W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. "2.

(c) "Forest" means any land covered with trees and

undergrowth and includes all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved,
protected or otherwise and any land recorded as forests in the Government records
irrespective of the ownership."

Section 2(b) of the Ordinance defined 'ecologically fragile land' in the following manner:
"2(b) "ecologically fragile lands" means.-

(i) any portion of forest land held by any person and lying contiguous to or encircled by a
reserved forest or a vested forest or any other forest land owned by the Government and
predominantly supporting natural vegetation; and

(ii) any land declared to be an ecologically fragile land by the Government by notification
in the official Gazette under Section 4."

Under the 2003 Act, the definition of forest was substantially changed which is to the following effect.
"2(c)'forest' means any land principally covered with naturally grown trees and
undergrowth and includes any forests statutorily recognised and declared as reserved forest,
protect forest or otherwise, but does not include any land which is used principally for
cultivation of crops of long duration such as tea, coffee, rubber, pepper, cardamom,
coconut, arecanut or cashew or any other sites of residential buildings and surroundings
essential for the convenient use
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. of such buildings."

The most substantial provision which has been introduced in the definition of Sec.2(c), i.e., certain land
has been excluded from the definition of forest, i.e., (i) any other land which is used principally for the
cultivation of crops of long duration such as tea, coffee, rubber, pepper, cardamom, coconut arecanut or
cashew, (ii) on any other sites of residential buildings and surroundings essential for the convenient use
of such buildings. Another relevant statutory provision to be noted is that by Sec.1(2) of the 2003 Act
which Act has been enforced with effect from 2nd day of June, 2000.
129. The above change in the definition of forest and enforcement of the Act from 2.6.2000 clearly
indicates that several categories of land which were initially included in Ordinance No.6 of 2000 in the
definition of forest have been excluded and the Act
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. having enforced with effect from 2.6.2000, definition of forest as
contained in Sec.2(c) was liable to be deemed to be operative. Consequence is that the land which was
notified under Ordinance No.6/2000 or subsequent Ordinance also includes the excluded categories of
land as contained in Sec.2(c) of the Act.
130. In view of the above substantial changes made by the 2003 Act, Sec.19(3) was enacted. Section
19(3) is quoted as below:
"19.(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the said Ordinance or in any judgment
decree or order of any Court-

(a) no land other than the ecologically fragile land as defined in this Act, whether notified
under sub-section(3) of Section 3 of the said Ordinance or not, shall be deemed to have
vested or ever to have been vested in Government; and

(b) every notification issued in respect of any land under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the
said Ordinance shall be scrutinised by the custodian suo motu or on an application made by
the owner or any person having the right of possession or
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. enjoyment of such land and if necessary, such notification
shall be revised and issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

Section 19(3) starts with a non-obstante clause, i.e., "notwithstanding anything contained in the said
Ordinance......" Section 19(3)(a) provided that no land other than the ecologically fragile land as
defined in this Act, whether notified under sub-section (3) of the said Ordinance or not, shall be
deemed to have vested or ever to have been vested in Government. This provision clearly mentioned
that only land which is ecologically fragile land within the meaning of the Act 2003 Act shall vest in
the Government. The other land which is excluded under the Act even if notified under the Ordinance
shall not vest. Consequence of the provision is that any land used principally for the cultivation of
crops of long duration such as tea, coffee, rubber, pepper, cardamom, coconut arecanut or cashew of
any
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. other sites of residential buildings and surroundings essential for the
convenient use of such buildings shall not vest in the State despite they having been notified in the
Ordinance. On account of the above reason, Sec.19(3)(b) thus mandated a scrutiny by the Custodian
suo motu or on application made by owner or any person over right, possession or enjoyment of the
land. The scrutiny as contemplated in Sec.19(3)(b) assumes great importance and significance since the
lands which have been notified in the Ordinances which is principally used for cultivation of crops of
long duration has gone out of the purview of ecologically fragile land under the 2003 Act and
Notification was required to be revised accordingly. Scrutiny is contemplated both suo motu or on a
claim made by the owner person having right or possession. Thus the custodian is determining the lis
regarding the land
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. covered by ecologically fragile land under the Act or not. The 2007
Rules have been framed to give effect to Sec.19. Rule 17 gives detailed proceeding for making an
application and the relevant documents to be accompanied by the application proving ownership,
possession and enjoyment. Rule 17(1) has already been quoted above.
131. Rule 19 empowers the Custodian to make further enquiry and call for further reports as he deems
fit. Rules 19 and Rule 20 have been quoted as above.
132. Whether the exercise undertaken by the Custodian is administrative or quasi judicial is the issue
which is to be answered.
133. H.W.R.Wade & C.F.Forsyth in the Administrative Law, 10th Edition while explaining the concept,
administration and quasi judicial functions has stated:
"The one distinction which would seem to be workable
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. is that between judicial and administrative functions. A
judicial decision is made according to rules. An administrative decision is made according
to administrative policy. A judge attempts to find what is the correct solution according to
legal rules and principles. An administrator attempts to find what is the most expedient and
desirable solution in the public interest. It is true, of course, that many decisions of the
courts can be said to be made on grounds of legal policy and that the courts sometimes have
to choose between alternative solutions with little else than the public interest to guide
them.

xx xx xx xx A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires

to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A typical example is a minister
deciding whether or not to confirm a compulsory purchase order or to allow a planning
appeal after a public inquiry. The decision itself is administrative, dictated by policy and
expediency. But the procedure is subject to the principles of natural justice, which require
the minister to act fairly towards the objectors and not (for example) to take fresh evidence
without disclosing it to them. A quasi judicial decision is therefore an administrative
decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure."

