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Intuitionism
Available now:
Reasons, Eric Wiland
Series Editors:
Thom Brooks is Reader in Political and Legal Philosophy at the
University of Newcastle, UK. He is the founding editor of the Journal
of Moral Philosophy and runs a popular Political Philosophy blog
called The Brooks Blog.
Intuitionism
DAVID KASPAR
L ON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W Y OR K • SY DN EY
www.bloomsbury.com
David Kaspar has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work.
EISBN: 978-1-4411-5986-1
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
Introduction 10
Moral beliefs and intuitionism 11
Methods of intuitionism 13
The fi rst data of ethics 14
Assumptions to avoid 15
Divisions in moral theory 16
Intuitionism 18
Morality in action 20
Commonsense morality? 22
Persistent data 23
Prejudices and social support 24
Chapter summary 25
Introduction 27
Prichard’s point 28
Ross’s intuitionism 30
The downfall of early analytic intuitionism 32
3 Moral knowledge 50
Introduction 50
Empiricism and rationalism 51
Self-evidence explained 52
Moral proofs 54
Justification structures 56
Epistemic appraisal 59
Intuitions 62
Skepticism about intuitions 64
Self-evidence, mathematics, and morality 66
Mere truisms? 67
Synthetic a priori truths 69
You know what’s right 70
Chapter summary 73
Introduction 74
Where in the world is morality? 75
Moral skepticism and moral nihilism 77
Responding to moral nihilism 78
Naturalism and nonnaturalism 80
Supervenience problems 84
Supervenience solutions 87
Expert disagreement 90
Intuitionism and disagreement 93
Chapter summary 97
Introduction 99
Moral explanation 100
Moral relations 101
Properties of moral relations 104
Transactions 105
Moral kinds 107
Promises 109
Variations of conditions for promises 111
Understanding and a priori knowledge 113
The metaphysical status of moral kinds 115
The convention objection 118
Chapter summary 120
Introduction 121
What’s wrong with deontology 122
Intuitionists against intrinsically good action 123
Prichard’s case for intrinsically good action 124
Ross’s case for intrinsically good action 126
Good and right 129
Good and kind 131
Ought 133
Possible moral facts 135
Particular moral facts 138
Explaining supervenience 140
Chapter summary 144
Introduction 146
Moral knowledge and normative ethics 147
Supreme principles of morality 148
Kantianism 150
New Kantianism 153
Utilitarianism 155
Utilitarianism and action-guidance 157
Utilitarianism and moral explanation 159
Virtue ethics 162
Criteria of right action 166
The incorporation project 167
Chapter summary 169
Introduction 170
Which principles? 171
Moral decisions 174
Moral risk 176
Between thought and action 178
The prudence dependency thesis 180
Moral knowledge again 181
The motivation problem 182
The ultimate issues 184
Chapter summary 187
Conclusion 188
Notes 190
References 201
Index 207
So what’s that one thing that sets them apart from us? According
to intuitionism, what distinguishes the inhabitants of this other
world from us is that they believe they know what’s right, many
of us don’t. Everything else is the same. If this picture is true, that
means that our moral thinking is in error today. You might say,
then, that many of us are living in moral perplexity. Our perplex-
ity is partly explained by our awareness of the extreme complexity
of morality itself. But a better part of it is due to factors which
are not primarily moral. Since society’s mores are less uniform
than they once were it doesn’t assure us in our moral beliefs as it
once did. Perhaps more importantly, science, with its technologi-
cal offshoots, has vastly increased our knowledge of everything
but morality. Even if we know very little science we are sure that
morality is not a scientific matter, and sense that ethics cannot
4. Overview
In Chapter 1, I give an outline of intuitionism and provide an
opportunity for testing our moral intuitions. Chapter 2 relates
the fortunes of intuitionism in the past hundred years, explain-
ing both its downfall in the middle of the twentieth century and
its recent revitalization. Chapter 3 makes the case for the intu-
itionist position on moral knowledge and shows why a number
of objections to intuitionism do not pass muster. In Chapter 4,
I review recent attacks on intuitionism, provide some intuitionist
responses, and pinpoint some of the major metaethical challenges
intuitionism must overcome, chief among them being the problem
of moral supervenience. Chapter 5 outlines a theory of the grounds
of intuitionism, a much neglected topic. In my view, explaining
moral rightness requires providing a theory of moral relations and
a theory of moral kinds. In Chapter 6, I show that Prichard and
Ross gave us more reasons to believe than not to believe that mor-
ally right actions are also intrinsically good. I then take this result,
combine it with the theory of moral kinds, and provide an out-
line of moral explanation which overcomes the problem of moral
Introduction
Intuitionism is an old view that has only recently been revived.
What is especially exciting about it is that, despite its age, intui-
tionism has a wide range of promising yet unexplored theoretical
possibilities. Its explanatory power covers a surprising number of
areas. That power is fi rmly rooted in its foundational knowledge.
The fi rst order of business, then, is to bring you into the kind of
basic moral reflection that establishes intuitionism’s foundations.
Since many who oppose it go astray right at the initial stage of
moral inquiry, such elementary reflections form an important part
of the case for intuitionism.
This chapter outlines a big picture perspective of intuitionism
and provides an opportunity to test our moral intuitions. What
I will establish here are intuitionism’s foundations, the methods
by which they are secured, as well as its basic doctrines. Beyond
that I do not present the main arguments to support it or vigor-
ously defend it from any of many attacks. All that will come
later. I do, however, clear up a number of prevalent misunder-
standings of the view. My purpose in all this is to give both
novice and expert ethicists the best opportunity to understand
intuitionism.
One previously unexplored topic is explored here. Intuitionism
explains why we have the moral beliefs we do, in fact, have. More
specifically, it explains why each of us has our moral beliefs, as well
as why civilizations over millennia have consistently adhered to
certain moral principles. The task of explaining our actual moral
they know certain acts are wrong, but be unsure about others.
Other readers, I am equally sure, are surprised to learn that they
have moral knowledge, for they are not aware of having any!
Since the basis of intuitionism is what we really think about
morality, and since we obviously have very different beliefs
about morality, it seems best to start our investigation with each
reader’s personal beliefs. So let us start with what you believe
about morality.
Let us think carefully together about the moral statements
listed below. As you think about each one, try to determine, fi rst,
whether or not you believe it. Having done that, ask how strongly
you hold your belief. Do you feel certain of it? Are you only some-
what convinced? Or is your confidence in a particular judgment
weak? Later I will assess these moral statements. Here is the list: