5.+Islam+Syariat
5.+Islam+Syariat
5.+Islam+Syariat
C R E AT I V E C O M M O N S AT T R I B U T I O N - S H A R E A L I K E 4 . 0 I N T E R N AT I O N A L L I C E N S E .
P u b l i s h e d b y S h a r i a Fa c u l t y o f S tate I s l a m i c U n i ve rs i t y o f P ro f. K . H . S a i f u d d i n Z u h r i , P u r wo ke r to
Book Review
Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia
Saifuddin Zuhri Purwokerto by MMI, HTI, and KPPSI. In this book, researchers combine literature and field research
with emic data. The ideological thread of the Sharia Islamic Movement (Formalist) is
Coresponding Author: a documentation of the “creed of Islamic solutions” integrated with Islamism/ Kaffah
[email protected]
Islam. The culmination of formalization was the appearance of the seven magic
DOI: https://doi. sentences of the Jakarta Charter at the 2000 MPR-RI Meeting. At the same time, the
org/10.24090/el-aqwal. largest mass organizations in Indonesia, represented by Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul
v3i2.12589 Ulama, were outside the movement, even refusing or not supporting the fight for the
Jakarta Charter. In an academic context, the revitalization of fundamentalist, literal,
and scriptural Islam contains harmful elements in the context of statehood and the
plurality of the nation. Furthermore, the ideological conflict of Islam in Indonesia must
be understood that Indonesia is not Islam in the face of the West or Arabization but
must present Moderate Islam, which offers an alternative path, so that it does not give
rise to a new flow of conversion to Islam to other religions which are seen as providing
more comfort in religion, rather than being in Islam which is formalist and has an
ideological face.
Keywords: Islam Sharia, Salafiyah, Indonesia
Introduction
Talking about Islamic movements in Indonesia cannot be separated from the diversity of existing
understandings, such as fundamentalism, moderate, liberal, and secular.1 Each group has its views
and approaches to understanding and practicing Islamic teachings, reflecting ideological, political,
social, and cultural contexts. Fundamentalism is often associated with the desire to return to the
fundamental values of pure Islam (formalist Islam), following Sharia and sacred texts. Moderates
tend to take a more inclusive approach, emphasizing peace, tolerance, and interfaith dialogue,
represented by Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. The liberal group usually encourages a more
progressive reinterpretation of Islamic teachings, adjusting to the times and modernity, while the
secular group seeks to separate religion from politics and government affairs, emphasizing the
importance of state neutrality in religious matters; one of the critical figures is Thaha Husain. (1889-
1973)2 and Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966).3
1
Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia,” in Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of
Islamic Education in Southeast Asia, 2009, 55–105.
2
Thaha Husain is a prominent writer, academic, and literary critic in modern Arab thought, dubbed the “Father of Arab Literary
Renewal.” Born in Egypt and blind since childhood, he was successfully educated at Al-Azhar and the Sorbonne, which shaped
his progressive views on culture, religion, and education. One of his works, Fi al-Syi’r al-Jahili, challenged traditional views
of pre-Islamic literature, sparking controversy. Husain pushed for educational reform and secularization, arguing that Arab
progress could only be achieved through cultural and intellectual modernization.
3
Ali Abd al-Raziq was an Islamic cleric and scholar best known for his controversial views on Islamic politics and the caliphate,
which he expressed in his book Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (1925). He stated that Islam does not require any particular system
The book Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia by Haedar Nashir is an in-
depth study of the rise of Ideological Salafism in the fight for the formalization of the application
of Sharia in state life in Indonesia. This movement began with an attempt by a group of Muslims to
reinsert the Jakarta Charter in the 1945 Constitutional Amendment at the Annual Session of the MPR
in 2000. Groups that persistently fight for the Jakarta Charter are the Indonesian Mujahidin Council
(MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta (FPIS), the Preparatory
Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Sharia (KPPSI) South Sulawesi Branch, the Indonesian
Muslim Workers Association, the Hizbullah Front, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and others.
Meanwhile, the Islamic parties are the Moon Star Party (PBB), the United Development Party (PPP),
and the Justice Party (PK, which is now PKS), although PK is not as open as PBB and PPP. On the other
hand, the National Mandate Party (PAN) also supported, although with a more moderate attitude, by
offering a formula for changing Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution4 , which is not limited to Muslims
only.5
Previous Studies
Studies related to the formalization of Islamic law in Indonesia include sociological studies with
a social-movement approach related to religious movements.6 Studies so far have been more on
the movements of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism within the framework of Islamic studies,
which have become the mainstream in PTKIN.
Several studies related to the Islamic Sharia movement in Indonesia include Darul Islam: A
Rebellion by C. Van Dijk (1983), Republican Rebellion: The Case of Darul Islam Aceh by Nazaruddin
Sjamsuddin (1990), Sharia Islam Yes, Sharia Islam No edited by Kurniawan Zein and Sarifuddin
(2001), Bunga rampai Syariat Islam: Urgency and Consequences edited by Edy Sumtaki (2003), Islamic
Sharia in Indonesia: Actualization of Teachings in Economic, Political, and Legal Dimensions edited
by Muhammad Iqbal and Azhari Akmal Tarigan (2004), Islamic Sharia: A Liberal Muslim View edited
by Burhanudin (2003), Radical Islam: The Struggle of Hardline Islamic Organizations in Indonesia by
Khamami Zada (Thesis, 2002), Islamic Militant Movements in Indonesia and Southeast Asia by Yunanto
(2003), The Politics of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia to Nigeria by Samsu Rizal Panggabean (2004).7 The
above studies examine how the Sharia Islamic movement as a religious movement involves aspects
of belief and understanding in the building of an Islamic World-View that is in contact with the social
experiences and sociological realities of Muslims in particular and the dynamics of the nation in
general, both in the present and the past.
