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H U M A N W E L F A R E A N D M O R A L WORTH
This page intentionally left blank
Human Welfare and
Moral Worth
Kantian Perspectives
THOMAS E. HILL, JR.
C L A R E N D O N PRESS • OXFORD
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Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press

in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
© In this collection Thomas E. Hill Jr., 2002
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
Reprinted 2007
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
And you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
ISBN 978-0-19-925262-6
SOURCES AND
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank the following for permission to reprint the essays in this

collection.
'Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy' was originally published

as 'Kantianism' in Hugh LaFoIIette (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Ethical
Theory, 227-476, €> zooo, by Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted by per-
mission of Blackwell Publishers.
'Is a Good Will Overrated?' originally appeared in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy: Moral Concepts, XX (1996), 199—317. Reprinted by per-
mission of Blackwell Publishers.
'Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism' originally appeared
in Social Philosophy and Policy, 1.8(2) (2.001), 300—29. Reprinted with
the permission of Cambridge University Press.
'Beneficence and Self-Love' originally appeared as 'Beneficence and Self-
Love: A Kantian Perspective' in Social Philosophy and Policy, 9(1)
(1992), 1—2.3. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University
Press.
'Reasonable Self-Interest' originally appeared in Social Philosophy
and Policy, 14(1) (1997), 52—85. Reprinted with the permission of
Cambridge University Press.
'Happiness and Human Flourishing' was originally published as
'Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics' in Social Philoso-
phy and Policy (1998), 143—75. Reprinted with the permission of
Cambridge University Press.
'Four Conceptions of Conscience' originally appeared in Nomos, XL
(1998), 13-51, Reprinted by permission of New York University Press.
'Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment' was originally published as
'Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment' in Law and Philoso-
phy, 18(1) (1999), 407-41. Reprinted with kind permission from
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
vi Sources and Acknowledgements
'Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth' was originally published
as 'Kant on Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth' in The South-
ern journal of Philosophy, xxxvi, Supplement (1998), zi-yi. Reprinted
by permission of The Southern journal of Philosophy, published by the
Department of Philosophy, the University of Memphis,
'Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues' was originally published in

H. E. Mason (ed.). Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory^ © 1996 by
Oxford University Press, Inc. Used, by permission of Oxford University
Press, Inc.
Although I have no one but myself to blame for the deficiencies of these
essays, I acknowledge gratefully the help that many others have given
me. Some of these are mentioned in the notes within the essays, but my
debt is wider than the notes indicate. The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill provided more than basic institutional support, and The
Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green, Ohio, provided
four stimulating conferences and a summer fellowship that contributed
to four of the essays, A fellowship from the Institute for the Arts and
Humanities at the University of North Carolina gave me time to work
on ideas for other essays. My colleagues at the University of North
Carolina have been generally encouraging and philosophically stimu-
lating, and in a number of cases offered instructive criticism. For this I
especially want to thank Bernard Boxiil, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, and
Gerald Postema. Graduate students have often been helpful, and 1 have
been especially fortunate to have a group of former students whose
work and correspondence continue to stimulate my thinking about
Kantian ethics and related matters. These include especially Lori
Alward, Samuel Bruton, Richard Dean, Sarah Holtman, Andrew
Johnson, Sean McKeever, Cynthia Stark, and Valerie Tiberius. I have
learned from the work of many other Kantians and critics of Kant.
There are too many to acknowledge properly, but a fuller acknowledg-
ment would highlight Henry Allison, Marcia Baron, Sharon Byrd, David
Cummiskey, Stephen Engstrom, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Christine
Korsgaard, Jeffrie Murphy, Onora O'Neill, John Rawls, Andrews
Reath, J. B. Schneewind, Allen Wood, and no doubt others.
Several people have helped specifically in the process of preparing this
volume for publication. As research assistants, Wendy Nankas, Vicki
Behrens, Clea Rees, Shelby Weitzel at first and Adrienne Martin did
editorial work that saved me from many errors. Their philosophical
Sources and Acknowledgements vii
judgment, meticulous care, and sound advice were very helpful and
much appreciated, Gucki Obler provided quick, reliable office support,
with cheerful encouragement,
As before, family members have been very supportive, My father,
whose dedication to reading and writing philosophy remains undimin-
ished at age 93, continues to be an inspiration. Most of all, I am deeply
grateful to Robin for her unfailing support and encouragement. Among
other things, her practical help and good spirit enable me to write about
theoretical masters and her empathetic understanding of real human
problems helps me to remember the practical matters that, in the end,
moral philosophy is about.
CONTvENTS
Abbreviations for Kant's Works x
Introduction i
PART L Some Basic Kantian Themes u
i, Kantian Analysis; From Duty to Autonomy j?

z. Is a Good Will Overrated? 37
3, Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism 61
PART II, Human Welfare: Self-interest and Regard for Others 97
4, Beneficence and Self-Love 99

5, Reasonable Self-Interest 125
6". Happiness and Human Flourishing 164
7. Meeting Needs and Doing Favors 201
8. Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends 244
PART III, Moral Worth: Self-Assessment and Desert 275
9. Four Conceptions of Conscience 2.77

TO. Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment 310
II. Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth 340
ii. Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues 36*1
Bibliography 403
Index 413
ABBREVIATIONS FOR
KANT'S WORKS
A Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Mary Gregor

(The Hague: Marttnus Nijhoff, 1974). Translated from
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst (1798), in
Kants gesammelte Schriften, ed, under the auspices of the
Konigliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1908-13), [7: 117—333!.
Ci Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1965). Translated from, Kritik der reinen
Vernunft (1781, 1787) in Kants gesammelte Schriften [first
edition, 4: 1-252; second edition, 3: 1-594]. References to the
first and second editions are indicated by the standard A/B
abbreviation,
Cz Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1997). Translated from Kritik der
praktischen Vernunft (1788), in Kants gesammelte Schriften, [5:
1-163.].
C3 Critique of judgment, tr. Warner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett

Publishing Co., 1987).
G Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. H. J, Paton (New

York: Harper and Row, 1964). Translated from Grundlegung zur
Metaphysik der Sitten (1795), in Kants gesammelte Schriften,
[4: 387-463].
Cig Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Mary Gregor

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Translated from
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1795), in Kants gesam-
melte Schriften [4: 387-463].
LE Lectures on Ethics, tr. Louis Infield (New York: Harper and Row,
1963). Translated from Eine Vorlesung Kants fiber Ethik, ed.
Abbreviations for Kant's Works xi
Paul Menzer (Berlin: im Auftrage der Kantgesellschaft, 192.4). A
more recent and thorough translation is Lectures on Ethics, tr.
Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997), [17: 3-732.]. LE refers to the infield edition;
references to the Heath and Schneewind edition will be indicated
in the notes,
MM The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996). Translated from Die Meta-
physik der Sitten (1797-8), in Kants gesamtnelte Schriften, [6:
203-49 r].
PP Perpetual Peace, tr. H. B. Nesbit, in Kant; Political Writings, ed.

Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
'translated from Zum ewigen frieden: Ein philosophischer
Entifurf (1795), l^ : 341—86],
R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, tr. Allen Wood

and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998). Translated from Die Religion innerbalb der
Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (1793—4), in Kants gesamtnelte
Schriften, [6; i-xoz),
RL 'On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns',

in ImmanueJ Kant, Grounding of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr.
James Ellington, 3rd edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1993), translated from Ober em vermeintes Recht aus
Menschenliebe zu tugen (1797), [8: 4x5-30],
Numbers in square brackets refer to the relevant volume and page

number of Kants gesammelte Schriften. This edition of Kant's works is
commonly called the Akademie (or Academy) edition. When works of
Kant other than those abbreviated above are cited, a full reference will
be given in a footnote. Passages in other translations of Kant's works
can be located by the marginal numbers, which indicate the Academy
edition pages and are now included in virtually all translations.
Introduction
In a recent collection of essays, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian

Perspectives, I explored the implications of basic Kantian ideas for
several practical issues, including cultural conflicts, political violence,
and responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing. The essays in
the present volume continue the same sort of investigation with regard
to other topics. Broadly speaking, the main topics here are, first, self-
interest and regard for others (or 'human welfare') and, second, moral
assessment of ourselves and others (or 'moral worth'}. The first three
essays provide background on certain central themes in Kant's ethics:
a priori method, categorical imperatives, autonomy, the special value of
a good will, and appeals to possible and hypothetical consent in moral
arguments. Then the next essays raise particular questions regarding
human welfare, for example; Are our obligations to help others pre-
scribed and limited by our sentiments toward them? What reasons do
we have to promote the welfare of others as well as our own? Is it our
obligation to promote others' happiness as they conceive it or their
'human flourishing* as ancient philosophers define it? How demanding
is the duty to promote others' happiness? Are some instances of helping
supererogatory? Finally, the last four essays focus on the nature and
grounds of moral assessments of persons as deserving esteem or blame
for their choices. For example: How should we conceive of conscience?
In what sense, if any, is it appropriate that we suffer for our wrongdo-
ing? Is punishment justified because wrongdoers inherently deserve to
suffer for their misdeeds? Is there anything morally worthy in our striv-
ing to avoid pangs of conscience and just punishment by our peers? In
what sense, if any, should we feel guilty if we cause serious harm, in
tragic situations where we could find no better option?
The essays discuss Kant's explicit views on these topics, but they also
consider how a reasonable contemporary Kantian theory might best
address the problems. Scholars disagree, of course, about what is best
and most central in Kant's work, and they also disagree about how to
interpret particular passages, I do not pretend to offer a complete or
definitive account of Kant's position, nor do I insist that my proposals
z Introduction
for developing Kantian ethics point to the only reasonable paths to
explore. As in previous essays, my aim is to respect the letter of Kant's
texts as far as possible but also to identify, trace, and develop themes
worthy of contemporary attention. At times these aims conflict, and
then the best one can do is to suggest reconstructions that are to some
extent compromises. Readers will have to assess these for themselves,
In selecting topics 1 was influenced by several factors. The guiding
aim was to explore the resources and limits of a Kantian perspective by
reviewing critically what Kant wrote on various issues that remain of
interest today. For this purpose the essays in the present volume sup-
plement not only those recently collected in Respect, Pluralism, and
Justice: Kantian Perspectives but also some of my essays published
earlier in Autonomy and Self-Respect and Dignity and Practical Reason
in Kant's Moral Theory, The selection of topics in several cases was also
influenced by invitations to conferences devoted to particular issues,
This was the case with Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 1.2. I am grateful to
the conference organizers for encouraging me to think more about the
issues in question. Chapter 7 was prompted as a response to quite rea-
sonable worries raised by David Cummiskey and Mateia Baron about
my earlier (1971) characterization of Kant's principle of beneficence. In
addition, I was drawn to many of the topics discussed in this volume,
and previous ones, by my strong sense that some familiar questions
about Kant's ethics have already been overworked and others too long
neglected. In some other cases, the questions that I consider are not new
but I have wanted to challenge familiar answers and call attention to
different, and perhaps better, ways of looking at the issue.
The essays presented here and those in the previous volume are based
on the conviction that Kant's works can be reasonably faulted on many
counts but they remain a rich, and not yet fully tapped, resource for
contemporary moral philosophy. This is not a new theme. In fact it now
seems to be readily affirmed by most critics of Kantian ethics as well as
by Kant scholars. What I hope readers will find interesting in these
essays are the particular ways in which it is developed.
The essays, at least by default, accept many of the familiar objections
to Kant's ethics. For example, as before, readers will find me impatient
with Kant's endorsement of strict, inflexible moral rules and his radical
ideas about noumenal wills. To some extent the latter can be interpreted
as practical, normative points. I do not defend the idea that Kant's for-
mulas of the Categorical Imperative can serve as simple decision pro-
cedures for solving moral problems. Nor do I address doubts about
whether Kant has shown that it is always rational to be moral. I set
Introduction 3
aside, because I share, familiar doubts about the adequacy of Kant's
ideas about nonhuman animals and certain human virtues. Kant's treat-
ment of our moral responsibility to the needy may be inadequate to
conditions in the world today. His conceptions of punishment and
conscience, I agree, have a dark side that needs to be tempered with
more hopeful and humane sentiments.
My main focus, however, is on what I find appealing in Kant's ethics,
or at least on matters that promise to repay our efforts to rethink con-
structively what Kant has said. For example, I present in a favorable
light Kant's ideas about the need for a priori method, duties understood
as categorical imperatives, autonomy, and the special value of a good
will. My account of Kant's views on reasons for acting, the possibility
of altruism, and the duty of beneficence interprets them as quite close
to common thought about these matters though in conflict with various
popular philosophical theories. In my last four essays, I argue that, when
separated from misunderstandings and inessential features, Kant's con-
ceptions of conscience, judicial punishment, and moral dilemmas are
more attractive than the alternatives to which they are often compared.
A common theme in many of the essays is Kant's emphasis on individ-
ual freedom and responsibility. More than many moral theories, Kant's
theory leaves it to individuals to choose how to live so long as they meet
