Review

System 1 vs. System 2 Thinking

Sergio Da Silva

Department of Economics, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianopolis 88040-900, Brazil;

[email protected]

Abstract: This paper explores the dual-processing hypothesis of the mind, Systems 1 and 2, by examining
debates between cognitive and evolutionary psychologists. I structure the discussion in a back-and-forth
manner to emphasize the differences. I show that, while the majority of cognitive psychologists now
embrace the dual-processing theory of the mind, Systems 1 and 2, there are still some who disagree.
Most evolutionary psychologists, in contrast, dispute the existence of System 2, a domain-general mind,
although some disagree. However, a consensus is growing in favor of System 2, although evolutionary
psychologists’ concerns must be addressed. The uniqueness of this review is that it contrasts the
perspectives of cognitive psychologists with evolutionary psychologists, which is uncommon in the
cognitive psychology literature, which tends to overlook evolutionary viewpoints.

Keywords: dual-processing theory of the mind; systems 1 and 2; cognitive psychologists;

evolutionary psychologists

1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that the human mind is specialized for specific domains. But
is there a domain-general mind? Cognitive psychologists concur; however, evolutionary
psychologists find this notion too pricy to accept. The specialization of different cognitive
processes to handle specific types of information or tasks makes the mind domain specific.
This means that the mind is not a single, general-purpose processor capable of handling
all types of information equally well, but rather a collection of specialized modules, each
optimized for a specific type of information or task.
Citation: Da Silva, S. System 1 vs. Most cognitive psychologists now accept the dual-processing theory of the mind,
System 2 Thinking. Psych 2023, 5, which states that the mind operates in two separate but interconnected systems: the auto-
1057–1076. https://doi.org/ matic system and the controlled system. The automatic system is a collection of subsystems
10.3390/psych5040071 known as System 1. It is fast, intuitive, and works unconsciously. It is responsible for
processing information that is readily available in our memory and has been repeated
Academic Editors: Otmar Bock and
Alexander Robitzsch
several times. This system is in charge of our first reactions to situations and emotions. In
contrast, the controlled system, or System 2, is slower and more deliberate. It is in charge of
Received: 1 September 2023 conscious thought, reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. This system is more
Revised: 24 September 2023 adaptable and flexible, allowing us to override our initial reactions and critically evaluate
Accepted: 4 October 2023 information. System 1 is often referred to as the “gut feeling” mode of thought because it
Published: 5 October 2023
relies on mental shortcuts known as heuristics to make decisions quickly and efficiently.
When the information presented is new, complex, or requires conscious thought, System 2
is used. It is frequently referred to as the “thinking” mode of thought because it relies on
Copyright: © 2023 by the author.
effortful processing to reach a conclusion.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. Both systems collaborate to help us process information and make decisions, but
This article is an open access article which system is used depends on the situation and type of information being processed.
distributed under the terms and Understanding the differences between these two systems can help us better understand
conditions of the Creative Commons why we sometimes make intuitive decisions and why we sometimes need to exert conscious
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// effort to solve more complex problems. This theory has important implications, not only
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ in psychology, neuroscience, and economics, but also in marketing and education, where
4.0/). it is used to explain why certain messages are more convincing than others and why

Psych 2023, 5, 1057–1076. https://doi.org/10.3390/psych5040071 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/psych

Psych 2023, 5 1058

certain learning approaches are more effective than others. Seminal works on System 1 and
System 2 thinking are [1–8].
Meta-analyses generally support the dual-processing theory of the mind, finding
evidence for the existence of two distinct cognitive systems and the idea that they can
influence behavior and decision making in different ways [6,9–13]. In contrast, certain
researchers have contended that the theory lacks empirical backing and that the differen-
tiation between System 1 and System 2 thinking is not distinctly outlined or universally
applicable. They claim that the theory is based on anecdotal evidence. This criticism should
not be dismissed in the face of supportive meta-analyses because meta-analyses alone
cannot resolve an issue. A meta-analysis is a statistical method used to merge findings
from several studies, aiming to derive a conclusion regarding a particular research question.
Meta-analysis has the advantages of increased statistical power, improved precision, and
finding integration. However, heterogeneity, study quality, selection bias, data availability,
and model selection are all issues. Meta-analysis has grown in popularity in recent years.
However, it is overused. For instance, textbooks improperly utilize their findings to resolve
a controversy [14]. Some basic references on the pros and cons of meta-analysis are [15–22].
An additional critique is that the differentiation between System 1 and System 2
thinking is excessively simplistic and fails to encompass the intricacies of human cognition.
Several critics argue that there is no clear distinction between these two systems and
that many mental processes involve the integration of both. The dual-processing theory
oversimplifies complex human cognition processes and does not fully capture how the mind
has evolved to process information and make decisions. Detractors contend that the dual-
processing theory of the mind frequently relies on laboratory experiments that inadequately
capture the intricacies of decision making and reasoning in real-world scenarios. They also
claim that the theory is too vague and does not provide clear guidelines for determining
whether a situation requires System 1 or System 2 thinking. This can lead to ambiguity in
the interpretation of results.
Besides that, some evolutionary psychologists are skeptical of the theory because they
do not see clear evolutionary mechanisms explaining why humans evolved to process
information in two ways. As a result, more nuanced and detailed accounts of the processes
involved are required, as is a better understanding of the interactions between the two sys-
tems. This should be taken seriously as a research agenda. Furthermore, some evolutionary
psychologists argue that the dual-processing theory is based on Western, individualistic
perspectives and fails to take cultural and individual differences in thinking styles and
preferences into account. This should also be considered in the future research agenda.
The mind is domain specific for a variety of reasons. First, the brain has evolved to
deal with a diverse set of environmental challenges and opportunities, and different types
of information necessitate different types of processing. Processing visual information, for
example, necessitates different neural circuits and mechanisms than processing auditory
or linguistic information. Second, domain specificity improves efficiency and processing
speed. The brain can optimize neural circuits and processing mechanisms for each type
of information or task by specializing different cognitive processes to specific domains.
Third, domain specificity can aid in the prevention of interference between cognitive
processes. If different types of information or tasks were processed by the same domain-
general cognitive mechanisms, the risk of interference between them would be increased,
potentially impairing overall cognitive performance. This supports modularity. However,
there are evolutionary reasons for the modules to communicate with one another.
Evolutionary psychologists are willing to accept the dual-processing theory of the
mind if it is based on evolution by natural and sexual selection. The difference between
System 1 and System 2 thinking must be the result of evolutionary pressures shaping how
humans think and process information. From this perspective, fast and intuitive System 1
thinking is an adaptation that has evolved to process survival-critical information quickly
and efficiently. For instance, the ability to quickly identify possible threats and respond to
emergencies is a crucial survival trait that evolution would have favored.
Psych 2023, 5 1059