The Apex Court had also occasion to consider in several cases the distinction between administrative
and quasi judicial functions. It is sufficient to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Indian
National
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare [(2002) 5 SCC 685]. The Apex
Court in the said case had occasion to examine Section 29A of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951
in the context of nature of function which is performed by the Election Commission. Section 29A
provided for registration of political parties. In a Judgment the Kerala High Court issued a direction
permitting cancellation of registration of political parties who violated the constitution by holding
forcible bandh which had been declared illegal. In the above context the High Court permitted to make
application to the Election Commission of India to initiate steps for cancellation of registration of
political parties. It was submitted that in exercise of a quasi judicial power there being no provision for
review, the order registering political parties cannot be reviewed.
134. The Apex Court in the said case found out whether function is administrative or quasi judicial.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Following was laid down in paragraph 20 to 23.
20. On the argument of parties, the question that arises for our consideration is, whether the Election
Commission, in exercise of its powers under Section 29-A of the Act, acts administratively or quasi-
judicially. We shall first advert to the argument raised by learned counsel for the respondent to the
effect that in the absence of any lis or contest between the two contending parties before the Election
Commission under Section 29- A of the Act, the function discharged by it is administrative in nature
and not a quasi-judicial one. The dictionary meaning of the word quasi is "not exactly" and it is just in
between a judicial and administrative function. It is true, in many cases, the statutory authorities were
held to be quasi-judicial authorities and decisions rendered by them were regarded as quasi-judicial,
where there was contest between the two contending parties and the statutory authority was required to
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. In Cooper v. Wilson6 it is stated that "the definition of a quasi-
judicial decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more contending parties and an outside
authority to decide those disputes". In view of the aforesaid statement of law, where there are two or
more parties contesting each other's claim and the statutory authority is required to adjudicate the rival
claims between the parties, such a statutory authority was held to be quasi-judicial and decision
rendered by it as a quasi-judicial order. Thus, where there is a lis or two
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. contesting parties making rival claims and the statutory authority under
the statutory provision is required to decide such a dispute, in the absence of any other attributes of a
quasi-judicial authority, such a statutory authority is quasi-judicial authority.
21. But there are cases where there is no lis or two contending parties before a statutory authority yet
such a statutory authority has been held to be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as a quasi-
judicial decision when such a statutory authority is required to act judicially. In R. v. Dublin Corpn.7 it
was held thus:
"In this connection the term judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal
tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for purpose of this question, a
judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and
circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights. And if there be a body
empowered by law to enquire into facts, makes estimates to impose a rate on a district, it
would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequence would be
judicial acts."

22. Atkin, L.J. as he then was, in R. v. Electricity Commrs. stated that when any body of persons has
legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act
judicially, such body of persons is a quasi-judicial body and decision given by them is a quasi-judicial
decision. In the said decision, there was no contest or lis between the two contending parties before the
Commissioner. The Commissioner, after
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. making an enquiry and hearing the objections was required to pass
order. In a nutshell, what was held in the aforesaid decision was, where a statutory authority is
empowered to take a decision which affects the rights of persons and such an authority is under the
relevant law required to make an enquiry and hear the parties, such authority is quasi-judicial and
decision rendered by it is a quasi-judicial act.
23. In Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani2 it was held thus: (AIR p. 260, para 173) "(i) that
if a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out
of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to
determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and
prima facie, and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to
act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that if a statutory authority
has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two
parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the
subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the
authority is required by the statute to act judicially. In other words, while the presence of two parties
besides the deciding authority will prima facie and in the absence of any other factor impose upon the
authority the duty to
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. act judicially, the absence of two such parties is not decisive in taking
the act of the authority out of the category of quasi-judicial act if the authority is nevertheless required
by the statute to act judicially."
In paragraph 24 the Apex Court noted the legal principles holding that when act of statutory authority
would be quasi judicial or administrative. Paragraphs 24 and 25 are quoted below:
24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act,
which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these:
Where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act
(b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties
and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act
judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial.
25. Applying the aforesaid principle, we are of the view that the presence of a lis or contest between the
contending parties before a statutory authority, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-judicial
authority is sufficient to hold that such a statutory authority is quasi-judicial authority. However, in the
absence of a lis before a statutory authority, the
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. authority would be quasi-judicial authority if it is required to act
judicially.
135. The Apex Court in the said case further laid down that what distinguishes administrative from a
quasi judicial function. Following was further laid down in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29.
"27. What distinguishes an administrative act from a quasi-judicial act is, in the case of
quasi-judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act
judicially. In other words, where law requires that an authority before arriving at a decision
must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial
authority.

28. Learned counsel for the respondent then contended that a quasi-judicial function is an
administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were
judicial and in that view of the matter, the function discharged by the Election Commission
under Section 29-A of the Act is totally administrative in nature. Learned counsel in
support of his argument relied upon the following passage from Wade & Forsyth's
Administrative Law:

"A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be

exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A typical example is
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. a minister deciding whether or not to confirm a compulsory
purchase order or to allow a planning appeal after a public inquiry. The decision itself is
administrative, dictated by policy and expediency. But the procedure is subject to the
principles of natural justice, which require the minister to act fairly towards the objections
and not (for example) to take fresh evidence without disclosing it to them. A quasi-judicial
decision is therefore an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of
judicial procedure."

