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Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page i
Developing Brazil
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page ii
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page iii
DEVELOPING
BRAZIL
Overcoming the Failure
of the Washington Consensus
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
b o u l d e r
l o n d o n
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page iv
Published in the United States of America in 2009 by

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com
and in the United Kingdom by

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU
 2009 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser.
Developing Brazil : overcoming the failure of the Washington consensus /
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-58826-624-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Brazil—Economic policy. 2. Brazil—Economic conditions—1985–
3. Macroeconomics—Brazil. I. Title.
HC187.P392212 2009
338.981—dc22
2008048410
British Cataloguing in Publication Data

A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.
Printed and bound in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the requirements

of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.
5 4 3 2 1
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page v
Contents
Preface vii
Introduction 1
1 Low Growth 29
2 The Old Developmentalism 45
3 Reforms and Institutions 67
4 The Fiscal Debate 93
5 Is Inflation a Real Threat? 115
6 Overappreciated Currency and the Dutch Disease 129
7 Overappreciation and Foreign Savings 149
8 High Interest Rates 177
9 A Macroeconomic Model 203
10 Political Coalitions 221
11 New Developmentalism 243
List of Acronyms 267

References 269
Index 285
About the Book 301
v
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page vi
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page vii
Preface
T
his book is a discussion of why the Brazilian economy per-
formed so poorly after the 1994 price stabilization and, more gen-
erally, a critique of the Washington Consensus—the conventional
orthodoxy—that has presided over economic policy in Brazil since the
early 1990s. It is also an analysis of the national development strategy
that is gradually being defined in Brazil—an approach that I call new
developmentalism—which is an alternative to the strategy that caused
high rates of growth in Brazil between 1930 and 1980 (i.e., national de-
velopmentalism) and to conventional orthodoxy.
I know that in the North today conventional economists and jour-
nalists regularly praise Brazil’s economic performance and moderate in-
ternational policies. Such positive assessment reminds me of the way
that Argentina and Russia were presented in the 1990s, although Presi-
dent Lula is no Carlos Menem or Boris Yeltsin. Yet, since 1980, when
the debt crisis began, or even since 1994, when the Real Plan stabilized
high inflation, Brazil’s growth has been much smaller than what its nat-
ural resources and its relatively cheap labor would predict. I will present
data to demonstrate that the economic performance of Brazil is much
worse than that of China and India since 1980 and worse than Russia’s
since the late 1990s—three countries that usually are cited together with
Brazil as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).
The Washington Consensus demonstrably failed to promote growth
and redistribution in the countries that adopted it, whereas the countries
that didn’t adopt it, but instead updated their development strategies,
continue to grow steadily. Brazil falls into the former category, the dy-
namic Asian countries into the latter. There is also a third category of
vii
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page viii
viii Preface
countries that, like Argentina and Russia, adopted the conventional or-
thodoxy promoted by the Washington Consensus and suffered major
crises, but that learned their lessons, changed their macroeconomic poli-
cies, and experienced high growth rates. Nevertheless, in many coun-
tries, including Brazil and Mexico, the conventional orthodoxy contin-
ues to dominate economic policies. I argue in the pages that follow that
Brazil and many other developing countries can achieve substantially
higher rates of growth and be successful in catching up with the income
levels of advanced countries if they adopt specific national growth
strategies instead of simply abiding by an economic ideology that re-
flects rich countries’ recommendations and pressures. In doing so, I use
theories and models, but keep them simple, believing that good eco-
nomics, like any good theory, can almost always be explained in simple
terms. My subject matter is Brazil’s economy, but my analysis is in-
tended to have a broader application to other developing countries.
I have been critical of the Washington Consensus and of the macro-
economics of stagnation that it implies ever since it became dominant in
Latin America (Bresser-Pereira 1991a [1990]). My criticism, however,
gained a new dimension beginning in the first quarter of 1999, by which
time I had been for several years a member of the Cardoso administra-
tion.1 That administration’s economic policies, after the successful and
innovative Real Plan of 1994, became fully orthodox and led the coun-
try to two balance-of-payment crises. From 1999 to 2001, Yoshiaki
Nakano, my constant companion on this intellectual journey, and I em-
barked on a systematic critique of the conventional orthodoxy based on
our shared structuralist and Keynesian views of economics (see Bresser-
Pereira 2001a [1999]; Bresser-Pereira and Nakano 2002, 2003). Our
criticism showed that the conventional proposals, albeit inclusive of
certain necessary policies and reforms, did not, in fact, promote a coun-
try’s development, but instead kept it semistagnant, incapable of com-
peting with wealthier countries, and easy prey to a form of economic
populism, namely, foreign exchange populism. Our alternative economic
strategy—new developmentalism—was innovative in that it acknowl-
edged a series of historical facts that implied a need to review the na-
tional development strategy. New developmentalism is both a “third dis-
course” between old developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy and
a national development strategy that attributes a smaller role to the state
and to industrial policy while emphasizing macroeconomic stability and
sustainable development. It may be viewed as an updated developmental-
ist strategy applied to countries that have risen to become middle-income
countries. It is also a strategy that responds to the new realities of global
capitalism. I am not proposing to return to the “developmental state”
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 2:29 PM Page ix
Preface ix
that Chalmers Johnson (1982) identified in Japan, but to look to the

state that in a middle-income country in the twenty-first century effec-
tively complements markets in the coordination of the economy and the
promotion of economic, social, and sustainable development.2
An earlier version of this book was published in Portuguese in Brazil
(Bresser-Pereira 2007); the present edition is not, however, simply a
translation, but an updated, improved work. In writing the book I relied
on the collaboration of a group of macroeconomists who have been col-
leagues in criticizing the prevailing system and who read the manuscript
and offered suggestions: Yoshiaki Nakano, Fernando Ferrari Filho, Gilberto
Tadeu Lima, José Luís Oreiro, Luiz Fernando de Paula, Matias Vernengo,
and Paulo Gala. I am also grateful for the assistance of several econo-
mists and political scientists who provided me with data or with whom I
discussed topics in the book: Alexandre De Zagottis, Antônio Carlos
Macedo e Silva, Arício Xavier de Oliveira, Arthur Barrionuevo Filho,
Cícero Araújo, Fábio Giambiagi, Fernando Dall’Acqua, Gilberto Dupas,
Gildo Marçal Brandão, Hélcio Tokeshi, João Sicsú, José Márcio Rego,
José Roberto Afonso, Lauro Gonzalez, Lílian Furquim, Luiz Antônio
Oliveira Lima, Márcio Holland, Miguel Bruno, Nelson Marconi, Ricardo
Carneiro, Rodrigo Bresser Pereira, Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., and Rogério
Mori.
Cleomar Gomes dos Santos was involved in writing the chapter on
inflation-targeting policy and Paulo Gala the chapter on the critique of
growth with foreign savings. Help from Carmen Augusta Varela was cru-
cial to my research, and I am indebted to her and to Cecília Heise for
their meticulous review of my manuscript. I am especially indebted to
Alexandra Strommer de Godoi for reviewing the manuscript and making
several useful comments. During the writing of the book I had support
from G. V. Pesquisa at the São Paulo School of Business Administration
of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. My final thanks go to Lynne Rienner,
an old friend and publisher of several of my books in the United States,
who showed interest in also publishing this one and who stimulated me
to improve it. My permanent interlocutor throughout this effort was my
lifelong wife, Vera Cecília. I dedicate this book to my five children and
ten grandchildren, who stand to gain the most if any of the ideas proposed
and discussed here take hold.
Notes
1. From 1995 to 1999 I was a member of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso

administration—as minister of federal administration and reform of the state—
Bresser_FM.qxd 2/12/09 10:31 AM Page x
x Preface
and throughout that period I personally made clear to the president my dis-
agreement with the economic policies that his economic team was pursuing.
2. Other classical analyses of the developmental state include those by
Alice Amsden (1989) on Korea and Robert Wade (1990) on Taiwan. For a more
recent treatment, see Woo-Cummings (1999). These works deal with Asian
countries, but between the 1930s and the 1980s, Brazil was also a developmen-
tal state (see Bresser-Pereira 1977).
Bresser_Intro.qxd 2/10/09 11:25 AM Page 1
Introduction
B
razil in the early twenty-first century is experiencing a time
of uncertainty and self-questioning. The country attained democ-
racy in 1985 and has been making a great effort to reduce the rad-
ical inequalities that mark its society, but the economy has been nearly
stagnant since 1980; although the huge increase in commodity prices
has improved growth rates in the early years of the century, overappre-
ciation of the domestic currency makes the future uncertain and opti-
mism unwise. The core political goals of modern societies are security,
freedom, well-being, social justice, and protection of the environment,
but we do not know how to achieve them. Capitalism is victorious and
organizes the surface of the earth with nation-states that compete
through their firms, but many forms of capitalism exist, all more or less
dynamic, more or less assuring of freedom, more or less fair, and none
has a monopoly on the one true path. The hegemonic power, the United
States, which at one time—the early 1990s—thought it knew what this
true path might be, turned it into the Washington Consensus and into an
economic “conventional orthodoxy” that failed to convince a number of
Asian countries; those that it did convince lagged behind economically.
This is one of the reasons why such hegemony has, since the turn of the
century, been experiencing a very deep crisis.
My goal in this book is to better understand the perverse economic
reasoning that, inspired by the conventional orthodoxy, prevails in Brazil,
notwithstanding that high inflation rates were tamed in 1994 and despite
a favorable international economic scenario. My goal is to develop a
political argument and a macroeconomic argument to criticize a strategy
that rich countries seek to sell to developing countries or (if they get
1
2 Developing Brazil
duly indebted) to impose on them using the International Monetary Fund

(IMF), the World Bank, and the international financial system as tools.
To this end, I attempt to determine why Brazil has not yet attained
macroeconomic stability despite the economic policy framework put in
place on its behalf. I attempt to determine the coalition of social and po-
litical forces that has led Brazilian governments to ignore the Dutch dis-
ease (see Chapter 6 for a complete definition) and to accept the policy
of growth with foreign savings and other recommendations from the
North. And, finally, I propose to lay out the general outlines of a pru-
dent and viable alternative to the macroeconomic policy in place—a
new policy that preserves price stability, attains true macroeconomic
stability, and enables development to resume—as well as to show the
falsehood of the conventional discourse that maintains that the only al-
ternative to the orthodoxy is economic populism: Brazil has shown in
the past, and other nations, Asian ones in particular, are showing now,
that an alternative does exist. The argument is complex, both politically
and macroeconomically, but, if I had to offer an explanation for the
quasi stagnation since the early 1980s, I would summarize the political
argument as the loss of the idea of nation and the macroeconomic argu-
ment as the loss of control over the exchange rate. If I and many others
argued in the 1980s that the great problems the country faced were a fis-
cal crisis of the state coupled with a foreign debt crisis, I now claim that
the main political obstacle the country faces is the weakening of the
Brazilian nation and that the main economic hurdle is the acceptance of
the conventional orthodoxy as the country’s macroeconomic policy.
Every power system has its own logic, which becomes more sophis-
ticated as societies progress. Old imperial systems relied on the force of
arms; modern ones, such as those represented by advanced countries in
the age of global capitalism, prefer ideological hegemony as a means to
affirm their interests and to neutralize the competitiveness of middle-
income countries such as Brazil.1 Old empires merely bought the col-
laboration of subjugated elites in order to exercise imperial domination;
modern, and relatively weaker, imperial systems resort to the ideological
co-optation of local elites but, to this end, require complex ideological
systems such as hegemonic thinking and its application to developing
countries: the Washington Consensus and its conventional orthodoxy.
To criticize hegemonic thinking, even if limited to the conventional or-
thodoxy, is by no means a trivial republican endeavor. The rhetoric of
hegemonic thinking is always that of perfect rationality, of the identifi-
cation of its postulates and conclusions with common sense, scientific ob-
jectivity, and morality of the day; it is the rhetoric of the sole legitimate
Introduction 3
option. Hegemonic thinking sees itself as perfect because it finds legit-

imacy in the economics developed by the world’s best universities—its
own—and because every empire sees itself as the bringer of enlighten-
ment and civilization, of peace and progress, of freedom and democ-
racy. No matter that all the evidence shows that, on the contrary, the
most successful developing countries have accomplished their capitalist
revolutions by following a different path; it is irrelevant that those
countries that accept hegemonic thinking with docility almost invariably
go into a state of quasi stagnation. Although force is always to hand, it is
far more important for hegemonic power to impose conventional knowl-
edge or an orthodoxy on the dominated. J. K. Galbraith (1958) coined
the term conventional wisdom, which has now become part of the En-
glish lexicon as a synonym for accepted—and mistaken—truths. This is
the kind of truth that the empire transfers to its periphery through the
“soft power” of hegemony—a kind of power that many progressive
Americans believe superior to the “hard power” of their hawkish peers,
heedless of the fact that, right though they may be, this shows that the
alternative of not exercising power simply does not exist for the hege-
monic power.2 Words such as nationalism, developmentalism, and capi-
tal controls enter the index of forbidden words (after all, it is not only
Catholic orthodoxy that had its Index Librorum Prohibitorum), and
those who embrace such ideas are termed “outdated” or “populists.”
This kind of thinking, or language, is presented as naturally as possible,
but, according to Edward Said (2003 [1978], p. 321), who criticized
hegemonic domination by the West of the Eastern peoples, it is a myth-
ical language. “Mythical language is a discourse and, therefore, cannot
help but be systematic; no one discourses freely, no one makes state-
ments without first belonging—in certain cases unconsciously, but al-
ways involuntarily—to the ideology and institutions that assure one’s
existence. The latter are invariably the institutions of an advanced cul-
ture dealing with less developed societies, a strong culture encountering
a weak one.”
The opponent, therefore, is powerful, but this is not to say that de-
veloping countries are condemned to eternal subordination. Hegemonic
idea systems follow a cyclic pattern of an increasingly short duration.
British hegemony lasted a little more than a century, ending in World
War I. US hegemony established itself after World War II, reaching its
acme in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in 1995—the
start of the period analyzed in this book—the neoliberal and globalist
wave through which this hegemony expressed itself was already facing
internal problems; in the 2000s it is in deep crisis. Hegemonic power is
4 Developing Brazil
by definition strong but is offset by the real interests of peripheral soci-

