Instant ebooks textbook Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance 1st Edition William R. Cline download all chapters

Download the full version of the ebook at
https://ebookultra.com
Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change

Finance 1st Edition William R. Cline
https://ebookultra.com/download/carbon-abatement-
costs-and-climate-change-finance-1st-edition-
william-r-cline/
Explore and download more ebook at https://ebookultra.com

Recommended digital products (PDF, EPUB, MOBI) that
you can download immediately if you are interested.
Climate Change and Carbon Markets A Handbook of Emissions

Reduction Mechanisms Farhana Yamin
https://ebookultra.com/download/climate-change-and-carbon-markets-a-
handbook-of-emissions-reduction-mechanisms-farhana-yamin/
ebookultra.com
Climate Change Measures and Trade Considerations 1st

Edition George R. Fried
https://ebookultra.com/download/climate-change-measures-and-trade-
considerations-1st-edition-george-r-fried/
ebookultra.com
Climate Change A Multidisciplinary Approach 2nd edition

William James Burroughs
https://ebookultra.com/download/climate-change-a-multidisciplinary-
approach-2nd-edition-william-james-burroughs/
ebookultra.com
Climate Change and Climate Modeling Neelin J.D.
https://ebookultra.com/download/climate-change-and-climate-modeling-
neelin-j-d/
ebookultra.com
Carbon Risk and Green Finance 1st Edition Aaron Ezroj
https://ebookultra.com/download/carbon-risk-and-green-finance-1st-
edition-aaron-ezroj/
ebookultra.com
Understanding Climate Change Feedbacks 1st Edition Panel

On Climate Change Feedbacks
https://ebookultra.com/download/understanding-climate-change-
feedbacks-1st-edition-panel-on-climate-change-feedbacks/
ebookultra.com
Adjudicating Climate Change State National and

International Approaches 1st Edition William C. G. Burns
https://ebookultra.com/download/adjudicating-climate-change-state-
national-and-international-approaches-1st-edition-william-c-g-burns/
ebookultra.com
Human Impacts on Weather and Climate 2nd Edition William

R. Cotton
https://ebookultra.com/download/human-impacts-on-weather-and-
climate-2nd-edition-william-r-cotton/
ebookultra.com
Climate and Culture Change in North America AD 900 1600

1st Edition William C. Foster
https://ebookultra.com/download/climate-and-culture-change-in-north-
america-ad-900-1600-1st-edition-william-c-foster/
ebookultra.com
Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance
1st Edition William R. Cline Digital Instant Download
Author(s): William R. Cline
ISBN(s): 9780881326307, 0881326305
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 1.11 MB
Year: 2011
Language: english
96 Policy Analyses in International Economics
July 2011
Carbon Abatement
Costs and Climate
Change Finance
William R. Cline
PE TERSON I N S T I T U T E F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L E CO N O M I C S
Carbon Abatement
Costs and Climate
Change Finance
Carbon Abatement
Costs and Climate
Change Finance
William R. Cline
PE TERSON INS T I T U T E F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L E CO N O M I C S
Washington, D C
Ju ly 2011
William R. Cline has been a senior fellow at Copyright © 2011 by the Peter G. Peterson
the Peterson Institute for International Eco- Institute for International Economics. All
nomics since its inception in 1981 and has held rights reserved. No part of this book may be
a joint appointment at the Center for Global reproduced or utilized in any form or by any
Development since 2002. During 1996–2001 means, electronic or mechanical, including
while on leave from the Institute, he was dep- photocopying, recording, or by information
uty managing director and chief economist of storage or retrieval system, without permission
the Institute of International Finance. He is from the Institute.
the author of 23 books, most recently Financial
Globalization, Economic Growth, and the Crisis of For reprints/permission to photocopy please
2007–09 (2010). He was senior fellow, Brook- contact the APS customer service department
ings Institution (1973–81); deputy director of at Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222
development and trade research, US Treasury Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923; or email
Department (1971–73); Ford Foundation visit- requests to: [email protected]
ing professor in Brazil (1970–71); and lecturer
and assistant professor of economics at Princ- Printed in the United States of America
eton University (1967–70). 12 11 10 5 4 3 2 1
PETER G. PETERSON INSTITUTE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-

FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS Publication Data
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Cline, William R.
Washington, DC 20036-1903 Carbon abatement costs and climate change
(202) 328-9000 FAX: (202) 659-3225 finance / William R. Cline.
www.piie.com p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
C. Fred Bergsten, Director ISBN 978-0-88132-607-9
Edward A. Tureen, Director of Publications, 1. Carbon offsetting. 2. Carbon dioxide
Marketing, and Web Development mitigation—Costs. 3. Climatic changes—
Economic aspects. 4. Global warming—
Typesetting by Susann Luetjen International cooperation. I. Title.
Printing by Versa Press, Inc. HC79.A4C5495 2011
363.438’746—dc23
2011017671
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. This publication is part of
the overall program of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not
necessarily reflect the views of individual members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
1 Overview 1
Policy Context 1
Method and Plan of the Study 2
Principal Findings 3
2 Baseline Emissions under Business as Usual 7

Framework 7
Decomposing Emissions Trends, 1990–2006 9
Baseline through 2030 12
Extending the Baseline through 2050 16
3 Abatement Initiatives in the Copenhagen Accord 19

and Cancún Agreements
Copenhagen Accord Pledges 20
Cancún Agreements 23
4 Abatement Cost Functions 25

Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models 25
RICE Model 26
EMF 22 Models 27
McKinsey Model 30
v
5 Abatement Costs through 2050 33
Copenhagen Convergence 34
Abatement Costs under the Copenhagen Convergence Scenario 39
Other Model–Based Estimates 48
Alternative Abatement Paths 50
6 Trade and Timing 57

Shadow Price of Carbon Dioxide 58
7 Estimating Investment Requirements and 71

Adaptation Costs
International Energy Agency 72
World Bank 74
Investment Levels Implied by Abatement Cost Estimates 75
Adaptation 79
8 Synthesis 81
The $100 Billion Copenhagen Commitment 81
Estimates of This Study 83
Appendices
Appendix A Data Sources and Further Statistical Tables 91
Appendix B Estimating Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations 99
under Alternative Emissions Paths
Appendix C Other Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols 103
Appendix D Alternative Policy Paths for CO2 Emissions, 2010–50 107
Appendix E Abatement Costs of the Alternative Policy Paths 113
Appendix F Cost-Minimizing Reallocation of Abatement over Time 117
Appendix G Abatement Cost Function Estimates Based on EMF 22 121
References 131
Index 135
Tables
Table 2.1 Carbon dioxide emissions: Growth decomposition, 10
1990–2006
Table 2.2 Business as usual baseline emissions of carbon dioxide 13
Table 2.3 Decomposition of emissions growth, 2010–20 14
Table 2.4 Decomposition of emissions growth, 2020–30 15
Table 2.5 Business as usual baseline, 2030–50 17
Table 3.1 Country targets and initiatives under the Copenhagen 21
Accord
Table 4.1 Multiplicative abatement cost parameter (a) in the 27
Nordhaus RICE model
vi
Table 4.2 Abatement cost function parameters, EMF 22 28
synthesis model
Table 4.3 Ackerman et al. abatement cost parameters from 31
McKinsey for 2030
Table 5.1 Business as usual baseline and Copenhagen Convergence 37
target emissions, 2020 and 2050
Table 5.2 Business as usual baseline and Copenhagen Convergence 38
abatement path: Annual rates of growth in carbon plus
energy efficiency
Table 5.3 Percent reduction in emissions from business as usual 40
baseline, Copenhagen Convergence scenario
Table 5.4 Abatement costs for the Copenhagen Convergence 41
policy path: RICE model basis
policy path: EMF 22 synthesis model basis
Table 5.6 Abatement costs in 2030 for the Copenhagen Convergence 47
policy path: McKinsey/Ackerman et al. basis
Table 5.7 2050 emissions under Copenhagen Convergence and 54
UNDP scenarios
Table 5.8 Cumulative CO2 emissions after 2010 and atmospheric 55
concentrations
Table 6.1 Shadow price of CO2 under Copenhagen Convergence 60
abatement in the absence of international offsets trading
Table 6.2 Purchases or sales of CO2 emissions rights, global shadow 64
price, and savings from emissions trading: RICE cost
function basis
Table 6.3 Global CO2 emissions under alternative variants of the 67
Copenhagen Convergence policy scenario
Table 6.4 Present value of abatement costs under alternative 69
Copenhagen Convergence scenarios: RICE cost basis
Table 7.1 Annual investment required for Copenhagen Convergence 77
abatement, 2020–40
policy path
Table 8.2 Developing-country financing needs for abatement and 85
adaptation and financial flows from offset purchases
Table A.1 Population 92
Table A.2 Baseline per capita GDP 94
Table A.3 Business as usual baseline CO2 emissions per capita 96
Table A.4 Business as usual baseline energy consumption 97
Table C.1 Radiative forcing of other greenhouse gases and aerosols 104
by 2050 under business as usual low scenario B1p
Table D.1 CO2 emissions path under Copenhagen Convergence 108
scenario
Table D.2 CO2 emissions path under UNDP (2007) 109
vii
Table D.3 CO2 emissions path under Chakravarty et al. (2009) 110
Table D.4 CO2 emissions path under Frankel (2008) 111
Table E.1 Abatement costs: UNDP (2007) 113
Table E.2 Abatement costs: Chakravarty et al. (2009) 115
Table E.3 Abatement costs: Frankel (2008) 116
Table F.1 Emissions profile under cost-minimization discounting 118
at 1.5 percent per year
at 3 percent per year
at 5 percent per year
Table G.1 Regression results for abatement cost function 124
Table G.2 Abatement costs for the Copenhagen Convergence 127
policy path: EMF 22 synthesis model basis constrained
Table G.3 Investment required for Copenhagen Convergence 129
abatement: 2020 and 2030
Figures
Figure 4.1 Comparison of RICE and EMF 22 based abatement 29
cost estimates for uniform cuts from baseline
Figure 5.1 Business as usual and Copenhagen Convergence 36
abatement emissions paths, 1990–2050
Figure 5.2 Alternative policy paths for C02 emissions, 2010–50 53
Figure B.1 Business as usual emissions and increased atmospheric 100
concentrations: SRES scenario estimates and regression
equation
Figure G.1 Abatement cost with purchases of emissions rights 126
viii
Preface
In this study, William Cline continues his work on climate change that began
with his path-breaking 1992 book, The Economics of Global Warming, and includes
his most recent book Global Warming and Agriculture: Impact Estimates by Country
(2007). This new analysis focuses on the abatement costs likely to be required
to keep global warming within the internationally endorsed ceiling of 2°C
warming above preindustrial temperatures. Cline employs three leading abate-
ment cost models to examine a “Copenhagen Convergence” policy scenario
in which the major nations achieve their 2020 emissions curbs pledged at
Copenhagen in December 2009 and thereafter converge to uniform low per
capita emissions by 2050.
The momentum for action on greenhouse gas abatement has faltered
recently, at least in the United States with the failure of Senate action on legis-
lation on emissions restraint after the Waxman-Markey bill passed the House
of Representatives in 2009. The estimates in this study should provide some
reassurance that forceful action is possible without imposing prohibitive
economic costs. The central model estimates indicate that abatement costs
would amount to about one-third to two-thirds of one percent of GDP for
industrial countries by 2030 and moderately less for developing countries.
But participation of the major emerging-market economies will be necessary
for success and by 2050 the cutbacks from the business-as-usual baseline for
China and some others among them are surprisingly close to the deep cuts in
industrial countries—because of the rapid rise of emissions otherwise associ-
ated with rapid growth.
The Institute has sought to contribute to the debate on the new inter-
national economic architecture needed to curb global warming. In 2008, the
Institute published Leveling the Carbon Playing Field by Visiting Fellow Trevor
ix
Houser and coauthors from the World Resources Institute. Senior Fellows
Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott have written working papers on World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules relating to climate change and the prospects
for US-NAFTA cooperation on abatement, and Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz,
and Jisun Kim published a major book in 2009 entitled Global Warming and the
World Trading System.
The Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics is a private,
nonprofit institution for the study and discussion of international economic
policy. Its purpose is to analyze important issues in that area and to develop
and communicate practical new approaches for dealing with them. The
Institute is completely nonpartisan.
The Institute is funded by a highly diversified group of philanthropic foun-
dations, private corporations, and interested individuals. About 35 percent
of the Institute’s resources in our latest fiscal year was provided by contribu-
tors outside the United States. The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation has
provided generous support for much of the Institute’s recent work on climate
change, including the present study. In 2009–10 the Foundation provided
support to focus on developing countries’ financing needs for climate action.
The present study translates the abatement cost estimates into prospective
financing needs (chapter 7), including for adaptation. It turns out that the
benchmark Copenhagen Accord figure of $100 billion annually by 2020 is
broadly supported by the calculations developed here.
The Institute’s Board of Directors bears overall responsibilities for the
Institute and gives general guidance and approval to its research program,
including the identification of topics that are likely to become important
over the medium run (one to three years) and that should be addressed by
the Institute. The director, working closely with the staff and outside Advisory
Committee, is responsible for the development of particular projects and
makes the final decision to publish an individual study.
The Institute hopes that its studies and other activities will contribute to
building a stronger foundation for international economic policy around the
world. We invite readers of these publications to let us know how they think we
can best accomplish this objective.
C. Fred Bergsten
Director
June 2011
x
PETER G. PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036-1903
(202) 328-9000 Fax: (202) 659-3225
C. Fred Bergsten, Director
BOARD OF DIRECTORS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
* Peter G. Peterson, Chairman Barry Eichengreen, Chairman