29. We do not find any merit in the submission. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that another test
which distinguishes administrative function from quasi- judicial function is, the authority who acts
quasi-judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts
administratively is dictated by the policy and expediency. In the present case, the Election Commission
is not required to register a political party in accordance with any policy or expediency but strictly in
accordance with the statutory provisions. The aforequoted passage from Administrative Law by Wade
& Forsyth is wholly inapplicable to the present case. Rather, it goes against the argument of learned
counsel for the respondent. The aforequoted passage shows that where
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. an authority whose decision is dictated by policy and expediency
exercises administratively although it may be exercising functions in some respects as if it were
judicial, which is not the case here."
136. Now applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, let us proceed to examine the nature of function
of the Custodian while acting under Sec.19(3)
(b). When a person makes an application under Sec.19 (3)(b) challenging the Notification issued under
the Ordinances notifying the area as ecologically fragile land and contends that it is exempted under the
2003 Act, the lis very much arises. The lis of course is between the State Government and the
applicant. This attribute is fully attracted in the function of the Custodian envisaged under Sec.19(3)(b).
It is further relevant to note that the Custodian is statutorily obliged to conduct an enquiry and he has to
act according to Rules 2007 as noted above and his action is not to be dictated by the policy and
expediency.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc.
137. The fact that the Custodian is also required to conduct an enquiry and obtain reports indicates that
he has to decide judicially as to whether the land is ecologically fragile land or not. Rule 17(1) uses the
words "to decide whether such land qualified to be notified as ecologically fragile land in accordance
with the provisions of the Act." Rules 2007 explain the statutory functions of the Custodian and the
Scheme delineated by Sec.19 as well as Rules 17, 19 and 20 fully proves that the Custodian acts quasi
judicially while deciding an application under Sec.19(3)(b).
138. Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned Senior Advocate for the State has placed reliance on a judgment of
the Apex Court reported in 1980 (3) SCC 402 and the Apex Court in the said judgment laid down the
following in paragraph 5:
"5. The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to
review its earlier
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. orders as the rules do not vest the government with any
such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission:
Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji; D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar and
State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas. All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the
government was exercising quasi-judicial power vested in them by statute. We do not think
that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or
by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To
extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and
startling results. Surely, any government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in
administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be
hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are
bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice
where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative
decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all
grounds
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a
court. We see no force in this submission of the learned Counsel. The appeal is, therefore,
dismissed. In the said case the Apex Court laid down that power to review must be
conferred by Statute either specifically or by necessary implication is not applicable to
decision purely of an administrative nature. The said judgment was in the context of an
administrative decision. As observed above, the Custodian exercises the quasi judicial
function and said judgment is of no help.

139. The 2003 Act or Rule 19 of the 2007 Rules does not confer any specific power of
review to the Custodian. Whether quasi judicial authority shall have any power to review or
recall his orders is the next question to be considered. It is relevant to note that in Indian
National Congress's case, the Apex Court held that the Election Commission exercises a
quasi judicial function under Sec.29A of the Representation of Peoples
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Act. The Apex Court in the said case observed that absence
of any statutory provision the quasi judicial authority may not have any power to review. In
paragraph 32, the following was laid down.

32. This matter may be examined from another angle. If the directions of the High Court for
considering the complaint of the respondent that some of the appellant political parties are
not functioning in conformity with the provisions of Section 29-A is to be implemented, the
result will be that a detailed enquiry has to be conducted where evidence may have to be
adduced to substantiate or deny the allegations against the parties. Thus, a lis would arise.
Then there would be two contending parties opposed to each other and the Commission has
to decide the matter of deregistration of a political party. In such a situation the proceedings
before the Commission would partake the character of quasi-judicial proceeding.
Deregistration of a political party is a serious matter as it involves divesting of the party of
the statutory status of a registered political party. We are, therefore, of the view that unless
there is
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. express power of review conferred upon the Election
Commission, the Commission has no power to entertain or enquire into the complaint for
deregistering a political party for having violated the constitutional provisions. The Apex
Court further held that there are three exceptions that the Commission can review its order
registering a political party. In paragraph 33 the Apex Court noticed that three exceptions.
Paragraph 33 is quoted as below:

"33. However, there are three exceptions where the Commission can review its order
registering a political party. One is where a political party obtained its registration by
playing fraud on the Commission, secondly, it arises out of sub-section (9) of Section 29-A
of the Act and thirdly, any like ground where no enquiry is called for on the part of the
Election Commission, for example, where the political party concerned is declared
unlawful by the Central Government under the provision of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 or any other similar law.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. One exception was that when the order is obtained by
playing fraud. In paragraph 34 of the judgment, the Apex Court considered the exception
and laid down the following:

"34. Coming to the first exception, it is almost settled law that fraud vitiates any act or
order passed by any quasi-judicial authority even if no power of review is conferred upon
it. In fact, fraud vitiates all actions. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural Distt. Council it was stated
that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate all acts and orders. In Indian Bank v.
Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. it was held that a power to cancel/recall an order which has
been obtained by forgery or fraud applies not only to courts of law, but also to statutory
tribunals which do not have power of review. Thus, fraud or forgery practised by a political
party while obtaining a registration, if comes to the notice of the Election Commission, it is
open to the Commission to deregister such a political party. In paragraph 35, the 2nd and
3rd exceptions were elaborated. In paragraph 35 the following pertinent
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. observations were made.

