‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 awit Number 16 March 1982 Special Report: SEYCHELLES INVASION | INFORMATION BULLETIN (CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION ‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Editorial The morality of U.S. foreign policy continues 10 plummet, The Reagan administration snuggles up to the most vicious and repressive regimes in the world. The brutal junta in FI Salvador is in its death throes while the U.S. stuffs millions into its coffers, With bloody hands, the government has the effrontery to assert that “progress” is being made in the field of human rights there. And it embraces other such regimes. like the racist South African, Secrecy and Deceit The political climate can be summed up briefly: secrecy and deceit both at home and abroad. President Reagan has issued his Executive Order on United States Intelligence Activities which, among other evils, unleashes the CLA within the United States, subjecting people here to the same surveillance, infiltration, manipulation, and dirty tricks which have plagued the rest of the world especially the Taird World—for the last 35 years. In response to objections suggesting that the CLA is far better trained to break the law than to uphold it, Director Casey has demanded immunity from prosecution for his minions. C1A officials brazenly called for the authority to “maintain our capabilities to do the kinds of things we do abroad.” One Justice Department official called the pro= posal “harebrained;” we would suggest that “hair-raising” is move apt. Along with an upsurge in covert operations, the trend toward greater secrecy continues. The President issued a second Executive Order, on classification of documents, which completely reverses a 25-year trend toward greater ‘openress in government, The public’s right to know has been sacrificed in the name of national security Domestically. decades of social programs are meeting their deaths at the same altar; every budget is slashed but that of defense, The administration replaces every helicop- ter blown up in Fl Salvador with money taken from the pockets of the poor The Intelligence Identities Protection Act A word is in order about the so-called “Names of Agents Act.” To our surprise, the bill was not approved by the Senate in the last session, and has not yet come up in 1982. Because it is certain to pass in some form soon we have adhered to our announcement last issue to suspend the Naming Names column tor the time being, About This Issue The bulk ofthis issue is devoted to the themes of mercen- arism and state repression, both of which are exemplified by South Africa. Not content to suppress savagely the aspirations of the vast majority of its own people. it sends, armies into Angola and terrorists into Morambique, and connives to invade the Seychelles with a ragtag band of veteran mercenaries, the dogs of war The Reagan administration's open admiration for the South African regime is matched only by its warmth for any Latin American dictator with just enough brains to be able to say “anti-communist." In this issue we look at institutionalized torture by Argentina and by El Salvador, the latter with direct U.S. guidance and participation. And Wwe examine the rabid desire of the administration to Table of Contents Editorial 2 Seychelles Invasion 4 War in Angola 11 Mozambique Rebels 13 Argentina’s Death Squads 14 Green Beret Torture 17 White Paper II 19 Constantine Menges 22 Deceit and Secrecy 24 CIA Media Operations 32 Klan Koup Attempt Part II 44 Nugan Hand, The CIA Bank 51 Where Are They Now? 56 Sources and Methods 60 CuvertAstion Information Bullerin Number 16, March 1982, published by Covert Action Publications, tne Corporation P.O: Rox 50272, Washington, DC 20008, Telephon: (203) 265-3904. Alcighstexerned copes I Inc Tsposrapby by Ar for People, Washington, DC: printing by Ea iy Pres, Brookiva, NY. Washington Stafl El Distrito Columbia Nonproti by Covert Actin Publications Ray, Willa Schaap, Lous Woll, Board of Advisors Philip Agee, Ken Lawrenee Hse WilcoM. Jim Wicot. The Covers ation Information Bulletins atelableat nan benign around the world Inquiries from dstebutors and subscription services welcomed. Library subscriptions encourage Indened mike ine on Une. SSN 0275.309% 2 CovertAction Number 16 (March 1982) | a roved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264.‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 destabilize Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, Secretary Haig’s “continental approach” could spell disaster for the people of this hemisphere. Indeed. CA/B has learned that the CIA has been given a specific order to topple the Sandinista government of Nicaragua in less than two years, PATRIA upaesMORIR Number 16 (March 1982) As we went to press, a report in the February M4 Washington Post confirmed many of the observations which appear in this issue. “Intormed sources” have disclosed a CIA proposal for “a secret $19 million plan to build a broad political opposition to the Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, and to ereate “action teams’ for paramilitary, political operations and intelligence gathering in Nicaragua and elsewhere,” The reportalso noted that Argentina may be training up to 1,000 men for these activities, Sources also contirmed that the US. issupportingand advising the anti-Sandinista, forces in Honduras, We also are pleased to publish an in-depth analysis of psychological warfare on CLA media operations in Chile Jamaica. and Nicaragua, We conclude the report on the ‘complex plot to invade Dominica, And we present a study ff the machinations of the now defunct Nugan Hand Bank fof Australia. major financier for CLA-related operations. Housekeeping Matters First, we apologize to all our subscribers and supporters for the lateness of this issue. We hope that its size and contents will make up for the delay come to realize (after nearly four years) that our intentions However, we have to publish every two months do not allow us to do justice to ts we cover, We cannot realistically publish issues this one under our current subscription sehe- the subj as large due, and are considering a change to quarterly. doubl issue format, We would like to hear from our readers about this, and any other suggestions you might have. One Sad Note We cannot close without noting, with sadness and anger the jailing of David Truong, a staunch opponent of U.S, intervention in Vietnam who went on to involve himself in ‘many of the progressive struggles in this countey. He was Vietimized by a paid CIA! FBI informant and was subject ed to intensive unconstitutional surveillance, telephone tapping, and mail opening, actions upheld in an unprece- dented decision, The Carter administration charged him with being a ‘spys" his real erime was that he had the audacity to think that the war was over and that relations between the wo, countries should be normalized. David is one of the first, but certainly not the last —to feel the weight of the Reagan, administration's national security state. People interested should write to: Vietnam Trial Sup. port Committee, 1322 I8th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036. = About the Cover U.S, “adviser.” citeled, instructs Salvadoran sol diers in methods of war. (See page 17 for interview with Salvadoran deserter on Green Beret torture in- struction.) This photograph was taken secretly and \Wwas first published in Soherania, the magazine of the Central American Anti-Imperalist Tribunal in Man igua, Subscriptions. in the {i S. and Furope.are U.S. $30; write to Soherania, Apartado 49, Managua, Ni- caragua Libre 7 CovertAction 3 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back Mercenaries By Elfen Ray The United States defines the “trouble spots” of the world through official foreign policy statements. This is, often a U.S. intelligence tactic which allows entire geo- political areas of the world to escape close serutiny. The U.S. media continually fall prey to this maneuver, Thus events in Poland, for example, become “the news” while significant covert actions of far more strategic importance may be employed elsewhere without much risk of detec'ion, ‘Such inattention has been the fate of the Indian Ocean. even though it has been described repeatedly as perhaps the ‘most strategic area in the world. Recent events, culminat- ing in the abortive invasion of the Republic of the Sey- chelles in November, suggest that the U.S., South Africa, and other Western allies are deeply involved in a massive scheme to manipulate developments covertly throughout the Irdian Ocean area The Indian Ocean is bordered by some 40 nations con- taining the world's richest known deposits of fuel oil and minerals. It controls the Persian Gulf sea lanes crucial to the West. Atthe same time, an increasing number of Indian, ‘Ocean nations are moving toward socialism and are active members of the Non-Aligned Movement; India, Tanzania, Morambique, Madagascar, and the Seychelles have led a struggle to demilitarize the Indian Ocean and have it de- clarec a nuclear-free zone of peace, There is, however, one ‘major military installation in the middle of the Indian Ocean- Diego Garcia and it is controlled by the U.S, The Pentagon is committed to expanding its facilities in Diege Garcia, making the huge air and naval base under construction there the largest overseas U.S. base For obvious reasons the US. is unhappy about the political trends in the area. Two of Diego Garcia's nearest neighbors (though they are each more than a thousand ‘miles away) are the Seychelles, with a socialist government, and Mauritius, whose pro-Western government is widely expec.ed (0 lose to the socialist apposition in elections which must be held in the first half of 1982. U.S. pre- ‘occupation with Mauritius is all the more significant be- cause Diego Garcia is in fact a dependency of that country. In 1965, three years before Mauritius became independent, the United Kingdom leased Diego Garcia to the United States, rent-free, for 70 years. The socialist opposition, the Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM), has relentlessly attacked this agreement, MMM General-Secretary Paul Berenger has affirmed that his party, if elected, will chal- lenge the validity ofthe lease agreement under which every 4 CovertAction Mauritian on Diego Garcia was forcibly removed to the main islands, all grossly under-compensated for their MMM‘ Berenger is seen as threat to U.S. control of Diego Garcia losses. The Seychellois government of President France Albert Rene has vigorously supported Berenger’s position, Mauritius and the CLA Covert Action Flap In August 1981 Mauritius was briefly in the U.S. news in a context which begins to explain the complex scenario that follows. On July 25 the Washingron Post reported that members of the House Intelligence Committee, in an un- precedented move, wrote directly to President Reagan ex: pressing their concern over a plan outlined to them by then CIA Deputy Director for Operations Max Hugel, Though ‘the Congressional “oversight” committees do not have the power on their own to approve or disapprove CIA covert operations, federal law obliges the CIA to inform them, at least in broad outline, of major secret proposals. Hugels briefing disturbed both Republicans and Democrats on the Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Committee enough to drive them to put their objections in writing to the President. The plan was described variously in subsequent leaks asa covert action in Africa,""a scheme aimed at overthrowing foreign government,” and “a plot to assassinate a foreign leader in Africa.” On July 26 Newsweek magazine reported that the plan involved in action perhaps assassination against Lib: yan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Two days later a White House official, probably then national security adviser Richard Allen, leaked the information that the plot was actually directed against Mauritania, not Libya. Finally when the government of Mauritania demanded an explan- ation, U.S. officials “clarified” the matter in an admission to the Wall Street Journal which went largely unnoticed the target ofthe plan was really Mauritius, not Mauritania To underscore this “final word” on the affair, an adminis tration source told the Washingion Post for its August 15 edition that the confusion had come about because of the similarity in the two countries’ names, and that in any case the plot “did not involve cloak-and-dagger action but was mainly a quiet effort to slip money to the government there to help counteract financial aid being supplied to forces opposing the government by . .. Qaddafi.” The Real Plot CAIB’s investigations suggest that the third explanation was no more valid than the first two, except to pinpoint the area of the world being targeted. For one thing, itis incon- ceivable that “slipping” some funds to a friendly leader facing a difficult election--a commonplace CIA operation—could generate such unheard of Congressional objections, Indeed it is unlikely the CIA considers such routine payments worthy of reporting to the oversight committees The original leaks indicated that the House Committee was appalled by a plan, broad in scope, “which they felt was not properly thought though.” Countering Qaddaf's influence, in fact destabilizing his government, was already overt U.S. foreign policy But the Indian Ocean is another matter. The papers and the newsmagazines focused on CIA disinformation which threw them off the scent. None ofthe media looked beyond Mauritius: none explained that the MMM islikely tocome to power despite any secret funding to the government and that the MMM does not need any Libyan financing to succeed, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, 81, Prime Minister ‘of Mauritius since independence in 1968, is highly unpopu- lar. In the 1976 elections, the MMM won more seats in Parliament than any other party, and had 40% of the popular vote, but Ramgoolam formed a hasty coalition to stay in power: Now the MMM and the Socialist Party have formed a coalition for the upcoming elections which most observers believe cannot be beaten. Ramgoolam paid an official visit to Washington Octo- ber 13-16, visiting the World Bank, the IMF. the State Department, and President Reagan in a quest for overt aid for his beleaguered government. On the surface, the visit was a total failure; all funding requests were turned down, According to the State Department’s East Africa desk officer, many projects were discussed, but nothing was resolved, Of course, since the White House itself was leak- ing details of plans for covert funding, it would be impolitic toannounceaat the same time plans for open aid. Yet when Ramgoolam returned to Mauritius, he called President Number 16 (March 1982) Reagan “the greatest President of the greatest country. high praise indeed for somcone who did not give him a dime. This of course raises the question: What deals were really made? U.S. Involvement in the Seychelles Invasion? Since the Mauritius Militant Movement is not vet in power and thus cannot be overthrown, the objections of the House Intelligence Committee must have focused on a broader plan for the region. What would surely have upset them was a half-baked scheme involving the CIA. the South Africans, and a ragtag band of macho mercenaries. plotting not merely to destabilize the MMM but to over= throw their most vocal supporters, the government of Pres- ident Rene of the Seychelles, a chain of tiny islands with a population of about 62,000. This would not be the West's first attempt to rid the Indian Ocean of President Rene and his militantly non aligned government. In 1979, in fact, another plot was a ant Rene continues to be target of US.