eties, whose elites often refuse subordination, whether because of patri-
otic feelings of belonging, or because their real interests lie in their own
country, or because only in their own country can they rely on the state
as an instrument of collective action, as the states of developed coun-
tries are in their own nations. Although hegemonic thinking has encoun-
tered substantial hurdles since it assumed a neoliberal form and man-
aged to impose itself on the world circa 1990, it remains dominant in a
large number of developing countries. The following years have been
marked by deep financial crises affecting “emerging markets” in the
1990s, by the brutal crisis in Argentina in 2001, and by the disaster that
was the invasion of Iraq—years that indicate the hegemony’s clear de-
cline. As a result, even the traditionally more dependent Latin American
countries, which more easily accepted the recommendations of the con-
ventional orthodoxy and suffered the most, have now begun to appreci-
ate the decline of hegemonic thinking and the opportunity this decline
affords them to reorganize and formulate national development strate-
gies. Around the world, the North’s neoliberal and conservative hegem-
ony is being challenged; the Washington Consensus is contested and se-
verely criticized.
This book, by focusing on Brazil and the period during which con-
ventional orthodoxy was prevalent there (1995–2006), seeks, on the one
hand, to contribute to changing the country’s economic policy and, on
the other, to stand as a critique of the set of diagnoses and policies by
means of which the North’s hegemony is exercised. Criticism of impe-
rial systems has always been fundamental in late countries’ efforts to at-
tain higher levels, to catch up. In the nineteenth century the English
hegemony did not prevent France, the United States, Germany, and Japan
from developing. The Great Depression of the 1930s created an oppor-
tunity for Latin American countries, and particularly Brazil, to find a
path to industrialization and development. The end of colonialism after
World War II created the opportunity for Asian countries such as South
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and, later on, China and India to at-
tain high economic growth rates.3 In Latin America, the great foreign
debt crisis of the 1980s disorganized the region’s nations, cut short their
national revolutions, and led them, beginning in 1990, to surrender to
the conventional orthodoxy. As a consequence, countries lost importance
and contented themselves with much lower growth rates. In Brazil, after
1995 the conventional orthodoxy implemented a macroeconomic policy
based on soft fiscal policy, high interest rates, and a noncompetitive ex-
change rate;4 this would be an orthodox policy. Meanwhile the dynamic
Introduction 5
Asian countries adopted the opposite policy, namely, the macroeco-

nomic tripod that I understand to characterize new developmentalism:
hard fiscal adjustment, moderate interest rates, and competitive exchange
rates. If we leave aside the claim that in practical terms the conventional
orthodoxy is soft in fiscal terms (I discuss this in Chapter 4), the strange
thing is that the high interest rates–noncompetitive exchange rate bino-
mial is the opposite not only of new developmentalism but also of the
good, “orthodox” practices of rich countries’ central banks and finance
ministries; macroeconomic orthodoxy in rich countries is one thing, in
developing countries, another. This fact, besides showing the difference
between using a national development strategy and using an imported
strategy, also shows a well-known imperial use: “make what I say, not
what I do.” The failure of the conventional orthodoxy’s policies and the
success of Asian national strategies, however, have created a new oppor-
tunity for Latin American countries, especially Brazil: an opportunity to
rebuild themselves as nations and to resume formulating a national de-
velopment strategy, that is, new developmentalism. This book is essen-
tially about Brazil, but it includes the dynamic Asian countries because
it makes repeated reference to their new developmentalism. On the other
hand, I believe that the ideas discussed in this book will be helpful to
many other developing countries that, like Brazil, were unable to frame
a serious and workable alternative to the conventional orthodoxy—the
alternative that I call new developmentalism.
Method
In this book I employ the historical-deductive method, which takes an ob-

servation of an economic reality and, based on the determination of pat-
terns and trends, attempts to generalize from it and build a theoretical
model. This was the method that Adam Smith and Karl Marx used to un-
derstand the fundamental economic transformation that was the capitalist
revolution and that John Maynard Keynes adopted for the world econ-
omy after World War I to formulate the first macroeconomic monetary
economy model. The assumption is that the purpose of economics is not
merely to provide a toolbox but to formulate models for concrete eco-
nomic systems. When the great classical economists analyzed the capital-
ist revolution, the economic system they sought to model was exceed-
ingly broad; when Keynes and Michael Kalecki originally formulated
macroeconomics, their subject was more restricted, but still broad; when
I, in this book, attempt to understand the macroeconomics of stagnation
6 Developing Brazil
that has prevailed in Brazil since 1995, I am focusing on a more con-

strained economic system, but since I am simultaneously analyzing and
criticizing the reasoning of the conventional orthodoxy in terms of macro-
economics, the scope again expands.
Macroeconomics lies at the heart of economics; it is the branch of
economics that shows how economic systems work based on the behavior
of the fundamental economic aggregates—income or product, invest-
ment, savings, consumption, public revenues and expenditures, or do-
mestic revenues and expenditures—plus the five macroeconomic prices:
profit rate, wage rate, inflation rate, interest rate, and exchange rate.
Macroeconomics, therefore, is an empirical science with a historically
observable subject, so that the appropriate method for approaching it is
the historical-deductive method. This method differs from the hypothet-
ical-deductive method used by neoclassical economists and used funda-
mentally in microeconomics, although the neoclassical authors tire-
lessly attempt to apply it to substantive areas of economics such as
macroeconomics and the theory of economic development. The hypo-
thetical-deductive method, based as it is on a hypothetical homo eco-
nomicus, facilitates making economics more “accurate”—as accurate, in
extremis, as mathematics, which, as a methodological rather than a sub-
stantive science, legitimately uses the method. Thus developed, micro-
economics is useful if treated as a methodological aspect of economics,
as is the case with game theory or econometrics. Analysis of concrete
economic systems, however, can be performed only with the historical-
deductive method, which does use hypothetical-deductive tools, but
only to arrive at models for the system under examination (Bresser-
Pereira 2005d). Making economic theory means developing models for
real economic systems and then testing them, insofar as it is possible,
through empirical, econometric research. The models thus obtained are
open-ended ones that provide a modest description of open systems
such as real economic systems. Mathematics, a methodological science
devoid of subject and based purely on logical assumptions, may have
closed models; substantive sciences, working as they do with empirical
subjects, may develop simple models of great explanatory power, but
such models will necessarily be open-ended and, therefore, modest about
their claims to truth.
Adopting this method clearly frames me as a Keynesian rather than
a neoclassical economist. And what kind of Keynesian economist am I?
Post-Keynesian, neo-Keynesian, new Keynesian? I choose not to tie
myself to this or that thread, as the reality to hand—the Brazilian econ-
omy—is very different from that with which these schools concern
Introduction 7
themselves. What matters is to believe that all of macroeconomics will

be forever Keynesian, because it was founded by Keynes; but no form
of macroeconomics can be Keynesian alone, because it is a historical
discipline that, faced with new facts or with ever-present structural or
institutional changes, must be constantly updated, revised, rethought.
Adopting an empirical-deductive, rather than hypothetical-deductive,
method implies that the truth criterion for economics is not mainly log-
ical consistency (this is the criterion that applies to the methodological
sciences), but empirical verification. Still, as such verification is not al-
ways easy or feasible, and as the ultimate goal of science is to guide
human action, a second criterion of validity for economics is the prag-
matic forecasting ability of its models. If, for example, a model showing
that an economic policy based on loose fiscal adjustment, high interest
rates, and volatile exchange rates tends to produce low economic growth
is confirmed in practice—as has been the case in Brazil—such a model
will be correct. Another example: if the same model predicts that infla-
tion will not spin out of control if interest rates drop to civilized levels,
and such a prediction is borne out when rates are lowered, the model
will be likewise confirmed. A final example: when, based on the theory
of inflation inertia, we argued that a stabilization plan as powerful as
was the Collor Plan in fiscal and monetary terms would be unable to
eliminate inflation because it failed to adopt a strategy to neutralize in-
flation inertia, and this forecast was borne out—then the theory of iner-
tial inflation is confirmed as true. 5 For all this, I reject the “consisten-
tialism” implied in neoclassical economics and its attempt to reduce
macroeconomics to a closed system by assuming rational expectations.
Since economics is the science of markets, the two central laws accord-
ing to which markets operate—the law of supply and demand and the
tendency of profit rates to equalize when relative prices are in equilib-
rium—must never be cast aside in the name of the voluntarism arising
from the role in which statists cast planning or, as neoclassical econo-
mists put it, of expectations and “credibility.”
Neoclassical macroeconomics often exaggerates the role of expec-
tations, accusing them of running against the second law in particular. A
good example lies in the disastrous attempts to stabilize inflation by co-
ordinating expectations, as was tried in the Southern Cone of Latin
America at the turn of the 1970s and into the 1980s, using the exchange
rate as a coordination instrument (Diaz-Alejandro 1991 [1981]). An-
other example can be found in neoclassical economists’ and the conven-
tional orthodoxy’s insistence on explaining high inflation as simply an
expectations-related problem that could be overcome by means of the
8 Developing Brazil
government’s commitment to strict monetary and fiscal policies, instead

of understanding that inflation inertia was characterized by a permanent
distributive conflict due to lagging price adjustments on the part of ac-
tors who were therefore constantly pushing relative prices into and out
of equilibrium.6 The radical use of the “rational expectations” assump-
tion and of the concept of “credibility” lies at the root of serious mis-
takes in macroeconomic theory and policy. Expectations and credibility
are crucial to markets’ behavior, and there is always rationality in them,
but the expectations of economic actors are not so rational as to “corre-
spond to the true model,” as intended by the radical theory of rational
expectations. For economic and social life to flourish and for economic
policymakers to be effective, trust must be omnipresent. This trust,
however, springs not from an acknowledgment of the appropriate model
and the strict observance of rules, but from the mutual understanding of
all—an understanding that requires theorists and policymakers to be
prudent and modest, as well as able to discern what is new—to under-
stand the structural change that institutional change and, therefore, eco-
nomic policy change requires.7
The economic system I analyze here is well defined. It is the macro-
economic system that has prevailed in Brazil since the Real Plan of
1994 achieved price stability. An economic system is defined not only
by its capitalist nature or its openness to international competition
within the framework of globalization, not only by the ratios of wages,
profits, and interest through which income is distributed, and not only
by the technological variables that condition growth and distribution; it
is also defined by the institutions and economic policies it may adopt:
by its degree of capital account openness, that is, by whether it accepts
involvement in financial globalization (not to be confused with trade
globalization); by whether the selected fiscal regime is loose; by its
short-term interest rates and foreign exchange policies, which it may
seek to manage or to leave to the devices of the markets; and by the po-
litical coalitions that support this or that policy. The economic system
addressed here is that of countries, such as Brazil, that compete within
the framework of global capitalism and, notwithstanding, adopt the rec-
ommendations of, or yield to the pressures that come from, the North—
the conventional orthodoxy—thereby adopting the competition’s ad-
vice. Contrasted to them are the dynamic economic systems of Asian
countries that follow their own economic policy counsel. The economic
system I examine here, therefore, is not an abstraction but a concrete
economic, social, and political reality that demands definition in terms
of a specific model.
Introduction 9
This book is on the area of development macroeconomics because

its basic tenets are employment and growth, and the basic variables and
policies it discusses are macroeconomic ones. I will be using this latter
term synonymously with economic development—that is, a process of
structural transformations in economy and society that lead to better
standards of living through the accumulation of capital and the incorpo-
ration of technical progress in production—and reserve the term devel-
opment, on its own, to signify the end result of economic, social, politi-
cal, and environmental development, that is, development as regards the
four major objectives of modern societies: well-being, social justice, free-
dom, and environmental protection. Income growth in a country that finds
oil reserves and remains dependent on this product is neither growth nor
economic development because its structures, cultures, and institutions—
the three dimensions on which a society can be analyzed—remain almost
unchanged. Economic development, however, is not always just, does not
always take place democratically, and does not always preserve the envi-
ronment. For equal opportunities, freedom, and respect of nature to be
present, there must be social development, political development, and sus-
tainable development.
The Conventional Orthodoxy and