"35. The second exception is where a political party changes its nomenclature of
association, rules and regulations abrogating the provisions therein conforming to the
provisions of Section 29-A(5) or intimating the Commission that it has ceased to have faith
and allegiance to the Constitution of India or to the principles of socialism, secularism and
democracy, or it would not uphold the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India so as to
comply with the provisions of Section 29-A(5). In such cases, the very substratum on
which the party obtained registration is knocked off and the Commission in its ancillary
power can undo the registration of a political party. Similar case is in respect of any like
ground where no enquiry is called for on the part of the Commission. In this category of
cases, the case would be where a registered political party is declared unlawful by the
Central Government under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
or any other similar law. In such cases, power of the Commission to cancel the registration
of a political party is sustainable on the settled legal principle that when a statutory
authority is conferred
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. with a power, all incidental and ancillary powers to
effectuate such power are within the conferment of the power, although not expressly
conferred. But such an ancillary and incidental power of the Commission is not an implied
power of revocation. The ancillary and incidental power of the Commission cannot be
extended to a case where a registered political party admits that it has faith in the
Constitution and principles of socialism, secularism and democracy, but some people
repudiate such admission and call for an enquiry by the Election Commission, reason
being, an incidental and ancillary power of a statutory authority is not the substitute of an
express power of review.

One of the submissions which was advanced by learned Senior Advocate Shri K.V.
Viswanathan is that under Sec.21 of the General Clauses Act quasi judicial authority can
always review or cancel its order. The Apex Court in the above case has laid down that
provisions of Sec.21 of the General Clauses Act are not applicable where a statutory
authority is required to
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. act quasi judicially. The following was laid down in
paragraphs 38 and 39.

"38. We have already extensively examined the matter and found that Parliament
consciously had not chosen to confer any power on the Election Commission to deregister a
political party on the premise that it has contravened the provisions of sub-section (5) of
Section 29-A. The question which arises for our consideration is whether in the absence of
any express or implied power, the Election Commission is empowered to cancel the
registration of a political party on the strength of the provisions of Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act runs as under:

"21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, notifications,
orders, rules or bye-laws.-- Where, by any Central Act or regulation, a power to issue
notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power,
exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any
notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued."

39. On perusal of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, we find that the expression "order" employed
in Section 21 shows that such an order must be in the nature of notification, rules and bye-laws etc. The
order which can be modified or rescinded on the application of Section 21 has to be either executive or
legislative in nature. But the order which the Commission is required to pass under Section 29-A is
neither a legislative nor an executive order but is a quasi-judicial order. We have already examined this
aspect of the matter in the foregoing paragraph and held that the function exercisable by the
Commission under Section 29-A is essentially quasi-judicial in nature and order passed thereunder is a
quasi-judicial order. In that view of the matter, the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act
cannot be invoked to confer powers of deregistration/cancellation of registration after enquiry by the
Election Commission. We, therefore, hold that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act has no
application where a statutory authority is required to act quasi-judicially.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Whether the order dated 8.1.2008 passed by the Custodian can fall in
any of the exceptions enumerated by the Apex Court in Indian National Congress's case. In answering
this we have to look into the order dated 8.1.2008 and notice the grounds on which the Custodian
proceeded to pass orders recalling his earlier order dated 12.6.2007, since the order of review by the
Custodian can be saved when it falls in any of the exception as noted above. Otherwise exercising a
quasi judicial function the Custodian has no jurisdiction to review, power of review not having
specifically conferred. For considering W.P(C) No.3210 of 2008, we have to examine whether the said
order dated 8.1.2008 is sustainable. The Custodian in his notice dated 26.12.2007 has stated as follows:
"As per proceedings order cited 5, the Revenue Divisional officer, Thiruvananthapuram has
cancelled the transfer Registry effected in the name of M/s.Southern Field Ventures
Limited.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. As per Order cited 6 above, the Hon'ble High Court of
Kerala has passed an interim order. The Government as per communication cited 7 above,
has requested the Custodian to take appropriate Action.

The above facts were considered by the Custodian of Ecologically Fragile Lands and is
prima facie satisfied that the proceedings cited 3 above which has not come into force was
issued without taking into account consideration certain vital factors and also the result of
facts suppressed by you and also is issued without jurisdiction. Hence Custodian of
Ecologically Fragile lands is prima facie satisfied that the proceedings cited 3 above should
be recalled for the following among other reasons:-

1. The application cited 2 above is not maintainable since the person who filed the
application was not the owner of a person who had right of possession or enjoyment of the
land notified as Ecologically Fragile Land.

2. Even the sale deed executed by M/s.Jay Shree Tea & Industries Limited in favour of
Southern Field Ventures Private Limited is invalid in view of Section 84 of the Kerala Land
Reforms Act. This fact including pendency of the ceiling case was suppressed by you while
filing the application.

3. The question whether as on

 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. 02.06.2000, the land was actually Ecologically Fragile land
is not gone into and considered by mistake, while issuing proceedings cited 3 above. 4. The
core question whether the land in question will come within the definition of Ecologically
Fragile land was not considered in proceedings cited 3 above. Take notice that Custodian of
Ecologically Fragile Lands is holding a sitting to consider these aspects on 2.06.2008 at
11.00 in the office of the Custodian of Ecologically Fragile Lands, Forest Head Quarters,
Vazhuthacaud, Thiruvanthapuram to ake a final decision whether to recall the proceedings
cite 3 or not.