-and South, African-inspired destabilization. uncovered. resulting in the expulsion trom the Seychelles of several of the 120 American civilians employed at what the U.S. Air Force describes as a “satellite tracking sta tion,” on the main island, Mahe. (For economic reasons, the Rene government allowed the station to remain, after renegotiating a more equitable lease last year.) According, to Colin Legum, Africa correspondent lor the London CovertAction § Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Observer, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya and the U.S. Charge °Affaires inthe Seychelles were also implicated in the 1979 plot. In the recent attempted overthrow. a number of sources indicate that the planned invasion of the Seychelles, though it did not occur until November, was widely known, at the time the Committee's letter to Reagan was written, The September 1981 issue (published in August) of American Relations, the Washington newsletter of the right-wing Institute of American Relations, carried a brief item entitled, “A Coup in the Seychelles?" With prophetic certanty, the story stressed U.S. concern over the “Marxist-oriented” Seychelles because “the United States does not want an unfriendly power astride such important sea lanes.” “Look for trouble in the Se months,” the magazine concluded Th2 Institute of American Relations isa small think tank created and nurtured by Senator Jesse Helms, acknow edgec leader of the New Right in Congress. The Institute’s, Director is Dr. Vietor A. Fediay. a Russian emigre who, according to the November 1978 Boston magazine, spent twenty years working for a secret Air Force intelligence program called the Aerospace Technology Division. Asan. aide to Senator Strom Thurmond in 1975, Fediay was the Washington liaison for an international cartel comprising, Azorean businessmen, American Mafia figures, and French mercenaries who openly lobbied the U.S. govern- ment and the CIA for military support fora proposed coup against Portuguese rule in the Azores, The military aspects of the coup were planned by the right-wing French para- military Secret Army Organization (OAS). Since the CIA, was, at that time, under intense eriticism, President Ford, apparently vetoed the plan. Some months later, however, in January 1976 according to Mosher Jones magazine (Septmber-October 1980) Richard Allen reintroduced the plan ina letter to Henry Kissinger. Allen. later Rea- ‘gan’ national security adviser and now consultant to the Foreian Intelligence Advisory Board, was representing, fugitive financier Robert Vesco at the time. The Arores coup would have given the U.S. complete control over its Air Force base there, a benefit not over: looked by Fediay and his boss Thurmond, In the current, Seychelles situation the stakes are even higher and the ‘administration not so hesitant helles in the coming The Recruitment Recruitment for the Seychelles invasion of November 25 procesded apace during the summer and fall. Gung Ho, a mercenary magazine which competes with Soldier of For- tune. ran an article in its May 198] issue entitled," Mercen- ary Opportunities East of Suez.” It extolled the benefits and possibilities of a “dogs of war" invasion of the Sey- chelles and Mauritius, noting former Seychelles Prime Minister James Mancham’s support for such an action, Mancham, who lives the life of a rich playboy exiled in London, has been implicated deeply in the preparations for the invasion, According to the Johannesburg Sunday Times (No- vember 29, 1981) Jim Graves, managing editor of Soldier of Foctune told their reporter, “I heard four months ago from a souree in France that something big was going to blow 4p in Africa.” Graves assured the reporter that hie 6 CovertAction visit to South Africa two days before the invasion was purely “coincidental.” The London Sunday Times of the same date noted that, the recruitment had apparently begun some 18 months before in South Africa, and that “Something big became the gossip of Durban bars.” The same day the London Observer pointed out that “recruitment offers were made fairly openly in bars.” Even Eschel Rhoodie, the former South African Information secretary, told the Observer that “he had heard about the planned coup from French and British sources four weeks ago.” Robin Moore, author of “The Green Beret,” and a favorite celebrity of the mer- cenary magazine crowd, told the Johannesburg Sundar Times that*shares” in the $5 million Seychelles operation had been offered around the U.S. for months preceding the invasion, “I was tryingto get people to invest init,” he said, (Moore did not make this admission to any U.S. media, whom he only said he thought the plan was crazy. The statement to the Johannesburg paper would seem grounds, for prosecution under the U.S, Neutrality Act, although in recent years that law has almost never been enforced against mercenary activities in this country.) Who Paid? Moore's claim aside, much reportage of the funding for the Seychelles operation appears riddled with disinforma- tion, “red herrings” to mask the real sources of financing, But the respected London Financial Times of November 27, quotes the Johannesburg Star, saying“the mercenaties had been recruited in Johannesburg with money fromthe U.S.” The Durban Sunday Tribune, November 29, said, "Despite ‘terse, one-sentence denial by the U.S. government yester- day, separate mercenary sources in South Africa are em- phatic that funding for the operation originated with the CIA. Continuing, the Sunday Tribune points out that “their statement is backed up by former Rhodesian mer- cenaries, who as recently as a month ago spoke of a planned CLA-backed operation in the Indian Ocean ‘like Bob Denard’s invasion of the Comoros Islands." This is rather more likely than the story in a London gossip column (picked up by the Washingron Post) quoting, 4 British socialite who contributed $9,000 for the coup because the Seychelles “was running out of decent Chablis. The French Connection Its significant that several news sources reported hear- ing of the plan in France. French mercenaries, most nota- bly "Colone\” Bob Denard, figure prominently in the Indi- an Ocean region. Denard led the 1978 invasion which installed the right-wing government in the Comoros and ‘was implicated in the 1979 plot to invade the Seychelles, a plan which was discovered by the Rene government before the mercenaries were able to leave Durban, Denard today shuttles back and forth between the Comoros, Kenya. South Africa, Gabon, and France; he heads Socovia,an air, Ireight service which ostensibly delivers meat. ‘As the Seychelles plot unfolds, the Comoros) Kenya connection remains one of the biggest mysteries. Several other incidents inthe fall of last year may relate directly to French involvement, or at least Denard’s. In September, exiles from the Comoros in Paris charged that Number 16 (March 1982) ‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 South Africa was behind the planning of a military inva: sion against either the Seychelles or Madagascar, another Indian Ocean nation with a progressive government Though the charge was vague. a former Congo mercensry, apparently connected to Denard, was supposedly equip- pingan.xpedition to the Comoros, but absconded with the funds to Mombasa, Kenya when an investigation into the expedition was launche More substantial evidence is found in the October arrest of Olivier Danet in Paris. Danet, a former French volun- teer in the Rhodesian army, had taken part in Denard’s invasion of the Comoros, and more recently had been a bodyguard for then French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, He wasarrested with Captain Paul Barris, depus ty commander of France’sclite anti-terrorist group. and six ‘others, all charged with smuggling light arms into France rom Belgium, “arms believed to be destined for an extreme right group.” according to the October 13, 1981 Rand Daily Mail ‘The Comoros Mercenaries The Comoros, the only mercenary-run government in the world, figures prominently in the recent invasion. The plane which brought the attackers from Swaziland to the Seychelles had stopped there for half an hour. According to the Royal Swazi Airline pilot, “there isa bit of mystery Whether anyone joined the aircraft there and flew tothe Seychelles.” The January 1982 issue of Afrique-Asie maga- zine claims that five Europeans and several crates labelled ‘gifts for handicapped children” went on board during the stopover. When the Comoros obtained independence from France in 1975, Ahmed Abdallah ruled briefly as President. He was deposed and a progressive government under Ali Soi- lih took power until 1978, when it was ousted in the mer~ ‘cenary invasion led by Denard. The mercenaries reinstalled ‘Abdallah, but effectively ran the country. Olivier Danel fact, served a few months as Justice Minister: Charles” heads the Presidential guard; and Christian Olgater, another mercenary, controls the national shipping, line, Virtually all other aspects of the country’s economic and political life are so controlled. Though Denard has been forced, by pressures from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to spend little time in the Comoros, he owns, with Abdallah, about 60% of the local posts and tele- communications monopoly, STICOM. President Abdal Jah periodically denies that he is under the influence of the mercenaries, particularly Denard, but all independent re~ ports are to the contrary. ‘The Comoros have significantly increased their links with neighboring South Africa recently, reportedly through negotiations carried out by Denard. In mid-1981 the Comoros signed a secret agreement with the South, ‘African government allowing the latter to construct a ‘major telecommunications earth station on Grand Como- ro, inexchange for economic aid. Pretoria is also in charge ofthe expansion of Radio Comoro, and reports have circu- lated that the United States has also installed a radio, communication station there. Additionally, there are re~ ports that a joint U.S.