Nashir’s book offers methodological research by understanding the Sharia Islam movement
emically using “inter-conscious perspectives,” namely between understanding the nature of the
of government, including the khilafah, which he believed was merely a product of history. His views drew criticism from
traditional scholars, and Al-Azhar revoked his degree. Although controversial, his thoughts were influential in discussions
about the relationship between Islam and the state, and became an important reference for proponents of secularism in
modern Islamic politics.
4
Nursalim, Muh. “Politik Hukum dalam Amandemen Pasal 29 UUD 1945 Telaah terhadap Upaya Penerapan Syari’ah Islam di
Indonesia.” Unisia 30.64 (2007).
5
Haedar Nashir, Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis Di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2013), 53.
6
Social movements are collective movements to achieve social, political, or cultural change in society. It arises in response to
dissatisfaction with conditions or systems that are perceived to be unjust, with the aim of fighting for rights, reforms or policy
changes.
7
Nashir, Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis Di Indonesia, 59-63.
Sharia Islam group’s mind accompanied by critical analysis confirmed in other views, especially
religious movements. Furthermore, Nashir uses an interpretative sociological approach with an
integral perspective,8 a deconstructionism perspective,9 and a social movement perspective.10
8
Islamic integralism is an understanding that concerns Islamic Sharia as a religious and political guide, among its figures
Muhammad Rashid Ridha (1865-1935), Hasan Al-Bana (1906-1949), Sayyid Quthb (1906-1966), and Abul A’la Al-Maududi (1903-
1979) .
9
This approach seeks to dismantle or analyze texts to show that meanings that are considered stable or fixed are actually
uncertain and full of contradictions. Deconstructionism not only analyzes the content of a text, but also its underlying
structures and assumptions, with the aim of destabilizing or deconstructing its apparent meaning. Figures in Islamic studies
include Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (Sudan, 1946-), Mohammad Abed Al-Jabiri (Morocco, 1935-2010), Munawir Sadjali (1932-
1999), Thaha Husain (1889-1973), Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966).
10
Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968), Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), Nelson Mandela (1918-2013).
Islamic organizations fighting for the formalization of Sharia in multiple regions, shows legal-formal,
doctrinal, and militant characters. In legal-formal terms, this movement presents Islam literally. It
follows the legal rules according to Sharia law or Islamic fiqh, prioritizing official texts and regulations
to be applied rigidly in various aspects of life. Doctrinally, they understand and practice Islam in
an absolute and rigid manner, rejecting other views or ideologies such as democracy, liberalism,
socialism, and secularism as haram or kufr. Meanwhile, the militant aspect of the movement is
reflected in a high-spirited, even violent, religious attitude, although they usually do not resort to
physical violence; this violent disposition focuses more on enforcing Sharia through doctrinal and
militant arguments rather than violent actions.
These characters are part of the Shari’ah Islam group’s belief system or Islamic world-view,
supported by three essential aspects. First, the Sharia-based view of Islam, which focuses on the
principles of Sharia law or Islamic fiqh such as “al-ahkām al-khamsah” (five principles of law: wajib,
sunnah, haram, makruh, and mubah), gives birth to a black-and-white view of Islam, in contrast to
the more nuanced view of “Islam hakikat”. Second, an integralistic view that directly relates Islamic
law to all dimensions of life, believing that Islam must be realized in the Islamic System (al-Nidhām
al-Islamy), including in state and government institutions, even to the formation of an Islamic state.
Third, the social situation and structural conditions faced by Shari’a Islam groups often affect the
way they fight for the implementation of shari’a, operating in the social and political dynamics
around them.11
In a theological and ideological context that is militant and dogmatic, the Sharia Islam movement
has a core dynamic that becomes the deepest strength and basic spirit of its followers. This core
dynamic is a belief system about Islamic Sharia as the main teaching that is ingrained in their minds,
forming the world-view of the Shari’a Islam group. This belief makes Sharia the main teaching and
central theme of its movement. Groups such as MMI, HTI, and KPPSI view Sharia as a law that must be
carried out sacredly and as a “manhaj al-hayat” (Islamic way of life), understand Sharia as a complete
guide in all aspects of life, and embody it in state institutions.
For HTI and MMI, the establishment of Islamic Sharia is a necessity and must be implemented
in the form of a Khilafah state.12 They believe that glory cannot be achieved without Sharia, and
there is no Sharia without a daulah (State). They also believe that Sharia must be implemented in the
State in order for it to function properly in the lives of Muslims, communities, nations and states.
This deep conviction reflects an integrative world-view, which builds the construction of Islamic
beliefs as religion, State and law in one comprehensive whole. Any attempt to rationalize or reform
the application of Sharia tends to be rejected because it is considered contrary to the principles of
Islamic purity and is seen as leading to secularization or modernization, which is regarded as a kufr
or secular system.
refers to the desire to present the teachings of Islam (Islamic Sharia) purely and comprehensively in
every aspect of life. The movement aims to reconstruct the idealization of Islam and Islamic society or
State, referring to the ideal type of Islam in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the generations
after him literally. Meanwhile, the nature of “ideological” is inherent because this movement shows
Islamic beliefs and practices that strive to implement Islamic shari’a in state institutions, even
building an Islamic state format known as the Khilafah state.13
This Islamic shari’a movement theologically reflects the Salafiyah character, but ideologically
shows the orientation of Islamism (Islamiyah), which integrates Islamic teachings, especially Islamic
shari’a, in the state structure. Therefore, the movement is strongly characterized as “Ideological
Salafism.”