You are therefore given a chance to explain your side on the above points before the Custodian,
Ecologically Fragile Lands. Hence you are requested to attend the siting on 2.01.2008 at 11.00 a.m.
Without fail. Since the matter is very urgent especially since the batch of cases are posted on 9.1.2008
before the Honourable High Court of Kerala, no adjournment will be given in the above matter. Hence
you are requested to attend the sitting without fail."
140. One of the grounds noticed in the order is that registry in favour of the petitioner M/s.Southern
Field Ventrues has been cancelled by the Revenue Divisional
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Divisional Officer by order dated 3.10.2007. Application dated
30.3.2007 was filed by the petitioner on the basis of registered sale deed dated 30.3.2005. Allegations
have also been made in the notice that several material facts including proceeding of ceiling pending in
Case No.K2-7561/84 of the Taluk Land Board has been concealed. Allegation of suppression of facts
was also alleged. It was alleged in the notice that application filed by the petitioner under Sec.19(3)(b)
was not maintainable. In view of the reasons as noted above in the show cause notice we are satisfied
that there were sufficient cause to initiate proceedings for recalling the order dated 12.6.2007. The
present case falls well within the exceptions as noted in Indian National Congress's case. We thus found
no infirmity in issuing the show cause notice dated 26.12.2007 for recall of the impugned order.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc.
141. Now we come to the order dated 8.1.2008 passed by the Custodian recalling the order dated
12.6.2007. The order dated 8.1.2008 gives various reasons for recalling the order dated 12.6.2007. One
of the reasons given by the Custodian is that the order dated 26.12.2007 was passed on state of affairs
as existed on 12.6.2007 and not as on 2.6.2000 which was the relevant date, the Custodian has observed
that the said order was passed on a mistake due to which the order deserves to be recalled.
142. Pendency of Ceiling Case No.614 of 1984 which fact was suppressed pursuant to remand in
C.R.P. No.2346 of 1984. One more reason which has been given in the order is that the land having
vested under Notification dated 20.10.2000 issued under Ordinances there was no title with the
erstwhile owner, Jay Shree Tea to transfer any land in favour of the
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. petitioner. It is useful to note the following observations of the
Custodian in paragraph 19.
Hence M/s.Jay Shree Tea and Industries Ltd., which was the previous owner of the property, had no
right, title or interest in the property after 2.6.2000. In view of Section 19(3) read with Rule 17 of
Kerala Forest (Vesting & Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Rules, only three category of
persons, has right to apply before the Custodian, as regards the Ecologically Fragile Lands are
concerned. They are (1) owner, (2) any person having right of possession and (3) any person having
right of enjoyment of any land notified under Section 3 of the Ordinance. Owner is define under
Section 2(1) of the Kerala Forest (Vesting & Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act 2003, or
any person having right of possession or right of enj' of the above said land prior to 2.6.2000 has locus
standi to apply before the Custodian under Section 19(3) of the Act read with Rule 17 of the Rules. In
the present case, M/s.Southern Field Venrtures Pvt. Ltd. is the person who had filed application under
Section 19(3) of the Act. In view Rule 17(2)(a) of the Kerala Forest (Vesting & Management of
Ecologically Fragile Lands), Rules, every application shall be accompanied by documents to prove
ownership or enjoyment of the land. This means that the application should be accompanied by
documents showing that the applicant has legal title or possession or right of enjoyment of the said
land. In the present case,
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. M/s.Southern Field Ventures had produced Photostat copies of three
Sale Deeds No.732/2005 dt.30.3.2005, 733/2005 dt.30.3.2005 and 734/2000 dated 30.3.2005 registered
in the Palode Sub Registry Office. The said sale deeds are allegedly executed on behalf of M/s.Jay
Shree Tea and Industries Ltd. in favour of M/s.Southern Field Ventures, allegedly transferring the entire
land. It is pertinent to note that as on the date of the above said sale deeds dt.30.3.2005, M/s.Jay Shree
Tea and Industries Ltd., had no legal right, title or legal possession of the above said land, which was
vested with the Government w.e.f. 2.6.2000. Hence the sale deeds as aforesaid does not covey any legal
title, ownership or possession in favour of Southern Field Ventures Ltd. Hence M/s.Southern Field
Ventures Pvt.Ltd. Has no "ownership", "right of possession", or "right of enjoyment"
of the above said properties, so as to enable the Company to file application under Section
19(3) of the Kerala Forest (Vesting & Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Rules.
However, this jurisdictional precondition for entertaining an application was not noted, by a
mistake when proceedings cited 5 above was issued. As can be seen from the proceedings
cited 5 above, the Custodian had not considered the question regarding the right of
Southern Field Ventures to file application, under Section 19(3) of Rule 17. This an
apparent mistake.."