New Developmentalism
This book springs from a basic question: why has neither the price sta-
bility attained in 1994 nor world prosperity in recent years been enough
to lead Brazil to macroeconomic stability and resumed economic
growth? Since 1980, Brazil’s economy has remained macroeconomi-
cally unstable, with low growth and high unemployment. The growth
rate of income per capita, which was 4 percent a year between 1950 and
1980, fell to less than 1 percent at one point. In 1994 the Real Plan fi-
nally overcame the high inflation that had ravaged the country for 14
years, but the long-awaited resumption of development never came. After
2002, a structural external shock, caused by growing worldwide pros-
perity, added to two large devaluations of the Brazilian currency and
doubled Brazil’s exports, but even so, the country failed to show satis-
factory growth. This prolonged quasi stagnation of the Brazilian econ-
omy led me to write this book. If the Brazilian economy were healthy—
if the main macroeconomic indicators pointed toward stability and if the
economy were growing at a reasonable pace—we might concern ourselves
with long-term reforms capable of contributing to gradually making Brazil
10 Developing Brazil
a more prosperous, just, and, perhaps, happier society. Alas, this is not
the case. Although no country grew as fast as Brazil between 1930 and
1980, since 1980, or since 1994, it has been among the slowest growing
of countries.8
In this book I offer an explanation of the chronic quasi stagnation of
the Brazilian economy. The Brazilian economy fails to grow because it
is caught in a trap of high interest rates and an uncompetitive exchange
rate that keeps savings and investment rates depressed—a trap that eco-
nomic policy reinforces instead of identifying and overcoming. Why do
these mistakes occur? Naturally, there is an issue of incompetence, there
are obstacles to true fiscal adjustment, and there are domestic vested in-
terests in maintaining a high interest rate and an uncompetitive ex-
change rate, but the main reason is that, in 1995, after 15 years of crisis
and no national development strategy, the country’s macroeconomic
policy was fully subordinated to the dictums of the Washington Consen-
sus: the country’s economic “strategy” came to be determined abroad.
Never have Brazil’s economic policymakers received as many compli-
ments from Washington and New York as they have since 1995. The un-
derlying rationale of the conventional orthodoxy, however, is not re-
sumed development, nor even macroeconomic stability, but serving the
commercial and financial interests of advanced countries and, therefore,
neutralizing the capacity of middle-income countries such as Brazil,
which are regarded as competitors and a threat because of their cheap
labor. I will probably be called a “conspiracy theorist” or an “outdated
nationalist” for this statement, but it stems from the very nature of glob-
alization, characterized by generalized economic competition between
nation-states. In this ever fiercer competition, middle-income countries
pose an objective threat to advanced countries, owing mainly to their
cheap labor. The threat hangs mainly over the working class and the
middle class (whether professional, or wage-earning, or business), who
are directly affected by competition from developing countries; this is
why US workers opposed the admission of Mexico into the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); on the other hand, the interests of
large multinationals and their executives and shareholders are not so
clear, because some stand to gain while others may lose. Since, how-
ever, these countries are democracies and politicians play a strategic
role, hegemonic thinking and the policies it generates represent the av-
erage of national interests; it is this thinking, expressed in the conven-
tional orthodoxy, that regards middle-income countries such as Brazil as
threats.9 In the medium term this is a mistake, as advanced countries will
end up benefiting from the greater economic development of all countries;
Introduction 11
but, in the short term, the stagnation of wages in rich countries is related
to the growing competition from countries with cheap labor.
In accordance with a pattern common to many developing coun-
tries, after 1990 the Brazilian economic authorities—with a brief inter-
regnum during the Itamar Franco administration, which included the
formulation of the Real Plan—adopted the reforms prescribed by the
Washington Consensus and the accompanying monetary policy—one
based on high interest rates and an appreciated exchange rate. The same
happened in every Latin American country that, having accepted the
recommendations of the conventional orthodoxy, relinquished control
over its exchange rate by accepting the policy of open foreign accounts
and the growth with foreign savings put forward by Washington and
New York. The sole exception was Chile, which did the right thing by
liberalizing its economy and turning toward exports but also imposed
controls on capitals inflows and was thereby able to manage its ex-
change rate. Not by chance, Chile was the only Latin American country
to report satisfactory growth. The orthodoxy’s inadequacy as regards re-
suming economic development, however, soon made itself felt. The sec-
ond country to adopt it—Mexico—faced a balance-of-payments crisis
as early as 1994, and, as the country most committed to the conventional
orthodoxy, remains semistagnant to this day. Later, in 1998, Brazil’s num-
ber came up. But the crisis that indelibly marked the failure of the Wash-
ington Consensus was Argentina’s, where President Carlos Menem had
fully adopted every recommendation—and been commended for it. Like
Argentina, Brazil is an example of the disaster of mindless adoption of
the conventional orthodoxy by a developing country. Asian countries
brought about their capitalist revolutions without implementing certain
key conventional orthodoxy recommendations—particularly those re-
garding open capital accounts and the policy of growth with foreign
savings—whereas Brazil, like almost all Latin American countries, sub-
ordinated itself to the orthodoxy and to the local interests of nonproduc-
tive, or rentier, capital, lagging behind the massive international compe-
tition that characterizes today’s global capitalism. Several studies show
the baleful outcome of the application of the Washington Consensus to
Latin America. A recent one (Berr and Combarnous 2007, pp. 536–537)
uses factor analysis to examine the impact of these reforms on 23 Latin
American and Caribbean countries from 1990 to 2003 and concludes
that “an engagement in the process of reforms is not accompanied by
significantly stronger growth or a significantly reduced poverty or in-
equality.” In addition, “the ‘good students’ failed to reach better results
than the rest in terms of economic growth.” In Asia, several countries
that held their ground in the face of the conventional orthodoxy, such as
South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, also made the same
mistake in the early 1990s and endured the crisis of 1997, whereas at
the same time, and faced with the same constraints, other countries in
Eastern Asia, particularly China, India, and Taiwan, retained control
over their exchange rates, preventing them from appreciating, and con-
tinued to grow. In more general terms, at the level of reform, while Latin
American countries indiscriminately accepted every liberalizing reform,
interrupting their national revolutions, letting their nations became dis-
organized, and losing cohesion and autonomy, Asian countries were
more prudent: they accepted certain reforms that were compatible with
the higher income levels they had attained but preserved their national
autonomy—their national development strategies.
After all the crises, one Latin American country seems to have
learned its lesson. The case in point is Argentina, which since 2003 has
attained economic growth rates almost on a par with China’s. The policy
that has been in place since the crisis of 2001, with controlled public ac-
counts, low interest rates, and a managed exchange rate (thanks to those
interest rates and to the taxation of commodity exports that, by exploit-
ing abundant natural resources, can cause malignant exchange appreci-
ation), indicates that Argentina is treading a new-developmentalist path.
It is still too soon to be sure of its success. Inflation rates close to 12 per-
cent a year in 2006 are a problem whose solution—price controls—is not
sustainable in the medium run. The Argentine authorities, however, have
been fiscally responsible and are putting up a strong resistance to the
pressures of the International Monetary Fund—and, therefore, of the
conventional orthodoxy—to appreciate the exchange rate and thereby
control inflation. This control will have to be achieved by other means,
through a temporarily higher interest rate and more stringent fiscal ad-
justment—measures compatible with new developmentalism.
Developmentalism was the name given to the national strategy that
Latin American countries in general and Brazil in particular adopted be-
tween 1930 and 1980. In this period, and especially between 1930 and
1960, many Latin Americans were firmly set on nation building and on
finally endowing their formally independent states with national soci-
eties equipped with basic solidarity when it came to international com-
petition. But the weakening caused by the crisis of the 1980s, combined
with the hegemonic force of the ideological wave that began in the United
States in the 1970s and with the internal prevalence of an ideological
cycle that I call the Democracy and Justice Cycle, brought the national
revolution in Latin American countries to a halt or to a new dependency.
Introduction 13
Local elites, who stopped thinking with their own heads, took the advice
of, and yielded to the pressures from, the North, and their countries, de-
prived of their national development strategies, saw development stop
in its tracks. The conventional orthodoxy, which replaced national de-
velopmentalism, had not been internally formulated and failed to reflect
national concerns and interests, but instead reflected the vision and ob-
jectives of rich countries. Furthermore, as is typical of neoliberal ideol-
ogy, it assumed that the market could coordinate everything automati-
cally and proposed that the state should dispense with the economic role
it had always played in developed countries: that of supplementing the
market’s coordination in order to promote economic development and
equity. I have been a systematic critic of the macroeconomics of stagna-
tion that the conventional orthodoxy proposes because it is based on a
mistaken agenda—it still regards inflation as the main problem in the
Brazilian economy—and, mainly, because it fails to produce the macro-
economic stability that is expected of it. Instead, because of the high in-
terest rates and the appreciated exchange rate, the conventional ortho-
doxy keeps the country in permanent semistagnation, besides rendering
it prone to recurring balance-of-payments crises such as those that oc-
curred in 1998 and 2002 and that will occur again in time, depending on
what happens to the world’s economy, as a result of the brutal apprecia-
tion of the real in recent years. I have also criticized the loss of a sense
of nationhood and the lack of a national development strategy. But my
criticism is aimed not just at the prevailing conventional wisdom but es-
pecially at the prevailing conventional wisdom that complains of exces-
sive fiscal adjustment, suggests that the country should again turn to its
domestic market, advocates higher public spending to foster effective
demand, and irresponsibly proposes “renegotiating” domestic and for-
eign debt. The national macroeconomic stabilization and development
strategy I advance in this book—the new-developmentalist strategy—
involves, first, more—not less—stringent fiscal adjustment, has as its
main goal lower short-term interest rates (today’s real disease in the
Brazilian economy), and advocates managing the exchange rate in such
a manner as to keep inflation under control and sustain the Brazilian
economy’s competitiveness. New developmentalism is a national devel-
opment strategy that has been gradually defining itself in Latin America
as the region’s countries see the failure of the Washington Consensus to
promote growth and its socially inequitable nature, which favors only
the wealthy and the more educated strata of professional middle classes
while imposing losses on middle-class business owners, professionals,
and the poor. New developmentalism replaces its forerunner—a national
development strategy that was enormously successful in promoting

Brazil’s economic development between 1930 and 1980 and then fell
into a severe crisis in the midst of which it degenerated into economic
populism.10 New developmentalism, as a reflection of the much more
advanced condition of the Brazilian economy today as compared with
the 1930s, is not protectionist but export-led, and, although it stresses
the importance of industrial policy, sees more relevance in macroeco-
nomic policy and does not cast the state in an important role as a pro-
ducer of goods and services.
As we will see throughout this book, however, the differences that
truly matter today are those between the prevalent Washington Consen-
sus and the emerging new developmentalism. In a nutshell, whereas the
conventional orthodoxy proposes growth with foreign savings and open
capital accounts, new developmentalism advocates financing investment
with domestic savings and maintaining control over the exchange rate
to prevent artificial wage gains (foreign exchange populism); whereas
the conventional orthodoxy loosely defines fiscal adjustment in terms of
a greater primary surplus, new developmentalism defines it more strictly
in terms of lower public deficits and bigger public savings; whereas the
conventional orthodoxy understands that the exchange rate is nonman-
ageable and imposes strict limitations on the management of the only
instrument it deems to have available—the short-term interest rate—
new developmentalism embraces the possibility of and the need for man-
aging both rates as much as possible; whereas the conventional orthodoxy
sees the lack of market-oriented reforms as the root cause of Brazil’s
quasi stagnation (when it even concedes the existence of such a stagna-
tion), new developmentalism, although in favor of reforms to strengthen
the state and the market, argues that the main cause of this quasi stagna-
tion is today’s macroeconomic policy. This policy, based on a high in-
terest rate and on an appreciated exchange rate, fails to create the neces-
sary demand for the capital accumulation rate to attain the levels needed
to resume economic development. If we bear in mind that aggregate de-
mand is essentially dependent on investment, the high interest rate, mis-
takenly justified as a requirement to keep inflation under control, in ad-
dition to imposing high financial costs on the state, hampers both private
and public investment; an appreciated exchange rate, on the other hand,
arising as it does from the government’s inability to neutralize the Dutch
disease11 and from its acceptance of the policy of growth with foreign
savings, discourages exports of goods with high per capita value added
and, therefore, investment.
Brazil’s economic development is now essentially dependent on the
demand for investment, not on the supply of skilled labor. Even though
Introduction 15
education and scientific and technological development remain as na-