* George David, Vice Chairman Richard Baldwin, Vice Chairman
* James W. Owens, Chairman, Kristin Forbes, Vice Chairwoman
Executive Committee
Isher Judge Ahluwalia
Leszek Balcerowicz Robert E. Baldwin
Ronnie C. Chan Steve Beckman
Chen Yuan Olivier Blanchard
* Andreas C. Dracopoulos Barry P. Bosworth
* Jessica Einhorn Menzie Chinn
Mohamed A. El-Erian Susan M. Collins
Stanley Fischer Wendy Dobson
Jacob A. Frenkel Jeffrey A. Frankel
Maurice R. Greenberg Daniel Gros
Herbjorn Hansson Sergei Guriev
Tony Hayward Stephan Haggard
* Carla A. Hills Gordon H. Hanson
Karen Katen Takatoshi Ito
W. M. Keck II John Jackson
Michael Klein Peter B. Kenen
* Caio Koch-Weser Anne O. Krueger
Lee Kuan Yew Paul R. Krugman
* Reynold Levy Justin Yifu Lin
Andrew N. Liveris Jessica T. Mathews
Sergio Marchionne Rachel McCulloch
Donald F. McHenry Thierry de Montbrial
Indra K. Nooyi Sylvia Ostry
Paul O’Neill Jean Pisani-Ferry
David J. O’Reilly Eswar S. Prasad
Hutham Olayan Raghuram Rajan
Samuel J. Palmisano Kenneth S. Rogoff
Frank H. Pearl Andrew K. Rose
Michael A. Peterson Fabrizio Saccomanni
Victor Pinchuk Jeffrey D. Sachs
* Joseph E. Robert, Jr. Nicholas H. Stern
Lynn Forester de Rothschild Joseph E. Stiglitz
* Richard E. Salomon William White
Sheikh Hamad Saud Al-Sayari Alan Wm. Wolff
Edward W. Scott, Jr. Daniel Yergin
Frederick W. Smith
Lawrence H. Summers Richard N. Cooper,
Jean-Claude Trichet Chairman Emeritus
Laura D’Andrea Tyson
Paul A. Volcker
Peter Voser
Jacob Wallenberg
Marina v.N. Whitman
Ronald A. Williams
Ernesto Zedillo
Ex officio
* C. Fred Bergsten
Nancy Birdsall
Richard N. Cooper * Member of the Executive Committee
Barry Eichengreen
Honorary Directors
Alan Greenspan
Frank E. Loy
David Rockefeller
George P. Shultz
Acknowledgments
I thank Thomas Emmons and Yimei Zou for painstaking and inspired research
assistance. For comments on an earlier draft, I thank without implicating
Trevor Houser, Caio Koch-Weser, and an anonymous reviewer.
xiii
1
Overview
The major nations have come tantalizingly close to beginning more meaningful
action to curb global warming. The Copenhagen Accord of December 2009,
ratified and more formally incorporated into the United Nations climate nego-
tiations system at Cancún, Mexico, in December 2010, set a target of limiting
warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels. For the first time, the Copenhagen
Accord took the crucial step of incorporating the major developing countries
into an international action program. The sole previous (and still extant) inter-
nationally agreed mechanism, the Kyoto Protocol, was incapable of meaningfully
curbing global warming because its limits on emissions applied only to industrial
countries, yet the share of these countries in global emissions is already slightly
less than half and under business as usual will shrink to less than 40 percent by
2030 and about 30 percent by 2050 (tables 2.2 and 2.5 in chapter 2).
Policy Context
The eventual damages from unrestrained global warming could be severe. With
3°C warming by late in this century, agricultural production potential would
fall by 3 to 16 percent globally, 17 to 28 percent in Africa, 29 to 38 percent in
India, 20 to 30 percent in Pakistan, 9 to 21 percent in the Middle East and
North Africa, and 13 to 24 percent in Latin America, depending on whether
“carbon fertilization” benefits partially offset heat stress (Cline 2007, pp. 69,
96). With even 2°C warming, on a time scale of centuries, the Greenland ice cap
would likely melt, raising sea level 7 meters. With considerably higher warming
and on a time scale of millennia, sea levels could rise 60 to 80 meters, the
oceans become anoxic from shutdown of the ocean conveyor belt, and anaer-
obic bacteria emit hydrogen sulfide in toxic amounts, a mechanism that may
have caused the Permian-Triassic mass extinction 251 million years ago (Cline
1
2011, Kump et al. 2005). Stakes and time scales such as these bedevil fine-point
calculations of optimal abatement and argue for an insurance approach that
focuses on even small probabilities of disastrous impacts (Weitzman 2007).
The central policy questions then become: How expensive is insurance
against global warming, and who will pay the insurance policy premiums? This
study seeks to examine the prospective costs of abatement through 2050 at the
global level and in detail for the 25 largest economies (with the European Union
treated as a single economy). It also attempts to shed light on the magnitude of
abatement investment requirements and adaptation costs in developing coun-
tries by 2020 and to relate them to the target of $100 billion in international
support pledged by industrial countries in the Copenhagen Accord.
Method and Plan of the Study

Chapter 2 sets forth a framework for evaluating prospective economic costs
of reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the context of a coordinated interna-
tional effort to curb global warming. The framework first identifies the business
as usual (bau) emissions baseline for each of the 25 largest emitting economies.
These baselines are examined as a function of four parameters: population
growth, growth of per capita GDP, growth in the “energy efficiency of output”
(inverse of energy required per unit of GDP), and growth in the “carbon effi-
ciency of energy” (inverse of carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy). Actual
trends in these influences are estimated for the period 1990–2006. Prospective
bau baseline trends for these parameters for each of the next four decades are
then identified, taking into account such existing projections as those of the
Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009) and the various emissions paths
considered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001).
Chapter 3 reviews the emissions policy pledges undertaken by major coun-
tries in the Copenhagen Accord for the period through 2020 and the subse-
quent Cancún Agreements. Chapter 4 sets forth three leading abatement cost
models (or in one case, family of models) that serve as the basis for the study’s
cost calculations.1 Chapter 5 then identifies the policy paths for cuts from the
bau baseline. These cutbacks determine the abatement costs in the cost models
applied. The principal policy scenario is a Copenhagen Convergence scenario
built around the abatement initiatives undertaken in Copenhagen. Reductions
from bau baselines by 2020 are estimated for the Accord, which includes
pledges by 14 of the 25 large emitting economies. For the United States and the
European Union, pledges were also made for reductions by 2050. The central
policy scenario postulates straight-line reductions from 2020 levels to a 2050
target of uniform per capita emissions level of 1.43 tons of carbon dioxide per
year, broadly consistent with the objective of limiting atmospheric concentra-
1. The RICE model developed by William Nordhaus (2010b); those of McKinsey (2009) as compiled
by Ackerman et al. (2010); and specially estimated equations based on model results compiled in
Energy Modeling Forum 22 (see appendix G).
2 Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance

tion to 450 parts per million (ppm) and limiting global warming to 2°C.2 To
check compatibility with this objective, a summary formula is developed for
relating cumulative emissions to atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
(appendix B). The analysis next calculates costs that would be associated with
this central global abatement policy scenario. Alternative policy scenarios are
also considered (appendix D).3
In chapter 6 the efficiency of abatement is examined further for the
Copenhagen Convergence scenario. The marginal cost of abatement for each
country and each period is calculated for the scenario. A cost minimization
exercise is then conducted in which countries are allowed to trade emissions
rights subject to the constraint that total global abatement for the year in
question remains unchanged. Further scope for cost minimization is then
examined through allowing reallocation of emissions cutbacks across time in
the four decades and under alternative discount rate assumptions.
Chapter 7 turns to implications for international climate finance. A method
is proposed for converting abatement cost estimates into corresponding invest-
ment requirements, based on the relationship between capital stock and
output flows of magnitudes capable of compensating for the abatement cost
impacts. Investment requirements are then estimated applying this method to
the range of abatement cost estimates. For developing countries, these invest-
ment requirements are compared with the benchmark figure of $100 billion per
year in financing by 2020 endorsed by industrial countries in the Copenhagen
Accord. As this amount is meant to include costs of adaptation to warming not
avoided, the analysis also considers the range of adaptation costs. The discus-
sion also considers the role of “carbon offset” payments, whereby industrial-
country firms purchase emissions reductions in developing countries as a
means of meeting emissions limits, in relationship to the benchmark financing
total. Chapter 8 provides a synthesis of the estimates of the study.
Principal Findings
Among the most important findings of this study are the following:
n The Copenhagen pledges for 2020 would cut global carbon dioxide emis-
sions by 9 percent from the bau baseline, from 35.9 to 32.7 billion tons of
carbon dioxide (GtCO2).
2. This path would require somewhat deeper cuts for the European Union and United States by
2050 than the two offered in their Copenhagen Accord submissions. Note also that the Copenhagen
Convergence scenario limits concentrations by 2050 to somewhat less than 450 ppm for carbon
dioxide alone, but somewhat more for CO2-equivalent of all greenhouse gases, as discussed later.
3. These include the influential proposal by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP
2007) as well as two leading proposals by academic researchers (Chakravarty et al. 2009, Frankel
2008). Using the RICE model cost parameters, a range of abatement costs corresponding to the
range of policy scenarios is explored.
OVERVIEW 3
n To achieve a path limiting warming to 2°C and atmospheric concentra-
tions of CO2 to 450 ppm, it will be necessary to cut 2050 emissions from
a baseline of 53.2 to 13.3 GtCO2 (a reduction of 75 percent from baseline)
(table 5.1 in chapter 5).
n In 1990–2006, efficiency of output relative to energy use rose at 1.4 percent
annually for the 25 largest economies, while energy efficiency per unit
of carbon required did not grow at all. From 2010 to 2030, baseline EIA
projections indicate 2 percent annual output/energy efficiency growth but
again zero energy/carbon efficiency growth. To achieve the needed emis-
sions cuts from 2020 to 2050, it will be necessary for the sum of these two
efficiency growth rates to reach 6 percent annually (table 5.2). Most of
this acceleration likely will need to come from a shift to carbon-spare or
carbon-free energy.
n To mobilize global political support for abatement, particularly in devel-
oping countries, it would be appropriate after 2020 to pursue international
convergence to uniform per capita emissions by 2050. The required 2050
level would be 1.43 tons of carbon dioxide (tCO2) per person, compared
with today’s levels of 19.3 tons in the United States, 5.0 tons in China, and
1.4 tons in India.
n This Copenhagen Convergence path would be only modestly more ambi-
tious than the 2050 cutbacks of 80 percent from 1990 levels pledged at
Copenhagen by the European Union and 83 percent from 2005 levels
pledged by the United States (reaching, respectively, 84 and 89 percent
from 1990 and 2005 levels).
n The 75 percent global cutback from bau baseline by 2050 would represent
89 percent cuts for industrial countries on average and 69 percent cuts for
developing countries. Because of their rapid baseline growth in output
and carbon, such emerging-market economies as China, Malaysia, South
Africa, and South Korea would need to cut emissions by 85 to 90 percent
from the 2050 baseline, surprisingly similar in depth to cuts needed by
industrial countries.
n Despite these seemingly daunting cutbacks, on the basis of the leading
abatement cost models it turns out that the costs would be modest. By
2030, in the prominent RICE model abatement costs would amount to
about one-fourth of one percent of GDP (0.28 percent for industrial coun-
tries, 0.19 percent for developing countries); by 2050 the RICE-based esti-
mate reaches 1.2 percent of world product (1.6 percent industrial countries,
1.0 percent developing countries; table 5.4). Costs in the leading bottom-
up model (McKinsey) are considerably lower. Costs are somewhat higher in
a family of regional cost functions estimated from results of the Stanford
Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 22 model survey, but not radically so. In
the preferred variant, the EMF 22–based costs by 2030 amount to 0.67 per-
cent of GDP for industrial countries and 0.62 percent for developing coun-
tries (table G.2 in appendix G).
4 Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance

n Abatement costs can be limited further by international emissions trade,
and by shifting cutbacks earlier in time, toward a more aggressive target
by 2020 than the Copenhagen pledges. The present value of abatement
costs over the next 40 years amounts to 0.45 percent of world product (dis-
counting at 1.5 percent, and less if higher discount rates are used). If emis-
sions trading is allowed and marginal costs are equalized across countries,
the present value of abatement costs falls to 0.40 percent. If in addition
the cutbacks are moved forward in time, especially in China, where there
are no cutbacks yet from baseline by 2020, the present value of abatement
costs can be further reduced to 0.33 percent of the present value of world
product over the four decades (table 6.4 in chapter 6).
n The global carbon dioxide price that emerges when trading is allowed
stands at $54 per ton of carbon dioxide in 2030 (in 2005 dollars, RICE
model cost-function basis), in the same range as the $40 per ton of carbon
dioxide “allowance” price estimated by the US Congressional Budget Office
for US abatement under the Waxman-Markey bill passed by the House of
Representatives in 2009 (table 6.2).
n Based on a simple model relating capital stock to output, the annual invest-
ment needed to create economic capacity providing output equal to offset
abatement costs would stand at about 40 percent of the annual abate-
ment cost magnitude (rather than two to three times as high as implied
in some recent official studies). Translation of the estimated abatement
costs in developing countries using this approach into corresponding
annual investment yields a total of $53 billion in China and $41 billion
in other developing countries by 2020 and, respectively, $176 billion and
$118 billion by 2030 (table 8.2 in chapter 8).4
n The main estimates of adaptation costs (for such measures as coastal protec-
tion and response to increased malaria threat) place these at about $40 bil-
lion annually by 2020 and $50 billion by 2030. Together, and excluding China
(with the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves) as not needing interna-
tional financing, the abatement investment costs plus adaptation costs sum
to about $80 billion for 2020, on the same order of magnitude as the $100
billion Copenhagen pledge (and without counting offset purchases).
The broad implication of the estimates of this study is that that although
the costs and financing requirements for aggressive international action
limiting climate change will be substantial, they should be of a sufficiently
manageable magnitude that the outcome is likely to depend more on political
will rather than economic feasibility.
4. Investment would be needed already by 2020 in China despite no change from baseline in that
year in order to set on track the abatement needed during 2020–30 to follow the Copenhagen
Convergence path. The abatement cost estimate used as the basis for the investment calculation
is the average of the estimates from the RICE model and the preferred variant of the EMF 22 esti-
mates.
OVERVIEW 5
2
Baseline Emissions under
Business as Usual
In models of abatement cost, the driving force in the calculations is typically

the depth of the emissions cut from a business as usual (bau) baseline. The first
step in this study is thus to estimate bau emissions through 2050. The estimates
are developed for the world as a whole and at the country level for the 25 largest
emitting economies (with the European Union treated as a single country). A
decomposition framework useful for this purpose distinguishes four influences
determining emissions growth: rising population, rising per capita GDP, trends
in efficiency in energy use per unit of GDP, and trends in carbon-saving increases
in energy per unit of carbon emitted. For 25 economies accounting for 92 percent
of global emissions in 2007, emissions rose at an annual rate of 1.8 percent from
1990 to 2006, composed of 1 percent for population growth, 2 percent for per
capita output growth, offset by 1.4 percent annual increase in output efficiency
of energy, with virtually no change in efficiency of carbon usage of energy.
Baseline projections through 2030 are taken from the Energy Information
Administration. They show that by 2030 China alone will have approximately
the same emissions as the United States, European Union, and Japan combined.
The projections are extended through 2050 by applying projections of popula-
tion growth and extrapolations of the 2020–30 country-specific growth rates
of per capita output, energy efficiency, and carbon efficiency. The resulting
global totals by 2050 amount to 53 billion tons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2), in
the same broad range as a key scenario used by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC): “A2,” with 61 GtCO2 by 2050.
Framework
For any of the major emitting countries, let Et = emissions of carbon dioxide
(excluding from deforestation, not considered in the present study) in year t.
7
Let Nt = population in year t. Let qt = real GDP per capita, at 2005 constant
international purchasing power parity (ppp) dollars. Let t = output per unit
of energy, or “energy efficiency.” Let t = energy per unit of carbon dioxide, or
“carbon efficiency.” Referring to constant rates over a period of a decade, for
the decade and country in question the path of population will follow:
Nt = N0ent (2.1)
where n is the rate of growth of population, subscript 0 denotes the year at the
beginning of the decade, and e is the base of the natural logarithm. Similarly,
output per capita will follow the path:
qt = q0egt (2.2)
where g is the growth rate of per capita income. Total production will then
equal:
Qt = Ntqt (2.3)
Total carbon dioxide emissions will then equal total output divided by
the energy efficiency parameter (output per unit of energy) times the carbon
efficiency parameter (energy per unit of carbon), or:
Qt
Et = (2.4)
OtJt
The time path for the energy and carbon efficiency parameters, in turn,
will be:
Ot = O0ewt (2.5)
and
Jt = J0ect (2.6)
where w is the annual rate of increase in energy efficiency of output and c is the
annual rate of increase in carbon efficiency of energy.
Substituting, the time path for carbon dioxide emissions will be:
N0entq0egt
Et =
O0ewtJ0ect
(2.7)
N0q0
= e(n+g–w–c)t = E0e(n+g–w–c)t
O0J0
The annual rate of change of emissions will then be the ratio of the deriva-
tive of this expression to the expression itself:
. dEt /dt (n+g–w–c)E0e(n+g–w–c)t