According to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), there are three main reasons why Islamic
shari’a must be enforced in Indonesia, a Muslim-majority country.14 First, the aqidah reason, where
every Muslim who is sincere in his aqidah must want the implementation of Islamic shari’a as a logical
consequence of his recognition as a Muslim, to keep away from disaster, destruction, and perdition
as explained in the Qur’an Surah Al-Ahzâb verse 36. Second, historical reasons, where the history
of Muslims from the time of the Prophet to the Khulafa al-Rashidun and the Caliphs afterwards,
including the Tabi’in and salafus shalih, lived in the Islamic system, namely the Khilafah, which
maintained wihdatul ummat and wihdatul imamah, as reminded in the Qur’an Surah Al-Mu’minun
verses 52 and 53. Third, the reason for the reality of the times, with regard to the current reality
of life which is influenced by the multidimensional crisis of globalization, requires Muslims to be
more courageous in offering solutions from the Qur’an and Hadith to overcome various problems of
mankind, in accordance with Allah’s command in the Qur’an Surah Ali Imran verse 139.
Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the other hand, sees the enforcement of Islamic shari’a as a struggle to restore
Islamic life in the Islamic Darul and in Islamic society. They want to establish an Islamic Caliphate
in which Islamic shari’a is fully implemented and Muslims are free from the kufr system that has
dominated life. Their struggle refers to golden history, especially to the establishment of Daulah
Islamiyah in Medina and the Prophet’s life there.
The Shari’a Islam movement, like the Salafist movement before it, carries the theme of
purification or puritanization (tandhif al-’aqidat al-Islamiyyah), claiming to be the bearer of “pure
Islam” and “kaffah Islam”. This movement exists as a form of self-defense and resistance to Western
threats and other ideologies that are considered enemies of Islam. They emphasize the rejection of
secularism, liberalism, and religious pluralism, which are considered Western tools to undermine
Islam.
When compared to the history and development of the Salafiyah movement in Indonesia, Shari’a
Islam groups such as MMI, HTI, KPPSI, and similar groups show a different Salafiyah character from
the Salafiyah movement that is characterized by da’wah or emphasizes the teachings of aqidah such
as Salafiyah Yamani and Haraki in Indonesia. The Shari’a Islam movement is also different from
the early 20th century Salaf movements such as Muhammadiyah and other Islamic reformism
13
Adiwilaga, Rendy. “Ketuhanan Pancasila Dan Ketuhanan Islamisme: Sebuah Tinjauan Teoritis.” JISIPOL| Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan
Ilmu Politik 4.1 (2020): 52-64.
14
Moch Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the Politics of Religious
Orthodoxy,” Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “conservative Turn, 2013, 60–104.
movements that focused more on purifying Islamic faith and reforming the lives of Muslims through
education, health, and social welfare.15
The Islamic shari’a movement that developed in the reform era showed a different character
from the two previous Salafiyah groups. This new era Salafi group emphasizes the application of
Islamic shari’a as a whole in state institutions, even building a Khilafah state, not just in individual
and community life. They integrate Islamic teachings into the political and State system, reflecting
an Islamist orientation that integrates Islamic teachings in political/state life.
The Islamic Shari’a movement, which is characterized as “Ideological Salafism”, reproduces
previous radical Islamic movements such as Wahhabi and Pan-Islamism. When compared to post-
Revivalism movements, this movement is similar to Islamic Neorevivalism models such as the
Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt, Jama’at Islami in Pakistan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Islamic movements that fight for the formal implementation of Islamic shari’a in the State
are often involved in the discourse and ideology of the Islamic State. Although not all of these
movements are ideological, many structurally claim to be within the framework of the Unitary State
of the Republic of Indonesia. However, substantively, there are still contradictions with the positive
legal system and the state structure of the NKRI.
The Special Autonomy status in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and similar efforts in South
Sulawesi demonstrate another format of implementing Islamic shari’a in the Indonesian political
system. These states are identical to the format of a “mini” Islamic state or “Islamic federal state,”
although in practice they are often partial and clash with the positive legal system.
Overall, the Islamic Shari’a movement in Indonesia, as represented by MMI, HTI, KPPSI, and
the like, shares a line of thought with Islamist or Neorevivalist movements, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, Jama’at-i-Islami, and the Taliban. The concepts of the Islamic System (al-Nidzam
al-Islami) and kaffah Islam, including essential idioms such as Minhaj al-Hayat, emphasize the
implementation of Islamic shari’a and an Islamic caliphate as part of their struggle. The movement
views the implementation of Islamic shari’a in the State as a more systematic and robust path to
establishing a total Islamic system.
The reproduction of the Islamic shari’a movement with the character of “Ideological Salafiyah”
displays the spirit of Islamic revivalism, especially in the form of neo revivalism which tends to
be doctrinal and conservative. This movement developed alongside the revival of revivalist or neo
revivalist-oriented da’wah movements, often re-emerging after periods of exile. One example is the
Tarbiyah movement, which has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, and later became the backbone
of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In this context, the ideological Salafist movement emerged as
a new phenomenon on the national stage.