-British deep water research team is, in fact based at a large mercenary camp at Kandaani, Grand Comoro, (It is known that the Mozambique Chan- nel includes some very warm currents which pass over very Number 16 (March 1982) cold water, a condition which makes it difficult 1o detect, submarine movements.) ‘A delegation of French journalists recently visited the Comoros in an attempt to interview the mercenaries, but, they could not be found, Apparently they are maintaining very low profile, The journalists did learn, however. that Denard was in the Comoros at the time of the invasion of the Seychelles, arriving from South Afriea on November 19 and departing on December & The Invasion Despite minor discrepancies in the many accounts of the incident, a fairly clear picture of what happened can be pieced together. Most difficult, however. is a precise ac~ counting of the individuals involved, because of inconsis= tencies in names on travel documents and uncertainty whether the South African authorities released the names, of all persons who ultimately escaped to that country On November 24 a group of 44 men pretending to be members of a fictitious drinking elub, The Ancient Order of Foam Blowers, boarded a Swaziland-hound bus at Jo- hannesburg, en route toa Seychelles vacation, They spent the night at a Holiday Inn in Transvaal where, according to some reports, two women also bound for the Seychelles checked in, The next day the entire group reached the Swaziland airport and boarded a Royal Swazi Airlines plane bound for the Seychelles via the Comoros. At the Comoros the two women left the plane. although the pilot later recalled that he thought a man and a woman had disembarked. Moreover, if the unconfirmed reports of five fother men joining the flight at the Comoros are true. itis, possible that the original group numbered 39. rather than 44, South African reports suggested that the two women “warned” the Seychelles authorities of the impending arti val of the mercenaries, but considering the ensuing melee at the Seychelles airport this seems unlikely, and the precise role of the two women is unknown. ‘The plane arrived at the Seychelles in the late afternoon, ‘on November 25. Waiting at the airport were six of at least cight confederates who had arrived on the island over the CovertAction 7 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 preceding several weeks to reconnoitre, Some of them were apparently armed, and all of the arriving mercenaries had ‘weapons hidden in their luggage, under packages of toys marked “presents for handicapped children.” These in- cluded rockets and rocket launchers, machine guns, rifles, and grenades. It is clear, both from the manner of the entry and from subsequent investigations and confessions, that the attack ‘was not planned for the arrival, but for some weeks in the future The mercenaries expected to leave the airport with their arsenal and movein with the advance team which had rented villas in the mountains neat the U.S. tracking sta- tion, Indeed many other weapons were subsequently dis- covered packed up at a villa As the new arrivals passed through customs, however, a sharp-eyed inspector discovered a hidden weapon. Within aa shor. time the others removed weapons from the baggage anda battle ensued which ultimately destroyed much of the airport and demolished the Royal Swazi plane. The mer- ccenari:s finally took overa large part of the airport, includ- ing the control tower and some adjoining facilities. They also took 70 people hostage —airport personnel. other pas- sengers, and some people captured just outside the airport Seychellois security forces ringed the airport, and pre~ vented some of the mercenaries from taking over a nearby military installation: one soldier was killed in the defense of the fort, and another at the airport. Although the mercen- aries vere surrounded, the authorities refrained from im- ‘media-e action because of the many hostages. Fortunately for th: invaders. a regularly scheduled Air India plane approached the airport some five hours after the standoff began The mercenaries. who were in possession of the contre! tower. guided the plane down, pretending that nothir g was amiss. The Seychellois, who controlled one end of the runway, tried to warn the plane not to land by setting off flares, but this was not understood by the Air India pilot, In landing. one of the plane's wingflaps was, damaged by a vehicle put on the runaway by the Seychel- lois to discourage him. Itis unclear how the Air India pilot was ecavinced to land at all ‘After some four hours of sporadic shelling and eross- fire—which further devastated the airport and negotia- tions with the Air India pilot, he was forced to agree to fly to Durban, South Africa. At least 42 of the invaders and 2 members of the advance team, one of them wounded, entered the plane under cover of darkness, carrying the body of another invader who had been killed in the initial, shootout. Three heavily armed members of the advance team remained, guarding the hostages. At this point, one of, the new arrivals and one of the advance team were un- accounted for. By cawn, some of the hostages managed to escape and reported that the ranks of their captors had been drastically reduced. The Seychellois, until then unaware that almost all of the invaders had left on the Air India plane. rushed the facilities and captured the three men guarding the remaining hostages without incident. Shortly thereafter the missing member of the advance team which had come to the airport was captured. Later the two who had re- mained at the villa were arrested, but it was only two weeks. later that the one missing mercenary who had arrived on the Royal Swazi light crept, half-starved, out of the woods, and wes arrested, One local Seychellois contact was also arrested. 8 CovertAction ‘The Mercenaries Many days passed before the true identities of the mer= ccenaries came to light from flight manifests, travel docu: ‘ments, confessions from the captured, and belated state- ments from the South African government, The South Africans had held the Air India arrivals incommunicado land released no details or names for some time The leader of the landing force was none other than Mike Hoare, 62, Irish-born resident of South Africa. "Mad Mike” Hoare had been a key mercenary in the Congo inthe 1960s, leading the forces which suppressed the supporters ‘of Patrice Lumumba and helping to install Mobutu. Hoare hhad worked off and on with both the CIA and the South, Africans for years, Aging mercenary Mike Hoare: End of Dog-of-War era, Second in command was “Captain” Peter Duffy, anoth- er Congo veteran who had served with Hoare, The man who hid in the woods for two weeks was Jeremiah “Josh” Puren, who had fought with Hoare in the Congo and had, served as an aide to Katangese secessionist leader Moise Tshombe, Puren was a South African Air Force veteran, reported to be an active member of South African military intelligence. There were two Americans involved, both of whom made it to Durban: Barry Gribben and Charles Dukes, the wounded member of the advance team. But most interest ing was the discovery that more than half of the group were South Africans, most of them active or reserve members of, the “Red Devils,” an elite reconnaissance commando group. According to the Financial Times, the Red Devils were linked to raids into both Mozambique and Angola last year Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 “Red Devils” commander Chris Hillebrand, one of defeated meres, train al South Africa Combat School The member of the advance team captured shortly after the hostages were freed turned out to be Martin Dolinchek, an active-duty member of South African intelligence, NIS. (formerly BOSS). Dolinchek, who subsequently confessed in great detail and gave numerous interviews to the press said hie was on leave from NIS. although the South Atri= cans tersely stated that he had quit, His testimony deeply implicated the South African government. His false pass- port had been duly issued by the passport division of the Durban Department of the Interior. He admitted that he had arranged for Mike Hoare’s false passport through the same office. Dolinchek also said that he and Robert Sims. Mike Hoare’s brother-in-law, arrested at the villa, had tested the weapons packed for the operation at a Durban airport in broad daylight, Dolinchek had been scouting the island for nearly a month with Sims and his colleague, Susan Ingles, She had been in charge of finances, apparent ly spending large sums throughout the island. South African Reaction When, several days alter the mercenaries landed at Dur- ban, the South African authorities finally reacted, to the astonishment of most of the world, they released 39 of the ‘44 men with no charges, and charged five, including Hoare. with the relatively minor offense in South Africa of kid napping, They were immediately released on very low bail International reaetion was swift and vitriolic. South Africa has been a strident vocal opponent of “terrorism. including air piracy. and is a signatory to several interna: tional conventions on hijacking. The South African law is very strict, with a mandatory five-year minimum sentence and possible 30 years" imprisonment. There is no minimum for Kidnapping. International pressure was overwhelming. and on January 5 the entire group of 44 was charged with air piracy Number 16 (March 1982) here isan unexplained discrepancy in the figures, how ever, South Africa originally announced that 44 mercensr ies had been detained upon landing in Durban, but the nuary 5 announcement by the provineta eral spoke of 45 warrants There ate already indications that the new charges may bea sham. South African legal authorities have comment: ced that the international conventions, and South Atrican, law, define hijackin Attorney Gen as a taking over of a plane after the doors have been closed for takeoff. Ifthe decision to take over the plane, even by foree, was made before boarding it they say. this would not constitute air piracy. but a *politi- cal crime” committed on Seychellois soil. Since South Africa has no extradition treaty with the Seychelles, se= rious prosceution of most of the offenders may be illusory The Role of James Mancham ‘One of the many loose ends in this alfair is the role of former President James R. M. Mancham. the man deposed by Albert Rene in 1977. Mancham wis on a lecture tour of the United States when the botched invasion occurred, speaking on™ The Struggle for Power in the Indian Ocean, When the wreckage of the airport was cleared. two partial ¥y burned tape recordings were found, containing messages from Mancham to the people of the Seychelles in which he offered to accept an “invitation” to resume the presidency and “help the country in the national task of restoring democracy.” Faced with this evidence, Mancham admitted, to reporters that he had been approached in September by ‘dissident Seychellois" who asked him to make some tapes, Jing coup. However. Martin Dolinchek told Seychellois authorities that Hoare had described to him a September mecting with Mancham in London. and ‘other mercenaries reported that Hoare spoke often of Mancham, saying that he would bea figurehead” after the takeover, suggesting a Comoros-lype regime, For use in an im CovertAction 9 ‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 It is impossible to believe that Mancham knew nothing of the actual plot. He has always been close to South Africa, and during his presidency was sharply criticized for providing Seychelles passports for South Africans to aid their travels in the rest of Africa South Africa and the CIA What most strains eredulity are the official South Afri- can assertions of total ignorance. Open recruitment had been -aking place in South Africa for at least eighteen ‘months. Everyone in mercenary circles in South Africa France, and the U.S. seemed to know about it, Rumors were printed in magazines and newspapers on three conti- nents. Sims and Dolinchek strongly suggest South African complicity, and Air India passengers reported that the mercenaries who took over their plane talked openly on the trip te Durban of the South African goverment role, tis also difficult to believe that the CIA was not aware of, if not deeply involved in, the plot, Interest in the Indian (Ocean is intense, and. as noted above, the CIA has in the past manipulated affairs in both the Seychellesand Mauri- tus, Moreover, the evidence is strong that the House Int as well as many right-wing organiza~ hhad some idea of the machinations ligenes Committee ions in the US under way In anionic twist, Prime Minister Ramgoolam of Maurie tius accused the Seychelles on December 5 of seeking to overthrow his government by “actively promoting stabilization” there, With the Seychelles stll reeling from the invasion and attempting to shore up defenses against further threatened attacks, this complaint was surely @ diversion, perhaps part of Ramgoolam’s faltering reelection campaign, In fact there are recent reports out of South Africa that Mike Hoare met with Bob Denard in Durban in mid- December to discuss second invasion. Itis unclear wheth- erthisis only South African disinformation to increase the justificble nervousness of the people of the Seychelles. Was Kenya Involved? A more difficult question relates to the possible official involv zment of Kenya in the plot, Dolinchek told his cap tors: "A new government was to be flown in from Kenya. The Kenyan government agreed to provide two airplanes which were to fly in Kenyan soldiers and police to replace Tanza ian troops which were believed to be in this coun try. Colonel Mike Hoare said the whole thing would be a pushover. The Kenyan government was silent for 20 hours after this statement was reported, and then vigorously denied any involvement and insisted that Dolinchek was lying. It is impossible at this time to know whether Dolinchek’s claim ‘as anything more than subtle disinformation, an obvious difficulty in interrogating a trained intelligence officer, whose mission might well be to sow the seeds of dissension among other African countries But Kenya is not a clase friend of the Seychelles. Is policies are decidedly pro-Western, Huge military tacilties hhave been granted the U.S. at the Kenyan port of Momba- sa, Though Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi is current head cf the OAU and claims to abhor mercenatism, he allows one of the largest CIA stations in Africa to operate 10 CovertAction out of Kenya, Morcover, Kenya was implicated in the 1979, plot against the Seycheli Conclusion Several facts emerge from the many reports of this mean adventure, from which some observations can be made, They should be viewed in light ofthe fixation ofthe United States with the Indian Ocean and its paranoia over “threat ened” sea lanes. As President Rene observed, “Our com= ‘mitment to socialist development, coupled with the strate- gic geographical location of our islands in the Indian Ocean make us prone to such ruthless maneuvers of dest bilization and apgression.” Events in the Indian Ocean region raise some parallels with U.S. activity in the Caribbean Basin. There, 100. there are expressions of concern over sea lanes, and there, too, mercenary activity is encouraged, Cuban exiles and Some: cista fugitives play the role that South Africans fill in, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, (In fact, U.S. mil itary mancuvers were taking place in the Caribbean and in North Africa during the months and weeks preceding the Seychelles invasion.) it seems