their moral responsibilities. To meet those responsibilities, however,
requires moral vigilance, firm commitment, and good judgment as well
as right action.
The essays are meant to be self-standing, and so reading them, in a
particular order is not necessary. I did not intend to presuppose a prior
knowledge of Kant's writings on ethics, but readers with some famili-
arity with Kant's work will probably find the essays more helpful
and challenging than others will. In order to make the connection
between the essays more evident and to enable readers to select topics
that most interest them, \ provide below a brief summary or abstract of
each essay.
I. Some Basic Kantian Themes, The aim of the two opening essays is
to distinguish certain core ideas in Kantian ethics from more extreme
associated ideas. Some of the associated ideas, I argue, have been mis-
takenly attributed to Kant. Others are indeed aspects of Kant's more
radical and controversial thought, but, arguably, the core ideas are inde-
pendent of these. For the most part, I suggest, the core ideas represent
familiar assumptions of common moral discourse and practice. At least,
on a proper understanding, they approximate these more closely than
4 Introduction
most have supposed. The third essay of this set surveys Kant's 'con-
structivist' procedures for justifying moral principles.
i. 'Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy' distinguishes radical
from core interpretations of three important Kantian themes: that fun-
damental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori methodol-
ogy; that duties are conceived as categorical imperatives; and that moral
agents have autonomy of the will. A core idea is that an a priori method
is required to analyze moral concepts and to reflect on whether moral-
ity and prudence are grounded in necessary requirements of practical
reason. This relatively uncontroversial point, however, is often associ-
ated with the implausible idea that substantive moral issues can be
settled in complete independence of empirical evidence. Similarly, the
core idea that duties are conceived as categorical imperatives marks the
familiar assumption that, unlike prudential and pragmatic principles,
moral principles do not bind us simply because they promote our hap-
piness or serve our personal ends. This common thought, however, is
often conflated with Kant's unfortunate claim that various simple, sub-
stantive moral principles (e.g., about lying, revolution, and 'unnatural'
sex) hold in all conditions, without exception. Again, Kant's idea of
autonomy has been interpreted in a bewildering variety of ways, but
arguably the core idea simply refers to certain capacities and disposi-
tions that we must attribute to any agent who is subject to duties under-
stood as categorical imperatives.
z. 'Is a Good Will Overrated?' offers an interpretation of the special
value of a good will, which for Kant is the moral disposition expressed
in morally worthy acts and the indispensable condition of being a good
person. Kant's famous declaration that only a good will can be con-
ceived as good without qualification has often been interpreted as a
radical and distinctively Kantian thesis, but I argue that the core idea
is a common-sense one. In brief, it is not that our decisions should be
dominated by a self-righteous concern for our own moral purity but
rather that we should not pursue any goods by means that we recog-
nize to be morally wrong. The thesis, I suggest, is best understood, not
as a guide to praise and blame, but as an indeterminate practical prin-
ciple that becomes action-guiding only when supplemented by a stan-
dard of right and wrong (e.g. the Categorical Imperative). If Kant's
writings at times encourage readers to stand on rigid principles in foolish
disregard of disastrous consequences, the fault lies with his unwarranted
belief that this rigidity is required by the Categorical Imperative, not
with his initial affirmation that only a good will is unconditionally good.
3. 'Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism' is about the
Introduction 5
justificatory force of arguments that appeal to actual, possible, and
hypothetical consent. Despite certain popular views of Kantian ethics,
Kant treats actual consent as having only a derivative and limited rele-
vance to how we may be treated, A more fundamental standard for Kant
is that practices are justified only if, as rational agents, we can consent
to them as universal practices. Application of this standard, however,
requires important assumptions about the context of choice and further
standards of rationality that determine what universal practices it is
possible, in the relevant sense, to will. When these are made explicit,
the possible consent standard is essentially equivalent to a hypothetical
consent standard that requires that practices conform to principles that
any rational agent would will in specified conditions. The essay reviews
the role of possible and hypothetical consent in Kant's use of the idea
of an original contract as well as the Categorical Imperative. Finally, the
essay discusses whether several familiar objections to the use of hypo-
thetical consent arguments are applicable to Kant's ethics.
II. Human Welfare: Self-Interest and Regard for Others. The five essays
in this section address questions related to our moral responsibility to
promote human happiness or well-being. Although they are a selective
rather than a comprehensive treatment of these issues, the essays take
up a Kantian perspective on a wide range of issues: the possibility of
altruism, the nature of happiness, the stringency of our duty of benefi-
cence, and the relation between reasons to promote our own good and
reasons to promote the good of others.
4. 'Beneficence and Self-Love' is primarily directed to the question:
(i.) Given the limits of our natural altruistic sentiments, is it possible for
us to act as altruistically as duty seems to require? A Kantian answer
requires attention to two further questions: (2) What are we morally
required to do on behalf of others besides respecting their rights? (3)
Why is this a reasonable requirement? The plausibility of Kant's posi-
tion on the first issue, I suggest, depends on (a) a distinction between a
deliberative point of view and a purely empirical point of view, (b) a
moderate (not maximizing) interpretation of the imperfect duty of
beneficence, and (c) adequate justifying grounds for accepting that duty.
The reconstruction of Kant's position here makes use of a practical, not
metaphysical, interpretation of Kant's controversial 'two perspectives'
on the world.
5. 'Reasonable Self-Interest' contrasts common-sense ideas of what is
reasonable with current philosophical ideas of rational choice: (i) max-
imizing self-interest, (2.) efficiency and coherence in pursuit of one's
6 Introduction
ends, (3) maximizing intrinsic value, and (4) efficiency and coherence
constrained by a Kantian ideal of co-legislation. Contrary to usual
assumptions, the last, I suggest, corresponds more closely to the
common-sense ideas than any of the other models. This is not a proof
of the Kantian ideal, or of common sense, but calls for rethinking
assumptions,
6. 'Happiness and Human Flourishing' reviews the role of happiness
in Kant's ethics and contrasts his ideas of happiness with the idea of
human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers pos-
sible reasons why Kant avoided the traditional ideas of human flour-
ishing and instead worked with more subjective ideas of happiness. This
was due, I conjecture, not merely to historical influences or misunder-
standing of ancient philosophy but also to Kant's respect for individual
freedom to choose, within moral limits, the way of life one prefers. The
essay also replies to Michael Slote's charge that Kant requires us to
devalue our own happiness relative to others*.
7. 'Meeting Needs and Doing Favors* addresses the controversial
