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A Procedural Framework for Transboundary Water
Management in the Mekong River Basin Shared Mekong
for a Common Future 1st Edition Qi Gao Digital Instant
Download
Author(s): Qi Gao
ISBN(s): 9789004266797, 9004266798
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 1.73 MB
Year: 2014
Language: english
A Procedural Framework for Transboundary Water Management
in the Mekong River Basin
International Water Law Series
Series Editor
Stephen C. McCaffrey
Editorial Board
VOLUME 1
By
Qi Gao
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gao, Qi , author.
A procedural framework for transboundary water management in the Mekong River basin : shared
Mekong for a common future / by Qi Gao.
pages cm. — (International water law series ; volume 1)
Originally issued as author’s thesis (Ph. D.)—University of Western Sydney, 2013.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-26678-0 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-26679-7 (e-book) 1. Water resources
development—Law and legislation—Mekong River Watershed 2. Mekong River Watershed—International
status. I. Title.
KNC660.M45G36 2014
341.4’420959—dc23
2013049069
This publication has been typeset in the multilingual ‘Brill’ typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering
Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.
For more information, please see brill.com/brill-typeface.
issn 2351-9606
isbn 978 90 04 26678 0 (hardback)
isbn 978 90 04 26679 7 (e-book)
∵
Contents
Preface x
Abstract xii
List of Abbreviations xiii
List of Figures xv
1 Introduction 1
I The Mighty Mekong: A River at Risk 1
II Challenge-Response: The Rationale for a Procedural
Perspective 6
A Sustainable Development 8
B Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 10
C International Watercourse Law 14
III Overview 17
Bibliography 299
Index 331
Preface
This book marks the culmination of my past six years of research in the area of trans-
boundary water management. My academic journey was first guided by Professor Ke
Jian from the Wuhan University, who aroused my interests on transboundary water
management and the associated legal and political theories. I spent two years focusing
on the management of transboundary water pollution within China, which led me to
rethink the prevalent theory of integrated water resources management in the context
of developing countries like China.
Further down this road, I shifted my attention to transboundary water management
issues at the regional level, bearing in mind of the questions I had since my previous
research. In particular, I was puzzled, yet, deeply attracted by the increasingly polycen-
tric nature of transboundary cooperation, the various stages of domestic reforms and
complicated geopolitical situation in the Mekong region. I therefore conducted around
four years of research on the Mekong water governance in Australia at the University
of Western Sydney (UWS) with financial support from both the Chinese Scholarship
Council and the UWS. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all those people who
have given me their generous help and warm encouragement during the preparation
of this book.
I am deeply grateful for Professor Michael Jeffery, QC who went beyond the call of
duty to ensure that I was not only academically well supervised but also that my stay
in Australia was an enjoyable and memorable one. I am also very grateful to Professor
Donna Craig, for her generosity and kindness and for her influence on me as a success-
ful female academic who managed to find a good balance between work and life. I was
truly shocked and saddened to learn about the passing of Professor Jeffery in July 2013.
Publishing this book is my way of remembering him and offering my condolences to
his family.
For the past four years, Professor Ke Jian from Wuhan University has kindly made
many valuable suggestions to me. Thanks to him, I was introduced to the Mekong
Legal Network in Thailand, which has been very beneficial to my research. I would
therefore like to thank Daniel King and all of the other friends I made through this
great network. I have also interacted with academics and students from the Mekong
Research Group (previously known as the Australian Mekong Resource Centre).
I would like to thank everyone there who, in their different ways, gave support and
helped me carry out my research, especially Professor Philip Hirsh, Professor Bernard
Boer, Visiting Professor Lu Xing, Dong Xing, Yumiko Yasuda and Oulavanh
Keovilignavong.
My academic life at the UWS, School of Law was greatly enriched by my dear col-
leagues. Dr. Xiaobo Zhao, Dr. Xiaoyi Jiang and Dr. Hem Aitken who helped a lot when
preface xi
I first started my study there and have since shared their valuable research and life
experiences. I am also grateful for numerous interesting discussions with Manzoor
Rashid, Elizabeth Gachenga, Xiangbai He and Ying Shen.
I would like to thank Professor Wang Xi and the KoGuan Law School of the Shanghai
Jiao Tong University for the great support I received during the process of finalizing
this book. I am also deeply appreciative of the efficient and skilful help from Marie
Sheldon, Lisa Hanson and the rest of the team at Brills.
Finally, the successful completion of this book would not have been possible with-
out the enormous support and sacrifice of my family. I owe a large debt of gratitude to
my loving parents for being so supportive of their daughter’s choice even if that meant
their only child rarely came home for the past four years. My deep apologies and grati-
tude also extend to my dear husband, Lei Duan, who is currently a PhD candidate in
the University of Tokyo, Japan and has been my soul mate and best friend for over eight
years. I would like to thank my relatives and friends in China and Japan for their gener-
ous support and help, not only to myself, but also to my parents and husband.
Abstract
The Mekong River is “both a uniting and dividing force” for China and Southeast Asia.1
The initial focus of the study will identify the major environmental challenges on the
Mekong River ecosystem and the status quo of water resources management in the
Mekong region, focusing on the existing water-related legal arrangements and mecha-
nisms at both domestic and regional levels. It will discuss the ongoing difficulties and
as well as aspirations for reform of the water management regime. The capacity of
governments and inter-governmental organisations with regard to implementation
and legal regulation will also be analysed, as well as the role of non-state actors on
decision-making processes concerning development activities in the region. It is obvi-
ous that, despite attempts to reshape the management of Mekong water resources into
a more integrated regime, the current frameworks at both domestic and regional levels
remain fragmented.