Et = = =n+g–w–c (2.8)
Et E0e(n+g–w–c)t
8 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

So it turns out that the rate of growth of emissions for the country and
decade in question will simply equal the period growth rate of population plus
the growth rate of per capita GDP minus the growth rate of the energy effi-
ciency of output minus the growth rate of the carbon efficiency of energy.
Decomposing Emissions Trends, 1990–2006

The framework in equations 2.1 to 2.8 can be used to decompose the growth
of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels (and hence excluding defores-
tation) by major emitting nations in recent decades. Table 2.1 reports this de-
composition.
The six largest emitters in 2006 were China, the United States, the European
Union, Russia, India, and Japan. Emissions growth rates for 1990–2006 were
high in China and India, intermediate in the United States, and low in the
European Union, Japan, and Russia. High emissions growth in China reflected
very high growth in per capita GDP and low (negative) growth in carbon effi-
ciency of energy (c), which more than offset high growth in energy efficiency
of output (w). In this respect it is encouraging that China has announced its
intention to reduce the carbon intensity of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020 (as
discussed below). In the 2006–10 five-year plan, China instead solely empha-
sized increased energy efficiency.1 In India, rapid emissions growth reflected
high demographic expansion, high growth in GDP per capita, and substan-
tial negative growth in carbon efficiency of energy, which together more than
offset relatively high growth in energy efficiency of output.
Low growth of emissions in Japan reflected low population growth
and only moderate economic growth and was achieved despite low growth
in energy efficiency of output (albeit from an already high base). In Russia,
carbon dioxide emissions declined by about one-fourth from 1990 to 2006 as
a consequence of a decline in GDP and increase in output efficiency of energy
(but only to a still low level of  by 2006). Intermediate emissions growth in the
United States reflected intermediate population and economic growth only
partially offset by relatively rapid energy efficiency growth, with virtually no
change in carbon efficiency of energy.
For the 25 major emitting countries (including the European Union as
one), emissions rose at 1.82 percent annually from 1990 to 2006. The largest
source of emissions growth was from per capita output growth (about 2.1 per-
cent). Population growth added about 1.1 percent per year, but rising energy
efficiency of output provided an offset of about 1.4 percent per year. There was
almost no contribution at all to emissions restraint from the source of carbon
efficiency of energy (–0.03 percent per year).
1. For the 2006–10 five-year plan, China pledged to reduce energy use per unit of GDP by 20
percent. This amounted to a pace of 3.7 percent per year, compared with 4.8 percent achieved in
1990–2006 (table 2.1).
BASELINE EMISSIONS UNDER BUSINESS AS USUAL 9

10
Table 2.1 Carbon dioxide emissions: Growth decomposition, 1990–2006a

CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE
Efficiency
Level, 2006
Growth rates, 1990–2006 (annual percent) parameters, 2006b
Country/ (million
economy metric tons) Total n g w c O
J
Argentina 173 2.70 1.13 2.76 1.36 –0.17 6.66 0.40
Australia 372 1.48 1.18 1.98 1.07 0.60 5.38 0.33
Brazil 352 3.27 1.48 1.23 –0.51 –0.05 7.47 0.64
Canada 544 1.19 1.01 1.75 1.18 0.39 4.32 0.50
China 6,099 5.79 0.84 8.84 4.82 –0.93 3.16 0.31
Egypt 167 4.91 1.87 2.20 –0.13 –0.71 5.37 0.37
European Union 4,050 –0.23 0.22 1.96 1.57 0.83 7.17 0.45
India 1,509 4.89 1.74 4.33 2.51 –1.32 4.73 0.37
Indonesia 333 4.97 1.52 2.96 1.03 –1.53 4.32 0.54
Iran 467 4.50 0.86 2.76 –2.07 1.19 3.70 0.37
Japan 1,293 0.61 0.20 1.12 0.24 0.47 7.50 0.41
Kazakhstan 193 –1.88 –0.46 1.85 2.52 0.75 2.36 0.32
Malaysia 188 7.49 2.07 3.80 –0.84 –0.78 4.36 0.36
Mexico 436 0.78 1.47 1.59 0.77 1.51 7.89 0.41
Pakistan 143 4.57 2.28 1.89 0.41 –0.81 4.76 0.56
Russia 1,564 –1.77 –0.25 0.08 1.46 0.13 2.69 0.43
Saudi Arabia 381 3.58 3.25 0.73 –1.45 1.85 3.95 0.38
South Africa 414 1.36 1.38 0.78 –0.05 0.85 3.27 0.31
South Korea 475 4.22 0.72 4.63 0.10 1.03 5.31 0.46
Taiwan 273 4.82 0.73 4.52 0.43 –0.01 5.62 0.38
Thailand 272 6.53 0.99 3.60 –0.77 –1.17 4.19 0.38
Turkey 269 3.80 1.66 2.47 0.53 –0.21 9.09 0.35
Ukraine 319 –4.07 –0.64 –1.81 1.33 0.29 2.05 0.43
United States 5,748 1.04 1.10 1.81 1.75 0.12 5.49 0.40
Venezuela 171 2.12 1.77 0.73 0.32 0.06 4.44 0.36
25 emitters 26,207 1.82 1.09 2.06 1.36 –0.03 5.13 0.39

n = population; g = ppp GDP per capita; w = energy efficiency; c = carbon efficiency
a. Fossil fuels and cement; excludes deforestation.
b. Thousands of 2005 purchasing power parity (ppp) GDP dollars per ton oil equivalent (toe) and toe per tCO2.
Source: See appendix A.
Baseline through 2030
The Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009) provides business as
usual projections of emissions by major economy and region through 2030.
Appendix A discusses the use of these projections as the primary basis for the
bau baseline in the present study. Tables A.1 through A.4 report the corre-
sponding projections of population, real GDP per capita (2005 ppp dollars),
emissions per capita, and annual energy consumption.2 Table 2.2 reports the
resulting bau baseline estimates used in the present study. In the aggregates,
Russia is included in the industrial-country subtotal.
In the bau baseline based on the EIA projections, global emissions rise
from 29.5 GtCO2 in 2007 to 41.4 GtCO2 by 2030. The pace of emissions growth
decelerates only marginally, from about 1.7 percent per year from 1990 to 2007
to about 1.5 percent in the coming decade and 1.4 percent in the 2020s. China’s
share in global emissions, which has risen from 11 percent in 1990 to 22.4 per-
cent in 2007, rises further to 28.7 percent by 2030, or more than its share in
global population at that time (17.7 percent; table A.1). In contrast, the share of
the United States, the European Union, and Japan in global emissions, which
stood at 46.7 percent in 1990 and had fallen to 37.7 percent by 2007, declines
further to 28 percent by 2030—almost identical to the share of China alone.
Table A.4 in appendix A reports the EIA’s projections of energy consump-
tion through 2030 for regions and major economies. Given the projections
of purchasing power parity per capita GDP, population, energy consumption,
and emissions, it is possible to decompose emissions growth into the compo-
nents discussed above (population, n; ppp per capita GDP, g; subtraction of
energy efficiency growth, w; and subtraction of carbon efficiency growth, c).
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report these bau baseline decompositions for 2010–20 and
2020–30, respectively.3
Over the next two decades, continued high economic growth in China
combines with the already high emissions base to drive the increase in the
share of world emissions to about 30 percent. Even so, the projections allow
for some deceleration in China’s per capita growth: from 8.8 percent annually
in 1990–2006 (table 2.1) to about 6 percent in the 2010s (table 2.3) and about
4 percent in the 2020s (table 2.4).
The components of emissions growth in tables 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 do not
show radical changes from one decade to the next. For the 25 major emit-
2. Specifically estimated by EIA for the largest economies and based on regional trends for others;
see appendix A. Note that “European Union” in the table is for the 27 current members of the
European Union. The EU estimate is calculated as the base level for 2007 for these countries specif-
ically, and then for 2020 and 2030 it is based on the proportionate emissions growth for “OECD
Europe” in the EIA projections.
3. Data for major industrial countries are from the EIA estimates. For countries without detailed
estimates in the EIA source, the energy, economic growth, and emissions projections are based on
averages for the regions in which the countries are located.

Table 2.2 Business as usual baseline emissions of carbon dioxide
(million metric tons)
Level Annual percent
growth
Country/economy 1990 2007 2020 2030 2007–20 2020–30
Argentina 113 172 207 225 1.42 0.84
Australia 293 377 401 433 0.49 0.76
Brazil 209 352 511 642 2.87 2.28
Canada 450 530 601 651 0.97 0.80
China 2,415 6,603 9,544 11,889 2.83 2.20
Egypt 76 192 210 239 0.71 1.29
European Union 4,200 4,050 4,070 4,133 0.04 0.15
India 691 1,574 2,083 2,471 2.15 1.71
Indonesia 150 416 475 633 1.01 2.88
Iran 227 476 621 730 2.05 1.62
Japan 1,172 1,236 1,264 1,199 0.17 –0.52
Kazakhstan 261 195 225 236 1.12 0.46
Malaysia 57 248 267 357 0.58 2.88
Mexico 385 445 471 563 0.44 1.78
Pakistan 69 148 203 271 2.41 2.88
Russia 2,075 1,585 1,785 1,815 0.91 0.17
Saudi Arabia 215 423 508 597 1.41 1.62
South Africa 334 434 523 595 1.44 1.29
South Korea 242 477 569 627 1.36 0.97
Taiwan 126 263 388 518 3.01 2.88
Thailand 96 309 388 517 1.75 2.88
Turkey 147 290 271 275 –0.53 0.15
Ukraine 612 321 372 389 1.12 0.46
United States 4,865 5,812 5,821 6,242 0.01 0.70
Venezuela 122 153 205 223 2.25 0.84
25 emitters 19,600 27,080 31,984 36,470 1.28 1.31
Rest of world industrial 301 522 515 541 –0.11 0.48
Rest of world developing 2,000 1,849 3,436 4,374 4.77 2.41
World 21,901 29,451 35,935 41,384 1.53 1.41
Industriala 13,356 14,112 14,457 15,014 0.19 0.38
Developing 8,545 15,339 21,478 26,370 2.59 2.05
a. Includes Russia.
Source: See appendix A; author’s calculations.

Table 2.3 Decomposition of emissions growth, 2010–20
(annual percent)
Country/economy n g w c Emissions
Argentina 0.93 2.36 2.72 0.35 0.23
Australia 1.07 2.33 2.00 0.61 0.78
Brazil 1.02 2.73 1.34 0.23 2.17
Canada 0.75 1.60 1.13 0.41 0.82
China 0.60 6.15 3.60 0.50 2.65
Egypt 1.79 2.15 2.30 0.33 1.32
European Union 0.04 2.00 1.37 0.41 0.26
India 1.23 4.86 2.70 0.72 2.66
Indonesia 0.96 3.63 1.71 0.47 2.42
Iran 1.00 1.97 1.46 0.11 1.40
Japan –0.42 1.46 0.38 0.24 0.42
Kazakhstan 0.33 3.85 3.05 0.28 0.85
Malaysia 1.62 3.63 2.37 0.47 2.42
Mexico 1.03 2.83 1.56 0.01 2.28
Pakistan 1.42 3.63 2.17 0.47 2.42
Russia –0.53 4.17 2.53 0.36 0.76
Saudi Arabia 1.39 1.97 1.86 0.11 1.40
South Africa –0.12 2.15 0.39 0.33 1.32
South Korea 0.15 3.61 2.89 0.56 0.31
Taiwan 0.11 3.63 0.86 0.47 2.42
Thailand 0.48 3.63 1.23 0.47 2.42
Turkey 1.09 2.00 2.42 0.41 0.26
Ukraine –0.65 3.85 2.07 0.28 0.85
United States 0.96 1.78 2.20 0.23 0.31
Venezuela 1.39 2.36 3.17 0.35 0.23
25 emitters 0.77 2.87 1.96 0.29 1.39
Rest of world industrial 1.05 1.41 1.72 0.33 0.40
Rest of world developing 1.77 3.00 2.46 –0.40 2.70
World 1.05 2.76 2.08 0.24 1.49
Industrial 0.26 2.10 1.64 0.32 0.40
Developing 1.20 3.88 2.52 0.26 2.30
Source: Author’s calculations.

