Mugomba-RegionalOrganisationsAfrican-1978

Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the East African
Community
Author(s): Agrippah T. Mugomba
Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 261-272
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The journal of Modern African Studies, i6, 2 (1978), pp. 261-272
Regional Organisations and

African Underdevelopment:
the Collapse of the
East African Community
byAGRIPPAH T. MUGOMBA*
For better or worse, Africa is coming of age. The golden epoch of high hopes
for pan-African co-operation and unity has passed. In its place is coming a
new era of confrontation, ideological conflict and even 'African imperialism'
that threatens everything pan-Africanists believed in and were crusading for
... at the dawn of [the] continent's independence from colonial rule. The
change in the nature of pan-African politics from lofty idealism to hard-nosed
realpolitik is nowhere more evident than in the present paralysis of the
Organisation of African Unity. The Angolan crisis and now the Spanish
Sahara dispute have laid bare the new realities of the African continent in a
revealing and even devastating manner. - The Montreal Star, i 6 March I 976.
F OR the first time in its I4-year history, the Organisation of African

Unity has been divided along sharply defined ideological demarcations
in its attempts to resolve pressing disputes. The member states appear
to be moving away on divisive issues from accommodation on the basis
of common interests to confrontation based on ideological and other
inclinations. A number of recent developments indicate the extent to
which the cardinal principles of unity and solidarity in purpose have
been eroded.
To begin with, for the first time since i963, the O.A.U. was unable
in January I976 even to vote on the admission of a newly independent
state, the People's Republic of Angola, because the divisions among
members over which liberation movements) legitimately represented it
cut so deeply. Normally, admission is by a unanimous decision without
even a formal vote. Secondly, and also for the first time, an African
colony, the Spanish Sahara, has been forcibly carved up at approaching
independence between two neighbouring countries, Morocco and
Mauritania, despite a fundamental O.A.U. principle of respect for the
sanctity of existing boundaries. An increasing number of other states
* Lecturer in Political Science and Director of the Center for Black Studies, University
of California, Santa Barbara.
262 AGRIPPAH T. MUGOMBA
are also openly challenging the continent's colonial-dictated borders
and are demanding the return of 'lost lands' or 'lost people'. Thirdly,
ideological distances among the O.A.U. members have taken on an
international outlook, with the great powers swiftly moving to establish
diplomatic coalitions among their respective 'clients'. The perennial
East-West conflict over preferred economic and political systems in the
world's 'peripheries' appears to be making the policy of non-alignment
completely irrelevant on the African continent, although detente has
become the modus operandi in almost all other parts of the globe. Finally,
more and more African governments are turning to the 'left' in their
domestic and foreign policies, and this trend appears to be introducing
profound changes in post-colonial politics and diplomacy.
This article looks at the impact of ideology on inter-African align-
ments in one important area of the continent, with the aim of identifying
some of the major variables that appear to be exerting powerful
influences on regional integration and liberation. Although we cannot
realistically explain policy differences among African states in terms of
ideology alone, it seems to be generally true that tensions in recent years
within the East African Community have been clearly exacerbated by
the growing ideological distances between the partner states. This by
no means ignores the fact that differences are being magnified, and
indeed polarized, by super-power contests for diplomatic influence and,
if possible, ideological allegiance in regional environments.
SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN EAST AFRICA