Under these circumstances, this book attempts to explore procedural implications
of integrated water resources management and its application in the Mekong region.
The increasingly polycentric nature of transboundary cooperation must be borne in
mind, with the emergence of newly recognised stakeholders who represent a broader
range of interests than has been the case in the past. The following major procedural
requirements can be identified in the proposed procedural framework: information
exchange and data collection on a regular basis (chapter three); notification and con-
sultation (chapter four); the public’s right of access to information and participation
(chapter five) and environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental assess-
ment, and their applications in the transboundary context (chapter six).
In order to tailor and better understand the procedural requirements in the context
of the Mekong region, both the ideal and practical scenarios are considered, combined
with selected case studies. Existing legislation and practice concerning the use and
application of procedural mechanisms in the Mekong region will be analysed. The dis-
cussion on procedural mechanisms will also consider how to improve their implemen-
tation in light of the ongoing tradition and strong preference for soft law approaches
to transboundary cooperation. The relationship between legally-binding agreements
and the capacity for compliance in the context of the Mekong region will be discussed.
In addition, the relationship between the procedural and substantial elements of inte-
grated river basin management will be re-examined in the final chapter. The final
chapter will outline the conclusions and suggest possible areas for future research.
1 Philip Hirsch et al., ‘National Interests and Transboundary Water Governance in the Mekong’
(Report, University of Sydney, 2006) iii.
List of Abbreviations
FIGURE Caption
Introduction
Figure 1 Hydrographic map of the Mekong Basin, with indication of the Mekong River and
the main tributaries and flow contribution by country
S ource: World Bank and Asian Development Bank, ‘WB/ADB Joint
Working Paper on Future Directions for Water Resources
Management in the Mekong River Basin: Mekong Water Resources
Assistance Strategy’ (Working Paper, World Bank and Asian
Development Bank, 2006) 13.
The Mekong River is “both a uniting and dividing force” for China and
Southeast Asia.1 It originates from Qinghai Province in China. Known as the
Dza Chu River in Qinghai and Tibet, it integrates with the Angqu River in
Chamdo, Tibet. Only after this point, it became known as the Lancang River. It
then flows southeast through the Yunnan Province and enters into Southeast
Asia. The Mekong River basin (henceforth referred to as the Mekong region),
with a total land area of 795 000 square kilometres, includes parts of China,
Myanmar and Vietnam, about one third of Thailand and most of Cambodia
and Laos.2
Not only has the river supported one of the world’s most diverse wildlife, sec-
ond only to the Amazon River,3 it also has been of major cultural, traditional,
social and economic significance to the dense population living in this region.4
All riparian states of Mekong are developing countries and most inhabitants
are relevantly poor. The strong need for economic growth has tightened com-
petition over water resources and aroused serious environmental concerns
and disputes. The environmental discourses are also “intricately bound up in
a wider world of geopolitics, which include China’s emerging relations with
regional neighbours”.5
One highly controversial issue is dam construction. Driven by rapid indus-
trialisation, export-led economic growth and expanding domestic consumer
markets, demand for electricity is growing in the Mekong region.6 The govern-
ments in this region have seen a great potential for hydropower development
on the mainstream and tributaries of the Mekong River.
The mainstream hydropower development initially started on the upper
Mekong in Yunnan Province, China from 1980s. Based on the most recent
data, there has been a cascade of 16 dams (half located on the upstream of
Lancang and half on the midstream and downstream of Lancang) planned on
1 Philip Hirsch et al., ‘National Interests and Transboundary Water Governance in the Mekong’
(Report, University of Sydney, 2006) iii.
2 Mekong River Commission, About Mekong—the Land & its Resources <http://ns1.mrcmekong
.org/about_mekong/about_mekong.htm>.
3 World Wildlife Fund, Greater Mekong <http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/
greatermekong/>.
4 Mekong River Commission, People <http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/people/>.
5 Philip Hirsch, Cascade Effect (8 February 2011) China Dialogue <http://www.chinadialogue
.net/article/show/single/en/4093-Cascade-effect>.
6 But the magnitude of this growth is contested between government agencies and civil soci-
ety groups. See Carl Middleton, Jelson Garcia and Tira Foran, ‘Old and New Hydropower
Players in the Mekong Region: Agendas and Strategies in François Molle, Tira Foran and Mira
Käkönen (eds), Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region (Earthscan, 2009) 23, 24.
Introduction 3
the mainstream of Lancang River in Yunnan.7 Among them, two projects have
already been cancelled by 2007 due to environmental reasons.8 In particular,
the second eight-dam cascade located on the midstream and downstream of
Lancang has attracted most of the attention. At the time of writing, six of them
are already completed and one is in the final stage of getting formal a pproval.9
It was not until more recently, has the hydropower development on the
upstream of Lancang and in the Dza Chu River begun to raise more attention
domestically and internationally. Combined with another 14 dams planned in
the Dza Chu River in Tibet and Qinghai Province,10 there are in fact 28 dams
in total planned (eight of them are already completed) on the mainstream of
Mekong in China.
