna Award is at odds with the context in which Article 281 appears, including
provisions found in close proximity to it. Article 282 of the Convention provides:
If the States Parties, which are parties to a dispute concerning

the interpretation or application of this Convention have
agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or
otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to
the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding
decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures
provided for in this Part, unless the Parties to the dispute
otherwise agree.348
26.43. Logically, this can only mean that where the agreed procedure does not entail a
binding decision (as in the case of the DOC), it shall not apply in lieu of the proceedings of
section 2 of Part XV, “unless the Parties to the dispute otherwise agree”. There can be no
agreement “otherwise”, unless such agreement is specifically stated.
26.44. Article 281 must be read consistently with Article 282. It must therefore mean that
the dispute settlement procedures of section 2 of Part XV can be displaced only by an express
agreement to that effect.
26.45. Paragraph 4 of the DOC plainly does not reflect such an express agreement.
Nowhere does it state that UNCLOS-related disputes must be resolved only through friendly
consultations or negotiations. It therefore does not establish an “agreement between the
parties [to] exclude any further procedure” within the meaning of Article 281. On this basis
alone the Tribunal can reject China’s objection to jurisdiction based on the DOC.
C. No Settlement Has Been Reached Pursuant to the DOC
26.46. Even if the DOC encompassed legally binding obligations (quod non), and even if
it were intended to exclude the compulsory procedures established in section 2 of Part XV of
UNCLOS (also quod non), Article 281 would still impose no obstacle to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction because the Parties have not settled their dispute through negotiation.
26.47. In its Memorial, the Philippines explained that Article 281 is premised on the
assumption that the “other” means of dispute settlement envisaged would actually prove
348
UNCLOS, Art. 282 (emphasis added)
138
successful,349 and that, consistent with international jurisprudence, a party that came to
believe that such means were no longer likely to lead to a settlement would have the right to
submit the case to the procedures specified in the Convention.350
26.48. This position is affirmed in the jurisprudence. Even in Southern Bluefin Tuna, the
case on which China’s objection rests, the arbitral tribunal relied on the parties’ “prolonged,
intense and serious” negotiations to conclude that the negotiation provision in question
(Article 16 of Convention for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna) did not require
the parties “to negotiate indefinitely while denying a party the option of concluding, for
purposes of both Articles 281(1) and 283, that no settlement has been reached”.351
26.49. Similarly here, taking account of the long-standing nature of the dispute and the
numerous unsuccessful diplomatic exchanges, negotiations and consultations between the
Parties,352 it is evident that no settlement has been reached. To the contrary, China’s
increasing assertiveness since 2009353 has exacerbated the dispute, threatening to reduce the
DOC to a dead letter. In these circumstances, the Philippines was entirely justified in
concluding that continued negotiation would be futile.
349
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 5 (M. Nordquist, et. al., eds.,
2002), para. 281.1, p. 23. SWSP, Vol. XII, Annex LA-148(bis).
350
Id., para. 281.3.
351
Admissibility, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (4 Aug. 2000), para. 55. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-50. In that
regard, the arbitral tribunal concurred with ITLOS, which, in the provisional measures phase of the case, held
that “[a] State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1 of the Convention when it
concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted”. Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v.
Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, para. 60.
MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-37. See also Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the
Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports
2003, para. 47. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-41; The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional
Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS Reports 2001, para. 60. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-39; Arctic
Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia), Provisional Measures, para. 76. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-45; The “ARA
Libertad” Case (Republic of Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 December 2012, ITLOS
Reports 2012, para. 71. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-44.
352
See Memorial, Chapter 3, Sections III-IV and Chapter 7, Section II(B). As the ICJ pointed out in its Advisory
Opinion in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case, diplomatic exchanges between two States could
demonstrate the existence of a situation “in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the
performance or non-performance of certain treaty obligations”, and lead to the conclusion that an “international
dispute[] [has] arisen” and that the “parties have not succeeded in settling their disputes by direct negotiations”.
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950,
pp. 74, 76. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-1.
353
Memorial, paras. 3.51-3.54. See Letter from Francis H. Jardeleza, Solicitor General of the Republic of the
Philippines, to Judith Levine, Registrar, Permanent Court of Arbitration (30 July 2014). SWSP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 466.
139
26.50. In its Position Paper, China implausibly maintains that the Parties have never
engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter of the arbitration.354 It argues that
the voluminous diplomatic exchanges between the Parties have merely pertained to
“responding to incidents at sea in the disputed areas and promoting measures to prevent
conflicts, reduce frictions, maintain stability in the region, and promote measures of
cooperation”.355 These arguments do not withstand scrutiny. In the first place, the exchanges
China sites all relate to matters arising precisely as a result of the Parties’ differing
conceptions of their entitlements in the area. China itself refers to these problems as resulting
from the existence of “disputed areas”. The Philippines fails to see how this is anything other
than the heart of the subject matter of the arbitration.
26.51. Moreover, China itself cites to elements of the record that only confirm the fact
that the Parties have negotiated over the subject-matter raised in this case. At paragraph 60 of
its Position Paper, for example, China observes that in September 2004, the two sides issued
a Joint Press Statement in which they “reaffirmed their commitment to peace and stability in
the South China Sea and their readiness to continue discussions to study cooperative
activities like joint development pending the comprehensive settlement of territorial disputes
and overlapping maritime claims in the area”.356 The Philippines submits that this statement,
without more, demonstrates that as of 2004 the Parties had already engaged in substantial
discussions concerning their competing claims in the South China Sea, the subject that is, of
course, at the heart of this dispute.
26.52. China’s Position Paper also overlooks the Parties’ diplomatic exchanges over its
public assertion of its nine-dash line claim in May 2009;357 its obstructionist actions vis-à-vis
354
355
Id., para. 47. The only support for this argument that China cites stems from a 1997 statement of the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the Philippines cited, along with other documents, in the Memorial as
evidence of the Parties’ exchange of views over the scope of their respective maritime jurisdictions and
entitlements in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal. According to China, that statement was rather “centered on
the issue of sovereignty”. Id., para. 49. To that effect, China accuses the Philippines of having “deliberately
omitted” a passage from the statement which purportedly establishes China’s understanding. Id. However, the
Philippines did not cite the statement in question because it is plainly irrelevant. Indeed, it merely communicates
China’s position on the nature of the Parties’ dispute over their respective maritime entitlements in the vicinity
of Scarborough Shoal. It is other statements in the same document that unequivocally record that the Parties’
were already engaged in a conflict of views concerning their claims of maritime jurisdiction in the area that
make it relevant to the Philippines’ showing of the futility of further exchanges of views. See Foreign Ministry
of the People’s Republic of China, Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement Regarding Huangyandao (22 May
1997), p. 2. MP, Vol. V, Annex 106.
356
China’s Position Paper, para. 60 (emphasis added). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 467.
357
140
Philippine oil and gas development projects and fishing in the disputed area;358and its
promulgation of regulations that purport to allow it to exercise greater administrative control
over the waters it claims within the so-called nine-dash line.359 These exchanges concern all
of the various issues in dispute360 and are plainly sufficient to meet the threshold required by
Article 281 (and, for that matter, Article 283).361
26.53. China further asserts that the Philippines could not have exchanged views with
China on matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention before 2009
when the Philippines “start[ed] to abandon its former maritime claims in conflict with the
Convention”.362 This is illogical. The Philippines signed UNCLOS the day it was opened for
signature (10 December 1982) and was one of the first States to submit its instrument of
ratification (8 May 1984). As early as 1988, the Philippines declared its intention to
“harmonize its domestic legislation with the provisions of the Convention”, and “to abide by
the provisions of the said Convention”.363 Although domestic constraints delayed such
harmonization until March 2009, the Philippines has consistently formulated its maritime
claims in the South China Sea by reference to UNCLOS.364 In any event, there could be no
doubt on China’s part that after March 2009 the Philippines was exchanging views on matters
that directly implicated the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Convention.
China’s recalcitrance since then is more than sufficient to justify the Philippines’ conclusion
that continued negotiation would be futile.
D. In Any Event, China Is Not Entitled To Invoke the DOC Due to Its
Own Breaches
26.54. In its Memorial, the Philippines pointed out that in addition to the reasons stated
already above, China is not entitled to invoke the DOC as a bar to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
358
Id., paras. 3.46-3.54.
359
See Id., paras. 3.55-3.58.
360
See also Id., paras. 7.83-7.92.
361
See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (4 Aug. 2000), para. 55. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-50.
362
363
Declaration of the Republic of the Philippines in response to Australia’s Objection to the Declaration of the
Philippines upon Signature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (26 Oct. 1988), Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vol. 3, Part 1, Chapters 12-29, and Part 2, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.E/26 (1 Apr. 2009), p. 484. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-67.
364
141
due to its persistent non-compliance with its terms,365 in particular paragraph 5, pursuant to
which the parties’ undertake “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability in [the region]”.366
26.55. China’s Position Paper seeks to justify its disregard of the DOC by misrepresenting
the facts. In its Memorial, the Philippines demonstrated China’s recalcitrance by reference to
its actions in and around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.367 China counters
that it was the Philippines that “first resorted to the threat of force” in Scarborough Shoal “by
dispatching on 10 April 2012 a naval vessel to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and
fishermen”.368 In fact, the evidence shows that Scarborough Shoal had long been subject to
Philippine fisheries jurisdiction, as attested by the significant number of Philippine arrests of
Chinese fishermen harvesting endangered species between 1995 and 2012.369 The exercise of
Philippine fisheries jurisdiction in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal was generally
uncontested by China until April 2012, when Chinese government vessels interfered for the
first time with Philippine law enforcement activity to prevent the arrest of Chinese fishermen
engaging in unlawful fishing practices.370 In light of these uncontested facts, it is
disingenuous for China to argue that it was the Philippines that “first resorted to the threat of
force” in Scarborough Shoal.
26.56. China also argues that it was the Philippines that “illegally ran a naval ship
aground” at Second Thomas Shoal in May 1999.371 However the vessel came to be there, it is
located at a low-tide elevation that is an integral part of the seabed over which the Philippines
has sovereign rights and jurisdiction.372 Moreover, the Philippines acted less aggressively
than China which in 1995 seized Mischief Reef, over the protest of the Philippines.373 In any
365
Id., paras. 7.74-7.76.
366
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (4 Nov.
2002), para. 5. MP, Vol. V, Annex 144.
367
See Memorial, paras. 3.59-3.67; 6.148-6.152.
368
369
See Memorial, para. 3.51 and accompanying footnote.
370
Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the Embassy of
the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 12-0894 (11 Apr. 2012). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 205.
371
372
Note Verbale from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines to the Embassy of
the People’s Republic of China in Manila, No. 13-1585 (9 May 2013). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 217.
373
142
event, the DOC postdates these actions by three years and does not seek to resolve these
issues. It merely exhorts the parties to “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that
would complicate or escalate disputes”.374 China’s more recent actions at Second Thomas
Shoal are inconsistent with this commitment. 375
26.57. China’s more recent massive land reclamations activities at features throughout the
South China Sea constitute an even more flagrant breach of the undertaking to exercise self-
restraint. The Philippines has previously made the Tribunal aware of China’s actions,376
which have attracted the attention of the international press and the concern of States
throughout the region and, indeed, throughout the world. The inconsistency between these
actions and the DOC could scarcely be more stark.
26.58. Accordingly, even if the commitments the signatory States to the DOC undertook
were legally binding (which they are not), China’s flagrant disregard of paragraph 5 would
deprive it of any entitlement to claim the benefit of its alleged rights under paragraph 4.
26.59. For the reasons presented above, the DOC poses no obstacle to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. The arguments to the contrary in China’s 7 December 2014 Position Paper are
unavailing.
E. The Other Bilateral Documents China Cites Are Irrelevant
26.60. In addition to the DOC, China cites a number of other bilateral documents and
statements that it claims support the conclusion that the Parties agreed to settle their disputes
through consultations and negotiation to the exclusion of other means. It cites two categories
of documents and statements: some pre-dating the DOC and some post-dating the DOC.
26.61. China’s attempt to invoke documents post-dating the DOC can be dismissed
summarily. It cites (1) a September 2004 Joint Press Statement issued on the occasion of the
visit to China by the then-President of the Philippines, and (2) a September 2011 Joint
374
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (4 Nov.
2002), para. 5. MP, Vol. V, Annex 144.
375
376
See Letter from Francis H. Jardeleza, Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines, to Judith Levine,
Registrar, Permanent Court of Arbitration (30 July 2014). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 466.
143
Statement issued on the occasion of a visit to China by the current President of the
Philippines.377 In both statements, the Parties reaffirmed their commitment to the
implementation of the DOC.378 Whatever force these statements may have can therefore
extend no further than that of the DOC itself. As explained at length above, the DOC is
without consequence to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. So too are the after-the-fact statements on
which China seeks to rely.
26.62. China’s efforts to enlist the statements it cites pre-dating the DOC do not fare any
better. China cites four:
(a) An August 1995 Joint Statement concerning Consultations on the South China
Sea and Other Areas of Cooperation in which, among other things, both sides “agreed
to abide by” the principle that “[d]isputes shall be settled in a peaceful manner
through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect”;379
(b) A March 1999 Joint Statement of the China-Philippines Experts Group on

Confidence-Building Measures in which the two sides, among other things, “agreed
that the dispute should be peacefully settled through consultation”;380
(c) A May 2000 Joint Statement on the Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the
Twenty-First Century in which the two sides “agee[d] to promote a peaceful
settlement of disputes through friendly consultations and negotiations in accordance
with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea …”;381 and
(d) An April 2001 Joint Press Statement of the Third China-Philippines Experts’
Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures in which the “two sides noted that
the bilateral consultation mechanism to explore ways of cooperation in the South
China Sea has been effective”.382
377
China’s Position Paper, paras. 36, 37. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 467.
378
Id.
379
Id., para. 31.
380
Id., para. 32.
381
Id., para. 33.
382
Id., para. 34.
144
26.63. None of these joint statements, whether taken individually or collectively, can be
taken as an agreement to exclude recourse to the procedures specified in Section 2 of Part XV
of the Convention. Joint statements like these are commonplace in international practice and,
at best, constitute aspirational political statements. They do not purport to establish binding
legal obligations. States everywhere would undoubtedly be dismayed to learn otherwise.
26.64. Moreover, there is nothing in any of the statements cited above that even arguably
reflects an intent to exclude recourse to compulsory proceedings entailing a binding decision.
Particularly telling in this respect, is the reference in the May 2000 statement to negotiations
conducted “in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”. Inasmuch as Section
2 of Part XV constitutes an integral part of the Convention, the reference to UNCLOS plainly
reflects an understanding that, while negotiations are to be encouraged, recourse to alternative
procedures, including compulsory procedures, is entirely appropriate when negotiation has
failed or is futile.
26.65. China’s attempts to raise doubts about the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by invoking the
statements listed above or, indeed, the DOC itself, reflect a larger misunderstanding about the
relationship between negotiations, on the one hand, and adjudication, on the other. China’s
arguments posit a contradiction that does not exist. Negotiation and adjudication play
complimentary roles in the international system.
26.66. In the Nicaragua v. United States case, the United States sought to deny the
admissibility of Nicaragua’s claims based on the fact that active, regional negotiations were
on-going under the auspices of the so-called Contadora Process. The Court denied the
objection of the United States, holding that it “considers that even the existence of active
negotiations in which both parties might be involved should not prevent both the Security
Council and the Court from exercising their separate functions under the Charter and the
Statute of the Court”.383
26.67. The Court then proceeded to recall that in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case it
had stated:
383
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, para. 106. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-13.
145
The Turkish Government’s attitude might thus be interpreted as
suggesting that the Court ought not to proceed with the case
while the parties continue to negotiate and that the existence of
active negotiations in progress constitutes an impediment to the
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the present case. The Court is
unable to share this view. Negotiation and judicial settlement
are enumerated together in Article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations as means for the peaceful settlement of
disputes. The jurisprudence of the Court provides various
examples of cases in which negotiations and recourse to
judicial settlement have been pursued pari passu. …
Consequently, the fact that negotiations are being actively
pursued during the present proceedings in not, legally, any
obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function.384
If active negotiations are no impediment to the exercise of the judicial function, a fortiori
failed or futile negotiations are not either.
26.68. Finally, the Philippines observes that a rule that an agreement to negotiate could,
without more, preclude recourse to compulsory means of dispute settlement would lead to
manifestly absurd results. Negotiation depends for its success on the good faith of both
parties to work cooperatively toward a compromise solution that takes account of the
perspectives and interests of both States. Even when good faith is present, negotiations may
not lead to a settlement of the dispute. Political or other circumstances may prevent one or
both States from making the accommodations necessary to arrive at a solution. And where
good faith is absent, a rule converting an agreement to negotiate into a bar to compulsory
dispute settlement could easily be exploited by one State to put the disputed matters into a
permanent state of limbo by refusing to agree on anything. Indeed, not only would this result
be absurd, it would create a grave threat to the international system for resolving disputes
among States.
III. The Subject-Matter of This Dispute Is Not “An Integral Part of Maritime
Delimitation”
26.69. China’s final argument is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction because the
“issues presented by the Philippines for arbitration constitute an integral part of maritime
delimitation between China and the Philippines and, as such, can only be considered under
384
Id. (citing Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978,
para. 29. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-9).
146
the over-arching framework of maritime delimitation between China and the Philippines”.385
According to China: “The Philippines’ approach of splitting its maritime delimitation dispute
with China and selecting some of the issues for arbitration, if permitted, would destroy the
integrity and indivisibility of maritime delimitation and contravene the principle that
maritime delimitation must be based on international law as referred to in Article 38 of the
ICJ Statute and that ‘all relevant factors must be taken into account’”.386
26.70. The Philippines anticipated — and refuted — just this argument in its Memorial, in
which it showed that the mere fact that some of the questions presented in this case may have
potential implications for a future delimitation between the Philippines and China does not
render China’s Declaration under Article 298 applicable.387 China’s Position Paper notably
makes no effort to respond to any of those points.
26.71. Article 298(1)(a) is specific and limited. By its terms, it applies in relevant part
only to “disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating
to sea boundary delimitations”. It does not purport to apply to any dispute that might (or
might not) later have implications for subsequent delimitations conducted in accordance with
the referenced articles.
26.72. The scope of Article 298(1)(a) must be evaluated in light of the place of Article
298 in the scheme of UNCLOS. Part XV is a critical part of the Convention. It has been
described as “the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium of the compromise must be
balanced”.388 Moreover, Article 309 is emphatic: “No reservations or exceptions may be
made to this Convention unless expressly permitted”. Relevant too is the maxim exceptiones
sunt strictissimae intepretationis. Given Article 309’s prohibition on reservations that are not
expressly permitted, this principle must apply with particular force in the case of UNCLOS.
26.73. The exception “expressly permitted” applies only to “disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations”.
The case the Philippines has presented does not concern any of these Articles. The Tribunal is
not called upon to express any views on them, let alone the portions thereof relating to sea
385
386
Id.
387
388
147
boundary delimitations. Accordingly, to deem Article 298(1)(a) applicable, and to apply it to
disputes beyond those expressly stated, would not only be inconsistent with Article 309, it
would also have the practical effect of creating a broad new exception that the Convention
does not contemplate.
26.74. In its response to Question 6, for example, the Philippines adverted to a

hypothetical case relating to the validity of a coastal State’s straight baselines.389 If China’s
position were correct, a declaration under Article 298 by the State whose baselines were the
subject of challenge would prevent the court or tribunal from exercising jurisdiction, even
though such a case would present only issues arising under Article 7 of the Convention. This
is because the baselines of the State in question might be relevant to the delimitation between
the disputing States. To accept China’s reading of Article 298(1)(a) would therefore convert
it from an exception of limited scope into a jurisdictional Trojan Horse of unpredictable
dimensions.
26.75. The core of the Philippines’ case relates to China’s assertion of sovereign rights
and jurisdiction, including “historic rights”, beyond the limits of its permissible entitlements
under the Convention. It thus raises questions of entitlement, not the delimitation of any
maritime areas where China has entitlements that overlap with those of the Philippines or
other States. As the Philippines showed in its Memorial (and China’s Position Paper nowhere
disputes), entitlement and delimitation are fundamentally different. 390 ITLOS made the point
clear in its Judgment in Bangladesh v. Myanmar, in which it unambiguously observed that
entitlement and delimitation are “distinct concepts”.391 The ICJ adopted the same approach in
Nicaragua v. Colombia, in which it analyzed the issues of entitlement and delimitation in
separate sections of its Judgment.392
26.76. Even though questions of entitlement may be relevant also to issues of

delimitation, they are also of independent significance. In particular, in maritime areas where
China has no entitlement under UNCLOS, no question of delimitation involving China arises.
389
390
391
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment of 14 March 2012, ITLOS Reports 2012, para. 398. MP Vol. XI,
Annex LA-43.
392
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, paras.
167-183. MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-35.
148
Thus, with respect to China’s assertion of “historic rights” in vast areas within the nine-dash
line beyond the limits of its entitlement under the Convention, no issues of delimitation can
even conceivably arise. Without entitlement, there is no basis for a delimitation. Moreover,
China’s assertion of such expansive rights where it has no entitlement call into question the
Philippines’ rights and freedoms in areas immediately adjacent to its coast. The Tribunal
therefore has jurisdiction to address them whether or not they have implications for any
subsequent delimitation between the Philippines and China.
26.77. China also asserts that “[a]lthough the Philippines professes that the subject matter
of the arbitration does not involve any dispute covered by China’s 2006 declaration, since
China holds a different view in this regard, the Philippines should first take up this issue with
China, before a decision can be taken on whether it can be submitted for arbitration. Should
the Philippines’ logic in its present form be followed, any State may unilaterally initiate
compulsory arbitration against another State Party in respect of a dispute covered by the
latter’s declaration in force simply by asserting that the dispute is not excluded from
arbitration by that declaration”.393
26.78. This aspect of China’s argument finds no support in the Convention. In the first
place, China’s views presume that the parties to a dispute must agree on whether any of the
Article 298 exceptions apply before either may resort to compulsory procedures. This is
absurd, and is tantamount to making the exceptions self-judging, which, as the Philippines
showed in its Memorial, they plainly are not.394 If they were accepted as such, any State
could side-step its obligation to submit to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions
under Section 2 of Part XV merely by asserting that the dispute is covered by its Article 298
Declaration. The danger such an approach would pose to the Convention’ dispute resolution
mechanisms is self-evident.
26.79. China’s nominal concerns about a flood of vexatious lawsuits are unfounded. The
Convention came into force nearly 20 years ago. In the years since, this is the first case in
which it has been argued that jurisdiction is barred by virtue of the delimitation exception set
forth in Article 298 declaration. Moreover, the decision to resort to international litigation is a
matter of utmost solemnity. The Philippines considers that the States Parties to UNCLOS can
393
China’s Position Paper, para. 73.
394
149
and must be presumed to be acting in good faith in having recourse to a court or tribunal. In
any event, if the respondent State considers commencement of arbitration manifestly
unfounded, it has the right to submit preliminary objections to jurisdiction. In the
circumstances China hypothesizes, the Philippines has no doubt that the court or tribunal
would not hesitate to take appropriate action.
26.80. For all of these reasons, China’s 7 December 2014 Position Paper fails to show that
the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over any aspect of the claims of the Philippines has presented
in this arbitration. To the contrary, for the reasons first articulated in the Philippines’
Memorial, reiterated in its answers to Questions 1 through 12 above, and once more
underscored in its response to this Question 26, the Tribunal plainly has jurisdiction to decide
the issues raised in the Philippines’ Statement of Claim and provide appropriate relief
consistent with the Submissions in the Memorial.
150
APPENDIX TO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 13
A13.1. In this Appendix, the Philippines presents additional historical evidence,

supplementing what it presented with the Memorial, that demonstrates China has not
exercised sovereignty, sovereign rights, historic title, or historic rights over the maritime area
enclosed by the nine-dash line.
I. Early History
A13.2. During the first millennium C.E. the South China Sea was regularly traversed by
the Malay peoples, a subset of the Austronesian group, who settled in present-day Malaysia,
Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines, as well as by inhabitants of present-day Viet Nam.
Those living in China also made use of the Sea.395 There are references to fishermen,
reportedly from Hainan, who plied the waters, annually visiting the Paracel Islands and going
as far as the island of Borneo.396 Fishermen from elsewhere, especially modern-day Malaysia
and the Philippines, also exploited these fishing grounds.
A. China
A13.3. Chinese navigators were aware of the many dangerous features in the South China
Sea as early as the Eastern Han period (around 100 C.E.),397 and believed the area was
inhabited by demons.398 They sought to avoid these hazards by hugging the east and west
coasts,399 which were identified as separate regions referred to as the “Oriental and
Occidental Seas”.400
395
396
Charles Gutzlaff, “Geography of the Cochin-Chinese Empire”, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of
London, Vol. 19 (1849), p. 93. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 516.
397
Stein Tønnesson, “An International History of the dispute in the South China Sea”, East Asian Institute
Working Paper Series, No. 71 (16 Mar. 2001), p. 5. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 273. See also Brantly Womack, “The
Spratlys From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Dec.
2011), pp. 370, 373. MP, Vol. IX, Annex 300; Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea:
Paracels - Spratlys - Pratas - Macclesfield Bank (1976), p. 22. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 520.
398
Stein Tønnesson, “The History of the Dispute”, in War or Peace in the South China Sea? (T. Kivimaki, ed.,
2002), p. 7. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 532.
399
B. Catley & M. Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (1997), p. 36. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex
526.
400
Nobuo Muroga, “The Philippines in Old Chinese Maps”, Philippine Historical Review, Vol. 2 (1969), p. 266.
151
A13.4. By the ninth and tenth centuries, private Chinese merchants had became involved
in trade with Southeast Asia,401 but it was “[n]ot until the twelfth century [that the] Chinese
t[ook] a significant role themselves in [] trade”,402 establishing commercial routes with the
polities surrounding the South China Sea. For example, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
Chinese traders established entrepôts along the western coasts of Luzon, Mindoro, Cebu and
Mindanao in what is now the Philippines.403 There is documentation of direct trading between
Luzon, the main island of the Philippine archipelago, and Fujian in southern China as of the
thirteenth century.404
A13.5. In addition to trading with predecessor polities in present-date Philippines, Chinese