Most evolutionary psychologists believe that there is little evidence to suggest that
System 2 thinking evolved as a distinct cognitive mechanism. What cognitive psychologists
call System 1 and System 2 thinking are more likely products of the same evolved cognitive
processes. However, an increasing number of evolutionary psychologists now believe
that slower and more deliberate System 2 thinking evolved to allow for more careful
and controlled decision making in situations where quick and intuitive decisions are
insufficient. Perhaps System 2 thinking would have been useful for solving complex
problems and making long-term decisions about survival and reproductive success. In
such cases, the modules must communicate with one another. Specialized mechanisms
must be interchangeable or transferable across domains. As a result, a more nuanced view
of the mind that recognizes both domain-specific and domain-general processes is possible.
This is evidenced in this review.
When discussing the disagreements between cognitive and evolutionary psychologists
regarding the roles of Systems 1 and 2, I use a back-and-forth methodology to underline
the differences. The goal is to show that, while the majority of cognitive psychologists now
support the dual-processing theory of the mind, some still disagree. However, there is rising
support for System 2, despite the concerns of evolutionary psychologists. The significance
of this review is that it highlights this contrast, a unique perspective in cognitive psychology
literature that typically overlooks evolutionary viewpoints. The literature on this topic is
vast; thus, I will focus on works directly linked to the controversy. Nonetheless, in the final
section, I comment on recent developments that may indirectly add to the debate.
The review is organized as follows after this introduction. Section 2 presents the
standard viewpoint of evolutionary psychologists who challenge the existence of System 2.
Section 3 examines cognitive psychologists’ reactions to the denial of a domain-general
mind. Section 4 crystallizes the cognitive psychologists’ point of view. Section 5 shows
that other cognitive psychologists are likewise doubtful of System 2. Section 6 shows how
some evolutionary psychologists are beginning to accept a domain-general mind. Finally,
Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.

2. Attack of Evolutionary Psychologists

Mainstream cognitive psychology is founded on a number of fundamental assumptions
that evolutionary psychology challenges. Cognitive psychologists believe that cognitive
architecture is all-purpose and devoid of content [23]. For example, information processing
devices responsible for food choice would be the same as for mate and habitat choice. The
capacity for reasoning, learning, imitation, goal-oriented actions, recognizing similarities,
conceptualizing, and memory retention exemplify general-purpose mechanisms.
Conversely, most evolutionary psychologists hold the opposing viewpoint: the mind
comprises numerous specialized mechanisms, each finely tuned to address distinct prob-
lems [24]. This modularity explains why people have different cognitive strengths and
weaknesses, and why some people are better than others at certain types of processing.
Modular processes are fast, mandatory, domain specific, informationally encapsulated,
cognitively impenetrable, facilitated by specific neural architecture, susceptible to idiosyn-
cratic pathological breakdown, and of fixed developmental sequence [25,26]. Modularity
enables faster processing and greater accuracy in specific domains and provides a parsi-
monious explanation of cognitive processes by implying that different types of processing
can be accounted for by different specialized modules rather than a single domain-general
mechanism. Seminal works on modularity are [25–33].
Given that cognitive psychology views the mind as a versatile information-processing
tool, limited consideration is directed towards the selection of stimuli for cognitive ex-
periments. Frequently, cognitive psychologists choose stimuli primarily based on their
ease of presentation and experimental control. Triangles, squares, and circles are used in
studies rather than natural categories such as relatives, partners, enemies, or edible objects.
Because artificial stimuli lack “content”, they are preferred. For instance, in memory studies,
nonsensical syllables are occasionally employed to avoid interference from real words with
Psych 2023, 5 1060

meaningful syllables. Nevertheless, the rationale behind using such devoid-of-meaning

artificial stimuli becomes valid only if the mind functions as a general-purpose information
processor. If cognitive mechanisms are specialized to process information in specific tasks,
it makes less sense [24].
According to evolutionary psychologists, another core presumption of cognitive psy-
chology is “functional agnosticism”, asserting that the study of information processing
mechanisms can occur without a full grasp of the specific adaptive issues they evolved
to address. Ultimate (functional) explanations supplement purely proximate (causal)
explanations by framing them in terms of survival value or function. Why does that
bird sing so much more in the spring? The proximate explanation is that longer days
cause hormonal changes, whereas the ultimate explanation is that it attracts breeding
partners. The goal of evolutionary psychology is to find ultimate explanations for the
study of human cognition [24]. In a similar vein, evolutionary psychologists posit that
comprehending the functioning of human cognitive processes—such as categorization,
reasoning, judgment-making, and memory retention—necessitates a prior understanding
of these processes’ underlying functions, much like we need to grasp the primary role of
the human liver (filtering out toxins) to understand it. These activities are carried out by
cognitive mechanisms.
The following are the fundamental assumptions of evolutionary psychology [28]:
(1) The human mind consists of evolved information-processing mechanisms, intricately
woven into the nervous system. (2) These mechanisms and their developmental programs
are adaptations shaped by natural and sexual selection across ancestral environments over
evolutionary epochs. (3) Numerous mechanisms exhibit functional specialization, driving
behaviors that effectively address particular adaptive challenges, such as mate selection,
language acquisition, and cooperation. (4) For effective functional specialization, many
mechanisms necessitate a comprehensive content structure.
Most cognitive psychologists, in contrast, accept the hypothesis of domain-general
cognitive mechanisms, which stem from the behaviorists’ domain-general learning pro-
cess [28,34]. One flaw in this hypothesis is that it ignores the existence of information
sets that cognitive mechanisms have been specifically designed by evolution to process.
A computer is also a domain-general information processor, but without “combinatorial
explosion” issues. If the mind were a domain-general program with no processing rules,
it would be confronted with a dizzying array of options. Assume you need to make
100 decisions in the first minute and another 100 in the second. There will be 10,000
possible combinations (100 × 100) after only two minutes. One million in three minutes
(100 × 100 × 100), and so on [28]. The computer does not experience this combinatorial
explosion because we program specific tasks for it, greatly reducing its set of decisions to
make. However, the domain-general mind hypothesis of cognitive psychology does not
specify these types of programs. Evolutionary psychology, however, sees them as issues of
survival and reproduction.
Cognitive psychology will always be rooted in computational theories [35]. A compu-
tational theory defines a problem as well as the mechanism for solving it. This means that
it specifies the information processing mechanism’s function [23]. The foundational princi-
ples of computational theory include: (1) Problem solving involves information processing
mechanisms. (2) These mechanisms solve problems by considering their inherent structure.
(3) To elucidate a mechanism’s structure, comprehension of the problem it was designed
to solve and its purpose is essential. However, computational theory on its own does
not outline how a mechanism resolves an adaptive problem, as each problem possesses
multiple potential solutions.
Computational theories do not negate the requirement for scientific experiments to
test hypotheses about problem-solving strategies in organisms. Instead, they narrow down
the possibilities by outlining what is necessary for a successful solution. This process
allows computational theories to eliminate many non-viable solutions for an adaptive
problem. An important constraint for evolutionary psychologists is that information
Psych 2023, 5 1061