The presence of the ideological Salafiyah movement is not only a response to the socio-political
situation but also influenced by theological aspects that encourage the reformulation of Islamic
teachings with a Salafiyah orientation. This movement has a different character and orientation
from the previous generation of salaf. There are several characteristics of the ideological Salafiyah
movement:
15
Gazali, Hatim, Dewi Anggraeni, and Mariam Eit Ahmed. “Salafi-Jihadist Movements and Ideology in Educational
Institutions: Exploring the Nexus with Religious Moderation.” Edukasia Islamika: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam 8.1 (2023):
127-146.
1. Focus on Islamic Shari’a: This movement makes the issue of “Islamic Shari’a” a central
theme, with the aim of institutionalizing it formally in the life of the State or government.
This creates a face of “Shari’ism” or “Shari’at mindedness,” i.e. Islam that is completely
Shari’a-oriented.
2. Emphasis on the Islamic Caliphate: The theme of the “Islamic Caliphate” or “Caliphate
State” was revived, especially by the Hizbut Tahrir group, which made it a central theme.
This is a replication of the “Islamic State” (Daulah Islamiyah) issue of the past.
3. Formalization of Islamic Shari’a in State Institutions: There is an attempt to implement
Islamic shari’a in state institutions, similar to the reprint of the “Jakarta Charter,” which is
oriented towards implementing Islamic shari’a through undercurrents in various regions.
4. Middle Eastern character: The movement has a Middle Eastern face that emphasizes a
literal (scriptural) and militant character, often featuring Neo-Wahhabiyah or Islamic Neo-
Revivalism.
The reproduction of the ideological Salafiyah Shari’a Islamic movement also has a Middle Eastern
dimension similar to the Wahabi movement in Saudi Arabia and hardline Islamic groups such as the
Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaah Islamiyah. There are theological similarities with the more purity-
oriented “Salafiyah Dakwah” movement, such as Salafiyah Yamani of Yemen.
The reproduction process of this Islamic movement grew rapidly during the Reformation
era, starting in the 1970s and increasing in the 1980s and 1990s with the “internationalization”
or “transmission” of the movement from the Middle East to Indonesia. The phenomenon of
“Arabization” or Middle Eastern style brought by the shari’a Islam movement can be seen from
several manifestations:
1. Arabic symbols: The use of Arabic symbols in public spaces that indicate an Islamic identity
that is identical to Arabic.
2. Comparisons to the Middle East Movement: For example, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI) considers the model of Islamic formalization in an ideal country such as Taliban
(Afghanistan) as a reference.
3. Scriptural Purification: Adopting the Wahabi model of purification in religious practice
and the unification of religion and State, similar to what Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab did
in Saudi Arabia.
4. Organization Network: Direct links with Islamic movements in the Middle East, such as
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) which is linked to Hizbut Tahrir in Lebanon.
The Shari’a Islamic movement with the character of “Ideological Salafism” not only wants to
bring back the style of Islamic society of the Salaf generation, but also to apply Islam strictly to
current conditions. It seeks to reject the “death of ideology” thesis often put forward in the post-
modern era, and furthermore, to give birth to an Islamic ideology as an alternative to secular, liberal
and man-made ideologies that are considered “kufr”.
orientations of religious movements as a result of the struggle between the demands of doctrinal
teachings and the social realities faced. This Islamization did not take place linearly, but in layers,
giving rise to a new reality of the struggle between Islam and society in Indonesian history.16
The Islamic Shari’a movement with the character of “Ideological Salafiyah” is an example of
legal-formal and doctrinal political Islamization. This political Islamization departs from the view
that Islam regulates all dimensions of life, including politics or the State. When political reality
is considered un-Islamic, this movement seeks to transform the State in accordance with Islamic
teachings, even forming an Islamic state. The Re-Islamization process is an effort to apply Islamic
principles and values in personal and public life.
In the context of the Islamic shari’at movement, Re-Islamization takes the form of the
politicization of shari’at, focusing on the institutionalization of Islamic shari’at in the state
constitution, which is influenced by complex socio-political conditions. This politicization of shari’at
creates “ideologization of shari’at,” which is a view that interprets Islamic shari’at as a total ideology
that covers all dimensions of life, including politics.
The ideologization of shari’a departs from the belief that Islam is a religion, a state, and shari’a.
This led to the establishment of a state of God that has absolute sovereignty in the ideological-political
construction of shari’a Islam, similar to the Theocentrism State of the Middle Ages in modern 21st
century life. This State of God is a theocracy that strictly implements Islamic law.
The phenomenon of the State of God based on rigid shari’a can be seen in the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. When state absolutism is established in secular politics, power is centered on humans.
However, in theocentrism, power involves the sacredness of religion and the sovereignty of God,
giving birth to a more absolute and sacred absolutism of power.
Movements to implement Islamic shari’a in areas such as Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Java
have also pursued mobilization and consolidation strategies through the Muslim Congress and
conventional and unconventional channels. However, Muslim support has not been significantly
widespread, and some movements such as HTI and MMI are more elitist than mass movements. In
Aceh, the implementation of Islamic shari’a was directly linked to local conflict, while in other areas
such as Bulukumba and Cianjur, the successful implementation of Islamic Sharia was due more to
local political support than a widespread mass movement.
Overall, the Islamic Shari’a movement with the character of “Ideological Salafiyah” displays an
effort to bring back and implement Islamic Shari’a strictly and formally in the life of the State and
society, as a response to existing socio-political conditions and ideological challenges in the post-
modern era.
The Islamic Shari’a movement, especially those oriented towards Islamic political ideology
(Islamism) and political Islam, is a complex phenomenon arising from various internal and external
factors. This movement is not new, temporary, or always harmful. Azyumardi Azra emphasizes that
Islamic movements that tend to be radical cannot be seen merely as superficial or violent radicalism.