tional priorities on the supply side, the fact of the matter is that Brazil
has vast idle human resources. The high unemployment rates and the
mass migration of middle-class Brazilians to wealthy countries are evi-
dence of this. Brazil’s economic development depends, in the short and
medium run, on a lower interest rate and a competitive exchange rate
capable of stimulating investment. Demand is ensured, essentially, by
investment or capital accumulation, which, in addition to expanding
worker productivity on the supply side, is, on the demand side, the de-
terminant of employment levels. This is why a satisfactory difference
between the expected profit rate and the market interest rate—the deter-
minant of growth—is so important to the growth process. Demand,
however, is further determined by consumption, which depends mainly
on wages, and on exports, which vary based mainly on the exchange
rate. This is why the wage rate or average wage, whose growth is the
manifestation of economic development on the supply side, is also im-
portant on the demand side. And this is why the exchange rate is a cen-
tral macroeconomic price in the historic development process.12
My alternative to the orthodox and conventional economic policy is
not the equally conventional Keynesianism that proposes increasing
public expenditures and thereby fostering aggregate demand. There is
certainly a need to stimulate aggregate demand through export-oriented
investment, which will eventually stimulate foreign trade–oriented in-
vestment. The policy of stimulating demand through public or budget
deficits makes sense only in a non-full-employment economy whose
public sector is in fiscal equilibrium. Otherwise, such a move would be
easily confused with fiscal populism; if a government with high indebt-
edness levels becomes involved in an expansive fiscal policy, the eco-
nomic players’ expectations of a potential failure of the state would
make the investments promoted by public spending uneconomic. Like-
wise, with a highly indebted public sector, an indiscriminate rise of the
interest rates does not contribute to lowering inflation, as rational eco-
nomic actors foreseeing a state failure caused by interest (it was caused
by expenditures in the former case) protect themselves by not reducing
their margins.
In the 1990s, Brazilian society, convinced as it was of being in the
less-than-zero-sum game of high inflation, managed to rally and devel-
oped a strategy to fight high and inertial inflation; it now needs a similar
strategy to counter the trap of high interest rates and uncompetitive ex-
change rates. To do this, however, Brazil will need to be able to again rely
on a nation, and this nation must use the state as its instrument par excel-
lence for collective action and, thus, to formulate a national development
strategy—an international competition strategy; only then will the Brazil-

ian economy be able to increase public expenditures and private invest-
ments and, through growth greater than that of advanced countries, con-
verge toward their development levels.
The Conventional Orthodoxy Defined
Brazil’s inability to attain macroeconomic stability and resume growth

is related to the capture of the state by a powerful political coalition that
is not truly interested in the country’s economic development: a coali-
tion that coexists with government’s fiscal populism and in practical
terms supports foreign exchange populism because it has an interest in
a relatively appreciated exchange rate. This coalition is made up of ren-
tiers and the financial system that benefit from high interest rates and of
multinational enterprises and rich countries’ interests represented by the
multilateral agencies that benefit from an overvalued local currency; the
neoliberal discourse that it uses materializes in the stabilization and
growth strategy that I call the “conventional orthodoxy.” I have repeat-
edly made reference to this strategy—or more precisely, “anti-strategy”;
the time has come to define it. The conventional orthodoxy is the set of
diagnoses and recommendations emanating from Washington—more
specifically, from the US Treasury, from the International Monetary Fund,
and from the World Bank—and directed to developing countries. In its
current guise, it has manifested itself since the 1980s through what has
become known as the Consensus of Washington. This consensus, as ex-
pressed by John Williamson (1990), consisted of a series of principles
that preached fiscal adjustment and market-oriented reforms or what
was also referred to as “structural adjustment.” In some chapters, I draw
a distinction between the First and Second Consensuses of Washington
to highlight the fact that the former is chiefly concerned with the current
account and the fiscal adjustment that became necessary as a result of
the great foreign debt crisis of the 1980s; the latter, which has been preva-
lent since the early 1990s, supports open capital accounts and growth
with foreign savings, which implies a disregard of current account ad-
justment. Although the term Consensus of Washington remains in use
and today has a clear meaning related to the neoliberal ideology, I also
speak of the “conventional orthodoxy” because it is a more general ex-
pression and also because its failure to bring about growth made the rel-
ative “consensus” that existed in the 1990s disappear.
The ten reforms Williamson originally enumerated did not necessar-
ily imply neoliberalism. It is quite possible to favor fiscal adjustment, or
Introduction 17
trade openness, or the privatization of competitive industries without aim-

ing to reduce the state to a minimum. But in the form in which it was
practiced around the world, it was certainly neoliberal and globalist—
and this is precisely the ideological definition of the conventional ortho-
doxy. It is neoliberal insofar as it has a clear pro-market bias that weak-
ens the state apparatus and preaches that most developing countries
could benefit from fiscal adjustment and market-oriented reforms, espe-
cially greater trade and financial openness. It is globalist because it as-
sumes that increased interdependency among nation-states implies a
loss of their relevance: a thesis of particular interest to advanced coun-
tries, whose citizens are inevitably nationalist—so uniformly nationalis-
tic that they do not need the adjective to define themselves. It is global-
ist because, within the generalized competition framework that defines
globalized capitalism, the conventional orthodoxy ignores the fact that
a country will be hard put to grow unless it can rely on a national devel-
opment strategy: each nation-state must not allow its nation and its state
to weaken, under penalty of paralyzed development. It is based on neo-
classical economics but is not to be confused with it because it is not
theoretical, but overtly ideological and oriented toward institutional re-
forms and economic policies. Although the dominant neoclassical eco-
nomics is based in universities, particularly US ones, the conventional
orthodoxy has its roots mainly in Washington, home to the US Treasury
and the two supposedly international agencies that are in fact subordi-
nate to the US Treasury, namely, the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, the former concerned with macroeconomic policy, the
latter with development. Its secondary wellspring is New York, the head-
quarters or center of major international banks and multinational com-
panies. This is why we can say that the conventional orthodoxy is the
set of diagnoses and policies meant for developing countries and origi-
nating in Washington and New York. The conventional orthodoxy changes
over time, but, since the United States became hegemonic, it has ex-
pressed its ideological hegemony over the rest of the world at the level
of economic ideas. This hegemony represents itself as “benevolent”
when it is in fact the arm and mouth of neoimperialism—the imperial-
ism without (formal) colonies that established itself under the aegis of
the United States and other rich countries following the end of the clas-
sic colonial system, immediately after World War II.
The conventional orthodoxy, as it has been applied in Brazil since
the 1990s, says four different things: first, that the country’s major prob-
lem is the lack of microeconomic reforms to allow the market to freely
operate; second, that even after the end of high and inertial inflation in
1994, controlling inflation continues to be the main economic policy
objective; third, that in order to exert this control, interest rates will in-
evitably remain high owing to sovereign risk and to fiscal issues; fourth,
that “development is a competition among countries for foreign sav-
ings” and that the implicit current account deficits and the appreciation
of the exchange rate caused by capital inflows are no cause for concern.
Usually the adjective “orthodox” is applied to macroeconomic poli-
cies: orthodox policies usually have a neoclassical foundation and are
opposed either to Keynesian macroeconomics or to populist policies. If
we ignore the latter, a macroeconomic policy is orthodox if it gives full
priority to the control of inflation; it is Keynesian if it combines the con-
trol of inflation with economic growth. Both approaches, however, know
that moderate interest rates and a competitive exchange rate are also ob-
jectives to be achieved. Perhaps the orthodox are less adamant than the
Keynesians in this matter, but, for instance, during the times of high
growth in Japan, we had a classical combination of an orthodox finance
ministry with a developmentalist Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (MITI), in which the orthodox macroeconomic policy was based
on fiscal adjustment, moderate interest rates, and a competitive ex-
change rate. The “conventional orthodoxy” that is being adopted by
many developing countries, including Brazil, however, is orthodox only
because of the priority given to the control of inflation. In the three other
variables, it adopts the opposite values: soft fiscal adjustment, high in-
terest rates, and an uncompetitive exchange rate. Thus, the conventional
orthodoxy is an orthodoxy for developing countries. We can discuss
whether it is really soft or not in terms of fiscal policy, because the
economists involved maintain a strong rhetoric of austerity, whereas
Keynesians admit budget deficits in special circumstances. I discuss this
matter in Chapter 4. There is no doubt, however, about the macroeco-
nomic trap: high interest rates and an uncompetitive exchange rate.
There is no doubt, either, as to the other two issues that I will discuss in
this book and that are related to the uncompetitive exchange rate: the
conventional orthodoxy proposes a policy of growth with foreign sav-
ings that usually does not increase the investment and the growth rates,
but appreciates the currency and increases domestic consumption be-
sides increasing the foreign debt, and ignores the Dutch disease that
makes the national currency overvalued and uncompetitive. I discuss
the latter two issues in Chapter 5. Besides a chronic macroeconomic in-
stability, the consequences are insufficient effective demand, lack of
export-oriented investment opportunities, and a low investment rate,
which prevent developing countries from catching up—from gradually
achieving the income levels of the rich countries.
Introduction 19
The conventional orthodoxy has dominated the country since the

early 1990s but has not led to resumed growth. It is uninterested in solv-
ing either the problem of the high real short-term interest rate or that of
the overvalued exchange rate and ties everything to fiscal adjustment or
to overcoming the structural fiscal imbalance, heedless of the fact that a
major cause of this maladjustment lies in the absurdly high interest rates
themselves and that the problem can be faced only with a simultaneous
attack on the interest disease and on fiscal imbalance. As for the interest
rate, it confuses short term and long term and understands that the
short-term interest rate is endogenous, defined by the market, and, as a
result, it feels comfortable accepting stratospheric rates. As for the ex-
change rate, it understands that it, too, is endogenous and, consistent
with its convenient belief that a middle-income country such as Brazil
can grow only with foreign savings, accepts that it should remain rela-
tively appreciated. The appreciated exchange rate policy that the con-
ventional orthodoxy adopts is interesting, first, to rich countries fearful
of the competition of countries with relatively cheap labor, such as
Brazil, and second, to multinationals, which can then transfer more
strong currency for the same profits made in reals in the country. The
interest rate policy is interesting for domestic and foreign rentiers who
live on interest and for the financial industry that collects commissions
from rentiers. The disaster that the orthodoxy implied in terms of balance-
of-payment crises and low growth for the Latin American countries that
adopted it after the late 1980s is now notorious (Frenkel 2003).
Nation and Globalization
New developmentalism, like the national developmentalism of the

1950s, at once assumes the existence and implies the formation of a true
nation capable of formulating an informal, open-ended national devel-
opment strategy, as is typical of democratic societies whose economies
are coordinated by the market. A nation is a society of individuals or
households that share a common political fate and organize as a state
with sovereignty over a certain territory. A nation, therefore, like the mod-
ern state makes sense only within the framework of the nation-state that
arises with capitalism. For a nation to share a common political fate, it
must, in addition to having a state, strike solidarity bonds among its
members and have shared objectives, chief among which, historically, is
development. Other objectives, such as freedom and social justice, are
also crucially important to nations, but nations arise, like the state and
capitalism, with economic development as an intrinsic part of their

logic, of their very being. Nations, nation-states, capitalism, and economic
development are simultaneous and intrinsically correlated historical
phenomena. In its more advanced form—today’s globalization—the con-
stitutive economic units of capitalism are not just firms operating inter-
nationally, but also, if not chiefly, nation-states or national states. It is
not just firms that compete on worldwide markets, as conventional eco-
nomics would have it; nation-states, too, are key competitors. The main
criterion for success for the political rulers of every modern national
state is high economic growth relative to that of other countries. Glob-
alization is the stage of capitalism where, for the first time, nation-states
span the entire globe and compete economically among themselves
through their firms. With globalization, nation-states became more in-
terdependent, but, for this precise reason, more strategic. In order to be
able to compete (for competition is the essential relationship that makes
them interdependent), they must also cooperate in the construction of an
international system of institutions to set the rules of the game nations
play. In the competitive process as well as in the cooperative one, each
nation-state has a dramatic need for autonomy—an autonomy that hegem-
ony attempts to constrain in order to impose and exert its own domina-
tion. Globalization occurs in every realm: commercial, direct investment,
financial, technological, and cultural. The commercial globalization de-
rived from trade openness is a competitive opportunity for Brazil given
its relatively cheap labor; on the other hand, financial globalization, de-
fined by financial or capital account openness, is not interesting to devel-
oping countries because it denies them control over the exchange rate
and, therefore, their own national development process.13
A nation involves a basic agreement among classes when it comes
to competing internationally. Businesspeople, workers, and the profes-
sional middle class (including state bureaucrats and intellectuals) may
struggle with one another but know that their fate lies in competitive in-
volvement in the world of nation-states. It involves, therefore, a national
agreement—a nationalist agreement. A national agreement is the basic
social contract that gives rise to a nation and keeps it strong and cohesive;
it is the great accord among the social classes of a modern society that en-
ables such a society to become a true nation, that is, a society equipped
with a state capable for formulating a national development strategy.
The great national agreement, or pact, made in Brazil after 1930 joined
together the newborn national industrial bourgeoisie and the bureau-
cracy, or the new state technicians; these were joined by urban workers
and the old oligarchy sectors more attuned to the domestic market, such
Introduction 21
as the very ranchers from whom Getúlio Vargas sprang. The adversaries
were imperialism, represented mainly by British and US interests, and
the associated agricultural-exporter oligarchy. The most strategic agree-
ment that can be made in a modern capitalist society is that struck be-
tween industrial businesspeople and the state’s bureaucracy, including
politicians, but such an agreement also involves workers and the middle
classes. There will always be domestic opposition, somehow identified
with imperialism, or with today’s colony-free neoimperialism, and with
local collaborator or globalist groups. In globalized capitalism, the lat-
ter are the rentiers, who live on high interest rates, and the financial sec-
tor, which collects commissions from the rentiers.
A nation is inevitably nationalist, insofar as nationalism is the ide-
ology of the formation of the national state and its permanent reinforce-
ment or consolidation. Nationalism may also be defined, as Ernest Gell-
ner does, as an ideology that pursues the correspondence of nation and
state, that is, that wants a state for each nation.14 This is a good defini-
tion, too, but typical of a thinker from Central Europe; it is a definition
that exhausts itself as soon as the nation-state forms—when nation and
state first coincide on a given territory, formally establishing a “sover-
eign state.” Therefore, it disregards Ernest Renan’s celebrated 1882
aphorism: “a nation is an everyday plebiscite.”15 It fails to explain how
a nation-state may formally exist without a true nation, as is the case
with Latin American countries, which, in the early nineteenth century,
were endowed with states owing not only to the patriotic efforts of na-
tionalist groups but also to the good services of Britain with its maneu-
vers to drive Spain and Portugal out of the region. As a result, these
countries saw themselves equipped with states (i.e., with a national law
system and an organization to guarantee such system) in the absence of
true nations, as they stopped being colonies to become dependent on
Britain, France, and, later, the United States. For a nation to truly exist, it
is a requirement that the various social classes, notwithstanding the con-
flicts that set them apart, be joined in national solidarity when it comes to
international competition and that they use national criteria to make pol-
icy decisions, especially concerning economic policy and institutional re-
form. In other words, rulers must think with their own minds, instead of
dedicating themselves to confidence building, that is, the construction of
foreign credibility at the expense of national interests, and all of society
must be capable of formulating a national development strategy.
New developmentalism is a manifestation of a moderate national-
ism that is reemerging in Brazil after the exhaustion of the society’s
cycle that I call the Democracy and Justice Cycle (1964– ) and also
after the failure of the conventional orthodoxy to promote economic