“ships carried [Chinese] commercial ventures to states on the perimeter of the … South China
Sea[]” and beyond.405 Early in the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty,406 towards the end of the 13th
century, China set up a “maritime superintendenc[e]” in Quanzhou, in Fujian, opposite
Taiwan, which “focused on trade into the South China Sea, [Quanzhou] being the most
important trading port for maritime Muslim merchants from abroad”.407 The establishment of
these commercial routes, however, was not accompanied by an assertion of sovereignty or
rights to the South China Sea waters.
A13.6. The use of the Sea was open to all; neither China nor any other polity claimed
ownership or sovereignty over the waters. The only polity that was ever excluded from the
Sea was China, by virtue of its own imperial edicts. Fearful of foreign influence, China’s
emperors imposed bans on overseas trade, and on navigation by Chinese vessels, beginning
in the early 1300s.408 When the ban of the Yuan era was lifted, in 1322, the local economy of
401
Kenneth R. Hall, A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal Development, 100-1500
(2011), p. 214. Annex SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 297(bis).
402
Anthony Reid, Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia (2000), p. 44. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 265.
403
404
405
Lo Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and
Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan Periods (2012), p. 312. SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 546.
406
The Yuan Dynasty ruled China from 1271-1368 C.E.
407
Timothy Brook, The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties (2010), p. 219. SWSP, Vol.
X, Annex 541.
408
Id., pp. 219-220.
152
Quanzhou quickly became dominated by foreigners.409 By the rise of the Ming Dynasty in
China in the mid-14th century,410 private trading by Chinese had again been forbidden.411
A13.7. During the Middle Ages, China was not a significant power in the South China
Sea. Nor did it maintain a significant presence. Indeed, “[i]n Ming-dynasty records … [the
South China Sea was] conceptualized as part of a diffuse frontier between the Chinese and
non-Chinese worlds of navigation and trade, one of those maritime spaces where the civilized
world encountered the barbarian world”.412 China’s position is illustrated by the decision of
the Yongle Emperor (1402-24) to send the well-known admiral Zheng He on a series of
cruises, in the first half of the 1400s,413 along the western edge of the South China Sea.414
Faced with the dominance of the Java-based Majapahit Empire over the southern part of the
South China Sea and potential tributaries, the Emperor felt compelled to make a show of
strength.415
A13.8. Although Zheng He’s charts “identified some coral islands in the South China
Sea”, knowledge about these maritime features continued to be sparse.416 This persisted for
hundreds of years. According to one historian, in an early 17th century Chinese text entitled
Studies on the Ocean East and West, “the South China Sea Islands are absent, which likely
409
Id., p. 220.
410
The Ming Dynasty ruled China from 1368-1644 C.E.
411
See Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (2003),
pp. 75-77. MP, Vol. IX, Annex 276.
412
Ulises Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties: Levels of
Geographical Knowledge and Political Control”, East Asia History, Vol. 32/33 (Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007), p. 114.
SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 537.
413
See Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (2003), p.
82. MP, Vol. IX, Annex 276.
414
Stein Tønnesson, “An International History of the dispute in the South China Sea”, East Asian Institute
Working Paper Series, No. 71 (16 Mar. 2001), p. 5. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 273. See also Brantly Womack, “The
Spratlys From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Dec.
2011), pp. 370, 373. MP, Vol. IX, Annex 300.
415
Lo Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and
Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan Periods (2012), p. 334. SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 546.
416
Geographical Knowledge and Political Control”, East Asia History, Vol. 32/33 (Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007), pp. 114-
153
confirms that the central section of the [Sea] was largely avoided by sailors and lay outside
the main trading routes”.417
A13.9. Shortly after Zheng He’s voyages, private trading by Chinese was again
418
outlawed, heralding a general suppression of Chinese maritime activities that persisted for
the remaining two centuries of the Ming Dynasty. Whether “[t]o open the coast or close it
was a perennial question at [the Ming Emperor’s] court right down to the end of the
1630s”.419
A13.10. During the Ming era, China regularly suppressed maritime activities. For example,
a 1525 closure of the southern coast “promot[ed] … piracy by driving traders into smuggling
… re-escalting violence along the coast”. This continued until maritime trade was allowed to
reopen in 1567.420 The impact of China’s restrictions on seafaring is described by a petitioner
in Fujian, who reported the difficulties that had been caused by the institution of such a ban in
1638: “The seas are the fields of the Fujianese, for the people living along the coast have no
other way to make a livelihood … The poorest always band together and go to sea to make a
living. The moment coastal restrictions are tightened, they have no way to get food, so they
turn to plundering the coast”.421
A13.11. As discussed in greater detail in the Philippines’ response to Question 14,

contemporaneous maps produced in China confirm that China did not consider the islands or
waters of the South China Sea to fall under its sovereignty.422 A “large and exact map of
China” prepared during the Yuan Dynasty, the original of which has been lost, did not
include the littoral states of the South China Sea, or the Sea itself.423 It was only later, during
the Ming Dynasty, in the mid-1500s, that a “map of th[o]se countries called Tung-nan hai-i
tsung-t’u (General map of the Barbarians in the Southeast Seas)” was added to an atlas based
417
Id., p. 116.
418
See Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (2003),
pp. 75-77. MP, Vol. IX, Annex 276.
419
X, Annex 541.
420
Id., pp. 223-224.
421
Id., p. 225.
422
423
Nobuo Muroga, “The Philippines in Old Chinese Maps”, Philippine Historical Review, Vol. 2 (1969), p. 266.
154
on the Yuan Dynasty map,424 which depicted the South China Sea.425 As the maps of that era
confirm, China claimed no land or sea south of Hainan Island. Indeed, as more fully
discussed in the Philippines’ response to Question 14, Chinese maps did not depict any
islands south of Hainan as subject to Chinese sovereignty until the mid-twentieth century.426
And before 2009, no Chinese map reflected a Chinese claim to the waters of the South China
Sea.
B. Other Polities
A13.12. Other native peoples regularly traversed and exploited the South China Sea prior to
the arrival of Europeans and conducted trade across it. As explained by one historian: “Some
of the first coastal communities of Southeast Asia actively engaged in long-distance maritime
trade”.427 Merchants and seamen in Southeast Asia realized that they could capitalize upon
the “need for a maritime link between East and West”,428 and played an important role in a
maritime trade network for transporting Chinese goods to depots to the south.429 By the
second century C.E., the realm of Funan, located on the southern tip of Indochina, had
become a major trading entrepôt,430 and prospered as a trading centre for some five hundred
years.
A13.13. The Cham peoples, living along what is now the southeastern coast of Viet Nam,
also played a significant role in the maritime trade of Southeast Asia during the first
millennium C.E. At Champa’s height, its seafarers were involved in nearly all shipping
between China and the rest of the world.431 As one historian has explained, throughout this
period “Champa had to be heavily involved in the trade, tribute, and voyages of pilgrimage
moving to and from China … Most of this shipping was manned by Austronesian-
424
Id.
425
Id.
426
427
Pierre-Yves Manguin, “The Archaeology of Early Maritime Polities of Southeast Asia” in SOUTHEAST ASIA:
FROM PREHISTORY TO HISTORY (I. Glover & P. Bellwood eds., 2004), pp. 282, 285. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 534.
428
429
Id., p. 45.
430
Lynda Norene Shaffer, Maritime Southeast Asia to 1500 (1996), p. 22. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 257.
431
155
speakers”.432 During the era of Champa’s pre-eminence, “Philippine trade and tribute …
appear[s] to have reached China via Champa”,433 presumably through inhabitants of the
Philippine archipelago shipping goods across the South China Sea to Champa, and then
onwards to China.
A13.14. At the beginning of the second millennium C.E., a polity named Srivijaya, based
on Sumatra in present-day Indonesia, dominated the southwestern part of the South China
Sea. It “built … alliances with Malay coastal populations” and kept “goods moving into south
China ports by servicing vessels voyaging throughout the Southeast Asian archipelago”. In
addition, its ports “were utilized as centers of exchange”.434
A13.15. Srivijaya’s downfall “increased the significance of the southern Vietnam coastline
as a commercial power”.435 By the 1200s, there was a vibrant trade in Southeast Asia, carried
out by “Southeast Asians and Southeast Asia-based traders”.436 The most powerful polity of
these times was the Majapahit Empire,437 which, by 1377, could claim ports extending “from
the furthest tip of Sumatra in the west to New Guinea in the east and as far north as the
southern islands of the Philippines”. Its navy, comprised of “multiethnic resident sailors”,
were both traders and providers of maritime security.438
A13.16. Immediately prior to the arrival of Europeans, the South China Sea was viewed by
the merchant community as “a series of seas, bays, islands, and coastal markets that stretched
from and connected the south coast of China, including Taiwan, the Philippines, the
Indonesian archipelago, to the west coast of Malaya and Sumatra”.439 There was a
considerable amount of exchange between “Chinese merchants coming from the north and
432
Id.
433
Id., p. 47. See also Kenneth R. Hall, A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal
Development, 100-1500 (2011), p. 242. Annex SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 297(bis).
434
435
Id., p. 33.
436
Id., p. 34.
437
Id., p. 35.
438
Id., p. 258.
439
George Bryan Souza, “Maritime Trade and Politics in China and the South China Sea” (1987), in
Portuguese, Dutch and Chinese in Maritime Asia, c. 1585-1800: Merchants, Commodities and Commerce
(2014), p. 318. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 523.
156
Muslim merchants coming from the south”.440 Merchants from Java and Malacca, located on
the west coast of present-day peninsular Malaysia, plied the South China Sea with armed
ships carrying goods to China in the early 1500s.441 In 1493, the Supreme Commander of
Guangdong, the Chinese province along the northeastern shore of the South China Sea,
expressed concern about “huge number[s] of foreign ships landing in China without reporting
their arrival to officials without any regard for the tribute schedule”.442
A13.17. In short, prior to the arrival of Europeans, the South China Sea was used freely by
all the various polities located along its littoral. Although China, like other littoral States,
made use of the South China Sea, it did not exercise sovereignty or jurisdiction over the Sea,
or claim special rights. Indeed, at various times, it expressly forbade its people from
navigating the waters in question.
II. The Colonial Era
A13.18. The South China Sea continued to be used by various States, including the
European powers, after their arrival in Southeast Asia. At no point during this period did
China exercise, or claim, sovereignty or rights in respect of its waters.
A. Maritime Activities of the Colonial Powers
A13.19. The period of European expansion in Southeast Asia commenced when the
Portuguese captured Malacca at the western entrance to the South China Sea in 1511. They
aimed “to gain entry to China in order to trade, and use that access to dominate trade all
around the South China Sea. They did not succeed, but the disruption [in trade they caused]
was sufficient to paralyze trade by others”.443 Although the Portuguese were unsuccessful in
440
X, Annex 541.
441
See Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz, “Melaka and Its Merchant Communities at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century”,
in Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea (D. Lombard & J. Aubin, eds.,
2000), pp. 26, 29-31. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 530.
442
X, Annex 541.
443
Id., p. 223.
157
their attempt to dominate the South China Sea, they paved the way for the entry of other non-
Asian powers to operate in the area.444
A13.20. The Dutch arrived in Indonesia in 1596,445 where the Majapahit Empire had
exercised control. By 1601, they were sailing along the Chinese coast,446 attempting to gain
access to local markets.447 Although the Comprehensive Atlas of the Dutch East India
Company observes that the littoral around the South China Sea was “only slightly influenced
by Dutch expansion”,448 the Dutch mapped the South China Sea in relatively fine detail
during the 17th century.449
A13.21. The survey work they carried out assisted the Dutch East India Company in its
expansive transhipment operations, by which its ships regularly traversed the South China
Sea.450 The Company sometimes captured Chinese ships to use for its cargo transport
operations, apparently without consequence, and hired Chinese crews to sail those vessels.451
A13.22. Spain gained influence in the South China Sea in the sixteenth century. Spanish
explorer Miguel Lopez de Legazpi encountered and attacked “Moro” trading ships off of the
Philippines in 1565.452 China made no effort to control, let alone prevent, Spanish maritime
activities. In 1572, Spain declared a colony in the Philippines.453 A Spanish ship reportedly
444
Portugal’s pretensions to control navigation routes to East and Southeast Asia promoted Grotius to write
Mare Liberum and its ultimate triumphant assertion of freedom of the seas.
445
Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (2003), p.
103. MP, Vol. IX, Annex 276.
446
X, Annex 541.
447
George Bryan Souza, “Maritime Trade and Politics in China and the South China Sea” (1987), in
Portuguese, Dutch and Chinese in Maritime Asia, c. 1585-1800: Merchants, Commodities and Commerce
(2014), pp. 322-324. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 523.
448
J. Gommans & R. van Diessen, Comprehensive Atlas of the Dutch United East India Company, Vol. VII
(2010), 23. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 543.
449
See infra paras. A14.27, A14.29, A14.33-A14.34.
450
Robert Parthesius, Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters: The development of the Dutch East India Company
(VOC) shipping network in Asia 1595-1660 (2010), pp. 58-60. Annex SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 292(bis).
451
Id., p. 59.
452
Robert J. Antony, “Turbulent Waters: Sea Raiding in Early Modern South East Asia”, The Mariner’s Mirror,
Vol. 99, No. 1 (Feb. 2013), p. 26. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 548.
453
Luis H. Francia, A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (2010), p. 59. MP, Vol. IX,
Annex 291.
158
was sent by the Admiral from Manila to survey Scarborough Shoal in 1800,454 which was
also explored in 1806 by Spanish captain Don Francisco Reguelme.455 Spain’s ongoing
presence in the area is evidenced by the Spanish steam vessel, the Mariveles, reportedly
striking a reef in the South China Sea in 1879.456 In that year, a captain in the Spanish
Directorate of Hydrography published a pilot for the Philippine archipelago, describing
numerous South China Sea features as located in the Palawan Passage.457 China did not make
any documented attempts to restrict or otherwise regulate Spanish navigational and surveying
activities, just as it made no effort to control the maritime activities, away from the
immediate vicinity of the Chinese coast, of the Portuguese or Dutch.
A13.23. British, French and American ships also traversed the Sea unimpeded by China.
Various British ships sailed through the South China Sea between the late 1600s and early
1800s. William Dampier, the first person to circumnavigate the globe three times, sailed
between Manila and the coast of China during the summer of 1687.458 The Bombay Merchant
was recorded in 1800 as sighting an “extensive reef of breakers, in the form of the letter A”,
believed to be the Paracels.459 Charles Darwin navigated the Sea during his five-year voyage
on the HMS Beagle, recording his observation of several features, including the Paracel
Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Macclesfield Bank, and Swallow Shoal.460 Other British voyages
undertaken in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries include those made by the
Middlesex and Earl Lincoln.461 As discussed in greater detail in the Philippines’ response to
Question 14, British hydrographers and cartographers engaged in extensive surveying and
mapping of the South China Sea and its insular features during the nineteenth century. There
454
John Purdy, The Oriental Navigator: Directions for Sailing to, from, and upon the coasts of, the East-Indies,
China, Australia, &c. (3rd ed., 1816), p. 145. SWSP, Vol. IV, Annex 386.
455
Lawrence D. Campbell, The Asiatic Annual Register: Or, A View of the History of Hindustan, and of the
Politics, Commerce and Literature of Asia, For the Year 1804 (1806), 474. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 553.
456
U.S. Hydrographic Office, Sunda Straight and the Southern Approaches to China Sea with West and North
Coasts of Borneo and Off-Lying Dangers, Vol. V (1915), p. 375. SWSP, Vol. IV, Annex 395.
457
See Capt. Camilo de Arana, Spanish Directorate of Hydrography, Pilot of the Philippine Archipelago (1879).
SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 556.
458
Samuel Prior, All the Voyages Round the World from the First by Magellan, in 1520 to that of Freycinet in
1820 (1848), p. 81. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 554.
459
James Horsburgh, Memoirs: Comprising the Navigation to and from China (1805), p. 33. SWSP, Vol. XI,
Annex 552.
460
Charles Darwin, Geological Observations on Coral Reefs, Volcanic Islands and on South America (1851), p.
182, passim. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 555.
461
Annex 552.
159
is no indication of protest from China in regard to any of these British activities; nor did
China protest, or seek to restrict, any of the maritime activities of the other European powers.
A13.24. The French arrived in the South China Sea in the late 1600s; the Amphirite is the
first French vessel recorded as appearing in the South China Sea, in 1701.462 Several
expeditions followed. Jean Fraçois de Galaup, comte de Lapérouse, commanded the ship the
Boussole from 1785-1788.463 The ship sailed from Manila in the spring of 1787, stopping at
Luconia Shoals in the South China Sea before sailing on for the coasts of Korea and Japan.464
Captain Etienne Marchand of the ship the Solide circumnavigated the globe in the last decade
of the 18th century. On 8 December 1790, he set sail from Macao with the purpose of
sounding on Macclesfield Bank and exploring the South China Sea, including the area around
Pulo Sapata.465
A13.25. American ships navigated the waters of the South China Sea as well, although
some were apparently lost. The clipper ship Flying Cloud reported encountering dangerous
weather on a voyage from China to New York in 1854.466 The Cole was reported wrecked on
the Pratas Shoal in 1858 when traveling from Hong Kong to New York.467 Shortly thereafter,
a Boston ship, Courser, was reported lost on the Pratas Shoal.468 The Alfred Hill was reported
lost after running aground on the Paracels en route to Hong Kong from Boston in 1861.469
A13.26. A 19th century British account of the South China Sea, by the East India
Company’s hydrographer James Horsburgh, observed that “vessels which navigate on the
China Sea belonging to different countries, and even those belonging to the Chinese empire,
are probably of greater magnitude, and more valuable, than any other commercial vessels
used in other parts of the globe”.470 There is no evidence that China attempted to exclude or
462
Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (1982), p. 44. SWSP, Vol. V, Annex 246(bis).
463
Samuel Prior, All the Voyages Round the World from the First by Magellan, in 1520 to that of Freycinet in
1820 (1848), p. 298. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 554
464
Id., pp. 303-306.
465
Id., pp. 346, 352.
466
“Arrival of the Flying Cloud-Interesting Sketch of the Passage from China to New York”, New York Times
(25 Nov. 1854), p. 1. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 558.
467
“Marine Intelligence”, New York Times (16 June 1858), p. 1. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 559.
468
“Marine Intelligence”, New York Times (19 June 1858), p. 1. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 560.
469
“Loss of the Ship Alfred Hill”, New York Times (31 July 1861), p. 1. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 561.
470
Annex 552.
160
place conditions on non-Chinese ships from using the South China Sea for transit or trade, or
for any other purpose.
B. Efforts To Combat Piracy
A13.27. For a long time, the South China Sea was plagued by piracy. As one historian has
explained, “[t]he first recorded incidence of piracy in the South China Sea took place in AD
589 … However, it is almost a certainty that piracy flourished long before…”.471 In the 1500s
and 1600s, “South East Asian trading ports, such as Hoi An, Malacca, Pahang and Manila,
became thriving emporia frequented by Chinese and Japanese smugglers and pirates”.472 In
the 1570s, a pirate based in Taiwan “sallied forth with the monsoons each year to plunder
shipping across the entire South China Sea”.473 In the 17th century, the pirate fleet of the
“Chinese warlord Cheng Chi-Lung … [was] expand[ed]… into what was effectively the most
powerful maritime power in the South China Sea”.474 They exacted protection from ships
sailing in the “wide zone” between “China, Japan, and South East Asia”.475
A13.28. Europeans also engaged in piratical activities: “Throughout the late sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, European pirates and privateers continually pillaged shipping in South
East Asia. Any vessel was a potential target”.476 China did not attempt to suppress these
activities, even though its vessels were sometimes victimized:
During the seventeenth century, Dutch, English, French, and

Danish sea rovers repeatedly robbed indigenous, Chinese,
Japanese, and Arab trading vessels around Sumatra, Java, and
the Malay Peninsula. In the 1620s the heavily armed ships of
the British and Dutch East India Companies joined forces to
attack Chinese junks trading at Manila.477
A13.29. The prevalence of piracy in the South China Sea prompted European powers, from
an early date, to attempt to suppress it. The Portuguese and Dutch, for example, were
471
Angus Konstam, Piracy: The Complete History (2008), p. 288. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 538.
472
473
Id., p. 29.
474
475
476
Id., p. 27.
477
Id.
161
particularly active in supressing piracy, which threatened their ambitions to monopolize the
spice trade.478
A13.30. By the late 18th century, the problem “seemed to have got out of control in the
South China Sea”; evidently, by 1802 there were “more than 50,000 pirates roving around the
South China Sea”.479 Contemporary sources described their pervasive presence. The New
York Times published a letter in 1853 from the U.S.S. Supply detailing the extent of piracy in
the South China Sea:
In the China Sea we passed numerous picturesque islands, with

which nothing of interest is connected, except that Malay
pirates lurk around them, ready to pounce upon any vessel
unprepared for them. In truth, the whole sea, from the mouths
of the Tigris to every quarter, is a nest of pirates, who can only
be swept from their cruising grounds by a force of light-draft
steamers, carrying a long gun or two each. This class of vessels
would be of more actual service here than all the sailing vessels
that ever were on the station.480
A13.31. In response, “European maritime powers brought their naval might to bear on the
problem of piracy … [A] combination of colonial police work, maritime steam power and
shell-firing naval ordnance brought an end to a thousand years of pirate domination in the
South China Sea”.481 In 1824, the Netherlands and the U.K. signed a treaty agreeing to
“engage to concur effectually in repressing piracy”.482 And “[b]eginning in 1836 the British
and other European powers began to adopt effective piracy-suppression campaigns” in the
South China Sea.483 As a demonstration of the depth of its commitment to suppressing piracy,
Britain went so far as to acquire Labuan Island off the coast of Brunei “as a base … for the
478
Id., p. 24.
479
Robert J. Antony, “Giang Binh: Pirate Haven and Black Market on the Sino-Vietnamese Frontier, 1780-
1802” in Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (J. Kleinen & M.
Osseweijer, eds., 2010), p. 33. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 542.
480
“China: The Voyage - The China Sea - Macao - Cumsingmoon, &c. &c.”, New York Times (10 Feb. 1853), p.
1. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 557.
481
482
Treaty between United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respecting Territory and Commerce in the East Indies
(17 Mar. 1824), reprinted in The Edinburgh Annual Register, for 1824, Vol. 17, Parts 1-3 (1825), Arts. 2, 27.
483
162
suppression of piracy…”.484 The European campaigns were “so successful” by 1860 “that
piracy ceased being a serious problem in South East Asia”.485
A13.32. China, by contrast, was not engaged in anti-piracy activities in the South China
Sea.486 There is no evidence that it ever attempted to exercise jurisdiction over the Sea’s
waters beyond the immediate area of its mainland coast.
C. Viet Nam’s Control of Part of the South China Sea
A13.33. Prior to France’s establishment of a protectorate in Viet Nam in 1884,487 as an

independent Vietnamese kingdom exercised control in the northern part of the South China
Sea. This began when the Doi Hoang Sa society was founded in the early 1800s to exploit the
Paracels for commercial purposes.488 Among other things, it exercised a degree of control
over the adjacent maritime space, as indicated by the fact that it forced passing vessels to
provide goods. The society’s flotilla was comprised of
70 sailors selected from An Vinh commune on a rotational

basis. Selected sailors receive their conscription-labor order in
the first lunar month of the year. The Hoang Sa Flotilla’s
sailors are provided individually with food sufficient for six
months, and they sail on five small fishing boats for three full
days to reach the islands (that is Hoang Sa archipelago). Once
settled down on the islands, they are free to catch as many birds
and fish as they like for food. They collect goods such as
bronze sabres and copper horses, jewelries, silver money, silver
rings, copper products, tin ingots, black lead, guns, ivory,
golden beeswax, fur and porcelain items, and so on. They also
collect plenty of sea turtle shells, sea cucumbers, and volute
shells.
The Hoang Sa Flotilla returns to the mainland in the eighth