It is to be noted that by recalling the order dated 12.6.2007, application filed by the petitioner under
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Sec.19(3)(b) revived and was to be decided afresh. Order dated
8.1.2008 does not reject the application filed by the petitioner dated 30.3.2007. Rather the observation
in the order is to the effect that relevant aspect is to be considered. Following observations were made
by the Custodian in paragraph 24.
....A reading of the proceedings cited 5 above will clearly show that the said proceedings is only
relating to to the state of affairs as on 24.05.2007 and not as on 02.06.2000 and prior to such date, when
the actual vesting took place. This aspect was overlooked by mistake while issuing proceedings cited 5
above. The consideration of this aspect is crucial, for a complete and final disposal of the application
under Section 19(3)(b) of the Kerala Forest (Vesting & Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands)
Act, 2003 and to decided whether the land is Ecologically Fragile Land or not".
143. The Custodian having taken the view that application under Sec.19(3)(b) is to be decided again
after taking into consideration all relevant facts and
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. circumstances, we are of the view that the Custodian ought not to have
expressed any concluded opinions regarding the merits of the application as has been done by him in
the order. Notice dated 26.12.2007 only was a notice to the effect as to whether the proceeding dated
12.6.2007 be recalled or not.
144. We are thus of the view that, although the Custodian was considering the issue of recall of the
order dated 12.6.2007, it was sufficient for him to give reason to recall the order, but since the
application was not decided by that order, he ought not to have expressed any final opinion. For eg.,
one of the opinions expressed by the Custodian in his order dated 8.1.2008 is that the petitioner has no
right to file application under Sec.19(3)(b) of the 2003 Act, which does not appear to be correct. The
reason given by him is that his previous owner, M/s.Jay Shree Tea Industries, has no right to transfer
the estate to the
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. petitioner since it was already vested on 2.6.2000 in the State as
notified by Notification dated 20.10.2000 in the Kerala Gazette. As noticed above, the definition of
forest in Sec.2(c) Ordinance No.6/2000 was different which did not contain any exclusion. The
definition under Sec.2(c) of forest as per the 2003 Act was substantially changed which provided for
exclusion of plantations and buildings Sec.1(1) further provided that the Act shall be deemed to come
into force on the 2nd day of June, 2000. Section 19(3)(a) further provided that the ecologically fragile
land as defined in the 2003 Act shall only be vested in the State. Thus the ecologically fragile land as
defined under the 2003 Act shall only vest in the State Government as on 2.6.2000 which clearly means
that plantations were exempted. Thus by the operation of law it will be deemed that excluded
plantations do not vest in the State. Case of
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. the petitioner was that his estate was tea plantation and did not vest in
the State. Thus the issue which was to be decided in the application was as to whether the estate was a
plantation excluded or was forest land as per the 2003 Act. Hence the assumption by the Custodian that
the land vested on 2.6.2000 in the State and Jay Shree Tea Industries has no jurisdiction to transfer was
not correct and was an issue which was yet to be decided in application. There are materials on record
including the Three Member Committee Report which was obtained by the Custodian for passing the
order dated 12.6.2007 which indicates that apart from plantation there were buildings and structures
existing in the building. Observation of the Custodian that the application was not maintainable thus is
unsustainable. An application which is claiming a right and inviting the Custodian to decide the issue
on merits cannot be
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. thrown out observing that the application is not maintainable.
Observations of the Custodian thus, that the application was not maintainable are unsustainable. We
further observe that the other observations of the Custodian expressing any concluded opinion on the
merits of the application has also to be set aside to enable the custodian to decide the application afresh
without being influenced by any observations made in the order dated 8.1.2008.
145. We have noted the statutory scheme of Sec.19(3). According to Sec.19(3) the Custodian had to
scrutinise the notifications. Section 19(3)(b) mandates the Custodian to scrutinise any land notified
under Ordinances. Every Notification issued in respect of any land under 19(3) of Sec.3 of the said
Ordinance "shall be scruitised by the Cutodian...." The key words are "shall be scrutinised by the
Custodian suo motu. There is reason for using the word "shall" which is in
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. mandatory form in Sec.19(3)(b). As noted above, Sec.19(3) begins with
a a non-obstante clause. The definition of forest under Sec.2(c) has been substantially changed under
the 2003 Act excluding plantation and buildings, etc., from the ambit of ecologically fragile land. An
overriding effect has been given to the provisions of the Act. Use of the words, "notwithstanding
anything contained in the said Ordinance" clearly indicate that Ordinances or Notifications are to be
overridden by the provisions of the Act regarding the definition of ecologically fragile land as given in
the Act. As noted above, Sec.1(2) deems the 2003 Act to have into force with effect from 2.6.2000. The
provisions of the Act thus shall be deemed to have come into force from 2.6.2000. Section 1(2) gives
retrospective enforcement of the Act. Deeming provisions are to be given its full effect as laid
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. down by the Apex Court in Arooran Sugars Ltd's case (supra).
Paragraphs 11 and 13 which are relevant are quoted as below.
11. Sections 5 and 6 of Act 25 of 1978 contain deeming fiction in its different clauses while purporting
to omit and remove the amendments which had been introduced by Act 7 of 1974 in the Principal Act.
The role of a provision in a statute creating legal fiction is by now well settled. When a statute creates
legal fiction saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not
been done, the Court has to examine and ascertain as to for what purpose and between what persons
such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to. Thereafter courts have to give full effect to such a statutory
fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. In the well-known case of East End Dwellings
Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, Lord Asquith while dealing with the provisions of the Town and
Country Planning Act, 1947, observed:
"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless
prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the
putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or
accompanied it. ... The statute says that you must imagine a certain
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. state of affairs. It does not say that having done so, you
must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries
of that state of affairs."

That statement of law aforesaid in respect of a statutory fiction is being consistently followed by this
Court. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of State of Bombay v. Pandurang
Vinayak Chaphalkar; Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar; J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg.
Mills Ltd. v. Union of India; M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC and Harish Tandon v. A.D.M.
13. The legislature by different deeming clauses and through statutory fiction requires the court to treat
that amendments so introduced by Act 7 of 1974 had never been introduced in the Principal Act. The
power of the legislature to amend, delete or obliterate a statute or to enact a statute prospectively or
retrospectively cannot be questioned and challenged unless the court is of the view that such exercise is
in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It need not be impressed that whenever any Act or
amendment is brought in force retrospectively or any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, in
this process rights of some are bound to be affected one way or the other. In every case, it cannot be
urged that the exercise by the legislature while introducing a new provision or deleting an existing
provision with retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If that
stand is accepted, then the
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. necessary corollary shall be that legislature has no power to legislate
retrospectively, because in that event a vested right is effected; of course, in special situation this Court
has held that such exercise was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Reference in this connection
may be made to the cases of State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, T.R. Kapur v. State of
Haryana and Union of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal a
Constitution Bench on the facts and circumstances of that case observed: (SCC pp. 61-62, para 52)
"The legislation is pure and simple, self-deceptive, if we may use such an expression with reference to
a legislature- made law. The legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect
to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under
a written Constitution, and have to conform to the do's and don'ts of the Constitution, neither
prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene fundamental rights. The law must
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or acquired rights of
the parties today. The law cannot say, twenty years ago the parties had no rights, therefore, the
requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by twenty years. We are
concerned with today's rights and not yesterday's. A legislature cannot legislate today with reference to
a situation that obtained twenty years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights
accrued in the course of the twenty years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. and a negation of history."
In same terms this Court expressed the opinion in the cases of T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana and
Union of India v. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty in respect of alterations in rules framed under Article 309 of
the Constitution retrospectively regarding conditions of service. Ordinances having overridden to the
extent of definition of forest land and ecologically fragile land, earlier Notification issued in the
Ordinances notifying the land as ecologically fragile land thus has to be reconsidered which is the
requirement of the statutory scheme. Legislature consciously used the words "shall be scrutinised by
the Custodian". Thus it was the statutory duty of the Custodian to scrutinise the issue. It is further
relevant to note that notifications issued under the Ordinances notifying the land as ecologically fragile
land shall not become inoperative after lapse of Ordinance. Section 19(1) contains a transitory
provision, which is quoted as below:
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. "19. Validation and Transitory Provisions.- (1)
Notwithstanding the expiry of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically
Fragile Lands) Ordinance, 2001 (16 of 2001) (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordiance)-