The East African Community is effectively defunct only a decade
after it came into formal existence. The collapse of this once highly
acclaimed experiment in regional co-operation is the result of actions
taken by the partner states themselves over a period of years. Since I 975,
a three-dimensional verbal 'guerrilla' war has been waged by Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda against one another; indeed, sometimes it has
come very close to physical combat. These bitter exchanges have led
directly to the disintegration of the Community and to the dismember-
ment of most of its jointly-operated services. Today, each state has
assumed direct control over regional activities within its own territorial
boundaries; thus everything is now run separately, from railways, ports
and harbours to postal services and airlines. The question arises: What
went wrong?
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that Tanzania has progressively
'drifted' southwards as the conflict in Southern Africa intensified; the
REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 263
independence of Mozambique, in particular, quickened the tempo, as
Julius Nyerere sought to play a pivotal role along with the other so-
called 'front-line' Presidents in the diplomatic and military initiatives
aimed at resolving the Southern African crisis. Thus, the combined
effect of growing disillusionment with Tanzania's traditional partners,
and the emergence of a group of regional actors with which T.A.N.U.
shares ideological affinity,' has been to shift decisively the country's
political, economic, and ideological interests. The 'Southern connection'
is clearly now seen as offering a more promising future.
At the same time Kenya, which is firmly committed to the capitalist
path to development in an area dominated by socialist-oriented states,
has become increasingly isolated and defensive while displaying a
cosmopolitan outlook in its international policies. Jomo Kenyatta is
ideologically the 'odd man out' in East Africa, and the spectre of
'encirclement' by unfriendly - and some would say jealous - neigh-
bours, has pushed Kenya into fully embracing the United States in an
attempt to enhance its security and limit its virtually total regional
isolation, politically, economically, and diplomatically.
Unfortunately, and notwithstanding the regional impact of Idi Amin's
'unpredictable' behaviour, Uganda has witnessed so many ideological
somersaults that it could not play the potential r6le of a moderating
force to balance the 'extreme' positions of Kenya and Tanzania, with
the principal objective of keeping the Community in existence.
There are, of course, several more substantial reasons for the growing
disillusionment which has since resulted in the collapse ofthe Community.
These include: long-harboured fears of domination by one or the other
of the partners; resentment by Kenya over the need to 'carry' the
poorer members; long-strained relations between Uganda and Tanzania
over Nyerere's refusal to recognise Amin's military regime; markedly
different foreign policy concerns and approaches; and the concentration
of foreign capital in the industrial and commercial 'core', which has
long threatened to turn the two 'peripheral' states into economic
satellites and the principal victims of Kenyan 'sub-imperialism '.2 These
and other, perhaps purely 'psychological', reasons have cumulatively
encouraged the growth of competing nationalisms which reached a
climax in varying degrees of desire to run as many of the common
service institutions as possible on a separate or parallel basis. By the
1 In January 1977, T.A.N.U. and the Afro Shirazi Party merged into a single national
political organisation called Chama Cha Mapinduzi (the Revolutionary Party).
2 For an analysis of Kenyan 'sub-imperialism', see Timothy M. Shaw, 'International
Stratification in Africa: sub-imperialism in Southern and Eastern Africa', in journal of
Southern African Affairs (Baltimore), u, 2, April 1977, pp. 145-65.
early I970s, centralization was no longer the general pattern in East
Africa, the result being further regional disintegration and instability.
Although it is generally argued that decentralization had been made
necessary by the 'inexplicable' failure, noticeable quite early on, to
transfer capital funds to the regional headquarters of the various institu-
tions in the three states, this movement had been under way for quite
some time. In fact, it began with the decision in I 966 to end the common
monetary unit and establish separate currencies. The next major
development was the break-up of the University of East Africa, which
had existed since i963, and its replacement by national institutions in
I970. Three years later the East African Income Tax Department
ceased to operate, and since then virtually all the other key Community
operations, while retaining the East African tag, have been run very
much on a national basis. The collapse of East African Airways in
February I977, which was quickly followed by Kenya's decision to
launch its own international airline, sealed the fate of the Community.
Although none of the three partner states has as yet shown enough
courage to abrogate the i967 Treaty of Co-operation, there is little
doubt that each is committed, irrevocably, to progressive withdrawal
from the ties established ten years ago and those inherited collectively
at the time of independence in the early i96os. No one seems to feel,
seriously, that the Community is still worth saving, even though state-
ments to that effect have been issued from time to time by each of the
three Governments, especially Tanzania.
It is perhaps paradoxical that the attitude of the Tanzanian Govern-
ment should be seen, particularly in Kenya, as having been the deciding
factor in the collapse of the Community, because Julius Nyerere was the
principal driving force behind its formation. In I 96 I he had even offered
to delay Tanganyika'simpendingindependence from Britain if this would
enable all three East African territories to move forward at the same time
to political federation. The failure to achieve this goal, and the not so im-
pressive performance of the Community since its inception, undoubtedly
contributed to the disillusionment which has now destroyed effective eco-
nomic co-operation in the region. Of greater concern to Tanzania, how-
ever, has been the view that neither formal federation nor symbolic
regional unity could, in any sense, be seen as making a positive contribution
to the country's chosen socialist path to development. Indeed, according
to Amon Nsekela, such a course would only be acceptable
if it held out the promise of a marked improvement in the material welfare