Despite the benefits argued by Chinese officials, the ongoing dam con-
struction has created serious concerns about its potential negative impact
on the ecosystem. In 2010, a severe drought in Southwest China remarkably
decreased the water level in the Mekong River and exacerbated tensions
between China and neighbouring countries.11 Whether China’s management
of a series of hydroelectric projects on the upper reaches of Mekong River has
aggravated the crisis was under fierce dispute. This situation is further compli-
cated by eleven mainstream dam proposals on the lower Mekong River, which
might have a huge negative impact on the passage and breeding capacities of
the Mekong’s many migratory fish species.12 The rapid hydropower expansion
on the Mekong tributaries (both in China and the four lower Mekong coun-
tries) should be noted as well.13 Moreover, developments like the expansion
of agriculture, the growth of factories and the discovery of oil in the Mekong
region also raise concerns about pollution.14 River clearances, which aim to
increase navigation, could affect the health of the Mekong River by changing
its deep reaches and rapids.15
The Mekong region not only suffers from traditional environmental
concerns,16 it is also under the global threat of climate change. The glaciers
located on the Tibetan Plateau which feed the Mekong during periods of snow
melt are steadily retreating, due to increased temperatures and an accompany-
ing lower rate of precipitation.17 Although its long term effects and scenarios
remain contested,18 the possible variations will influence the ecological system
of Mekong River at all levels.
Interestingly, instead of the upstream dam construction, the Chinese gov-
ernment and scholars argue that the severe draught in 2010 should be blamed
on climate change. The arguments on hydropower as a promising approach to
mitigate climate change impact further add to the uncertainty and intricacy
of the high-profile hydropower dispute.19 Meanwhile, sea-level rise is another
issue raised by climate change, which may be the cause for salt water encroach-
ments into the Mekong Delta in recent years.20 Climate change mitigation and
adaptation is crucial to the Mekong region for the countries of the region are
among the most vulnerable to climate change in the world.21 But most devel-
opment processes are currently planned and implemented without due con-
15 tributary dams planned on the Yangbi River and Xier River. See generally 中国河流网
[China River],《水电地图》[Hydropower Map] <http://www.river.org.cn/map.aspx>.
14 Milton Osborne, ‘River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of China and Southeast
Asia’ (Working Paper No 2, Lowy Institute, 2004) 18–9.
15 Ibid. 25–30.
16 The major traditional environmental hazards often refer to various kinds of pollution or
natural resources damage that only have a local or regional impact and mainly call for the
application of the preventive principle due to its relatively low level of scientific uncer-
tainty. Other environmental issues like ozone depletion, biodiversity conservation and
climate change have notable global significance and often involve a much higher degree
of scientific uncertainty, thus requiring the application of the precaution principle.
17 Osborne, above n 12, 43–4.
18 Osborne, above n 14, 44.
19 Philip Hirsch and Rosalia Sciortino, ‘Climate Change and the Resource Politics of the
Greater Mekong Subregion’ in Kobkun Rayanakorn (ed), Climate Change Challenges in the
Mekong Region (Chiang Mai University Press, 2011) 223, 243.
20 Osborne, above n 14, 44.
21 Mekong River Commission, Climate <http://www.mrcmekong.org/the-mekong-basin/
climate/>.
Introduction 5
sideration of climate change risks.22 Even if it was taken into account, there is
a high risk of the discourse being selectively used as a pretext for “pre-existing
resource politics aiming at exploiting the commons for macroeconomic pur-
poses and corporate profit”.23
Environmental threats are not respectful of national borders and thus any
one country may be effectively unable to protect its own environment.24 This
is especially true with respect to transboundary river basin management.
The ecological integrity of the Mekong region calls for cooperation among all
riparian states. So far, some mechanisms in this region could be used to facili-
tate such cooperation, including the Mekong River Commission (MRC),25 the
Greater Mekong Subregion Program (the GMS Program),26 and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)27 and its dialogue relationship with China.
But in reality, these cooperative mechanisms still suffers from many prob-
lems which can be briefly concluded as follows: China and Myanmar are not
the formal members of the MRC; the increasing marginalisation of the MRC; the
prevailing culture of “ASEAN Way” that relies on consensus-building and coop-
erative programs instead of legally binding treaties or strong regional bureau-
cracy; the loose structure of the GMS; not enough integration of environmental
concerns into trade, investment and exploitation of natural resources, etc. As
will be analysed in chapter two, despite the attempt of further integration, the
current regional cooperation remains highly polycentric.
22 Masao Imamura, ‘Introduction: Water Governance in the Mekong Region’ in Louis Lebel
et al. (eds), Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong (Mekong Press, 2007) 1, 4.
23 Hirsch and Sciortino, above n 19, 227.
24 Transport, Health and Environment Pan-European Programme (THE PEP) and
Environmental Aspects of Transport: Strengthening of Environmental and Health Aspects
of Transportation, UN ESCOR, ITC, 70th sess, UN Doc ECE/TRANS/2008/4 (2007) 2; Roger
W. Findley and Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Law in a Nutshell (West Publishing, 2000)
53.
25 The MRC member states include Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. Two upstream
states, China and Myanmar, only participate as dialogue partners, instead of formal mem-
bers of the MRC.
26 The GMS is made up of Cambodia, China (specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region), Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. In 1992, with
assistance from the Asian Development Bank, all six Mekong countries jointly launched
a program of subregional economic cooperation (the GMS Program) to enhance their
economic relations, building on their shared histories and cultures, covering nine prior-
ity sectors, which also include environment. Asian Development Bank, Greater Mekong
Subregion (22 July 2011) <http://www.adb.org/gms/>.
27 All the Mekong riparian states, except China, are formal members of ASEAN. China main-
tains a strategic partnership with ASEAN.