month through Eo seaport. On their return trip, they sail to Phu
484
A. V. M. Horton, “British Administration in Brunei 1906-1959”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2
(1986), p. 355. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 522.
485
486
Hong-kay Lung, “Britain and the Suppression of Piracy on the Coast of China, with Special Reference to the
Vicinity of Hong Kong 1842-1870” (2001), pp. 47-48. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 531.
487
Treaty between France and Annam (“Patenote Treaty”), 6 June 1884, Art. 1(2). MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-68.
488
Note Verbale from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of France, to the Chinese Legation to Paris (4 Jan.
1932), p. 2. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 504.
163
Xuan Citadel to submit the goods they have collected
offshore.489
Records from detail the booty collected during the expeditions.490 Chinese documents from
the time also appear to recognize a link between the Paracels and Viet Nam.491 This tradition
was continued by the Nguyen Emperor, Gia Long,492 under whose authority the Vietnamese
flag was planted on the Paracels in 1816.493
A13.34. In 1834, the Nguyen court issued a chart indicating that the area in which the
Paracel Islands are located belonged to the Nguyen lords.494 The following year, Emperor
Minh Mang ordered that a pagoda and a stele be erected on one of the islands.495 In the mid-
1800s, foreigners recognized that the Paracels and their adjacent maritime area were claimed
by the “King of Cochin-China”, the ruler of part of present-day Viet Nam, who “ke[pt]
revenue cutters and a small garrison [in the Paracels] to collect the duty on all visitors, and to
ensure protection to its own fishermen”.496 These patrol boats were observed as early as the
1750s by a French explorer in the Paracels.497
A13.35. Vietnamese individuals and government officials were also involved in rescuing
European ships in distress. In 1714, Vietnamese fishermen in the Paracel Islands rescued
Dutch sailors who were the victims of a shipwreck; the Dutch sailors were later brought to
meet the rulers of the area.498 In 1830, sailors on a European boat wrecked in the Paracels
489
D.K. Phuc, et al., Vietnam’s National Sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly)
Archipelagoes, p. 39. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 551.
490
See id.
491
See Nha Nguyen, Process of Establishing Vietnam’s Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong
Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes (2002), pp. 47-50. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 533.
492
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, National Boundary Commission, “On Viet Nam’s Sovereignty over Hoang
Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes”, in Paracel & Spratly Islands Belong to Viet Nam: Historical Evidence and
Legal Grounds, p. 18. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 499.
493
494
Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels - Spratlys - Pratas - Macclesfield Bank
(1976), p. 24-25. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 520.
495
496
Charles Gutzlaff, “Geography of the Cochin-Chinese Empire”, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of
London, Vol. 19 (1849), p. 93. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 516.
497
Vu Phi Hoang, Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes: Vietnam’s Territory (1988), p.
498
Id., p. 45.
164
were rescued by Vietnamese.499 Following another disaster in 1836, Viet Nam’s Nguyen
rulers attempted to save a British merchant ship carrying 90 sailors.500 There is no evidence
that China or its rulers challenged the assertion or exercise of authority by the Vietnamese
over these South China Sea waters.
D. Chinese Activities During the Colonial Era
A13.36. Had China continuously exercised sovereignty or rights in the South China Sea,
this would be expected to manifest itself in the historic record. There are no such records,
however. As one historian has observed, “[f]or the entire Ming [Dynasty, from 1368 to 1644,]
until the late Qing [Dynasty, which lasted from 1644 to 1911], records of government-
sanctioned activities [in] the [South China Sea] archipelagos are absent in Chinese sources,
representing a consistent silence in Chinese historiography”.501
A13.37. In fact, for much of this period, China forbade its people from engaging in
maritime trade. When the Qing (Manchu) dynasty came to power, “trade was severely
inhibited in part by a prohibition on sea commerce promulgated in 1661”. The closure of the
coast from 1662 to 1683 “severed the trade links between Guangdong and the Nanyang [the
old Chinese term for the countries of Southeast Asia]”.502 A brief “period (1684-1759) of
openness followed, only to be reversed … in 1760 when the government restricted all
relations with Western traders to the port of Canton (Guangzhou)”.503
A13.38. China maintained, at best, a minimal presence in the South China Sea during in the
19th century. As one historian has observed:
499
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, National Boundary Commission, “On Viet Nam’s Sovereignty over Hoang
Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes”, in Paracel & Spratly Islands Belong to Viet Nam: Historical Evidence and
Legal Grounds, pp. 20-21. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 499.
500
Id., p. 25.
501
Geographical Knowledge and Political Control”, East Asia History, Vol. 32/33 (Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007), p. 122.
SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 537.
502
Robert B. Marks, “Maritime Trade and the Agro-Ecology of South China, 1685-1850”, in Pacific Centuries:
Pacific and Pacific Rim history since the sixteenth century (D.O. Flynn, et al., eds., 1999), p. 89. SWSP, Vol. X,
Annex 529.
503
Ulises Granados, “Modernization and Regionalism in South China: Notes on Coastal Navigation in
Guangdong Province During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century”, International Journal of
Maritime History, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (June 2012), p. 95. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 545.
165
In … Southeast Asian countries where the [Chinese] junk trade
previously flourished, Chinese participation by the end of the
nineteenth century was limited to activities other than transport,
which increasingly was in foreign hands. By 1870, [for
example,] the Chinese junk trade had ceased to the Philippines
…504
III. The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
A13.39. The beginning of the 20th century saw a surge of activity with regard to claims to
maritime features in the South China Sea. Even Germany, which had no colony in Southeast
Asia, “sent a military detachment to the Spratlys in 1883 to carry out survey work”.505
A13.40. Britain, having established a sphere of influence in northern Borneo in the

1860s,506 sought to extend its naval and commercial dominance deeper into the South China
Sea afterwards. For example, British vessels circumvented trade restrictions imposed by the
Spanish and carried out commerce with the nearby island of Sulu, in present-day
Philippines.507 In 1877, Britain authorised the hoisting of the Union Jack over Spratly Island
and Amboyna Cay.508 The British Admiralty surveyed the entire area; in 1888, the U.K.
published a chart showing the principal reefs in the Spratly Islands.509 There are no recorded
protests from China.
A13.41. In the latter part of the 19th century, France, as colonial power in Viet Nam, took
interest in some of the Spratly Islands, and in the Paracel Islands. It made plans to build a
lighthouse in the Paracels in 1899.510 China made no protest over French activity in the
Spratlys or the adjacent waters. Around the turn of the century, however, the “Qing
government ordered the regional authorities in Guangdong to organize … [a] patrol to” the
504
Id., p. 110.
505
(1976), p. 25. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 520.
506
Leigh R. Wright, The Origins of British Borneo (1970), pp. 30, 38. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 519.
507
Id., pp. 31, 39.
508
Letter from Foreign Office, United Kingdom, to the Law Officers of the Crown, United Kingdom (29 July
1932), pp. 1-2. SWSP, Vol. III, Annex 361.
509
D. Hancox and V. Prescott, “A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands and an Account of
Hydrographic Surveys Amongst Those Islands”, IBRU Maritime Briefing, Vol. 1, No. 6 (1995), p. 35. MP, Vol.
VIII, Annex 256.
510
Ulises Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier: Ocean Identity in the Making, 1902-1937”,
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2005), pp. 445-447. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 535.
166
Pratas and Paracel Islands.511 In 1902 or 1909 (the date is unclear), China reportedly sent an
expedition to the Paracels, allegedly hoisting Chinese flags on some islands and erecting a
stone monument on one of them.512 However, there was no accompanying claim of rights in
the adjacent maritime area, let alone to the other islands or waters of the South China Sea.
France persisted in its claims. In 1925, the Vietnamese royal court, under French protection,
claimed the islands as part of the territory of Annam.513 And in 1927, “the French Indochina
authorities sent the ship De Lanessan to the [Spratlys], and later in 1929 the ship La
Malicieuse anchored in [the] waters [around the Paracels] and surveyed Triton Island, North
Reef, Lincoln Island and Bombay Island”.514 In 1933 it claimed sovereignty over Spratly
Island, Amboyna Cay, Itu Aba, North Danger Reef, Loaita and Thitu.515
A13.42. Japan also established a presence in the South China Sea. In 1917, “a Japanese
company began to fish the waters around the Spratlys”.516 In the Pratas Islands, Japanese
vessels also undertook fishing activities.517 By the mid-1930s, Japanese companies were
claiming special rights over the Spratlys for the purpose of exploiting whatever economic
potential could be derived from them.518 In 1937, Japan moved to occupy some of the Paracel
Islands, reportedly shooting at Chinese fishermen present in the area, which prompted a
Chinese field investigation.519
511
Id., p. 447.
512
See Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels - Spratlys - Pratas - Macclesfield
Bank (1976), p. 26. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 520; and Ulises Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral
Reefs During the Ming and Qing Dynasties: Levels of Geographical Knowledge and Political Control”, East
Asia History, Vol. 32/33 (Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007), p. 109. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 537.
513
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2005), p. 451. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 535.
514
Id.
515
Republic of France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Notice relating to the occupation of certain islands by
French naval units”, Official Journal of the French Republic (26 July 1933), at 7837. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 159.
516
(1976), p. 27. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 520.
517
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2005), p. 450. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 535.
518
Id., p. 459.
519
Republic of China, Republican Government Military Commission, Letter Regarding the Current Conditions
on Xisha Islands and Enhancement of Construction and Management (31 Aug. 1937), reprinted in Archival
Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(1):072 (Republic of
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee ed.) (1995), p. 370. SWSP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 477.
167
A13.43. Between the two world wars, Britain focused on exploiting the military utility of
the South China Sea, especially in order to protect Singapore from potential Japanese
designs. The British Admiralty surveyed parts of the South China Sea between 1931520 and
1938521 to identify shipping routes and a “safe concealed fleet anchorage”.522 In 1937, the
H.M.S. Herald surveyed a number of the larger Spratly features for military purposes during
a voyage between Hong Kong and Singapore.523
A13.44. China did not protest any of the British, French or Japanese activities south of the
Paracels, or claim to enjoy sovereignty over, or to have historic rights to, the waters of the
South China Sea. Indeed, a late 1920s official Chinese mission to the Paracel Islands to
survey their economic potential reported that they were “the southernmost point of the
country”.524 A 1933 memorandum from the Republic of China’s National Defence
Committee Secretariat similarly recognized that “the southernmost territory of China is
Triton Island of Xisha [Paracel] Islands”.525 The memorandum also stated that although
“Chinese people have long utilized the [Spratlys] for their livelihood, … it is neither clear
whether there have been political, transportation or commercial facilities on the islands, nor
whether any declaration has been made to the outside world”.526 In the 1930s, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry document admitted that China’s “doubts concerning [Viet Nam’s] territorial
claims” to the Paracels were of “[r]ecent” vintage.527
520
D. Hancox and V. Prescott, Secret Hydrographic Surveys in the Spratly Islands (1999), p. 59. MP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 261.
521
Id., p. 115.
522
Id. pp. 184-185.
523
See generally Memorandum from Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “Herald”, to Commander-in-Chief, China
Station, British Royal Navy (3 May 1937). SWSP, Vol. III, Annex 370.
524
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2005), p. 450 (emphasis in original). SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 535.
525
Republic of China, National Defense Committee Secretariat, Statement of Opinions Based on Research of
Military Relevance and Methods Regarding the Nine French-Occupied Islands (1 Sept. 1933), reprinted in
Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(1):072
(Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995), p. 103. SWSP,
Vol. VIII, Annex 475.
526
Id., pp 103-104.
527
Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of China in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of China (20 Jan. 1947), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(2):199 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning
Committee, ed.) (1995), p. 446. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 483.
168
A13.45. A 1937 report by the Republican Government Military Commission again
confirmed China’s position that the Paracels were the “southernmost territory of our
country”.528 Research undertaken by the Chinese government in 1947 proved unable to
support a Chinese claim to sovereignty further south than Hainan Island.529 To the contrary,
research carried out in the 1940s in response to a request from the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs revealed that “[a]ll records and maps about [China’s] national territory
suggest[] that the country extended to Qiongzhou [Hainan] Island in the south”.530
IV. The Period Since World War II
A13.46. At the outset of World War II, Japan claimed all the features in the South China
Sea.531 It incorporated the Spratlys into its jurisdiction in March 1939.532 And the Japanese
528
Republic of China, Republican Government Military Commission, Letter Regarding the Current Conditions
on Xisha Islands and Enhancement of Construction and Management (31 Aug. 1937), reprinted in Archival
Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(1):072 (Republic of
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995), p. 370. SWSP, Vol. VIII,
Annex 477.
529
Telegram from Special Agent Office of the Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China in Pingjin to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (7 Feb. 1947), reprinted in Archival Compilation on
South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(2):248 (Republic of China Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995), p. 514. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 484.
530
Id. Other Chinese government documents indicate that various government ministries were not confident in
the accuracy of their knowledge about certain of the island groups. See Letter from Ministry of the Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of China to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of China
(20 Sept. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 2, Doc. No. III(1):006 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee,
ed.) (1995), pp. 762-763. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 478; Republic of China, Executive Yuan [Branch], Order (29
Sept. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol.
2, Doc. No. III(1):007 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.)
(1995). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 479; Letter from Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China to
the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of China (1 Oct. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South
China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, Doc. No. III(1):008 (Republic of China Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995). SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 481; Letter from
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of China to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (9
Oct. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol.
2, Doc. No. III(1):009 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.)
(1995). SWSP, Vol. III, Annex 351.
531
Memorandum from Japan to the United States (31 Mar. 1939). SWSP, Vol. III, Annex 381.
532
Note Verbale from the Embassy of Japan in Washington to the United States Department of State (31 Mar.
1939), in Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 2 (1943), pp.
278-80. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 172.
169
navy took effective control of the Sea shortly after the war began.533 When Japan was
defeated, it renounced its claims to the Spratlys and the Paracels.534
A13.47. As the war was ending, the Chinese nationalist government began to assert
territorial claims to the South China Sea. As is discussed in more detail in the Philippines’
response to Question 14,535 in 1947 the Chinese nationalist government circulated a map
internally which indicated the features that should be included within “scope of takeover”536
planned by the government. This followed upon the government’s occupation of Itu Aba in
1946.537 The nationalist government did not occupy any other features, and abandoned Itu
Aba in 1950, only to return in 1956.538
A13.48. After the war, all coastal States resumed their normal navigational, fishing and
other commercial activities. Vessels from the Philippines fished freely in the South China
Sea, primarily within 200 M of the main Philippine islands, including at Scarborough Shoal
and in the Spratlys. Fishing vessels from Viet Nam concentrated their efforts off the
Vietnamese coast and in the Paracel Islands,539 as well as the Spratlys.540 Vessels from
Malaysia also fished in the Spratlys.541 Chinese fishermen also fished throughout these
waters. But China made no documented effort to control or regulate these activities, and, in
fact, it did not control or regulate the activities of non-Chinese fishermen or vessels.
533
See Stein Tønnesson, “An International History of the dispute in the South China Sea”, East Asian Institute
Working Paper Series, No. 71 (16 Mar. 2001), p. 8. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 273.
534
Treaty of Peace with Japan (“Treaty of San Francisco”), 136 U.N.T.S. 45 (8 Sept. 1951), entered into force
28 Apr. 1952, Art. 2(f). MP, Vol. XI, Annex LA-72.
535
See infra para. A14.22.
536
Letter from Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of China to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of China (9 Oct. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, Doc. No. III(1):009 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research &
Planning Committee, ed.) (1995), pp. 767-768. SWSP, Vol. III, Annex 351; Letter from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of China to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of China (1 Oct. 1946), reprinted
in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, Doc. No. III(1):008
(Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995), pp. 767-768.
537
Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (2014), p. 58. SWSP, Vol. V, Annex 459.
538
Id., p. 70; Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (1982), p. 76-77. SWSP, Vol. V, Annex
246(bis).
539
See Ha Anh Tuan, “The Tragedy of Vietnamese Fishermen: The Forgotten Faces of Territorial Disputes in
the South China Sea”, Asia Journal of Global Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2012-2013), pp. 100-101. MP, Vol. IX,
Annex 305.
540
See Nguyen Dang Thang, “Fisheries Co-operation in the South China Sea and the (Ir)relevance of the
Sovereignty Question”, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2011), p. 63. MP, Vol. IX, Annex
299.
541
See id.
170
A13.49. In the 1970s, the Philippines and Viet Nam began sending their armed forces to
occupy some of the larger features in the Spratlys;542 Malaysia followed suit later in the
decade.543 In particular, the Philippines occupied Commodore Reef, Flat Island, Lankiam
Cay, Loaita, Nanshan, Northeast Cay, Second Thomas Shoal, Thitu and West Work; Viet
Nam occupied Alison Reef, Amboyna Cay, Barque Canada Reef, Central London Reef,
Collins Reef, Cornwallis South Reef, East London Reef, Great Discovery Reef, Grierson
Reef (Sin Cowe East), Ladd Reef, Landsdowne Reef, Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, Petley
Reef, Pigeon (Tennent) Reef, Sand Cay, Sin Cowe Island, Southwest Cay, Spratly Island and
West London Reef; and Malaysia took over Ardasier Reef, Dallas Reef, Erica Reef,
Investigator Shoal, Mariveles Reef, and Swallow Reef.544
A13.50. China was a latecomer to the scene. It sent its armed forces to establish a presence
in the Spratlys for the first time only in 1988. In that year, it commenced its occupation of
five features, all of which were either low-tide elevations or small rocky protrusions:
McKennan Reef,545 Gaven Reef,546 Johnson Reef,547 Cuerteron Reef548 and Fiery Cross
Reef.549 At Johnson Reef Chinese forces displaced the Vietnamese troops who had previously
occupied the feature, reportedly killing dozens of Vietnamese in the process.550
A13.51. Although the PRC claimed sovereignty over all the Spratlys, it extended its
presence beyond these five features only to Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation, in 1995,551
and to Second Thomas Shoal, a low tide elevation, in 2013 (after these proceedings were
commenced).552 China has not been able to exercise sovereignty, sovereign rights or historic
rights in respect of any other maritime feature in the Spratlys, or over the adjacent waters,
beyond those its armed forces have physically occupied.
542
Zhiguo Gao, “The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation?”, Ocean Development and International
Law, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1994), p. 346. MP, Vol. VII, Annex 255.
543
Id.
544
See SWSP, Vol. II.
545
546
Id., para. 5.72.
547
Id., para. 5.90.
548
Id., para. 5.92.
549
Id., para. 5.94.
550
E. Wong & J. Ansfield, “To Bolster Its Claims, China Plants Islands in Disputed Waters”, New York Times
(16 June 2014). SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 565.
551
552
See id., paras. 3.59-3.67, 5.61-5.62.
171
A13.52. In respect of the waters, China did not make public or explicit claims to
sovereignty, sovereign rights or historic rights in the maritime area encompassed by the nine-
dash line until 2009. The original dashed line, dating from 1947, was understood
internationally, to the extent other States were aware of it, only as asserting a Chinese claim
to the insular features of the South China Sea, not to all of the waters.553 China’s 1958
Declaration on the Territorial Sea recognized that the islands south of Hainan that it then
claimed, including the Spratly Islands, were “separated from the mainland … by the high
seas”.554 This was reaffirmed in China’s 1992 law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone.555 China 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf was the
first to claim any historic rights, and even then China did not expressly claim any such rights
in South China Sea.556 The Law simply stated in general terms: “The provisions of this Act
shall not affect the historical rights of the People’s Republic of China”.557 There was no
explanation of what those rights were, or where they were located.
A13.53. As the Philippines has explained in the Memorial, China’s first public claim to
sovereignty, sovereign rights and historic rights in the waters of the South China Sea
encompassed by the nine-dash line was contained in two Notes Verbales to the Secretary
General of the United Nations dated 7 May 2009. One was in response to the joint
submission of Malaysia and Viet Nam to the CLCS, the other to a separate submission of
Viet Nam, in which those States provided information on their continental shelf beyond 200
M. China’s Notes Verbales stated that China has “indisputable sovereignty over the islands of
the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction
over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map)”.558
553
See supra para. 15.13. See also infra paras. A14.22-A14.23.
554
(3rd ed. 2001), Art. 1. MP, Vol. V, Annex 103.
555
556
People’s Republic of China, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act (26 June 1998), Art. 14.
MP, Vol. V, Annex 107.
557
Id.
558
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009), p. 2 (emphasis in original). MP, Vol.
VI, Annex 191; Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009), p. 2 (emphasis in
original). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 192.
172
A13.54. China’s claim met strong reactions by the other South China Sea coastal States.
The Philippines, observing that China’s Notes Verbales touched “not only on the sovereignty
of the islands per se and ‘the adjacent waters’ in the South China Sea, but also on the other
‘relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof’ as indicated in the map attached”,
stated that China’s claims “have no basis under international law, specifically UNCLOS”.559
Viet Nam protested that “China’s claim over the islands and adjacent waters in the Eastern
Sea (South China Sea) as manifested in the map … has no legal, historical or factual basis,
therefore is null and void”.560 Indonesia also rejected the Chinese map, emphasizing that, in
the absence of a “clear explanation as to [its] legal basis, the method of drawing, and the
status of those separated dotted-lines”, the “so called ‘nine-dotted-lines map’ … clearly lacks
international legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982”.561 Malaysia opposed
China’s claims by insisting that its joint submission with Viet Nam “conform[s] to the
pertinent provisions of UNCLOS 1982”.562 Since these protests were made, no South China
Sea State has agreed to, or accepted, or acquiesced in China’s claim. Nor has any other State
endorsed or supported China’s claim.
559
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 000228 (5 Apr. 2011), pp. 2, 4 (emphasis in original). MP, Vol.
VI, Annex 200.
560
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 86/HC-2009 (8 May 2009). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 193.
561
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 (8 July 2010), pp. 1-2. MP, Vol. VI, Annex
197.
562
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, No. HA 24/09 (20 May 2009), p. 1. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 194. The United States has taken a
similar position. Citing “an incremental effort by China to assert control over the area contained in the so-called
‘nine-dash line’, despite the objections of its neighbors”, the United States stated that under international law
“all maritime claims must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with the international law of the
sea … [C]laims in the South China Sea that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed … Any
use of the ‘nine-dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would be
inconsistent with international law”. United States, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific, “Testimony of Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State” (5 Feb. 2014), pp. 2-3. MP, Vol. VI, Annex 170.
173
174
APPENDIX TO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 14
A14.1. The Philippines has prepared this Appendix to assist the Tribunal in interpreting
the maps that are presented in the historic atlas found in Volume VI.
A14.2. Section I describes the history of Chinese cartography as it relates to China’s