questions, (i) How demanding, in Kant's view, is the imperfect duty to
promote the happiness of others? and (z) Is there any place or analogue
in Kant's ethics for supererogatory acts—or acts that are, in some sense,
morally good to do but more than is required? Here I suggest that the
general duty to promote others' happiness, especially as presented in
The Metaphysics of Morals, is an important but rather minimal require-
ment. Contrary to recent commentators, however, the fact that the
general principle articulates only a rather minimal requirement does not
mean that helping others in serious need is morally optional. Judgment
in particular cases is not completely determined by the intermediate
principles of The Metaphysics of Morals, Reflection from the moral
framework expressed in the formulas of the Categorical Imperative
can show why helping in many particular cases is morally demanded.
Although Kant admittedly does not include a category of 'supereroga-
tory' acts in his moral system, 1 argue that his position, reasonably con-
strued, supports the common opinion that some acts are, in a sense,
morally good to do but are not required. This discussion is a partial
response to recent work of David Cummiskey and Marcia Baron.
8. 'Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends' focuses on what indi-
viduals value and pursue when considered apart from moral consider-
ations. These matters are ultimately relevant to our moral decisions
under various Kantian principles, such as beneficence, but my concern
here is with personal, values as such. The essay begins by reviewing the
various kinds of moral evaluation in Kant's theory in order to contrast
Introduction j
these with the sort of personal value judgments and decisions to be dis-
cussed. Then the two main issues are raised. First, in Kant's view, what
value judgments, if any, are implicit when we set ourselves ends and
adopt maxims? Are we necessarily committed to the judgments that
the end is good and that it is good to act on the maxim? If so, 'good'
in what sense? In particular, do these individual choices of ends and
maxims implicitly commit us to the idea that the ends and maxims are
worthy of endorsement from an impartial (and ultimately moral) point
of view? Commentators often suggest that Kant held this view, and pas-
sages in the Critique of Practical Reason might seem to confirm it. If
we assume it as a premiss, it becomes all too easy to deduce Kant's con-
troversial thesis that all rational agents are implicitly committed to the
moral law. The assumption, however, is implausible and examination
of relevant texts raises doubts that Kant relied on it.
The second troublesome issue is whether Kant's idea of 'setting an
end' as an 'act of freedom' implies a radical kind of voluntarism that is
implausible from a present-day perspective. The suspicion is not entirely
unwarranted, but 1 suggest that underlying the idea of freely setting ends
are significant normative points that are separable from implausible
kinds of voluntarism.
III. Moral Worth: Self-Assessment and Desert, The final, four essays turn
from questions of moral deliberation (for example, what should we do?)
to questions of moral assessment (for example, how well have we been
doing?) These are related, but assessment is more concerned with the
moral worth of past acts and motives, whether we deserve esteem or
blame for what we have done, and when it is appropriate to feel guilty.
Kant emphasizes moral assessment of ourselves, and for this the idea of
conscience discussed in Chapters 9 and ri is crucial. The moral assess-
ment of others is involved in judicial punishment, which is discussed in
Chapters 10 and u. I argue that moral judgments about a criminal's
moral deserts have a more limited role in Kant's theory of punishment
than is commonly thought. The third essay of this set, Chapter n,
inquires whether avoiding wrongdoing has any moral worth when it is
motivated by pangs of conscience or fear of punishment. The final essay,
Chapter i, z, presents a Kantian position on the possibility of 'moral
dilemmas' and 'gaps' in moral theory. I include it here because the final
two sections consider whether it is appropriate to feel guilty for causing
harm in a dilemma-like situation.
9. 'Four Conceptions of Conscience' contrasts Kant's view of con-
science, and its merits, with alternative views. The alternatives include
8 Introduction
Joseph Butler's theory of conscience, as well as two conceptions briefly
reviewed in Respect, Pluralism, and justice. Kant's view avoids the epis-
temological problems of the popular religious conception, but Kant's
view shares the latter's assumption that conscience is experienced as an
intuitive voice rather than a deliberative judgment. Kant's view denies
the metaethical skepticism in the cultural relativists' conception, but it
agrees with their claim that conscience expresses a dissonance between
our acts and our moral beliefs rather than a perception of what is truly
right or wrong. Finally, although Kant agrees with Butler that reason,
in due reflection, is our only source of justified beliefs about what we
ought to do, Kant distinguishes the roles of reasonable deliberation
about what is right from conscience as inner judge of innocence or guilt
by the standards of our own moral beliefs.
to. 'Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment' is about relations between
wrongdoing and suffering because of our wrongdoing. Kant maintains
that, although wrongdoers are intrinsically liable to suffer self-reproach
and disapproval of others, wrongdoing does not entail 'deserving to
suffer' in a sense providing intrinsic practical reasons to inflict suffer-
ing. Arguably, even Kant's most infamous remarks on punishment fail
to show otherwise. Contrary to common impressions, Kant is best
understood as holding a mixed theory in which retributive policies lack
deep retributive justification. Although other factors are relevant, the
need to preserve justice by credible legal threats plays a crucial role in
justifying the practice of punishment. At the end 1 explore implications
of this interpretation for a contemporary Kantian perspective on
punishment,
L I . 'Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth' concerns the moral
worth of acting from certain motives that may seem morally suspect
from a Kantian point of view. The controversial motives of sympathy
and love have been the object of endless discussion, but my focus is on
two relatively neglected motives associated with anticipating punish-
ment and a troubled conscience. Like the anticipation of grief, I suggest,
these can give rise to two importantly different sorts of motive, one of
which is morally worthy from a Kantian perspective and the other is
not. Even 'fear' of just punishment can express respect for other citizens
as sources of moral law.
12. 'Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues' offers an explanation
of Kant's denial that there can be any genuine moral dilemmas. It also
criticizes Alan Donagan's claim that we can put ourselves in a moral
dilemma through our own prior wrongdoing even though we cannot
innocently fall into one. True moral dilemmas, in which one would be
Introduction 9
wrong no matter what one did, are distinguished from tragic cases in
which 'gaps' in moral theory leave us no resolution. Kant's moral theory,
I suggest, has such 'gaps,' and arguably this is not altogether a bad thing.
Questions then arise about 'residues' of feeling and attitude after we
have been forced to make a choice in such a situation. Are feelings of
guilt and special regard for those we have injured appropriate? How
can Kantians grant that we 'should feel' anything at all? I explore how
plausible answers to these questions can be given from a Kantian per-
spective without appealing to consequentialist reasons for training
people to feel guilty when they are not.
PART I
Some Basic Kantian Themes