6 chapter 1
In response to the above problems and challenges, this study takes a proce-
dural perspective to promote sustainability in the Mekong region, mindful of
its relationship with the (equally important) substantive counterparts and the
fact that the distinction between procedural and substantive elements could
be obscure in some cases. This choice is based on a practical consideration of
the cooperation background in the Mekong region and underscores the values
of procedure.
Procedure can be treated as an end in itself or as a means to an end.28
Procedure is desirable as an end per se because of its valuable nature, such
as openness, transparency, participation, accountability and predictability,
which themselves constitute as important characteristics of good governance.
Meanwhile, it is a means to improve the governance of shared water resources.
The development of procedural framework is a more practical and construc-
tive choice, for the substantial elements of good water governance and the
substantive resolution of the multi-fold environmental challenges have been
proved to be more sensitive or controversial to be reached on consensus across
the Mekong region. Detailed analysis in this respect is provided in chapter two.
At the international level, good governance relies on cooperation in goodwill
and a more democratic atmosphere. A well-designed procedural framework
could help direct the riparian states in the Mekong region to work more coop-
eratively towards sustainable water governance.
Although the procedural arrangements may not be quite as conspicuous as
the substantive principles and targets established at the international level, it
is observed that a large percentage of international efforts on tackling environ-
mental challenges have in fact concentrated on procedural reforms.29 This can
be easily identified in many multilateral environmental treaties, which usu-
ally “contain a few material principles of great generality while more detailed
provisions address procedural issues”.30 The latter often includes a combina-
tion of the following (though not necessarily covers all of them): informa-
tion exchange and data collection, prior notification and consultation, public
28 Durwood Zaelke, Matthew Stilwell and Oran Young, ‘What Reason Demands: Making
Law Work for Sustainable Development’ in Durwood Zaelke, Donald Kaniaru and
Eva Kružíková (eds), Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance and Sustainable
Development (Cameron May Ltd, International Law Publishers, 2005) vol. 1, 29, 42.
29 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Environmental Disputes’ (1991) 60 Nordic
Journal of International Law 73, 73.
30 Ibid.
Introduction 7
as one of the priority issues in the Mekong region. Not only does the due process
reflect the requirements of procedural justice, it is also a valuable approach to
promote the improvement of substantive requirements, to evaluate and secure
a more sustainable outcome.
A Sustainable Development
As developing countries, economic and social development is one of the high-
est priority concerns of the Mekong countries. This leads to fierce controver-
sies between development and environmental protection in this area. In many
cases, the former takes priority over the latter. While increasing emphasis and
claims on the right to development in this region should be fully recognised,
the growth-driven deterioration of environment and disputes raised by com-
petitive water usage and exploitation of natural resources has generated lots
of tension and instability in the Mekong region. Meanwhile, environmental
protection also relies on further economic and social development to provide
enough financial and technical support to build capacity and raise public
awareness on environmental protection. Therefore, how to promote sustain-
able governance of water resources in this area is a key issue.
Although sustainable development is viewed as a core concept of inter-
national environmental policy, its legal status remains highly controversial,
especially with regard to its concrete meaning in a specific context. As differ-
ent governments and international organisations pursue their own priorities
and make their own value judgment,32 the diversified, conflicting claims and
interpretations about the concept’s specific normative implications seems to
abound, triggering disputes which are often exceedingly difficult to resolve.33
Having acknowledged the potential controversies, it is argued that even if
there is no legal obligation to develop sustainably, there may nevertheless be
law “in the field of sustainable development” and a more realistic suggestion is
to focus on its components, rather than on the concept itself.34 Among the ele-
ments that have been identified,35 the integration of environmental p rotection
32 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 54.
33 Gunther Handl, ‘Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
International Law’ (1990) 1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3, 25.
34 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 32, 127.
35 This includes, but is not limited to, the integration of environmental protection and
economic development, the right to development, the sustainable utilisation of natural
resources, the equitable allocation of resources both within the present generation and
between present and future generation, public participation, access to information and
environmental impact assessment.
Introduction 9
and economic development is one of the key criteria and has been explic-
itly articulated by Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration.36 In practice, however,
substantive reconciliation of interests is still largely left to the discretion of
administrative authorities and often varies according to the specific contexts.
In general, courts are reluctant to make a judgment on whether the outcome of
a development decision is sustainable. The potential tension between environ-
mental protection and development is illustrated in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Case. In order to settle the disputes arising out of a hydroelectric project situ-
ated on a shared river border, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recog-
nised the need to reconcile economic development with protection of the
environment.37 Instead of ruling on whether the national action falls short of
a standard of “sustainable development”, however, the court held that parties
should negotiate to reach a resolution.38 Here, it seems that the court viewed
sustainable development as a value or objective that should be considered by
parties during the decision-making process.39
Following the logic of this judgment, although international law may not
require development to be sustainable, it does appear to require develop-
ment decisions to be the outcome of a process which promotes s ustainability.40
The primary criterion of this test would be whether the normative elements
of sustainable development are introduced into this process. The substan-
tive elements of sustainability, ranging from the integration of environ-
mental protection and economic development to inter-generational and
intra-generational equity, should certainly be taken into account while mak-
ing a decision. Meanwhile, the procedural elements should be viewed as
an integral part of sustainability itself. They also can be used to further secure
the consideration of the substantive elements and contribute to a more sus-
tainable outcome.41 The connection between sustainable development and
procedural requirements has been recognised by several important procedural
conventions, which affirm the need to ensure sustainable development in the
preambles.42 For lawyers, the key point to grasp is that sustainable governance
47 Anil Agarwal et al., ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ (TAC Background Papers
No 4, Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee, 2000) 25, 28.