historical relationship, or lack thereof, with the South China Sea, demonstrating that for more
than 700 years, until at least 1933, China did not consider the insular features of the South
China Sea south of Hainan Island, or the waters themselves, to be part of China. Nor did
China claim any rights to those waters during those seven centuries. The first map purporting
to show Chinese sovereignty or rights in the South China Sea below Hainan Island was not
prepared until 1933.
A14.3. Section II describes maps produced by the current littoral States of the South China
Sea other than China, and their colonial predecessors. These maps confirm that, in the area
south of Hainan Island, China was not understood to have claimed, or exercised, sovereignty
or rights to the insular features or waters of the South China Sea.
A14.4. Finally, Section III describes maps showing oil and gas concessions in the South
China Sea offered by countries in the region. It demonstrates that, until very recently, China
had not issued offshore concessions beyond the areas immediately adjacent to Hainan Island.
It also demonstrates that, whether before or after 2009 when China submitted its nine-dash
line claim to the U.N., other countries did not consider China to have sovereign or historic
rights to the seabed and subsoil of the South China Sea.
I. Maps Produced by China
A14.5. Until the mid-twentieth century, the official maps produced by China did not make
any claims to Chinese rights or sovereignty over the waters of the South China Sea or its
various maritime features.
A14.6. The earliest map of China that the Philippines has been able to identify is a stone
etching in Xi’an that was prepared in 1136, apparently based on the work of the geographer
Jia Dan (贾耽), who lived from 729-805 C.E.563 It depicts China during the Southern Song
563
Hyunhee Park, “A Buddhist Woodblock-printed Map in 13th Century China”, Crossroads: Studies on the
History of Exchange Relations in the East Asian World, Vol. 1/2 (2010), p. 17. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 539.
175
Dynasty,564 and is entitled the Hua Yi Tu (华夷图), which means The Map of China and the
Barbarian Countries. The Philippines presents a copy, based on a rubbing done in 1933.565
The map shows Hainan as the southernmost part of China. The South China Sea is not
depicted.
A14.7. This is also the case for a map of China produced in 1389, the Universal Map of
the Great Ming Empire (Da Ming hun yi tu, 大明混一图).566 It depicts the Ming Empire as
extending no further south than Hainan, and does not show the South China Sea.
A14.8. The Territorial Atlas of the Great Ming Empire (Da Ming yu di tu, 大明舆地图),
produced between 1547 and 1559, depicts the Chinese empire during the reign of the Jiajing
Emperor (1507-1567).567 The two relevant panels of the Atlas are reproduced in Volume VI.
The first is an overview map of the entire Chinese empire, which shows it did not extend
further south than Hainan. The second panel shows Hainan in detail. None of the maritime
features of the South China Sea are depicted.
A14.9. Another Ming atlas produced in 1601 during the reign of the Wanli Emperor
(1563-1620) shows the same thing. It includes a map of what are now China’s Guangdong
and Hainan provinces,568 but does not include a map indicating ownership of any of the South
China Sea maritime features or the Sea itself. One of its panels depicts the South China Sea
as being beyond China’s boundary (jie, 界). It does this by depicting an undulating coastline
at the top, the five arcs of which are labelled 云南界 (Yunnan boundary), 广西界 (Guangxi
boundary), 琼崖界 (Qingya boundary), 广东界 (Guangdong boundary), and 福建界 (Fujian
boundary), thereby indicating that the area beyond those lines, including the Sea, lies outside
the listed imperial provinces.569
564
Hua Yi Tu [Map of China and the Barbarian Countries] (China, 1136 [c. 1933 rubbing]), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005081/ (accessed 4 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M24.
565
Id.
566
Author unknown or unavailable, Da Ming Hun Yi Tu [Universal Map of Great Ming Empire] (China, 1389?).
SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M25.
567
Da Ming yu di tu [The Territorial Atlas of the Great Ming Empire] (China, 1547 to 1559), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626776 (accessed 4 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M26.
568
Junheng Zuo, “Leaf 20”, in Tian di tu [Atlas of Heaven and Earth] (China, 1601), available at
http://www.loc.gov/resource/g7820m.gct00225/?sp=20 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M28.
569
Junheng Zuo, “Leaf 6”, in Tian di tu [Atlas of Heaven and Earth] (China, 1601), available at
176
A14.10. The 1602 Map of the Ten Thousand Countries of the Earth (kun yu wan guo quan
tu, 坤舆万国全图), also known as the Matteo Ricci World Map,570 which was produced in
Beijing as part of a collaboration between Jesuit missionaries in China and Chinese imperial
cartographers,571 depicts the littoral of the South China Sea, but does not indicate or purport
to claim Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or its features. The map identifies
Hainan as the southernmost part of China.
A14.11. A circa 1619 map depicts China and insular Southeast Asia.572 It illustrates trade
route lines emanating from a point off of Quanzhou in Fujian Province. One route extends
“southwest (kunshen, 坤申 or 232.5°) toward the Da Nang Peninsula (在港) and Hoi An (会
安), off the coast of modern Viet Nam (Nguyen Cochinchina) between Thi Nai or Qui Nhon (
新州) and Quang Nam (广南), the launching point for Southeast Asian trade”.573 Another “is
marked bing (丙, 165°) and heads toward Luzon and Manila”.574 A third route goes from
Guangzhou to Manila.575
A14.12. According to a cartographic expert, the map confirms that the “South China Sea
[was] the central area for trade” among various Southeast Asian polities at the time.576 The
“Southern Sea or Nanhai is not identified at all”,577 let alone identified as being Chinese.
Consistent with the map’s purpose to show trade routes is the inclusion of hazards to
navigation, specifically, “the outlines of the reefs and island of Pratas (南澳氣, Nan’ao qi),
the Paracel Islands (萬里長沙似船帆樣, Wanli chang sha si chuan fan yang, ‘The Paracels
570
Matteo Ricci, Li Zhizao, engraver, Kunyu wanguo quantu [Map of the Ten Thousand Countries of the Earth]
(China, 1602), available at https://www.lib.umn.edu/bell/riccimap (accessed 3 Mar. 2015) (western panel).
571
Jerry Brotton, Great Maps: The world’s masterpieces explored and explained (2014), p. 127. SWSP, Vol.
XI, Annex 550.
572
The Selden Map of China [East Asian Shipping Routes] (China, c. 1609). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M30. This
is referred to as the Selden Map because it was brought to Europe by the legal theorist John Selden.
573
Robert Batchelor, “The Selden Map Rediscovered: A Chinese Map of East Asia Shipping Routes, c. 1619”,
Imago Mundi: The International Journal for the History of Cartography, Vol. 65, No. 1 (24 Jan. 2013), p. 48.
SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 547.
574
Id.
575
Id., p. 50.
576
Id.
577
Id.
177
resembling the shape of a sail’), and the Spratleys (萬里石塘, Wanli shitang)”.578 The islands
are not indicated as belonging to China.
A14.13. This is consistent with a 1647 Chinese atlas, entitled Look at Distant Places in the
Palm of Your Hand (xia lan zhi zhang, 暇览指掌), which does not depict the South China
Sea; the southernmost area shown as being part of China is Hainan.579
A14.14. Unlike maps produced by European powers beginning in the mid-17th century,
which demonstrate an increasing awareness of the various features in the South China Sea,580
relatively few Chinese maps from this period show the Sea or its features in comparative
detail.
A14.15. None of the Chinese maps indicate that the waters of the South China Sea or its
features were part of the Chinese empire. An example is the Kangxi Provincial Atlas of China
(huang yu quan lan fen sheng tu, 皇舆全览分省图), named after the emperor during whose
rule it was produced (from 1661 to 1722).581 According to Professor Laura Hostetler, an
expert on Chinese cartography, the Kangxi Atlas “does not depict and makes no mention of
regions beyond the southern scope of the map (or empire)”,582 namely Hainan, which is
depicted in the plate showing modern-day Guangdong and Hainan provinces.583 This is
notable because the atlas was intended to be a “comprehensive atlas” produced by a “survey
[of] the entire empire”.584 The absence of the South China Sea is therefore indicative that the
Sea and its features were not considered to fall within the Chinese empire. This is confirmed
by the 1754-1760 Provincial Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty (Da Qing fen sheng yu tu, 大清
578
Id., p. 52.
579
“Leaf 12”, Xia lan zhi zhang [Look at Distant Places in the Palm of Your Hand] (China, 1647?), available at
580
See infra Section A14.II.B.
581
Huang yu quan lan fen sheng tu [The Kangxi provincial atlas of China] (China, 1721 to 1722), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626779/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M32.
582
Laura Hostetler, “Early Modern Mapping at the Qing Court: Survey Maps from the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and
Qianlong Reign Periods” in Chinese History in Geographical Perspective (Y. Du and J. Kyong-McClain, eds.,
2013), p. 25. MP, Vol. X, Annex 308.
583
Huang yu quan lan fen sheng tu [The Kangxi provincial atlas of China] (China, 1721 to 1722), available at
584
Laura Hostetler, “Early Modern Mapping at the Qing Court: Survey Maps from the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and
Qianlong Reign Periods” in Chinese History in Geographical Perspective (Y. Du and J. Kyong-McClain, eds.,
2013), p. 27. MP, Vol. X, Annex 308.
178
分省舆图), which was designed to show the provinces under the control of the Qing
Dynasty.585
A14.16. The Philippines has identified four Chinese maps from this period showing the
Paracels and Spratlys. Two were produced in the 1790s. They are entitled, respectively, the
Complete Map of Astronomy and the Qing Empire (jing ban tian wen quan tu, 京板天文全
图)586 and the Complete Map of Imperial Territory (Yu di quan tu, 舆地全图).587 Both show a
long spit of land to the south of Hainan, labelled万里石塘 (wan li shi tang) and万里长沙
(wan li chang sha), old Chinese names for the Spratlys and Paracels, respectively. The
islands are located between lines that appear to depict sailing routes; the route to the west of
the spit of land connects to features labelled 满剌加 (man la jia), 三齐国 (san qi guo), and
丁机宜 (ding ji yi). These are Ming Dynasty-era names for Malacca, Palembang (in Java),
and Indragiri (in Sumatra).588 This suggests that these maritime features were included to
warn navigators to circumvent them whilst traveling to foreign ports. Two other maps, an
1811 map entitled The Great Qing Dynasty’s Complete Map of All Under Heaven (Da Qing
wan nian yi tong tian xia quan tu, 大清万年一统天下全图)589 and an 1814-1816 Complete
Geographical Map of the Great Qing Dynasty (Da Qing wan nian yi tong di li quan tu, 大清
万年一统地理全图),590 also show the Spratlys and Paracels as lying between trade routes
extending south from Hainan.
585
Da Qing fen sheng yu tu [Provincial Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty] (China, 1754-1760), available at
586
Junliang Ma, Jing ban tian wen quan tu [Complete Map of Astronomy and the Qing Empire] (China, after
1790), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005137/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M34.
587
Yu di quan tu [Complete Map of Imperial Territory] (China, 1798-1800), available at
588
Zhang Xie, Compilation of Historical Books on the History of Chinese-Foreign Exchange: Investigation of
Eastern and Western Oceans (1981, modern edition), pp. 293, 259. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 521.
589
Da Qing wan nian yi tong tian xia quan tu [The Great Qing Dynasty’s Complete Map of All Under Heaven]
(China, 1811), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005018/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M36.
590
Da Qing wan nian yi tong di li quan tu [Complete Geographical Map of the Great Qing Dynasty] (China,
1814-1816), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005060/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M37.
179
A14.17. Chinese maps from the 1800s through the appearance of the 11-dash line map in
1947591 do not indicate Chinese claims to any of the South China Sea features or to the Sea
itself. These include maps that were intended to depict the extent of the Chinese empire,
which do not show Chinese claims south of Hainan. Examples include:
• the Qing Empire’s 1842 Complete Map of all Under Heaven (huang chao yi tong
yu di quan tu, 皇朝一统舆地全图),592
• the 1864 complete map of Guangdong Province,593
• a post-1885 Complete Map of The Twenty-Three Provinces of the Great Qing

Dynasty (Da Qing er shi san sheng yu di quan tu, 大清二十三省舆地全图),594
• the 1896 Complete Map of All Provinces (huang chao zhi sheng yu di quan tu, 皇
朝直省舆地全图),595
• the 1929 Republican-era China Humiliation Map (Zhong hua guo chi di tu, 中华
国耻地图),596 and
• the circa 1933 New Provincial Map of the Republic of China (zhonghua min guo
fen sheng xin tu, 中华民国分省新图).597
591
The Various Islands in The South Sea] (China, 1947). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M20.
592
Li Zhaoluo & Yan Liu, Huang chao yi tong yu di quan tu [Qing Empire’s Complete Map of all Under
Heaven] (China, 1842), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005054/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP,
Vol. VI, Annex M39.
593
Li Zhaoluo & Yan Liu, Guangdong quan tu [Complete Map of Guangdong Province] (China, 1864),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005120/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M40.
594
Da Qing er shi san sheng yu di quan tu [Complete Map of the Twenty-Three Provinces of the Great Qing
Dynasty] (China, after 1885), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005068/ (accessed 4 Mar. 2015).
595
Peilan Li, Huang chao zhi sheng yu di quan tu [Qing Empire’s Complete Map of All Provinces] (China,
1896), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005083/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M45.
596
Zhong hua guo chi di tu [China Humiliation Map] (China, 1929), available at
597
Zhonghua min guo fen sheng xin tu [New Provincial Map of the Republic of China] (China, c. 1933),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2006629696/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M47.
180
A14.18. Other Chinese maps that depict the southern reaches of the empire are no different
in this respect; they also stop at Hainan. This is true for:
• a post-1815 Chinese map of the waterways in Guangdong province,598
• an 1870 coastal map of South China,599 and
• an 1887 map of the waterways and roads in Guangdong Province.600
A14.19. There is an 1870 Territorial Map of the Joint Borders Between Yunnan,
Guangdong Provinces and Vietnam (dian yue yue nan lian jie yu tu, 滇粤越南联界舆图)
which depicts two Chinese provinces and Viet Nam. It also includes the northwestern part of
the South China Sea. There is no indication of the Sea’s incorporation into the Qing
Empire.601
A14.20. Chinese maps prepared since the early 20th century confirm that China’s claim to
the South China Sea is of recent vintage.
A14.21. The first Chinese map identified that could be construed as indicating a Chinese
claim to any South China Sea feature is a circa 1933 map602 that shows the Paracel Islands,
labeled Triton Island 土莱塘岛 (tu lai tang dao) in an inset with Hainan Island. This is an
older Chinese name for the feature, and it appears with 查里屯岛 (cha li tun dao) in
parentheses, which is the transliteration of the English name. The inset does not extend
further south. A later Chinese map of the East Indies from around 1941603 does not depict
598
Guangdong tong sheng shui dao tu [Map of the Waterways in Guandong Province] (China, after 1815),
599
Li Zhaoluo, Yan Liu, Nan yang fen tu [South Sea Portion Map] (China, 1870), available at
600
Zhongpei Li, Guangdong quan sheng shui lu yu tu [Map of the Waterways and Roads in Guangdong
Province] (China, c. 1887), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005159/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP,
Vol. VI, Annex M44.
601
Li Zhaoluo, Yan Liu, Dian yue yue nan lian jie yu tu [Territorial Map of the Joint Borders Between Yunnan,
Guangdong Provinces and Vietnam] (China, 1870), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005069/
(accessed 4 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M41.
602
Zhonghua min guo fen sheng xin tu [New Provincial Map of the Republic of China] (China, c. 1933),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2006629696/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M47.
603
Ya Kwang Geographical Society, Tai yue quan tu [The Map of the East Indies] (China, c. 1941). SWSP, Vol.
VI, Annex M48.
181
lines suggesting any Chinese claims. It labels the South China Sea features in English, and
uses Chinese characters to transliterate or translate the English names; Chinese characters are
not used to label the features with Chinese names.604
A14.22. A map containing the dashed line was reportedly first introduced in a 1947 atlas
circulated internally within the Chinese Nationalist Government.605 This was subsequently
published in February 1948.606 The Chinese Ministry of Interior prepared the map in response
to an order from the Executive Yuan, the executive branch of the Republic of China, ordering
various government agencies to consult “for assisting [the] takeover of the South China
Sea”.607 This shows that China did not then consider itself to be exercising sovereignty or
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the area encompassed by the dashed line, but was preparing
to assert a claim; the novelty of the claim was confirmed by the fact that many of the features
in the South China Sea still did not have Chinese names.608 Other accounts indicate that the
Ministry of the Interior may have based the map on privately-drawn maps produced between
1936 and 1945,609 or on an internal government map produced in 1935 indicating that the
southernmost feature of the South China Sea was James Shoal, at the southern edge of
today’s nine-dash line.610
A14.23. Whatever the original dashed line was intended to show, it is clear that no other
State understood it to represent a claim to the maritime areas it encompassed. As related in
604
In the Paracels, 林康岛 (lin kang dao) is used for Lincoln Island and 蒲利孟滩 (pu li meng tan) for Bremen
Bank. In the Spratlys, the map labels Tizard Bank as 铁沙礁 (tie sha jiao), Spratly Island as 斯巴拉说？岛 (si
ba ra shuo dao), and North Luconia Shoal as 北卢康尼亚滩 (bei lu cong ni ya tan). It also labels Northwest
Investigator Reef as 西北调查礁 (xi bei diao cha jiao). 调查 (diao cha) means “investigate”.
605
Zou Keyuan, “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and Its Legal
Consequences for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands”, International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, Vol. 14, No. 27 (1999), p. 33. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 264; L. Jinming and L. Dexia, “The Dotted
Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note”, Ocean Development & International Law, Vol. 34,
No. 3-4 (2003), pp. 288-290. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 275.
606
The Various Islands in The South Sea] (China, 1947). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M20.
607
Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China to the Ministry of the Interior of the
Republic of China (1 Oct. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, Doc. No. III(1):008 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research &
Planning Committee, ed.) (1995), p. 765. SWSP, Vol. VIII, Annex 480.
608
See id., p. 766 (indicating that the government needed to decide “[h]ow to name the islands, reefs, and
beaches after takeover”).
609
Compilation of Historical Materials on the South China Sea Islands of China (H. Zhenhua et al., eds), pp.
321-322, 353-360. SWSP, Vol. IX, Annex 515.
610
L. Jinming and L. Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note”, Ocean
Development & International Law, Vol. 34, No. 3-4 (2003), p. 289. MP, Vol. VIII, Annex 275.
182
the Memorial,611 although the dashed line was included in official Chinese maps published
between 1950 and 2013,612 it was not until China transmitted two notes to the U.N. Secretary
General in May 2009 that China explained that it depicted the breadth of its alleged
“sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil
thereof”.613
II. Maps Produced by the Other Littoral States of the South China Sea
A14.24. Maps produced by the other littoral States in the South China Sea confirm that no
other State or polity considered that China claimed, or exercised sovereignty or rights over,
the Sea’s waters or maritime features.
A. Maps Predating the Mid-17th Century
A14.25. Early European maps are consistent with contemporaneous Chinese cartography in
not depicting the waters of the South China Sea or its maritime features as being part of
China.
A14.26. The first European printed map to show Southeast Asia with some semblance of
accuracy, the 1548 India Tercera Nova Tabula, by Giacomo Gastaldi, does not connect the
611
612
China Cartographic Publishing House, Hanging Map of the People’s Republic of China (1950). MP, Vol. II,
Annex M1; Ya Guang Yu De Xue She, Large Map of the People’s Republic of China (1951). MP, Vol. II,
Annex M2; Ya Guang Yu De Xue She, Large Map of the People’s Republic of China (1952). MP, Vol. II,
Annex M3; China Cartographic Publishing House, Hanging Map of the People’s Republic of China (1956). PM,
Vol. II, Annex M4; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (1971). MP,
Vol. II, Annex M5; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 1973).
MP, Vol. II, Annex M6; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (May
1973). MP, Vol. II, Annex M7; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China
(May 1978). MP, Vol. II, Annex M8; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of
China (1980). MP, Vol. II, Annex M9; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of
China (June 1981). MP, Vol. II, Annex M10; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s
Republic of China (June 1982). MP, Vol. II, Annex M11; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the
People’s Republic of China (June 1984). MP, Vol. II, Annex M12; China Cartographic Publishing House, Map
of the People’s Republic of China (Mar. 1987). MP, Vol. II, Annex M13; China Cartographic Publishing House,
Map of the People’s Republic of China (Aug. 1988). MP, Vol. II, Annex M14; China Cartographic Publishing
House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (June 1992). MP, Vol. II, Annex M16; China Cartographic
Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (Aug. 1995). MP, Vol. II, Annex M17; SinoMaps
Press, Map of the People’s Republic of China (2007). MP, Vol. II, Annex M18; China Cartographic Publishing
House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (China, 2013). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M19 (originally produced
as Memorial, Figure 4.4).
613
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 191; Note
Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 192.
183
South China Sea with China.614 Six years later, a map by the same mapmaker arguably
depicted the Paracel Islands, but in an incorrect location.615 In 1570, another map produced in
what is now Italy corrected this, depicting them as a sail off the coast of Viet Nam.616 Neither
map connected them with China.
A14.27. A Dutch map published in 1569 map shows the Paracel Islands off the coast of
Viet Nam, without attributing them to China;617 it labels them “Baixos de Chapar” and likely
was intended to include the Spratlys. The same is true for a 1609 map, which refers to them
as the “Pracel Ins”.618 They are similarly depicted in a 1594 Dutch map of the Insulae
Moluvccae619 and a 1606 Dutch map of insular Southeast Asia.620 A Dutch map from 1570621
neither shows any features in the South China Sea, nor indicates Chinese ownership over the
Sea itself.
A14.28. That the South China Sea was not considered to fall under Chinese sovereignty is
confirmed by a 1600 British map of the Pacific Ocean and Asia that depicts the coasts of
what are now all of the littoral States, as well as what appear to be the Paracel Islands. It does
not indicate those, or any other islands south of Hainan, as belonging to China.622
A14.29. Early maps of the Philippines demonstrate cartographic awareness of features in