pertinent to solving human adaptive problems must have been recurrently present in
ancestral environments. Consequently, humans (and possibly other species as well [36])
possess numerous specialized psychological mechanisms, each dedicated to addressing
specific adaptive challenges [24].
Steven Pinker [37] encapsulates the viewpoint of evolutionary psychologists as fol-
lows (p. 75): “The idea that a solitary, general substance could excel in perceiving depth,
managing hands, alluring a mate, nurturing offspring, eluding predators, and outwitting
prey, devoid of some level of specialization, lacks credibility. Suggesting that the brain over-
comes these challenges solely through ‘plasticity’ is akin to asserting that it accomplishes
them through magic”. Yet, while the majority of evolutionary psychologists agree with this
viewpoint, there are those who believe that in addition to specialized mechanisms, humans
have also developed domain-general mechanisms [38–43].
Examples of these general systems include general intelligence, concept creation,
analogical reasoning, working memory, and classical conditioning. Working memory is the
portion of short-term memory that pertains to conscious perceptual and verbal processing
occurring in the present moment. Classical (Pavlovian) conditioning refers to association-
based learning. General intelligence is the fluid capacity to integrate multiple cognitive
abilities in order to tackle a novel problem. Evolutionary psychologists who recognize
domain-general mechanisms contend that while recurring features of adaptive challenges
lead to specialized adaptations, humans encountered numerous novel problems without
frequent recurrence for dedicated adaptations to develop.
One instance illustrating the interplay between domain-specific and domain-general
processes is found in Baddeley and Hitch’s working memory model. This model under-
scores the significance of temporarily storing and manipulating information for cognitive
tasks. While the model primarily centers on the central executive and the phonological loop,
it also introduces the notion of domain-specific “slave systems”, such as the visuospatial
sketchpad and the phonological store. This situation presents a notable tension between
the concept of distinct sensory modules and the assumption of universal computational
operations in working memory, often rooted in learning mechanisms such as Hebbian
plasticity (the process through which information is encoded and retained in neurons in
the brain) and long-term potentiation (the strengthening of synapses resulting in a lasting
enhancement of signal transmission between neurons).
Within the realm of working memory, Baddeley and Hitch’s model does imply a
degree of domain specificity through its separate slave systems catering to different
types of information. Nevertheless, the central executive component, responsible for
directing attention and manipulating information, is commonly viewed as more domain-
general in nature. Consequently, it becomes evident that domain-specific modules may
indeed collaborate with domain-general processes to facilitate the execution of complex
cognitive tasks.
Furthermore, we tackle outdated adaptive problems in innovative ways. For instance,
we procure food from vending machines, tools from hardware stores, and partners through
the Internet. Humans were able to thrive in environments that were continually changing
and vastly dissimilar to the Pleistocene [41]. General intelligence appears to have developed
to address non-recurring difficulties (associated with quickly changing surroundings) in
pursuit of evolutionary goals or to discover novel answers to existing problems. Quickly
changing ecosystems include unpredictable temperature changes, variations between ice
ages and hot, dry summers, and rapid changes caused by the activity of volcanoes and
earthquakes [41]. Throughout the course of human evolution, numerous information
patterns were highly varied, which may have favored the creation of more generic, open-
minded psychological systems. There is a need for domain-general mechanisms to deal
with novelty, unpredictability, and variability [40,44].
Despite these arguments, most evolutionary psychologists are skeptical that domain-
general mechanisms evolved. General intelligence could potentially represent a domain-
specific adaptation targeting a particular category of challenges—specifically, those that
Psych 2023, 5 1062

are evolutionarily unprecedented [45]. Demonstrating proficiency in evolutionarily novel

activities such as using the Internet or driving a car does not necessarily indicate domain-
general adaptations. We can train a bear to ride a bicycle or a dolphin to groove to rock
music, but this does not automatically infer that the adaptations facilitating these new
behaviors are widespread [46].
Hence, the presumption of general processing mechanisms presents at least two
significant challenges: (1) The earlier-mentioned combinatorial explosion issue, wherein
unrestricted general mechanisms could generate an infinite array of potential behaviors.
This would leave individuals unable to discern effective adaptive solutions from the
multitude of unsuccessful ones. (2) Defining a successful adaptive solution varies across
domains. Qualities essential for sound food selection, for instance, differ from those
essential for favorable mate choice.
In summary, within the realm of evolutionary psychology, it remains premature to
definitively conclude whether humans possess domain-general mechanisms alongside the
established domain-specific mechanisms. But one thing is certain: the domain-specific
mind assumption has been successfully used to discover important mechanisms, and it
remains to be seen whether the domain-general mind assumption will yield comparable
empirical discoveries [24]. But another thing is certain too: the human mind cannot have
separate and isolated mechanisms.
Evolution favors specialized mechanisms that collaborate well and in a variety of
combinations. The adaptations interact with one another [24]. Certain mechanisms’ data
provides information to others. Internal data from sight, smell, and hunger help determine
whether a food is edible. There is no information encapsulation in adapted psychological
mechanisms [47], and thus no modularity. If information were encapsulated, psychological
mechanisms could only access independent information and could not access information
from other psychological mechanisms. There must also be supermechanisms that specialize
in ordering and regulating other mechanisms. A man walking through a forest, for example,
may come across a hungry lion, a bush full of ripe fruit, and a receptive female. Initially,
he might opt to steer clear of the lion, even if it means passing up on the fruits and
sexual opportunity. He may choose to pick some fruits before fleeing from the lion if he
is starving. His psychological mechanisms interact in a variety of ways and are activated
and deactivated in unpredictable patterns [24]. In computer science, supermechanisms that
specialize in ordering and regulating other mechanisms are known as daemons.