of the mass of Tanzanians, implying not only a more rapidly growing level of
income but also in line with our Socialist policies, [and] more equitably
distributed incomes. In turn this would imply that federation would have to
contribute, in some significant way, to the destruction of those forces -
economic, social and political - which are responsible for our absolute level
of poverty and for the inequitable way in which what little we have is
distributed among us.'
But even if federation were now not regarded as a practical venture,

one would still have expected a continuing commitment to the main-
tenance of the Community. The Tanzanian perspective, however, seems
to be that Kenya, with its comparatively more advanced economy, has
been 'ripping off' its partners. The contention is that despite some
laudable efforts to reduce the inherited inequalities, it has proved impos-
sible to reverse the trend whereby Kenya's level of economic growth has
accelerated and completely outpaced those of its partners. Due to the
concentration of development on Kenya, established in colonial times,
the 'spread' effects there have far outweighed any wider 'backwash',
particularly in the case of Tanzania, which feels that through higher
trade tariffs the junior partners have been 'subsidising' Kenyan growth
based on industrial expansion geared to the requirements of the enlarged
East African Common Market.
Tanzania has in the past complained bitterly about the failure to
compensate adequately the disadvantaged partners for the concen-
tration of benefits in Kenya, as well as external investments, by
channelling resources to Uganda and Tanzania. It is, after all, the
latter who have had a greater need for the Community and the Common
Market than the former:
The difficulty has always been that the benefits of this greater growth have
tended to be concentrated in Kenya and so far we have been totally incapable
of rectifying this except by narrow autarchic policies which may have bene-
fited us but, if so, then certainly at the expense of growth in East Africa as a
whole. This concentration of benefits should not, on the whole, surprise us.
Regional concentration and imbalance is a characteristic of capitalist develop-
ment throughout the world and one which history has showed, tends to be
aggravated over time.
The explanation for this is that profit maximisation dictates that advantage
be taken of external economies with the result that areas with a slight
economic advantage succeed in attracting successively more and more enter-
prises. These then form their own market which draws further enterprises;
they build up superior economic, social, and cultural facilities which have
even more drawing power. Other areas become increasingly less attractive
and soon begin to lose the dynamic members of their labour force to the
advanced centres, their relative disadvantage thereby being exacerbated.2
1 African Development (London), February 1974, p. E.A.15. Amon Nsekela was then a
member of the now defunct East African Assembly and head of the Tanzanian National Bank
of Commerce. 2 Ibid.
Tanzania's principal complaint would, therefore, appear to be that
although a number of initiatives have been taken to facilitate the
equitable distribution of benefits among the partner states, the planned
geographical allocation of new industries recommended in the i964
Kampala Agreement, and the attraction of new investments from
abroad and within East Africa through the transfer tax system (aban-
doned in I973), have failed completely to offset Kenya's initial advan-
tages. Thus, instead of benefits flowing out, as expected, from the 'core'
to the 'periphery', the reverse process has continued of 'milking' the
economies of Tanzania and Uganda. This has enhanced Kenya's inter-
mediary status or sub-imperial role in the overall pattern of dependent
relationships that link the East African states to the global political
economy. These charges of regional neo-colonialism are not entirely
unfounded.'
From the beginning, the East African Community and Common
Market inherited the administrative foundations laid down by Britain
during the early i96os. Similarly, the economic structures of the three
partner states, also transferred intact from the former colonial power,
had a built-in capitalist model of production and development. Con-
sequently, the Community and Common Market began to function
within the broad framework of capitalism, and the problem has been to
reconcile these externally-oriented institutions with the particular needs
of the three members, notably Tanzania which continues to suffer from
almost absolute poverty. The net result has been a failure both to trans-
form their economies from a permanent dependence on the world
economy and to encourage relevant long-term development. Instead,
the East African Common Market has helped to open up the region to
more effective exploitation by international capital while avoiding
altogether the crucial issue of resolving the root causes of poverty. While
it cannot be denied that the partner states have invariably benefited
from pursuing different objectives within a wider market framework
rather than on a purely national basis, it should be acknowledged that
they have failed to confront seriously the problem of underdevelopment.
Although it is likely that any Third-World common market built
around a capitalist model of development will tend to both magnify and
exacerbate existing inequalities, this is not to suggest that regional
balkanisation is the more realistic or even the inevitable alternative. On
the contrary, failure to establish not only larger but also viable economic
1 See Martin Godfrey and Steven Langdon, 'Partners in Underdevelopment? The Trans-
nationalisation Thesis in a Kenyan Context', in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics (Leicester), xiv, i, March 1976, pp. 42-63, and Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya:
the political economy of neocolonialism, 1964-1971 (London, 1975).
groupings has been a major factor in retarding more rapid advancement
throughout the continent; indeed, continuing fragmentation has facili-
tated intensive exploitation, and has effectively prevented most African
countries from collectively realising the vast resource potential at their
disposal.
Yet there are certain realities which should not be overlooked in the
enthusiasm for the noble parn-African ideal of political unity and
economic integration. The very limited success of regional experiments
on the continent has been largely due to the absence of a common
ideology, especially as regards development. Indeed, the incongruous
ideological positions displayed by the three partners in the East African
Community have effectively prevented other states in the region from
seeking membership, clearly a requirement for enhanced growth poten-
tial. It is not surprising that the experiment appeared to be doomed even
in I974:
We cannot proclaim the creation of a customs union as a progressive step

forward if it has the effect of sinking us even further into the abyss of poverty
and degradation or if it necessitates compromising our policies of Socialism
and self reliance.
Meaningful common markets and meaningful federations can only be con-
structed on the basis of an ideology which is in large measure common to all
participant states. Where the ideology is not shared a federation is unlikely
to ensue and if it did there would undoubtedly be a build up of pressure which
would threaten its continued existences
While the long-term future of the East African Community has

always been linked to the larger goal of a political federation, the
necessary conditions for such an undertaking have remained out of
reach. Indeed, it is unlikely that they will be realised until there is an
ideological consensus among the partners, the acceptance of a common
economic strategy, a willingness to tackle the regional problems of
distribution, and the ability to devise effective methods of minimising
inequalities.2 But as long as one member is committed to the view that a
planned socialist economy is the overwhelming prerequisite of a success-
ful federation while the other two think otherwise, or have no relevant
ideology, the present state of affairs will remain, with an increasing
tendency by Tanzania to look elsewhere for a potentially more promising
future. Ideological affinity is thus a key element that has always been
i8 MOA
absent in East Africa.
1 African Development, IOc. cit. p. E.A. I7. See also Ann W. Seidman, Comparative Development
Strategies in East Africa (Nairobi, 1972), p. 5.
2 See B. W. T. Mutharika, Toward Multinational Economic Co-operation in Africa (New York,
1972), pp. 267-76.
THE IMPACT OF CONFLICTING NATIONAL INTERESTS
The East African Community has tottered on the brink of collapse
ever since the military coup that brought Idi Amin to power. Since
January I 97 I Uganda and Tanzania have been almost in a state of war,
and on a number of occasions there have been open hostilities between
them. Nyerere's initial military and political support for ex-President
Milton Obote, and more especially his refusal to recognise the legitimacy
of Amin's regime, has made it impossible for the East African Authority
-made up of the three Heads of State-to meet and sort out the
differences which have hampered the smooth functioning of the
Communty.
It would be incorrect, however, to blame the Community's troubles
on the quarrels between Uganda and Tanzania, for it is now a well-
established fact that since I975 each member state has been at logger-
heads with the other two simultaneously. The real point is that all three
have simply drifted apart in their domestic and external policies and
goals since the 'golden' years of i963-7, when it was thought possible
to capitalism on the administrative infrastructure inherited from the
British, and to set up a viable Community with the various decentralised
parastatal organizations. Instead of substantial economic co-operation
drawing the members together politically, today they are not only much
farther apart but each has growing doubts about the actual relevance
of that organizational relic of colonialism. To many, the Community has
long out-lived its usefulness and no longer serves the divergent interests
of its members.
Differences in foreign policy approaches and outlooks have had a
marked impact on relations between the East African states. While
Tanzania has striven to widen the scope of its international relations by
pursuing vigorously a policy of non-alignment in relations with the
major power blocs (although its socialist ideology has struck an affinity
with other, more orthodox, Marxist-Leninist states), Kenya has tended
to practise what might be called 'discretionary non-alignment' (a term
popularized by Malawi's Dr H. Kamuzu Banda),' and remains very
much in the 'western camp'judging by its international image and the
countries it deals with closely.2 Uganda under Amin, on the other hand,
has drifted back and forth without any clear sense of direction in its
I Cf. Carolyn McMaster, Malawi: foreign policy and development (Brighton, 1974).
2 For a rather unconvincing attempt at discussing the divergent foreign policies in East
Africa, see Susan Aurelia Gitelson, 'Policy Options for Small States: Kenya and Tanzania
reconsidered', in Studies in Comparative International Development (Beverly Hills), xii, 2, Summer
I977, pp. 29-57.
international relations.' Furthermore, the individual orientations dis-
played by each state towards the three super-powers have served to
dramatise the external 'systemic penetration' of the East African sub-
system. Tanzania has long maintained a close friendship with China,2
and lately its links have been extended to Cuba and the Soviet Union
with the rapid intensification of the military and diplomatic struggles
over the future of Southern Africa. These new developments have been
reflected in the visits to Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola
in March I977 by the Cuban and Soviet Presidents.
From another angle, Amin's embrace of the Islamic faith, and his
growing dependence on emergency financial help from Saudi Arabia
and military assistance from Libya, have introduced new and powerful
influences in East African politics. At the same time Kenya, increasingly
isolated from its neighbours - each of whom has links of one kind or
another with the Soviet Union - and afraid of soon being drawn into
various nearby conflicts, particularly the danger of renewed confronta-
tion with Somalia, has effectively transferred allegiance from Britain
to the United States in an attempt to give greater credence to its
security. These developments have introduced the necessary conditions
for the rapid militarization of the region, which may lead to a dangerous
arms race in which the military technologies of the super-powers would
be matched against each other from time to time,3 a situation remi-
niscent of the contemporary Middle East. The ongoing conflict in the
Horn of Africa, and the possibility of an outbreak of violence between
Somalia and Kenya, clearly illustrate the dangers and the potential for
the super-powers to be drawn into such regional conflicts.
1 It could be argued, of course, that a consistent pattern of foreign policy behaviour can
be discerned from Uganda's conduct of international relations since I972. The trend, while
characterised by both continuities and discontinuities, has been to progressively radicalise the
country's external image - to the extent of making the previous Obote regime appear very
'moderate'. Perhaps the key ingredient missing in Amin's foreign policy has been a clearly-
defined ideological profile. For the 'boomerang' pattern of international behaviour which
has emerged, see Susan Aurelia Gitelson, 'Major Shifts in Recent Ugandan Foreign Policy',
in African Affairs (London), 76, 304, July I977, pp. 359-80. And on Amin's political beliefs,
see Nizar A. Motani, 'From Ideology to "Idi-ology": Uganda under Obote and Amin', in
Africa Report (New York), 2I, 5, September-October I976, p. 50.
2 See George T. Yu, China and Tanzania: a study in co-operative interaction (Berkeley, I970),
and China's African Policy: a study of Tanzania (New York, 1975).
See Peter Enahoro, 'East Africa: arms race', in Africa (London), 48, August I975,
pp. IO-I2; Strategic Survey, 1976 (London, I977), pp. 59-60; and Richard H. Deutsch,
'Fuelling the African Arms Race', in Africa Report, 22, 2, March-April I977, pp. 50-2.
i8-2
CONCLUSIONS
In a narrow sense it would appear that ideology, regional conflict,