clear that both South Africa and the United States knew of, and condoned. the plan, Beyond the admit- tedly unreliable braggadocio of mercenaries interviewed in the press, the circumstantial evidence is strong, Most sig nificant is financing. Estimates of the cost of the Seychelles ‘operation range between two and five million dollars, and, iis inconceivable that such a sum was raised by’ a handful of dissident Seychellois exiles, or society types looking for 4 thrill, The alleged CIA funding of the ruling party in Mauritius may well have been a cover, in part, Lor some of this money Moreover, the close relationship between the Reagan administration and Pretoria cannot be underestimated. The U.S, and South Africa are openly exchanging infor mation and plans, as they connive to block SWAPO’ relentless path to true independence for Namibia, and as they plot the brutal destabilization of Angola, Movam- bigue, and Zimbabwe. Tocholds in the Comoros and Mau- and, they hope, in the Seychelles secure the pe rimeter of Southern Africa as they counter socialist devel- ‘opment in the Indian Ocean. More information will surely come to light. On De- cember 15 the U.N, Security Couneil unanimously agreed to send a commission of inquiry to the Seychelles to inves tigate the invasion and report back, Every member of the Security Couneil except the U.S. was enthusiastic in its condemnation of merecnarism. Jeane Kirkpatrick suggest- ed that sending the mission was assuming that the "Se chelles affair was not purely internal,” which was™prejudg- ing the situation.” This is a preposterous Statement, con- sidering that the $2 armed mercenaries, led by Mad Mike Hoare, recruited. funded and supplied under the noses of the South Africans, were hardly a group of dissident Seychellois. In addition, although little is expected to come to light from the trials, if any, in South Africa, those to commence shortly in the Seychelles may explain much more of this strange episode, Whether the House Intelligence Committee or anyone else will call for greater scrutiny of the U.S. role remains to be seen - ‘Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Pretoria’s Continuing War Soush Africa's relentless war against Angola has escale- ted dramatically over the past several months. In August ‘and again in November, Cunene Province in southwestern Angola was devastated by massive, weeks-long South AF rican attacks. Invading forces advanced over 150 miles into Angolan territory with more than twice the number of troops deployed in the 1975-76 South African invasions. Coverage of these events has removed any lingering credence given to South Africa's contention that its raid: into Angola are limited incursions aimed at military bases ‘of the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO). In fact, the scope ofthe war is vast, the battle is, non-stop, the targets are primarily Angolan towns and villages, and substantial areas of the Angolan side of the border with Namibia have been openly occupied by South Airica, The myth nurtured by Pretoria that much of the Number 16 (March 1982) fighting has been conducted by UNITA forces is no longer even peddled, Operation Protea The first major escalation, Operation Protea, began on July 28, 1981, and by September $ most of the southern part of the province, including the key towns of Xangongo and Njiva, was occupied by South African Defense Force (SADE) troops. As in previous major confrontations, the Angolan army, FAPLA, held its own in the head to head ground fighting, but was overwhelmed by’ the massive air ‘and artillery support whieh poured in whenever the SADF advance faltered. Whole towns and villages in the region were leveled Journalists who reached the area on Sep. tember 5 and were bombed by South African fighter CovertAction IL Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264.Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264 planes~confirmed the reports of wide-spread civilian ca- sualties and the destruction of non-military targets, The planes, they said, were attacking “anything that moves, The invasion and occupation were the subject of a Secur- ‘ty Couneil debate at the United Nations, and the U.S. veto was the only vote against condemnation of South Africa Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, commented, “The Reagan administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa to curry favor else- where.” Crocker defended the veto as an expression of American “neutrality.” The U.S. position, which amount- ed to open support for naked South African aggression, wasa clear signal to Pretoria. "We are grateful that Ameri- cca has shown a sense of balance about the Angolan ‘inva- sion’ issue,” wrote the Citizen, an English-language Johan- nesburg paper closely linked to South African intelligence. South Africa insisted that its operations were directed against SWAPO, but it was obvious that the primary pur- ose as to bolster the sagging fortunes of UNITA, an explanation supported by a September 14 London Times analysis. The Times Johannesburg correspondent noted that UNITA forces were moving into the territory occupied by South Africa from their sole stronghold, desolate Cuando-Cubango Province, to the east of Cunene. “In- formed observers here," he reported, “believe that the scale of the South African incursion was part of a longer-term strategy aimed at developing UNITA into a proxy force which could police a broad swathe of territory along Ango- |a’s southern border.” Operation Daisy During September and October SADF positions were shuffled, with some occupied areas abandoned and others, fortified. Then, on October 27, another massive attack was launched—Operation Daisy. This battle raged for three ‘weeks, and was reported daily by the Angolan authorities. It was not until December 7, however, that Pretoria con- firmec the reports. South African journalists, who were aware of the operation, were prohibited by law from men- tioning it until that time, Operation Daisy involved fighting from 100 to 150 miles inside Angola. As Joseph Lelyveld reported in the New York Times (December 8, 1981), "Each subsequent attack has carried South African forces deeper into Angola.” Finally, on November 30, in a vicious act of sabotage, the Petrangol oil refinery in Luanda was bombed. South African equipment was found at the scene, as well as mate- rial in Afrikaans. Most significantly, the sabotage opera- tion had been conducted by white mercenaries; several white bodies were found, apparently the result of a pre- matur: explosion which, fortunately, halted the bombing before the refinery complex was totally destroyed. Anecological disaster was narrowly averted through the heroism of Angolan refinery workers who rolled away thouse nds of barrels of lead tetraethyl from blazing storage buildings. Had this toxic additive been vaporized, a Bel- gian refinery official noted, “an enormous poison cloud could have enveloped Luanda, had the wind blown the wrong way.” UNITA Claims The day after the explosion Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, 12 CovertAction who was in New York at the time, claimed credit for the sabotage, Western diplomatic observers, however, agreed that the saboteurs were South African mercenaries. and, whether of not they were nominally acting for UNITA, it was clear that South Africa trained them, supplied them, and sent them on their mission, Moreover, there was specu- lation over the manner of arrival of the mercenaries. At a press conference while the fire was still being fought. the Angolan oil minister suggested that the mercenaries might hhave come by South African submarine. A similar charge hhad been leveled by Mozambique at the time of the attemp- ted mining of Beira harbor. Interestingly. only two days. before the attack on the refinery the South Africans had relaunched one of the navy’s three submarines alter a 15 month overhaul, and it had immediately left port fora “sea trial.” The U.S. role in the Angolan war has not been limited to ‘outspoken support for the Pretoria regime. Jonas Savimbi received VIP treatment on his recent visit in November and, December. [See CAIB Number 7 for details of Savimbi's ‘November 1979 visit.] It was no coincidence that this visit came precisely as the House considered the Senate's pro- posal to repeal the Clark Amendment, prohibiting U.S. intervention in Angola. Savimbi’s meetings with numerous, CIA, National Security Council, and State Department officials did not prevent the House from upholding the Clark Amendment, although this victory may be irrele- vant. On January 22an interview with Savimbi appeared in the conservative Portuguese weekly Tempo. He said, refer- ringto U.S. aid to UNITA, "Material help is not dependent on, nor limited by, the Clark Amendment, A great country like the United States has other channels... The Clark Amendment means nothing.” Knowledgeable observers ‘point out that the Reagan administration has been known, to offer to increase proportionately aid to countries that ‘will commence or inerease aid to UNITA. Simultaneously with Savimbi’s tour, President Mobutu of Zaire made a state visit to the U.S. This visit had been scheduled for early 1982, but was moved up—at the urging, of the CIA—for reasons of great concern to Angola. While Mobutu has his own serious internal problems in Zaire, he is also providing cover for another front in the U.S-South African war against Angola. A group of Zaire-based mer ccenaries, along with some remnants of Holden Roberto’s defunct FNLA, have established "the Military Committee of the Angolan Resistance” (COMIRA). This group, with what appears to be CIA support in direct violation of the Clark Amendment, is said to be planning attacks against Angola from the north, while the Luanda government is preoccupied with the massive South African operations in, the south, a strategy similar to that which failed in 1975-76, To have Mobutu and Savimbi in Washington together seemed like an attempt to coordinate puppets. American press coverage has focused obsessively on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, although they were ‘not involved in the battles against South Africa, but pro- vided rear guard support for FAPLA. But public opinion must come to grips with the extent of South African and CIA operations against Angola and the blatant disregard of the Clark Amendment. Extensive destruction and grow- ing civilian casualties can clearly be laid at the doorstep of he Reagan administration. Chester Crocker's assertion of is a farce, - yeutrali Number 16 (Mareh 1982) pA sroved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264.‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Mozambique Rebels Exposed South African aggression against Mozambique. which increased in early 1981 (see C4/B Numbers 12nd 13). has dramatically escalated. A campaign of terrorism and sab- fotage has followed the mid-October speech of South Atri ean Defense Minister. Gen, Magnus Malan, The speech, which has been described as a call for a “second *Matola- type’ raid in Mozambique,” announced preparations for the opening of a“second front.” While Gen. Malan was not specilic, the first front is Angola, and the second front, Observers agreed, must be Mozambique. Mike Hough, the dircetor of the Pretoria Institute for Strategie Studies. was, quoted by the Rand Daily: Mail (October 16, 1981} as pointing owt that “the Mozambique and Angola situations ‘were almost identical.” Speaking of Gen. Malan, Hough said. “I have a good idea that he must be referring to Movambique.” Even while Gen, Malan was speaking. it now appears. a band of South African commandos were infiltrating Mo- zambique for purposes of sabotage. On October 14, a Mozambican army patrol found a group of men laying mines along the vital Beira-Umtali railway, which links Zimbabwe with the major Mozambican port. Six sabo- re killed: they were discovered to be three South xplosives experts and three teurs Airican demolitions and members of the "Mozambique National Resistance.” a small, shadowy group which has been sniping at the Ma- cchel goxernment since 1976. The MNR was widely believed to be a creation of South [Africa since its first appearance, and the identilication of the bodies by the railroad tracks provided further confir- mation, Afrikaans writing had been found on crates of ammunition captured from the MNR. Further and more etailed confirmation has come from a most unexpected source, a [6-year BOSS veteran, agent Gordon Winter In early October Penguin Books distributed in London advance copies of “Inside BOSS.” Gordon's 640-page con- fessional of his years asa South African intelligence agent The book aroused so much controversy—and dovens of threatened lawsuits that i was withdrawn from sale only days after it became generally available. Although several British journalists have questioned Winter's change of heart and openly speculated that he is still working for South Africa, the book's details of South African intelli tence operations are generally regarded as accurate. Tnit, he describes how MNR was created in 1976 by Gen, Malan, then Chief of Staff of the Army, as “a fake Black liberation movement in Mozambique.” Winter. in his cover as a journalist, spent much of 1977 writing stories, glorifying theexploits of the non-existent organization, All of the aets of sabotage and terrorism were, infact, conduct- ‘ed by South African commandos. By 1978 the South Afri: cans recruited “between ten and twenty Blacks from Mo- vambique” who became areal” MNR. They were photo- graphed with weapons and uniforms a few miles from Pretoria, The pictures were published by Winter and other journalist-a side Mozambique. ints ay guerrillas “training at secret bases in ‘Over the next few years asmall core of ‘Number 16 (March 1982) MNR members, assisted by South Atrican w plosives, experts and financing, sporadically caused exten sive damage throughout Mozambique The MNR--that is to say, the South Africans stepped up its activities after the abortive railway episode. That their cover was fully blown was of no consequence. At the end of Octoher a series of explosions damaged the Zimbabwe-Morambique oil pipeline, and disrupted rail fand road links between the two countries. Two bridges, crossing the Pungue River. 