Instead, it has deeper roots, related to three main aspects: social conditions, processes that trigger
the movement, and events that accelerate the development of the movement.
16
Kassim, Abdulbasit. “Defining and understanding the religious philosophy of jihādī-Salafism and the ideology of Boko Haram.”
Politics, Religion & Ideology 16.2-3 (2015): 173-200.
The Aceh phenomenon, for example, reflects the failure of the ruling regime that triggered the
emergence of Islamic movements demanding special autonomy, even through physical resistance.
Legal-formal, doctrinaire and militant formalistic Islamic movements often thrive amid certain
social conditions that encourage political Islamization in various regions. Some of these movements,
such as HTI, MMI, and KPPSI, show a strong ideological character with an orientation towards the
formalization of shari’at.
In the context of Indonesian history, the shari’a Islamic movement is often born in line with
the cycle of political crisis. Changes in government regimes and socio-cultural crises gave rise to
various Islamic movements from the pre-independence period to the reform era. For example, in
the 1930s the Indonesian Islamic Party (PII) and the Indonesian Islamic Assembly (MIAI) emerged.
At the beginning of independence, the Jakarta Charter and the establishment of the Masyumi Party
emerged. After that, there was a debate based on the State at the Constituent Assembly in 1959 and
the birth of new political parties at the beginning of the New Order. Finally, in the reform era of 1998,
a new political climate emerged that opened up space for Muslim aspirations.
The social crisis that occurred, including the crisis of morality, triggered the awareness of
the importance of upholding religious values. This theological awareness then unites with Islamic
ideological awareness when dealing with the ideologies of secularism and liberalism that are also
present in the midst of the crisis. This crisis strengthened identity politics among Islamic groups.
For example, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) organized its first congress in 2000 in response to
the crisis that gave birth to the reform era. They argued that the crisis that engulfed Indonesia was
caused by people’s and government’s non-compliance with Islamic shari’ah.
In the view of MMI activists, the crisis occurred because the community, despite being
predominantly Muslim, did not understand the role of shari’a in the life of the nation and State, and
did not have the militancy to uphold it. They also believe that the government and society are not
convinced that Islamic shari’a is the main solution to social problems. This rejection of shari’a, they
argue, is at the root of all the disasters that have befallen the country.
The Islamic shari’a movement, in this context, seeks to offer Islamic shari’a and the caliphate
system as an alternative to overcome the multidimensional crisis that they see as the result of
secular ideologies and faulty political systems. According to them, only by returning to Islamic law
can humanity be freed from the social and political crises caused by man-made ideologies such as
secularism, capitalism, and nationalism. Islamic Shari’a is seen as the only way out of the crisis, as it
is considered a solid, absolute, God-given system.
Religious revival, particularly through the militant Sharia Islam movement, represents the
phenomenon of “religious revitalization” in society’s social, political and moral crises. These
movements emerged in the Reformation era as a response to the failure of the existing system, with
the main goal of saving humanity through the implementation of Islamic shari’a. In a crisis situation,
religion becomes a force used to provide solutions to the existing system. In crisis situations, religion
becomes a force used to provide solutions to problems that are considered serious, especially those
related to morality and social stability.
Religious revival usually manifests in two main forms: religious revitalization movements and
rescue movements. The religious revitalization movement seeks to revive religious teachings in
daily life as a solution to the prevailing crisis. On the other hand, rescue movements focus more
on upholding religious law as a way out of a situation that is considered broken. Strong ideological
beliefs often drive such movements and require the support of fanatical believers.
In the context of the Islamic shari’a movement, “salvation” is often prominent. Many Islamic
groups assume that the current political and social system has failed, because it is seen as a product
of “kufr” ideology or not in accordance with Islamic teachings. Therefore, they propose the
implementation of Islamic shari’a as an alternative that is considered capable of bringing stability
and legal certainty in society. The enforcement of Islamic shari’a and the khilafah system are often
personified as a form of salvation similar to the concept of the “Queen of Justice” or “Imam Mahdi”
in eschatological beliefs, which will free the ummah from crisis and lead to a better age.
The movement also shows a strong orientation towards the past, considered Islam’s golden age.
A return to Salafiyah Islam, which refers to understanding Islam at the time of the Prophet and
companions, is their main goal. In this regard, the shari’a Islamic movement adopts a conservative
approach that rejects renewal or modernization, in contrast to the Islamic reform movement in the
early 20th century which emphasized renewal as well as purification.
This phenomenon of religious revival also often involves ideological conflicts with other groups
that are considered anti-shari’ah, both from within the Muslim community itself and from outside.
Movements such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) have
shown a strong stance against the ideologies of secularism, liberalism and capitalism, which they
see as a threat to the survival of Islamic life. In addition, they also oppose moderate or liberal Islamic
groups that are considered not to fight for the formalization of Sharia.
In their perspective, the world is currently experiencing a multidimensional crisis, especially in
terms of morality, and secular ideologies have failed to provide a solution. They believe that only with
Islamic shari’a and the khilafah system can humanity achieve a life of peace, justice and prosperity.
These movements emphasize that the solution to the existing crises can only be found through the
implementation of a system that comes from God, not a man-made system that is considered fragile
and limited.
Overall, the rise of the shari’a Islam movement reflects a reaction to social and political crises,
as well as a desire to return to religious teachings as a way to address the challenges facing Muslims
in the modern era.