and systemic external penetration are the critical variables that have
shaped the politics of the East African sub-system.' However, in order
to explain the dismal failure of the Community it is necessary to expand
the range of variables to include other, equally significant factors,
namely: the growing 'radicalisation' of regional politics, including the
proliferation of Marxist-oriented regimes in Eastern and Southern
Africa; Kenya's contribution to the 'development of underdevelop-
ment' within the Community and the Common Market, as well as the
increasingly conservative, authoritarian, and defensive position of
Kenyatta's regime both at home and in the region; Amin's erratic
behaviour which has prevented Uganda from bridging relations with -
as well as between - Kenya and Tanzania; the transformation of the
separate local conflicts stretching from the 'Horn' to Southern Africa
and the Indian Ocean into one expansive conflict theatre dominated by
the super-powers;2 and, above all perhaps, the 'divorce' between Kenya
and Tanzania, which has sealed the fate of the Community. On this, in
the words of a Nairobi observer:
We are wedded in an unhappy marriage of convenience. An amicable

divorce may be the only way of ending this constant and pointless bickering.
Like the parties to a broken marriage, we may find that relieved of the
pressures of having to live under the same roof we may learn to cultivate a
healthier and more respectful attitude towards one another.3
The question of whether Kenya or Tanzania bears the main responsi-