Table 2.4 Decomposition of emissions growth, 2020–30
(annual percent)
Country/economy n g w c Emissions
Argentina 0.73 2.19 2.02 0.07 0.84
Australia 0.85 2.28 2.26 0.11 0.76
Brazil 0.76 2.84 1.43 –0.12 2.28
Canada 0.58 1.70 1.24 0.24 0.80
China 0.21 4.25 2.18 0.09 2.20
Egypt 1.43 1.29 1.40 0.04 1.29
European Union –0.11 1.93 1.39 0.28 0.15
India 0.97 3.41 2.51 0.16 1.71
Indonesia 0.76 3.27 1.38 –0.23 2.88
Iran 0.59 2.01 1.01 –0.04 1.62
Japan –0.69 0.86 0.35 0.35 –0.52
Kazakhstan 0.00 2.90 2.38 0.06 0.46
Malaysia 1.39 3.27 2.00 –0.23 2.88
Mexico 0.81 2.80 1.85 –0.02 1.78
Pakistan 1.25 3.27 1.87 –0.23 2.88
Russia –0.64 3.01 1.92 0.29 0.17
Saudi Arabia 1.28 2.01 1.71 –0.04 1.62
South Africa 0.07 1.29 0.04 0.04 1.29
South Korea –0.07 2.83 1.80 –0.02 0.97
Taiwan –0.13 3.27 0.49 –0.23 2.88
Thailand 0.25 3.27 0.86 –0.23 2.88
Turkey 0.77 1.93 2.27 0.28 0.15
Ukraine –0.75 2.90 1.63 0.06 0.46
United States 0.90 1.70 1.85 0.05 0.70
Venezuela 1.11 2.19 2.41 0.07 0.84
25 emitters 0.54 2.48 1.68 0.03 1.31
Rest of world industrial 0.67 1.55 1.59 0.14 0.48
Rest of world developing 1.56 3.00 2.76 –0.62 2.41
World 0.84 2.46 1.92 –0.03 1.41
Industrial 0.15 1.93 1.52 0.18 0.38
Developing 0.97 3.19 2.19 –0.08 2.05

ting countries, population growth decelerates from 1.1 percent annually in
1990–2006 to 0.77 percent in 2010–20 and 0.54 percent in 2020–30. Per capita
growth accelerates, from 2.1 to 2.9 percent followed by 2.5 percent. Although
the individual-country rates of growth per capita tend to remain stable or ease,
the rising shares of China, India, and other rapidly growing emerging-market
economies in global output boosts the overall per capita growth rate of the
25 major emitting countries. Annual growth in output efficiency of energy
also rises, from 1.4 to 2.0 percent followed by 1.7 percent. Carbon efficiency
(energy per unit of carbon) rises modestly and then ebbs again (from –0.03 to
0.29 percent, followed by 0.03 percent). In other words, the outlook is business
as usual in two senses of the phrase: no special change from climate action and
relative continuity (inertia) in the various factors contributing to emissions
growth. Virtually the entire reduction in emissions growth from the recent
historical period to the decade of the 2020s is accounted for by a half-percent
deceleration in annual population growth. Although there is some acceleration
in energy efficiency growth, it is offset by a rise in per capita GDP growth.
Extending the Baseline through 2050

Climate policy deliberations have focused on the period through 2050. Before
examining abatement costs, it is therefore necessary to extend the bau baseline
through 2050. Population projections by the US Census Bureau (2009) provide
a basis for estimating the rate of growth of population (n) for 2030–40 and
2040–50. For economic growth per capita, energy efficiency growth, and carbon
efficiency growth, the strong inertia just discussed suggests that a reasonable
first approximation is continuation at the rates expected for the 2030s. Table
2.5 reports the resulting emissions growth components for 2030–40 and 2040–
50, along with the resulting absolute levels of bau baseline emissions by 2040
and 2050. The emissions growth rates are simply the population growth rates
for the decade in question plus continuation of the other growth rate compo-
nents (+g, –w, –c) experienced in 2020–30 as shown in table 2.4.
The global level of CO2 emissions by 2050 resulting from these assump-
tions turns out to be broadly compatible with the more plausible among the
emissions paths considered in the 2007 IPCC report. Thus, in the second
highest path in that assessment, “A2,” global emissions were projected to reach
16.5 billion tons of carbon (GtC) by 2050, or 60.6 GtCO2 (IPCC 2007a, 803),
broadly similar to the estimate of 53.2 GtCO2 in table 2.5.
Some recent studies have suggested that faster-than-expected emissions
growth in the period 2000–06 means that the A2 path considerably under-
states likely future emissions, even though it had previously been regarded as
being toward the higher end of reasonable scenarios (see, e.g., Sheehan 2008).4
4. Actual CO2 emissions growth from 2000 to 2006 averaged 3.1 percent (van Vuuren and Riahi
2008, 241). In comparison, the highest of six scenarios considered by the IPCC (A1B) called for
3.4 percent annual growth from 2000 to 2010; the median scenario rate was 2.0 percent. Scenario

Table 2.5 Business as usual baseline, 2030–50
Population Emissions
Annual growth Annual growth Levels
(percent) (percent) (million tCO2)
Country/economy 2030–40 2040–50 2030–40 2040–50 2040 2050
Argentina 0.55 0.37 0.66 0.48 241 252
Australia 0.61 0.46 0.53 0.38 457 474
Brazil 0.53 0.29 2.05 1.81 789 945
Canada 0.38 0.26 0.60 0.48 691 725
China –0.05 –0.21 1.93 1.77 14,426 17,220
Egypt 1.20 0.96 1.06 0.82 266 288
European Union –0.24 –0.37 0.02 –0.10 4,143 4,101
India 0.73 0.53 1.47 1.27 2,863 3,249
Indonesia 0.54 0.27 2.66 2.39 826 1,049
Iran 0.27 0.11 1.30 1.14 832 932
Japan –0.89 –1.03 –0.72 –0.86 1,116 1,023
Kazakhstan –0.19 –0.37 0.27 0.09 242 245
Malaysia 1.11 0.91 2.60 2.40 463 588
Mexico 0.56 0.34 1.54 1.31 657 749
Pakistan 1.01 0.76 2.64 2.39 353 448
Russia –0.63 –0.65 0.18 0.15 1,847 1,876
Saudi Arabia 1.42 1.24 1.76 1.58 711 833
South Africa 0.04 0.07 1.26 1.29 675 767
South Korea –0.44 –0.79 0.61 0.26 666 684
Taiwan –0.49 –0.82 2.52 2.19 666 829
Thailand –0.00 –0.22 2.63 2.41 673 856
Turkey 0.51 0.24 –0.12 –0.38 272 261
Ukraine –0.78 –0.84 0.43 0.37 406 422
United States 0.83 0.79 0.62 0.59 6,644 7,046
Venezuela 0.82 0.59 0.54 0.32 235 242
25 emitters 0.35 0.20 1.21 1.14 41,159 46,107
Rest of world industrial 0.32 0.04 0.13 –0.15 548 540
Rest of world developing 1.35 1.17 2.14 1.90 5,416 6,549
World 0.67 0.53 1.30 1.21 47,123 53,196
Industrial 0.07 0.01 0.28 0.22 15,446 15,785
Developing 0.77 0.61 1.83 1.66 31,677 37,410

However, global economic growth was unusually rapid in this period, averaging
5 percent annually in 2004–07 versus 3.4 percent in 2000–03 and 3 percent
in 1990–99 (ppp GDP; IMF 2010). In contrast, the global financial crisis cut
world economic growth to an average of only 1.1 percent per year in 2008–09.
Correspondingly, there was an estimated 1.3 percent decline in global emis-
sions from 2008 to 2009 (Myhre, Alterskjaer, and Lowe 2010). Even before the
global recession some analysts judged that the recent emissions trends over-
stated prospective long-term growth and that there was no reason yet to depart
from the range of emissions scenarios previously considered by the IPCC (van
Vuuren and Riahi 2008). Nonetheless, to the extent that the bau baseline used
here is understated, the estimates of emissions reductions and abatement costs
will also tend to be understated.
The carbon dioxide emissions baseline includes only emissions from fossil
fuels and industrial processes. Although emissions from deforestation and
land use are also currently important, at about 4 GtCO2 per year, the IPCC
emissions scenarios typically anticipate that they will decline substantially,
falling to a median of 1.1 GtCO2 by 2030 and 0.6 GtCO2 by 2050 (IPCC 2001,
801).5 These levels are sufficiently low to omit from the analysis, especially
considering that although their inclusion would tend to boost the baseline
(modestly), it would also tend to reduce unit abatement costs (because of
low-cost opportunities in afforestation and reduced deforestation). Finally,
non-CO2 greenhouse gases and aerosols are also omitted from the main anal-
ysis. Appendix C considers their additional influence and estimates that a
target of 450 ppm for CO2-equivalent including other greenhouse gases and
aerosols would translate to a more ambitious target of 414 ppm for carbon
dioxide itself.
A2 was at the median through 2010 but second highest by 2050, with average annual growth for
2000–50 amounting to 1.7 percent (versus 2.4 percent in the highest path, A1T). Calculated from
IPCC (2001, 801).
5. However, in scenario A2 deforestation and land use still account for about 4 GtCO2 by 2030 and
about 3 GtCO2 by 2050.

3
Abatement Initiatives
in the Copenhagen Accord
and Cancún Agreements
In December 2009, heads of state met in Copenhagen for the 15th Conference
of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). In the resulting Copenhagen Accord they pledged targets for
emissions reductions by 2020. For the first time, major emerging-market and
developing countries undertook abatement pledges. Their previous omission
had been a serious shortcoming of the Kyoto Protocol. Subsequently incor-
porated more formally into the UNFCCC at the 16th Conference of Parties
in November–December 2010 in Cancún, Mexico, the Copenhagen Accord
pledges provide the best basis for identifying prospective abatement paths
through 2020. Together with policy scenarios developed in this study for
subsequent international action, they serve as the basis for the abatement cost
estimates compiled in chapters 5 and 6.
As set forth in chapter 5, the 2020 targets are only a modest beginning
in the task of limiting global warming. They would reduce global emis-
sions from about 35.9 billion tons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) under busi-
ness as usual (bau) to 32.7 GtCO2 (table 5.1 in chapter 5), a cutback of only
9 percent. Reductions would be 17 percent from 2005 levels for the United
States and 20 percent below 1990 levels for the European Union. Because bau
emissions paths are virtually flat through 2020 for these two leading world
economies, the corresponding cutbacks from baseline are both approximately
17 percent as well (tables 2.2 and 5.3). Among emerging-market economies,
Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and South Africa pledged cutbacks
of approximately one-third from the 2020 baselines. In contrast, China and
India pledged cutbacks in carbon intensity of GDP (by 40 to 45 percent and
20 to 25 percent from 2005 levels, respectively). However, because of antici-
pated increases in energy efficiency even in the bau baseline, the resulting emis-
19
sions levels for these two largest emerging-market nations would not require
cutbacks from baseline. Even so, the limits would constrain any tendency
toward “carbon leakage” through increased carbon-based export activity that
could result from complete free-riding.
Copenhagen Accord Pledges

The Copenhagen Accord (see UNFCCC 2010a) called for limiting warming
to 2C and stated that an assessment by 2015 should determine whether the
goal should be further strengthened to a limit of 1.5C. Under the Accord,
Annex I parties of the UNFCCC (industrial and former transition economies)
were expected to submit “economy-wide emissions targets” for 2020. Other
(emerging-market and developing) economies were invited to submit volun-
tary “nationally appropriate mitigation actions.” Table 3.1 lists the pledges of
the main emitting economies.
The United States set as its 2020 target a reduction of emissions by 17 per-
cent from the level in 2005 as the base year (5.8 GtCO2; CDIAC 2009). It also
stated a reduction of 83 percent below the 2005 level as the target for 2050.
These were also the targets in the Waxman-Markey bill passed by the House of
Representatives in June 2009 (Govtrack 2009). The European Union pledged to
reduce emissions by 20 percent by 2020 from 1990 levels and by as much as 30
percent “provided that other developed countries commit themselves to compa-
rable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately
to their responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 2010a). The
most likely prospect, however, is that the European Union will not consider
other efforts sufficient and hence will remain with the 20 percent cut target
for 2020. In its submission, the European Union further stated that developed
countries should reduce emissions by 80 to 95 percent below 1990 levels by
2050, so implicitly the EU target for itself by 2050 is at least an 80 percent cut.
Among other major industrial economies, Japan pledged a 25 percent re-
duction by 2020 from its 1990 base, “premised on the establishment of a fair
and effective international framework in which all major economies participate
and on agreement by those economies on ambitious targets.” Canada pledged
a cut of 17 percent by 2020 from a base year of 2005, “to be aligned with the
final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in enacted legisla-
tion.” Australia pledged unconditionally a 5 percent cut by 2020 below 2000
levels. It also pledged a cut of up to 25 percent if an ambitious international
agreement were reached that would stabilize CO2-equivalent concentrations
at 450 parts per million (ppm); and of up to 15 percent for a less ambitious
agreement in which “major developing economies commit to substantially
restrain emissions and advanced economies take on commitments comparable
to Australia’s.” (The calculations below place Australia’s cut at 10 percent.)
The major emerging-market economies chose two alternative approaches
for their pledges of nationally appropriate mitigation measures. Brazil, Indo-
nesia, Mexico, South Korea, and South Africa undertook cuts of about one-

Table 3.1 Country targets and initiatives under the Copenhagen
Accord
2007 levela
(million tons
Country Pledge for emissions reduction by 2020 Base year of CO2)
Annex I
Australia 5 percent (15 or 25 percent contingent) 2000 377
Canada Same as the United States 2005 530
European Union 20 percent (30 percent contingent); implied 1990 4,050
80 percent by 2050
Japan 25 percent (contingent) 1990 1,236
New Zealand 10 to 20 percent (contingent) 1990 39
Norway 30 to 40 percent 1990 46
Russia 15 to 25 percent 1990 1,585
Switzerland 20 percent (30 percent contingent) 1990 46
United States 17 percent; 83 percent by 2050 2005 5,812
Other
Argentina Measures for energy efficiency and support to — 172
renewable energy
Brazil 36 to 39 percent cut by 2020; focus on bau 352
deforestation and agriculture
China 40 to 45 percent cut in carbon intensity of 2005 6,603
GDP; 15 percent nonfossil energy
India 20 to 25 percent cut in carbon intensity of 2005 1,574
GDP
Indonesia 26 percent; focus on afforestation, reduced bau 416
deforestation
Kazakhstan 15 percent 1992 195
Mexico 30 percent bau 445
Singapore 16 percent bau 148
South Africa 34 percent bau 434
South Korea 30 percent bau 477
Total 24,537
bau = business as usual
a. Excludes deforestation.
Source: Table 2.2; US Energy Information Administration; and UNFCCC, Copenhagen Accord, http://unfccc.int/
home/items/5262.php.
third from bau baselines otherwise attained by 2020. In the case of Brazil, about
two-thirds of the overall cut of 36 to 39 percent was to come from forestry and
agricultural measures. Considering that deforestation accounts for about half
ABATEMENT INITIATIVES 21
of Brazil’s emissions, the implication is that industrial emissions (the emis-
sions considered in the analysis of this study) would be cut from the bau base-
line by about 24 percent.1
China and India chose the other main alternative of the major emerging-
market economies: statement of a target expressed as a reduction in the carbon
intensity of GDP. China pledged a reduction of 40 to 45 percent in carbon
dioxide emissions per unit of economic output by 2020 compared with the
2005 base. It also pledged to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary
energy consumption to 15 percent by 2020 and set specific targets for increased
forest coverage. Its submission specifically referred to UNFCCC Article 4, para-
graph 7, which premises developing-country action on industrial-country
implementation of commitments on financial resources and transfer of tech-
nology. For its part, India set as its goal a reduction in the nonagricultural
emissions intensity of GDP by 20 to 25 percent by 2020 from the 2005 level.
India also cited Article 4, paragraph 7.
The bau projections set forth above provide a basis for examining the
meaning of the pledges by China and India. China’s CO2 emissions stood at
5.63 billion tons in 2005 (CDIAC 2009). Its bau baseline is at 9.54 GtCO2 by
2020 (table 2.2). The baseline emissions multiple from 2005 to 2020 is thus
1.69. In comparison, for 2005–20 per capita GDP growth is expected to average
6.9 percent per year (appendix table A.2) and population growth 0.6 percent,
placing total growth at 7.5 percent per year. This growth would increase GDP
by a multiple of 2.96. Shrinking the ratio of emissions to GDP by 42.5 percent
would translate to an expansion of emissions from 2005 to 2020 by a multiple
of 1.70.2 So the pledged reduction in carbon intensity is almost identical to
the expected bau baseline. For purposes of the calculations in this study, it is
assumed that China has zero departure from baseline by 2020 in the central
policy scenario (Copenhagen Convergence) based on the Copenhagen Accord.3
The same calculation for India shows the following. Baseline emissions rise
by a multiple of 1.46, from 1.42 GtCO2 in 2005 (CDIAC 2009) to 2.08 GtCO2
in 2020 (table 2.2). Real GDP grows at 6.3 percent through 2020 (5 percent per
capita plus 1.3 percent population growth), yielding an expansion multiple of
2.50 from 2005 to 2020. Shrinking the GDP expansion by the goal for reduced
1. That is, of a total cut of 36 percent from bau, two-thirds or 24 percent would be in forestry and
agriculture, implying a cut from baseline of 48 percent in these sectors. The remaining 12 percent
of the total would amount to 24 percent of the half of total emissions coming from the industrial
sector.
2. That is, 2.96 × 0.575.