3. Cognitive Psychologists Fight Back

Keith Stanovich [48] summarizes cognitive psychologists’ responses to the funda-
mental criticisms of evolutionary psychologists. As previously stated, the majority of
evolutionary psychologists deny the existence of domain-general processing mechanisms.
As a result, they accept the modularity hypothesis. However, the majority of cognitive psy-
chologists are opposed to modularity [49–51]. System 2 is the term cognitive psychologists
use to describe domain-general processing mechanisms, as seen. System 1, also known
as TASS (The Autonomous Set of Systems), is the term for domain-specific processing. In
terms of genes, System 1 maximizes inclusive fitness, which is an indicator of an individ-
ual’s overall contribution to the next generation, accounting for both its own offspring and
the offspring of its relatives. Based on the individual’s ultimate goals, System 2 calculates
utility maximizing actions. Analytical processing is required for an individual to maximize
their utility in situations other than those found in evolutionary adaptation environments.
This necessitates System 2 overriding System 1 [48].
According to cognitive psychologists [48], the evolutionary psychologists’ adaptation-
ist approach focuses on functional dimensions and minimizes individual differences among
humans caused by genetic variability, which would be functionally superficial [28]. As a
result, they regard general intelligence and other inherited personality traits as functionally
secondary. The issue is that general intelligence and other personality traits are essential
for maximizing personal utility, which includes the pursuit of status.
Psych 2023, 5 1063

Cognitive psychologists observe that evolutionary psychologists often downplay the

impacts of discrepancies between the environment of evolutionary adaptations and the
present-day environment. There would not have been much of a difference between
then and now. Nonetheless, there are unnatural pressures for decontextualization in the
modern world. Conflicts between System 1 and System 2 result from this, as demon-
strated by Kahneman and Tversky’s agenda of heuristics and biases [52]. The settings in
which System 1 performs best—frequently rehearsed, frequency-coded, time-constrained,
recognition-based decisions—do not always exist in the modern world. Representative-
ness, availability, sunk cost, confirmation biases, overconfidence, and other consequences
that hinder an individual’s capacity to maximize utility result from the conflict between
System 1 and System 2.
Cognitive illusions, for example, arise when confronted with probability representa-
tions other than the frequentist one. For example, “40 people out of 1000 have symptoms”,
rather than “4% have symptoms”, is more understandable. However, the frequentist rep-
resentation does not eliminate the cognitive bias any more than the Muller-Lyar visual
illusion is eliminated after we “learn” to see it. Lines with arrow-like tails are used in
the Muller-Lyar illusion, with one line having inward-facing tails and the other having
outward-facing tails. The line with inwardly pointing tails appears shorter, while the line
with outwardly pointing tails appears longer.
Cognitive biases are systematic errors in thinking that can lead to incorrect judgments
and choices. In the dual-processing theory of the mind, cognitive biases are often associated
with System 1 thinking. System 1 makes decisions quickly and efficiently using heuristics,
which are simple rules of thumb, but this can lead to systematic biases. In contrast, System 2
thinking is thought to be less prone to biases because it is more likely to engage in critical
evaluation of information, consider multiple perspectives, and weigh the evidence carefully.
In practice, however, it is not always the case that System 2 thinking is free from biases,
and many biases can persist even when we are engaging in more deliberate and reflective
thinking. For example, memes are another source of persistence of bias in System 2 thinking.
Memes are units of cultural transmission that are analogous to genes. This highlights the
complex interplay between System 1 and System 2 thinking and suggests that biases are the
result of a more complex interplay of multiple cognitive and emotional processes, rather
than being solely the result of one system or the other.
Contrary to the heuristics and biases approach, some cognitive psychologists agree
with evolutionary psychologists who do not recognize System 2. Earlier frequentist repre-
sentations were shown to remove cognitive biases in non-frequentist probability format
experiments [53]. System 1 understands frequentist representation but not non-frequentist
representations such as Bayesian probability. However, many frequentist versions of base-
rate problems are computationally simpler and thus cannot be directly compared to the
non-frequentist version [54,55]. The System 1 heuristics, developed for the Pleistocene era,
are not suited for attaining rationality in the contemporary world. Many modern decisions
did not exist in the environment of evolutionary adaptations, and we did not have time to
train and collect data on their frequency. As a result, we must use various inference rules to
make logical and probabilistic inferences. Furthermore, we must filter a large amount of
information coming from our autonomous modules that could stymie a decision.
Evolution by natural and sexual selection, according to evolutionary psychologists,
built the human mind’s decision-making machinery, and this set of cognitive devices de-
fines and constitutes the universal human principles that guide decision making. Therefore,
evolutionary psychology ought to furnish a compilation of universally shared human
preferences, along with methodologies for obtaining and rearranging supplementary pref-
erences [56]. Cognitive psychologists do not deny this, but they caution against ignoring
the role of culture in determining human preferences. However, culture has evolutionary
roots as well. Slow biological evolution has given way to rapid cultural evolution. Even
so, this is also the result of natural and sexual selection, and the agents through which
this selection operates are memes. Memes live in people’s heads and replicate like viruses,
Psych 2023, 5 1064

infecting other people’s heads. Cultural evolution eliminates less adapted memes while
spreading more adapted memes, greatly accelerating cultural change [57].

4. The Reasserted Point of View of Cognitive Psychologists

Evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience, according to cognitive
psychologists, points to the existence of two minds in the brain [4,58]. This has nothing
to do with the dualism mind–brain, as the mind can still be considered simply as brain
activity [59]. Two systems compete to influence our perceptions and actions. System 1 is
an ancient evolutionary mechanism shared with other animals. Its subsystems comprise
innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired through a domain-general
learning mechanism. On the other hand, System 2 is a recent evolutionary development
that is distinctly human. It facilitates abstract reasoning and hypothesis-driven thinking.
System 2 correlates with general intelligence measures. However, it has a limited working
memory capacity. Our actions often rely on System 1 decision-making processes rooted in
previous experiences, wherein we repeat successful past approaches. These intuitive choices
demand minimal contemplation. Alternatively, decisions can be formed by constructing
mental models or simulating future scenarios, a task for which System 2 is employed. The
literature assigns several labels to Systems 1 and 2 [6,7,25,48,60–75]. However, we cannot
expect these labels to be consistent from one author to the next [58].
A classic experiment to study attention is the Stroop task, which shows the conflict
between automatic System 1 and controlled processing System 2 thinking. It is the most
straightforward evidence for the existence of the two systems. Participants are given a list
of words that are printed in various colors. The task is to identify the color of the ink used to
print the word while ignoring the word itself. The task is made more difficult by presenting
incongruent stimuli, such as words printed in different colors of ink, such as “blue” printed
in red ink. Participants encounter a conflict between a task they intend to complete using
System 2 and an automatic response from System 1 that interferes with it. That is, System 2
is in charge of self-control [1]. It is difficult to break the habit of responding to the color in
the Stroop task after years of learning to read words. When participants succeed, however,
they increase activity in the areas of the cortex responsible for color vision while decreasing
activity in the areas responsible for word identification [59].
According to cognitive psychologists, there is also evidence of dual-process reasoning
in tasks exhibiting the belief bias effect [76]. In these tasks, participants attempt to reason
logically according to the instructions, but prior beliefs interfere with the answers provided.
There are four types of syllogisms: (1) a legitimate argument and a credible conclusion
(absence of conflict); (2) a legitimate argument and an unbelievable conclusion (presence of
conflict); (3) an illegitimate argument and a credible conclusion (presence of conflict); and
(4) an illegitimate argument and an unbelievable conclusion (no conflict). When accepting
or rejecting the conclusions of these syllogisms, the belief bias effect appears. Participants
are more likely to accept a conclusion if it stands on its own merits. The belief bias
effect makes it difficult to deduce the conclusion logically from the premises. Cognitive
psychologists believe that this indicates that System 2 is having difficulty removing the
belief suggested by System 1.
Cognitive psychologists also find evidence from neuroscience for the dual-reasoning
process. Though neither system has a single location in the brain [1], in brain images taken
by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), there is evidence of neural differentiation
of reasoning with abstract material and with material that uses semantic-rich problems [77].
Content-based reasoning engages the left hemisphere’s temporal lobe, while abstract formal
problem solving triggers activity in the parietal lobe. Commonly shared neural regions
include the bilateral basal ganglia nucleus, the right cerebellum, the fusiform gyrus, and
the left prefrontal cortex. For syllogistic reasoning, two distinct regions are involved.
In tasks inducing the belief bias effect, Goel and Dolan [78] utilized fMRI. In syllogism
tasks where participants make logically correct decisions, the right inferior prefrontal
cortex activates. Conversely, belief-biased incorrect responses activate the medial ventral
Psych 2023, 5 1065