(a) all ecologically fragile lands vested in the Government under the said Ordinance shall
insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been
vested under this Act;

(b) anything done or deemed to have been done or any action taken or deemed to have been
taken under the said Ordinance shall, insofar it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under this Act."

Section 19(1)(b) provided that anything done or deemed to have been done or any action taken or
deemed to have been taken under the said Ordinance shall in so far as it is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Act be deemed to have been done or taken under the Act. Thus under the Ordinances
actions taken including the Notifications issued shall be deemed
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. to have been taken under the Act in so far as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Act shall operate. Thus by lapse of Ordinances Notifications shall not
automatically come to an end. The Notifications issued under the Ordinances shall not become
inoperative after lapse of the Ordinances since they shall be deemed to have taken under the 2003 Act
in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and further the Custodian has to
scrutinise the Notifications issued under the Ordinances which is required by Sec.19(3)(b) of the Act
for the purpose and object as noted above.
ISSUE No.XIII
146. In view of the forgoing discussion now we proceed to examine as to what relief the petitioners, if
any, are entitled in this batch of Writ Petitions.
147. In view of our decision on above issues
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. especially Issue No.12, W.P(C).No.3210/2008 (M/s.Southern Field
Ventures Private Ltd. v. State of Kerala) and few other Writ Petitions relating to the said issue need to
be decided in the following manner:
W.P(C).No.3210 of 2008 (M/s.Southern Field Ventures Private Ltd. v. State of Kerala):

148. The prayer for quashing Exhibit P38 show cause notice dated 26.12.2007 is refused. Exhibit P40
order dated 8.1.2008 in so far as it recalls the order dated 12.6.2007 is affirmed, we direct the
Custodian of Ecologically Fragile Lands to decide the application filed by the petitioner dated
30.3.2007 afresh without taking into consideration any of the observations and findings referred to in
his order dated 8.1.2008 and in accordance with this judgment.
149. The prayer in W.P(C).No.27821 of 2007 for quashing Exhibit P17 notification published on
20.10.2000 cannot be granted, since we have already
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. passed order in W.P(C).No.3210 of 2008 directing the Custodian to
decide the application dated 30.3.2007. Exhibit P26 notice dated 7.9.2007 and Exhibit P27 notice dated
8.9.2007 shall be subject to the decision of the Custodian on the application dated 30.3.2007 of the
petitioner as directed in W.P(C).No.3210 of 2008. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.
W.P(C).No.29101 of 2007 (Indian Institute of Space Science and Technology v. State of Kerala &
others):
150. The prayer for quashing Exhibit P3 notice dated 8.9.2007 shall abide by the decision
on the application of M/s.Southern Field Ventures Private Ltd.

dated 30.3.2007 as directed in W.P(C).No.3210 of 2008. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.
WP(C).No.27296 of 2007 (PIL) (The Friends of Environment v. State of Kerala & others):
151. The prayer of the petitioner to quash Rules 17 to 20 of the Kerala Forests (Vesting and
Management
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. of Ecologically Fragile Lands) 2007 is refused. Exhibit P6
order dated 12.6.2007 having already been recalled by order dated 8.1.2008, which has
been confirmed in W.P (C).No.3210 of 2008, the prayer for quashing Exhibit P6 has
become infructuous. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.

W.P(C).No.32767 of 2007 (PIL) (Lawyers Environmental Awareness Forum v. Union of India):

152. In view of our order in W.P(C).No.3210 of 2008 directing the Custodian to decide the
application dated 30.3.2007 regarding claim of Merchiston Tea Estate to be exempted from
notification issued under Ordinance, the prayer for declaring Merchiston Tea Estate as
ecologically fragile land cannot be granted.

However, we direct that no construction in Merchiston Tea Estate shall be undertaken without
conducting an environmental impact study to be conducted under the
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. supervision of the sixth respondent. The Writ Petition is disposed of
accordingly.
W.P(C).No.29466 of 2009 (PIL) (D.Reghunathan Nair v. State of Kerala:
153. The prayer of the petitioner to quash Exhibit P2 order dated 12.6.2007 has become
infructuous, in view of order dated 12.6.2007 having been recalled by further oder dated
8.1.2008, which recalling has been confirmed by our order in W.P(C).No.3210 of 2008.
Rest of the prayers are refused. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.