3. China’s Energy Research Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) issued projections in 2009 that are extremely close to those used here (ERI 2009). The ERI
places baseline emissions in 2020 (in the absence of a commitment to reducing carbon dioxide
emissions) at 10.2 GtCO2 (p. 806). Given the report’s projections of economic and population
growth, the implied carbon intensity of GDP declines by 42.4 percent. The corresponding esti-
mates here are 9.5 GtCO2 and 42.9 percent.

carbon intensity yields a permitted expansion of emissions by a multiple of
1.94.4 So for India also, the target is not a constraint on bau emissions. Indeed,
in the case of India the pledge includes a sizable cushion of about 33 percent.5
India is also treated in the relevant calculations below as having a zero cut from
bau baseline by 2020 in the Copenhagen Convergence scenario.
The diagnosis that the Chinese and Indian offers at Copenhagen would
not constrain them from their bau baselines can be examined from another
perspective: How do their promised rates of increase in carbon efficiency
of output compare with those over a comparable period in the past? From
1990 to 2006, emissions rose at annual growth rates of 5.8 percent for China
and 4.9 percent for India (table 2.1). Real GDP rose at 9.7 percent for China
and 6.1 percent for India (table 2.1, sum of n and g). So carbon efficiency of
output (w + c, as distinguished from carbon efficiency of energy, c) rose at the
difference, or 3.9 percent per year in China and 1.2 percent per year in India.6
Over the span of 15 years, these rates translate to a reduction in carbon per
unit of output by 43.5 and 16.1 percent, respectively. So it turns out that at
Copenhagen, China promised to do just as well as it has done over the past 15
years, but not better. India promised to do a bit better than it has in the past,
reducing carbon requirements of output by about 22 percent rather than about
16 percent. It can be argued, nonetheless, that for China to continue its high
rate of reduction of carbon per unit of output would be an important accom-
plishment. As shown in table 2.1, for the 25 largest emitting nations (with the
EU treated as one) the average rate of growth in carbon efficiency of output was
1.33 percent per year in 1990–2006 (w + c in the table). China’s corresponding
rate was 3.89 percent, almost three times as high despite coming solely from
rising energy efficiency that far exceeded falling carbon efficiency.
It should be recognized that what amounts to a bau pledge through 2020
from China and India represents a contribution to global abatement in at
least one further sense. In the absence of such undertakings, emissions from
China and India might rise well above the bau baseline as a consequence of
“carbon leakage” through production and trade responses to new opportuni-
ties presented as other nations cut back carbon-intensive production.
Cancún Agreements
The 16th Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC in Cancún in effect legiti-
mated within the United Nations framework the politically crucial but more
ad hoc pledges offered by major countries a year before at Copenhagen, where
obstruction by six countries had forced the UNFCCC merely to “take note”
4. That is, 2.50 × 0.775.

5. That is, 1.94/1.46.
6. Carbon efficiency of output rises at the sum of carbon efficiency of energy, c, and energy effi-
ciency of output, w.
ABATEMENT INITIATIVES 23
of rather than adopt the Copenhagen Accord.7 This time a forceful chairman,
Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa, declared that “consensus does
not mean unanimity” and 193 Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Cancún
Agreements despite the opposition of a single country, Bolivia (Stavins 2010).
Beyond endorsing the Copenhagen pledges, the Cancún agreements
provided for a mechanism to monitor the progress of countries in meeting
the commitments; established the Cancún Adaptation Framework for assis-
tance to vulnerable countries in adjusting to climate change already under way
(including a new climate fund managed by the World Bank); and spelled out
steps for national action plans for curbing deforestation. For the first time
in an official United Nations accord the agreements also adopted the objec-
tive of limiting global warming to no more than 2C above preindustrial levels
(UNFCCC 2010b, Houser 2010b, Stavins 2010).
The European Union and some other parties (including Japan, Australia,
Russia, and Canada) seek to transform the Cancún Agreements and the miti-
gation pledges of the Copenhagen Accord into a legally binding interna-
tional treaty as the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. It
seems far more likely, however, that progress will have to occur on the more
informal basis implied by the very name of the Ad Hoc Working Group set
up at Copenhagen. In the pivotal case of the United States, climate legisla-
tion stalled after passage of the Waxman-Markey bill in 2009, as the Great
Recession shifted priorities and landmark health care legislation as well as
financial regulatory reform preempted attention. For some time it may fall to
the Environmental Protection Agency as well as three state-level regional initia-
tives to implement what amounts to a Plan B for mitigation (Cline 2010b).
For the purposes of the present study, the principal implication of the
Cancún Agreements is that they strengthen the international political commit-
ment (albeit not in a legally binding fashion) to the abatement targets that
emerged in the Copenhagen Accord and that are the basis for the estimates for
abatement costs and emissions levels by 2020.
7. UNFCCC (2010a, Decision 2/CP.15). The formal name for the Copenhagen undertakings,
subsequently used frequently in the Cancún Agreements (UNFCCC 2010b), is Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action Under the Convention. At Copenhagen the dissenting
countries were Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Tuvalu, and Venezuela. For an account of the
negotiations at Copenhagen, see Houser (2010a).

4
Abatement Cost Functions
This chapter sets forth the next building block in the analysis of this study:
equations and parameters for estimating abatement cost as a function of the
depth of emissions cut from baseline. Three sets of estimates are used in this
study. Two are from the “top down” school, in which overall economic output
is cut back in a nonlinear fashion as emissions are reduced. The widely used
“RICE” model of William Nordhaus (2010b) has a nearly cubic cost function.
In a second set of top-down estimates the survey of other leading models in
the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) provides the basis for new esti-
mates of region-specific abatement cost curves developed in the present study
(appendix G). The third set of estimates is from the “bottom up” analysis of
McKinsey (2009), in which the focus is on a sequence of successively more costly
operations to cut emissions (with initial activities such as a shift to fluorescent
lighting having negative cost if institutional obstacles can be overcome).
The broad effect is that the cheapest abatement is found in the McKinsey
curves; next is the RICE abatement cost, which can be very low in initial
cutbacks but mounts rapidly; and highest are the EMF 22 costs, which begin
much higher but rise less rapidly with less-than-quadratic parameters. With
the quantitative estimates of the cost functions obtained in this chapter, it is
possible to apply the abatement policy scenarios examined in the next chapter
to arrive at estimates of prospective costs of international action to limit
climate change.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models

There are two schools of carbon abatement cost curves. The first is the “bottom
up” school based on specific operations (e.g., shifting to fluorescent lighting in
buildings, at the low-cost end, or car hybridization, at the high-cost end). This
25
school typically identifies some initial portion of emissions that can be elimi-
nated at zero or even negative cost, representing existing inefficiencies in energy
use. Such market imperfections as lack of finance for investment in energy-
saving measures with multi-year recovery periods, and “agency” problems (for
example, an apartment dweller does not reap the long-term benefits of energy-
efficiency investments), are invoked as causes of such opportunities for “free”
emissions savings. The second is the “top down” school, which typically models
abatement costs at the aggregate economywide level as a nonlinear function
of the extent of the target carbon cutback from the business as usual (bau)
baseline. Creyts et al. (2007) provide an example of the influential McKinsey
estimates in the bottom-up tradition; Nordhaus (2008, 2010b) represents a
leading top-down model. Both schools tend to identify reductions in abate-
ment costs over time, for a given target percent cutback from bau emissions,
as a consequence of a widening menu of technological alternatives. One of the
most important of these is carbon capture and sequestration as a potential
means of future burning of coal with minimal emissions, a technology whose
feasibility so far remains to be demonstrated on substantial scale. The esti-
mates developed in the present study turn out to show a range from low abate-
ment costs based on the McKinsey bottom-up model to intermediate in the
Nordhaus top-down model to relatively high costs using equations estimated
from the EMF 22 survey of integrated assessment models (see appendix G).
RICE Model
The form used by Nordhaus (2008) for calculating abatement cost, and also
applied in the new EMF-based estimates developed in the present study, is as
follows:
kt = DtPEt (4.1)
where k is abatement cost as a fraction of GDP,is a parameter that declines

over time to reflect the widening menu of technological alternatives, µ is the
“control rate” or proportionate reduction in emissions from the bau baseline
to the policy target level,  is the exponent showing the degree of nonlinearity
in costs for deeper cuts, and as before t is the year in question. In his regional
RICE model, Nordhaus sets the degree of nonlinearity uniformly at  = 2.8, or
nearly cubic, for all countries and time periods. Table 4.1 reports his time- and
country-varying cost parameter for the 25 major emitting economies exam-
ined in this study.1 For example, in order to cut US emissions by 40 percent
from baseline by 2030, it would require an opportunity cost to the economy of
1. Values are from the online version of the RICE model available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.
edu/RICEmodels.htm. Note that Nordhaus uses 1 and 2 for the terms α and  here. The model
provides specific estimates for the following economies: United States, European Union, Japan,
Russia, China, and India. All other estimates shown here are from the relevant regional groupings
in the model: Africa, Latin America, Middle East, Eurasia, Other Asia, and Other High Income.

Table 4.1 Multiplicative abatement cost parameter (α) in
the Nordhaus RICE model
Country/region 2020 2030 2040 2050
United States 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.020
European Union 0.034 0.028 0.024 0.021
Japan 0.047 0.039 0.032 0.027
Russia 0.044 0.036 0.030 0.025
Eurasia 0.049 0.038 0.030 0.024
China 0.063 0.049 0.038 0.030
India 0.066 0.052 0.042 0.034
Middle East 0.055 0.045 0.037 0.031
Africa 0.042 0.033 0.026 0.021
Latin America 0.038 0.032 0.027 0.023
Other high income 0.048 0.039 0.032 0.027
Other non-OECD Asia 0.070 0.057 0.046 0.039
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Source: Nordhaus (2010b).
k = 0.029 × 0.402.8 = 0.0022, or 0.22 percent of GDP. As indicated in the table, for
a given percent cut from baseline, by 2050 the cost is only about half as large
(as a percent of GDP) as it would be in 2020. The declining cost, combined
with a relatively high long-term discount rate, contributes to the “ramp-up”
profi le (relatively moderate initial cuts followed by rising proportional cuts)
of the optimal abatement paths found in studies by Nordhaus (2008, 2010a).
The 2010 version of the RICE model (Nordhaus 2010b), from which table
4.1 is taken, derives the abatement cost parameters from models with national
and regional detail in the Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007b) and the
Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 22 report (Clarke, Böhringer, and Rutherford
2009), as indicated in Nordhaus (2010a, 6).
EMF 22 Models
Appendix G applies the same functional form of equation 4.1 to estimate cost
functions from the large set of model results compiled in EMF 22. It turns
out that the estimated equations show a strong pattern of higher abatement
costs than those of the RICE model for moderate emissions cutbacks but more
comparable estimates for large cutbacks. Correspondingly, the equations esti-
mated in appendix G show much less nonlinearity than indicated by the RICE
parameters, with the exponent on the proportionate cutback always less than
quadratic rather than nearly cubic.
Table 4.2 reports the EMF-based estimates of the multiplicative cost coef-
ficient  (equation 4.1) as well as the exponential coefficient (), which varies
ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS 27

Table 4.2 Abatement cost function parameters,
EMF 22 synthesis model
Country/group 2020 2030 2040 2050
A. Multiplicative (α)
China 0.087 0.087 0.100 0.078
European Union 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024
India 0.090 0.090 0.066 0.066
United States 0.049 0.049 0.023 0.023
Group 1 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.021
Group 2 0.101 0.101 0.073 0.073
Group 3 0.092 0.092 0.102 0.070
B. Exponential (β)
China 1.381 1.381 1.586 1.586
European Union 1.278 1.278 1.442 1.442
India 1.545 1.545 1.412 1.412
United States 1.569 1.569 1.158 1.158
Group 1 1.457 1.457 1.612 1.612
Group 2 1.532 1.532 1.336 1.336
Group 3 1.413 1.413 1.764 1.764
Group 1: Other Annex I countries excluding Russia (i.e., developed countries).
Group 2: BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).
Group 3: Other countries (i.e., developing countries other than the BRICs).
Source: Appendix G.
by region and time period rather than being universally a single value (2.8 in
the RICE model). Figure 4.1 illustrates results comparing the RICE cost func-
tion with the EMF-based estimate for selected regions (the United States, the
European Union, China, and Latin America) under standardized cuts from base-
line (20 percent in 2020, 40 percent in 2030, 60 percent in 2040, and 80 percent
in 2050). In all cases the EMF-based equations show higher cost than the RICE
equations. For example, for the United States, a cutback of 40 percent from base-
line in 2030 would cost 1.15 percent of GDP in the EMF-based estimates but
only 0.22 percent of GDP in the RICE-based estimates. The divergence is the
greatest for developing countries. Thus, again for a 40 percent cut in 2030, the
EMF-based cost would be about 2½ percent of GDP for China and for Latin
America, whereas the RICE-based cost would be only 0.36 percent of GDP for
China and 0.25 percent for Latin America.2
2. The EMF-based equations are specific to the region for China but for Latin America are from
the EMF general category “Group 3” of developing countries other than the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China).