growth. This was the case in Brazil between 1930 and 1960, under the
leadership of Brazil’s twentieth-century statesman, Getúlio Vargas. In
this period, Brazilian society took national decisions on its own behalf
and formulated a successful national development strategy. In those 30
years (or 50 if we count the military regime, which, despite a political
alliance with the United States against communism, remained national-
ist), Brazil changed: from an agricultural country, becoming industrial,
moving from a mercantilist to a fully capitalist social formation, transi-
tioning from a semicolonial status to that of a nation. Developmentalism
was the name given to the national development strategy and the ideol-
ogy that drove it. Therefore, the current process of defining new devel-
opmentalism is also a resumption of the concept of nation in Brazil and
other Latin American countries. This implies a nationalist perspective in
the sense that economic policies and institutions are formulated and im-
plemented with national interest as a main driver and with each country’s
citizens as authors. This nationalism is not meant to endow a nation with
a state, but to make the existing state into an effective instrument for
collective action by the nation, an instrument that allows modern na-
tions in the early twenty-first century to consistently pursue their polit-
ical objectives of economic development, social justice, and freedom, in
an international framework of peace and collaboration among nations. It
implies, therefore, that this nationalism should be liberal, social, and re-
publican, that is, that it should embody the values of modern industrial
societies. Unlike liberalism and socialism, with their universal aspira-
tions, nationalism, as Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. (2006, p. 3) points out,
“is not humanism . . . nationalism is a historical phenomenon and not a
universal, timeless value.”16 Nationalism is an ideology of national uni-
fication and consolidation. It is always a reaction against the empire.
Nothing, however, prevents nationalism from being liberal and social,
as long as it is each of the two in moderate measure. And nothing pre-
vents it from making a contribution to the ideals of universal peace and
solidarity, as nation-states are the political organization principle of the
world society; they are entities that compete among themselves, but, for
this very reason, must act collectively to establish the institutions charged
with regulating this competition.
Society’s Cycles and State Cycles
Although this book is concerned with economic and political develop-

ments in Brazil after it was able to end high and inertial inflation in 1994,
Introduction 23
before ending this Introduction I permit myself to offer a broad view of

Brazil in the twentieth century. To better understand the obstacles ahead
and the complex relationships between the Brazilian nation and its state
as an instrument for collective action, one must focus on the cycles that
society and the state underwent in Brazil in the twentieth century—
those of society preceding those of the state, the former creating social
and ideological consensus, the latter leading to political pacts and con-
trol of the state. The model I summarize here is specific to Brazil, but I
believe that, with the appropriate adjustments, it could apply to many
Latin American countries. At the societal level, in the early twentieth
century the Nation and Development Cycle begins with such imposing
characters as Silvio Romero, Manoel Bonfim, and Euclides da Cunha;
progresses to Alberto Torres, Monteiro Lobato, Oliveira Vianna, and
Roberto Simonsen; attains classical status in the works of Gilberto
Freyre, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Caio Prado Jr., and Barbosa Lima
Sobrinho; and becomes fully defined in the 1950s in the thinking of
great intellectuals such as Ignácio Rangel, Guerreiro Ramos, and Hélio
Jaguaribe at the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (Superior In-
stitute of Brazilian Studies; ISEB) and Celso Furtado at the Economic
Commission for Latin America and Caribe (ECLAC) of the United Na-
tions.17 In the early 1960s, with the military coup of 1964, whose roots
lie in the increased Cold War tension in Latin America and in the conse-
quent political radicalization brought about by the Cuban Revolution of
1959,18 this nationalist cycle, which revolves around national identity
and industrialization, collapses, as industrial businesspeople who were
the “national bourgeoisie”—that is, a capitalist class committed to na-
tional interests—and the military, ever a pillar of Brazilian nationalism,
afraid of the communist threat, associated themselves with the United
States to establish a military regime in Brazil.
At the state level, which lags behind the societal level, the corre-
sponding cycle is reflected in the National-Developmentalist Pact that
begins with the tenentista movement (lieutenants’ movement) and the
revolution of 1930 and finds in Getúlio Vargas its main political actor.
In this cycle the government successfully leads a national development
strategy oriented toward import-substitution industrialization, and Brazil
attains the world’s highest growth rate. After redemocratization, in 1945,
the National-Developmentalist Pact experiences a political crisis that
culminates in 1954 with Vargas’s suicide, reestablishes itself with the
election of Juscelino Kubitschek, and faces a new crisis in 1961 that
eventually resolves itself with the military coup of 1964. After that, the
National-Developmentalist Pact, which includes industrialists, state bu-
reaucrats, and organized workers, loses the last of these groups and turns
into the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Pact. Yet the national-developmen-

talist strategy is resumed and survives until the great foreign debt crisis
of the 1980s.
This crisis arises at a time when the new social cycle, which I call
the Democracy and Justice Cycle, has already taken large steps toward
undermining the military regime. The cycle is born among left-wing in-
tellectuals, usually associated with the São Paulo School of Sociology
and the theory of associated dependency, who, after the coup of 1964,
start leveling criticism at ISEB, which has diagnosed and supported the
National-Developmentalist Pact, and rejecting its basic thesis—namely,
that a great national accord led by the national bourgeoisie is giving rise
to a Brazilian nation and to Brazil’s industrial development. The theory
of dependency, which becomes hegemonic in Latin America in the
1970s, originates from this rejection. If no national bourgeoisie exists,
as the intellectuals mistakenly believe, then the concept of nation is un-
viable. In its stead, a new consensus forms, no longer based on the ideas
of nation and economic development, but on the demand for democracy
and social justice. Whereas the Nation and Development Cycle was
born out of rejection of foreign dependency, the Democracy and Justice
Cycle is based on acceptance of dependency as an inevitable sociologi-
cal and economic fact. Whereas the nationalist cycle had economic de-
velopment as its core goal, the new cycle, which corresponds to the the-
ory of associated dependency, assumes that economic development is
assured, be it as a result of the dynamic nature of capitalism or through
the inflow of foreign capital. Since, according to the new consensual
reasoning, continued industrialization is ensured, the two major prob-
lems Brazilian society still has to address are overcoming the military
authoritarian regime and the country’s pervasive and radical inequity.
This view of Brazil gradually becomes prevalent throughout society
while the idea of a nation, identified as it is with the military and busi-
nesspeople, sinks into oblivion. Politically organized society fails to be-
come a nation oriented toward national autonomy and development to
become a civil society focused on the affirmation of civil, political, and
social rights. Democracy becomes the core demand, social justice a re-
quirement at once moral and political. After the “April package” of
1977,19 the struggle for democracy, which has enjoyed the support of
workers, the left wing, and important sectors of the middle classes since
the coup, gains the additional support of businesspeople, no longer under
the threat of communism.20 A new government pact forms at the politi-
cal level but remains outside the realm of the state: the 1977 Popular-
Democratic Pact. From that year on, because of the bourgeoisie’s negative
Introduction 25
response to President Ernesto Geisel’s April package, the bourgeoisie’s

alliance with the military breaks down. The Democracy and Justice
Cycle acquires momentum, becomes prevalent, and, with the “Diretas
já” (the national movement demanding direct elections for the presi-
dency), leads the country to democratic transition in 1985. Besides
achieving democratic transition, its chief accomplishment is the consti-
tution of 1988. But in the next year, amid the constitutional workings,
the Popular-Democratic Pact collapses with the failure of the Cruzado
Plan to control high inflation rates and with the ensuing economic cri-
sis. Add to this the inability of the Partido do Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, PMDB)—the politi-
cal party that represented this pact—to face the crisis, and one can see
why the Brazilian society will yield, from 1990 onward, to the neolib-
eral wave and to global modernity. The ideas of democracy and justice
remain but are now joined by those of neoliberal, modernizing reforms.
It is difficult to name the political pact that arises from this surrender of
society and that controls the state after 1990, as it retains the notions of
democracy and justice but adds to them the contradictory proposals of the
conventional orthodoxy. I call it the Neoliberal-Dependent Pact, to em-
phasize its subordination to the North and its economic neoliberal or
ultra-liberal character.21
The two parties that came to power after PMDB—Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy Party, PSDB) and
Partido dos Trabalhadores (Labor Party, PT)—are also the fruit of the
Democracy and Justice Cycle, and, therefore, of the waiver of a sense of
nation. Democracy has been attained; the task at hand is to attain jus-
tice. But how? The three parties agree that it has to be through increased
public spending in the social area. And so it is, as proven by the 9 per-
cent increase of social expenditures as a share of gross domestic product
(GDP) that occurs after redemocratization. The outcome of this great ef-
fort, however, is meager because its underlying assumption—that eco-
nomic development is ensured—has proven false: growth has lasted for
ten years; the economy has been in quasi stagnation since 1980.
Therefore, it is now increasingly clear that the Democracy and Jus-
tice Cycle has become exhausted. Its core goals—democracy and social
justice—remain as valid and necessary as ever, but society is at a loss as
to how to proceed given the lack of economic development and in-
creased unemployment. A continued increase of the tax burden to fund
social spending is evidently no longer a realistic option. The lackluster
presidential elections of 2006 and the absence of genuine public debate
are indications of this exhaustion: the political parties originating in the
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10 appellent ou pays les destrois de Tuydon. Et de ces
montagnes nest la rivière de Tuyde, qui anciennement
suelt departir Escoce et Engleterre; et tournie
celle rivière en pluiseurs lieus en Escoce et en Engleterre.
Et sus se fin, desous Bervich, elle s’en vient
15 ferir en le mer, et là est elle moult grosse.
Li contes Douglas et se route, où bien avoit cinq
cens armeures de fier, s’en vinrent, ensi que je vous
di, ferir d’un rencontre sus ces Englès, où il avoit
pluiseurs haus barons et chevaliers d’Engleterre et
20 de Braibant. Là furent cil Englès reculé et rebouté,
et en y eut pluiseurs rués par terre, car il chevauçoient
sans arroi. Et se il euissent attendu l’autre
route, il fuissent venu à leur entente, car li rois y
estoit qui fu tantos enfourmés de ce rencontre.
25 Adonc sonnèrent les trompettes dou roy, et se
recueillièrent toutes gens qui ces montagnes avoient à
passer. Et vint là li arrie[re]garde, li contes de Sallebrin
et li contes de Le Marce, où bien avoit cinq
cens lances et mil arciers. Si ferirent chevaus des
30 esporons et s’en vinrent dalés le roy; si boutèrent
hors leurs banières. Tantost li Escot perçurent qu’il
avoient falli à leur entente, et que li rois estoit
[159] derrière. Si n’eurent mies conseil de là plus attendre,
ançois se partirent; mais il en menèrent pluiseurs
bons chevaliers d’Engleterre et de Braibant pour
prisonniers, qui là leur cheirent en ès mains. Il furent
5 tantost esvanui; on ne sceut qu’il devinrent, car il se
reboutèrent entre les montagnes ens ou fort pays. Si
fil li sires de Baudresen priès atrapés, car il estoit
en celle compagnie; mais il chevauçoit tout derrière,
et ce le sauva, mais il y eut pris six chevaliers de
10 Braibant.
§ 356. Depuis ceste avenue chevaucièrent toutdis