The confrontation between Shari’a Islamists and those representing Liberal Islam or Islamic
Neomodernism is very clear. This debate is even associated with the narrative of “Crusade II” which
is not only aimed at non-Muslims such as Zionists, Secularists, Crusaders, Atheists, and Paganists, but
also at fellow Muslims who reject Islamic shari’a and blaspheme the shari’a fighters. Shari’a Islamists
view Muslims who are anti-shari’a as enemies of Islam. They are considered part of a systematic
conspiracy that seeks to destroy Islam.
This tension is not only theological or ideological, but also extends to the political realm.
Islamic Sharia groups feel increasingly threatened when they see the higher level of rejection of the
formalization of Islamic Sharia. This situation encourages them to become more militant in fighting
for the implementation of shari’at. They see their enemy as the “great enemy of Islam,” both from
within and outside the Muslim community.
Islamic Shari’a movements often grow in tension with government regimes that are seen as
not in favor of Islam, even carrying secular ideologies that are contrary to Islamic teachings. Their
opposition is not to individual rulers, but to the system of government considered un-Islamic. This
ideological tension continues and always finds theological justification and political opportunities,
so the conflict seems endless.
The sociological trauma of a history of resistance and conflict strengthens militancy among
shari’a Islamists. This attitude is driven by a rigid view of the threat to Islam, especially from the West
which they perceive as an infidel, secular, liberal and anti-Islamic force. In this case, the presence of
Islamic groups characterized as “Ideological Salafiyah” further intensifies the confrontation. They
view the Indonesian State as a secular entity, even though some Muslims consider Pancasila to have
religious values.
This phenomenon is actually not new in the history of Islam in Indonesia. This tension dates
back to the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java (1948-1962) which fought for an Islamic state in the
midst of a state based on the Pancasila ideology. For Shari’a Islamists, every government regime
since independence has never been able to genuinely and significantly accommodate the interests
of Muslims. They feel that Islamic law is only applied in the realm of family law, while national law is
dominated by positive law and customary law.
In a global context, the militant and doctrinaire shari’a Islamic movement is often associated
with the struggle against foreign powers, particularly the West. These groups are very vocal in their
opposition to the United States and its allies, whom they view as enemies of Islam. Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) are examples of vehement movements in
their opposition to the West. They call for jihad against what they call the infidel’s attack on Islam,
and demand the exit of the Zionist armies of Israel and the United States from the Muslim Holy Land.
However, on closer inspection, the hostility of shari’a Islamists towards the West is not entirely
in line with Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. Rather,
this hostility is closer to Tariq Ali’s view of an “inter-fundamentalist clash,” that is, a conflict between
religious fundamentalism representing Islam and imperial fundamentalism represented by the
United States. This indicates that this conflict is part of the dynamic between conflicting ideological
forces in modernity and imperialism.
The “Salafiyah Ideological” Islamic movement emerged as a response to situations considered
contrary to the Islamic teachings they believed in. This movement can be categorized as a “sectarian
response” within the framework of Wilson’s thesis, which explains that certain religious groups
emerge as a reaction to social conditions that are incompatible with their views. In this case, the
“Ideological Salafiyah” movement responds to situations that they consider un-Islamic, viewing
them as a threat to the interests of Muslims.
Unlike other Islamic groups, this movement has a unique religious outlook and tends to interpret
existing conditions differently. They view the world with a “utopian” lens, aiming to bring about a
mission of salvation and liberation of the world from corruption through the enforcement of Islamic
shari’ah. This is in line with Wilson’s view of how religious groups often take an isolationist stance,
carry a holy calling, and strive to improve the world according to their beliefs.
However, this “Ideological Salafism” movement does not show an introversionist response,
which tends to withdraw from the outside world. Instead, they actively entered the political sphere,
aiming to formalize religion in the State’s life. The movement also did not exhibit reformist elements
as did modernist Islamic movements such as Muhammadiyah in the early 20th century. They do not
offer new formats or reforms, but rather focus on “reprinting” the idealism of the khilafah state and
the application of Islamic shari’a, which they consider final and does not require change.
In a social context, “Ideological Salafiyah” groups often emerge from groups that feel politically,
economically and culturally marginalized. Groups such as Majelis Mujahidin and Hizbut Tahrir
are examples of movements that have emerged within the social structure of Muslims. Still, they
institutionally are not as large as organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. These
groups feel marginalized, both at the national level and in the lives of Muslims as a whole. They
consider that the major Islamic organizations have been unsuccessful in fighting for the formalization
of Islamic shari’a, and so they have taken over the task through more militant movements.
In addition, the movement was also influenced by past experiences of political trauma, such
as the elites’ involvement in the struggle against the repressive New Order regime. Some of them
have even been imprisoned for being subversive. Activists from groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) also have strong religious backgrounds, many of whom have been
involved in Islamist movements since their student days.
In the context of Aceh, the “Salafiyah Ideological” movement was also influenced by the long
history of the Acehnese people’s struggle to implement Islamic Sharia. The Acehnese people felt
that the central government often obstructed their efforts to implement Islamic shari’a in the
region, resulting in a sense of dissatisfaction and resistance that colored the dynamics of the Islamic
movement in Aceh.
Overall, the “Ideological Salafiyah” movement in Indonesia is a complex response to various
crisis conditions that they consider to be contrary to Islam. This movement is influenced not only
by theological or ideological factors but also by pragmatic and cultural factors shaping how they
interact with the social situation around them.