prefrontal cortex—a component of the mammalian brain. Supporting this, the medial
ventral prefrontal cortex is linked to intuitive and heuristic responses akin to those from
System 1 [78]. Furthermore, in a study using positron emission tomography (PET), access
to deductive logic was found to involve the right medial ventral prefrontal cortex, which is
an area known to be associated with emotions [79].
Cognitive psychologists see the correspondence bias, which can be seen in the Wason
selection task, as additional evidence that mental processes are dual. Wason [80] wanted
to know if people can be Popperian: if they are well equipped to test hypotheses in
everyday life by looking for evidence that potentially falsifies them. The Wason selection
task evaluates the potential violation of the conditional hypothesis “if P then Q” across four
distinct situations, each illustrated using a set of four cards. When P is true but Q is false,
an assumption of the form “if P then Q” is violated.
In the abstract version of the Wason selection task, participants are presented with a
conditional statement and presented with four cards. Each card displays a letter on one
side and a number on the other. The objective is to determine which card or cards need to
be flipped over to ensure that a statement such as “If there is an A on one side of the card,
there is a 3 on the other side” remains consistent without being proven false. Remember
that the statement “if P then Q” is only violated when P is true but Q is false. As a result,
the logically correct answers are P and not Q. This means that when we turn the P card over
and find a not Q behind it, or when we turn the not Q card over and find a P on the other
side, the rule is broken. The stated rule would not be broken by turning over cards A and 7.
The most common choices, however, are A or A and 3, in which case the correspondence
bias occurs. Typically, less than 25% of participants correctly answer A and 7. There is
a proclivity to select cards that are lexically corresponding (A and 3), regardless of their
logical status.
The correspondence bias is a System 1 heuristic. Humans are not born with the ability
to detect violations of descriptive or causal rules. The brain evolved to aid in survival
and reproduction, not to uncover the truth. When social contracts are involved, however,
performance on the Wason selection task improves [81]. Applying the identical format as
the earlier abstract example, wherein the statement is “If a person is drinking beer, that
person must be over the age of 18”, the correct P and not Q cards—namely, “drinking beer”
and “16 years old”—are reversed on more than 70% of occasions. According to cognitive
psychologists, there is evidence in neuroscience that the correspondence bias reflects the
existence of two minds. Those who successfully overcome the bias activate distinct brain
regions [82].
Lastly, cognitive psychologists highlight archaeological findings indicating that hu-
mans developed System 2, meant for domain-general reasoning, subsequent to the existence
of autonomous subsystems (System 1). Notably, approximately 50,000 years ago, there was
a sudden rise in representational art and religious imagery, along with swift transformations
in instrument and artifact design [83].
However, the dual-mind idea contradicts evolutionary psychologists’ focus on the
mind’s massive modularity, even when engaged in domain-general reasoning, and the
fact that domain-specific mechanisms make more evolutionary sense than domain-general
reasoning abilities. The potential late evolution of System 2 implies differentiating between
evolutionary rationality (the logic of System 1) and individual rationality (the logic of
System 2) [84]. With less direct genetic influence, System 2 enables humans to follow their
own goals rather than those of their genes [48].
The cognitive reflection test [85] is a direct assessment of individual cognitive ability,
gauging the interplay between their Systems 1 and 2. Higher scores on this test indicate
greater proficiency in utilizing System 2 to counteract System 1 inclinations. Comprising
three questions tailored to evoke compelling yet incorrect automatic responses, the cognitive
reflection test unfolds as follows: (1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make
5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (3) In a lake, there
Psych 2023, 5 1066

is a patch of lily pads. Each day, the patch’s size doubles. If it takes 48 days to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take to cover half of the lake? The accurate answers are 5, 5,
and 47, correspondingly, whereas the intuitive (yet incorrect) answers are 10, 100, and 24.
In a separate approach, [86] present an alternative questionnaire. While the test main-
tains a positive correlation with general intelligence assessments, it remains distinct from
them. As it evaluates the capacity to counteract impulsive initial responses (known as
cognitive reflection), the cognitive reflection test holds the potential for superior predictive
accuracy in decision making, particularly within scenarios concerning risk and intertempo-
ral choice [85]. Better decision making, after all, is dependent on the test’s broad rationality
rather than algorithmic intelligence. Women perform worse on the cognitive reflection
test than men. Furthermore, atheists outperform religious people [87]. A weaker System 2
is not always a bad thing in terms of evolution, however. Perhaps women and religious
individuals are “more evolutionarily adapted”, resulting in a more robust System 1.
In the context of the dual-processing theory of the mind, “nudges” can be viewed
as a method of influencing System 1 thinking. Nudges are low-cost, gentle interventions
that aim to influence behavior by making it easier for individuals to make good decisions.
They are commonly used in behavioral economics and are based on the idea that individ-
uals are frequently influenced by the context in which they make decisions rather than
their underlying preferences. Nudges are frequently designed to take advantage of the
automatic, intuitive, and quick-acting nature of System 1 thinking. Nudges can influence
people’s decisions by making certain options more visible, accessible, or prominent, with-
out requiring them to engage in more deliberate and reflective System 2 thinking. A nudge
could be as simple as presenting options in a specific order or using specific cues or labels
to highlight certain options. These nudges work because they influence the unconscious
processes associated with System 1 thinking rather than requiring people to conduct a more
deliberate and reflective analysis of their options. Nudges, while effective at influencing
behavior, can also be contentious.
Nudges have the following advantages: (1) they are low-cost and simple to implement;
(2) they can be more effective than traditional policy instruments; and (3) they are generally
non-intrusive. The disadvantages include: (1) they can be seen as paternalistic or manipula-
tive; (2) they can be designed and implemented in ways that reflect the biases and interests
of those who design and implement them; (3) they can be less effective than traditional
policy instruments in some situations; (4) they can have unintended consequences and can
be dangerous in the age of big data [88].
In addition, nudges fail to acknowledge the influence of memes. While memes [57] are
frequently linked with quick and spontaneous responses (System 1), they can also demand
more deliberate and analytical thought (System 2), such as those that rely on wordplay
or obscure cultural or political references. For instance, when an individual gets a tattoo
or adopts an ideology, they are making a conscious memetic choice that reduces their
utility and inclusive fitness. Because System 2 memes can also result in poor judgment
and decision making, they are uncontrollable by nudges designed to promote System 2
dominance over System 1 thinking.