bility for isolating the other(s) is not easy to resolve. No doubt, some
would argue that it is, in fact, T.A.N.U.'s dogmatic commitment to a
socialist ideology, as well as the southward tilt of its foreign policy -
itself, at least in part, a reflection of its principles, ideological prefer-
ences, and priority interests - which have forced Tanzania to become
both insular and isolated from its traditional partners in East Africa.
1 On subordinate or penetrated political systems and dominant or intrusive systems, see
James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York, I97I ), pp. Ii6-32 and
3 18-24; Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions (Englewood
Cliffs, i970), pp. i-4i; and Kenneth W. Grundy, 'Intermediary Power and Global Depen-
dency: the case of South Africa', in International Studies Quarterly (Beverly Hills), 20, 4,
December 1976, especially pp. 553-63.
2 See also Raymond W. Copson, 'East Africa and the Indian Ocean - a Zone of Peace?',
in African Affairs, 76, 304, July 1977, pp. 339-58; Agrippah T. Mugomba, The Foreign Policy
of Despair: Africa and the sale of arms to South Africa (Nairobi, s977), pp. 68-II5; and Peter
Robbs, 'Africa and the Indian Ocean', in Africa Report, 21, 3, May-June 5976, pp. 45-5.
3 Weekly Review (Nairobi), cited in African Development, November 1975, p. 20.
From this perspective, therefore, it would be misleading to suggest that
Kenya's (or even Uganda's) behaviour has in any appreciable way led
to its alienation from the other partners in the Community.
On the other hand, it does not seem incredible to suggest that the
increasingly cosmopolitan role of Nairobi - notably as the host for inter-
national institutions and conventions - has promoted Kenya to the
status of an African middle power comparable to the position now
occupied by South Africa, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast in their re-
spective zones. That newly-acquired importance has, inevitably perhaps,
contributed to the growing distances between the East African states;
there is no way in which Tanzania and Uganda could ignore their
apparent relegation to a subordinate position, and hence their sensitivity
to the emergence of a sub-imperial state capable of undermining
their own interests. Kenya's ascendance above the others, both in
power and wealth - and therefore in diplomatic influence - requires
the development of new relationships appropriate to its growing
status as a middle-ranking power, and that in turn opens up East
Africa to more powerful external influences over which no state in the
area has effective control.
This external penetration of the region may, therefore, be having
undesirable consequences. Thus, the answer to the question raised
above would seem to be that it is the rapidly altering 'strategic image'
of each of the East African states, brought about mainly by Kenya's
' ascent' to a superordinate position, which explains the widening gap
between them. The East African Community has been the principal
casualty of these perceptions of a changed regional 'balance of power'
situation.
The difficulties which have faced the East African Community are,
in many respects, similar to those confronting most other institutions
operating in a highly penetrated regional sub-system, where autonomy
is more apparent than real.' The facade of unity is permanently threat-
ened by the intrusive effects of external influences emanating from the
regional, continental, and global arenas. These centrifugal forces have
tended to pull the partner states apart rather than to unite them. When
the weight of the various other factors enumerated and discussed in this
article is added, one arrives at the conclusion that it was only the sheer
political will of the East African leaders which enabled the Community
1 See Charles Pentland, 'The Regionalization of World Politics: concepts and evidence',
in International Journal (Toronto), 30, 4, Autumn 1975, pp. 599-630, and also Louis A. McCall,
Regional Integration: a comparison of European and Central American dynamics, Sage Professional
Papers in International Studies, Vol. iv (Beverly Hills and London, 1976), especially pp. 5-19.
to function in the manner that it did for a decade. Unfortunately, this
alone cannot guarantee the survival of any commonly operated insti-
tution. The failure of this East African experiment, once heralded as the
best model for Africa, cannot go unnoticed elsewhere on the continent
and in the rest of the world. Certainly, the hard lessons of this unsuccess-
ful venture will need to be borne in mind in any future attempt at
further regional unity and economic integration in Africa.

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Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the East African

Regional Organisations and

F OR the first time in its I4-year history, the Organisation of African

SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN EAST AFRICA

if it held out the promise of a marked improvement in the material welfare

But even if federation were now not regarded as a practical venture,

We cannot proclaim the creation of a customs union as a progressive step

While the long-term future of the East African Community has

In a narrow sense it would appear that ideology, regional conflict,

We are wedded in an unhappy marriage of convenience. An amicable

The question of whether Kenya or Tanzania bears the main responsi-

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