48 Numerous river basin management institutions have been established at the domes-
tic and regional levels to promote IWRM, such as the Murray-Darling Basin Authority,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Yangtze River Water Resources Committee, the
US-Canadian International Joint Commission, the Permanent Joint Technical Commission
for Nile Waters, the Zambezi Intergovernmental Monitoring and Coordinating Committee,
the Amazonian Cooperation Council, the Danube River Protection Commission and the
International Commission for Protection of the Rhine.
49 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 32, 546, 581.
50 Ibid. 536, 546.
51 Marcus Moench et al., ‘The Fluid Mosaic: Water Governance in the Context of Variability,
Uncertainty and Change’ (Paper, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, 2003) 9.
52 Agarwal et al., above n 47, 30.
12 chapter 1
IWRM has dealt with numerous difficulties in more developed regions, it will
not be any easier in the context of the Mekong region. In fact, many substan-
tive elements of IWRM seem too controversial to be find consensus or to be
properly implemented in the near future. This can be mainly attributed to the
underdeveloped economy and the fierce competition over water resources in
the region; the multi-fold environmental challenges and considerable scien-
tific uncertainty; the immaturity of general political and legal systems at the
regional, national and local levels; and the polycentric status of the existing
domestic and regional transboundary cooperative mechanisms.
Moreover, procedural values like openness, transparency, information
abundance and effective stakeholder participation are inherent in the idea of
IWRM itself. In practice, they are a part of the enabling environment for the
development and functioning of IWRM and are generally viewed as an essen-
tial component to: (1) cultivate good will cooperation, (2) to catalyse consen-
sus-building on specific IWRM arrangements, (3) to regulate water-related
institutions, (4) to justify the legitimacy of development decisions, (5) to help
settle disputes and (6) to better secure a more sustainable outcome in the long
run. Since there might be huge difficulties for the Mekong countries to agree
on many substantive elements of IWRM, a more realistic and constructive
approach could be to include the procedural framework as one of the priority
issues to be addressed in the Mekong region. This may help avoid the political
deadlock.
The procedural requirements are highly related to the substantive aspect
of IWRM, but it does not directly address the distribution of sensitive inter-
ests or impose any substantive obligations on riparian states. Through the
increasing acceptance of due process as a notion across the region and a
gradual development of more detailed procedural arrangements, the essence
of IWRM and its substantive implications can be reflected and spread among
riparian states in a more subtle way, which would ultimately contribute to the
overall enhancement of sustainable water governance in the region. It should
be noticed, however, that highlighting the procedural components of IWRM
does not mean we could overlook or deny the importance of its substantive
counterparts. The substantive obligations and objectives could have a notable
58 During the negotiations, the upstream states were generally in favour of equitable utilisa-
tion as the controlling principle. However, as McCaffrey points out, the apparent conflict
between these principles is unreal and often based on a misunderstanding of the obliga-
tion to prevent harm in international law. It is further argued that equitable balancing is
applicable to pollution and environmental protection of international watercourses in
two situations only: when the harm is less than “significant”, or where it is significant but
unavoidable by the exercise of due diligence. See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 32,
549–52; Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (Oxford University
Press, 2007) 436–446.
59 It is argued that “comprehensive ecosystem protection remains an underdeveloped con-
cept in general international law, and it is not yet possible to conclude that states have a
general duty to protect and preserve ecosystems in all areas under their sovereignty”. See
Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 32, 557–61.
60 Ibid. 580–1.
61 McCaffrey, above n 58, 445.
62 See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) ( Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14,
para 192.
63 McCaffrey, above n 58, 407.
16 chapter 1
due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies,
would not be considered to have been exercised, if a party planning
works liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters
did not undertake an environmental impact assessment on the potential
effects of such works.66
III Overview
Although the Mekong countries have generally claimed to embrace the con-
cept of sustainable development, deep-rooted controversies still exist on how
to integrate the strong needs for economic development with environmental
protection and how to reconcile different interests represented by multiple
stakeholders. In many cases, there are doubts on what the right development
direction is and whether “pollute first, clean up later” is really avoidable at
the early stage of industrialisation. Meanwhile, the ecological system of the
Mekong River is currently under threats from both the traditional environ-
mental problems and global threats like climate change, the combination of
which generates huge pressure and scientific uncertainty on environmental
policy-making. This is further complicated by the intricately intertwined geo-
political interests and immature legal and political systems in the region. Such
triple-layered dilemma makes it very difficult to even identify where and how
to start solving the problems. Under such circumstances, the comprehensive-
ness of the study and the unique procedural perspective will add to the exist-
ing literature on what the future direction of water reform in the region should
be and how to facilitate the introduction and improvement of necessary pro-
cedural mechanisms. Moreover, the discussions on the theory and application
of integrated water resources management, procedural justice, soft law and
hard law, domestic and international compliance theories will contribute to
the scholarship on international water law and policy in general.
The initial focus of this research will identify the major environmental
challenges of the Mekong ecosystem and the status quo of water resources
management in the Mekong region, focusing on the existing water-related
legal arrangements and mechanisms at both domestic and regional levels. It
will discuss both the ongoing difficulties and as well as aspirations for reform
of the water management regime. The legal analysis of the status quo will be
18 chapter 1
68 David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and
Policy (Foundation Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 526.
69 Ibid. 527.
70 Neil Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment (Cambridge
University Press, 2008) 147.