the South China Sea but do not attribute them or the Sea to China. A 1601 Spanish map of
614
Giacomo Gastaldi, India Tercera Nova Tabula (Italy, 1548), in Early Mapping of Southeast Asia (1999).
SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M72. Although Italy was not “the sponsor of ocean voyages to Southeast Asia, [it] was a
major cartographic ‘think-tank’ for digesting and sorting out the data that those expeditions brought back”.
Thomas Suárez, Early Mapping of Southeast Asia: The Epic Story of Seafarers, Adventurers, and
Cartographers Who First Mapped the Regions Between China and India (1999), p. 130. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex
528.
615
G.B. Ramusio, Southeast Asia (Italy, 1554), in Early Mapping of Southeast Asia (1999). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M73.
616
Abraham Ortelius, Indiae orientalis [East Indies] (Netherlands, 1570), available at
http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/587925 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M86.
617
Gerardus Mercator, Nova et aucta orbis terrae [New and enlarged world] (Netherlands, 1569). SWSP, Vol.
VI, Annex M85.
618
Abraham Ortelius, Chinae [China] (Netherlands, 1609), available at
619
Petrus Plancius, Insulae Moluccae [Molucca Islands] (Netherlands, 1594), in Early Mapping of Southeast
Asia (1999). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M87.
620
Jodocus Hondius, Insulae Indiae orientalis praecipuae [East Indies Islands] (Netherlands, 1606), available
at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3424253 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M88.
621
Abraham Ortelius, Indiae orientalis [East Indies] (Netherlands, 1570), available at
622
Gabriel Tatton, Chart of the Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1600). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M121.
184
insular Southeast Asia and the Chinese coast depicts the Philippines and other island
groups.623 Some dots off the coast of Indochina may refer to South China Sea features, but
there is no linkage with China. A 1616 Dutch map showing the Philippines includes a sail-
shaped collection of dots labeled “Pracel”, presumably the Paracels, without suggesting any
connection to China.624
B. Maps from the Mid-Seventeenth Century to 1800
A14.30. Many non-Chinese maps produced in the middle of the 17th century illustrate a
growing awareness of the various features in the South China Sea. None indicates that China
exercised sovereignty or had rights over the various features of the South China Sea or over
the Sea itself.
A14.31. A 1626 British map of “the Kingdome of China” depicts territories abutting the
South China Sea,625 including “Luconia”, an early name for Luzon, as well as “El. Pracel”,
likely a reference to the Paracel Islands. It does not, however, indicate that these islands
belonged to China. In 1641, an atlas entitled Idrographisiae Nova Descriptio was produced in
Portugal showing the South China Sea and some of its features, but does not indicate Chinese
ownership of them or the Sea.626
A14.32. A 1676 French map, the Carte Generale des Indes Orientales et des Iíles
Adacentes,627 which maps Southeast Asia, depicts the “El Pracel” as a parallelogram
containing three columns of exes stretching along much of the coast of “Tsiompia”, with a
tail at its southwestern end. Notably, the island group is coloured in a different colour from
the colours used to indicate the surrounding countries. Specifically, China is depicted in
623
Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Descripcion de las Indias del Poniente [Description of the Indies of
Poniente] (Spain, 1601), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/366908 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015).
624
Petrus Bertius, Philippinae Insulae [Philippine Islands] (Netherlands, 1616), in Early Mapping of Southeast
Asia (1999). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M90.
625
John Speed, The Kingdome of China (United Kingdom, 1626), available at
626
Antonio Sanches, No title [Portolan chart of southeast Asia], in Idrographisiae Nova Descriptio (Portugal, c.
1641). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M108.
627
Pierre Mariette, Carte generale des Indes Orientales et des isles adiacentes [General map of the East Indies
and Adjacent Islands] (France, 1676), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2424185 (accessed 3 Mar.
185
yellow, Viet Nam in light red, and the Philippines in green. The island group is not coloured,
indicating that it is not associated with any particular littoral State or polity.
A14.33. Similar use of colour is present in a 1662 Dutch map of the Tabula Indiæ
Orientalis,628 and a 1676 British map,629 all of which depict some small insular features and
shoals off the coast of Palawan, likely indicating the Spratlys. Four of these five maps, those
dated 1626, 1650, 1662, and 1676, also depict what is likely Scarborough Shoal with the
label “P. de Mandato”.630 None connect the Sea or its insular features with China.
A14.34. In 1655, a Dutch map of the “Imperii Sinarum” was published; it does not show
any South China Sea features, nor does it indicate Chinese ownership of or rights in the
Sea.631 The same is true for a 1656 French map.632 A 1700 French map of China does not
show the South China Sea, and even fails to include the entire island of Hainan.633 A 1723
British map of China634 depicts Hainan and the “I. de Pruala” (likely the Pratas islands), but
does not show the South China Sea or any of its insular features. A 1751 French map of
“L’Empire de la Chine” shows Hainan but no small insular features.635
A14.35. Maps of the Philippines from this period show features in the South China Sea, but
do not indicate any Chinese claim over them or to the Sea. A 1723 Spanish map depicts the
Philippine archipelago, as well as the South China Sea and its littoral, in relatively good
628
Joannes L’Huilier, Frederick De Wit, Tabula Indiae Orientalis [Map of East Indies] (Netherlands, 1662),
available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2637169 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M92.
629
John Speed, A New Map of East India (United Kingdom, 1676), available at
http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3428400 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015) (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M123.
630
The inscription “P. de Mandato” likely refers to Spanish control of the feature. The phrase is closely related
to punto de mando, which is a widely-used military term referring to a point of command. The use of a Spanish
phrase on a non-Spanish map permits the inference that the point of command in this case is Manila, the capital
of the Spanish colony in the Philippines.
631
Martino Martini, Imperii Sinarum Nova Descriptio [New Chinese Empire], in Novus atlas Sinensis [New
Chinese Atlas] (Netherlands, 1655), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002625249/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015).
632
Nicolas Sanson, La Chine royaume [The Chinese Kingdom] (France, 1656). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M49.
633
Johannes Nieuhof, Carte exacte de toutes les provinces, villes, bourgs, villages et rivières du vaste et
puissant empire de la Chine [Exact map of all the provinces, cities, burgs, villages and rivers of the vast and
powerful Chinese Empire] (Netherlands, 1700), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/87691057/ (accessed 3
Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M93.
634
Herman Moll, China (United Kingdom, 1723), available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2006629363 (accessed 3 Mar.
2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M124. . This was reprinted in 1736. Herman Moll, The Empire of China and
Island of Japan, Agreeable to Modern History (United Kingdom, 1736). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M125
635
Robert de Vaugondy, L’Empire de la Chine [The Empire of China] (France, 1751). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M51.
186
detail.636 It shows the Paracel Islands, some shoals off of Palawan which might be the
Spratlys, and a feature off of Luzon which could be Scarborough Shoal. Unlike the mainland
features, which are depicted with vegetation and markers of civilization, these features appear
blank.
A14.36. The “most accurate and largest [map] ever drawn of the [Philippine] archipelago”
as of its production, the 1734 Carta Hydrographica y Chorographica de la Yslas Filipinas,637
served as a model for later maps of the Philippines.638 Produced by the Jesuit priest Pedro
Murillo Velarde, it depicts Scarborough Shoal and indicates certain hazards off of the coast
of Palawan, likely the Spratly Islands.639 It is the first map to refer to Scarborough Shoal as
“Panacot”, the Tagalog word for threat or danger. No reference is made to China.
A14.37. This pattern is repeated in many subsequently published maps, including:
• a 1752 French map that shows Scarborough Shoal and part of a feature which is
likely Macclesfield Bank;640
• a 1755 map of “The Philippin, Carolin, Molucka, and Spice Islands” that shows
both “Panacot” and a bank named “English Bank”, which is likely Macclesfield
Bank, off the coast of Luzon, as well as a small feature named “Low Rock” near
Palawan641;
• a 1790 map of the Philippines that shows “banks of 11 and 12 fathoms” off the
coast of Palawan, as well as “B.jo de Masingolo o Panacot” (Scarborough
Shoal).642
636
Francisco Diaz Romero and Antonio D. Ghandia, Carta Chorographica Del Archipielago de las Islas
Philipinas [Chorographic Map of the Archipelago of the Philippine Islands] (Spain, 1727). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M110.
637
Pedro Murillo Velarde, Carta hydrographica y chorographica de las Yslas Filipinas [Hydrographic and
Chorographic Map of the Philippines Islands] (Spain, 1734), available at
638
Carlos Quirino, Philippine Cartography: 1320-1899 (3d ed., 2010), p. 57. SWSP, Vol. X, Annex 540.
639
This map was reproduced a number of times, including in 1760 in Nuremberg. Pedro Murillo Velarde &
George Maurice Lowitz, Carta Hydrographica y Chorographica de las Ysles Filipinas [Hydrographic and
Chorographic Map of the Philippine Islands] (Germany, 1760). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M68, and in 1785 in
Venice, Antonio Zatta, Isole Filippine [Philippine Islands] (Italy, 1785). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M74.
640
Nicholas Bellin, Carte Reduite des Isles Philippines [Simplified Map of the Philippine Islands] (France,
641
Solomon Bolton, The Philippin, Carolin, Molucka, and Spice Islands, in Dictionnaire universel de commerce
[The universal dictionary of trade and commerce] (United Kingdom, 1755). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M127.
642
Duque de Almodóvar, Mapa de las Islas Filipinas [Map of the Philippine Islands] (Spain, 1790). SWSP,
Vol. VI, Annex M114.
187
A14.38. During this period, regional maps began to include more detail about the smaller
features in the South China Sea, although none indicated that China had any claim to those
features or the maritime area. For example, a 1726 Dutch map of the Indiae Orientalis et
Regnorum adjacentium643 shows the Paracels in a sail shape, along with some scattered
features off the coast of Palawan, but does not attribute them, or the sea area, to any State.
The same is true for a 1745 British “Chart of ye East-Indies”.644 A 1760 map produced in
Amsterdam shows the Paracels, Scarborough Shoal, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly
Islands. The Paracels (“Baixos de Pracels”) are depicted along the coast of “Cochichine”. Off
Palawan are scattered a number of banks and “klippe” (reefs). To their north is “de
Engelische Banc of Macelsfields”, and to the east of that is “B.jo de Marsingola ou Panacot”,
clear references to Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal, respectively.645 Another Dutch
map, from 1765, shows the Paracels in their traditional depiction off the Vietnamese coast as
well as some shoals off Palawan.646
A14.39. Emmanuel Bowen’s 1766 map of insular Southeast Asia depicts the “Pracel
Shoals”, the “Prata Shoals”, and a feature in between them named “The Triangles”.647 It was
later clarified that the Triangles were part of the Paracels; they were known “by the different
names of Triangles, Amphitrite, Spectacles, St. Anthony’s Girdle, [and] Lincoln”.648 The map
is annotated in some places with historical information, such as observing that “[t]he
643
François Valentijn, Tabula Indiae Orientalis et Regnorum adjacentium [Map of East Indies and Adjacent
Kingdoms] (Netherlands, 1726), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2014588025/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015).
644
Herman Moll, A chart of ye East-Indies with the coast of Persia, China also the Philipina, Moluca and Sunda
Islands, &c, (United Kingdom, 1745), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3426835 (accessed 3 Mar.
645
Covens and Mortier, Carte d’une partie de la Chine, les Isles Philippines, de la Sonde, Moluques, de
Papoesie, &c. [Map of a part of China, the Philippine Islands, Sunda, Moluccas, Papoesie, etc.] (Netherlands,
c.1760), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/916139 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M95.
646
Issak Tirion, Nieuwe Kaart van de Filippynsche, Ladrones, Moluccos of Specery Eilanden als mede Celebes
etc. [New Map of the Philippines, Ladrones, Moluccas, Spice Islands and Celebes, etc.] (Netherlands, 1765).
647
Emanuel Bowen, A New and Accurate Map of the East India Islands, in Maps and Charts of the Modern Part
of Universal History (United Kingdom, 1766). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M129.
648
Annex 552.
188
Philippine Islands took their [n]ame from Philip II. K. of Spain…”.649 It does not provide any
information regarding Chinese claims.
A14.40. A map of the Far East produced in 1761 by the distinguished British hydrographer
Thomas Kitchin650 appears to show the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, “Panacot” (Scarborough
Shoal), and “Lowe Rock” (likely a feature in the Spratlys). To the northeast of the Paracels is
a triangular figure labelled “The Lunets”, recognizable as “The Triangles” in Bowen’s map.
The map places three circles with crosses inside of them just off the coast of Palawan,
labelling them “Shelves of Parago [Palawan]”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
“shelf” was commonly used in that era to refer to a “sandbank in the sea … rendering the
water shallow and dangerous”.651 This suggests that these depictions are intended to refer to
the Spratly Islands. Moreover, these features were associated with the island of Palawan by
naming them “Shelves of Parago [Palawan]”. Kitchin’s 1769 map of the Philippines also
includes the “Shelves of Parago” and “Panacot”.652
A14.41. In 1770, by which point Mr. Kitchin had become “Hydrographer to his Majesty”,
he prepared what appears to be a reproduction of his 1761 map.653
A14.42. Other maps from the late 1700s similarly show the South China Sea in detail
without attributing the Sea or its features to China. A 1770 Spanish chart of the part of the
South China Sea between the Philippines and Viet Nam shows various features where one
would expect to find the Spratlys,654 the Paracel Islands as they had been traditionally
depicted, and Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal, and the “Lunetous”. According to the
legend, it also depicts a sailing route between the shoals that a French ship sailed in 1759. A
649
Emanuel Bowen, A New and Accurate Map of the East India Islands, in Maps and Charts of the Modern Part
of Universal History (United Kingdom, 1766). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M129.
650
Thomas Kitchin, A general map of the East Indies and that part of China where the Europeans have any
Settlements or commonly any Trade (United Kingdom, 1761). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M128.
651
“Shelf,” Oxford English Dictionary (accessed 5 Feb. 2015). SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 572.
652
Thomas Kitchin, A New Map of the Philippine Islands (United Kingdom, 1769). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M130.
653
Thomas Kitchin, East Indies (United Kingdom, 1770), available at
654
Carta plana que contiene parte del Archipielago de las Philipinas y … parte de la costa de Cochinchina
[Flat Map that Contains Part of the Archipelago of the Philippines and Part of the Coast of Cochinchina]
(Spain, 1770). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M112.
189
1784 map of the Pacific Ocean depicts those features in the South China Sea,655 as does a
Japanese map from the following year.656 None of these maps indicates Chinese possession or
control of any of the features, let alone of the surrounding sea.
A14.43. A French chart from 1775 has similar detail; it is the earliest that the Philippines
has identified which refers to Scarborough Shoal as such (here, it is “Scarboro”).657 In a 1778
British “Chart of the China Sea and Philippine Islands”,658 Scarborough Shoal is depicted, as
are certain of the Spratly Islands. They are referred to as “Paragua Shoals”, and are linked
with Palawan, as was done in the Kitchin maps. That chart was “composed from an original
drawing” of Captain Robert Carr. In 1794, a “New Chart of the Oriental Seas and Island” was
published in London, showing the Paracels, “Macclesfield Shoal”, Scarborough Shoal, and a
number of scattered features off the coast of Palawan.659 A 1792 map of the East Indies
published in Amsterdam showed those features as well.660 None identifies the South China
Sea or its features with China.
A14.44. At the beginning of the 19th century, a series of charts produced by Aaron
Arrowsmith were published. Arrowsmith’s maps, “more than any others, provide reliable and
valuable historical records of his own time”.661 His 1798 chart of the Pacific Ocean662
655
No title [Map of Pacific Ocean between the coast of California and Mexico and Japan, Philippines, and the
coast of China] (Spain, c. 1784), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/91680984/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015).
656
Sekisui Nagakubo, Sankai yochi zenzu [A complete map of mountain and sea territories] (Japan, 1785?),
657
Mannevillette, Chart of the China Sea (France, 1775). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M53. Another French map,
produced in the 1760s, depicts Scarborough Shoal but does not name it. It also shows the Paracel islands
without connecting them to China.Covens and Mortier, Carte d’une partie de la Chine, les Isles Philippines, de
la Sonde, Moluques, de Papoesie, &c. [Map of a part of China, the Philippine Islands, Sunda, Moluccas,
Papoesie, etc.] (Netherlands, c.1760), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/916139 (accessed 3 Mar.
2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M95. The same is the case for a 1778 French map P. Santini, Gilles Robert de
Vaugondy, Archipel des Indes Oriental (France, 1778), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/5883615
(accessed 4. Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M54.
658
R. Sayer & J. Bennett, A chart of the China Sea and Philippine Islands with the Archipelagos of Felicia and
Soloo (United Kingdom, 1778), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3667413 (accessed 3 Mar.
659
Robert Laurie & James Whittle, A New Chart of the Oriental Seas and Islands with the coasts of the
continent from the Isle of Ceylon to Amoye in China (United Kingdom, 1794). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M133.
660
Jan B. Elwe, Partie de la Nouvelle Grande Carte des Indes Orientales [Part of the New Large Map of the
East Indies] (Netherlands, 1792). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M97.
661
Greg Wood, “Successive States: Aaron Arrowsmith’s Chart of the Pacific Ocean, 1798-1832”, The Globe:
Journal of The Australian and New Zealand Map Society Inc., No. 70 (2012), p. 6. SWSP, Vol. XI, Annex 544.
662
Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1798), available at
190
(reissued in 1826663) and 1800 chart of the East Indies664 depict the South China Sea in
considerable detail. Whereas the 1800 chart depicted the
Paracels as a sail along the Vietnamese coast (albeit in somewhat more detail than earlier
maps), the 1825 chart better approximated its position and shape. Both charts show
Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal, and some of the Spratly features. Neither indicates
any Chinese claim or jurisdiction over the features or the surrounding waters.
A14.45. Another British chart, produced in 1802,665 provides greater detail than the 1800
Arrowsmith chart. It names and describes a number of the Spratly features, and shows
Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal, and provides soundings in a number of places, as
well as routes taken by certain ships.
A14.46. Nineteenth century regional maps do not depict China as having sovereignty or
rights in the South China Sea. Examples include British maps produced in 1811 of the East
India Islands;666 in 1836 of the Eastern Islands of the Malay Archipelago;667 in 1844 of the
“S.E. Peninsula and Malaysia”;668 in 1850 of the “Indian Archipelago”;669 in 1861 of Oceania
and Southeast Asia;670 in 1870 in a nautical chart of the “East India Archipelago”;671 and in
1881 by the Royal Atlas of Modern Geography.672 Each of these maps depicts various
features in the South China Sea without attributing them to China.
663
Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1826). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M139
664
Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the East India Islands exhibiting the several passages between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans (United Kingdom, 1800), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3422795 (accessed 3
Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M135.
665
Robert Laurie & James Whittle, A new chart of the China Sea and its several entrances (United Kingdom,
1802), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3620691 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M136.
666
W. Darton, Jr., The East India Islands (United Kingdom, 1811). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M138.
667
J. & C. Walker, Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, Eastern Islands or Malay Archipelago
(United Kingdom, 1836), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3621228 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015).
668
A.K. Johnston, S.E. Peninsula and Malaysia (United Kingdom, 1844). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M141.
669
John Bartholomew, Indian Archipelago (United Kingdom, 1850), in The Royal illustrated atlas of modern
geography. SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M142.
670
Keith Johnston, Oceania, in Keith Johnston’s General Atlas (United Kingdom, 1861). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M144.
671
James Imray & Son, East India Archipelago, Western Route to China, Chart No. 6 (United Kingdom, 1870).
672
Keith Johnston, Oceania, in Royal Atlas of Modern Geography (United Kingdom, 1881). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M147.
191
A14.47. This is also the case for French maps of the region produced in 1838673 and
1897,674 and for an 1865 Spanish map, which shows the western Pacific and the Indian
Oceans.675 None indicates Chinese claims or jurisdiction.
A14.48. Other maps indicate control of parts of the South China Sea by powers other than
China. An 1834 Vietnamese map, A Complete Map of Unified Viet Nam (大南一統全圖; Đại
Nam Nhất thống toàn đồ)676 shows Viet Nam, with a depiction of a group of features
stretching along its coast, in the shape of a long box with a tail. The northern set is labeled 黄
沙, which transliterates to Hoàng Sa, the Vietnamese term for the Paracel Islands. The
southern set is labelled萬里長沙, which transliterates to Vạn lý Trường Sa, the Vietnamese
term for the Spratly Islands. These both indicate a Vietnamese claim to those features. That
said, another map of Viet Nam produced between 1885 and 1890 does not depict any South
China Sea features other than Hainan in the periphery.677
A14.49. An 1840 French map of Oceania produced in the Atlas Geographique678 shows
colour bands grouping islands and dividing the Pacific into different zones, likely intended to
show the different island groups of the Pacific. It does not link the South China features with
China, although the Spratlys are grouped with insular Southeast Asia, while the Paracels are
not.
A14.50. An 1881 Dutch map of the “Indischen Archipel” depicts the South China Sea with
lines indicating the extent of control of various colonial powers over islands and sea areas.
Some features off of Palawan and what appears to be Scarborough Shoal are included within
Jean Louis Taberd, Annam Đại Quốc Họa Đồ/Tabula Geographica Imperii Anamitici [Map of the Annamite
673
Empire], in Dictionarium latino-anamiticum (France, 1838). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M56; Auguste-Henri
Dufour, Océanie [Oceania] (France, 1838). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M57.
674
E. Giffault, et al., Archipel Asiatique [Asian Archipelago], in Atlas Universel [Universal Atlas] (France,
675
Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta esférica del Océano Indio, Hoja III [Nautical Chart of the Indian
Ocean, Page III] (Spain, 1865), available at http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-rm2237 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP,
Phan Huy Chú, Đại Nam nhất thống toàn đồ [Complete Map of Unified Great Nam] (Vietnam, 1834).
676

677
Author unknown or unavailable, Việt Nam toàn cảnh dư đồ [Complete map of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1885-
1890), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/84696159/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M172.
678
Thunot Duvotenay, Océanie [Oceania] (France, c. 1840), available at
192
the Spanish zone of control, but the rest of the Sea is not associated with any particular
State.679
A14.51. Maps of China during this period depict Chinese territory ending at Hainan. This is
the case with the following British maps: an 1808 map of China,680 an 1851 map of China
and Burma,681 an 1881 Encyclopedia Britannica map,682 and an 1895 map produced by the
London Geographical Institute.683 An 1880 map produced by the London Geographical
Institute depicts the Paracel Islands and Scarborough Shoal without attributing them to China,
showing Hainan as the southernmost point of China.684 Maps of China produced in France in
1880685 and the United States in 1893686 also do not extend southward past Hainan Island.
A14.52. Maps of the Philippines confirm that China’s sovereignty did not extend southward
past Hainan. An 1808 general map of the Philippines, produced by the Spanish Hydrographic
Directorate,687 depicts both Scarborough Shoal, including the route of a ship that apparently
surveyed it, and many of the Spratlys, some with English names. Official Spanish maps and
nautical charts produced later in the century, including those in 1852,688 1865,689 1875,690 and
679
Jacques Eduard Sturler, Overzichts Kaart der Nederlandsche en Vreemde Bezittingen in den Indischen
Archipel [Oversize Map of the Dutch Overseas Possessions in the Indian Archipelago] (Netherlands, 1881).
680
Aaron Arrowsmith, China (United Kingdom, 1808). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M137.
681
J. Rapkin, China and Birmah (United Kingdom, 1851?), in The illustrated atlas and modern history of the
world, geographical, political, commercial and statistical, from Library of Congress,
682
W. & A.K. Johnston, China, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ninth Edition (United Kingdom, 1889). SWSP,
683
George Philip & Son Ltd., China and Tibet, in Harmsworth Atlas and Gazetteer (United Kingdom, 1895).
684
London Geographical Institute, China, Corea and Japan (United Kingdom, 1880). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M146.
685
Conrad Malte-Brun, Empire Chinois et Japon [Chinese Empire and Japan] (France, 1837). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M55.
686
E.F. Fisk, Hunt & Eaton, China, in The Columbian Atlas of the World We Live In (United States, 1893).
687
Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta General del Archipiélago de Filipinas [General Map of the
Archipelago of the Philippines] (Spain, 1808). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M115.
688
Antonio Morata, Islas Filipinas [The Philippine Islands], in Atlas de España y sus posesiones de ultramar
[Atlas of Spain and its Overseas Possessions] (Spain, 1852). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M116.
689
Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta esférica del Océano Indio, Hoja III [Nautical Chart of the Indian
Ocean, Page III] (Spain, 1865), available at http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-rm2237 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP,
193
1897,691 show the South China Sea features in detail. The English names for the features,
with the exception of Scarborough Shoal, are given. None shows China as having claims or
jurisdiction over the sea or its insular features.
A14.53. American maps produced after the United States became the colonial power in the
Philippines are no different in this respect. These include maps produced by the U.S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey in 1899,692 1918,693 1924,694 and 1935,695 and by the U.S. War
Department in 1903,696 which show Scarborough Shoal, but no other South China Sea
features. None indicates Chinese sovereignty or rights. Similarly, a 1933 detailed
hydrographic map of the Philippines produced by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey shows
a number Spratly features and Scarborough Shoal; China is not mentioned.697
A14.54. French maps of Viet Nam from this era also fail to indicate a Chinese claim in
regard to the adjacent waters. Maps produced by the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
of Colonies in 1902698 and 1914,699 and by the Indochina Geographic Service in 1928700 and
690
Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta General (en dos hojas) del Archipiélago Filipino, Hoja I [General
Chart (two pages) of the Philippine Archipelago, Page I] (Spain, 1875). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M118; Spain,
Hydrographic Directorate, Carta General (en dos hojas) del Archipielago Filipino, Hoja II [General Chart (two
pages) of the Philippine Archipelago, Page II] (Spain, 1875). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M119.
691
Chofré & Compa., Carta General del Archipiélago Filipino [General Map of the Philippine Archipelago]
(Spain, 1897). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M120.
692
United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Islas Filipinas, Mapa General [The Philippine Islands, General
Map], in Atlas de Filipinas (United States, 1899). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M160.
693
United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippine Islands (United States, 1918). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M162.
694
United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Contour Map of the Philippine Islands and Waters, USCGS Map
102 (United States, 1924). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M163.
695
United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Commonwealth of the Philippines (United States, 1935). SWSP,
696
United States, War Department, Map of the Philippine Islands (United States, 1903). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M161.
697
United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippine Islands (United States, 1940), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/2011592026 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M165.
698
French Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Colonies, Indo-Chine [Indochina] (France,
699
French Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Colonies, Indo-Chine [Indochina] (France,
700
French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Indochine [Indochina] (France, 1928). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M63.
194
1936,701 show maritime space off the Vietnamese coast, but indicate no Chinese claim to that
area.
A14.55. Some maps do attribute sovereignty over certain maritime features to a State, but
not to China. An early 20th century map of the East India Islands, published in London,
labels Amboyna Cay and Spratly Island as British possessions.702 So does a British 1910 atlas
of Oceania and the Pacific Ocean.703 A 1922 British atlas of the Pacific Ocean indicates zones
of control over the South China Sea; China is not mentioned, although Britain, France, and
the United States, all colonial powers at the time, are given zones.704 This is also done in a
1923 French map; in that case, however, China is given a small zone that ends in the south at
the approximate location of Macclesfield Bank.705 A 1936 Dutch map of the “Pacific Ocean
and Surrounding Countries” shows lines of control pertaining to colonial powers in the South
China Sea. In this case, a “3-dash line” appears to enclose the Spratly and Paracel Islands. It
is coloured blue, as is French Indochina. No feature or the sea is coloured lime green, the
colour assigned to China.706
C. World War II to the Present
A14.56. Cartographic materials from the post-World War II period continue to evidence the
fact that neither the South China Sea nor its insular features were considered to be subject to
Chinese sovereignty or rights.
A14.57. A 1940 map of “The Pacific Area” produced by the U.S. War Department labels
the Paracel Islands as Chinese.707 This was likely intended to counter Japan’s claim in favour
of the Republic of China, which enjoyed U.S. support at the time. No other American maps—
701
French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Indochine [Indochina] (France, 1936). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M64.
702
T. Fisher Unwin, East India Islands with parts of Lower Burma, Siam & Anam (United Kingdom, c. 1900).
703
George Philip & Son, Ltd., The London Geographical Institute, Oceania and Pacific Ocean (United
Kingdom, 1910). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M152.
704
Edward Stanford, Ltd., The Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1922). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M153.
705
French Republic, Colonial Geographic Service, Les Grand Nations dans l’Océan Pacifique [Full Nations of
the Pacific Ocean] (France, 1923). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M62.
706
Topografische dienst in Nederlandsch-Indië [Netherlands Indies Topographic Survey], Kaart van den
Grooten of Stillen Oceaan en Omliggende Landen [Map of the Great or Pacific Ocean and Surrounding
Countries] (Netherlands, 1936). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M99.
707
United States, War Department, The Pacific Area (United States, 1940). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M166.
195
and no contemporaneous Chinese maps—attribute the Paracels to China, including a map of
naval and air facilities in the Western Pacific produced by the U.S. Hydrographic Office in
1941.708 Nor do other non-Chinese maps reflect a Chinese claim to the Paracels. These
include a 1941 British map that indicates that the Japanese then occupied Spratly Island and
Amboyna Cay.709
A14.58. Britain produced maps showing the region in 1942710 and 1953,711 which do not
indicate Chinese sovereignty or rights. Nor does a 1959 map of North Borneo, which depicts
the Colony’s administrative boundaries.712 The same is true concerning a 1962 map of
Brunei.713
A14.59. France, which was the colonial power in Viet Nam, produced general maps of its
colony, French Indochina in 1946,714 1948715 and 1953.716 These all identify some of the
Paracel Islands, labelling them with French names. They do not indicate Chinese sovereignty
or rights with respect to the features or surrounding maritime area.
A14.60. With regard to Japanese maps, a 1940 “Detailed Map of the South Seas” labels the
Spratly features, which it identifies as 新南群島 (shinnan gunto), the Japanese name for the
Spratly Islands. It identifies them as belonging to 大日本 (dai nippon), the Japanese Empire.
The features are labelled in Japanese with Japanese names and are enclosed in a polygon.
Another 1940 map labels the features in Japanese. A 1941 large-scale chart produced by the
708
United States, Hydrographic Office, Pacific Ocean, Naval and Air Facilities in the Western Pacific (United
States, 1941). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M167.
709
George Philip & Son, Ltd., The London Geographical Institute, Philip’s War Map of the Far East (United
Kingdom, 1941). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M154.
710
United Kingdom, War Office, North Borneo (United Kingdom, 1942). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M155.
711
Federation of Malaya, Survey Department, Sarawak and Brunei (United Kingdom, 1953). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M156.
712
United Kingdom, Directorate of Overseas Surveys, North Borneo (United Kingdom, 1959). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M157.
713
United Kingdom, War Office and Air Ministry, Directorate Surveys, Brunei (United Kingdom, 1962).
714
French Republic, National Geographic Institute, Carte Générale de l’Indochine Française [General Map of
French Indochina] (France, 1946). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M65.
715
French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Carte Générale de l’Indochine Française [General Map of
716
French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Carte Générale de l’Indochine Française [General Map of
196
Japan Hydrographic Office labels the features in Japanese and English.717 A 1943 Japanese
map of the Philippines shows Spratly features off the coast of Palawan enclosed by three grey
dashes, indicating possession, likely by Japan.718
A14.61. American maps of the Philippines produced during World War II do not show
Chinese jurisdiction over any of the adjacent waters or features. A 1944 set of maps by the
Army Mapping Service shows Scarborough Shoal but no Spratly features.719 A 1949 map
produced by the Army Mapping Service does show those features, along with the Treaty of
Paris line.720
A14.62. Maps published post-independence by the South China Sea’s littoral States do not
indicate that China possessed sovereignty or sovereign rights in the South China Sea. These
include:
• maps produced by the Philippine Coast and Geodetic Survey in 1950,721 1957,722
1960,723 1974,724 and 1984,725 and by the Philippine National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority in 2006726;
• a 1958 general map of “Malaya and Adjacent Territories” produced by the