50 km, east ot the port of Beira, were sabotaged. Mozambican authoritiey indicated that those responsible had infiltrated the country with the group killed at the railway On November 12. the channel marker buoys in Beira harbor were blown up, an action which appeared to have required the use of a submarine or very fast gunboats. equipment obviously not available to the MNR, On De- ember 7 the Mavambican Army overran the main base ol the MNR at Giaraguy and discoverd a cache of correspond tence and minutes of mectings between MNR. South African olficials, including a colonel in military intelligence, One document confirmed that the railway mine laying plan had been conceived and ordered by the South Alricans. Finally. on December 17. two foreign wildlite experts and severil aides trom the Mozambican wildlife school were kidnapped. Zimbabwe too has not been immune to South At instigated violence, to say the least. Small MNR groups have often camped near the border, and. according to the Octoher 4. 1981 New York Times. South African planes supplying the MNR have on occasion violated Zimbab- In August a Zimbabwean garrison arms Pons, 6x wean airspace dump was sabotaged in an action which Prime Minister Robert Mugabe suggested involved South African collu- sion. And in mid-December a massive explosion ripped through his party's headquarters. Mugabe, commenting on South African adventures in his country, Mozambique lund the Seychelles, said. "A rabid racist regime has gone wild in our neighborhood.” On December 28, 1981, the Washington Post revealed that "Western intelligence sources . . . have confirmed Movambican charges that the rebels are reeeiving South African armaments and logistical support.” This 1s rather dramatic understatement, The MNR is South African. [ty activity is no less an enormity than the sending of merce> naries to the Seychelles or the raid on Matota. - Mozambican Movie on CIA Planned The Morambican government has announced that itis planning a full-length feature film on the CLA spy ring which operated in Mozambique since independ ence in 1975, This ring was described in CAIB Number 12. - CovertAction 13 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Argentina Activates International Death Squads By Elfen Ray Argentina, according to a Foreign Ministry official, wants a “balance of power” in Latin America, seeking @ “modus vivendi" to keep the area “independent from super- power conflicts.” In fact, however, itis working hand in glove with the United States and some of the most repres- sive regimes around the world. In particular it is exporting on a growing scale its well-honed specialties of disappear- ance, torture, and murder. Argentina brutally stifled political dissent following the coup ia which the military junta overthrew Isabel Peron in, 1976. Now. in secret agreements between the military re- sgime end the Haig State Department finalized last Sep- tember, Argentina is activating its torturers around the world, where they had been marking time since the Carter administration penalized their gross human rights viola~ tions which left between 15,000 and 30,000 Argentines, dead, Though the junta has slowed down its domestic killing somewhat, it has never eliminated its heinous poli- cies of extermination, Into El Salvador It is now apparent that in return for lifting the arms embargo imposed by Carter, Argentina will lead the way in the U.S. strategy of outside intervention—covertly in Nica- agua and overtly in El Salvador by aiding the CIA's plans 10 destabilize Nicaragua and by preparing to send troops into El Salvador after the bogus March elections. This is part of Haig's “continental” approach to involve reacticnary Latin American regimes in U.S. inter- ventionism, The embargo was lifted on December 14, 1981 after extens ve shuttle diplomacy. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen, Edward C. Meyer visited Buenos Aires in April: Gen, Leopoldo Galtieri, then Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army and now President, visited Washington in August; Secretary Haig’s envoy Gen, Vernon Walters met in Argen- tina with Galtieri in September; and Galtieri returned to the U.S. in November, shortly before he forced Gen, Ro- berto Viola to step down from the Presidency. During this, period. significantly, there were several reciprocal visits between high Salvadoran and Argentinean officals. The sutcome was foreordained: Galtieri announced that hhe was willing to send troops to EI Salvador, though Sal vadoran Defense Minister Guillermo Gareia publicly stat- ced they were “not needed at the moment.” In fact, they are 14 CovertAction desperately needed, as the Salvadoran regime is on the verge of complete collapse. Morcover, an unknown, number of Argentinean officers have been in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras for some time. On December 2, 1981. the New York Times revealed that Salvadoran military intelligence officers have been in Argentina for more than two years, taking courses “focusing on problems of organization, infiltration, and interrogation.” Other reports indicate that Argentinean military personnel described as “experienced forcign counterinsurgency specialists”—are in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In Guatemala they have elped in the capture of a number of guerrillas through wetwork analysis,” described by Lavin America Regional Reports as a method “whereby telephone, electricity and other household bills are serutiniz2d by computer for ‘abnormalities."* In fact this computer “suspect identification system” was U.S.-built and exported to Argentina, according to intelligence sources. Computer expertise aside. Argentina's specialty is tor ture, and recent exposes in South Africa confirm the scope of their activities South Africa A press campaign by liberal South African journalists recently resulted in the transfer from his “diplomatic” post- ingin Pretoria of one ofthe chief torturers of the notorious Escuela Mechanica de la Armada (Naval Mechanics School), which operated in Buenos Aires between 1974 and 1978. Ina series of articles running from October through December, the Durban Sunday’ Tribune identified tour Argentinean naval officers operating out of Pretoria who hhad administered the Escuela death camp, including Liew tenant Aliredo Astizthe“Blond Angel.” Astiz left South Africa in December after more than two yea work there. The question of their precise mission was not addressed in the flurry of press statements about the presence of the Argentinean torturers in South Africa. Observers outside South Africa have noted, however, the connection between, the training of Salvadoran and South African intelligence teams in Argentina. [tis possible that Astiz, as an expert in military repression, is now working in Argentina'sexpand- ing military role in El Salvador. Ifso, itis with the blessing of Washington. Number 16 (Mareh 1982) ‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 x The “Blond Angel,” Lt. Astiz, in groups, marking countless Argentines for torture and death, In their series. the Sunday Tribune compiled the follow- ing documentation © Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz headed kidnapping opera tions for the Escuela. one of the largest of at least 15 death camps used as secret detention and torture centers, Over 4.700 men, women, and children thought to oppose the ‘military junta passed through the Escuela. Fewer than 100) survived the camp, according to Amnesty International Astiz also infiltrated what were considered “subversive groups." for example a church center run by women at tempting to petition the Argentine government over the whereabouts of the “disappeared” children, Under an as: sumed name and pretending to have a missing relative, ‘Astiz infiltrated the church geoup to identify those ine volved. Then they were kidnapped, tortured, and killed. Asti was appointed naval attache in Pretoria on June 20. 1979, ‘© Rear Admiral Ruben J. Chamorro (the Dolphin) was commander of the Escuela [rom 1974 to 1978. There he ‘operating theaters” or torture rooms, e detained during the supervised the where over 100 people at a time wi height of the repression. The vietims were handcuffed and hooded, according to survivors, and were systematically tortured and then finally killed, often flown by helicopter ‘over the Atlantic and dumped while still alive. As one survivor recounted, “Chamorro was fond of personally showing visitors from the naval high command around his, camp, which he would proudly describeas the"best-known, maternity hospital in Buenos Aires.” because of the facili- ties for pregnant women sent there. Those women who did not abort on the torture table were put on display for naval staff who wanted to adopt babies. After the babies were born, the women would be murdered and the children given away. Chamorro was appointed armed forces at- tache in Pretoria on June 4, 1979, © Captain Jorge Acosta (the Tiger). one of the most powerful men in the Escuela, was later responsible for the placement of himself and the other torturers to senior “diplomatic” postings throughout the world. Acosta iscre~ dited with refining the use of the naval task force GT 333/2—as the instrument of intelligence collection and Number 16 (March 1982) torture. A lormer naval intelligence olficer, Acosta was said to be the most sadistie of the torturers and the person who decided, with Chamorro, which of the prisoners more than 90" of them were to be killed, When the Escuela was dismantled in 1978, Acosti managed to seeure appointments of his men as “diplomats” abroad. The South African government would not provide details of his, accreditation there, according to the Sunday Trebune ‘© Captain Jorge Perren (the Py Captain Acosta and was ve of the torturers, Later. Surv: vors documented the transfer of Perren to Argentina's counter-propaganda center in Paris, where he was joined, by Licutenant Astir, Both were recognized by the Argent rendered inellective nean exile community there and, ied to the armed n Pretoria on forced to leave France. Perren was appoint forees mission at the Argentine Embassy October 17, 1979 SATO The surface connection between South Africa and Ar gentina has heen the proposed defense pact, the South, Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), Under the proposal the two countries’ navies would play main roles, supplied by the NATO powers with sophisticated armaments “to fight Soviet naval encroachment of the South Atlantic." December of 1980 then Argentine Presicent Jorge Vila ruled out the possibility of a South Atlintie pact, saying that L such organization But successive military presidents have chan Indeed President Galtier’ is a virtual elient of the Reagan umental in cementing tin American countries could take no part in any ‘which might include South Africa.” J their tune administration, which has been ins relations between Argentina and South Alriea. When Gal- tieri visited the U.S. for the Conference of American Ar mis, he toasted top U.S. military officials: “Argentina will march together with the U.S. in the ideological batth Pushing this theme is Galtier friend, Gen, Meyer. Mey= er ideology: is exemplitied by his public statement that World War III began when the Soviet Union moved inte, Afghanistan, But perhaps the closest friends South Alriea and Argen- tina have in the Reagan administration are Gen, Walters ‘and Peter Hannatord.1 former Reagan speechwriter who is « registered lobbyist for Argentina, (See C4/# Number [2 on Hannaford’ role, with his then partner Michael Deaver, the White House aide. as a lobbyist for Guatema- la.) Hannaford recently visited South Africa and Namibia, expressing public support for the policies of the South African government. In May of 1981 an international conference to promote the concept of SATO was convened in Buenos Aires, privately sponsored by the Institute of American Relations, (sce the Seychelles article in this issue), the Council for Inter-American Security. and the Carlos. Pellegrini Foundation of Argentina. The symposium was comprised of militaryand strategic experts Irom the US. Argentina, South Africa, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. Playing a key role was Gen, Walters, former Deputy Director of the CIA anda ubiquitous lobbyist for right-wing regimes. The conference was less than successful, however, in that Braril has difficulty getting involved with South Africa because of its substantial trade with Nigeria, Angola, and other Black African countries CovertAction 15 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 ‘What Is In Store for El Salvador? members of the junta and “respected the entreaties of Ar- gentines .. .as well as warnings of U.S. counterinsurgency experts to avoid naming... the prineipal architects of Argentina’s victory over leftist terrorism,” The high offi- cials praised the order, in early 1975, which “permitted the armed forces to move in,” and praised the rising “terrorist, bbody-count.” One of their sources is quoted as follows: “Don't say it was I who said 50, but the victory over the terrorists began, the day my wile said, “There's no way out except to kill these monsters; we've got to kill them all!” As noted above, Argentina's torturers are training mil- itary officers from many countries, highlighting problems, of “organization, infiltration. and