The shari’a Islam movement, which focuses on the formal application of Islamic law within the
state structure, has deep theological roots in literalist Salafism. This Salafism seeks a reprinting of
Islam as it was in the time of the Prophet and the generation of the Salaf al-Shalih, but with adjustments
for the contemporary era. From a sociological perspective, this movement has ideological links with
modernist Islamic groups of the past, but displays a different character and orientation compared to
other Salafis.
The Salafiyah Reformists, spearheaded by Muhammadiyah, carried out a movement to return
to pure Islam as well as renewal (tajdid) so that Islam was able to adapt and respond to the dynamics
of modern times. In contrast, the shari’a Islamic movement does not follow the Salafiyah Reformist
model. This movement rejects renewal, seeing it as a threat to the purity of Islam and as a form of
accommodation to non-Islamic systems, especially those of Western origin. In addition, the Shari’a
Islamic movement also differs from Salafiyah Dakwah, which prioritizes the purification of aqidah
without engaging in political agendas.
The Islamic Shari’a movement tends to be ideological, focusing on building an Islamic system
as it was at the time of the Prophet and the Islamic Caliphate. They strive to institutionalize Islamic
shari’a in the state structure, even building an Islamic Caliphate state. This is different from Reformist
Salafism and Da’wah Salafism, which focus more on the institutions of society. This movement
considers the application of Islamic teachings in the personal and societal spheres by groups such as
Muhammadiyah as failing to withstand non-Islamic systems.
Ideological Salafism in the Islamic shari’at movement shows a more scriptural and legal-formal
orientation, focusing on doctrinal and legal purification. This movement has an agenda of fighting
for the formality of Islamic shari’a in the State, with the ambition of building a Caliphate state. Unlike
the Reformist Salafism that prioritizes reform and the Da’wah Salafism that does not involve itself
in politics, this movement enters the political arena intending to build an Islamic political system.
The shari’a Islam movement shares theological and ideological links with modernist Islamist
movements such as Majelis Mujahidin and Hizbut Tahrir, but with a more radical and dogmatic
character. The Majelis Mujahidin, for example, exhibits a militant character and refers to the Taliban
as the ideal model of Islam. In the latter category, the movement shows similarities with traditional
and conservative Islamic Neorevivalism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jama’at-i-
Islami in Pakistan.
In Indonesia’s context of the shari’a Islam movement, continuity and change mark a complex
dynamic. Continuity is seen in preserving religious beliefs and practices, while change illustrates
efforts to reislamize and purify Islamic teachings. Historically, Islamic political power in the
archipelago has shown an accommodative pattern within the State, with regions such as Aceh and
South Sulawesi implementing Islamic shari’a formally.
The Islamic shari’at movement seeks to implement Islamic shari’at in the state structure,
repeating the 1945 Jakarta Charter struggle and a similar failed attempt in 2000. Nonetheless, they
remain persistent in their fight for the formalization of shari’at, with some groups such as HTI and
MMI seeking to establish an Islamic state. The failure of efforts such as the Jakarta Charter shows
that political and socio-historical constellations strongly influence continuity and discontinuity in
the struggle for shari’a Islam.
When comparing the shari’at Islamic movement with the reformist movement, the striking
difference is the attitude towards reform. Shari’a Islamists reject reform and see Islam as a perfect
system that does not need to be developed. They hold to the understanding that Islam does not
require change or development of thought, only interpretation that refers to authentic sources.
Responses to the shari’at formalisation movement show significant opposition. Major Islamic
groups such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama as well as neo-modernist groups tend to be
moderate in the application of shari’at, in contrast to militant shari’at Islam groups. Christians and
secular nationalists also reject this idea, seeing it as a threat to national consensus and national
integration.
The Islamic shari’at movement continues to show great vitality in their struggle, even considering
rejection of shari’at as a form of disbelief. Their stance reflects the complex ideological conflict in
Indonesia, with the potential for greater conflict if this movement becomes intertwined with the
struggle for an Islamic state. However, the presence of major groups such as Muhammadiyah and
Nahdhatul Ulama as important counterweights to this dynamic ensures that ideological conflicts do
not reach the extremes of the past.
From Reformist to Ideological Salafism: The Evolution of the Sharia Islam Movement
The shari’a Islam movement, which focuses on the formal application of Islamic law within the
state structure, has deep theological roots in literalist Salafism. This Salafism wants a reprinting
of Islam as it was in the time of the Prophet and the generation of the Salaf al-Shalih, but with
adjustments for the contemporary era. From a sociological perspective, the movement has ideological
links with modernist Islamic groups of the past, but displays a different character and orientation
compared to other Salafis.17
The Salafiyah Reformists, spearheaded by Muhammadiyah, undertook a movement of return to
pure Islam as well as renewal (tajdid), so that Islam was able to adapt and respond to the dynamics
of modern times. In contrast, the shari’a Islamic movement does not follow the Salafiyah Reformist
model. This movement rejects renewal, seeing it as a threat to the purity of Islam and as a form of
accommodation to non-Islamic systems, especially those of Western origin. In addition, the Shari’a
Islamic movement also differs from Salafiyah Dakwah, which prioritizes the purification of aqidah
without engaging in political agendas.
The Islamic Shari’a movement tends to be ideological, focusing on building an Islamic system
as it was at the time of the Prophet and the Islamic Caliphate. They strive to institutionalize Islamic
shari’a in the state structure, even building an Islamic Caliphate state. This is different from Reformist
Salafism and Da’wah Salafism, which focus more on the institutions of society. This movement
considers the application of Islamic teachings in the personal and societal spheres by groups such as
Muhammadiyah as failing to withstand non-Islamic systems.