Malayan Surveyor General,727 a 1963 map from same (then Malaysian) source,728
717
Japanese Hydrographic Office, Taiheiyo [Pacific Ocean] (Japan, 1941). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M76.
718
Toseisha, Hyojun daitoa bunzu [Separate Map of Standard Greater East Asia - the Philippines] (Japan,
719
United States, Army Map Service, Philippines (North) (United States, 1943). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M168;
United States, Army Map Service, Philippines (South) (United States, 1943). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M169.
720
United States, Army Map Service, Philippine Islands (United States, 1949). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M170.
721
Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Republic of the Philippines (Philippines, 1950). SWSP,
722
Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Republic of the Philippines (Philippines, 1957). SWSP,
723
Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippines, PCGS Map 100 (Philippines, 1960). SWSP,
Vol. VI, Annex M102; Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Republic of the Philippines
(Philippines, 1960). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M103.
724
Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippines (Philippines, 1974, 2nd ed.). SWSP, Vol. VI,
Annex M105.
725
Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Administrative Map, Republic of the Philippines, PCGS
Map 201 (Philippines, 1984, 1st ed.). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M106.
726
Philippines National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), Philippines, NAMRIA Map
170 (1st ed., Philippines, 2006). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M107.
727
Federation of Malaya, Survey Department, Malaya (Malaysia, 1958). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M78.
728
Federation of Malaya, Survey Department, Malaysia (Malaysia, 1963). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M79.
197
maps from 1973,729 1976,730 and 1996731 by the Malaysian Directorate of National
Mapping, and two maps produced in 1979 by the same source, which show the
territorial sea and continental shelf claimed by Malaysia732;
• two mid-century Indonesian maps that show the southern reaches of the South
China Sea but do not include the bottom dashes of the nine-dash line,733 as well as
one produced in 2002734;
• maps published by Viet Nam in 1960,735 1964,736 1976,737 1989,738 and 1998739;
and
• maps from 1987740 and 2003741 showing the territorial waters of Brunei, and a
2011 official map of Brunei.742
729
Malaysia Jabatanarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping], Map of Malaysia
(Malaysia, 1973). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M80.
730
Malaysia Jabatanarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping], Malaysia (Malaysia,
731
Malaysia Jabatanarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping], Malaysia (Malaysia,
732
Diterbitkan oleh Pengarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping], “Sheet 1”, in
Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia [Map Showing Territorial Waters and
Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia] (Malaysia, 1979). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M82; Diterbitkan oleh
Pengarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping], “Sheet 2”, in Peta Menunjukkan
Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia [Map Showing Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf
Boundaries of Malaysia] (Malaysia, 1979). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M83.
733
Penerbit Fasco [Fasco Publisher], Indonesia (Indonesia, c. 1950). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M69; Universal,
Indonesia (Indonesia, c. 1960). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M70.
734
Bakosurtanal [Indonesia Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping], Batas negara kesatuan Republik
Indonesia [Limit of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia] (Indonesia, 2002). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M71.
735
Tổng Nha điển địa [General Department of Land Administration], Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa [Republic of
Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1960). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M173; Tổng Nha điền địa [General Department of Land
Administration], Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa, Vị-Trí Các Khu-Trù-Mật [Republic of Vietnam, Map of Agroville]
(Vietnam, 1960). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M174.
736
Tổng Nha Điến-Địa Phát-Hành, Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa [Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1964). SWSP, Vol.
VI, Annex M175.
737
Cục đo đạc và bản đồ Việt Nam [Department of Surveying and Mapping of Vietnam], Bản đồ Hành chính
Việt Nam [Administrative map of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1976). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M176.
738
Cục đo đạc và bản đồ Việt Nam [Department of Surveying and Mapping of Vietnam], Cộng hòa xã hội chủ
nghĩa Việt Nam [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1989). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M177.
Tổng cục quản lý đất đai [General Department of Land Administration], Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt
739
Nam [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1998). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M178.
740
Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General, Map showing territorial waters of Brunei Darussalam (Brunei, 1987).
741
Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General, Map showing the limits of the territorial sea, continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone of Brunei Darussalam (Brunei, 2003). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex M22.
198
III. Oil & Gas Concession Maps
A14.63. In its May 2009 Notes Verbales to the U.N. Secretary General, China claimed
“sovereign rights and jurisdiction … [to the] seabed and subsoil” of the waters enclosed by
the nine-dash line.743 The Deputy Director of China’s National Institute for South China Sea
Studies, Mr. Liu Feng, explained in August 2012 that China claims rights to oil and gas
extraction in “all the waters within the nine-dash line”.744
A14.64. In order to assist the Tribunal in assessing China’s claim over the seabed and
subsoil, the Philippines submits maps showing the location of the various littoral States’
offshore oil and gas fields and/or concessions beginning in the 1970s. These maps
demonstrate that States other than China have long claimed rights to the seabed and subsoil
within China’s nine-dash line. They also show that none of the States offering such blocks
recognized China’s alleged sovereign or historic rights to the seabed.
A14.65. While it is difficult to find evidence of China’s offshore offerings prior to the
1980s, the Philippines submits two privately-produced maps of offshore areas to demonstrate
that, at that point, China had not offered areas far from its mainland coast for oil or gas
exploration. (This is in contrast to the blocks offered by the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation in 2012, which were all within, or at least partially within, 200 M of Viet Nam’s
coast.745) For example, a 1984 map published by the Asian Research Service that purports to
show “China’s Hydrocarbon Potential” depicts contract areas no further south than the sea
immediately surrounding Hainan.746 A map produced the following year by Petroleum News
similarly indicates that China had not opened up for exploration or exploitation any areas
beyond those immediately south of Hainan (in the Yinggehai Basin).747
742
Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General, Negara Brunei Darussalam (Brunei, 2011). SWSP, Vol. VI, Annex
M23.
743
Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 191; Note
Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, No. CML/18/2009 (7 May 2009). MP, Vol. VI, Annex 192.
744
Jane Perlez, “China Asserts Sea Claim with Politics and Ships”, New York Times (11 Aug. 2012), p. 3. MP,
Vol. X, Annex 320
745
746
Asian Research Service, China’s Hydrocarbon Potential (1984). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M182.
747
Bai Yiliang, Oil and Gas Map of China (1985). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M183.
199
A14.66. Maps showing other States’ blocks demonstrate that, before 2009, those States did
not understand China to claim exclusive rights to the seabed within the nine-dash line, or that
they rejected China’s claim by offering for exploration and exploitation areas within the line
that they considered to be part of their own continental shelf. These maps include:
• Maps produced by private companies in 1981,748 1989,749 1990,7501993,751

1996,752 1997,753 and 2004, 754
and by the Philippine Department of Energy in
1994,755 showing Philippine blocks along the west coast of Palawan and in the
area where China has sought to interfere with the Philippines’ oil exploration
activities756;
• Maps produced in by private companies in 1982,757 1990,758 1996,759 and 2003,760

showing Vietnamese blocks off of the southeast coast of Viet Nam;
• Maps produced in 1977 by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,761 and by private
companies in 1980,762 1986,763 1998764 and 2004,765 showing Malaysian blocks
along its northern Borneo and eastern peninsular coasts; and
748
Petroconsultants, S.A., Philippines (1981). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M203.
749
750
751
752
753
754
IHS Energy, Philippines: General (2004). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M210.
755
Philippines Department of Energy, Consolidated Well Location Map (1994). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M207.
756
757
Petroconsultants, S.A., Vietnam (1982). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M212.
758
Petroconsultants, S.A., Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos (1990). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M213.
759
Petroconsultants, S.A., Vietnam (1996). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M214.
760
IHS Energy, Vietnam: Offshore South Vietnam (2003). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M215.
761
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Malaysia: Oil and Gas Prospects (1977). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M194.
762
Petroconsultants, S.A., Federation of Malaysia (Eastern Malaysia) (1980). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M195.
763
Petroconsultants, S.A., Malaysia: Eastern Sheet (1986). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M197.
764
Petroconsultants, S.A., Malaysia: General (1998). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M198.
765
IHS Energy, East Malaysia, Sabah / Sarawak (2004). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M199.
200
• Maps produced in 1977,766 1986,767 and 2002768 by the Indonesian Director of Oil
and Gas, as well as a privately-produced map from 1997,769 showing Indonesian
blocks along its northern coast.
A14.67. Even after China’s 2009 Notes Verbales, other coastal States continued to maintain
offerings in areas located within the nine-dash line. A 2011 map of the Asia Pacific region
produced by Quest Offshore Resources, Inc., for example, shows that, as of that date, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Viet Nam all maintained blocks in areas
encompassed by China’s claim.770
A14.68. The oil and gas concessions maps thus indicate that none of the other South China
Sea littoral States recognized or accepted China’s claim to sovereign or historic rights to the
seabed and subsoil within the nine-dash line. To the contrary, they show that these States
have claimed and offered for contract their own areas within that line.
Conclusion
A14.69. In short, the cartographic evidence confirms that, historically, China did not claim
or possess sovereignty or sovereign rights in the South China Sea or over any of its insular
features south of Hainan Island, with the possible exception of its contested (by Viet Nam,
preceded by France) claim to the Paracels, and that its claims in regard to other insular
features are of recent vintage, dating back no farther than 1947. China’s claim of sovereignty
or sovereign rights over the maritime areas within its dashed line is of even more recent
heritage; the cartographic evidence confirms that it was made for the first time in 2009.
766
Indonesian Direktorat Minyak dan Gas Bumi (DMGB), Rusmadi, Peta situasi wilayah kerja pertambangan
minyak dan gas bumi Indonesia (1977). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M187.
767
Indonesian Direktorat Minyak dan Gas Bumi (DMGB), Rusmadi, Peta situasi wilayah kerja pertambangan
minyak dan gas bumi Indonesia (1986). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M189.
768
Indonesian Direktorat Jenderal Minyak dan Gas Bumi, Peta wilayah kerja perminyakan Indonesia (2002).
SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M192.
769
Petroconsultants, S.A., Indonesia (1997). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M190.
770
Quest Offshore Resources, Deloitte Petroleum Services, Asia Pacific (2011). SWSP, Vol. VII, Annex M220.
201
FIGURES
Figure S8.1 Submissions with Respect to a Continental Shelf following page 38

Beyond 200 M by Vietnam and Malaysia
Figure S8.2 The Philippines’ Forthcoming Submission with following Figure S8.1
Respect to a Continental Shelf Beyond 200 M
Figure S8.3 China’s Potential Submissions with Respect to a following page 40

Continental Shelf Beyond 200 M in the Northern
Sector
Figure S8.4 Submissions and Potential Submissions with following Figure S8.3
Respect to a Continental Shelf Beyond 200 M in
the South China Sea
Figure S12.1 Viet Nam-Malaysia Joint Submission Area page 60

(annotated)
Figure S12.2 Annotated Excerpt of Malaysia’s Map (1979) page 61
Figure S13.1 Bohai Sea following page 68
Figure S13.2 Qiongzhou Strait following page 72

LIST OF ANNEXES
VOLUME III
EXHIBITS
GEOGRAPHICAL MATERIALS
Annex 344 United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, Admiralty Sailing Directions: China Sea Pilot
(NP30), Vol. 1 (5th ed., 2001)
Annex 232(bis) Navigation Guarantee Department of the Chinese Navy Headquarters, China Sailing
Directions: South China Sea (A103) (2011)
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Annex 345 Republic of the Philippines, Municipality of Kalayaan, “The First 100 Days:
Accomplishment Report of Mayor Eugenio B. Bito-Onon, Jr.”
Annex 346 Republic of the Philippines, Municipality of Kalayaan, Brochure: Municipality of Kalayaan,
Palawan, Philippines
Annex 347 Republic of the Philippines, Naval Defense Forces, Philippine Ports and Harbors, Special
Edition: Kalayaan Island Group (Mar. 1988)
Annex 92(bis) Republic of the Philippines, Municipality of Kalayaan, The Comprehensive Development
Plan 2010-2016 (5 Apr. 2013)
Annex 348 Republic of the Philippines, Municipality of Kalayaan, “Historical Background”, available
at http://kalayaanpalawan.gov.ph/about_the_municipality/historical_background.html
(accessed 2 Feb. 2015)
Annex 349 Letter from Rear Adm. Roberto B. Enriquez, Philippines Navy, to Asst. Secretary Benito B.
Valeriano, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines (27 Feb. 2015)
Annex 350 Republic of the Philippines, Municipality of Kalayaan, “Municipal Background”, available
at http://www.kalayaanpalawan.gov.ph/about_the_municipality/municipal_background.
html (accessed 2 Mar. 2015)
CHINESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Annex 351 Letter from Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of China to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of China (9 Oct. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South
China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, Doc. No. III(1):009 (Republic of
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995)
THIRD-PARTY GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Annex 352 French Republic, Governor of Cochin China, Decree (21 Dec. 1933), reprinted in Monique
Chemillier-Gendreau, Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands
Annex 353 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel)
and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands (1975)
THIRD-PARTY GOVERNMENT ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

Annex 354 United Kingdom, Foreign Office, List of Islands and Reefs in the Area Claimed by France
(undated)
Annex 355 United Kingdom, Draft Memorandum (undated)
Annex 356 United Kingdom, Draft Memorandum (undated)
Annex 357 Memorandum from Minister of Foreign Affairs, French Republic, to French Embassies in
London, Washington, Tokyo, The Hague and Manila (17 Apr. 1929)
Annex 358 French Republic, Indochina Hydrographic Mission, Procès-Verbal (13 Apr. 1930)
Annex 359 Memorandum from the Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office, United Kingdom (10 Nov.
1931)
Annex 360 Letter from Consul General of the United Kingdom, Saigon, to Secretary of State for
Foreign Affiars, United Kingdom, No. W 4148/178/17 (9 Mar. 1932)
Annex 361 Letter from Foreign Office, United Kingdom, to the Law Officers of the Crown, United
Kingdom (29 July 1932)
Annex 362 Letter from Secretary of the Admiralty, United Kingdom, to Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, United Kingdom, No. M.02075/32 (14 Nov. 1932)
Annex 363 Letter from Secretary of the Admiralty, United Kingdom, to Undersecretary of State,
Foreign Office, United Kingdom (8 Feb. 1933)
Annex 364 Memorandum from the Secretary of the Admiralty, United Kingdom, to Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom (23 Feb. 1933)
Annex 368 French Republic, Indochina Hydrographic Mission, Procès-Verbal of Taking Possession of
Thi-Tu Island (12 Apr. 1933)
Annex 369 Draft Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic to the
Embassies of the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States in Paris (17 July 1933)
Annex 370 Memorandum from Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “Herald”, to Commander-in-Chief,

China Station, British Royal Navy (3 May 1937)
Annex 371 United Kingdom, Hydrographer, “Probable Utility of Features as Landing Grounds for
Air-Craft” (28 Oct. 1937)
Annex 372 Memorandum to Admiralty, United Kingdom (12 Nov. 1937)
Annex 373 Draft Letter from Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom, to
Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence, United Kingdom, No. 3319/956/61 (Apr.
1938)
Annex 374 W.C. Jenk., H.M.S. Herald, United Kingdom, Report on Suitability of Islands in China Sea
for Landing Grounds (18 Apr. 1938)
Annex 375 Message from H.M.S. “Herald”, United Kingdom, to Commander-in-Chief, China Station,
British Royal Navy (25 Apr. 1938)
Annex 376 Message from British Admiralty, to H.M.S. “Herald”, United Kingdom, and Commander-
in-Chief, China Station, British Royal Navy (26 April 1938)
Annex 377 Message from H.M.S. “Herald”, United Kingdom, to British Admiralty (27 Apr. 1938)
Annex 378 United Kingdom, Foreign Office, “Islands in the South China Sea” (27 April 1938)
Annex 379 Memorandum from H.M.S. Herald, United Kingdom, to British Admiralty (27 Apr. 1938)
Annex 380 United Kingdom, Aide-Mémoire, No. 172/15G/38 (6 Sept. 1938)
Annex 381 Memorandum from Japan to the United States (31 Mar. 1939)
Annex 382 Telegram from Embassy of the United States in Paris to the Department of State of the
United States (5 Apr. 1939)
Annex 383 Memorandum from Consul-General of the Netherlands in Beijing to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, No. 2928/G-913/513 (4 Sept. 1951)
Annex 384 Telegram Secretary of State for the Colonies, United Kingdom, to Officer Administering
the Government of Hong Kong (14 Jan. 1956)
Annex 385 Record of Meeting (United States National Archives Document) (19 Sept. 1956)
VOLUME IV
EXHIBITS
HISTORIC PUBLICATIONS
Annex 386 John Purdy, The Oriental Navigator: Directions for Sailing to, from, and upon the coasts of,
the East-Indies, China, Australia, &c. (3rd ed., 1816)
Annex 387 James Horsburgh, India Directory, or Directions for Sailing to and From the East Indies, Vol.
2 (1827)
Annex 388 “Navigation in the China Sea”, Nautical Magazine and Naval Chronicle for 1867 (21 Sept.
1867)
Annex 389 United Kingdom, Hydrographic Department, The China Sea Directory, Vol. II (1879)
Annex 390 Alexander George Findlay, A Directory for the Navigation of the Indian Archipelago, and
the Coast of China (3rd ed., 1889)
Annex 391 A. Günther et al., The Annals and Magazine of Natural History, Vol. VI, 6th Series (1890)
Annex 392 United Kingdom, Hydrographic Department, The China Sea Directory, Vol. II (4th ed.,
1901)
Annex 393 United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, China Sea Directory, Vol. II (5th ed., 1906)
Annex 394 U.S. Hydrographic Office, Asiatic Pilot: The Shores of the China Sea from Singapore Strait to
and including Hongkong, Vol. IV (1915)
Annex 395 U.S. Hydrographic Office, Asiatic Pilot: Sunda Straight and the Southern Approaches to
China Sea with West and North Coasts of Borneo and Off-Lying Dangers, Vol. V (1915)
Annex 396 United Kingdom, Hydrographic Department, China Sea Pilot, Vol. II (1st ed., 1936)
Annex 397 United Kingdom, Hydrographic Department, China Sea Pilot, Vol. I (1st ed., 1937)
NEWSPAPER REPORTS
Annex 398 “East Sea: Coming to Da Thi Island (Petley Reef), to face Chinese ships,” BDN
Annex 399 “Feu de Joie pour le Quatorze Juillet”, Peiping Chronicle (15 July 1933)
Annex 400 [Untitled Article], New York Times (30 July 1933)
Annex 401 P.J. Philip, “Barren Coral Isles in Pacific Cause International Dispute”, New York Times (27
Aug. 1933)
Annex 402 “France’s Tiny New Island Empire”, New York Times (13 Aug. 1933)
Annex 403 “Pacific Isles Under Dispute: Groups in the Far East have Often been Cause of
Controversies”, New York Times (3 Sept. 1933)
Annex 404 “The Texts of the Day’s Communiques on the Fighting in Various War Zones”, New York
Times (4 May 1945)
Annex 405 Lindesay Parrott, “Australians Widen Borneo Grip; Americans Crash Way into Davao”,
New York Times (4 May 1945)
Annex 406 [Untitled Article], New York Times (24 Mar. 1949)
Annex 407 “Chinese Reds Said to Join Viet-Minh”, New York Times (25 Mar. 1949)
Annex 408 “South Vietnam Warned by Red China on Islands”, New York Times (31 Aug. 1956)
Annex 409 “Manila Asks Taiwan’s Troops to Quit South China Sea Island”, New York Times (11 July
1971)
Annex 410 “Tiny Isles in Pacific Make Big Waves”, New York Times (12 July 1971)
Annex 411 “Saigon Rejects Peking’s Claim to the Spratly Islands”, New York Times (6 Feb. 1974)
Annex 412 Fox Butterfield, “Spratly Islands Causing Concern: Analysts Believe Actions by 4 Asian
Countries Could Lead to Confusion”, New York Times (25 Jan. 1976)
Annex 413 Fox Butterfield, “Philippines is Bolstering its Position in Islands that are also Claimed by
Peking, Taipei and Hanoi”, New York Times (16 Mar. 1978)
Annex 414 “Spratlys a Haven for Illegal Poachers-Mercado”, Philippines Headline News Online (2 Dec.
1998)
Annex 415 “Green vegetables bring salty taste of the sea”, Tuoitre (21 Jan. 2008)
Annex 416 J. M. Glionna, “Squatters in paradise say it’s job from hell”, Los Angeles Times (26 July
2009)
Annex 417 David Jude Sta Ana, “Vietnam beefs up military garrisons in Spratlys”, The Philippine Star
(26 May 2011)
Annex 418 Cynthia D. Balana, “Philippines behind other Spratlys claimants in building defensive
structures”, Philippine Daily Enquirer (16 June 2011)
Annex 419 “New generation birth on uninhabitable islands”, Saigon-GP Daily (21 June 2011)
Annex 420 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Clash of sovereignties in the Spratlys”, The Philippine Star (30 June
2011)
Annex 421 “Mindanao lawmakers propose Spratlys task force”, Sun Star (19 July 2011)
Annex 422 Jaime Laude, “Navy Seabeas constructing ‘starshell’ on Patag Island”, The Philippine Star
(31 July 2011)
Annex 423 Abigail Kwok, “LAST OUTPOST: Soldiers endure loneliness, spartan living to guard
remote islands in Spratlys”, Interaksyon (25 Nov. 2012)
Annex 424 “Families of Vietnamese martyrs to visit Truong Sa for memorial”, Thanh Nien News (26
Jan. 2013)
Annex 425 “Deadly fight against Chinese for Gac Ma Reef remembered”, Thanh Nien News (17 Mar.
2013)
Annex 426 “Efforts to develop Trường Sa [Spratly Islands]”, Bao Tin Tuc (27 Apr. 2013)
Annex 427 Marc Jason Cayabyab, “PHL neglected its territories in West PHL sea - national security
analyst”, GMA News (28 May 2013)
Annex 428 Le Quang Minh, “Spratly Islands lighthouse job no sinecure”, Viet Nam News (11 June
2013)
Annex 429 “Sinh Ton dong Island - Vietnam’s watchtower”, Voice of Vietnam (11 July 2013)
Annex 430 Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark And Minnow”, New York Times (17 Oct. 2013)
Annex 431 C. Thayer, “What If China Did Invade Pag-asa Island?”, The Diplomat (16 Jan. 2014)
Annex 432 E. Campbell, “Reef Madness”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (20 May 2014)
Annex 433 “As Taiwan Beefs up Prized South China Sea outpost, Barely a Peep from China”, New York
Times (25 May 2014)
Annex 434 “Greening Trường Sa [Spratly Islands]”, Tuoitre Online (4 June 2014)
Annex 435 “PH won’t abandon Pagasa Island”, ABS-CBN News (6 June 2014)
Annex 436 Nikko Dizon, “Photos confirm China reclamation; experts hit reef degradation in
Spratlys”, Philippine Daily Enquirer (7 June 2014)
Annex 437 “Airstrip repair on Pagasa island ‘a go’ despite China protest - PAF”, GMA News Online (18
June 2014)
Annex 438 “2 monuments symbolizing Vietnam’s sovereignty over Spratlys named national relics”,
Thanh Nien News (18 June 2014)
Annex 439 Tran Dang, “Ancient Vietnamese artifacts found in Spratlys”, Thanh Nien Daily (28 Sept.
2014)
Annex 440 “South China Sea rivals compared by Global Times”, Want China Times (19 Dec. 2014)
Annex 441 J. Laude, “Strong waves prevent delivery of goods to troops in Spratlys”, The Philippine Star
(25 Dec. 2014)
Annex 442 J. Pan & L. Tien-pin, “Threat to Spratlys outposts ‘growing’”, Taipei Times (26 Dec. 2014)
VOLUME V
EXHIBITS
ACADEMIC ARTICLES, BOOK EXCERPTS AND REPORTS

Annex 246(bis) Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (1982)
Annex 443 Jorge R. Coquia, “Maritime Boundary Problems in the South China Sea”, University of
British Columbia Law Review, Vol. 24 (1990)
Annex 444 Steven Kuan-tsyh Yu, “Who Owns the Paracels and Spratlys? - An Evaluation of the
Nature and Legal Basis of the Conflicting Territorial Claims”, Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of
International Law & Affairs, Vol. 9 (1989-1990)
Annex 445 D. J. Dzurek, “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s on First?”, IBRU Maritime Briefing, Vol.
2, No. 1 (1996)
Annex 446 Hal Olson, “Marine Traffic in the South China Sea”, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 12 (1996)
Annex 447 Hal Olson, “Marine Traffic in the South China Sea”, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 12 (1996);
Intentionally Omitted
Annex 448 M. Valencia, et al., Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (1997)
Annex 449 Amitav Acharya, “Containment, Engagement or Counter-Dominance?: Malaysia’s

response to the rise of China”, in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power
(A. I. Johnston & R. S. Ross, eds., 1999)
Annex 450 Yann-huei Song, “United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A Study
of Ocean Law and Politics”, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 1 (2002)
Annex 451 D.G. Wiencek & J.C. Baker, “Security Risks of a South China Sea Conflict”, in Cooperative
Monitoring in the South China Sea: Satellite Imagery, Confidence-building Measures, and the
Spratly Island Disputes (J. C. Baker & D. G. Wiencek, eds., 2002)
Annex 452 Vivian L. Forbes,”Geographical Change: Direction and Continuing Issues”, in Southeast
Asia Transformed: A Geography of Change (Chia Lin Sien, ed. 2003)
Annex 453 Bruce Elleman, “Maritime territorial disputes and their impact on maritime strategy:
A historical perspective”, in Security and International Politics in the South China Sea:
Towards a cooperative management regime (S. Bateman and R. Emmers, eds., 2009)
Annex 454 Isagani de Castro, Jr., “Bilateralism and Multilaterlism in Malaysia-Philippines Relations”,
in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism , in
International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism (N.
Ganesan & R. Amer, eds., 2010)
Annex 455 Zhang Liangfu, Let the History Tell the Future: The Chronicle of a Century of China’s
Jurisdiction over South China Sea Islands (2011)
Annex 456 Gregory B. Poling, “Arguing Over Blocks: Do China and the Philippines both Have a
Claim?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (16 Apr. 2012)
Annex 457 Dallen J. Timothy, “Tourism, war, and political instability: territorial and religious
perspectives”, in Tourism and War (R. Butler & W. Suntikul, eds., 2013)
Annex 458 A. Erickson & A. Strange, “Pandora’s Sandbox”, Foreign Affairs (13 July 2014)
Annex 459 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (2014)
Annex 460 Johan Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia’s Approach to Cooperation in the South China Sea”, in
Non-Traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea: Shaping a New Framework for
Cooperation (S. Wu & K. Zou, eds., 2014)
MISCELLANEOUS
Annex 461 Robert Beckman, “The Philippines v. China Case and the South China Sea Disputes”, Asia
Society / LKY SPP Conference on the South China Sea (13-15 Mar. 2013)
Annex 462 “China Expands Woody Island”, Open Source Imagery & Geospatial Intelligence (29 Aug.
2014)
Annex 463 Russ Rowlett, “Lighthouses of the Spratly Islands” available at https://www.unc.
edu/~rowlett/lighthouse/spr.htm (accessed 11 Feb. 2015)
Annex 464 “Layang - Layang Island”, Sabah Tourist & Travel Guide, available at http://sabah.
attractionsinmalaysia.com/Layang-layang-Island.php (accessed 19 Feb. 2015)
Annex 465 “Spratly Islands Conflicting Claims”, Global Security, available at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-conflict.htm (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
VOLUME VIII
EXHIBITS
ARBITRAL DOCUMENTS
Annex 466 Letter from Francis H. Jardeleza, Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines, to
Judith Levine, Registrar, Permanent Court of Arbitration (30 July 2014)
Annex 467 People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of
China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines (7 Dec. 2014)
Annex 468 Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist
Republic of Viet Nam Transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal in the Proceedings Between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (14 Dec. 2014)
Annex 469 Letter from Francis H. Jardeleza, Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines, to
Judith Levine, Registrar, Permanent Court of Arbitration (26 Jan. 2015)
Annex 470 Letter from H.E. Ambassador Chen Xu, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in The
Hague, to H.E. Judge Thomas A. Mensah (6 Feb. 2015)
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Annex 471 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Asia and Pacific Affairs
of the Republic of the Philippines to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines (21 Dec. 1999)
CHINESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Annex 472 Republic of China, Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (3 Dec. 1911)
Annex 473 Republic of China, Constitution of the Republic of China (10 Oct. 1923)
Annex 474 Republic of China, Provisional Constitution of the Political Tutelage Period (1 June 1931)
Annex 475 Republic of China, National Defense Committee Secretariat, Statement of Opinions Based
on Research of Military Relevance and Methods Regarding the Nine French-Occupied Islands
(1 Sept. 1933), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(1):072 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995)
Annex 476 Republic of China, Draft Constitution of the Republic of China (5 May 1936)
Annex 477 Republic of China, Republican Government Military Commission, Letter Regarding the
Current Conditions on Xisha Islands and Enhancement of Construction and Management
(31 Aug. 1937), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(1):072 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Research & Planning Committee, ed.) (1995)
Annex 478 Letter from Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China to the Ministry of
Interior and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of China (20 Sept. 1946), reprinted
in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2,
Doc. No. III(1):006 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning
Committee, ed.) (1995)
Annex 479 Republic of China, Executive Yuan [Branch], Order (29 Sept. 1946), reprinted in Archival
Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, Doc.
No. III(1):007 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research & Planning
Committee, ed.) (1995)
Annex 480 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China to the Ministry of the
Interior of the Republic of China (1 Oct. 1946), reprinted in rchival Compilation on South
Annex 481 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China to the Ministry of
Interior of the Republic of China (1 Oct. 1946), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South
Annex 482 Republic of China, Constitution of the Republic of China (1 Jan. 1947)
Annex 483 Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of China in Paris to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of China (20 Jan. 1947), reprinted in Archival Compilation on South
China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(2):199 (Republic of
Annex 484 Telegram from Special Agent Office of the Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
China in Pingjin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (7 Feb. 1947),
reprinted in Archival Compilation on South China Sea Islands by Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 1, Doc. No. II(2):248 (Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research
& Planning Committee, ed.) (1995)
Annex 485 Fu Zhu, Regarding the Issue of Territorial Waters of China (1959)
Annex 486 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United
Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (14 May 1979), reprinted in
U.N. General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Report of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
A/34/235 (14 May 1979) (with attachment)
Annex 487 “May 4, 1979 Speech by Han Nianlong, Head of the Government Delegation of China,
at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Sino-Vietnamese Negotiations at the Vice-Foreign
Minister Level”, reprinted in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 21 (25 May 1979)
Annex 488 Chen Tiqiang and Zhang Hongzeng, “The Issue of Delimiting the Beibu Gulf Sea --
Rebuttal of Vietnamese Errors from the Perspective of International Law”, Guangming
Daily (2 Dec. 1980)
Annex 489 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Spokesman’s Statement of 28
November 1982 (28 Nov. 1982), reprinted in Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 1 (1983)
Annex 490 People’s Republic of China, Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China
on the baselines of the territorial sea (15 May 1996)
Annex 491 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Spokesperson’s Comment
on China-Asean Consultation” (30 Aug. 2000)
Annex 492 Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “The President Attended the
Opening Ceremony for ‘Republic of China Southern Historical Exhibition’” (1 Sept. 2014)
CHINESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS (TAIWAN AUTHORITIES)