5. The View of Dissident Cognitive Psychologists

At this point, it is clear that most cognitive psychologists agree that there are two
distinct mental processes known as System 1 and System 2, and that some evolutionary
psychologists are starting to accept the two-mind theory as well [24]. However, a small
group of cognitive psychologists, dubbed “ecological theorists” by their colleagues, agree
with the still dominant view among evolutionary psychologists that denies the existence of
domain-general mental processes (System 2).
According to these ecological theorists, intuitive and deliberate judgments are based
on common principles [89–91]. They contend that the evidence supporting the dual theory
is consistent with a single system theory [89]. Moreover, they contend that the theories
of the two systems lack clear conceptual definitions, rest on questionable methodologies,
Psych 2023, 5 1067

and depend on insufficient and often inadequate empirical support [90]. They claim
that dual-reasoning process theories demonstrate the retrocession of precise theories to
substitutes [92]. Additionally, they provide reasoning and empirical substantiation in
favor of a rule-based theoretical framework. This framework elucidates both intuitive
and thoughtful judgments while challenging the notion of dual systems characterized by
qualitatively distinct processes [91].
In the perspective of ecological theorists [91], rules serve as inferential tools for tasks
such as categorization, estimation, pairwise comparisons, and judgment, extending beyond
provided information. A rule takes the form of an if–then relation, akin to syllogistic
reasoning: if (clues), then (judgment). Consequently, rule-based judgments follow a
deductive approach. Notably, the same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate
judgments. The accuracy of both types hinges on how well the rules align with the
environment—an ecological rationality of rules. Thus, intuitive and deliberative judgments
are both rooted in rules. These rules may adopt either an optimizing or heuristic nature.
Nonetheless, a challenge arises in selecting appropriate rules for such judgments.
How do individuals choose a rule from their adaptive repertoire for a specific problem?
This choice is bound by the task and memory content, narrowing down the viable rules.
The ultimate selection of a rule, however, rests on processing capacity and perceived
ecological rationality. When multiple rules possess similar ecological rationales, a rule
conflict can emerge. The proper implementation of a specific rule might face interference
from competing rules. These rules are rooted in fundamental cognitive abilities, such as
recognition memory. Variations in these abilities among individuals impact how swiftly and
accurately a rule is executed. Rules, which encompass both intuitive heuristics founded
on stereotypes and deliberative logic-based rules, can exhibit varying degrees of ease
or difficulty in application. This depends on their level of routine integration and their
immediate accessibility. Individuals endowed with higher processing capabilities adeptly
employ both easy and challenging rules, guided by their perceived ecological rationality. In
contrast, individuals with limited processing capacity solely utilize straightforward rules
to guide their judgments. The accuracy of both intuitive and deliberate judgments hinges
on the ecological rationality of the employed rule. It is important to note that increased
complexity in rules does not necessarily equate to heightened accuracy compared to simpler
rules. Similarly, statistical rules do not inherently outperform heuristic rules in terms
of accuracy.
Nothing is more intuitive and automatic than visual illusions. For ecological theorists,
even the most basic perceptual judgments are rule-based. A figure with dots on the left that
appear concave and those on the right that appear convex inverts after turning the figure
upside down is an example of one of these illusions. This arises from the brain’s creation
of a three-dimensional mental model, utilizing shaded parts of dots to speculate about
the dots’ extension in the third dimension. In forming this speculation, the brain relies on
two assumptions: (1) that light originates from above (in relation to retinal coordinates);
and (2) that a single light source exists. Consequently, the visual illusion is founded on an
inferential rule that hinges on these two environmental attributes [93]. In times when the
sole light sources were the sun or moon, the brain adhered to a straightforward guideline: dots
with shadows on top were perceived as receding into the surface, while those with shadows
on the bottom were interpreted as protruding from the surface. This optical illusion aptly
showcases how automatic, rapid, and effort-free intuitive processes conform to heuristic rules.
The rule’s justification is ecological; it is suited to the environment. The heuristic rule that
uses the above properties 1 and 2 leads to good inferences in the three-dimensional world;
however, the rule leads to a visual illusion in the two-dimensional figure.
Ecological theorists emphasize ten adaptive toolbox heuristics that underpin both
intuitive and deliberate judgments: (1) recognition [94], which establishes that if one of
two alternatives is recognized, you should deduce that it is the most important; (2) flu-
ency [95,96] asserts that if you identify two choices, but one stands out as being recognized
more swiftly, you can infer that it holds greater significance; (3) choose the best [97], which
Psych 2023, 5 1068

states that you should first look for clues in expiration order, then stop looking for a
track that is recognized, and finally choose the alternative that this track suggests; (4)
tallying [98], which states that when estimating a criterion, you should ignore weights
and simply count the number of positive clues; (5) satisficing [99,100], which refers to
searching for alternatives and selecting the first that meets or exceeds your aspiration level;
(6) equality [101], which states that resources must be allocated equally to each of n alterna-
tives; (7) default [102,103], which states that if a default occurs, nothing should be done;
(8) tit-for-tat [104], which refers to cooperating first and then imitating the other’s behavior;
(9) imitate the majority [105], which refers to imitating the majority of your group’s behav-
ior; and (10) imitate the successful [105], which establishes that you should mimic the most
successful individual’s behavior.
Cognitive psychologists [9] concur that all System 1 and System 2 behavior can be
described by rules and even modeled by computer programs. Nonetheless, they argue that
labeling System 2 as “rules-based” is inaccurate, as it insinuates that System 1 cognition
lacks rule involvement. Rules can encompass both tangible and conceptual aspects, and
any automatic cognitive system amenable to computational modeling is also capable of
adhering to rules. However, the fact that intuition and deliberation are both rules says
nothing about whether these rules are derived from different cognitive mechanisms. They
do not support a single cognitive mechanism, as [91] claims.
Contrary to what the theory of the dual mind implies, ecological theorists believe:
(1) the dimensions that distinguish System 1 from System 2—judgment speed, ease, or
resource dependence—are continuous, not discrete; (2) these dimensions are misaligned;
and (3) Systems 1 and 2 do not work independently of one another [90]. However, cognitive
psychologists argue that, in response to the criticism that mental processes are continuous
and not discrete, the distinction between types and modes of processes must be considered.
Modes, unlike types, can change on a continuous basis. Continuous variation in cognitive
capacity, for example, determines the likelihood that an answer will be initiated by System 1
processing. This, however, does not invalidate the discrete distinction between Systems 1
and 2.
Concerning the criticism that the attribute clusters of Systems 1 and 2 are not aligned,
cognitive psychologists argue that it is based on the false assumption that both cognitive
systems have defining attributes. The fact that different cluster items are not always
observed together would only be a problem if the two cognitive systems had distinguishing
characteristics. However, when it comes to the criticism that dual-processing theories
have multiple and ambiguous definitions, cognitive psychologists [9] agree that label
proliferation has been ineffective. However, when it comes to the criticism that the evidence
for dual mental processes is ambiguous and unconvincing, cognitive psychologists disagree
and re-present the amount of evidence that exists on the various research fronts that we
have previously shown. After responses from Keren, Kruglanski, and Osman to these
remarks, Evans and Stanovich followed suit. Take a look at the discussion in [106–110].