li Englès plus sagement et mieulz ensamble, tant
qu’il furent en leur pays, et passèrent devant Rosebourch
et puis parmi la terre le signeur de Persi. Et
15 fisent tant qu’il vinrent au Noefchastiel sur Thin,
et là se reposèrent et rafreschirent. Et donna li
rois d’Engleterre congiet à toutes manières de gens
pour retraire çascun en son lieu. Si se misent au retour,
et li rois proprement ossi, qui petit sejourna
20 sus le pays; si fu venus à Windesore, où madame la
royne sa femme tenoit l’ostel grant et estoffet.
Or nous reposerons nous à parler une espasse
dou roy d’Engleterre, et parlerons de son ainsnet fil
monsigneur Edowart, prince de Galles, qui fist en
25 celle saison et mist sus une grande et belle chevaucie
de gens d’armes englès et gascons, et les mena
en un pays où il fisent grandement bien leur pourfit,
et où onques Englès n’avoient esté. Et tout ce
fu par l’enort et ordenance des Gascons, que li dis
30 princes avoit dalés lui de son conseil et en sa compagnie.
[160] Vous avés bien chi dessus oy recorder comment
aucun baron de Gascongne vinrent en Engleterre,
et fisent priière au roy d’Engleterre qu’il leur volsist
baillier son fil le prince de Galles pour aler en Gascongne
5 avoech yaus, et que tout cil de par de delà,
qui pour englès se tenoient, en seroient trop grandement
resjoï et reconforté, et comment li rois leur
acorda et delivra à son fil mil hommes d’armes
et deus mil arciers, où il avoit grant fuison de
10 bonne chevalerie, desquelz de nom et de sournom et
les plus renommés j’ay fait mention: si ques, quant
li princes fu venus à Bourdiaus, ce fu environ le
Saint Michiel, il manda tous les barons et chevaliers
de Gascongne desquelz il pensoit à estre servis et
15 aidiés: premierement le signeur de Labreth et ses
frères, les trois frères de Pumiers, monsigneur Jehan,
monsigneur Helye et monsigneur Aymemon,
monsigneur Aymeri de Tarste, le signeur de Mucident,
le signeur de Courton, le signeur de Longheren,
20 le signeur de Rosem, le signeur de Landuras,
monsigneur Bernardet de Labreth, signeur de Geronde,
monsigneur Jehan de Graili, captal de Beus,
monsigneur le soudich de Lestrade et tous les
aultres.
25 Quant il furent tout venu à Bourdiaus, il leur remoustra
sen entente, et leur dist qu’il voloit chevaucier
en France, et qu’il n’estoit mies là venus pour
longement sejourner. Cil signeur respondirent qu’il
estoient tout appareilliet d’aler avoecques lui, et que
30 ossi en avoient il grant desir. Si jettèrent leur avis
l’un par l’autre, que en ceste chevaucie il se trairoient
vers Thoulouse, et iroient passer la rivière de
[161] Garone d’amont desous Thoulouse, au Port Sainte
Marie, car elle estoit durement basse et li saison
belle et sèche: si faisoit bon hostoiier.
§ 357. A ce conseil s’acordèrent li Englès, et fist

5 cescuns son appareil dou plus tost qu’il peut. Si se
departi li princes de Bourdiaus à belles gens d’armes;
et estoient bien quinze cens lances, deux mil arciers
et trois mil bidaus, sans les Bernès que li Gascon
menoient avoecques yaus. Si n’entendirent ces
10 gens d’armes à prendre ne à assallir nulle forterèce,
jusques à tant que il eurent passet le Garone au Port
Sainte Marie, à trois liewes priès de Thoulouse, et le
passèrent adonc à gué; ne, passet avoit vingt ans, cil
dou pays ne l’avoient veu si petite que elle fu en celle
15 saison.
Quant li Englès et li Gascon furent oultre et logiet
ou pays thoulousain, cil de Thoulouse se commencièrent
durement à esbahir quant il sentirent les Englès
si priès d’yaus. En ce temps estoit en le cité de Thoulouse
20 li contes d’Ermignach ouquel cil de Thoulouse
avoient grant fiance, et c’estoit raisons; aultrement il
fuissent trop desconforté et à bonne cause, car il ne
savoient adonc que c’estoit de gerre. Pour ce temps
la cité de Thoulouse n’estoit mies gramment menre
25 que la cité de Paris; mès li contes d’Ermignach fist
abatre tous les fourbours, où en un seul lieu il avoit
plus de trois mil maisons. Et le fist pour ce qu’il ne
voloit mies que li Englès s’i venissent logier ne bouter
les feus.
30 Ce premier jour que li Englès eurent passet la rivière
de Garone, li princes et toute son host se logièrent
[162] dessus le pays en un très biau vignoble, et li
coureur vinrent courir jusques as barrières de Thoulouse.
Et là y eut forte escarmuce des uns as aultres,
des gens le conte d’Ermignach et des Englès. Et quant
5 il eurent fait leur emprise, il retournèrent à leur
host et enmenèrent aucuns prisonniers; si passèrent
celle nuit tout aise, car il avoient bien trouvé
de quoi.
A l’endemain au matin, li princes et tous li baron
10 de l’host et leur sievant s’armèrent et montèrent as
chevaus et se misent en ordenance de bataille, et
chevaucièrent tout arreement, banières desploiies, et
approcièrent le cité de Thoulouse. Lors cuidièrent bien
cil de Thoulouse avoir l’assaut, quant il veirent ensi
15 en bataille les Englès approcier. Si se misent tout en
ordenance as portes et as barrières, par connestablies
et par mestiers. Et se trouvoient bien de communaulté
quarante mil hommes, qui estoient en grant
volenté de issir hors et de combatre les Englès; mès li
20 contes d’Ermignach leur deffendoit et leur aloit au devant.
Et disoit que, se il issoient hors, il s’iroient
tout perdre, car il n’estoient mies usé d’armes ensi
que li Englès et li Gascon, et ne pooient faire milleur
esploit que de garder leur ville. Ensi se tinrent tout
25 quoi cil de Thoulouse, et ne veurent desobeir au
commandement dou conte d’Ermignach qu’il ne leur
en mesvenist, et se tinrent devant leurs barrières.
Li princes de Galles et ses batailles passèrent tout
joindant Thoulouse et veirent bien une partie dou
30 couvenant de chiaus de Thoulouse que, se on les assalloit,
il se deffenderoient. Si passèrent oultre tout
paisievlement sans riens dire, et ne furent ne tret ne
[163] berset, et prisent le chemin de Montgiscart, à trois
liewes avant, en alant vers Charcassonne. Si se logièrent
ce secont jour li Englès et li Gascon assés priès
de là, sus une petite rivière. Et l’endemain bien matin
5 se deslogièrent et approcièrent le forterèce qui n’estoit
fremée, fors de murs de terre et de portes de
terre couvertes d’estrain, car on recuevre ens ou pays
à grant dur de pière. Nequedent cil de Montgiscart
se cuidoient trop bien tenir, et se misent tout à deffense
10 sus les murs et sus les portes. Là s’arrestèrent
li Englès et li Gascon, et disent que celle ville estoit
bien prendable. Si l’assallirent fierement et vistement
de tous lés. Et là eut grant assaut et dur, et pluiseurs
hommes bleciés dou tret et dou jet des pières.
Finablement,
15 elle fu prise de force, et li mur rompu et
abatu; et entrèrent tout chil ens qui entrer y veurent.
Mes li princes n’i entra point ne tout li signeur,
pour le feu, fors que pillart et robeur. Si trouvèrent
en le ville grant avoir; si en prisent douquel
20 qu’il veurent, et le remanant il ardirent. Là eut grant
persecution d’ommes, de femmes et d’enfans, dont
ce fu pités.
Quant il eurent fait leur entente de Montgiscart, il
chevaucièrent devers Avignonlet, une grosse ville et
25 marcheande, et où on fait fuison de draps. Et bien y
avoit à ce donc quinze cens maisons, mais elle n’estoit
point fremée. Et au dehors sus un terne avoit
un chastiel de terre assés fort, où li riche homme de
le ville estoient retret; et cuidoient estre là bien à
30 segur, mais non furent, car on les assalli de grant
randon. Si fu li chastiaus conquis et abatus, et cil
que dedens estoient prisonnier as Englès et as Gascons
[164] qui venir y peurent à temps. Ensi fut Avignonlet
prise et destruite, où il eurent grant pillage; et
puis chevaucièrent devers le Noef Chastiel d’Auri.
§ 358. Tant esploitièrent li Englès que il vinrent

5 à Chastiel Noef d’Auri, une moult grosse ville et bon
chastiel, et raemplie de gens et de biens; mais elle
n’estoit fremée ne li chastiaus ossi, fors de murs de
terre, selon l’usage dou pays. Quant li Englès furent
venu devant, il le commencièrent à environner et
10 assallir fortement, et cil qui dedens estoient à yaus
deffendre. Cil arcier qui devant estoient arouté,
traioient si fort et si ouniement que à painnes se osoit
nulz apparoir as deffenses. Finablement, cilz assaus fu
si bien continués, et si fort s’i esprouvèrent Englès,
15 que la ville de Noef Chastiel d’Auri fu prise et conquise.
Là eut grant occision et persecution d’ommes
et de bidaus. Si fu la ville toute courue, pillie et robée,
et tous li bons avoirs pris et levés; ne li Englès
ne faisoient compte de draps ne de pennes, fors de
20 vaisselle d’argent ou de bons florins. Et quant il tenoient
un homme, un bourgois ou un paysant, il le
retenoient à prisonnier et le rançonnoient, ou il li
faisoient meschief dou corps, se il ne se voloit rançonner.
Si furent la ditte ville et li chastiaus dou Noef
25 Chastiel d’Auri tout ars et abatu, et reversé les murs
à le terre.
Et puis passèrent oultre li Englès devers Charcassonne,
et cheminèrent tant que il vinrent à Villefrance
en Carcassonnois, une bonne ville et grosse
30 et bien seans, et où il demoroient grant fuison de
riches gens.
[165] Saciés que cilz pays de Charcassonnois et de Nerbonnois
et de Thoulousain, où li Englès furent en celle
saison, estoit en devant uns des cras pays dou monde,
bonnes gens et simples gens qui ne savoient que c’estoit
5 de guerre, car onques ne furent guerriiet, ne
n’avoient esté en devant, ançois que li princes de
Galles y conversast. Si trouvoient li Englès et li Gascon
le pays plain et drut, les cambres parées de
kieutes et de draps, les escrins et les coffres plains
10 de bons jeuiaus; mès riens ne demoroit de bon devant
ces pillars; il en portoient tout, et par especial
Gascon qui sont moult convoiteus.
Cilz bours de Villefrance fu tantos pris, et grans
avoirs dedens conquis. Se s’i logièrent et reposèrent
15 demi jour et une nuit li princes et toutes ses gens; à
l’endemain, il s’en partirent et cheminèrent devers le
cité de Carcassonne.
§ 359. La ville de Carcassonne siet sus une rivière

que on appelle Aude, et tout au plain; un petit en
20 sus, à le droite main en venant de Thoulouse, sus un
hault rocier, siet la cités, qui est belle et forte et bien
fremée de bons murs de pière, de portes, de tours,
et ne fait mies à prendre. En le cité que je di, avoient
cil de Carcassonne mis le plus grant partie de leur
25 avoir, et retrait femmes et enfans. Mais li bourgois
de le ville se tenoient en le ville, qui pour celi temps
n’estoit fremée que de chainnes, mais il n’i avoit rue
où il n’en y eust dix ou douze; et les avoit on levées,
par quoi on ne pooit aler ne chevaucier parmi. Entre
30 ces kainnes, et bien à segur, par batailles, se tenoient
li homme de le ville, que on appelle ens ou pays
[166] bidaus à lances et à pavais, et tout ordonné et arresté
pour attendre les Englès.
Quant li doi mareschal de l’host veirent celle
grosse ville, où bien par samblant avoit sept mil maisons,
5 et le contenance de ces bidaus qui se voloient
deffendre, si s’arrestèrent en une place devant le
ville, et consillièrent comment à leur plus grant
pourfit il poroient assallir ces gens: si ques, tout
consideret, consilliet et avisé, il se misent tout à piet,
10 gendarmes et aultres, et prisent leurs glaves; et s’en
vinrent, cescuns sires desous sa banière ou son pennom,
combatre parmi ces chainnes à ces bidaus qui
les recueillièrent ossi faiticement as lances et as pavais.
Là eut fait pluiseurs grans apertises d’armes,
15 car li jone chevalier englès et gascon, qui se desiroient
à avancier, s’abandonnoient et se mettoient en
painne de sallir oultre ces kainnes et de conquerre
leurs ennemis.
Et me samble que messires Ustasses d’Aubrecicourt,
20 qui pour ce temps estoit uns chevaliers moult
ables et moult vighereus et en grant desir d’acquerre,
fu uns des premiers, selonch ce que je fui adonc
enfourmés,
qui le glave au poing salli oultre une
chainne, et s’en vint combatre, ensonniier et reculer
25 ses ennemis. Quant il fu oultre, li aultre le sievirent
et se misent entre ces kainnes, et en conquisent
une, puis deus, puis trois, puis quatre; car avoech
ce que gens d’armes s’avançoient pour passer, arcier
traioient si fort et si ouniement que cil bidau ne
30 savoient auquel entendre. Et en y eut de telz qui
avoient leurs pavais si cargiés de saiettes que merveilles
seroit à recorder. Finablement, ces gens de
[167] Carcassonne ne peurent durer, mès furent reculet,
et leurs kainnes gaegnies sur yaus, et bouté tout
hors de leur ville et desconfi. Si en y eut pluiseur
qui se sauvèrent par derrière, quant il veirent le
5 desconfiture, et passèrent le rivière d’Aude et s’en alèrent
à garant en le cité.
Ensi fu li bours de Carcassonne pris et grant avoir
dedens, car les gens n’avoient mies tout widiet; et
par especial de leurs pourveances n’avoient il riens
10 widiet. Si trouvoient Englès et Gascon ces celiers
plains de vins; si prisent desquelz qu’il veurent, des
plus fors et des milleurs: des petis ne faisoient il
compte. Et ce jour que li bataille y fu, il prisent
pluiseurs riches bourgois que il rançonnèrent bien
15 et chier.
Si demorèrent li princes et ses gens en le ville de
Carcassonne, pour les grosses pourveances qu’il y
trouvèrent, deus nuis et un jour, et ossi pour yaus
et leurs chevaus rafreschir, et pour aviser comment
20 ne par quel voie il poroient faire assaut à le cité qui
leur fust pourfitables; mais elle siet si hault et s’est
si très bien fremée de grosses tours et de bons murs
de pière que, tout consideret, il ne pooient trouver
voie que à l’assallir il ne deuissent plus perdre que
25 gaegnier.
§ 360. Ceste cités de Carcassonne dont je vous parolle