I
Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy
Among the most basic ideas in Kant's moral philosophy are these: that
moral philosophers must use an a priori method, that moral duties are
categorical imperatives, and that moral agency presupposes autonomy
of the will. In the second section of his Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals Kant develops each of these ideas in an argument for his
central thesis that the idea that we have moral duties presupposes that
we are rational agents with autonomy. The conclusion and each step of
the argument remain controversial. Kant's admirers usually see here a
great advance in moral theory, but critics often find Kant's contentions
obscure and implausible.
When a philosopher inspires such extremes of admiration and disdain
as Kant does in his ethical writings, we may well ask ourselves whether
Kant's friends and his critics are focusing their attention on the same
ideas. Elementary misunderstandings of Kant's ethics are common, and
serious Kant scholars often disagree about interpretations. Insightful
core ideas may be dismissed or ignored because they are conflated
with more radical, controversial ideas. My aim, then, is to do some
much needed sorting among the doctrines attributed to Kant, What is
central, and what is peripheral? What is commonplace, and what is
radical? Which assertions are preliminary starting points, and which are
the more remote conclusions? Considering these questions is necessary
for a balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Kant's
ethics.
In my remarks below 1 comment in turn on each of the major themes
mentioned above, trying to separate the more widely appealing core
points from the more controversial. The modest version of each basic
theme, 1 suggest, leads naturally to the next. The three themes are the
outline of an argument that the idea that we have moral duties presup-
poses the idea that we are rational agents with autonomy. To preview,
my main suggestions will be these:
( i ) Kant's insistence on an a priori method, in its modest version,
stems in large part from his belief that moral theory should begin with
an analysis of the idea of a moral requirement (duty). Despite his strong
14 Some Basic Kantian Themes
rhetoric about setting aside everything empirical, Kant's main point was
that empirical methods are unsuitable for analysis of moral concepts
and defense of basic principles of rational choice. The reason that Kant
insisted on an a priori method was not that he believed in rational intui-
tion of moral truths, opposed naturalistic explanations, assumed that
duties are imposed by noumenal will, or thought that empirical facts
are irrelevant to moral decisions.
( i ) Kant thought that analysis of the ordinary idea of duty
showed that we regard duties as categorical imperatives. That is, when
we suppose that we have a duty we are thereby supposing that we
have sufficient (overriding) reason to act accordingly and not just
because doing so furthers our (desire based) personal ends. The
modest point here is not that duties must always be experienced
as unwelcome demands that must be fulfilled from a sense of con-
straint. Kant's point is also independent of his dubious view that sub-
stantive principles regarding lying, obedience to law, sexual purity, etc.,
are exceptionless and applicable in the same way across all times and
places.
(3) The analysis of duty is for Kant merely a step on the way to the
conclusion that in thinking of ourselves as having moral duties we must
think of ourselves as rational agents with autonomy of the will. The
bask point is that in order to be a moral agent, with duties, one must
be able to understand and be moved by the sort of reasons that
categorical imperatives claim we have. Categorical imperatives are
addressed to deliberating rational agents presumed able to follow
reasons independent of their concern for happiness and personal ends.
To think that we can guide our decisions by such non-instrumental
reasons, we must conceive ourselves as agents that implicitly acknowl-
edge and respect the noninstrumental rational standards presupposed
by categorical imperatives. As moral agents we might not always live
up to the standards that we acknowledge, but our capacity to follow
them presupposes that we accept them as rational grounds for our deci-
sions and judgments. More controversially, in regarding our duties as
categorical imperatives we presuppose that our disposition to judge our
conduct by these basic standards is a constitutive feature of being moral
agents, and not something we have because of a prior commitment to
following external authorities, tradition, or common sentiments. In a
sense, then, particular duties can be understood as requirements that
rational agents impose on themselves, and following them is a way of
being self-governing.
Kantian Analysis: Frotn Duty to Autonomy 15
I. THE A P R I O R I METHOD IN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Kant repeatedly emphasizes in the Groundwork, and elsewhere, that we