W.P(C).No.32740 of 2007(PIL) (T.H.Mustaffa v. State of Kerala):

154. In view of our order passed in W.P(C).

No.3210 of 2008, the prayer of the petitioner to quash Exhibit P2 order dated 12.6.2007 has become
infructuous, in view of the recalling of the said order by subsequent order dated 8.1.2008 which
recalling has
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. been confirmed by us by order of the date in W.P(C). No.3210 of 2008.
Rest of the prayers are refused. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.
W.P(C).No.29245 of 2007 (PIL) (P.A.Sekharan v. State of Kerala & others):
155. The prayer of the petitioner to quash Exhibit P2 dated 12.6.2007 has become
infructuous, in view of recalling of the said order by subsequent order dated 8.1.2008,
which recalling has been confirmed by our order of the day passed in W.P(C).No.3210 of
2008.

Rest of the prayers are refused. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.
156. The prayer in W.P(C) No.30930 of 2006 N.A.Plantations v. State of Kerala & Others for issuance
of a declaration that the State is bound by the judgment of the civil court in O.S. No.134 of 1998 is
refused.
W.P(C) No.15324 of 2009 - State of Kerala v.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. N.A.Plantations filed by the State is allowed. The Compromise Ext.P8
as well as the judgment of the civil court, Ext.P10 dated 31.02.2003 in O.S. No.134 of 1998 are
quashed.
157. W.A. No.535 of 2014 - State Kerala & Others v. M/s.Athani Bricks & Metals (P) Ltd. Varabetta is
allowed. Interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P(C) No.5605 of 2014 is set aside.
W.P(C) No.1767 of 2007 - (Pallippath Shylaj & Others v. Forest Range, Kottiuyoor & Others)
158. Respondent in the counter having come up with the stand that no Notification regarding
petitioner's land has been published under the 2003 Act, the reliefs claimed have become infructuous.
There will be liberty to the petitioner to file afresh Writ Petition if any cause of action arises.
W.P(C) No.36454/2007 - (Kizhakkanela Sudhakaran v. Union of India & Others)
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc.
159. Prayer of the petitioner to quash Ext.P6, Government Order dated 22.11.2007 is refused, however
the petitioner shall be at liberty to submit a representation to the State Government.
160. As noted above, there are two Writ Petitions filed by the State challenging the orders passed by the
Civil Court granting interim injunction in the civil suit filed by the owners of the land. In one Writ
Petition compromise was also entered by the officers of the State and the suit was decided in terms of
the compromise as noted above. The ground taken in the Writ Petition is that the Civil Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain a suit, which is barred by Section 13 of the 2003 Act. It is useful to quote
Section 13 of the 2003 Act, which is to the following effect:
"13. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court.- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil
Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or to
 W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. determine any matter which is, by or under this Act,
required to be decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Tribunal, the custodian or
any other officer."

In view of the specific bar in entertainment of Civil Suit by the Civil Court, we are of the view that the
suit filed by the owners of the land was clearly not maintainable and the Civil Court has committed
error in granting interim injunction as well as deciding the suit on the basis of the compromise. The
orders passed by the Civil Court were clearly without jurisdiction and deserve to be set aside.
161. We have already upheld the constitutional validity of the 2003 Act. The prayer in the Writ
Petitions to declare the Act unconstitutional is refused.
162. The constitutional validity having upheld the claim of petitioners needs to be considered on merit.
Some of the petitioners have availed remedy under
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Sections 19, 10, 10A and 10B of 2003 Act, but many have been
awaiting the outcome of challenge to the constitutional validity. For determining the claim of each
owner, the facts, evidence, spot position have all to be considered which cannot be appropriately done
in writ proceedings. For an application under Section 19, no time limit is provided and he Custodian is
also obliged to suo motu examine the notifications, but for a dispute to be raised under Sections 10,
10A and 10B there are time constraints. But looking to the fact that constitutional validity is being
decided today, we deem it fit and proper to give opportunity to all to avail the statutory remedy under
Sections 19, 10, 10A and 10B as the case may be. The Custodian and the Tribunal may decide the
respective claims in light of the observations as made above.
163. In addition to what has been directed above in paragraphs 147 to 159, we dispose of all the Writ
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc. Petitions in following manner.
(i) We uphold the constitutional validity of

the 2003 Act. The prayer in the Writ

Petitions to declare the 2003 Act

unconstitutional is refused. The challenge to Rules 17 to 20 of 2007 Rule is also repelled.

(ii) Those petitioners who have challenged the Notifications issued under the Ordinances, notifying
their land as ecologically fragile land under Ordinance Nos.6/2000, 8/2000, 3/2001 and 16/2001 are
given liberty to submit an application to the Custodian under Sec.19 of the 2003 Act for reviewing the
Notification within one month from this day if not already made.
(iii) The Custodian shall proceed to examine

the above applications taking into

W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc.

consideration the relevant materials and averments and observations made in this judgment. The
decision be taken thereon within three months from the date of filing the application along with copy of
this judgment. The pending applications be also decided within three months.
(iv) Petitioners who have challenged the Notifications issued under Sec.3 of the Act are also allowed
one month's time to submit an application under Sec.10(1) and 10A as the case may be to the Tribunal
which may be considered and decided by the Tribunal in accordance with law expeditiously within a
period of six months from the date of submitting the applications.
W.P(C) No.26691 of 2010, etc.
(v) The other reliefs claimed in the different Writ Petitions not specifically dealt with as above are
refused.
164. Before we part, we record our deep appreciation for the learned counsel for the petitioners as well
as learned Counsel for the State who have placed the case with great industry and knowledge. With
their valuable assistance we could decide various involved issues with ease.
Parties shall bear their own costs.
AS