6. The Perspective of Dissenting Evolutionary Psychologists

By now, it should be obvious that the majority of evolutionary psychologists disagree
with the view held by the majority of cognitive psychologists that cognitive architecture is
domain-general and content-free. Nonetheless, some evolutionary psychologists aim to
explain complex cognitive functions and, by extension, the evolution of very high human
intelligence [24].
While the human brain constitutes just 2 to 3% of the body’s weight, it accounts for a
substantial 20 to 25% of calorie consumption [111]. The human brain is larger in relation
to the rest of the body than that of other primates, which already have large brains. Over
the last few million years, the human brain has tripled in size. Humans do not have
the largest brain mass or the highest brain-to-body ratio among species, but we do have
the most brain neurons [59]. Our large brains in terms of neurons contain sophisticated
information-processing devices and intelligence that our primate cousins lack, such as
Psych 2023, 5 1069

abstract thinking, reasoning, learning, and scenario-building abilities. What caused these
cognitive abilities to evolve? We have two hypotheses that may or may not be competing:
(1) the hypothesis of ecological dominance and social competition [112,113] and (2) the
hypothesis of deadly technological innovations [114].
According to the ecological dominance and social competition hypothesis, once ancient
humans relatively mastered the “four horsemen of the apocalypse”—famine, perennial
war, plague, and extreme weather—human competition became the new selective force.
The new adaptive problems are forming coalitions, punishing traitors, detecting fraud,
and negotiating social hierarchy positions. The risks of theft, cannibalism, sexual infidelity,
infanticide, extortion, and other betrayals increased in ancestral social groups of 50 to
150 people [115]. These social adaptive problems necessitate the selection of larger brains in
terms of neurons and higher social intelligence. Consciousness, language, self-awareness,
and theory of mind (the capability to comprehend others’ beliefs and desires [116]) exem-
plify novel forms of intelligence.
In addition, scenarios are created to practice responses to various social situations [113].
Social competition drives adaptations in the formation of coalitions for hunting large game—
a critical source of protein [117]. Forming cooperative hunting coalitions necessitates
communication skills as well as the ability to detect and punish traitors. It also requires
cooperation among members as well as rules for meat distribution. The increased scale
of group hunting allows surplus meat to be stored in the bodies of friends and allies in
exchange for a reciprocal return. Fighter coalitions quickly morph into war coalitions.
Hunting weapons can be used to gain access to other groups’ resources [112,118,119]. This
creates an arms race between adaptations for war and adaptations for defense, both of
which require higher levels of intelligence.
The high level of intelligence of today’s humans can be attributed to intense group life,
hunting, war, and bipedalism. Bipedalism liberated the hands for creation and application
of tools. The ecological dominance and social competition hypothesis is supported by
evidence. This hypothesis predicts that as population density increases, so will the selec-
tive pressure for greater intelligence, owing to increased social competition. Examining
skulls spanning 10,000 to 1.9 million years ago unveils a correlation: regions with higher
population density exhibit larger skull capacities [120]. However, ecological dominance
and social competition does not have a strong correlation with general intelligence (IQ).
The other explanation for the evolution of human intelligence is the deadly technolog-
ical innovations hypothesis. Individual differences in survival have not been eliminated
by technological advances that have increased average human survival rates. Individual
differences in survival are still associated with individual differences in intelligence. New
technologies—fire, tools, weapons, and boats—brought with them new threats. These new
technologies kill less intelligent people (deadly innovations), putting selective pressure on
the evolution of general intelligence.
Hunting weapons kill more than the hunted animal among Botswana’s !Kung [121].
Avoiding accidents caused by new technologies requires cognitive ability, such as creating
scenarios, anticipating bad luck, and taking precautions. Less intelligent people have more
fatal accidents, and their children have a higher mortality rate as a result of their absence
(double threat). More general intelligence is required as technology becomes more complex
(spiral complexity). African emigration brought new technologies as well as new dangers,
making it a ratchet emigration. Because intelligence is related to longevity, this supports
the deadly technological innovations hypothesis.
Each additional IQ point reduces the risk of dying by 1% between the ages of 25 and
64 [122]. Thus, having an IQ of 115, which is 15 points higher than the average of 100,
reduces this risk by 15%. Non-fatal injuries that reduce inclusive fitness are also linked
to IQ. In aggregated data from the modern world, low IQ is associated with a higher risk
of drowning; being involved in car, motorcycle, or bicycle accidents; being injured with a
knife; being involved in explosions or being struck by falling objects; and being struck by
lightning [114].
Psych 2023, 5 1070

In short, both the ecological dominance and social competition hypothesis and the
deadly technological innovations hypothesis suggest adaptive roles for the evolution of
general intelligence—abstract thinking, scenario construction, and the capacity to learn
from experience. In addition to domain-specific cognitive abilities, therefore, humans have
evolved domain-general cognitive abilities [24].
The authors of the controversies mentioned in this review are listed in Table 1. Recent
research that may contribute to this discussion can be found in the references [123–139].

Table 1. Cognitive vs. evolutionary psychologists on System 2.