cannot find answers to the fundamental questions of moral philosophy
by empirical methods.1 To gain a theoretical understanding of nature
we must rely on experience. We must use empirical concepts as well as
some basic categories of thought. Ordinary, common-sense knowledge
of what there is, how things work, and what is needed to achieve our
goals must also rely on experience. But moral philosophy, Kant insists,
is not an empirical science, and its conclusions are not simply inferences
from observations of human behavior, emotional responses, and social
practices. Rather, to address the basic questions of moral philosophy,
according to Kant, we must use an a priori method that does not base
its conclusions on what we learn from experience. Kant rejects many of
the prominent moral theories of his day (e.g., British 'moral sense' theo-
ries) because they treat moral questions as if they were empirical ques-
tions. He rejects, for example, Frances Hutcheson's view that moral
goodness is a natural property of actions that causes human beings to
feel approbation. 2 On this view, the answer to 'Which acts are morally
good?' would be discoverable by observing what sorts of acts human
beings tend to approve. Kant criticizes other theories for mixing empiri-
cal and a priori arguments in discussions of" basic issues that, he thinks,
should be approached in a purely a priori manner. For example, Kant
strongly disapproves of moral philosophies that argue that helping those
in need is right and reasonable because experience shows that charitable
people tend to be happier than uncharitable people.
Why begin moral philosophy by an a priori investigation instead of
empirical studies? The explanation, I think, concerns Kant's under-
standing of what the basic questions of ethics are. In the Groundwork,
he describes his task as seeking out and establishing the supreme prin-
ciple of morality.3 Judging by how Kant then proceeds to argue, it seems
that 'seeking out' the supreme principle is a matter of articulating an
abstract, basic, and comprehensive principle that can be shown to be a
deep presupposition in ordinary moral thinking. 'Establishing' the
1
G, 74-80 [4: 406-11], and 92-4 [4: 415-7].
2
J. B. Schnecwind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, ii (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 503—44.
•' G, 60 [4: 392-].
principle, 1 take it, is the further task of showing that the principle is
rational to accept and follow. In addressing the first task Kant begins,
provisionally, by assuming some very general moral ideas that he takes
to be widely accepted, in fact, part of ordinary rational knowledge of
morality. These assumptions include the special value of a good will and
the idea of duty as more than prudence and efficiency in pursuing one's
ends. That these are only assumed provisionally is shown by the fact
that, even at the end of the second section, Kant forcefully reminds us
that his 'analytic' mode of argument has not proved we really have
moral duties.'1 Instead, it only serves to reveal presuppositions of the
common moral idea that we have duties. For all we know at this
point, morality might be an illusion. Despite this disclaimer, the results
that Kant claims to reach by the analytic method are significant:
common moral belief presupposes that the several formulas of the
Categorical Imperative are morally fundamental, that rationality is not
exclusively instrumental, and that moral agents are to be seen as legis-
lators of moral laws as well as subject to them. These particular con-
clusions, however, are supposed results of the a priori method of
analysis, not assumptions used to justify the method. Other philoso-
phers might radically disagree with Kant's results but still see the value
of his analytic approach.
Kant's main idea is simple and familiar in philosophy. We make use
of moral concepts, some of which seem pervasive and essential features
of our moral thinking and discourse, even when we disagree in our par-
ticular judgments. By reflecting on the meaning, implications, and pre-
suppositions of these concepts, we may be able to understand them, and
ourselves, better. To say that the process of reflection is a priori is not
to imply that it could be done by hypothetical persons with no empiri-
cal concepts or experience of life. It is just to say that we are examin-
ing our ideas in a rational reflective way, looking for their structure and
presuppositions. The aim here is not to explain the causes or effects of
behavior that seems to be guided by moral ideas but only to gain a
clearer grasp of the content and implications of those ideas themselves.
Experiments, surveys, and comparative studies of different cultures can
be valuable for many purposes, but they do not serve the philosophical
purpose that Kant's analytical method was meant to address.
There was another important reason why Kant wanted moral phi-
losophy to begin with an a priori method. This stems from his convic-
tion that believing that we are under moral obligation entails believing
4
(i, i r z (4: 444-5], 107-8 (4: 440-iJ, and 1:14-15 [4: 446-7]-
Kantian Analysis: Frotn Duty to Autonomy iy
that we are subject to a rational requirement of a special sort (a
'command of reason'). This conviction was embedded in a long tradi-
tion, and Kant thought that it was part of ordinary understanding of
morality. The problem is that we can question whether the apparent
rationality of moral demands is an illusion. In fact, reading the British
moralists Hutcheson, Hume, and others would naturally raise doubts
in those (like Kant) who were deeply influenced by the natural law tra-
dition. Such doubts, Kant thought, call for a response, an effort to vin-
dicate the apparent (and commonly believed) assumption that moral
principles express requirements that we would be irrational to disre-
gard.J A positive response to the doubts would be to supplement (and
build on) the analytical argument mentioned above with further argu-
ment that we really have reason-based duties, or at least that it is nec-
essary to presuppose this for practical purposes. To do so would be to
show that morality is not a mere illusion. Like the task of analysis, this
task, which Kant undertakes in the notoriously difficult third section
of the Groundwork, is again not one that could be accomplished by
empirical investigations. The problem is to establish that guiding one's
life by certain principles is rationally necessary, that one always has suf-
ficient reason to do so.
Even if (contrary to Kant) there are only prudential reasons for fol-
lowing moral principles, to show that following them is always ratio-
nal is not simply a matter of collecting empirical data on the effects
of various behavior patterns. One would also need to argue that we
always have sufficient reason to do what most effectively promotes
the effects deemed 'prudent,' and this is a contested philosophical thesis
that is not itself subject to empirical proof (as even most non-Kantians
would agree). But the inadequacy of using an empirical method alone
becomes even more evident for those who grant Kant's thesis that
morality imposes categorical imperatives. 6 According to this, moral
principles are rationally necessary to follow, but their rational necessity
is not merely prudential or based on hypothetical imperatives. This
means (at least) that the reason for following moral principles cannot
be simply that doing so serves to promote one's happiness or individ-
ual ends. Thus, the rationality of following moral principles could
not be established by showing empirically that they are good guides
to happiness or means that serve well our particular purposes. For
not only is the idea of rationality a normative one (the previous point),
but also the sort of sufficient reason that needs to be defended is
5
Ci, 1 1 4 — ^ 1 [4: 446—63]. ** G, ft2.—it [4: 414-10],
more than the (empirically discernible) efficacy of our actions in achiev-
ing our ends.
This is not the place to review and assess Kant's actual argument in
defense of his idea that moral requirements are rationally necessary to
follow and even categorically so. And this assessment, fortunately, is not
necessary for present purposes. The need that Kant saw for an a priori
method, at least in parts of ethics, can be seen in the problems he posed,
independently of his particular solutions. The essential point is that if
we understand moral demands as saying to us that it is unreasonable
not to do what is demanded, then we want some explanation and
defense, especially once the seeds of philosophical doubt have been
raised. All the more, if we understand moral demands as purporting
to tell us what is categorically rational to do, then we may question
whether morality's claim to be categorically rational is defensible. If,
like most contemporary philosophers, we understand that claims about
what is reasonable, rational, supported by reasons, etc., are irreducibly
evaluative, practical, claims, then it becomes clear that the problems
cannot be resolved by empirical investigation alone. The problems may
prove to be irresolvable, or perhaps even pseudo-problems (as Humeans
think), but at least we can understand why Kant and others believe that
any search for resolutions must start with rational, a priori reflection.
Now that we have uncovered Kant's rationale for thinking that we
must employ an a priori method, we can respond to some common
objections and clarify certain misconceptions about the method.
(i) One misunderstanding that might lead readers to be skeptical of
Kant's methodology stems from the thought that the alternative to
empirical methods in moral theory is appeal to rational intuition or
rationalistic theological arguments. Hume's famous objections to deriv-
ing 'moral distinctions' from 'reason' seem primarily aimed at views of
this type. If turned against Kant, however, objections to rational intui-
tion and theological ethics would miss their mark, for Kant agrees with
Hume in rejecting rational tntuitionism and theology as the basis of
ethics. Like Hume, Kant holds that the traditional a priori arguments
for the existence of God are inadequate, that morality cannot be based
in theology, and that reason is not an intuitive power that 'sees' inde-
pendent moral facts. (Kant does not deny that there is 'knowledge' of
moral principles and that there are 'objective' moral values, but moral
validity is determined by, and so not independent of, what rational
agents with autonomy could or would accept.)
(z) Some moral theorists, past and present, see their main task as
explaining moral phenomena as a part of the natural world. It seems
Kantian Analysis: Frotn Duty to Autonomy 19
obvious that we raise moral questions, praise and blame in moral terms,
experience moral feelings (e.g., guilt, indignation), and are sometimes