Annex 493 Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “Opening Ceremony for the
Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China”,
YouTube Video (remarks of President Ma Wing-jeou begin at 47:10) (1 Sept. 2014),
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h89dhJWqViw (accessed 27 Jan. 2015)
Annex 494 Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “Excerpts from Remarks at
Opening Ceremony for the Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories
of the Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014), available at http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.
aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514 (accessed 27 Jan. 2015)
Annex 495 Transcript of Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, President Ma
Ying-jeou, “Excerpts from Remarks at Opening Ceremony for the Exhibition of Historical
Archives on the Southern Territories of the Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=33125&rmid=514 (accessed
27 Jan. 2015)
Annex 496 Office of the President of the Taiwan Authority of China, “President Ma attends opening
ceremonies of Exhibition of Historical Archives on the Southern Territories of the
Republic of China” (1 Sept. 2014), available at http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx
?tabid=491&itemid=33215&rmid=2355 (accessed 25 Feb. 2015)
Annex 497 Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Malaysia, “President Ma vows Taiwan will play
important role in South China Sea talks” (2 Sept. 2014)
ASEAN DOCUMENTS
Annex 498 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Report of the Third Meeting of the Working Group
of ASEAN-China Senior Official Consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea (11 Oct. 2000)
Annex 499 Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, National Boundary Commission, “On Viet Nam’s
Sovereignty over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes”, in Paracel & Spratly Islands
Belong to Viet Nam: Historical Evidence and Legal Grounds
VOLUME IX
EXHIBITS

Annex 500 Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Statement by the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Viet Nam (12 Nov. 1982), reprinted in Law of
the Sea Bulletin, No. 1 (1983)
Annex 501 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, “Straight Baseline Claim: China”, Limits in the Seas, No. 117 (9 July 1996)
Annex 502 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Spratly Islands”, CIA World Factbook (28 May
2014)
THIRD-PARTY GOVERNMENT ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS

Annex 503 Treaty between United Kingdom and the Netherlands, respecting Territory and
Commerce in the East Indies (17 Mar. 1824), reprinted in The Edinburgh Annual Register,
for 1824, Vol. 17, Parts 1-3 (1825)
Annex 504 Note Verbale from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of France, to the Chinese Legation
to Paris (4 Jan. 1932)
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES
Annex 505 Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the People’s Republic
of China, Joint Statement: Framework of Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century
(16 May 2000)
of China, Joint Statement: 3rd Philippines-China Experts’ Group Meeting on Confidence-
Building Measures, Manila, 3-4 April 2001 (4 Apr. 2001)
of China, Joint Statement (1 Sept. 2011)
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN STATES AND THE COMMISSION ON
THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
Annex 508 Republic of the Philippines, A Partial Submission of Data and Information on the Outer
Limits of the Continental Shelf of the Republic of the Philippines Pursuant to Article 76(8) of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Executive Summary (8 Apr. 2009)
Annex 509 Brunei Darussalam, Preliminary Submission concerning the Outer Limits of its Continental
Shelf (12 May 2009)
Annex 510 People’s Republic of China, Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China
Sea: Executive Summary (14 Dec. 2012)
GEOGRAPHICAL MATERIALS
Annex 511 International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas: North Pacific, Special
Publication No. 23 (Draft 4th ed. 2002)
EXPERT REPORTS
Annex 512 Dr. Alexander Zadorozhny, Expert Opinion on the Russian term “исторические
правооснования” in Article 298(1)(a)(i) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (8 Mar. 2015)
Annex 513 C. Schofield, et al., An Appraisal of the Geographical Characteristics and Status of Certain
Insular Features in the South China Sea (Mar. 2015)
Annex 514 Dr. Lindsay Parson, The potential for China to develop a viable submission for continental
shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles in the South China Sea (Mar. 2015)

Annex 515 Compilation of Historical Materials on the South China Sea Islands of China (H. Zhenhua et
al., eds.)
Annex 516 Charles Gutzlaff, “Geography of the Cochin-Chinese Empire”, Journal of the Royal
Geographical Society of London, Vol. 19 (1849)
Annex 517 J.F. Baddeley, “Matteo Ricci’s Chinese World-Maps, 1584-1608”, The Geographical Journal,
Vol. 50, No. 4 (Oct. 1917)
Annex 518 Nobuo Muroga, “The Philippines in Old Chinese Maps”, Philippine Historical Review, Vol.
2 (1969)
Annex 519 Leigh R. Wright, The Origins of British Borneo (1970)

Annex 520 Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels - Spratlys - Pratas -
Macclesfield Bank (1976)
Annex 521 Zhang Xie, Compilation of Historical Books on the History of Chinese-Foreign Exchange:
Investigation of Eastern and Western Oceans (1981, modern edition)
VOLUME X
EXHIBITS

Annex 522 A. V. M. Horton, “British Administration in Brunei 1906-1959”, Modern Asian Studies,
Vol. 20, No. 2 (1986)
Annex 523 George Bryan Souza, “Maritime Trade and Politics in China and the South China Sea”
(1987), in Portuguese, Dutch and Chinese in Maritime Asia, c. 1585-1800: Merchants,
Commodities and Commerce (2014)
Annex 524 Vu Phi Hoang, Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes: Vietnam’s
Territory (1988)
Annex 525 Daniel J. Dzurek, “The People’s Republic of China Straight Baseline Claim,” IBRU
Boundary & Security Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1996)
Annex 526 B. Catley & M. Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (1997)
Annex 527 Epsey Cooke Farrell, The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Law of the Sea: An Analysis
of Vietnamese Behavior within the Emerging International Oceans Regime (1998)
Annex 528 Thomas Suárez, Early Mapping of Southeast Asia: The Epic Story of Seafarers, Adventurers,
and Cartographers Who First Mapped the Regions Between China and India (1999)
Annex 529 Robert B. Marks, “Maritime Trade and the Agro-Ecology of South China, 1685-1850”, in
Pacific Centuries: Pacific and Pacific Rim history since the sixteenth century (D.O. Flynn, et
al., eds., 1999)
Annex 530 Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz, “Melaka and Its Merchant Communities at the Turn of the
Sixteenth Century”, in Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the
China Sea (D. Lombard & J. Aubin, eds., 2000)
Annex 531 Hong-kay Lung, “Britain and the Suppression of Piracy on the Coast of China, with
Special Reference to the Vicinity of Hong Kong 1842-1870” (2001)
Annex 532 Stein Tonnesson, “The History of the Dispute”, in War or Peace in the South China Sea? (T.
Kivimaki, ed., 2002)
Annex 533 Nha Nguyen, Process of Establishing Vietnam’s Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and
Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes (2002)
Annex 534 Pierre-Yves Manguin, “The Archaeology of Early Maritime Polities of Southeast Asia” in
Special Reference to the Vicinity of Hong Kong 1842-1870” (2001)
Annex 532 Stein Tonnesson, “The History of the Dispute”, in War or Peace in the South China Sea? (T.
Kivimaki, ed., 2002)
Annex 533 Nha Nguyen, Process of Establishing Vietnam’s Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and
Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes (2002)
Annex 534 Pierre-Yves Manguin, “The Archaeology of Early Maritime Polities of Southeast Asia” in
Southeast Asia: From Prehistory to History (I. Glover & P. Bellwood eds., 2004)
Annex 535 Ulises Granados, “As China Meets the Southern Sea Frontier: Ocean Identity in the
Making, 1902-1937”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 (2005)
Annex 536 Zou Keyuan, “The Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement on Maritime Delimitation in the
Gulf of Tonkin”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 36 (2005)
Annex 537 Ulises Granados, “The South China Sea and Its Coral Reefs During the Ming and Qing
Dynasties: Levels of Geographical Knowledge and Political Control”, East Asia History,
Vol. 32/33 (Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007)
Annex 538 Angus Konstam, Piracy: The Complete History (2008)
Annex 539 Hyunhee Park, “A Buddhist Woodblock-printed Map in 13th Century China”, Crossroads:
Studies on the History of Exchange Relations in the East Asian World, Vol. 1/2 (2010)
Annex 540 Carlos Quirino, Philippine Cartography: 1320-1899 (2010)
Annex 541 Timothy Brook, The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties (2010)
Annex 292(bis) Robert Parthesius, Dutch Ships in Tropical Waters: The Development of the Dutch East India
Company (VOC) Shipping Network in Asia 1595-1660 (2010)
Annex 542 Robert J. Antony, “Giang Binh: Pirate Haven and Black Market on the Sino-Vietnamese
Frontier, 1780-1802” in Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives (J. Kleinen & M. Osseweijer, eds., 2010)
VOLUME XI
EXHIBITS

Annex 543 J. Gommans & R. van Diessen, Comprehensive Atlas of the Dutch United East India
Company, Vol. VII (2010)
Annex 297(bis) Kenneth R. Hall, A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal
Development, 100-1500 (2011)
Annex 544 Greg Wood, “Successive States: Aaron Arrowsmith’s Chart of the Pacific Ocean, 1798-1832”,
The Globe: Journal of The Australian and New Zealand Map Society Inc., No. 70 (2012)
Annex 545 Ulises Granados, “Modernization and Regionalism in South China: Notes on Coastal
Navigation in Guangdong Province During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Century”, International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (June 2012)
Annex 546 Lo Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power 1127-1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime
Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan
Periods (2012)
Annex 547 Robert Batchelor, “The Selden Map Rediscovered: A Chinese Map of East Asia Shipping
Routes, c. 1619”, Imago Mundi: The International Journal for the History of Cartography,
Vol. 65, No. 1 (24 Jan. 2013)
Annex 548 Robert J. Antony, “Turbulent Waters: Sea Raiding in Early Modern South East Asia”, The
Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 99, No. 1 (Feb. 2013)
Annex 549 J. Hardy & S. O’Connor, “China advances with Johnson South Reef construction,” IHS
Jane’s Defence Weekly (19 Sept. 2014)
Annex 550 Jerry Brotton, Great Maps: The world’s masterpieces explored and explained (2014)
Annex 551 D.K. Phuc, et al., Vietnam’s National Sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa
(Spratly) Archipelagoes
HISTORIC PUBLICATIONS
Annex 552 James Horsburgh, Memoirs: Comprising the Navigation to and from China (1805)
Annex 553 Lawrence D. Campbell, The Asiatic Annual Register: Or, A View of the History of
Hindustan, and of the Politics, Commerce and Literature of Asia, For the Year 1804 (1806)
Annex 554 Samuel Prior, All the Voyages Round the World from the First by Magellan, in 1520 to that of
Freycinet in 1820 (1848)
Annex 555 Charles Darwin, Geological Observations on Coral Reefs, Volcanic Islands and on South
America (1851)
Annex 556 Capt. Camilo de Arana, Spanish Directorate of Hydrography, Pilot of the Philippine
Archipelago (1879)
NEWSPAPER REPORTS
Annex 557 “China: The Voyage - The China Sea - Macao - Cumsingmoon, &c. &c.”, New York Times
(10 Feb. 1853)
Annex 558 “Arrival of the Flying Clould-Interesting Sketch of the Passage from China to New York”,
New York Times (25 Nov. 1854)
Annex 559 “Marine Intelligence”, New York Times (16 June 1858)
Annex 560 “Marine Intelligence”, New York Times (19 June 1858)
Annex 561 “Loss of the Ship Alfred Hill”, New York Times (31 July 1861)
Annex 562 David Jude Sta Ana, “China builds more Spratly outposts”, The Philippine Star (24 May
2011)
Annex 563 “‘We should find our own solutions’”, New Straits Times (26 May 2012)
Annex 564 David Jude Sta Ana, “China reclaiming land in 5 reefs?”, The Philippine Star (13 June 2014)
Annex 565 E. Wong & J. Ansfield, “To Bolster Its Claims, China Plants Islands in Disputed Waters”,
New York Times (16 June 2014)
Annex 566 “Transcript of New York Times Interview With President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan”, New
York Times (31 Oct. 2014)
CARTOGRAPHIC REFERENCE MATERIAL

Annex 567 U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Junheng Zuo, Map of Tian di tu (1601),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626725/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2015)
Annex 568 U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Hua yi tu Map (Stone) (circa 1933),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005081/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2015)
Annex 569 U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Da Ming yu di tu (Plate) (circa
1547), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626776 (accessed 4 Feb. 2015)
Annex 570 U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Xia lan zhi zhang (Plate) (circa
1647), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626721/ (accessed 5 Feb. 2015)
Annex 571 U.S. Library of Congress, Bibliographic Record: Map of Huang yu quan lan fen sheng tu
(Plate) (1721), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626779/ (accessed 6 Feb. 2015)
MISCELLANEOUS
Annex 572 “Shelf,” Oxford English Dictionary (accessed 5 Feb. 2015)
Annex 573 Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Robert W. Smith (Mar. 2015)

VOLUME XII
LEGAL AUTHORITIES
ICJ CASES
Annex LA-175 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980
Annex LA-176 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007
Annex LA-177 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007
OTHER INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW

Annex LA-178 Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the WTO
Appellate Body, Doc. No. WT/DS58/AB/R (12 Oct. 1998)
Annex LA-179 Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award, UNCLOS
Annex VII Tribunal (7 July 2014)
Annex LA-180 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Award
on Jursidiction, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal (26 Nov. 2014)
UN DOCUMENTS
Annex LA-181 Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945)
Annex LA-182 International Law Commission, “317th Meeting”, in Report of the International Law
Commission Covering the Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955
(22 June 1955)
Annex LA-183 United Nations, Secretary General, Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of
the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/1 (30 Sept. 1957)
Annex LA-184 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of
its eighteenth session (4 May-19 July 1966), in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, Vol. II (1966)
TREATIES
Annex LA-185 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1025 U.N.T.S. 319 (24 Feb. 1976),
entered into force 15 July 1976
Annex LA-186 Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea concerning sovereignty and
maritime boundaries in the area between the two countries, including the area known
as Torres Strait, and related matters (“Torres Strait Treaty”), 1429 U.N.T.S. 208 (18 Dec.
1978), entered into force 15 Feb. 1985
LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATING HISTORY DOCUMENTS

Annex LA-187 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Summary Records of
the 37th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37 (12 Aug. 1974)
Annex LA-188 Republic of the Philippines, Revised draft article on historic waters and delimitation of
the territorial sea, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.24/Rev.1 (19 Aug. 1974)
Annex LA-189 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Bays and
Other Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. C.2/Blue Paper No. 1/Rev.1 (25 Mar. 1975)
Annex LA-190 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Bays and
Other Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. C.2/Blue Paper No. 3 (3 Apr. 1975)
Annex LA-191 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Second Committee, Blue Papers, Historic
Waters, U.N. Doc. C.2/Blue Paper No. 3/Rev.1 (9 Apr. 1975)
Annex LA-192 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Plenary, 189th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/SR.189 (8 Dec. 1982)
TREATISES AND ARTICLES

Annex LA-193 Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1951-4: Points of Substantive Law, Part II”, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol.
32 (1956)
Annex LA-194 Hersch Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas”, British Yearbook of
International Law, Vol. 27 (1950)
Annex LA-195 Gilbert Gidel, The Continental Shelf in the Law (1951)
Annex LA-196 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea III, Statement of activities of the Conference
during its first and second sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.8/REV.1 (17 Oct. 1974)
Annex LA-197 C.F. Amerasinghe, “The Problem of Archipelagos in the International Law of the Sea”,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 23 (1974)
Annex LA-198 Clive R. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (1979)
Annex LA-199 D.P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1 (1982)
Annex LA-200 Louis B. Sohn, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III
Point the Way?”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1983)
Annex LA-201 Peter Beazley, Maritime Limits and Baselines: A Guide to their Delineation (1987)
Annex LA-130(bis) R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed. 1988)
Annex LA-202 Charlotte Ku, “The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in Southeast
Asia Case Western Reserve”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 23
(1991)
Annex LA-203 United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas No. 112: United States Responses to Excessive
Maritime Claims (9 Mar. 1992)
Annex LA-204 W.M. Reisman & G. Westerman, Straight Baselines in International Maritime Boundary
Delimitation (1992)
Annex LA-205 E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea: Introductory Manual, Vol. 1 (1994)
Annex LA-206 W. Michael Reisman, “The Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government
of the Republic of Yemen Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the
Proceedings”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 (1999)
Annex LA-148(bis) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 5 (M.
Nordquist, et al., eds., 2002)
Annex LA-207 Yann-huei Song, “The South China Sea Declaration on Conduct of Parties and Its
Implications: Taiwan’s Perspective”, Maritime Studies (Mar.-Apr. 2003)
Annex LA-208 V. Prescott & C. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2nd ed.,
2005)
Annex LA-209 Yoshifumi Tanaka, “Low-tide Elevations in International Law of the Sea: Selected
Issues”, Ocean Yearbook, Vol. 20 (2006)
Annex LA-210 Robin Churchill, “Some Reflections on the Operation of the Dispute Settlement
System of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea During its First Decade”, in The
Law of the Sea (D. Freestone, et al., eds. 2006)
Annex LA-211 Hugo Caminos, “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: An Overview of its
Jurisdictional Procedure”, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals,
Vol. 5 (2006)
Annex LA-212 J. Roach & R. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (2012)

Annex LA-213 Sophia Kopela, Dependent Archipelagos in the Law of the Sea (2013)
Annex LA-214 Roberto Lavalle, “The Rights of States over Low-tide-elevations: A Legal Analysis”,
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 29 (2014)
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE MATERIALS