Introduction 19
(2) What roles do the MRC, GMS, ASEAN-China dialogue relationship play in
the current governance? What are the deficiencies and strengths of the
current cooperation regarding transboundary water governance?
(3) What adjustments should be made regarding the approaches of promot-
ing water reform in the Mekong region? What water-related legal
responses should be emphasised as priorities in this region?
(4) What is the current status of legislation and practice regarding the proce-
dural mechanisms? How can they be enhanced in the context of the
Mekong region? What are the limitations of procedural approaches?
(5) What is the relationship between legally-binding agreements and the
capacity for compliance in the context of the Mekong region? How
should implementation be improved in light of the ongoing tradition of
strong preference for soft law documents and approaches?
chapter 2
1 Doubts have been raised by Asit K. Biswas, who argued that “in the real world, the concept
of IWRM will be exceedingly difficult to be made operational”. See Asit K. Biswas, ‘Integrated
Water Resources Management: A Reassessment’ (2004) 29(2) Water International 248.
A Hydropower Expansion
The increasing momentum for hydropower development on the mainstream
and tributaries of Mekong is one of the most troubling issues in this region.
As observed by Hirsh, over the past half century, hydropower development in
the Mekong region has “ebbed and flowed with broader events and ideologies”,
particularly the region’s “shifting, and often fractured, geopolitical landscape”.3
During the Cold War period, most of the work of the Mekong Committee4
focused on planning a cascade of large dams on the mainstream, but none of
them materialised at the time mainly due to a variety of political obstacles.5
From the late 1980s onwards, demand for natural resources including energy
has grown rapidly but the dam proposals were set within very different eco-
political milieus.6
Deeply embedded driving forces for the hydropower expansion mainly
include: rapidly escalating globalisation, urbanisation and industrialisation,
domestic and foreign investment, energy demand and restructuring, agricul-
tural irrigation, trade and security concerns.7 The construction and planning
2 Maso Imamura, ‘Introduction: Water Governance in the Mekong Region’ in Louis Lebel
et al. (eds), Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong (Mekong Press, 2007) 1, 2.
3 Philip Hirsch, ‘The Changing Political Dynamics of Dam Building on the Mekong’ (2010) 3(2)
Water Alternatives 312, 313.
4 The Mekong Committee, with the membership of four lower Mekong countries, was estab-
lished with the auspices of the United Nations but under the de facto hegemony of the
United States early during the Cold War period. Ibid.; Jeffrey W. Jacobs, ‘Mekong Committee
History and Lessons for River Basin Development’ (1995) 161(2) Geographical Journal 135.
5 Hirsch, above n 3.
6 Ibid. 314.
7 See generally John Dore, Yu Xiaogang and Kevin Yuk-shing Li, ‘China’s Energy Reforms
and Hydropower Expansion in Yunnan’ in Louis Lebel et al. (eds), Democratizing Water
Governance in the Mekong (Mekong Press, 2007) 55, 60–7; Chris Greacen and Apsara Palettu,
‘Electricity Sector Planning and Hydropower’ in Louis Lebel et al. (eds), Democratizing Water
Governance in the Mekong (Mekong Press, 2007) 93.
Towards Sustainable Development 23
1 Tributary Dams
Against the backdrop of increasing global concern over the social and environ-
mental impact of large dams and a strong environmental movement within
Thailand,8 Thailand started to expand its natural resource exploitation across
its national borders. Meanwhile, Laos, in its bid to become “the battery of
Southeast Asia”, sought to enhance its income by exploiting and exporting its
natural resources.9 Vietnam has also looked to its neighbours to secure its elec-
tricity supply while the large hydropower dams within its own territory have
often been criticised for causing serious social upheaval and high environmen-
tal costs.10
Although Cambodia has taken a more negative position on hydropower
development due to its downstream location and its dependence on wild cap-
ture fisheries,11 it is also on the “threshold of an extensive domestic hydropower
development programme to improve its rudimentary electricity infrastruc-
ture”, supported mainly by Chinese developers and financiers.12 The Mekong
only passes through a small part of Myanmar where settlement is sparse, but
the plans for extensive hydropower development on other river systems within
Myanmar should be taken into account as well.13
By 2010, most Mekong tributaries have cascades of dams in place or planned,
among which approximately 71 projects are expected to be operational by
2030.14 Several Mekong tributaries themselves are transboundary rivers and
8 The successful opposition to the Nam Choan Dam in the mid-to late-1980s is a good
example here. Philip Hirsch, ‘Water Governance Reform and Catchment Management
in the Mekong Region’ (2006) 15(2) Journal of Environment and Development 184, 188. For
more detailed discussion on the environmental movement in Thailand, see section II in
this chapter.
9 Hirsch, above n 3.
10 Carl Middleton, Jelson Garcia and Tira Foran, ‘Old and New Hydropower Players in
the Mekong Region: Agendas and Strategies’ in François Molle, Tira Foran and Mira
Käkönen (eds), Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower, Livelihoods and
Governance (Earthscan, 2009) 23, 37.
11 Hirsch, above n 8, 189.
12 Middleton, Garcia and Foran, above n 10, 38.
13 Ibid. 39.
14 International Centre for Environmental Management, ‘Mekong River Commission
Strategic Environmental Assessment of Hydropower on the Mekong Mainstream’ (Report,
ICEM, 2010) 8.
24 chapter 2
the dam construction has caused disputes among their riparian states.