System 2
Cognitive Psychologists Evolutionary Psychologists
Yes No
Evans, [4,58,67,68]
Evans and Over, [66]
Evans and Stanovich, [9,110]
Cosmides and Tooby, [23,27,46,56,81]
Evans et al., [55,76]
Tooby and Cosmides, [28]
Stanovich, [48,71]
Fodor, [25,26,60]
Stanovich and West, [2,84]
Spelke, [29]
Sloman, [3]
Carey, [30]
Westen, [5]
Hirschfeld and Gelman, [31]
Strack and Deutsch, [6]
Keil, [32]
Epstein, [7]
Leslie, [33]
Barsalou, [8]
Barrett and Kurzban, [34]
Samuels, [49]
Pinker, [37]
Samuels et al., [50]
Kanazawa, [45]
Over, [51]
Macchi and Mosconi, [54]
Kahneman, [1]
No Yes
Buss, [24]
Gigerenzer, [53,92]
Mithen, [38,83]
Gigerenzer and Goldstein, [97]
Livingstone, [39]
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, [91]
Geary, [44]
Kruglanski, [107]
Geary and Huffman, [40]
Keren, [106]
Chiappe and MacDonald, [41]
Keren and Schul, [90]
Figueredo et al., [42]
Osman, [89,108]
Premack, [43]
Thompson, [109]
Hagen, [47]

Although not directly relevant to the debate between cognitive and evolutionary
psychologists over System 1 vs. System 2, an intriguing line of research is worth mentioning.
The more widely recognized view of the link between cognitive capacity, intuition, and
reasoning ability is that individuals with higher cognitive capacity are better at correcting
biased intuitions during reasoning tasks. However, there may be a positive link between
cognitive capacity and accurate intuitive thinking. To some extent, cognitive capacity is
connected with the ability to rectify incorrect intuitions, although it predominantly predicts
accurate intuitive responses. This implies that smarter individuals may just have more
accurate intuitions rather than being particularly skilled at correcting incorrect ones [140].
In other words, it is not just a case of System 2 overriding System 1 reasoning. As
a result, while smarter deliberation influences reasoning correctness, it is not the entire
explanation. Another theory is that people with higher cognitive capacity just have better
intuition. They would not need to deliberate to rectify early intuitions in this “smart
intuitor” perspective because their first hunch is already correct [141–145]. Cognitive
capacity predicts the ability to have correct intuitions rather than the ability to rectify them
through deliberation. So, rather than using the cognitive reflection test to capture “the
smart deliberator view”, it is more crucial to consider the smart intuitor view using a
Psych 2023, 5 1071

two-response test [145]. Participants in the two-response paradigm respond to a problem

in two steps: an initial intuitive reaction and a final response after reflection. Surprisingly,
research reveals that those who deliver the accurate final response frequently match it with
their first intuition. This implies that good reasoners do not always require reflection to
rectify their intuitions. Individual differences studies show that those with higher cognitive
capacity are more likely to have correct initial responses [129,146–148].
Another important piece of new research says that the dual-process theory should be
changed so that it is based on the single principle of rational choice [149]. By doing this, it
can explain better than the single-process theory where habits come from, why they slip
up, and how they break. It is suggested that the way to decide if one theory is better than
another is to look at how few principles it uses, and to avoid adding extra qualifications to
explain anomalies.

7. Concluding Remarks
Examining the debates between cognitive and evolutionary psychologists, this article
discussed the dual-processing hypothesis of the mind, Systems 1 and 2. Using a back-
and-forth methodology to emphasize the differences, the goal was to show that, while the
majority of cognitive psychologists now support the dual-processing theory of the mind,
some still disagree. Nevertheless, it appears that System 2 is garnering support. This review
is unique in that it contrasts the perspectives of cognitive psychologists and evolutionary
psychologists, which is uncommon in the cognitive psychology literature, which tends to
put evolutionary perspectives in the background.
Most cognitive psychologists agree that there are two mental processes, which Daniel
Kahneman popularized as System 1 and System 2. These two systems compete for domi-
nance over our inferences and actions. In evolutionary terms, System 1 predates the other
and comprises a self-contained assembly of autonomous subsystems. System 2 enables
abstract reasoning as well as the use of hypotheses. System 2 is thus a domain-general
processing mechanism. Domain-specific processing mechanisms refer to System 1. The late
evolution of System 2 suggests that a distinction be made between evolutionary rationality,
which is System 1’s logic, and individual rationality, which is System 2’s logic. As a result
of the emergence of System 2, humans can pursue their own goals rather than just the goals
of genes.
Most evolutionary psychologists, however, deny the existence of a domain-general
processing mechanism (System 2) and only accept the modularity of mind hypothesis.
A minority of cognitive psychologists support this view and believe that intuitive and
deliberate judgments are based on shared principles. While most evolutionary psychol-
ogists disagree with the notion that cognitive architecture is domain-general and devoid
of content, some evolutionary psychologists are beginning to accept the theory of the
two minds.
Even though recurrent features of adaptive challenges favor specialized adaptations,
evolutionary psychologists assert that humans encountered numerous novel problems
lacking sufficient regularity for specific adaptations to evolve. Therefore, prematurely
assuming the existence of a domain-general processing mechanism alongside established
domain-specific processing mechanisms is cautioned against by these psychologists. After
all, the domain-specific mind assumption has been used successfully to discover important
mechanisms, and it remains to be seen whether the domain-general mind assumption will
yield comparable empirical results.
However, the human mind cannot have separate and isolated mechanisms because
certain mechanisms’ data provide information to others. Internal data such as sight, smell,
and hunger provide information that can be used to determine whether a food is edible.
There is no information encapsulation in the adapted psychological mechanisms, and
thus no modularity. This is due to the fact that information encapsulation would imply
that psychological mechanisms would only have access to independent information and
would not have access to information from other psychological mechanisms. There must
Psych 2023, 5 1072

also be supermechanisms, such as daemons, that specialize in ordering and regulating

other mechanisms.
Analytical processing is required in situations other than those found in evolutionary
adaptation environments, and this necessitates System 2 overriding System 1. A large
number of cognitive biases emerge from the conflict between System 1 and System 2, as
studied in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s heuristics and biases agenda. These
biases interfere with an individual’s ability to maximize utility. According to cognitive
psychologists, evolutionary psychologists are incorrect in assuming that System 1 heuristics,
which were adapted to the Pleistocene, are optimized for making sound decisions in the
modern world. We have no other alternative than to apply a variety of inference rules
to draw logical and probabilistic judgments using System 2 because many contemporary
decisions did not exist in the environment of evolutionary adaptations, and we did not
have time to train and gather data on their frequency. Furthermore, we must filter a large
amount of information coming from our standalone modules (System 1) that may obstruct
a sound decision.
Nudges are a method for influencing System 1 thinking. However, despite their
effectiveness in influencing behavior, nudges can sometimes be controversial. In addition,
because memes can contaminate System 2 thinking, poor judgment and decision making
are not solely the product of System 1 dominating System 2 thinking—a circumstance that
nudges cannot influence.
In summary, this review shows that there is a growing consensus in favor of System 2,
but the challenges raised by evolutionary psychologists must be addressed. Even while
acknowledging the possibility of both domain-specific and domain-general processes, more
nuanced and detailed accounts of the System 1 and 2 processes are required, as is a better
understanding of how the two systems interact. We also cited several fairly recent studies
that are already taking this into account.

Funding: The CNPq provided support for this work through Grant number PQ 2 301879/2022-2,
and Capes through Grant number PPG 001.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The author affirms the absence of any conflict of interest. The funders played
no part in shaping the study’s design.

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