fu anciennement appellée Carsaude, car la rivière
d’Aude s’i keurt au piet desous; et le fisent
fremer et edefiier Sarrasin. Onques depuis on ne vei
30 les murs ne le maçonnement desmentir; et est ceste
où li grans rois de France et d’Alemagne,
[168] Charlemainne, sist sept ans, ançois que il le peuist
avoir.
Quant ce vint au matin, à heure de tierce, que li
princes et li signeur eurent oy messe et beu un cop,
5 il montèrent à chevaus et se misent en ordenance
pour passer le pont et le rivière d’Aude, car il voloit
encores aler avant. Si passèrent tout à piet et à
cheval et assés priès, à le trettie d’un arch de le
cité de Carcassonne. Au passer, on leur envoia des
10 bastions de le forterèce en kanons et en espringalles,
quariaus gros et lons, qui en blecièrent aucuns
en passant, car d’artillerie la cités estoit bien
pourveue.
Quant li princes et tout sen host furent oultre, il
15 prisent le chemin de Cabestain; mais il trouvèrent
ançois deus villes fremées, Ourmes et Tèbres, seans
sus une meisme rivière qu’il pooient passer et rapasser
à leur aise. Ces deux villes estoient bien fremées
de bons murs et de bonnes portes, et tout à plainne
20 terre. Si furent les gens qui dedens estoient si effreé
des Englès, qui avoient pris Carcassonne et pluiseurs
villes en devant, que il s’avisèrent que il se racateroient
à non ardoir et à assallir: si ques, quant li
coureur furent venu à Ourmes, il trouvèrent aucuns
25 bourgois de le ville qui demandèrent se li princes
ou si mareschal estoient en leur route. Cil respondirent
que nennil. «Et pour quoi le demandés vous?»
—«Pour ce que nous volons entrer en trettiés
d’acort, se il y voloient entendre.»
30 Ces parolles vinrent jusques au prince. Si envoia li
dis princes le signeur de Labreth, qui vint jusques à
là, et en fist la composition, parmi douze mil escus
[169] qu’il deurent paiier au prince, dont il livrèrent bons
hostages. Et puis chevaucièrent vers Tèbres, qui se
rançonnèrent ossi. Et tous li plas pays d’environ estoit
ars et bruis sans nul deport.
5 Et sachiés que cil de Nerbonne, de Besiers et de
Montpellier n’estoient mies bien à segur, quant il
sentoient les Englès ensi approcier. Et par especial cil
de Montpellier, qui est ville poissans, rice et marcheande,
estoient à grant angousse de coer, car il n’estoient
10 point fremet. Si envoiièrent li riche homme
la grigneur partie de leurs jeuiaus à sauveté en Avignon
ou ou fort chastiel de Biaukaire.
Tant esploitièrent li Englès que il vinrent à Cabestain,
une bonne ville et forte, seans à deus liewes de
15 Besiers et à deus de Nerbonne. Et vous di que ceste
ville de Cabestain est durement riche, seans sus le
mer, et ont les salines dont il font le sel par le vertu
dou soleil. Si doubtèrent ces gens de Cabestain à tout
perdre, corps et biens, car il estoient faiblement fremet
20 et muret. Si envoiièrent au devant dou prince et de
son host pour trettier que il les laissast en pais, et il
se racateroient selonch leur poissance. Li sires de Labreth,
qui cognissoit auques le pays, faisoit ces trettiés
quant li princes y voloit entendre. Si se rençonnèrent
25 cil de Cabestain à paiier quarante mil escus,
mès que il euissent cinq jours de pouveance, et de
ce livrèrent il ostages. Depuis me fu dit qu’il laissièrent
perdre leurs hostages et ne paiièrent point d’argent,
et se fortefiièrent telement de fossés et de palis
30 que pour attendre le prince et toute son host. Je ne
sçai de verité comment il en ala, se il paiièrent ou
non; mais toutesfois il ne furent point ars ne assalli.
[170] Et s’en vinrent li Englès à Nerbonne, et se logièrent
au bourch.
§ 361. A Nerbonne a cité et bourch. Le bourch

pour le temps estoit une grosse ville non fremée,
5 seans sus le rivière d’Aude, qui descent d’amont devers
Carcassonne; et desous Nerbonne, à trois liewes,
elle chiet en le mer qui va en Cippre et par tout le
monde.
La cité de Nerbonne, qui joint au bourc, estoit
10 assés bien fremée de murs, de portes et de tours. Et
là dedens est li hostelz le conte Aymeri de Nerbonne,
qui, pour ce temps que li princes de Galles et li Englès
se vinrent logier ou bourch, y estoit, et grant fuison
de chevaliers et d’escuiers dou pays nerbonnois
15 et d’Auvergne, que li dis contes y avoit fait venir pour
aidier à garder sa cité. En le cité a canonneries moult
grandes et moult nobles, et sont en une eglise que
on dist de Saint Just, et valent par an bien cinq cens
florins.
20 Ceste marce de Nerbonne est uns des bons et des
cras pays dou monde. Et quant li Englès et li Gascon
y vinrent, il le trouvèrent durement riche et plain.
Voirs est que cil dou bourg de Nerbonne avoient retrait
en le cité leurs femmes et leurs enfans et partie
25 de leur avoir. Et encores en trouvèrent li Englès et
li Gascon assés.
Quant li Englès eurent conquis le bourch de Nerbonne
sus les Nerbonnois, desquelz il y eut mors et
pris assés, il se logèrent à leur aise dans ces biaus
30 hostelz, dont il y avoit à ce jour plus de trois mil.
Et trouvèrent ens tant de biens, de belles pourveances
[171] et de bons vins, qu’il n’en savoient que faire.
Et estoit li intention dou prince que de faire assallir
le cité, ensi qu’il fist, et dou prendre, car dit li fu
que, s’il le prendoient, il trouveroient tant d’or et
5 d’argent dedens, de bons jeuiaus et de riches prisonniers
que li plus povres des leurs en seroit riches à
tous jours. Et ossi li princes attendoit le redemption
de chiaus de Cabestain et d’aucunes villes et chastiaus
en Nerbonnois qui s’estoient rançonné à non ardoir.
10 Et si se tenoient tout aise sus celle belle rivière d’Aude,
yaus et leurs chevaus; et buvoient de ces bons vins
et de ces bons muscades, et toutdis en espoir de plus
gaegnier.
Si devés savoir que ces cinq jours que li princes fu
15 ou dit bourch de Nerbonne, il n’y eut onques jour
que li Englès et Gascon ne fesissent et livrassent cinq
ou six assaus à chiaus de le cité si grans, si fors et si
mervilleus que grant merveilles seroit à penser comment
de çascun assaut il n’estoient pris et conquis.
20 Et l’euissent esté, il n’est mies doubte, se ne fuissent
li gentilhomme qui en le cité estoient; mais cil en
pensèrent si bien et s’i portèrent si vassaument que li
Englès ne li Gascon n’i peurent riens conquerre. Si
s’en partirent li princes et toutes ses gens; mès à leur
25 departement li Englès varlet et pillart paiièrent leur
hoste, car il boutèrent en plus de cinq cens lieus le
feu ou bourch, par quoi il fu tous ars.
Si chevaucièrent li princes et ses gens en retournant
vers Carcassonne, car il avoient tant conquis
30 d’avoir et si en estoient cargié, que pour celle saison
il n’en voloient plus. De quoi cil de Bediers, de
Montpellier, de Luniel et de Nimes, qui bien cuidoient
[172] avoir l’assaut, en furent moult joiant quant il sceurent
que li Englès leur tournoient le dos.
Et vinrent li Englès en une bonne et grosse ville,
par delà la rivière d’Aude, car il l’avoient passet au
5 pont à Nerbonne en Carcassonnois, que on appelle
Limous; et y fait pines plus et milleurs que d’autre
part. Ceste ville de Limous, pour le temps d’adonc,
estoit faiblement fremée; si fu tantost prise et conquise
et grant avoir dedens. Et y eut ars et abatu à
10 leur departement plus de quatre mil maisons et biaus
hosteuz, dont ce fu grans damages.
Ensi fu en ce temps cilz bons pays et cras de Nerbonnois,
de Charcassonnois et de Thoulousain pilliés,
desrobés, ars et perdus par les Englès et par les Gascons.
15 Voirs est que li contes d’Ermignach estoit à
Thoulouse et faisoit son amas de gens d’armes à chevaus
et à piet pour aler contre yaus, mès ce fu trop
tart; et se mist as camps, à bien trente mil hommes,
uns c’autres, quant li Englès eurent tout essilliet le
20 pays. Mais li dis contes d’Ermignach attendoit monsigneur
Jakemon de Bourbon, qui faisoit son amas de
gens d’armes à Limoges et avoit intention d’enclore
les Englès et Gascons, mais il s’esmut ossi trop tart,
car li princes et ses consaus, qui oïrent parler de ces
25 deus grandes chevaucies que li contes d’Ermignach
et messires Jakemes de Bourbon faisoient, s’avisèrent
selonch ce, et prisent à leur departement de Limous
le chemin de Charcassonne, pour rapasser le rivière
d’Aude. Et tant fisent qu’il y parvinrent; si le trouvèrent
30 en l’estat où il le laissièrent, ne nulz ne s’i
estoit encores retrais. Si fu telement pararse et destruite
des Englès que onques n’i demora de ville
[173] pour herbergier un cheval; ne à painnes savoient
li hiretier ne li manant de le ville rassener ne dire
de voir: «Chi sist mes hiretages»; ensi fu elle
menée.
5 § 362. Quant li princes et ses gens eurent rapasset

le rivière d’Aude, il prisent leur chemin vers Montroyal,
qui estoit une bonne ville et fremée de murs
et de portes, et siet en Carcassonnois. Si l’assallirent
fortement quant il furent là venu, et le conquisent de
10 force, et grant pillage dedens que cil dou pays y
avoient attrait sus le fiance dou fort liu. Et là eut
mors grans fuison de bidaus hommes de le ville,
pour tant qu’il s’estoient mis à deffense et qu’il ne
s’estoient volut rançonner. Et fu au departement des
15 Englès la ville toute arse. Et puis prisent le chemin
des montagnes, ensi que pour avaler vers Fougans et
vers Rodais, toutdis ardant et essillant pays et rançonnans
aucune[s] villes fremées et petis fors qui n’estoient
mies tailliet d’yaus tenir. Et devés savoir que
20 en ce voiage li princes et ses gens eurent très grant
pourfit.
Et rapassèrent li Englès et li Gascon tout paisievlement
desous le bonne cité de Thoulouse au Port
Sainte Marie la rivière de Garone, si chargiet d’avoir
25 que à painnes pooient leur cheval aler avant. De quoi
cil de Tholouse furent durement esmeu et couroucié
sus les gentilz hommes, quant il sceurent que li Englès
et Gascon, sans yaus combatre, avoient rapasset
la rivière de Garone et s’estoient mis à sauveté, et en
30 parlèrent moult villainnement sus leur partie. Mais
tout ce se passa: les povres gens le comparèrent qui
[174] en eurent adonc, ensi qu’il ont encores maintenant,
toutdis dou pieur.
Ces chevaucies se desrompirent, car li princes s’en
retourna à Bourdiaus et donna une partie de ses gens
5 d’armes congiet, et especialment les Gascons, pour
aler viseter les villes et leurs maisons. Mais tèle estoit
li intention dou prince, et se leur disoit bien au partir
que, à l’esté qui revenoit, il les menroit un aultre
chemin en France, où il feroient plus grandement
10 leur pourfit qu’il n’avoient fait, ou il y remetteroient
tout ce qu’il avoient conquis et encores dou leur assés.
Li Gascon estoient tout conforté de faire le commandement
dou prince et d’aler tout partout là où
il les vorroit mener.
15 § 363. Nous nos soufferons un petit à parler dou