Moreover, the rapid expansion of hydropower projects on the tributaries may
ultimately have a cumulative impact on the mainstream. Some of the most
controversial cases include the Pak Mum Dam in Thailand, the Yali Falls Dam
in Vietnam, the Theum-Hinboun Dam, Nam Ngum 3 and the Nam Theun 2
Dam in Laos, and the Sesan 2 Dam and the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia. The
decision-making processes of some high-profile tributaries projects will be
used as case studies in the future chapters to gain more empirical information
on the problems of current water governance in the region and shed light on
how to promote the development of appropriate procedural mechanisms.
Meanwhile, Mekong tributary hydropower development in China has been
much less high-profile. The tributaries of Dza Chu and Lancang are generally
considered to have great potential for hydropower development.15 Along with
the rapid expansion of hydropower in the southwest of China, the Mekong
tributary dam construction in China seems very unlikely to be avoidable. But
since all the tributaries of Dza Chu and Lancang are located within China,
tributary dams are less likely to raise regional disputes compared to the main-
stream dam proposals. Instead, they could become the source of transbound-
ary disputes between different riparian provinces or cities inside China. This
study, however, will focus more on Mekong mainstream dams and tributary
dams in the lower Mekong region.
2 Mainstream Dams
(a) Upstream
With respect to mainstream hydropower development, China’s construction
and operation of the Lancang cascade in Yunnan Province exemplified the
tension between upstream and downstream states regarding the utilisation
and protection of international rivers. To date, the only mainstream dams on
the Mekong River exist in China. As mentioned earlier, there has been a cas-
cade of 16 dams (half of them on the upstream of Lancang and half of them
on the midstream and downstream of Lancang) planed on the mainstream of
Lancang River.16
In particular, the eight-dam cascade on the midstream and downstream of
the Lancang River has attracted most of the attention. The first of these, the
Manwan Dam, was completed in 1994, followed by Dachaoshan, Jinghong and
15 Such as the Angqu River, the Yangbi River and the Xier River.
16 中国河流网 [China River],《水电地图》[Hydropower Map] <http://www.river.org
.cn/map.aspx>.
Towards Sustainable Development 25
Nuozhadu.17 In March 2010, the Xiaowan Dam was completed as the highest
arch dam in the world.18 And the Gongguoqiao Dam started operating at the
end of 2012. The Ganlanba Dam is in the final stage of getting formal approval.
The Mengsong Dam, as the lowest of the eight dams on the cascade, was can-
celled in 2007 in order to allow fish passage up a significant tributary to com-
pensate for the obstructed passage past Jinghong (and the Ganlanba Dam in
the future).19
Along with the implementation of the Western Region Development
Strategy,20 and the ongoing energy restructuring in China to reduce green-
house gas emissions and secure energy production, boosting production of
“clean green” hydropower is seen as a strategically vital sunrise industry.21 The
proponents of the Lancang dam cascade allege that they could also benefit the
downstream in terms of irrigation, navigation, power generation and flood-
ing control.22 But the ongoing dam construction and operation in the upper
Mekong has raised concern and tension regarding its potential negative impact
on the ecosystem.
To some extent, the doubt and mistrust could be attributed to the lack of
transparency during the decision-making process, which was conducted solely
by the Chinese government without proper transparency and domestic pub-
lic participation procedure and was kept outside of any general awareness by
the other Mekong states until the mid-1990s.23 Along with the deepening of
cooperation between China and downstream states, an agreement on the pro-
vision of hydrological information on the Mekong River was signed in 2002
and China promised to provide water level data in the flood season.24 Talks are
under way to expand this data sharing agreement to include dry season levels.
Relevant development will be further discussed in chapter three.
Attention should also be paid to the first half of the Lancang dam cascade.
On the upstream of Lancang, five dams are already under construction and two
are planned to be built. The Guonian Dam, initially planned as the second of
the Lancang cascade, was later cancelled due to its potential impact on glacier
melting in the Three Rivers Headwaters National Nature Reserve.25 Recently,
scandal came out that the construction of the Huangdeng Dam, the sixth of the
cascade, has begun without getting approval from the government.26 Despite
controversies surrounding China’s dam construction on the upper Mekong at
the international level, the decision-making process of the Huangdeng Dam
further reveals challenges for relevant domestic law-making and implementa-
tion inside China. This case will be further discussed in chapter six.
Meanwhile, China’s hydropower development on the Mekong mainstream
in Tibet and Qinghai Province (known as the Dza Chu River) should not be
overlooked. The smallest dam on the Mekong mainstream is the Longqingxia
Dam in Zadoi, Qinghai Province. Completed in 2006, it is the first dam that
the Mekong mainstream encounters on its way to the mouth. Before then,
Zadoi was the only county in the Qinghai Province that did not have electric-
ity supply.27 In addition, a six-dam cascade is planned on the Dza Chu River
in Tibet, which constitutes a part of a broader plan to develop hydropower
in Tibet. Electricity generated by these dams in the future will be transmitted
to inland China.28 In the next decade, the rapid hydropower development in
China will likely to expand from Yunnan and Sichuan Provinces to Tibet. The
decision-making regarding dam plans in Tibet can be more politically sensitive
and is placed in a different geopolitical environment compared to hydropower
development in Yunnan Province. To date, information on these dam plans
remains limited.
(b) Downstream
The lower Mekong mainstream is threatened by eleven downstream dam pro-
posals, two in Cambodia and the rest in Laos (two of them are on the Lao-
Thailand reaches of the mainstream).29 Among all the proposals, the furthest
advanced projects are the Xayaburi Dam in north-central Laos and the Don
Sahong hydropower scheme in southern Laos near the Cambodia border.30
Damming the lower Mekong mainstream is extremely controversial due to the
possibility of a significant negative impact on the passage and breeding capaci-
ties of the Mekong’s many migratory fish species.31 The escalating momentum
for mainstream dams in the lower Mekong region presents a real test for the
inchoate regional environmental cooperation regime.