interrogation.” A fright- ening look at some of the methods involved can be found in, fan extraordinary article, “How Argentina Won Its War Against Leftist Terrorism,” in the February 13, 1982 Human Events. The piece in the tight-wing journal ex- presses the “hope” of the authors that Argentina can teach FI Salvador the lessons of success. The writers, former Chicago Sun-Times correspondent Virginia Prewett and former New York Times reporter William R. Mizelle,now ‘The indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians has publish “private intelligence reports on Latin America” plagued El Salvador for 50 years; Argentina's contribution called Hemispheric Horline. They interviewed the will be more of the same. = From August | to October 15, 198] the U.S. sponsored the largest naval maneuvers ever conducted by Western forecs during peacetime, Codenamed “Ocean Venture 81." the exercises involved over 120,000 troops, 250 ships, and 1,000 aircraft Irom 14 countries. and ranged from the South Atlantic to the Caribbean to the Baltie Sea. The massive show of power in the Caribbcan was coordinated by Rear Admiral Robert P. McKenzie, Commander of the Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force Claiming that the maneuvers in the Caribbean were in response to increasing Cuban power in the arca, the U.S. targcted its “fictitous™ war game scenario against Cuba, codenamed “Red.” and Grenada and the Grenadines, codenamed “Amber and the Amberdines.” On November 15 the U.S.S. Dwight Eisenhower, a nuclear-powered carrier which the captain claimed was “one of the niost awesome weapons systems jn the world,” paid an official visit to Barbados, The Barbados Peace Committee and the Movement for National Liberation (MONALI) met the ship with banners that proclaimed “Hands Ott Grenada and Cuba” and “Caribbean Must be a Zone of Peace.” The two groups sent a letter of protest to Prime Minister Tom Adams which said in part, “At a time when the Ronald Reagan government is one of the few governments in the world supporting the racist South African state and its continuing attacks on Angola, your government is trying to cory up to the Yankee warmongers.” - 16 CovertAction Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Interview: Salvadoran Deserter Discloses Green Beret Torture Role Fora long time documented reports of massacres by the Salvadoran armed forces and death squads have been Comatonplace. Suggestions that US. “advisers have heen involved were invariably denied by the Reagan administra: tian. But readers of the establishinemt press were shocked by a dispatch from Rayniond Bonner in the Januars 11 New York Times which placed U.S. Special Forces Green Berets at classes devised te teach methods of torture to Salvadoran soldiers, Bonner had imerviewed an army de serter in Mesicw City sho described the classes tm etal The implicarions of this shif from indiscriminate killing tw deliberate torture are significant. During the Viernam war U.S, troups and CIA “police advisers” regularly en And, as the Dan Misrione incident in Uruguay makes elear, U.S. ad: visers have in the past shown their clients how effective torture can be both in obtaining information and in ntinni= dating the population. The role of Argentina in South ‘Africa and El Salvador, discussed elsewhere in this issue, also confirms this development in the straveer of the Sal- adoran junta. gaved in torture to trv 10 obtain information, Moreover, in farther taped interviews with other jour nalists, Bonner’: source, 2/-vear-old Carles. Antonio Gomez Montano, implicated some of the Green Berets directly in the commission of torture. These interviews were first reported in the January 1982 issue of E1 Salvador Alert, the publication of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. CAIB has obtained the tran script of the critical interview, and what follows are the portions dealing with the participation of the U.S. troops. Gomez was drafted into the Salvadoran army in De: cember 1980, and was jailed the following April. In Mav somie friends helped him escape, and he spent the next several weeks traveling through EI Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico, where a refugee aid group has helped him 1 seutle In El Salvador I was cited to report to the barracks. At the same time, my brother was involved with the guerrilla strugele. Before | entered into the military, my brother was, a guerrilla fighter. He told me many times, why didn’t | incorporate into the guerrilla strugele, for the people? | Number 16 (March 1982) said, “No, I didn’t ike those sorts oF things." few later [ got a citation from the army that I had to report in February to the barracks. | did not answer the summons in February. was summoned again and finally had to go in December of 19K0. So} went and presented myself. Alter we were there they taught us how to handle the rifles, different types of Formations, working the streets, They brought us out to the different towns to carry out searches. Altera month, they taught us a course in anti guerrilla wartare, Many of my friends went on this course to Panama but I didn't go. After they returned, there was, another course that I took which was tor paratroopers After that course, they taught us a lot of tactics advancing, retreating, military tacties. After that they gave tus uniforms and boots that came from the U.S camouflage uniforms. There they gave us some classes about the war in Vietnam how we should act on the battlefield, What they told us was that we shouldn't have mercy on anyone, whether it be children or women of men, but you have to kill all of them, Many times we would go into the mountains. I saw many things in relation tothe officials, the officers. They took the young men and women from the houses and brought them to the barracks and afterwards they tortured them and killed them Later we had a welcome for the Green Berets. That day way the day of the soldier. They formed all of us up in columns. We had a homage for those who had fallen and for those still alive, too. They got us up for this to greet these Green Berets who came from the U.S. The officers said they would be able to teach youa new tactic. We didn", have any idea what this new tactic was: we thought it was something else. The first time they brought us toa voleano {and they brought ws to the slopes of the voleano so that we ‘were going to combat with the guerrilla fighters. The Green Berets didn't go into combat: they were just behind teaching us how toda these things. They would eriticize us, fs to what was good and what was bad. We passed five days, ‘ona volcano. There were 600 of us—inall, 5.000, Of those, there were many who didn’t return, There were lots of soldiers who were killed. Six days later we returned to the barracks and then they began to teach us how to torture, One evening they went and got nine young people that were accused of being guerrillas and brought them to where we were. This was CovertAction 17‘more ot less the last time that | had to sce very well the type of torture they carried out against the guerrillas. The first fone they’ brought—a young fellow who was around 15 or 16 years old and the first thing they did was to stick the bayone:s under his fingernails and pulled them out, That day he was the first one that died under torture. This young fellow said all sorts of things against them to let him go. The officers said “We are going to teach you how to mutilate and how to teacha lesson to these guerrillas.” The officers who were teaching us this were the American Green Berets. They didn't speak Spanish so they spoke English and then another officer Salvadoran translated it into Spanish for us. Then they began to torture this young fellow. They took out their knives and stuck them, under Fis fingernails, After they took his fingernails off, then thcy broke his cloows, Afterwards they gouged out his, eyes. Then they took their bayonets and made all sorts of slices in his skin all around his chest, arms, and legs. They then took his hair off and the skin of his sealp. When they saw there was nothing left to do with him, they threw gasoline on him and burned him. The next day his dead body wasn't around but was found by people out in the streets—-left in the street The rext day they started the same thing with a 1 old girl. They did more or less the same, but they did other things to her. too. First, she was utilized, raped by all the officers, They stripped her and threw her in a small room, they went in one by one. Afterwards they took her out tied and blindfolded. Then they began the same mutilating. pulling her fingernails out and cutting off her fingers, breaking her arms, gouging out her eyes and all they did to, the other fellow. They cut her legs and stuck an iron rod into her womb. The last one that they killed that day sufferee more, because they stripped him naked at mid- day, There they put him on this hot tin and made him lie there—ne was like cooking. After about a half-hour, when, they finally took him off, he was all covered with blisters like wounds. They did different types of torture to him. Then they threw him out alive at 14,000 feet altitude froma helicop’er. He was alive and tied. They go and they throw them out over the sea Q Can you give @ better description of the Green Berets? Names, numbers, anything? ‘A: I don’t know their names, but there were eight. The officers knew. There was only one of the eight that could speak Spanish. They were all white there were some Blacks, but I don’t know where they were from. The cight U,S. Green Berets that were there were all white, They dressed themselves the same as any soldier. One of them sort of gave orders but they didn’t have any indication of their rank, Q: Did they rape the women too? A: No. they only taught, Q: Did they do the fingernail pulling? Az It was one of the Green Berets doing the teaching. The Green Beret did the torture on the first one and then the others did the tortures on the others. Q: Were there any other Americans involved? A: Some sergeants there spoke English but I never knew much about them, They arrived (0 teach classes on how to, use the helicopters, 18 CovertAction ‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Q: Are you sure the Green Berets were with the U.S. Army, of were they mercenaries? A: Ithink they belonged to the U.S, Army because our olficers searched us very well and told us not to talk about the presence of the U.S. Army there: they prohibited us from speaking about this. A Luta Continua Unaffected by the imminent passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a group of European researchers have begun to expose light cover CIA officers serving in U.S. embassies. The first public appearance of this group was at a November press conference in San Jose, Costa Rica. at which a list of 225 present and former case officers in Central America and the Caribbean was made public, complete with extensive biographies. The material included 13 currently active opera tives in Nicaragua: 6 in El Salvador: and 4 in Honduras. Despite cries of protest from the Americans, details. including lists of names, were published in the regional media. The U.S. media were noticeably silent about the details of the press conference, except to report unsubstantiated claims by the U.S. Embassy in Managua that the press conference must have been linked toa visit by Philip Agce to Nicaragua some weeks earlier. The Embassy's wrath was generated by the publication in the Managua papers of all the names exposed as present or former CLA operatives in Nicaragua, with, in several instances, photographs. - White Paper? Whitewash! Philip Agee on the CIA and El Salvador ‘The CIA's history of document falsifications: the use of AIFLD as a CIA front; the CIA’s work with paramilitary and terrorist gangs; and a line by-line analysis of the State Department “*White Paper”’ and the “*captured’* documents. The re search which proved the White Paper was a fraud. Includes complete White Paper with exhibits and State Department Dissent Payer; 220 pages: paper- back: $6.50 plus $1.50 postage and handling: hardcover: $12.95 plus $1.75 postage and hand- ling. Order from: Deep Cover Publications, P.O. Box 677, New York, NY 10013. Number 16 (March 1982)Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264 White Paper I Administration Stonewalls While Covert Operations Escalate By Bill Schaap The Reagan-Haig State Department is nothing if not persistent. Its February White Paper on communist influ- fence in El Salvador was demolished last spring and Summer by commentators from the left, right, and center Yet by October # new version on the same theme was launched amid considerable diplomatic fanfare. The re~ port, originally entitled “Cuba's Covert Operations in Latin America.” was first submitted to NATO representa tivesat the October [4-16 Brussels meeting on Latin Amer~ ican exports. On November 8. in the form of a confidential able. it was sent to all major U.S. embassies; on December 14, now slightly revised and entitled “Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in the Hemisphere.” it was submitted to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Shortly thereat ter it way released publicly as @ State Department Special Report This“research paper” avoids some ofthe more egregious errors of the February White Paper ~conclusions unsup- ported or even contradicted by the supporting “evidence” by the simple expedient of providing no evidence what- soever 10 support its conclusions. And it did not charge that Cuban troops or advisors were actually in El Salvador, ignoring the frequently repeated fabrication that Cuban forees had blown up a bridge inside ElSalvador. As News week magazine (December I, 1981) conceded, “earlier re- ports of Cuban troopsfin El Salvador] were simply untrue, says one U.S, official,” In attempting to avoid the criticisms which had been ieveled at the White Paper, the charges were "monumental- ly hollow, and presented without factual or analytical sup. port."