Ideological Salafism in the Islamic shari’a movement shows a more scriptural and legal-formal
orientation, focusing on doctrinal and legal purification. This movement has an agenda of fighting
for the formality of Islamic shari’a in the State, with the ambition of building a Caliphate state. Unlike
the Reformist Salafism that prioritises reform and the Da’wah Salafism that does not involve itself
in politics, this movement enters the political arena intending to build an Islamic political system.
This Islamic shari’a movement shares theological and ideological links with modernist Islamic
movements such as Majelis Mujahidin and Hizbut Tahrir, but with a more radical and dogmatic
character. The Majelis Mujahideen, for example, exhibits a militant character and refers to the
Taliban as an idealized model of Islam. In the latter category, the movement shows similarities with
traditional and conservative Islamic Neorevivalism, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and
Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan.
In Indonesia’s context of the shari’a Islam movement, continuity and change mark a complex
dynamic. Continuity is seen in the preservation of religious beliefs and practices, while change
illustrates efforts to reislamise and purify Islamic teachings. Historically, Islamic political power in
the archipelago has shown an accommodative pattern within the State, with regions such as Aceh
and South Sulawesi implementing Islamic shari’a formally.
The Islamic shari’at movement seeks to implement Islamic shari’at in the state structure,
repeating the 1945 Jakarta Charter struggle and a similar failed attempt in 2000. Nonetheless, they
remain persistent in their fight for the formalisation of shari’at, with some groups such as HTI and
17
Merone, Fabio, Théo Blanc, and Ester Sigillò. “The evolution of Tunisian Salafism after the revolution: From la Maddhabiyya
to Salafi-Malikism.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 53.3 (2021): 455-470.
MMI attempting to establish an Islamic state. The failure of endeavours such as the Jakarta Charter
shows that political and socio-historical constellations heavily influence continuity and discontinuity
in the struggle for shari’a Islam.18
When comparing the shari’at Islamic movement with the reformist movement, the striking
difference is the attitude towards reform. Shari’a Islamists reject reform and see Islam as a perfect
system that does not need to be developed. They hold to the understanding that Islam does not
require change or development of thought, only interpretation that refers to authentic sources.
Responses to the shari’at formalisation movement show significant opposition. Major Islamic
groups such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama as well as neo-modernist groups tend to be
moderate in the application of shari’at, in contrast to militant shari’at Islam groups. Christians and
secular nationalists also reject this idea, seeing it as a threat to national consensus and national
integration.
The Islamic Shari’a movement tends to be ideological, focusing on building an Islamic system
as it was at the time of the Prophet and the Islamic Caliphate. They strive to institutionalize Islamic
shari’a in the state structure, even building an Islamic Caliphate state. This is different from Reformist
Salafism and Da’wah Salafism, which focus more on the institutions of society. This movement
considers the application of Islamic teachings in the personal and societal spheres by groups such as
Muhammadiyah as failing to withstand non-Islamic systems.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the presence of Islamic movements that fight for the formal application of Islam
in state institutions and aspire to realize the Islamic caliphate, such as those of MMI, HTI, KPPSI, and
other groups, is a new phenomenon in the development of Islam in Indonesia. This phenomenon
differs from mainstream Islam, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), which present a
moderate approach to Islam.
First, the Islamic Shari’a movement not only arises because of situational conditions such as
social, structural, and cultural but is also driven by the belief to restore Islam during the time of the
Prophet and the Salaf al-Shâlih generation. They carry the ideology of Islamism, which requires the
application of Islam as a whole (kaffah), including in state institutions.
Second, this movement is literal, formalistic, and dogmatic, intending to restore Islam to its
pure and ideal form according to the past. They seek to reprint Islamic revivalism, which tends to
be traditional and conservative, as found in the Wahhabiyah and Ikhwanul Muslimin movements. In
their view, Islam equals Sharia, and Islamisation means ‘shari’atisation.’
Thirdly, this Sharia movement differs from the moderate approach of Muhammadiyah and NU
and the Wali Songo’s flexible cultural approach to Islamisation. It also differs from Sufism, which
prioritizes substance over structural aspects of Islamic teachings. The movement is also at odds with
the more liberal school of Islamic Neomodernism.
Fourthly, the shari’at movement is well organized, unlike classic social movements that are not
institutionalized. They use top-down channels at the national level and bottom-up at the local level.
18
Sheikh, Naveed S. “Making sense of Salafism: Theological foundations, ideological iterations, and political manifestations.”
The Routledge handbook of religion, politics and ideology. Routledge, 2021. 177-196.
One of its manifestations was the attempt to amend the 1945 Constitution by reinserting the Jakarta
Charter, which failed, then moved on to shari’at legislation in several regions, which was successful.
Fifth, this movement differs from the moderate and flexible model of Islamisation that developed
in the archipelago. They are more akin to the literal and doctrinaire Islamic orthodoxy of the 19th
century. The movement continues the Salafiyah Islamic ideology that entered Indonesia in the 19th
century and flourished in the 1930s to 1950s.
If the Shari’a Islam movement characterised by ‘Ideological Salafism’ grows stronger, the
future of Islam in Indonesia may become more rigid, doctrinaire and elitist. This could lead to the
fragmentation of Muslims, and even potentially trigger religious conversions for those who are
uncomfortable with this all-shari’at face of Islam. However, the shari’a Islam movement is also a
challenge for moderate Islamists such as Muhammadiyah and NU to maintain balance amidst the
extremism that has emerged in religious and national life. In this dialectical process, the power of
moderate currents is needed to offer alternatives for Muslims in Indonesia.
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