Under the 1995 Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development
of the Mekong River Basin (the Mekong Agreement), the Mekong River
Commission (MRC) have taken some measures to facilitate regional coop-
eration and communication on the lower Mekong mainstream hydropower
development. This is represented by the MRC programs on IWRM, basin devel-
opment plan, information and knowledge management, fishery, environment
and hydropower; the MRC procedural documents on information exchange
and prior notification and consultation; and some internal strategies and poli-
cies on how to improve information transparency of the MRC and involve dif-
ferent stakeholders.
Several recent developments under the MRC have particularly addressed
the mainstream hydropower issues: commissioning a transboundary strate-
gic environmental assessment (SEA) research on all proposed lower Mekong
mainstream hydropower project which later recommended a 10-year deferral
for mainstream hydropower development due to many of its remaining uncer-
tainties and serious risks;32 holding prior consultations on the Xayaburi Dam
Project; and reaching consensus on commissioning another transboundary
29 The Don Sahong project, near the Khone Falls in Laos, only involves partial damming
(one channel of the mainstream, but it is the only channel that is known to provide a
year-round route for migrating fish). Other than the eleven dam projects, there is another
lower Mekong mainstream hydropower proposal called Thakho, which located in
Laos. But different from all the others, it is a river diversion project rather than a dam.
International Centre for Environmental Management, above n 14, 8, 31, 94.
30 Hirsch, above n 3, 318.
31 The Stung Treng and Sambor dams in Cambodia are two of the largest possible dams
in the lower Mekong region and could be the most potentially destructive ones in terms
of the area flooded and the impact on fisheries. Ibid.; Milton Osborne, ‘The Mekong: River
under Threat’ (Working Paper No 27, Lowy Institute, 2009) 17, 19, 41.
32 International Centre for Environmental Management, above n 14, 138.
28 chapter 2
B Climate Change
As another major environmental concern, climate change is expected to result
in higher temperatures, increased extreme weather events, rising sea levels,
changes in runoff patterns and more intensified monsoonal climate in this
area.33 Although concerns about the accuracy of the hypothesised impact and
the effectiveness of the proposed approaches still exist, it is safe to conclude
that the Mekong region, particularly the lower Mekong area, may be more
severely affected than many other parts of the world due to its great reliance
on water resources.34 It is also argued that the effects of climate change will
further intensify the competition to exploit the still abundant, but increasingly
stressed water resources in the Mekong region.35
On the positive side, the impact of climate change and the need for mitiga-
tion and adaptation have begun to attract more attention from the decision-
makers in the Mekong countries and there is a slowly increasing awareness
of the necessity to integrate this issue into broader policy-making and basin
development plans.36 For instance, the lower Mekong countries have agreed on
a Climate Change and Adaptation Initiative to promote basin-wide harmoni-
sation of effective strategies and plans at various levels.37 The MRC supports
relevant progress with technical advice and dialogue-based forums.38 But it is
also pointed out that this MRC initiative tends to avoid explicit connections to
the dams and most of its work focuses scenario analysis based on the MRC’s
33 Philip Hirsch and Rosalia Sciortino, ‘Climate Change and the Resource Politics of the
Greater Mekong Subregion’ in Kobkun Rayanakorn (ed), Climate Change Challenges in the
Mekong Region (Chiang Mai University Press, 2011) 223, 225.
34 Ibid. 224–5.
35 Richard P. Cronin and Timothy Hamlin, ‘Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams,
Human Security and Regional Stability’ (Report, Henry L. Stimson Centre, 2010) 1.
36 Mekong River Commission, Climate Change <http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/
climate-change/>.
37 Mekong River Commission, Climate Change and Adaptation Initiative <http://www.mrc-
mekong.org/about-the-mrc/programmes/climate-change-and-adaptation-initiative/>.
38 Mekong River Commission, above n 36.
Towards Sustainable Development 29
modelling capacity.39 Here, the scope of the climate change issue seems to be
carefully narrowed to reduce controversy.
Meanwhile, China, being the world’s biggest CO2 emitter,40 is also very vul-
nerable to climate change itself. At the international level, the Chinese govern-
ment refuses to accept any mandatory emission reduction target before 2020,
whereas it shows more willingness to take domestic measures to cope with cli-
mate change. In 2007, China became the first developing country to formulate
and implement a national program to address climate change. Two years later,
China put forward the goal of action to reduce the per-unit GDP greenhouse
gas emission in 2020 by 40 to 45 percent as compared to that of 2005.41 In
December 2011, the Minister of Environmental Protection signed agreements
with 31 provincial-level governments and eight state-owned enterprises, which
specify mandatory emission reduction targets and pollution control targets for
these local governments and enterprises, respectively, within the 12th Five-Year
Plan period (2011–2015).42 This includes Yunnan Province and major energy
enterprises in China, such as Huaneng—the main corporate player involved in
the hydropower development on the upper Mekong in China.43
The cooperation on climate change between China and other Mekong coun-
tries is slowly progressing. Responding to climate change and addressing its
impact has been recognised as one of the ten priority areas of environmental
cooperation between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).44 Currently, the collaborative practice is mainly limited to less con-
troversial areas like public education and awareness raising, climate change
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