Figure 4.1 Comparison of RICE and EMF 22–based abatement cost estimates for
uniform cuts from baselinea
percent of GDP
6
US-EMF 22
EU-EMF 22
China-EMF 22
5 Latin America-EMF 22
US-RICE
EU-RICE
4 China-RICE
Latin America-RICE
3
ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS
0
2020 2030 2040 2050
a. Cuts from baseline: 20 percent in 2020, 40 percent in 2030, 60 percent in 2040, 80 percent in 2050.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on tables 4.1 and 4.2.
29
McKinsey Model
For the bottom-up school, the most prominent abatement cost estimates
are those of McKinsey (2009). Ackerman, Stanton, and Bueno (2010) have
obtained detailed regional estimates from the McKinsey study and developed
summary equations approximating cost curves for 2030 by region. These
curves are of the form:
R (4.2)
z’ = A
B–R
where z' is marginal cost per unit of carbon dioxide reduction, R is the amount
of the reduction, B is the quantity of reduction at which the marginal cost
curve turns vertical (infinite cost for an additional unit of abatement), and A is
a cost parameter. The CRED model of Ackerman, Stanton, and Bueno (2010)
estimates this equation for nine regions, based on the McKinsey estimates.3
Importantly, the equation form chosen by Ackerman et al. does not allow for
the well-known initial negative marginal cost in the McKinsey estimates but
instead treats costs in the initial range as close to zero but not negative.
To obtain an estimate of total cost of abatement, it is necessary to inte-
grate the marginal cost function over the span from zero to the cutback of R.
This integral is:
R
z = ‫ ׬‬z’ = A[B ln B – R] (4.3)
0 B–R
Table 4.3 reports these bottom-up abatement parameters for 2030, in
billions of dollars at 2005 prices (parameter A) and billion tons of carbon (B).4
For example, for the United States in 2030 the reduction at which marginal
cost turns infinite is 1.39 GtC, or 5.1 GtCO2. Considering that the baseline
emissions for 2030 stand at 6.24 GtCO2 (table 2.2), marginal cost turns infi-
nite at 82 percent cutback from baseline. For most countries the estimates in
table 4.3 apply 2030 baseline shares in total emissions for the relevant region
to obtain the B scaled to the country in question.5
3. The nine regions are United States, Europe, Other High Income, Latin America, Middle East,
Russia and non-EU Eastern Europe, Africa, China, and South and Southeast Asia.
4. For industrial emissions only.
5. There is no attempt to estimate the parameters for Rest of World Developing, because in the
calculations later this grouping never carries out abatement because its per capita emissions are
always lower than the 2050 global convergence level. See appendix table A.3.

Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
j’allais l’atteindre puis, revenant sur moi et, me chargeant à son tour,
d’un solide coup de tête, elle m’envoya rouler dans un fossé plein
d’orties qui me piquèrent outrageusement. Je me relevai, couvert
d’ampoules cuisantes et je criai à la chèvre : « Tu n’es qu’un sale
Kaiserlik !… » Ce qui était, à mon sens, la suprême injure. Toutefois
j’avais appris que je n’étais pas invincible et, par la suite, je me
gardai de renouveler mon attaque.
Lorsque le mauvais temps m’empêchait de sortir, je
recommençais nos batailles avec des soldats de plomb. J’en
possédais une quantité, car mes grands-parents qui me gâtaient
comme je l’ai dit et qui encourageaient mon goût pour les jeux de
Bellone, m’en donnaient des boîtes à toute occasion : étrennes,
anniversaires, etc.
Mes lectures m’ancrèrent dans cette conviction que l’Empereur
était infaillible, qu’il ne pouvait jamais avoir tort. Toute opposition à
ses volontés me semblait un sacrilège. Je considérais ses
adversaires comme d’ineptes croquants dont la résistance devait
être punie par de formidables raclées. Aussi, quand j’en fus aux
revers : la retraite de Russie, Leipsick, la première abdication, je
tombai dans une désolation indicible. Quoique je n’eusse encore rien
lu de Victor Hugo, comme lui « j’accusais le destin de lèse-majesté ».
Autour de mon dieu, je ne distinguais plus que des traîtres et des
lâches. Le retour de l’île d’Elbe me rendit quelque allégresse.
Frémissant d’enthousiasme, je hurlai par les corridors cette phrase
de la proclamation impériale : « L’aigle a volé de clocher en clocher
jusqu’aux tours de Notre-Dame ! » Mais Waterloo me précipita de
nouveau dans le désespoir. Je ne voulais pas que la bataille eût été
perdue. Je lisais et relisais les pages funèbres avec le désir enragé
que « l’infâme » Grouchy vînt quand même à la rescousse et que la
Garde mît Blücher et Wellington en compote. Je vous certifie que j’ai
pleuré quand Napoléon abdiqua pour la seconde fois. Ah ! si j’avais
tenu Fouché, Lafayette et les pleutres du gouvernement provisoire,
quelle bastonnade, mes amis !
L’exil à Sainte-Hélène me navra. Je haïssais les Anglais d’une
haine irréductible. Je barbouillai d’encre l’effigie d’Hudson Lowe qui,
à mon avis, déshonorait le volume où l’agonie de Napoléon était
rapportée. Et pour atténuer mon deuil, je relus passionnément la
campagne d’Austerlitz…
Si je récapitule, dans l’ensemble, ces premiers souvenirs, il
m’apparaît que mon enfance annonce nettement ce que je devais
être jusqu’au jour où la Grâce divine me conduisit à la foi catholique
et l’expérience de la vie au royalisme. Travaillé, sans doute,
d’hérédités rebelles à la règle, poussé comme une plante sauvage, à
peu près sans contrôle, dénué de principes religieux, doué d’une
imagination exubérante qui se portait aux aventures, à la poésie et
au romantisme, surestimant, d’après l’histoire de Napoléon, la force
sans contre-poids, ni entraves, me développant à une époque de
mœurs plates, de démocratie pourrissante et de parlementarisme
infécond — tout conspirait à ce que je devinsse un révolté.
Et c’est, en effet, ce qui arriva.
CHAPITRE II
LA GUERRE DE 1870
Au mois de juillet 1870, la guerre éclata entre la France et

l’Allemagne. Dès le commencement d’août, ma mère, qui habitait
Paris avec mes deux sœurs, me réclama auprès d’elle et, prise de
peur, nous emmena en Belgique. Elle s’installa, en une sorte de
campement, à Liège où nous avions de la parenté.
Mon père, précepteur des fils du grand-duc Constantin, vivait à
Saint-Pétersbourg depuis plusieurs années et ne venait nous voir
que très rarement. C’est qu’hélas, la discorde régnait à notre foyer ;
chacune de ses visites se marquait par des scènes pénibles où se
froissaient deux caractères nullement faits l’un pour l’autre. Cette
mésentente eut les conséquences les plus graves sur mon avenir.
Je n’en parlerai cependant que le moins possible. Il y a là une
cicatrice douloureuse que je préfère ne pas rouvrir. Paix aux morts…
Cependant, malgré ces dissensions, mon père estima qu’il était
de son devoir de rejoindre les siens en détresse. Il obtint un congé,
s’embarqua sur un vaisseau russe qui le conduisit à Anvers et fut à
Liège environ une dizaine de jours avant le désastre de Sedan.
J’avais quatre ans lorsque je l’avais vu pour la dernière fois. C’est
dire que je ne gardais de lui qu’un souvenir fort confus ; mais,
comme je n’en avais guère entendu parler qu’avec amertume, je
redoutais son abord. Aussi fus-je agréablement surpris lorsque j’eus
découvert que c’était un homme très franc, très expansif — sauf
avec ma mère — et qui nous aimait beaucoup mes sœurs et moi. Je
me sentais tout à fait en confiance auprès de lui. Lui-même ne
pouvait pas se passer de moi. Ayant été nommé d’un comité de
secours aux réfugiés besogneux, il me prenait toujours avec lui pour
les courses et démarches que nécessitait sa mission charitable. Tout
en cheminant, la main dans la main, nous causions et je constatai
que mon culte pour Napoléon comme ma connaissance précoce de
l’histoire du Premier Empire ne semblaient pas lui déplaire. C’est
qu’il était très bonapartiste. Je me rappelle encore les invectives
dont, après le 4 septembre, il chargea l’équipe d’avocassiers et de
pamphlétaires républicains qui se jeta sur le pouvoir comme une
bande de marcassins amaigris par de longs jeûnes sur un champ de
pommes de terre connu pour son rapport fructueux. Ensuite, la
dictature de Gambetta en province — nous ne savions presque rien
de Paris assiégé — lui apparut ce qu’elle était réellement : le règne
d’un braillard, aux relations fort suspectes, et qui, flanqué
d’ambitieux subalternes et de bohèmes noceurs, ne réussit qu’à
organiser l’écrasement final de la France par les Teutons. Cent fois,
je l’ai entendu prédire que l’incapacité de ce gouvernement
hasardeux, issu d’une émeute devant l’ennemi, amènerait
fatalement notre défaite et la guerre civile. On voit qu’il ne manquait
pas de perspicacité.
Assurément, j’étais encore trop jeune pour juger, au point de vue
de la politique, les événements dont nous subissions le contre-coup.
Néanmoins, je possédais déjà un certain don d’observation qui ne
demandait qu’à s’exercer. C’est pourquoi quelques faits, très
significatifs quant à l’état des esprits, me frappèrent d’une façon
toute spéciale.
Par exemple, l’attitude des Belges à notre égard m’intriguait.
Certes, ils traitaient ceux de nos soldats internés chez eux avec
humanité et donnaient volontiers des soins aux malades. Pour nous
autres réfugiés, ils nous accueillaient sans beaucoup
d’empressement et nous témoignaient même de la froideur. Quand
on apprenait les défaites réitérées de notre patrie, ils ne
manifestaient point d’allégresse — du moins en notre présence —
mais on sentait qu’elles ne leur étaient pas désagréables. A Liège,
mes parents avaient loué le premier et le second étage d’une petite
maison sise derrière le Jardin Botanique. Le propriétaire occupait le
rez-de-chaussée. Souvent le soir, il montait les journaux à mon père.
En les lui remettant, il lui servait invariablement cette phrase : « Eh
bien monsieur, les Français sont de nouveau battus, savez-
vous ?… » Puis il s’efforçait de prendre un air compatissant ; mais, à
son intonation, il était facile de deviner que les victoires allemandes
l’attristaient beaucoup moins qu’il n’eût voulu le faire croire. Mon
père restant impassible, il attendait quelques secondes comme s’il
avait désiré entamer une controverse. Voyant que rien ne venait, il
se décidait à sortir de la chambre en murmurant : « C’est
fâcheux !… »
Jamais il n’obtint un mot de réponse. Moi qui le guettais, il
m’arriva de le suivre en tapinois sur le palier. Je voyais alors sa
physionomie se transformer avec une rapidité surprenante. Elle
exprimait toute autre chose que de la sympathie. Sans doute que le
silence gardé par mon père le vexait passablement, car une fois, je
l’entendis grommeler : « — Ces Fransquillons, on les rosse et ils
font encore les fiers !… Tout de même ils sont bien rossés !… » Et il
descendit l’escalier en se frottant les mains et en affichant une mine
de jubilation qui m’indigna.
— Il a donc deux visages ? me dis-je. Si nos revers lui causent
tant de joie, pourquoi fait-il semblant de nous plaindre ?
A sept ans on ne connaît pas la comédie humaine ; j’ignorais
donc que, comme l’a dit un philosophe désabusé, — peut-être
Chamfort — « la parole a été donnée à l’homme pour dissimuler sa
pensée ».
Blessé dans ma droiture, je rapportai à mon père ce que je
venais de voir et d’entendre. Il haussa les épaules puis, étant fort
lettré, il me cita ce distique d’Ovide :
Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,

Tempora si fuerint nubila, solus eris.
— Sais-tu ce que cela veut dire ?
N’ayant pas commencé le latin, je secouai négativement la tête.
— Eh bien ! cela signifie : « Tant que tu seras heureux, tu
compteras beaucoup d’amis. Si le temps se gâte, tu seras seul. »
Il était bien vrai que l’Europe qui, la veille, nous faisait fête, nous
tourna le dos à l’exemple de la Fortune en 70. Nul ne sembla
pressentir la menace pour toutes les nations qu’impliquaient les
succès de l’Allemagne sous l’hégémonie prussienne. Mais, qu’on
s’en souvienne, à cette époque, l’incorrigible rêveur, imbu
d’humanitairerie et de romantisme sentimental que fut Napoléon III,
dirigeait la politique étrangère de la France d’une façon si
incohérente que tout le monde se méfiait de lui. Sa diplomatie,
nébuleuse au possible, pleine de contradictions, tantôt hésitante,
tantôt tracassière, dénuée de traditions et totalement inapte à saisir
le Réel sous les apparences, nous avait aliéné les puissances
comme les petits peuples. De là, notre isolement.
Que Bismarck avait vu clair lorsqu’il lança cette boutade :
« Napoléon III ? Une grande incapacité méconnue ! »
Et comme elle s’était révélée, cette incapacité, avant et après
Sadowa ! Qu’on veuille bien se remémorer les faits. L’Autriche par
terre, la Prusse triomphante, maîtresse de la Confédération
germanique, Napoléon III avait laissé entendre qu’il nous fallait
quelque compensation pour l’unité allemande réalisée. Naïvement, il
fit valoir son inertie pendant la campagne de Bohême. Bismarck,
prodige d’astuce, équivoqua tant que la déconfiture de l’Autriche ne
fut pas certaine. Dès qu’il tint la victoire, il se montra irréductible.
Napoléon III demandait Mayence. Il lui déclara nettement que cette
cession était impossible parce que l’Allemagne unifiée n’admettrait
pas qu’on lui enlevât la plus petite parcelle de son territoire — fût-ce
à l’amiable. L’empereur n’insista pas. Mais, talonné par l’opinion, il
suggéra qu’il se contenterait de Luxembourg. Le roi de Hollande
consentait à l’annexion et il semble que les Luxembourgeois ne s’y
montraient pas très opposés. Bismarck, alors, déchaîna sa presse
qui poussa les hauts cris, dénonçant à l’Europe les convoitises
françaises et déclarant que Luxembourg qui, en ces temps-là, faisait
partie de la Confédération, ne pouvait en être détaché sous aucun
prétexte. Les rapports entre la France et l’Allemagne s’aigrirent de
plus en plus et un conflit faillit éclater dès 1867. Grâce à
l’intervention de l’Angleterre, les choses s’étaient arrangées tant bien
que mal.
Or, au cours des négociations, Bismarck avait insinué, d’un ton
négligent, à notre ambassadeur à Berlin que l’Allemagne ne
trouverait sans doute pas excessif que nous cherchions un
dédommagement en Belgique. « Ce sera votre pourboire », dit-il
avec cynisme. L’ambassadeur, assez nigaud de son naturel, ne
distingua pas le piège inclus dans cette avance. Il se laissa
persuader de rédiger un vague projet de note sur ce thème.
Napoléon, consulté, ne dit ni oui ni non. Mais, pour comble de
maladresse, l’ambassadeur oublia le papier chez Bismarck qui le mit
soigneusement de côté. Dès la déclaration de guerre, il s’empressa
de le publier à grand fracas. Le résultat qu’il cherchait fut obtenu :
l’opinion européenne se tourna contre nous. De plus, la Belgique,
fort jalouse de son indépendance, craignit de nous être annexée, si
nous l’emportions dans la lutte avec l’Allemagne. Elle avait cent fois
raison de se montrer ombrageuse à cet égard. Rien ne permet
d’affirmer que Napoléon ait eu quelque velléité de donner suite aux
ambitions soufflées par le chancelier machiavélique. Mais l’effet
voulu par celui-ci n’en était pas moins produit. Cela expliquait la
satisfaction mal dissimulée des Belges lorsqu’ils apprenaient nos
défaites et aussi, jusqu’à un certain point, leur réserve glaciale vis-à-
vis des réfugiés de France.
Mon père m’expliqua sommairement les raisons de cet état
d’esprit. Je le compris fort bien. Cependant je ne pus m’empêcher de
lui dire qu’il me paraissait injuste que les Belges nous rendissent
responsables des fautes de notre gouvernement.
— Que veux-tu, reprit-il, c’est comme cela dans la vie, et il ajouta,
citant cette fois La Fontaine :
… De tout temps,
Les petits ont payé les sottises des grands.
En aucune autre occasion je ne l’entendis critiquer le régime

napoléonien. Fervent approbateur du coup d’État de 51, il avait le
goût de l’autorité, allât-elle jusqu’à la compression gouvernementale.
Ce n’était pas à la cour de Russie qu’il pouvait le perdre. En outre, je
pense qu’il estimait peu digne de vilipender devant des étrangers
l’empereur malheureux. La plupart de nos compatriotes résidant à
Liège ne l’imitaient pas. On les entendait multiplier les
récriminations ; certains même chantaient une chanson idiote dont je
ne me rappelle que ces vers :
C’est le sire de Fich-Ton-Kan