[Larin American Regional Reports Caribbean, Jan tary 15, 1982,] Some allegations were so far-fetched that they were denied by the putative sources. The paper claimed that in 1978 Guyana had expelled “five or seven” Cuban diplomats; this was flatly denied by the Guyanese government. The paper repeated Edward Seaga’s pre-cle tion claim that there were as many as $00 Cuban advisors in, Jamaica under the Manley government, but failed to point ‘out that Seaga himself has now admitted this charge was Psychological Warfare Despite the unconvincing nacure of this new presenta Number 16 (March 1982) tion, however, it was, as Vewsweek noted psychological warlare™ designed to leave the Cubans and, the Nicaraguans wondering what the U.S. will do next. In that respect itis consistent with the current and dangerous theme that the United States is maintaining various op- tions regarding the Caribbean Basin, For many observers have noted that a strong, coordinated destabilization pro- ram, aimed in the first instance at Nicaragua, is not an “option” but a reality This thesis is strengthened by the administration's ad- missions that it wants to keep Cuba and Nicaragua guess ing. “Let them worry,” stid Gen. Vernon Walters. Seere- tary Haig’s roving envoy. “We believe that consteuctive ambiguity isa very powerful weapon in American foreign policy.” When Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O, Enders addressed a foreign policy conference of out-of- town journalists in Washington October 29, he pointedly noted, “Our policy towards Cuba is under very active consideration. You haven't heard the last of this at all.” The policy has kept not only Cuba and Nicaragua but also Congress guessing. On November 12 Haig appeared before Rep, Michael Barnes's subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Despite repeated attempts to pin him down, Haig would not reject the possibility of direct involvement in the destabilization or overthrow of Nicaragua. Barnes was so taken aback he stated. “If | were a Nicaraguan, 1 would be building my bomb shelter.” A. number of liberal Democrats wrote to the President exe pressing “shock” that the administration was “considering military actions in response to the apparent stalemate in El Salvador.” and a bipartisan group of Committ including Chairman Clement Zablocki. wrote tothe Presi- dent to register their “concern over possible U.S. actions directed against Nicaragua.” ‘The Numbers Game Tro the United States, where the biggest isso often consid ered the best, numbers have become an important part of the psychological war. The new international airport under construction in Grenada is invariably referred toas “huge” ‘or “mammoth,” even though it is no bigger than several other Caribbewa airports, and the minimum necessary to ‘accommodate jumbo jet passenger planes. Similarly. the is being waged a seare campaign over the size of the Cuban, CovertAction 19 ‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264 and Nicaraguan armies. Nicaraguan hopes for a force of 50,000 were described in November by Undersecretary of State James Buckley as “just huge.” And Max Singer, the reactionary deputy director of the Hudson Institute, said (Washington Post, December 23, 1981) that the resulting army will be “overwhelmingly the most powerful military force between Colombia and Mexico.” Singer is the only well-known academic moronic enough not only to refer 10 the Duarte regime as “El Salvador's revolutionary gov ment,” but also to call its sadistic and barbaric armed forces “the revolutionary army. U.S. “adviser,” identified as Cpt. Mike Shechan, at refugee camp on Honduras-Salvador border. Whet these critics never discuss is the size of the U.S. armed forces, or the constant threats of invasion by the U.S., or the boasts of the bands of mercenaries openly training throughout the United States and in Honduras, and Guatemala, When Enders asked Nicaragua's Foreign Minist:r Miguel D’Escoto why Nicaragua was building up itsarmy, he replied, “to defend ourselves in case you invade us.” To which Enders responded, “In that ease you are wasting your time, because we are one hundred times, bigger than you. The Flow of Arms ‘Somewhat surprisingly the new “research paper” pei petuates the most discredited theme of the White Paper. that Cuba and Nicaragua are responsible for a flow of arms to the revolutionary forces in El Salvador. The paper gives no documentation of this charge, except for a reference to the White Paper itself. The theme was, reiterated by Secretary Haig in his December 4 speech to the OAS meeting in St. Lucia: "Meanwhile, the principle of rnon-intervention is being violated as arms, ammunition, land other military supplies flow from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran insurgents.” These assertions continue to be made even though the only proven, admitted intervener in, 20 CovertAction El Salvador is the United States, which continues to pump millions of dollars worth of military equipment into the country ea Lanes, Mexico, and Other Hyperbole The desperation with which the U.S. views the conflict in El Salvador has led to some dire predictions, which can only be thwarted by incessant escalation of US. involve ment, When Thomas Enders presented the research paper to Congress on December 14 he way dramatic: “Il. alter Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority what state in Central America will be able to resist? How long would it be before the major strategic U.S, interests the canal, sea lanes, oil supplies. were at risk?” Under questioning, Enders confirmed that military contingeney planning has been undertaken, but would not say whether military options had "become policy.” The next day Undersecretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle appeared before the same subcommittee in a far more bombastic mood than Enders. “It would be a grave mise take.” he said, “if we ignored the direct military threat that this Soviet-Cuban arsenal represents, some 90 miles to the south of Florida.” Ikle, who was making the piteh for further funding of the war in El Salvador. “lar in excess” of existing authorizations, described at length the shipping paths and oil refineries of the Caribbean, as well as the Navy's need for secure maritime operations in the region, Constantine Menges wasn early exponent of the new Central American dom: no theory. The theory was implicit in the testimony of Enders and Iklc, and was explicit in the Max Singer col- umn noted above. Singer predicted that if the government of EI Salvador fell, there would be “little possibility” of preventing the same results in Guatemala and Honduras, “Then,” he continued, “drastic polarization is likely to be Marted in Mexico... violent conflict... not likely to be without serious security implications for the United States.” (As noted elsewhere in this issue, Plotting in Nicaragua The U.S. line that Cuba and Nicaragua were destabiliz- ing Central America was dealt a rude setback in January when Nicaraguan security forces uncovered plots to sabo- tage major industrial plants, and bomb Nicaraguan civil airliners. The bombers, who damaged an AeroNica plane in Mexico City before it took off, were CIA-trained Cuban exiles, including some connected to the 1976 Cubana bombing in Barbados. They were connected to the exile group CORU, nominally headed by Orlando Bosch. The plot to sabotage an oil refinery and a cement plant involved Somocistas and Venezuelan, Honduran, Salva- doran, and Argentine officials, Two of the would-be sabo- teurs, captured with hundreds of sticks of dynamite and other paraphernalia, implicated the diplomats and soldiers including military intelligence officers—in their confessions, leading to intensive discussions between Nica: raguan and Venezuelan officials, Nicaraguan Interior Min. ister Tomas Borge publicly stated that relations between the two countries should not be disturbed, as the Venerue- clearly working for the CIA, not for lans involved we their government Other evidence of CLA-style operations emerged, The leader of the Miskito separatists, Steadman Fagoth, a Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 former Somoza agent, had fled his base on the Atlantic coast region of Nicaragua for Honduras. From there he frequently broadcasts on a stridently anti-Sandinista clan: destine radio station, He has denied accusations that the station is a CIA-Honduran operation: however, on De- cember 20 he was injured in the crash of a Honduran military transport plane, near the Nicaraguan border, A number of Honduran officers were also on board The creation of “dissident” groups within Nicaragua including those Miskitos taken in by Fagoth’s propaganda. is very important to the would-be destabilizers. An un- named State Department ollicial quoted by the San Fran- cisco Examiner said that a naval blockade against Nicara: gua would be “impractical unless it was connected to some uprisings in Nicaragua . .. unless parts of Nicaragua were taken by anti-Sandinista guerrillas.” A blockade might then be justified to “prevent outside intervention.” What Does It Mean? The U.S, campaign and its rhetoric are carefully timed and coordinated. Despite constant exposures of its med- dling, the U.S. insists that its plans arc undecided and its options flexible. The impression that the administation is, uncommitted is fraudulent, and ean only be aimed at les- sening the vigilance of the targets of its covert operations. While open and direct military invasion of either Cuba or Nicaragua may be politically impractical, the intention is to prepare public opinion in the U.S. foranything short of suuch action, But those operations have already begun. despite the failure to convince the public. the Congress. or the media of the viability of the U.S. position, There is. it seems, an attempt to catch up to the reality with the propaganda, Critics of U.S. involvement in the Central American struggles, especially those who see the striking comparisons to early U.S. involvement in Vie ham, must work to assure that the media and the people ‘will continue to expose the administration's hypoctisy. == Americans in Managua demonstrate before U for end to covert actions. Embassy ‘Number 16 (March 1982) KKK (continued trom page 0) tics might have looked the other way and permitted the atiempt. Some aspects of the plot that are still being kept secret aresugeestive, Why. forexample, of the 12,40, or 0 backers of th to believe, were only two indicted by the grand jury? Why are the identities of the others not disclosed? Perhaps be ‘cause the U.S. government has something to hide Similarly. why was no action taken against the unidenti ‘oup. depending on which report you choose fied “several others the Los Angeles Tintes said refused 10 answer the grand jury’s questions? In this respect David Duke is a significant figure, He was central to the original plot and never denied his role in it; he rebuffed the grand jury, yet no action at all was taken against him. This plus the highly suspicious fact that Duke sent Perdue to a boat captain who was an ATF inlormer lends some eredibility to tld charges leveled by Duke Klan rivals that he's a zo. ernment agent, Ifso, it would suggest that the U.S. looked favorably on the intentions of this ragtag band of Klans- men, Nazis, and gangsters as long as they kept their si firmiy set on Grenada. One cannot be certain, however. ft seems unlikely that a group this weak and incompetent could pose a significant mnilitary threat to the Grenada revolution, even if assisted by Erie Gairy’s fifth column on the island. But a failure by such a group is likely to sharpen the alertness of Grenadh ans to the threat their country faces from the U.S. Prim Minister Maurice Bishop documented the seriousness of the danger in a letter to then U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim last August, He pointed out that the U.S. NATO military manuever called "Ocean Venture 81.” the largest such exercise since World War Two. had as its target a fictional group of Caribbean islands called Amber and the Amberdines. a thinly disguised reterence to Grena: da and the Grenadines. The practice amphibious landing took place on the southeastern tip of the Puerto Rican island Vieques. which corresponds to an area of Grenada that actually is called Amber. Other equally obyious sim ilarities were shown, With an attack of this magnitude being practiced. it does seem improbable that a small and inept band of mercenaries would be considered a serious, USS. option Another pursle the U.S. hasn't answered concerns two unidentified members of the invuding party. Perdue con- tracted with Howell to transport twelve. yet only ten were arrested. Who were the other {wo? One was probably Cane: dian Klan leader Alex McQuirter, He had originally been slated to lead one of the mercenary groups, but couldn't join the group in New Orleans because he was barred [rom the U.S. in January 1981. What about number twelve? No, fone has yet identified the missing mercenary. There remains, finally. the question of what action the Canadian government will take, ifany. At our press time a representative of the Ontario attorney general’ office told CAIB, “There has been an active investigation for a number of months. It is rapidly drawing to a close, and there will either be action or an announcement in the immediate future. Beyond that we cannot comment,” = FLASH: As CA/B went to press, it was learned that the Canadian authorities had brought charges against Alex MeQuirter and Charles Yanover. = CovertAction 21 Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Constantine Menges CIA Ideologue’ By David Arthur* most unprecedented action, three U.S. Senators have complained to CIA Director William Casey that a December 10 briefing they received on the Caribbean “se- riously violated” the Agency’s obligation to provide them, with ar objective analysis, The three Democrats, Paul Tsongas (Mass.), Claiborne Pell (R.1.). and Christopher Dodd (Conn.), charged in a December II letter to Casey that the closed session brieling. for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “evidenced a rhetorical tone and selective use of information which bor- dered on policy prescription rather than a straightforward analysis of available intelligence data.” The briefing was to present “evidence” of charges leveled in the Reagan administration's controversial White Paper fon Cutan influence in Latin America and to assess U.S. political and military options in Central America and the Caribbean. Congressional committees often ask the CIA to provide them with background material on important mat- {ers relating to national security. These briefings, accord- ing to te letter, should present a “professional, impartial, and balanced approach to highly controversial and sensi- tive issues. These vigorous standards insure the separation, of intelligence assessment from foreign policy advocacy The briefing was delivered by the CIA's National Intelli- gence Officer for Latin America, Constantine Menges, The letter characterized Menges’s spoken presentation as one that “undermines his credibility as a National Intelligence Officer and calls into question his further effectiveness.” ‘Some o servers believe that Menges's presentation further tencoure ges the view that the Reagan administration has, politicized the CIA by bringing in ideological conservatives, to fill scnstive posts. Menges, 42, officially joined the CIA in September 1981 after se-Ving as a policy analyst at the conservative think tank, the Hudson Institute, and as an editor of /nterna- tional Strategic Issues, a monthly newsletter published by SAGE Associates focusing on strategic risk assessment for USS. businesses. Over the years Menges's writings have often borne strong resemblance to the Agency’s official views on matters pertaining to U.S. interests in Latin, America Menges received a Ph.D. in government and political economy from Columbia University and studied at the school’s Russian Institute war and peace studies program, before becoming an assistant professor at the University of ‘David Arthur isa freelance writer ining in Washington, DC Copyrigh © 1982 by Davie Arthur 22 CovertAction Wisconsin in the mid-1960s. In 1967 he joined the staff of the RAND Corporation where he authored two studies on agrarian reform in pre-Allende Chile. During the same period he served as a consultant to VPI Films Ine, of Los Angeles and co-directed a documentary on successful” economic development projects in Latin America, Between 1970 and 1975 Menges held several posts as a special assistant in various offices of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. His duties there. ae- cording to Menges, “included innovative work for [then] Secretary Caspar Weinberger on linkages between work ition.” Menges joined the Hudson Institute in The Hudson Institute is well-connected to the defense and intelligence complex, Staffed by more than 40 protes- sional “analysts,” several of whom have worked at the Pentagon or the CIA. the Institute is endowed by more than 40 major multinational corporations, such as Exxon, ATA&T. Mitsui, the Royal Bank of Canada, and the Bank of America. Stern magazine (November 13. 1980) reported that since 1975 the Institute has received contracts primari- ly from the U.S. defense agencies (up to 40°) and Ameri- can oil and weapons firms. The Institute performs a wide range of classified research on national and international energy and national security issues. Even before the election of Ronald Reagan, Menges had worked vigorously to support a more hard-line policy in Central America. In October 1980 Menges sent a letter (reprinted in CA/B Number 12)to then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Bowdler urg- ing him to send “credible, well-informed individuals” to meet with democratic socialist leaders in Western Europe in order to begin a “more active and time-urgent effort to achieve changes in the Socialist International position on the extreme leftin El Salvador and Central America," Two ‘of the individuals recommended by Menges. Roy Prosterman and Mike Hammer, were consultants with the AIFLD program in El Salvadorat that time. Hammer and, two other AIFLD officials were gunned down by a right- wing death squad in a San Salvador coffee shop on Janu- ary 4, 1981 The first issue of Menges’s Inrernational Strategie Issues was published in April 1980, a few months before the State Department's controversial White Paper on El Salvador, “Communist Military Intervention,” had received a tho: rough discrediting in the media, In the newsletter the au thor cited a May 1979 CIA report that "Cuba has intensi- fied its efforts to unify insurgent groups, not only in Nica- agua where Cuba has concentrated its efforts, but in Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264‘Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Guatemala as well.” Menges’s vision of falling dominoes in, Central America culminated ina “tactical scenario of [the] destabilization” of Mexico, which Menges ominously calls, the “Iran next door.” He warns of the potential that by 1983 "a new revolutionary government in Mexico could offer non-intervention in American affairs. ..ifthesame is strictly observed by the United States.” Menges’s prescriptions for U.S. policy in the region were brought out inv discussion held on January 7, 1981 at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He argued that U.S. policy “must find the middle ground between the unrealistic interventionism of a crusade and the merely routine diplomatic relations in all situations short of visible crisis," Between the extremes of normal diplomatic relations on the one hand and what Meng called “dircet help to counteract externally supported desta- bilizing forces” on the other, a level of involvement which might be necessary in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Menges posits two levels of useful government and private action in Which the U.S. “can support democratic Forces and weaken those seeking to polarize the hemisphere into either com= rmunist or authoritarian regimes. ‘One level would utilize diseretionary resources such as information, communication, and cultural exchange pro- {grams to nurture “democratic groups” systematically. An example cited by Menges was the AIFLD program. A second level of activity would be focused on specifie coun= tries of interest and would involve the establishment of semi-autonomous foundations modeled on the West Ger man Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung “which would aet separately from the official dip lomatie presence.” The functions of such organizations “which could be performed at comparatively modest costs.” were spelled out in detail, and included: increasing the sense of solidarity among the existing democratic governments in Latia America;” building “links between newly legalized political parties, trade unions, voluntary associations, and their democratic counterparts in Latin American nations,” encouraging “democratic opposition groups through publication and distribution of their writ- ings and invitations to travel in the democracies.” "com: municating the facts of successful social and economic performancein the democracies and the repression, pover ty. corruption and elite privilege of communist regimes such as Cuba:” providing “appropriate accurate informa tion to leaders of democratic groups when extremists make efforts to penetrate and obtain control:* “providing advi- sory help in the conduct of faie elections, monitoring servic Ces, and establishment of independent parties and media: and “reaching out to students and workers from Latin American counties while they arc temporarily studying or residing in the U.S. These functions read like a detailed list of covert opera tions by the CIA in Latin America for decades. Its particu hat the foundations and organizations n suspected of deep links with the CLA and other western intelligence agencies. and in the case of AIFLD such charges are well-documented In their letter to Casey, the three Senators asked the CLA, Director to review Menges’ testimony and inform them of any uetions to be taken by the CIA regarding future briel= ings by Meages. The CIA. the Senators, and Men declined to comn nt on the briefing or the letter. But Number 16 (March 1982) right-wing Senator Jesse Helms who chaired the session in ‘question called it “one of the best presentations U've heard Tt wasn’t an attempt to brainwash any Senator... The problem for these Senators was that they were hearing things they didn’t want to hear about the communist take over in this hemisphere.” Menges now “official” after years of tocing Agency In mid-January Casey replied in writing, While he did not repudiate any of Menges's remarks, he reportedly ac Knowledged his “inexperience” and even hinted that the CIA had been pressured to take Menges on in such a sensitive position, Though this may have been intended 10 mollify the ruffled Senators, itis unlikely to do so. Despite the flap. however. the administration remained undaunted in its insistence that Cuba is the “source” (in Secretary Haig’s words) of instability in Central America, Only four days alter the Menges brieling, Assistant Seere tary of State for Inter-American Attairy Thomas Ende appeared belore the Subcommittee on Western Hemi- Sphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committ He told his audience about several major developments in the Cariphean Basin that have created, in his words. a state of danger." O1 for uniting the left in the countries of the region, commit ting it to violence, arming it, training it in warlare, and he said, “is the new Cuban strategy attempting 10 use it for the destruction of existing Thus advocacy and hetoriv continue to characterize the administration's presentations to Congress, despite the in recognized by the Senators who com= CovertAct Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 CO5531264 Deceit and Secrecy: Cornerstones of U.S. Policy By Bill Schaap is a political error to practice deceit i deceit is carried 10 far. Frederick the Great, 1740 To dismiss unpleasant truths as lies spread by the oppo- sition is a political reflex, but the Reagan administration hhas elevated this reflex to an obsession. Those who agr with the government's ideological underpinnings are tell= ing the truth; those who disagree are lying, They are not only liars but also, as we shall explain below, foreign agents. The current eraze centers around the formerly obscure term, “disinformation.” While the U.S. government takes the position that disinformation is a Soviet invention and, that the Soviets are the major practitioners. in fact dis- information has been a U.S. specialty since the days of the World War ll OSS. which had an entire branch devoted to it Currentestimates of the CIA's budget suggest that earlier 's were far too low. While studies of materials relating. to the late 1960s and early 1970s suggested an annual CIA, budget of one to two billion dollars [see CAB Numbers 4 and 7}, current conservative estimates, such as that of Defense Electronics (December 1981), indicate that a fig ure of tn billion doltars is more accurate for the CIA. and “in exezss of $70 billion annually” represents “the overal intelligence budget.” Perhaps one-fourth of the C1A‘s budget. nearly three billion dollars, is being devoted each year by the CIA to the spread of disinformation, through, ‘what it terms “deception operations.” This is exclusive of theexpenditures in thisarca by the State Department itself and its subsidiary. the International Communications Agency (ICA), parent of the Voice of America (VOA), The first major disinformation operation of the Reagan administration was the El Salvador campaign, epitomized by the State Department's" White Paper." The second was the Libya campaign, exemplified by the “hit squad” story Early in the Reagan administration the State Depart- ‘ment launched its campaign to “prove” that the an revolutionary forces were creatures of external forces, ‘most notably the Soviets and the Cubans. The flimsy “evi dence” presented in the White Paper was subsequently demolished, most notably in Philip Agee’s “White Paper? Whitewash!” Within a few months the establishment 24 CovertAction media joined in the attack, and despite sporadic attempts to revive it, the White Paper is no longer taken seriously The Libya campaign is another story Qaddafi was days administration. targeted from first of Reaga ‘The Libyan Hit Squad In the Spring and Summer of 1981 numerous news re- ports circulated suggesting various U.S. plots against the Libyan government, and its leader, Col. Muammar Qad- dafi, While U.S. hostility to Libya was real to the point of paranoia, and while many of the reports were undoubtedly true, most perplexing was the public nature of the disclo~ In ight of subsequent events. it now appeats that the and plots were publicized in order to arguc later that they formed the “Justification” for Libyan actions against the United States. As early as April 6, 1981, U.S. News and World Report said that the U.S... with Egyptian logistical support, funneled arms to anti-Qaddafi forces in Chad and the Sudan. At the same time, the U.S. openly made major arms deals with Morocco, another bitter foe of Number 16 (March 1982) Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C05531264