Annex LA-215 Leonid L. Gousev, Russian-English Law Dictionary (2003)
Annex LA-216 A.G. Pivovar & V.I. Osipov, English-Russian Legal Dictionary (2003)
Annex LA-217 Russian-English Dictionary of Diplomacy (K.V. Zhuravchenko, ed., 2006)
Annex LA-218 A.N. Vylegzhanin, et al., Qualification of Maritime Area as Historic Waters in Public
International Law: Theory and State Practice (2012)
MISCELLANEOUS
Annex LA-219 United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Cir. 1970)
VOLUME VI
HISTORIC MAPS
HISTORIC MAPS FROM THE MEMORIAL
Annex M1 China Cartographic Publishing House, Hanging Map of the People’s Republic of China
(China, 1950)
Annex M2 Ya Guang Yu De Xue She, Large Map of the People’s Republic of China (China, 1951)
Annex M3 Ya Guang Yu De Xue She, Large Map of the People’s Republic of China (China, 1952)
Annex M4 China Cartographic Publishing House, Hanging Map of the People’s Republic of China
(China, 1956)
Annex M5 China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (China,
1971)
Annex M6 China Cartographic Publishing House, Map of the People’s Republic of China (China, Jan.
1973)
May 1973)
May 1978)
1980)
June 1981)
June 1982)
June 1984)
Mar. 1987)
Aug. 1988)
June 1992)
Aug. 1995)
Annex M18 SinoMaps Press, Map of the People’s Republic of China (China, 2007)
2013)
Annex M20 Boundary Department of the Ministry of Interior, Nanhai shu dao wei shi tu [Map
Showing The Location of The Various Islands in The South Sea] (China, 1947)
BRUNEI
Annex M21 Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General, Map showing territorial waters of Brunei
Darussalam (Brunei, 1987)
Annex M22 Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General, Map showing the limits of the territorial sea,
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of Brunei Darussalam (Brunei, 2003)
Annex M23 Brunei Darussalam, Surveyor General, Negara Brunei Darussalam (Brunei, 2011)
CHINA
Annex M24 Hua Yi Tu [Map of China and the Barbarian Countries] (China, 1136 [c. 1933 rubbing]),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005081/ (accessed 4 Mar. 2015)
Annex M25 Author unknown or unavailable, Da Ming Hun Yi Tu [Universal Map of the Great Ming
Empire] (China, c. 1389)
Annex M26 Da Ming yu di tu [The Territorial Atlas of the Great Ming Empire] (China, 1547–1559),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626776 (accessed 4 Mar. 2015)
Annex M27 Junheng Zuo, “Leaf 6”, in Tian di tu [Atlas of Heaven and Earth] (China, 1601), available
at http://www.loc.gov/resource/g7820m.gct00225/?sp=6 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M28 Junheng Zuo, “Leaf 20”, in Tian di tu [Atlas of Heaven and Earth] (China, 1601),
available at http://www.loc.gov/resource/g7820m.gct00225/?sp=20 (accessed 3 Mar.
2015)
Annex M29 Matteo Ricci, Li Zhizao, engraver, Kunyu wanguo quantu [Map of the Ten Thousand
Countries of the Earth] (China, 1602), available at https://www.lib.umn.edu/bell/riccimap
(accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M30 The Selden Map of China [East Asian Shipping Routes] (China, c. 1608)
Annex M31 “Leaf 12”, in Xia lan zhi zhang [Look at Distant Places in the Palm of Your Hand] (China,
c. 1647), available at http://www.loc.gov/resource/g7820m.gct00226/?sp=12 (accessed 3
Mar. 2015)
Annex M32 Huang yu quan lan fen sheng tu [The Kangxi provincial atlas of China] (China, 1721–
1722), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626779/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M33 Da Qing fen sheng yu tu [Provincial Atlas of the Great Qing Dynasty] (China, 1754–
1760), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2002626726/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M34 Junliang Ma, Jing ban tian wen quan tu [Complete Map of Astronomy and the Qing
Empire] (China, after 1790), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005137/ (accessed
3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M35 Yu di quan tu [Complete Map of Imperial Territory] (China, 1798–1800), available at
http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71002353/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M36 Da Qing wan nian yi tong tian xia quan tu [The Great Qing Dynasty’s Complete Map of
All Under Heaven] (China, 1811), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005018/
Annex M37 Da Qing wan nian yi tong di li quan tu [Complete Geographical Map of the Great Qing
Dynasty] (China, 1814–1816), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005060/
Annex M38 Guangdong tong sheng shui dao tu [Map of the Waterways in Guandong Province]
(China, after 1815), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71002467/ (accessed 3 Mar.
2015)
Annex M39 Li Zhaoluo & Yan Liu, Huang chao yi tong yu di quan tu [Qing Empire’s Complete Map
of all Under Heaven] (China, 1842), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005054/
Annex M40 Li Zhaoluo & Yan Liu, Guangdong quan tu [Complete Map of Guangdong Province]
(China, 1864), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005120/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M41 Li Zhaoluo, Yan Liu, Dian yue yue nan lian jie yu tu [Territorial Map of the Joint Borders
Between Yunnan, Guangdong Provinces and Vietnam] (China, 1870), available at http://
www.loc.gov/item/gm71005069/ (accessed 4 Mar. 2015)
Annex M42 Li Zhaoluo, Yan Liu, Nan yang fen tu [Separate Map of the South Sea] (China, 1870),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005139/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M43 Da Qing er shi san sheng yu di quan tu [Complete Map of the Twenty-Three Provinces
of the Great Qing Dynasty] (China, after 1885), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/
gm71005068/ (accessed 4 Mar. 2015)
Annex M44 Zhongpei Li, Guangdong quan sheng shui lu yu tu [Map of the Waterways and Roads
in Guangdong Province] (China, c. 1887), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/
gm71005159/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M45 Peilan Li, Huang chao zhi sheng yu di quan tu [Qing Empire’s Complete Map of All
Provinces] (China, 1896), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005083/ (accessed 3
Mar. 2015)
Annex M46 Zhong hua guo chi di tu [China Humiliation Map] (China, 1929), available at http://www.
loc.gov/item/2007628129/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M47 Zhonghua min guo fen sheng xin tu [New Provincial Map of the Republic of China]
(China, c. 1933), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2006629696/ (accessed 3 Mar.
2015)
Annex M48 Ya Kwang Geographical Society, Tai yue quan tu / The Map of The East Indies (China, c.
1941)
FRANCE
Annex M49 Nicolas Sanson, La Chine royaume [The Chinese Kingdom] (France, 1656)
Annex M50 Pierre Mariette, Carte generale des Indes Orientales et des isles adiacentes [General map
of the East Indies and Adjacent Islands] (France, 1676), available at http://catalogue.nla.
gov.au/Record/2424185 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M51 Robert de Vaugondy, L’Empire de la Chine [The Empire of China] (France, 1751)
Annex M52 Nicholas Bellin, Carte Reduite des Isles Philippines [Simplified Map of the Philippine
Islands] (France, 1752)
Annex M53 Mannevillette, Chart of the China Sea (France, 1775)
Annex M54 P. Santini, Gilles Robert de Vaugondy, Archipel des Indes Oriental (France, 1778),
available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/5883615 (accessed 4. Mar. 2015)
Annex M55 Conrad Malte-Brun, Empire Chinois et Japon [Chinese Empire and Japan] (France, 1837)
Annex M56 Jean Louis Taberd, Annam Đại Quốc Họa Đồ / Tabula Geographica Imperii Anamitici
[Map of the Annamite Empire], in Dictionarium latino-anamiticum (France, 1838)
Annex M57 Auguste-Henri Dufour, Océanie [Oceania] (France, 1838)
Annex M58 Thunot Duvotenay, Océanie [Oceania] (France, c. 1840), available at http://catalogue.nla.
Annex M59 E. Giffault, et al., Archipel Asiatique [Asian Archipelago], in Atlas Universel [Universal
Atlas] (France, 1897)
Annex M60 French Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Colonies, Indo-Chine
[Indochina] (France, 1902)
Annex M61 French Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Colonies, Indo-Chine
[Indochina] (France, 1914)
Annex M62 French Republic, Colonial Geographic Service, Les Grand Nations dans l’Océan
Pacifique [Full Nations of the Pacific Ocean] (France, 1923)
Annex M63 French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Indochine [Indochina] (France, 1928)
Annex M64 French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Indochine [Indochina] (France, 1936)
Annex M65 French Republic, National Geographic Institute, Carte Générale de l’Indochine Française
[General Map of French Indochina] (France, 1946)
Annex M66 French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Carte Générale de l’Indochine Française
Annex M67 French Republic, Indochina Geographic Service, Carte Générale de l’Indochine Française
GERMANY
Annex M68 Pedro Murillo Velarde & George Maurice Lowitz, Carta Hydrographica y Chorographica
de las Ysles Filipinas [Hydrographic and Chorographic Map of the Philippine Islands]
(Germany, 1760)
INDONESIA
Annex M69 Penerbit Fasco [Fasco Publisher], Indonesia (Indonesia, c. 1950)
Annex M70 Universal, Indonesia (Indonesia, c. 1960)
Annex M71 Bakosurtanal [Indonesia Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping], Batas negara
kesatuan Republik Indonesia [Limit of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia] (Indonesia,
2002)
ITALY
Annex M72 Giacomo Gastaldi, India Tercera Nova Tabula (Italy, 1548), in Early Mapping of
Southeast Asia (1999)
Annex M73 G.B. Ramusio, Southeast Asia (Italy, 1554), in Early Mapping of Southeast Asia (1999)
Annex M74 Antonio Zatta, Isole Filippine [Philippine Islands] (Italy, 1785)
JAPAN
Annex M75 Sekisui Nagakubo, Sankai yochi zenzu [A complete map of mountain and sea territories]
(Japan, c. 1785), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gm71005079/ (accessed 3 Mar.
2015)
Annex M76 Japanese Hydrographic Office, Taiheiyo [Pacific Ocean] (Japan, 1941)
Annex M77 Toseisha, Hyojun daitoa bunzu [Separate Map of Standard Greater East Asia - the
Philippines] (Japan, 1943)
MALAYSIA
Annex M78 Federation of Malaya, Survey Department, Malaya (Malaysia, 1958)
Annex M79 Federation of Malaya, Survey Department, Malaysia (Malaysia, 1963)
Annex M80 Malaysia Jabatanarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping],
Map of Malaysia (Malaysia, 1973)
Malaysia (Malaysia, 1976)
Annex M82 Diterbitkan oleh Pengarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National
Mapping], “Sheet 1”, in Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua
Malaysia [Map Showing Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of
Malaysia] (Malaysia, 1979)
Annex M83 Diterbitkan oleh Pengarah Pemetaan Negara [Malaysian Directorate of National
Mapping], “Sheet 2”, in Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua
Malaysia [Map Showing Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of
Malaysia] (Malaysia, 1979)
Malaysia (Malaysia, 1996)
NETHERLANDS
Annex M85 Gerardus Mercator, Nova et aucta orbis terrae [New and enlarged world] (Netherlands,
1569)
Annex M86 Abraham Ortelius, Indiae orientalis [East Indies] (Netherlands, 1570), available at http://
catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/587925 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M87 Petrus Plancius, Insulae Moluccae [Molucca Islands] (Netherlands, 1594), in Early
Mapping of Southeast Asia (1999)
Annex M88 Jodocus Hondius, Insulae Indiae orientalis praecipuae [East Indies Islands] (Netherlands,
1606), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3424253 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M89 Abraham Ortelius, Chinae [China] (Netherlands, 1609), available at http://catalogue.nla.
Annex M90 Petrus Bertius, Philippinae Insulae [Philippine Islands] (Netherlands, 1616), in Early
Mapping of Southeast Asia (1999)
Annex M91 Martino Martini, Imperii Sinarum Nova Descriptio [New Chinese Empire], in Novus
atlas Sinensis [New Chinese Atlas] (Netherlands, 1655), available at http://www.loc.gov/
item/2002625249/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M92 Joannes L’Huilier, Frederick De Wit, Tabula Indiae Orientalis [Map of East Indies]
(Netherlands, 1662), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2637169 (accessed 3
Mar. 2015)
Annex M93 Johannes Nieuhof, Carte exacte de toutes les provinces, villes, bourgs, villages et rivières
du vaste et puissant empire de la Chine [Exact map of all the provinces, cities, burgs,
villages and rivers of the vast and powerful Chinese Empire] (Netherlands, 1700),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/87691057/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M94 François Valentijn, Tabula Indiae Orientalis et Regnorum adjacentium [Map of East
Indies and Adjacent Kingdoms] (Netherlands, 1726), available at http://www.loc.gov/
Annex M95 Covens and Mortier, Carte d’une partie de la Chine, les Isles Philippines, de la Sonde,
Moluques, de Papoesie, &c. [Map of a part of China, the Philippine Islands, Sunda,
Moluccas, Papoesie, etc.] (Netherlands, c.1760), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/
Record/916139 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M96 Issak Tirion, Nieuwe Kaart van de Filippynsche, Ladrones, Moluccos of Specery Eilanden
als mede Celebes etc. [New Map of the Philippines, Ladrones, Moluccas, Spice Islands
and Celebes, etc.] (Netherlands, 1765)
Annex M97 Jan B. Elwe, Partie de la Nouvelle Grande Carte des Indes Orientales [Part of the New
Large Map of the East Indies] (Netherlands, 1792)
Annex M98 Jacques Eduard Sturler, Overzichts Kaart der Nederlandsche en Vreemde Bezittingen in
den Indischen Archipel [Oversize Map of the Dutch Overseas Possessions in the Indian
Archipelago] (Netherlands, 1881)
Annex M99 Topografische dienst in Nederlandsch-Indië [Netherlands Indies Topographic Survey],

Kaart van den Grooten of Stillen Oceaan en Omliggende Landen [Map of the Great or
Pacific Ocean and Surrounding Countries] (Netherlands, 1936)
PHILIPPINES
Annex M100 Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Republic of the Philippines (Philippines,
1950)
1957)
Annex M102 Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippines, PCGS Map 100
(Philippines, 1960)
1960)
Annex M105 Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippines, PCGS Map 150
(Philippines, 1974, 2nd ed.)
Annex M106 Philippine Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, Administrative Map, Republic of the
Philippines, PCGS Map 201 (Philippines, 1984, 1st ed.)
Annex M107 Philippines National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA),
Philippines, NAMRIA Map 170 ( Philippines, 2006, 1st ed.)
PORTUGAL
Annex M108 Antonio Sanches, No title [Portolan chart of southeast Asia], in Idrographisiae Nova
Descriptio (Portugal, c. 1641)
SPAIN
Annex M109 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Descripcion de las Indias del Poniente [Description
of the Indies of Poniente] (Spain, 1601), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/
Annex M110 Francisco Diaz Romero and Antonio D. Ghandia, Carta Chorographica Del Archipielago
de las Islas Philipinas [Chorographic Map of the Archipelago of the Philippine Islands]
(Spain, 1727)
Annex M111 Pedro Murillo Velarde, Carta hydrographica y chorographica de las Yslas Filipinas
[Hydrographic and Chorographic Map of the Philippines Islands] (Spain, 1734),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2013585226/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M112 Carta plana que contiene parte del Archipielago de las Philipinas y ... parte de la costa de
Cochinchina [Flat Map that Contains Part of the Archipelago of the Philippines and Part
of the Coast of Cochinchina] (Spain, 1770)
Annex M113 No title [Map of Pacific Ocean between the coast of California and Mexico and Japan,
Philippines, and the coast of China] (Spain, c. 1784), available at http://www.loc.gov/
Annex M114 Duque de Almodóvar, Mapa de las Islas Filipinas [Map of the Philippine Islands] (Spain,
1790)
Annex M115 Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta General del Archipielago de Filipinas [General
Map of the Archipelago of the Philippines] (Spain, 1808)
Annex M116 Antonio Morata, Islas Filipinas [The Philippine Islands], in Atlas de España y sus
posesiones de ultramar [Atlas of Spain and its Overseas Possessions] (Spain, 1852)
Annex M117 Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta esférica del Océano Indio, Hoja III [Nautical
Chart of the Indian Ocean, Page III] (Spain, 1865), available at http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-
rm2237 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M118 Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta General (en dos hojas) del Archipiélago Filipino,
Hoja I [General Chart (two pages) of the Philippine Archipelago, Page I] (Spain, 1875)
Annex M119 Spain, Hydrographic Directorate, Carta General (en dos hojas) del Archipiélago Filipino,
Hoja II [General Chart (two pages) of the Philippine Archipelago, Page II] (Spain, 1875)
Annex M120 Chofré & Compa., Carta General del Archipiélago Filipino [General Map of the
Philippine Archipelago] (Spain, 1897)
UNITED KINGDOM
Annex M121 Gabriel Tatton, Chart of the Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1600)
Annex M122 John Speed, The Kingdome of China (United Kingdom, 1626), available at http://
Annex M123 John Speed, A New Map of East India (United Kingdom, 1676), available at http://
Annex M124 Herman Moll, China (United Kingdom, 1723), available at http://lccn.loc.
gov/2006629363 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M125 Herman Moll, The Empire of China and Island of Japan, Agreeable to Modern History
(United Kingdom, 1736)
Annex M126 Herman Moll, A chart of ye East-Indies with the coast of Persia, China also the Philipina,
Moluca and Sunda Islands, &c, (United Kingdom, 1745), available at http://catalogue.nla.
Annex M127 Solomon Bolton, The Philippin, Carolin, Molucka, and Spice Islands, in Dictionnaire
universel de commerce [The universal dictionary of trade and commerce] (United
Kingdom, 1755)
Annex M128 Thomas Kitchin, A general map of the East Indies and that part of China where the
Europeans have any Settlements or commonly any Trade (United Kingdom, 1761)
Annex M129 Emanuel Bowen, A New and Accurate Map of the East India Islands, in Maps and Charts
of the Modern Part of Universal History (United Kingdom, 1766)
Annex M130 Thomas Kitchin, A New Map of the Philippine Islands (United Kingdom, 1769)
Annex M131 Thomas Kitchin, East Indies (United Kingdom, 1770), available at http://catalogue.nla.
Annex M132 R. Sayer & J. Bennett, A chart of the China Sea and Philippine Islands with the
Archipelagos of Felicia and Soloo (United Kingdom, 1778), available at http://catalogue.
nla.gov.au/Record/3667413 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M133 Robert Laurie & James Whittle, A New Chart of the Oriental Seas and Islands with the
coasts of the continent from the Isle of Ceylon to Amoye in China (United Kingdom, 1794)
Annex M134 Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1798), available at
http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/2941716 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M135 Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the East India Islands exhibiting the several passages
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (United Kingdom, 1800), available at http://
Annex M136 Robert Laurie & James Whittle, A new chart of the China Sea and its several entrances
(United Kingdom, 1802), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3620691
Annex M137 Aaron Arrowsmith, China (United Kingdom, 1808)
Annex M138 W. Darton, Jr., The East India Islands (United Kingdom, 1811)
Annex M139 Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1826)
Annex M140 J. & C. Walker, Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, Eastern Islands or
Malay Archipelago (United Kingdom, 1836), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/
Annex M141 A.K. Johnston, S.E. Peninsula and Malaysia (United Kingdom, 1844)
Annex M142 John Bartholomew, Indian Archipelago (United Kingdom, 1850)
Annex M143 J. Rapkin, China and Birmah, in The illustrated atlas and modern history of the world,
geographical, political, commercial and statistical (United Kingdom, c. 1851), available
at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3427546 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M144 Keith Johnston, Oceania, in Keith Johnston’s General Atlas (United Kingdom, 1861)
Annex M145 James Imray & Son, East India Archipelago, Western Route to China, Chart No. 6 (United
Kingdom, 1870)
Annex M146 London Geographical Institute, China, Corea and Japan (United Kingdom, 1880)
Annex M147 Keith Johnston, Oceania, in Royal Atlas of Modern Geography (United Kingdom, 1881)
Annex M148 W. & A.K. Johnston, China, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ninth Edition (United
Kingdom, 1889)
Annex M149 George Philip & Son Ltd., China and Tibet, in Harmsworth Atlas and Gazetteer (United
Kingdom, 1895)
Annex M150 T. Fisher Unwin, East India Islands with parts of Lower Burma, Siam & Anam (United
Kingdom, c. 1900)
Annex M151 F. S. Weller, Harper & Brothers, Southern China and Adjoining Countries (United
Kingdom, 1900)
Annex M152 George Philip & Son, Ltd., The London Geographical Institute, Oceania and Pacific
Ocean (United Kingdom, 1910)
Annex M153 Edward Stanford, Ltd., The Pacific Ocean (United Kingdom, 1922), available at http://
Annex M154 George Philip & Son, Ltd., The London Geographical Institute, Philip’s War Map
of the Far East (United Kingdom, 1941), available at http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/
Annex M155 United Kingdom, War Office, North Borneo (United Kingdom, 1942)
Annex M156 Federation of Malaya, Survey Department, Sarawak and Brunei (United Kingdom, 1953)
Annex M157 United Kingdom, Directorate of Overseas Surveys, North Borneo (United Kingdom,
1959)
Annex M158 United Kingdom, War Office and Air Ministry, Directorate Surveys, Brunei (United
Kingdom, 1962)
UNITED STATES
Annex M159 E.F. Fisk, Hunt & Eaton, China, in The Columbian Atlas of the World We Live In (United
States, 1893)
Annex M160 United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Islas Filipinas, Mapa General [The Philippine
Islands, General Map], in Atlas de Filipinas (United States, 1899)
Annex M161 United States, War Department, Map of the Philippine Islands (United States, 1903)
Annex M162 United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippine Islands (United States, 1918)
Annex M163 United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Contour Map of the Philippine Islands and
Waters, USCGS Map 102 (United States, 1924)
Annex M164 United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Commonwealth of the Philippines (United
States, 1935)
Annex M165 United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Philippine Islands (United States, 1940),
available at http://www.loc.gov/item/2011592026 (accessed 3 Mar. 2015)
Annex M166 United States, War Department, The Pacific Area (United States, 1940)
Annex M167 United States, Hydrographic Office, Pacific Ocean, Naval and Air Facilities in the Western
Pacific (United States, 1941)
Annex M168 United States, Army Map Service, Philippines (North) (United States, 1943)
Annex M169 United States, Army Map Service, Philippines (South) (United States, 1943)
Annex M170 United States, Army Map Service, Philippine Islands (United States, 1949)
VIETNAM
Annex M171 Phan Huy Chú, Đại Nam nhất thống toàn đồ [Complete Map of Unified Great Nam]
(Vietnam, 1834)
Annex M172 Author unknown or unavailable, Việt Nam toàn cảnh dư đồ [Complete map of Vietnam]
(Vietnam, 1885–1890), available at http://www.loc.gov/item/84696159/ (accessed 3 Mar.
2015)
Annex M173 Tổng Nha điển địa [General Department of Land Administration], Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa
[Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1960)
Annex M174 Tổng Nha điền địa [General Department of Land Administration], Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa,
Vị-Trí Các Khu-Trù-Mật [Republic of Vietnam, Map of Agroville] (Vietnam, 1960)
Annex M175 Tổng Nha Điến-Địa Phát-Hành, Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa [Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam,
1964)
Annex M176 Cục đo đạc và bản đồ Việt Nam [Department of Surveying and Mapping of Vietnam], Bản
đồ Hành chính Việt Nam [Administrative map of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1976)
Annex M177 Cục đo đạc và bản đồ Việt Nam [Department of Surveying and Mapping of Vietnam],
Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1989)
Annex M178 Tổng cục quản lý đất đai [General Department of Land Administration], Cộng hòa xã hội
chủ nghĩa Việt Nam [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] (Vietnam, 1998)
VOLUME VII
HISTORIC OIL & GAS MAPS
BRUNEI
Annex M179 Petroconsultants, S.A., Brunei (Switzerland, 1978)
Annex M180 Petroconsultants, S.A., Brunei (Switzerland, 1986)
Annex M181 IHS Energy, Brunei: General (2003)
CHINA
Annex M182 Asian Research Service, China’s Hydrocarbon Potential (Hong Kong, 1984)
Annex M183 Petroleum News Southeast Asia Ltd., Oil and Gas Map of China (Hong Kong, 1985)
Annex M184 Cartographic Publishing House, Jin Qingyu, editor, Zhong guo neng yuan gong ye [China
Energy Resource Industry] (China, 1986)
Annex M185 PennWell Publishing Co., XYZ Mapping, Oil & Gas Map of China (China, 1995)
Annex M186 A. Malkin, Petroleum Economist Ltd., Energy Map of China (United Kingdom, 1996)
INDONESIA
Annex M187 Indonesian Direktorat Minyak dan Gas Bumi (DMGB), Rusmadi, Peta situasi wilayah
kerja pertambangan minyak dan gas bumi Indonesia (Indonesia, 1977)
Annex M188 Petroconsultants, S.A., Indonesia (Switzerland, 1986)
Annex M189 Indonesian Direktorat Minyak dan Gas Bumi (DMGB), Rusmadi, Peta situasi wilayah
kerja pertambangan minyak dan gas bumi Indonesia (Indonesia, 1986)
Annex M190 Petroconsultants, S.A., Indonesia (Switzerland, 1997)
Annex M191 IHS Energy Group, Indonesia: General (2002)
Annex M192 Indonesian Direktorat Jenderal Minyak dan Gas Bumi, Peta wilayah kerja perminyakan
Indonesia (Indonesia, 2002)
MALAYSIA
Annex M193 Petroconsultants, S.A., Eastern Malaysia and Brunei (Switzerland, 1973)
Annex M194 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Malaysia: Oil and Gas Prospects (United States, 1977)
Annex M195 Petroconsultants, S.A., Federation of Malaysia (Eastern Malaysia) (Switzerland, 1980)
Annex M196 Oil and Gas Fields in Malaysia (c. 1982)
Annex M197 Petroconsultants, S.A., Malaysia: Eastern Sheet (Switzerland, 1986)
Annex M198 Petroconsultants, S.A., Malaysia: General (Switzerland, 1998)
Annex M199 IHS Energy, East Malaysia, Sabah / Sarawak (2004)
PHILIPPINES
Annex M200 Petroconsultants, S.A., Philippines (Switzerland, 1973)
Annex M201 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Philippines (United States, 1978)
Annex M206 Philippine Deparment of Energy, Consolidated Well Location Map (Philippines, 1994)
Annex M209 IHS Energy, Philippines: General (2004)
Annex M210 IHS Energy, Philippines: Palawan & Mindoro Area (2004)
VIETNAM
Annex M211 Petroconsultants, S.A., Vietnam (Switzerland, 1982)
Annex M212 Petroconsultants, S.A., Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos (Switzerland, 1990)
Annex M213 Petroconsultants, S.A., Vietnam (Switzerland, 1996)
Annex M214 IHS Energy, Vietnam: Offshore South Vietnam (2003)
Annex M215 IHS Energy, Vietnam: General (2004)
OTHER
Annex M216 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, South China Sea: Maritime Claims and Petroleum
Activity (United States, 1981)
Annex M217 Oilfield Publications Limited, The South East Asia Oil and Gas activity and concession
map (United Kingdom, c. 1984)
Annex M218 PennWell Publishing Co., XYZ Mapping, Oil & Gas Map of Southeast Asia (United
States, 1994)
Annex M219 P. Bush and K. Fuller, Petroleum Economist Ltd., Oil and Gas Map of Asia (United
Kingdom, 2003)
Annex M220 Quest Offshore Resources, Deloitte Petroleum Services, Asia Pacific (2011)

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ARBITRATION UNDER ANNEX VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS

CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

SUPPLEMENTAL WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES

I. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation .....................................................................7

II. Other Bilateral Arrangements and Public Representations by the

I. China’s Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea .....................................63

II. China’s Claims to Historic Rights or Historic Title in Maritime Areas

A. Bohai Sea ...................................................................................................68

B. Qiongzhou Strait ........................................................................................72

III. China’s Reactions to Claims of Historic Rights or Historic Title

A. China’s Endorsement of Claims to Historic Bays .....................................73

B. China’s Rejection of Viet Nam’s Claim to Historic Waters in the

I. The Application of Article 7 to Dependent Archipelagos .....................................89

A. Pursuant to Other Articles of the Convention ............................................92

B. Pursuant to General International Law ......................................................94

C. Pursuant to Historic Rights and Titles .......................................................97

QUESTION 18............................................................................................................................ 109

I. Summary of the Law ............................................................................................109

II. Jurisprudence .......................................................................................................111

QUESTIONS 19 through 24 ....................................................................................................... 115

QUESTION 25............................................................................................................................ 121

QUESTION 26............................................................................................................................ 123

I. The Subject-Matter of the Arbitration Is Not Territorial Sovereignty .................125

A. The 2002 DOC Is a Non-Binding Political Instrument ...........................132

B. The DOC Does Not Exclude Recourse to Other Means of Dispute

C. No Settlement Has Been Reached Pursuant to the DOC .........................138

D. In Any Event, China Is Not Entitled To Invoke the DOC Due to

E. The Other Bilateral Documents China Cites Are Irrelevant ....................143

APPENDIX TO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 13 ..................................................................... 151

I. Early History ........................................................................................................151

B. Other Polities ...........................................................................................155

II. The Colonial Era ..................................................................................................157

A. Maritime Activities of the Colonial Powers ............................................157

B. Efforts To Combat Piracy ........................................................................161

C. Viet Nam’s Control of Part of the South China Sea ................................163

D. Chinese Activities During the Colonial Era.............................................165

III. The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries ...........................................166

IV. The Period Since World War II ...........................................................................169

APPENDIX TO RESPONSE TO QUESTION 14 ..................................................................... 175

I. Maps Produced by China .....................................................................................175

A. Maps Predating the Mid-17th Century ....................................................183

B. Maps from the Mid-Seventeenth Century to 1800 ..................................185

C. World War II to the Present .....................................................................195

III. Oil & Gas Concession Maps ................................................................................199

1. The Republic of the Philippines respectfully presents this Supplemental Written

3. This Supplemental Written Submission is presented in twelve volumes. Volume I

4. Volume II consists of an Atlas of Relevant Features in which the Philippines has

6. Volume VI consists of copies in A3 format of the historical maps requested by the

1.2. Article 282 of the Convention provides:

If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning

4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial

7. The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their

I. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

2.4. Article 281 provides:

If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning

II. Other Bilateral Arrangements and Public Representations by the Philippines

The fact that the Convention makes no specific reference to

The Philippines is invited to elaborate on these arguments.