prince, et parlerons d’aucunes incidenses qui avinrent
en celle saison, qui trop grevèrent le royaume. Vous
avés bien oy compter ci dessus comment messires
Charles d’Espagne fu mors par le fait dou roy de Navare:
20 dont li rois de France fu si courouciés sus le
dit roy, quoiqu’il euist sa fille espousé, que onques
depuis ne le peut amer, comment que par moiiens
et par bonnes gens qui s’en ensonniièrent, li rois de
France, pour eskiewer plus de damage, en celle anée
25 li pardonnast.
Or avint que li consaus dou roy Jehan l’enortèrent
à ce que, pour avoir ayde sus ses guerres, il mesist
aucune gabelle sus le sel où il trouveroit grant
reprise pour paiier ses soudoiiers; se l’i mist li rois,
30 et fu acordé en trop de lieus en France, et le levèrent
li impositeur. Dont pour celle imposition et gabelle
[175] il avint uns grans meschiés en le cité d’Arras en Pikardie;
car li communauté de le ville se revelèrent
sus les riches hommes et en tuèrent sus un samedi,
à heure de tierce, jusques à miedi, quatorze des plus
5 souffissans. Dont ce fu pités et damages, et est quant
meschans gens sont au dessus des vaillans hommes.
Toutes fois il le comparèrent depuis, car li rois y envoia
son cousin monsigneur Jakemon de Bourbon, qui
fist prendre tous chiaus par lesquels li motion avoit
10 estet faite, et leur fist sur le place coper les tiestes.
J’ay de ceste gabelle touchiet un petit, pour tant
que, quant les nouvelles en vinrent en Normendie,
li pays en fu moult esmervilliés, car il n’avoient
point apris de paiier tel cose. En ce temps y avoit
15 un conte en Harcourt, qui siet en Normendie, qui
estoit si bien de chiaus de Roem qu’il voloit: si ques
il dist ou deubt avoir dit à chiaus de Roem qu’il
seroient bien serf et bien meschant, se il s’acordoient
à celle gabelle, et que, se Diex le pooit aidier, elle
20 ne courroit jà en son pays; ne il ne trouveroit si
hardi homme de par le roy de France qui l’i deuist
faire courir, ne sergant qui en levast, pour le
innobediense, amende, qui ne le deuist comparer dou
corps.
25 Li rois de Navare, qui pour ce temps se tenoit en
le conté d’Evrues, en dist otretant, et dist bien que
jà ceste imposition ne courroit en sa terre. Aucun
baron et chevalier dou pays tinrent leur oppinion,
et se alliièrent tout, par foy jurée, au roy de Navare,
30 et li rois avoech yaus. Et furent rebelle as commandemens
et ordenances dou roy, tant que pluiseur
aultre pays y prisent piet.
[176] Ces nouvelles vinrent jusques au roy Jehan, qui
estoit chaus et soudains, comment li rois de Navare,
li contes de Harcourt, messires Jehans de Graville et
pluiseur aultre chevalier de Normendie estoient contraire
5 à ces impositions et les avoient deffendues en
leurs terres. Li rois retint ceste cose en grant orgueil
et grant presumption, et dist qu’il ne voloit nul
mestre en France fors lui. Ceste cose se couva un
petit avoecques aultres haynes que on y atisa, tant
10 que li rois Jehans fu trop malement dur enfourmés
sus le roy de Navare et le conte de Harcourt et ossi
monsigneur Godefroy de Harcourt, qui devoit estre
de leur alliance et uns des principaus.
Et fu dit au roy de France que li rois de Navare
15 et cil de Harcourt devoient mettre les Englès en leur
pays, et avoient de nouviel fait alliance au roy
d’Engleterre. Je ne sçai se c’estoit voirs ou non, ou se on
le disoit par envie; mais je ne croi mies que si vaillant
gent et si noble et de si haute estration vosissent
20 faire ne penser trahison contre leur naturel signeur.
Il fu bien verités que le gabelle dou sel il ne veurent
onques consentir que elle courust en leurs terres. Li
rois Jehans, qui estoit legiers à enfourmer et durs à
oster d’une oppinion, puis qu’il y estoit arrestés, prist
25 les dessus dis en si grant hayne que il dist et jura
que jamais n’aroit parfaite joie tant que il fuissent
en vie.
En ce temps estoit ses ainsnés filz, messires Charles,
en Normendie dont il estoit dus, et tenoit son hostel
30 ens ou chastiel de Roem et ne savoit riens des rancunes
mortèles que li rois ses pères avoit sus le roy
de Navare et le conte de Harcourt et monsigneur
[177] Godefroy son oncle, mès leur faisoit toute le bonne
compagnie qu’il pooit, l’amour et le [vicinage[296]]. Et
avint que il les fist priier par ses chevaliers de venir
disner avoecques lui ou chastiel de Roem. Li rois de
5 Navare et li contes de Harcourt ne li vorrent mies
escondire, mès li acordèrent liement. Toutes fois, se
il euissent creu monsigneur Phelippe de Navare et
monsigneur Godefroy de Harcourt, il n’i fuissent jà
entré. Il ne les crurent pas, dont ce fu folie; mès
10 vinrent à Roem, et entrèrent par les camps ou chastiel,
où il furent receu à grant joie.
Li rois Jehans, qui tous enfourmés estoit de ce fait
et qui bien savoit l’eure que li rois de Navare et li
contes de Harcourt devoient estre à Roem et disner
15 avoec son fil, et devoit estre le samedi, se departi le
venredi à privée mesnie; et chevaucièrent tout ce
jour, et fu en temps de quaresme, le nuit de Pasques
flories. Si entra ens ou chastiel de Roem, ensi que
cil signeur seoient à table, et monta les degrés de
20 la sale, et messires Ernoulz d’Audrehen devant lui,
qui traist une espée et dist: «Nulz ne se mueve
pour cose qu’il voie, se il ne voelt estre mors de celle
espée!»
Vous devés savoir que li dus de Normendie, li
25 rois de Navare, li contes de Harcourt et cil qui
seoient à table, furent bien esmervilliet et esbahi,
quant il veirent le roy de France entrer en le salle et
faire tel contenance, et vosissent bien estre aultre
part. Li rois Jehans vint jusques à la table où il
[178] seoient. Adonc se levèrent il tout contre lui, et li
cuidièrent faire le reverensce, mais il n’en avoit dou
recevoir nul talent. Ançois s’avança parmi la table
et lança son brach dessus le roy de Navare et le prist
5 par le kevèce, et le tira moult roit contre lui, en disant:
«Or sus, traittres, tu n’i es pas dignes de seoir
à la table mon fil. Par l’ame à mon père, je ne pense
jamais à boire ne à mengier, tant com tu vives.»
Là avoit un escuier, qui s’appelloit Colinet de
10 Bleville, et trençoit devant le roy de Navare: si fu
moult courouciés, quant il vei son mestre ensi demener;
et trest son baselaire, et l’aporta en la poitrine
dou roy de France, et dist qu’il l’occiroit. Li
rois laissa à ces cops le roy de Navare aler et dist à
15 ses sergans: «Prendés moy ce garçon et son mestre
ossi.» Macier et sergant d’armes sallirent tantost
avant, et misent les mains sus le roy de Navare et
l’escuier ossi, et disent: «Il vous fault partir de ci,
quand li rois le voelt.»
20 Là s’umelioit li rois de Navare grandement, et
disoit au roy de France: «A! monsigneur, pour
Dieu merci! Qui vous a si dur enfourmé sur moy?
Se Diex m’ayt, onques je ne fis, salve soit vostre
grasce, ne pensay trahison contre vous ne monsigneur
25 vostre fil, et pour Dieu merci, voeilliés entendre
à raison. Se il est homs ou monde qui m’en
voelle amettre, je m’en purgerai par l’ordenance de
vos pers, soit dou corps ou aultrement. Voirs est
que je fis occire Charle d’Espagne, qui estoit mon
30 adversaire; mais pais en est, et s’en ay fait la
penitance.»—«Alés, trahitres, alés, respondi li rois de
France. Par monsigneur saint Denis, vous sarés bien
[179] preecier ou jewer d’enfaumenterie, se vous
m’escapés.»
Ensi en fu li rois de Navare menés en une cambre
et tirés moult villainnement et messires Friches de
5 Frichans, uns siens chevaliers, avoecques lui, et Colinés
de Bleville; ne pour cose que li dus de Normendie
desist, qui estoit en jenoulz et à mains jointes
devant le roy son père, il ne s’en voloit passer ne
souffrir. Et se disoit li dus, qui lors estoit uns jones
10 enfes: «Ha! monsigneur, pour Dieu merci, vous
me deshonnourés. Que pora on dire ne recorder de
moy, quant j’avoie le roy et ces barons priiés de
disner dalés moy, et vous les trettiés ensi? On dira
que je les arai trahis. Et si ne vi onques en eulz que
15 tout bien et toute courtoisie.»—«Souffrés vous,
Charle, respondi li rois: il sont mauvais trahiteur,
et leur fait les descouveront temprement. Vous ne
savés pas tout ce que je sçai.»
A ces mos passa li rois avant, et prist une mace
20 de sergant et s’en vint sus le conte de Harcourt, et
li donna un grant horion entre les espaules et dist:
«Avant, trahittres orguilleus, passés en prison à mal
estrine. Par l’ame mon père, vous sarés bien chanter,
quant vous m’escaperés. Vous estes dou linage
25 le conte de Ghines: vo fourfait et vos trahisons se
descouveront temprement.» Là ne pooit escusance
avoir son lieu ne estre oye, car li dis rois estoit
enflamés de si grant aïr qu’il ne voloit à riens entendre,
fors à yaus porter contraire et damage.
30 Si furent pris à son commandement et ordenance
li dessus nommet, et encores avoech yaus messires
Jehans de Graville, et uns aultres chevaliers qui
[180] s’appelloit messire Maubue, et bouté en prison moult
villainnement. De quoi li dus de Normendie et tous
li hostelz fu durement tourblés, et ossi furent les
bonnes gens de Roem, car il amoient grandement le
5 conte de Harcourt, pour tant qu’il leur estoit propisces
et grans consillières à leurs besoings. Mais
nulz n’osoit aler au devant ne dire au roy: «Sire,
vous faites mal d’ensi trettier ces vaillans hommes.»
Et pour ce que li rois desiroit le fin des dessus
10 nommés, et qu’il se doubtoit que li communautés
de Roem ne l’en fesissent force, car bien sçavoit
qu’il avoient grandement à grasce le conte de Harcourt,
il fist venir avant le roy des ribaus et dist:
«Delivrés nous de telz.» Chilz fu tous appareilliés
15 au commandement dou roy. Et furent trait hors dou
chastiel de Roem et mené as camps li contes de
Harcourt, messires Jehans de Graville, messires Maubue
et Colinés de Bleville. Et furent decolé sans ce
que li rois volsist souffrir que oncques fuissent confessé,
20 excepté l’escuier, mès cesti fist il grasce. Et li
fu dit qu’il mor[r]oit, pour tant que il avoit tret son
baselaire sus le roy. Et disoit li dis rois de France
que trahiteur ne devoient avoir point de confession.
Ensi fu ceste haute justice faite dehors le chastiel
25 de Roem, au commandement dou dit roy: dont
depuis avinrent pluiseurs grans meschiés ou royaume

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Global Covenant The Social Democratic Alternative to

Reporting from Washington The History of the Washington

Elixir Cookbook 1st Edition Pereira

Harmonic Analysis and the Theory of Probability Salomon

The Audience in Everyday Life Living in a Media World

Quasi Monte Carlo Methods in Finance With Application

The Biometric Computing Recognition and Registration

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Dean Zimmerman (Editor)

Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira

Published in the United States of America in 2009 by

and in the United Kingdom by

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List of Acronyms 267

that Chalmers Johnson (1982) identified in Japan, but to look to the

1. From 1995 to 1999 I was a member of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso

duly indebted) to impose on them using the International Monetary Fund

option. Hegemonic thinking sees itself as perfect because it finds legit-

by definition strong but is offset by the real interests of peripheral soci-

Asian countries adopted the opposite policy, namely, the macroeco-

In this book I employ the historical-deductive method, which takes an ob-

that has prevailed in Brazil since 1995, I am focusing on a more con-

themselves. What matters is to believe that all of macroeconomics will

government’s commitment to strict monetary and fiscal policies, instead

This book is on the area of development macroeconomics because

The Conventional Orthodoxy and

development strategy that was enormously successful in promoting

education and scientific and technological development remain as na-

strategy—an international competition strategy; only then will the Brazil-

The Conventional Orthodoxy Defined

Brazil’s inability to attain macroeconomic stability and resume growth

trade openness, or the privatization of competitive industries without aim-

The conventional orthodoxy has dominated the country since the

Nation and Globalization

New developmentalism, like the national developmentalism of the

capitalism, with economic development as an intrinsic part of their

after the failure of the conventional orthodoxy to promote economic

Society’s Cycles and State Cycles

Although this book is concerned with economic and political develop-

before ending this Introduction I permit myself to offer a broad view of

into the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Pact. Yet the national-developmen-

response to President Ernesto Geisel’s April package, the bourgeoisie’s

§ 356. Depuis ceste avenue chevaucièrent toutdis

§ 357. A ce conseil s’acordèrent li Englès, et fist

§ 358. Tant esploitièrent li Englès que il vinrent

§ 359. La ville de Carcassonne siet sus une rivière

§ 360. Ceste cités de Carcassonne dont je vous parolle

§ 361. A Nerbonne a cité et bourch. Le bourch

5 § 362. Quant li princes et ses gens eurent rapasset

15 § 363. Nous nos soufferons un petit à parler dou

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