Qui s’en va-t-en guerre…
Avec ce refrain :
A deux sous tout l’paquet,

L’Père et la Mère Badingue
Et le petit Badinguet…
Mon père rougissait de ce manque de tenue qui, à coup sûr, ne

nous relevait pas aux yeux des Belges. Mais il continua de se taire,
ne voulant pas donner à nos hôtes goguenards et malveillants le
spectacle d’une querelle entre Français. Je suis à peu près assuré
que je fus le seul à connaître ses opinions. Et puisque je suis sur ce
sujet, je noterai, en passant, qu’il considérait comme périmée la
royauté légitime et qu’il se montrait violemment hostile à l’Église.
C’est, du reste, le point unique sur lequel il sympathisât avec mon
grand-père maternel. Il l’approuvait entièrement de m’avoir élevé
dans l’ignorance religieuse.
Cet empereur si décrié, je l’ai vu au comble de l’abaissement. —
Tout à fait par hasard, mon père et moi nous nous trouvions à la
gare des Guillemins lorsque, prisonnier de l’Allemagne après Sedan,
il traversa Liège pour se rendre au lieu de sa captivité : le château
de Wilhemshœhe en Hanovre. Le train qui l’y transportait, avec son
état-major, stationnait le long du second quai d’embarquement.
Comme nous arrivions, nous vîmes d’abord deux généraux français
qui se promenaient côte à côte, et sans rien dire, sur l’asphalte. La
portière du wagon d’où ils étaient descendus restait ouverte.
J’aperçus alors, assis dans le coin de gauche, un homme, de taille
un peu au-dessous de la moyenne, dont le visage terreux me frappa.
Une longue moustache aux pointes fortement cirées, une barbiche
qu’il tordait d’une main machinale, deux plis amers aux joues, des
yeux d’un bleu trouble. Il y avait une immense fatigue et une infinie
tristesse dans le regard. Le corps se tassait, comme écrasé sur la
banquette.
Mon père eut un mouvement de surprise. Il me serra le bras à
me faire crier et dit presque tout bas : « C’est l’empereur !… »
Puis il traversa la voie pour s’approcher du wagon. Je le suivis,
dévoré de curiosité. Quand il fut bien en face de la portière, il ôta son
chapeau et salua très bas. Napoléon III tressaillit d’abord
légèrement. On eût dit que cet hommage à César tombé le
surprenait. Ensuite, comme mon père demeurait immobile et tête
nue, il porta deux doigts à son képi, et l’ombre d’un sourire
mélancolique passa sur ses lèvres. Je me sentis le cœur fondre de
pitié.
A ce moment, un policier belge accourut qui d’une voix furibonde
nous ordonna de circuler.
En nous en allant, mon père me dit très simplement : — Il y aura
eu ici un Français pour saluer l’infortune. Tu ne l’oublieras pas…
Je ne l’ai pas oublié.
Quoique les circonstances où se prolongeait notre exil fussent
pénibles, je dois mentionner que j’en ressentis les effets avec moins
d’intensité qu’on ne pourrait le croire. Certes, quand j’entendais
déplorer autour de moi les efforts sans cesse déçus de la France
pour repousser l’invasion, je ne restais pas indifférent. Nos déboires
me chagrinaient et je détestais farouchement les Prussiens. Mais il y
avait en moi une telle puissance de rêve que, d’instinct, pour
échapper à tant d’obsessions lugubres, je me réfugiais, davantage
encore, dans ma chère histoire du Premier Empire. Je vivais avec la
Grande Armée, je m’évoquais amoureusement l’image de
l’Empereur — le vrai, le seul, celui au regard duquel le vaincu de
Sedan ne m’était qu’un fantôme plaintif. Je tirais un rideau entre nos
défaites présentes et nos victoires de jadis. On parlait de la
supériorité en effectifs et en artillerie de nos adversaires. Moi, je me
disais : — Ah que Napoléon ressuscite donc ! Il aura bien vite balayé
toute cette racaille puante et raflé leurs canons !…
Nourri de ces pensées, l’âme enveloppée d’une brume de gloire,
je ne concevais plus les maux dont souffrait notre patrie que dans un
lointain diffus. Cette prédominance de l’imagination me fut
certainement salutaire, car, impressionnable comme je l’étais, si
j’avais éprouvé dans toute leur âpreté les angoisses de l’heure, je
serais tombé malade de honte et de rage.
Il y eut pourtant une occasion où je pris conscience de la réalité
au point de commettre un acte violent.
J’ai dit que des parents à nous habitaient Liège. Ils avaient des
enfants dont, sur leur invitation, je partageais volontiers les repas et
les jeux. Leur père, directeur d’un journal, avait épousé l’une de mes
tantes. Un jour, dans la salle où nous étions en train de goûter, il
entra, flanqué d’un collègue berlinois venu en Belgique je ne sais
pour quel motif. Tous deux s’assirent près de nous et leur entretien
se porta tout de suite sur la guerre.
Mon oncle aimait la France ; sa feuille, la Meuse, était une des
rares qui nous témoignaient de la sympathie. Il commença par
blâmer les actes du gouvernement de soi-disant défense nationale.
Plusieurs de ses membres lui étaient connus et il ne paraissait pas
en faire grand cas. Mais il marqua de l’estime pour notre pays, si mal
dirigé qu’il fût, et vanta le courage de nos troupes. Son interlocuteur
mit d’abord quelques réserves dans ses propos. Mais l’Allemand
souffre s’il lui faut s’astreindre au tact d’une façon un peu prolongée.
Celui-ci ne tarda donc pas à se donner carrière. Avec une lourde
emphase il célébra d’abord le sérieux du génie germanique en
l’opposant à ce qu’il appelait la légèreté et la frivolité françaises.
Mon oncle lui fit observer que ces prétendus défauts c’était de
l’atticisme. — J’avoue, continua-t-il, sur une intonation doucement
teintée d’ironie, que vos compatriotes sont trop gens de poids pour
s’enlever ainsi sur les ailes de l’esprit. Leur gravité en souffrirait et
c’est ce que vous ne sauriez admettre.
L’Allemand flaira peut-être qu’il y avait là quelque persiflage. En
tout cas, le malotru qu’implique toute âme teutonne surgit aussitôt :
— La France, déclara-t-il, ne se relèvera jamais. Rien qu’en la
laissant se mettre en république, nous la livrerons aux dissensions
intestines ; elle oubliera de penser à la revanche ; et alors elle
remplira sa destinée qui est de nous fournir des cuisiniers, des
histrions et des garçons coiffeurs. Que voulez-vous qu’elle fasse de
plus ?
Et il éclata d’un rire épais.
Jusqu’à ces derniers mots je n’avais prêté au dialogue qu’une
attention distraite ; mais lorsque le barbare se mit à rabaisser de la
sorte ma patrie en deuil, une vague de colère me monta au cerveau.
Je devins pourpre ; je me levai impétueusement ; je saisis le bol de
chocolat qui fumait devant moi et le lui lançai à la tête en criant : —
Cochon de Prussien, la France aura bientôt des soldats qui
rosseront les vôtres comme à Iéna !…
Je m’arrêtai, suffoquant, les yeux pleins de larmes. Je cherchais
comment l’insulter encore. Je trouvai ceci : — Vive Napoléon Ier !…
Vous lui avez léché les bottes à Berlin !…
Ahuri et furieux, inondé de liquide bouillant, le gilet étoilé de
taches brunâtres, l’Allemand s’épongeait le visage en grommelant
de massives injures. Mes cousins, pétrifiés, bouche béante, me
regardaient sans souffler une syllabe. Mon oncle, réprimant avec
peine une forte envie de rire, offrait des excuses. Moi je toisais
fièrement l’Ennemi, tout prêt à empoigner un couteau et à le lui
plonger dans le ventre s’il faisait mine de m’attaquer. Il en avait, je
crois, très envie. Mais mon oncle reprit : — C’est un petit Français.
Que voulez-vous ? Il défend son pays comme il peut.
L’Allemand feignit de tourner la chose en plaisanterie. Mais au
regard qu’il me décocha, tandis que mon oncle l’emmenait dans le
cabinet de toilette, je compris que, s’il pouvait me rattraper et me
tenir, seul à seul, dans un coin, il ne m’épargnerait pas la schlague
due à mon crime de lèse-Germanie…
Ce Boche, puni par moi de son insolence, c’est l’unique souvenir
agréable que j’aie conservé de cette guerre.
CHAPITRE III
AU COLLÈGE
La guerre finie, la France saignante, amputée de l’Alsace-

Lorraine, une crise de folie, mi-patriotique, mi-socialiste, éclata,
faisant perdre la tête à une portion considérable de la plèbe
parisienne. Ce fut la Commune, qui mit le feu à la ville, massacra les
otages et renversa la Colonne de la place Vendôme. Toutes ces
gentillesses se passaient sous les regards réjouis des troupes
allemandes qui occupaient une partie des forts et de la banlieue.
Organisée par Thiers, chef du gouvernement provisoire, la
répression fut impitoyable. Comme il arrive toujours, les utopistes,
doublés d’aventuriers louches, qui avaient suscité cette révolte, se
mirent à l’abri en Angleterre et en Suisse, dès qu’il y eut péril pour
leurs précieuses peaux. Mais les pauvres diables, les sans-travail,
qui avaient pris le fusil pour assurer les trente sous quotidiens de la
solde à leurs femmes et à leurs petits ou qui s’étaient grisés des
alcools de la déclamation révolutionnaire dans les clubs, tombèrent
sous les balles des pelotons d’exécution ou furent déportés aux
antipodes.
Quand tout fut terminé et que notre pays commença de panser
ses plaies, mon père reprit le chemin de Saint-Pétersbourg, où on le
rappelait, du reste, avec insistance. Je n’entrerai pas dans le détail
des querelles qui précédèrent son départ. Encore une fois : paix aux
morts… Je dois pourtant noter que, contre son avis, ma mère voulut
me garder. Musicienne remarquable, elle s’était installée à Bruxelles
et y menait une existence agitée dans un monde d’artistes où se
mêlaient quelques boursiers cosmopolites. Auprès d’elle laissé à
peu près à moi-même, j’appris surtout à polissonner dans les rues.
Dieu sait ce que je serais devenu si mon père, informé de mon
abandon, n’avait bientôt décidé de mettre un terme à cette méthode
d’éducation au moins singulière. Il exprima sa volonté d’une façon si
péremptoire que, cette fois, ma mère dut céder. Mon père prit ses
dispositions pour que je fusse admis comme interne au collège de
Montbéliard, lieu d’origine de sa famille. Parmi les instructions me
concernant qu’il donna au Principal figuraient celles-ci : ma mère
n’aurait pas le droit de venir me voir ; je n’irais pas chez elle aux
vacances.
D’autre part, mes sœurs, reléguées dans des pensionnats au
loin, ignorèrent également les douceurs de la vie familiale. Elles
moururent prématurément, après avoir été très malheureuses. Pour
moi, isolé désormais parmi des indifférents, n’ayant guère retenu de
mes parents que le souvenir douloureux de leur animosité
réciproque, j’en acquis un fond de tristesse, un penchant au
pessimisme dont mon enfance et mon adolescence furent tout
assombries. Je ne reviendrai plus sur ce sujet pénible. Mais il était
nécessaire de montrer comment la discorde, dans une famille
dépourvue de convictions religieuses, prépare chez l’enfant qui,
sans défense possible, en a subi les effets, une anarchie de
sentiments et d’idées dont les germes se développeront à l’aise
pourvu que le milieu s’y prête. Et, certes, la société contemporaine le
fournit ce milieu ! La suite de mon récit en donnera un exemple des
plus probants.
Ce fut avec une répulsion totale que j’envisageai l’internat.

Imaginez un poulain sauvage, habitué à gambader, sans mors ni
sangle, à travers les prairies illimitées du Far-West et qu’on
verrouillerait brusquement dans une écurie aussi obscure que
nauséabonde. Concevez-vous sa fureur et sa désolation ? Tel était,
à peu de chose près, mon état d’esprit. Quoique je ne connusse pas
encore Dante, lorsque la porte du collège s’ouvrit, pour la première
fois, devant moi, je crus lire sur ses panneaux enfumés l’inscription
fatidique : Vous qui entrez, laissez toute espérance.
Jamais je ne me suis adapté. Pendant les cinq années que je
passai là, je tins ma réclusion pour un abus de la force contre lequel
tout mon être s’insurgea jusqu’au dernier jour.
Je n’avais cependant pas à supporter les rigueurs d’une règle
particulièrement revêche. La discipline n’avait rien d’excessif. Les
professeurs étaient des vieillards ankylosés par la routine d’un quart
de siècle d’enseignement et soupirant après la retraite, ou des
jeunes gens frais issus de la Normale et qui songeaient surtout à fuir
le chef-lieu d’arrondissement dénué de vie intellectuelle qu’un sort
contraire leur infligeait comme poste de début. Le Principal, absorbé
par le souci de défendre au dehors les opinions conservatrices,
fervent de l’Ordre Moral que préconisait le gouvernement de
l’époque, ne s’occupait de nous que par foucades. Il ne faisait que
de brèves apparitions dans les salles d’étude. Le plus souvent il se
contentait de les traverser en silence et en effleurant d’un regard
distrait les têtes inclinées sur les pupitres. D’autres fois, lorsque le
surveillant lui avait signalé quelque élève comme un collectionneur
zélé de mauvais points, il calottait le coupable en lui prédisant le
bagne. Mais ces exécutions étaient fort rares. En une seule
occasion, je le vis hors de lui. Comme je fus le promoteur de cette
explosion insolite, je raconterai le drame un peu plus loin. Le
surveillant général — qui cultivait en secret la bouteille et la fille de
cuisine — braillait beaucoup, mais ne punissait guère. Les pions
étaient ce qu’ils sont partout : les uns, des laborieux qui préparaient
des examens et ne nous demandaient que du silence. Les autres,
de nonchalants déclassés, satisfaits d’avoir le vivre et le couvert
sans se donner grand mal. Ceux-là rêvaient au petit café où, durant
les heures de classe, ils tuaient le temps à s’entonner des bock et à
jouer aux cartes. On ne saurait croire à quel degré nous leur
demeurions lointains, nébuleux — inexistants.
Comme on le voit, le joug n’était pas onéreux. En somme, dans
ce collège, presque tout le monde avait l’air de penser à autre chose
qu’à sa besogne. Mais il suffisait que je me sentisse à l’attache pour
me considérer comme en guerre avec ce personnel si peu enclin à
la tyrannie. Je le fis bien voir…
Je ne décrirai point par le menu mes années d’internat. Je
rapporterai seulement quelques faits caractéristiques où se
résumeront mes façons de penser et mes manières d’agir pendant
cette période de mon existence. Je noterai aussi ce que j’ai retenu
des passions politiques qui troublaient, par crises intermittentes, la
somnolence de la petite ville.
Une cour assez vaste et caillouteuse, où végètent quelques

platanes dont la nostalgie, me semble-t-il, égale la mienne. Des
bâtiments grisâtres — classes, études, dortoirs — l’encadrent de
trois côtés et y projettent leurs ombres froides. Au midi, une muraille
élevée complète la clôture.
J’ai la sensation d’être confiné dans le préau d’une prison. Je
frémis, tout indigné à la pensée que des jours et des jours
s’écouleront, monotones, à piétiner là, sans autre diversion que des
promenades insipides, le jeudi et le dimanche, en rangs, deux à
deux, sous la conduite d’un pion ennuyé.
Il est vrai qu’une fois par mois, pourvu que je ne sois pas puni, je
vais chez le correspondant choisi par mon père. Mais ce brave
homme, que déconcertent mes allures insolites, n’a pas réussi à
m’apprivoiser. Vis-à-vis de lui, je me tiens sur la défensive. Je
voudrais flâner tout seul par la ville, aller où il me plairait. Or, il ne
consent pas à ce que je me promène sans mentor. C’est pourquoi le
poulain ombrageux, ne prenant nul plaisir à un simple changement
de licol, repousse toutes ses invites à ma confiance.
Aux récréations, tandis que mes camarades crient, sautent,
gesticulent, jouent aux barres ou aux billes, j’arpente la cour tantôt
en long, tantôt en large, tantôt en oblique, la tête basse. Ou bien je
me plante, comme si j’étais au piquet, devant le mur du fond. J’en
suppute la hauteur, avec l’envie de l’escalader et d’aller voir un peu
ce qui se passe de l’autre côté. Je cherche s’il n’existerait pas
quelque fissure que je m’empresserais d’élargir jusqu’à en faire une
brèche par où m’évader.
Hélas, la cage est bien close !… Alors, je m’accroupis dans un
coin et je souhaite un cataclysme qui nous rendrait la liberté :
tremblement de terre, épidémie, que sais-je ? — Puis je tente une
expérience. Par une belle après-midi d’été où la contemplation des
petits nuages qui voguent gaiement dans un ciel radieux avive ma
soif d’escampette, je médite de l’inoculer aux enfants policés qui
gambadent autour de ma songerie morose. J’en rassemble une
douzaine. Je leur sers, pour commencer, une harangue véhémente
où je dénonce l’iniquité de notre réclusion. Ensuite, je leur propose
d’envahir en tumulte la loge du concierge, de bousculer ce
fonctionnaire, de tirer le cordon et de gagner, au pas de course, la
colline boisée qui surplombe la ville.
Tous m’écoutent, d’abord, avec stupeur. On dirait que jamais
nulle velléité d’indépendance ne les sollicita. Ames natalement
soumises, ils ne parviennent pas à réaliser mon esprit de révolte.
Puis les caractères se dessinent. Un blondin au profil de mouton,
premier de sa classe à perpétuité, bêle tout effaré : — Oh ! il ne faut
pas ; on nous mettrait en retenue !…
Celui-là est jugé ; si le complot s’ébruite, c’est lui qui sera le
dénonciateur.
Un autre, œil vif, frimousse espiègle, subit fortement la tentation.
Mais il craint le risque : — Et si l’on nous rattrape ? s’écrie-t-il.
Aprement je réponds : — Nous nous rebifferons ; nous couperons
des triques et nous taperons plutôt que de nous laisser reprendre !
Cette perspective d’une bataille avec l’autorité n’enflamme
personne. Les mioches m’examinent d’un air mi-craintif, mi-railleur,
comme si je chevauchais la plus imprévue des chimères. Ils se
consultent du regard à la muette. Enfin, un bout d’homme
grassouillet, à la physionomie déjà aussi rusée que celle d’un
notable commerçant, prononce le mot décisif : — Moi, je ne marche
pas ; on me supprimerait les dix sous de ma semaine.
Puis il me toise avec dédain et ajoute : — En voilà un original !…
A ce coup, tous les autres reconnaissent en moi l’imaginatif,
l’aventureux qu’il ne faut imiter sous aucun prétexte. Mon prestige
s’écroule. Ils retournent à leurs jeux en glapissant : — Il est fou ! Il
est fou !
Je hausse les épaules ; je les méprise de tout mon cœur. Et je
me sens l’âme d’un Spartacus dont les compagnons d’esclavage
refuseraient de rompre leurs chaînes à son appel. Par la suite je
l’entendrai bien souvent retentir à mes oreilles le terme par lequel la
démocratie béotienne où nous sommes condamnés à vivre
promulgue sa haine de quiconque se détache du troupeau pour se
tracer une voie personnelle : l’original, c’est-à-dire le monstre, celui
qui n’est pas comme tout le monde.
Cet épisode date des premiers mois de mon internement. Plus
tard, vinrent l’accoutumance et la résignation. Mais de combien de
soupirs mal étouffés elles étaient faites !…
Pour mes études, j’adopte un système dont je ne me suis point

départi jusqu’à ma délivrance : ne m’appliquer qu’aux choses qui
m’intéressent. Je n’étais pas un paresseux, mais j’entendais choisir.
En ce temps-là, dans les classes d’humanités, on donnait —
avec combien de raison — le premier rang aux langues mortes ;
quinze heures de latin, sept heures de grec par semaine. La
grammaire et la composition française étaient également en
honneur.
Je mords très bien à tout cela et, de plus, je ne néglige ni
l’histoire ni la géographie. Mais c’est surtout le latin et le français qui
conquièrent mon attention. La tarentule littéraire commence à
remuer en moi ; en voilà l’indice. Aussi, de la septième à la seconde,
je remporte des prix dans l’une et l’autre branche.
L’ennemi, ce sont les mathématiques. J’y suis totalement fermé.
Les chiffres m’horripilent, me causent même la plus vive aversion.
N’y comprenant rien, les tenant pour d’absurdes casse-tête, je les
élimine de mon programme avec le ferme propos de ne jamais leur
accorder le droit d’entrée dans ma cervelle.
De toute évidence, il y avait là une incapacité de nature, car elle
a persisté durant ma vie entière. A l’heure où j’écris ces lignes, je
continue d’être incapable de réussir une addition un peu étendue,
sans m’y reprendre à plusieurs fois. C’est pour cette raison que,
parlant de l’algèbre dans l’un de mes livres, je me montrai véridique
en écrivant : « Les logarithmes, ce doivent être des animaux bizarres
comme les ornithorrhynques et les babiroussas. »
Un colonel d’artillerie, mon ami quoique mathématicien hors-
ligne, lisant cette phrase croyait à une plaisanterie et, passionné
pour les nombres, il n’était pas loin de la trouver inconvenante.
— Mais non, lui dis-je, avouant mon ignorance, je n’ai fait que lui
donner une forme pittoresque. Si vous me demandiez le produit de
deux et deux, après réflexion, je vous répondrais peut-être quatre.
Mais si vous compliquiez l’examen, vous verriez aussitôt pousser de
chaque côté de mon crâne les longues oreilles d’Aliboron.
Et pour mieux le convaincre, je lui conte les anecdotes suivantes.
Je suis en cinquième. J’assiste, de corps et non d’esprit, à la
classe d’arithmétique. Comme de coutume, j’ai apporté un devoir où
j’ai proprement écrit l’énoncé des problèmes à résoudre, mais sans y
joindre le plus minime essai de solution. A quoi bon ? Je savais si
bien d’avance que je ne m’en tirerais pas !
Le professeur m’interpelle :
— Ainsi, c’est bien entendu, vous avez décidé de ne rien faire de
toute l’année ?
— Je réponds froidement :
— Cela va de soi, puisque je ne comprends goutte à tous vos
calculs.
— Je vous marque un zéro.
— Parmi les chiffres, c’est le seul pour qui j’éprouve de l’estime.
— Vous serez en retenue dimanche prochain et vous copierez
vingt pages du Cours de mathématiques de…
Ici, ouvrons une parenthèse : je ne me rappelle plus le nom du
bourreau qui confectionna cet instrument de torture.
Sur le moment le coup porte. Copier ces choses indigestes,
quelle horreur ! D’abord un peu déconfit, je ne tarde pas à reprendre
ma sérénité. Je me suis lié avec un externe, cancre irréductible,
mais qui, doué pour les affaires, a fondé une entreprise de pensums.
C’est-à-dire que, moyennant quelques plumes, des crottes de
chocolat ou une toupie, il se charge de rédiger les tâches afflictives
qu’on lui apporte. Très bien : j’aurai recours à cet industriel. Et
comme il apprécie surtout le métal, je lui verserai, d’un geste large,
la somme de deux sous.
Autre conflit. Je suis en seconde. Le professeur, sous prétexte de
géométrie, trace au tableau des lignes rigides et nous affirme
énergiquement leurs vertus — dont je n’ai cure. Tout en n’écoutant
pas et pour occuper mon loisir, je bâtis la traduction d’un passage du
Pro Milone de Cicéron. Ce n’est pas que la prose de ce bavard
spongieux m’enthousiasme, mais enfin on ne pourra pas prétendre
que je me dissipe.
Le professeur s’aperçoit que je ne lui accorde aucune attention.
Passe encore ; je l’ai formé : depuis longtemps, il désespère de mon
intelligence. Cependant, il estime que, par politesse, je devrais au
moins feindre de suivre son raisonnement. Piqué dans son amour-
propre, il s’écrie :
— Qu’est-ce que ce livre ?… N’essayez pas de le cacher, je le
vois fort bien. Apportez-le moi !…
Je lui tends le volume. Il lit le titre puis l’engouffre dans sa poche
avec une moue dédaigneuse. Ensuite, me désignant le tableau,
comme il pratique le calembour, il reprend, d’un air fin qui lui va très
mal : — Regardez là si c’est rond !
Les camarades — vils courtisans — s’esclaffent.

Instant ebooks textbook Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance 1st Edition William R. Cline download all chapters

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Instant ebooks textbook Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance 1st Edition William R. Cline download all chapters

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Instant ebooks textbook Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance 1st Edition William R. Cline download all chapters

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Download the full version of the ebook at

Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change

Explore and download more ebook at https://ebookultra.com

Climate Change and Carbon Markets A Handbook of Emissions

Climate Change Measures and Trade Considerations 1st

Climate Change A Multidisciplinary Approach 2nd edition

Climate Change and Climate Modeling Neelin J.D.

Understanding Climate Change Feedbacks 1st Edition Panel

Adjudicating Climate Change State National and

Human Impacts on Weather and Climate 2nd Edition William

Climate and Culture Change in North America AD 900 1600

PETER G. PETERSON INSTITUTE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-

2 Baseline Emissions under Business as Usual 7

3 Abatement Initiatives in the Copenhagen Accord 19

4 Abatement Cost Functions 25

6 Trade and Timing 57

7 Estimating Investment Requirements and 71

BOARD OF DIRECTORS ADVISORY COMMITTEE

* Peter G. Peterson, Chairman Barry Eichengreen, Chairman

Method and Plan of the Study

2 Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance

4 Carbon Abatement Costs and Climate Change Finance

In models of abatement cost, the driving force in the calculations is typically

. dEt /dt (n+g–w–c)E0e(n+g–w–c)t

8 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

Decomposing Emissions Trends, 1990–2006

BASELINE EMISSIONS UNDER BUSINESS AS USUAL 9

Table 2.1 Carbon dioxide emissions: Growth decomposition, 1990–2006a

25 emitters 26,207 1.82 1.09 2.06 1.36 –0.03 5.13 0.39

12 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

BASELINE EMISSIONS UNDER BUSINESS AS USUAL 13

14 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

BASELINE EMISSIONS UNDER BUSINESS AS USUAL 15

Extending the Baseline through 2050

16 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

BASELINE EMISSIONS UNDER BUSINESS AS USUAL 17

18 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

Copenhagen Accord Pledges

20 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

2. That is, 2.96 × 0.575.

22 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

4. That is, 2.50 × 0.775.

24 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models

where k is abatement cost as a fraction of GDP,is a parameter that declines

26 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

ABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONS 27

28 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

30 CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCE

Au mois de juillet 1870, la guerre éclata entre la France et

Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,

En aucune autre occasion je ne l’entendis critiquer le régime

C’est le sire de Fich-Ton-Kan

A deux sous tout l’paquet,

Mon père rougissait de ce manque de tenue qui, à coup sûr, ne

La guerre finie, la France saignante, amputée de l’Alsace-

Ce fut avec une répulsion totale que j’envisageai l’internat.

Une cour assez vaste et caillouteuse, où végètent quelques

Pour mes études, j’adopte un système dont je ne me suis point

You might also like