moved by our moral beliefs. Many philosophers committed to under-
standing the world, so far as possible, in naturalistic terras accept the
challenge of trying to explain moral phenomena (behavior, feelings, etc.)
without appeal to occult, theological, or other 'nonnaturaP entities. The
methodology needed for this project, it seems widely agreed, is empiri-
cal, at least in a broad sense. When we turn to Kant's moral philoso-
phy we find that not only does he use terminology (e.g., the will,
autonomy, intelligible world) that is outside what most naturalists con-
sider their domain, he even, insists that these moral terms cannot be
understood entirely in naturalistic terms. Clearly his moral theory is not
a successful fulfillment of the naturalists' project, and may even seem to
reflect contempt for such a project. Thus an objection to Kant's a priori
method might be grounded in the thought that it is a method that cannot
successfully carry out the project that naturalists consider most impor-
tant and may even show contempt for it.
It is true, of course, that Kant's moral philosophy is not an attempt
to contribute to the naturalists' project, but this does not mean that he
would regard it as an unfruitful or unimportant task for empirically ori-
ented scientists and philosophers to undertake. Although Kant insists
that the a priori tasks in moral theory must be undertaken first, he often
refers to 'practical anthropology' as empirical work that should follow
and supplement basic moral theory.7 What he had in mind (and
attempted rather casually and unsystematicalJy) was not the full natu-
ralists' project, but his theory of knowledge is friendly to that project,
at least if no more is claimed for its results than can be validly inferred
from experience. Kant is committed to the position (which in. fact he
believed that he had proved) that all phenomena are in principle explic-
able by empirical, natural laws. So, although he thought that for prac-
tical purposes we must employ normative ideas that are not reducible
to empirical propositions, anything that can count as observable phe-
nomena associated with moral practices must (in principle) be amenable
to empirical study and understanding. And, although he denied that
empirical science can establish moral truths or vindicate their rational
claim on us, his theory of knowledge allows (indeed insists) that all the
observable facts associated with moral and immoral acts can be studied
and (in principle) comprehended from an empirical perspective. This is
' G, <f5~6 (4: 387—8], and Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr,
Mary CJregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 19,97).
ZG Some Basic Kantian Themes
distinct from the practical perspective we must take up when we delib-
erate and evaluate acts,8 Each perspective has its legitimate and neces-
sary use, and limits. So, although Kant thinks the basic questions of
moral philosophy cannot be answered by empirical methods, he should
happily encourage naturalists' ambition to understand the phenomena
associated with moral activity so far as possible in naturalistic terms
through empirical investigations.
(3) Again, some critics familiar with Kant's philosophy as a whole
may suppose that Kant's insistence on an a priori method is based on
his controversial idea that we must think of moral agents not only in
empirical terms but also under the idea of free rational agency. This
involves thinking of them as belonging to an 'intelligible world' that
cannot be understood in the terms of empirical science.9 Hence one
might suspect that Kant thought an a priori method of investigation in
ethics is necessary because moral agents, as such, are not beings that we
can comprehend empirically. But 1 think that this is a mistake, and in
fact it gets the order of Kant's thought backwards. As we have seen,
there are simpler and less controversial explanations for Kant's insis-
tence on the a priori method. In fact he introduces the perspective of an
intelligible world into ethics not as an initial assumption but rather as
a point to which he believes his analysis of common moral knowledge
finally drives him. Analysis of the idea of duty shows that it presupposes
the idea of rational agents with autonomy, and this idea, he argues, can
be squared with his earlier conclusions about empirical knowledge only
if we think of these agents as 'intelligible' or noumenal beings,10 Many
philosophers who find Kant convincing at the earlier stages dissent from
this last stage of the argument. There is no doubt that Kant thought it
an important part of his systematic moral theory, but it is not a begin-
ning assumption used to justify his methodology. Rather, it is a final
theoretical point to which (Kant thought) his particular a priori argu-
ment (not the method itself) drives us. In short, his controversial
views about the ultimate Idea' of moral agents to which philosophical
reflection forces us is not presupposed in the modest methodological
procedures with which he begins.
(4) Finally, there is a persistent objection that, I suspect, rests partly
on misunderstanding but partly on, Kant's tendency to overstate his
8
See Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990). * G, 118—zi [4: 450—3!.
"! Note, for example, that although Kant is committed to the possibility of noumenal
'causation' in the Critique of Pure Reason, his argument for beginning ethics with art a
priori investigation precedes his conclusion that our conception of morality requires us
to think of moral agents from a nonempirical standpoint. See G, 74-81 [4: 406-14] and
118-2.3 [4: 450-51-
Kantian Analysis: Frotn Duty to Autonomy zi
insights. The objection proceeds as follows. First we note that the
reasons we give for thinking that acts are right or wrong are typically
empirical facts, e.g., 'That will kill him,* 'You intentionally deceived
him,' 'She saved your life and needs help now,' 'No society could survive
if it tolerated that.' Then we also note that most morally sensitive
persons realize that the acts picked out by simple descriptions (e.g.,
'killing', 'deceiving'} may be wrong in one situation but right in another,
depending on the empirical facts of the case. So a method that excluded
empirical information, it seems, will not even consider facts that are
crucial to determining what is right and what is wrong. Moral decisions
must be made in a complex and richly diverse world, and so it seems
foolish to suppose that we can discern what is right without knowing
accurately and in detail (and so empirically) what this world is like and
where we stand in it at the moment.
The objection would be appropriate and (1 think) devastating if
directed against a moral theorist who claimed that pure reason atone
can discern what we ought to do in each situation. But few, if any, today
make such a claim, and certainly Kant did not. Those who agree with
Kant that some fundamental moral principles can be vindicated through
the use of reason are well aware that we need empirical knowledge to
apply these principles to our current circumstances. We need to judge
whether and how moral principles are relevant, and this requires under-
standing based on experience. For example, that we should treat all
persons with respect, Kant thought, is an ideal norm, not something
empirical science or ordinary experience can establish; but, of course,
respect and disrespect are expressed in a wide variety of ways that we
learn only with experience in different cultural contexts.'' Kant does not
deny that we (rightly) cite facts in explaining the reasons why some par-
ticular act is morally required or forbidden; he merely agrees with Hume
that empirical facts alone do not establish any 'ought' claim. Kant was
indeed extremely rigoristic by not allowing that familiar moral princi-
ples (e.g., about lying) need to be qualified, but his rigidity on these
matters cannot be blamed on his rejection of empirical methods for the
basic issues in moral theory. Notoriously, Kant endorses some princi-
ples in an absolute, unqualified form, and most of us will agree that
inflexible adherence to such rules is an over-simple response to complex
moral problems. His extreme stand on lying, revolution, and sexual
practices, however, does not follow from his thesis that moral philoso-
phy should begin with a priori methods, e.g., of analysis.12 The problem,
11
MM, 109-J 3 (6: 462-8].
12
MM, 1.76-7 [6: 42.4-3], 96-7 [6: 3*0], 178-9 [6: 43,4-5], and 'On a Supposed Right
to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns', in Immanuel Kant, Grounding of the
zz Some Basic Kantian Themes
rather, lies in his thinking that rigid opposition to lying (etc.) is required
by the Categorical Imperative.
There remains serious controversy, however, on two related points,
First, many philosophers would deny that an a priori use of reason can
establish even one basic moral principle. This objection conies not only
from those who think that empirical methods can establish moral prin-
ciples, but also from those who think that moral principles cannot be
established by any method because they have no objective standing. This
is a perennial controversy, but it is about the results that can be estab-
lished by an a priori method rather than about the value of the method
in general. Second, even those who side with Kant on the first point may
reasonably worry that Kant himself tries to make too much of ethics
independent of empirical knowledge. It is one thing, they may say, to
suppose that some quite abstract, formal principles can be discovered
and defended by an a priori method, but quite another (and more
dubious) thing to exclude empirical facts when taking up other tasks of
moral philosophy. For example, if moral philosophers, following Kant
and Alan Oonagan, want to try to work out a system of universally
valid moral principles about substantive matters (such as lying, obedi-
ence to law, punishment, charity), then it seems only reasonable to
expect that the construction must take into account our (limited) empiri-
cal knowledge about the human condition in general and about the
diversity of contexts to which putative universal principles must be
applied. It is still a matter of dispute how much empirical information
Kant intended to exclude when he took up this project in The Meta-
physics of Morals, His arguments often presuppose facts that could only
be known empirically, but they also often raise the suspicion that his
determination not to rely on empirical evidence has led to unwarranted
rigidity and over-generalization. These worries and controversies cannot
be lightly dismissed, but they do not call into question Kant's main
reasons for adopting an a priori method for the basic issues in moral
philosophy.
II. CATEGORICAL AND

HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES
The vocabulary and tone of Kant's writing about morality is disturbing

to many readers, especially when they contrast this with the ethical
Metaphysics of Morals, tr. James Ellington, '?rd edn. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Co., 1993), 63-7.
Other documents randomly have
different content
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6. A Year of A.S. at Milwaukee, by Fuller. E.N. V. 74, 1915, p. 1146.
7. A.S. Experiments at Urbana. E.N. V. 74, 1915, p. 1097.
8. Experiments on the A.S. Process, by Bartow and Mohlman. E.C. V. 44, 1915, p. 433.
9. Milwaukee’s A.S. Plant, the Pioneer Large Scale Installation, by Hatton. E.R. V. 72, 1915, p.
481 and E.C. V. 44, 1915, p. 322.
10. A.S. Experiments at Milwaukee, by Hatton. Journal American Waterworks Association and
Proceedings Illinois Society of Engineers, 1916. Also E.R. V. 73, 1916, p. 255. E.C. V. 45,
1916, p. 104, and E.N. V. 75, 1916, pp. 262 and 306.
11. A.S. Defined. E.N. V. 75, 1916, p. 503, and E.N.R. V. 80, 1918, p. 205.
12. Status of A.S. Sewage Treatment, by Hammond. E.N. V. 75, 1916, p. 798.
13. Trial A.S. Unit at Cleveland, by Pratt. E.N. V. 75, 1916, p. 671.
14. Air Diffuser Experience with A.S. E.N. V. 76, 1916, p. 106.
15. Nitrogen from Sewage Sludge, Plain and Activated, by Copeland, Journal American
Chemical Society, Sept. 28, 1916. E.N. V. 76, 1916, p. 665. E.R. V. 74, 1916, p. 444.
16. Tests Show A.S. Process Adapted to Treatment of Stock Yards Wastes. E.R. V. 74, 1916, p.
137.
17. Aëration Suggestions for Disposal of Sludge, by Hammond. Journal American Chemical
Society, Sept. 25, 1916. E.R. V. 74, 1916, p. 448.
18. Cost Comparison of Sewage Treatment. Imhoff Tank and Sprinkling Filters vs. A.S., by
Eddy. E.R. V. 74, 1916, p. 557.
19. Large A.S. Plant at Milwaukee. E.N. V. 76, 1916, p. 686.
20. A.S. Novelties at Hermosa Beach, Cal. E.N. V. 76, 1916, p. 890.
21. A.S. Experiments at University of Illinois, by Bartow, Mohlman, and Schnellbach. E.N. V.
76, 1916, p. 972.
22. A.S. Results at Cleveland Reviewed, by Pratt and Gascoigne. E.N. V. 76, 1916, pp. 1061 and
1124.
23.
Sewage Treatment by Aëration and Activation, by Hammond. Proceedings American
Society Municipal Improvements, 1916.
24. A.S., by Bartow and Mohlman, Proceedings Illinois Society of Engineers, 1916.
25. The Latest Method of Sewage Treatment, by Bartow. Journal American Waterworks
Association, V. 3, March, 1916, p. 327.
26. Winter Experiences with A.S., by Copeland. Journal American Society of Chemical
Engineers, April 21, 1916. E.C. V. 45, 1916, p. 386.
27. A.S. Process Firmly Established, by Hatton. E.R. V. 75, 1917, p. 16.
28. Operate Continuous Flow A.S. Plant, by Bartow, Mohlman, and Schnellbach. E.R. V. 75,
1917, p. 380.
29. Chicago Stock Yards Sewage and A.S., by Lederer. Journal American Society of Chemical
Engineers, April 21, 1916. E.C. V. 45, 1916, p. 388.
30. The Patent Situation Concerning A.S. E.C. V. 45, 1916, p. 208.
31. “Sewage Disposal” by Kinnicutt, Winslow, and Pratt, published by John Wiley & Sons. 2d
Edition, Chapter 12.
32. A.S. Tests Made by California Cities. E.N.R. V. 79, 1917, p. 1009.
33. Conclusions on the A.S. Process at Milwaukee. Journal American Public Health
Association, 1917. E.N.R. V. 79, 1917, p. 840.
34. Dewatering A.S. at Urbana, by Bartow. Journal American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
1917. E.N.R. V. 79, 1917, p. 269.
35. Milwaukee Air Diffusion Studies in A.S. E.N.R. V. 78, 1917, p. 628.
36. A.S. Bibliography (up to May 1, 1917) by J. E. Porter.
37. Air Diffusion in A.S. E.N.R. V. 78, 1917, p. 255.
38. A.S. Plant at Houston, Texas. E.N. V. 77, 1917, p. 236, E.N.R. 83, 1919, p. 1003, and V. 84,
1920, p. 75.
39. A.S. Power Costs, by Requardt. E.N. V. 77, 1917, p. 18.
40. A.S. at San Marcos, Texas, by Elrod. E.N. V. 77, 1917, p. 249.
41. Filtros Plates Made the Best Showing in Air Diffuser Tests. E.N.R. V. 79, 1917, p. 269.
42. Results of Experiments on A.S., by Ardern and Lockett. Journal Society for Chemical
Research, V. 33, May 30, 1914, p. 523.
43. Final Plans at Milwaukee. E.N.R. V. 84, 1920, p. 990.
44. A.S. Bibliography, published by General Filtration Co., Rochester, N. Y., 1921.
45. A.S. at Manchester, Eng. by Ardern. Journal Society Chemical Industry, 1921. E.C. V. 55,
1921, p. 310.
46. The Des Plaines River A.S. Plant, by Pearse. E.N.R. V. 88, 1920, p. 1134.
47. Sewage Treatment by the Dorr System, by Eagles. Proceedings, Boston Society of
Engineers, 1920. Public Works V. 50, 1920, p. 53.
CHAPTER XIX
ACID PRECIPITATION, LIME AND ELECTRICITY, AND
DISINFECTION
275. The Miles Acid Process.—The Miles Acid Process for the treatment of sewage
was devised and patented by G. W. Miles. It was tried experimentally at the Calf Pasture
sewage pumping station, Boston, Mass., 1911 to 1914. In 1916 it was tried experimentally at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and it has been tested subsequently at other
places, notably at New Haven, Conn., in 1917 and 1918. It is one of the most recent
developments in sewage treatment and no extensive experience has been had with it. The
process consists in the acidification of sewage with sulphuric or sulphurous acid, as the result
of which the suspended matter and grease are precipitated and bacteria are removed. The
equipment required for the process consists of devices for the production of sulphur dioxide
(SO2), and for feeding niter cake or other forms of acid; subsiding basins; sludge-handling
apparatus; sludge driers; grease extractors; grease stills; and tankage driers and grinders.
The first step is the acidification of the sewage. The period of contact with the acid is
about 4 hours. Sulphurous acid seems to give better results than sulphuric because of the
ease in which it can be manufactured on the spot. It seems also to be more virulent in
attacking bacteria than an equal strength of sulphuric acid. In experimental plants the
acidulation has been accomplished in different ways such as: by the addition of compressed
sulphur dioxide from tanks; by the addition of sulphur dioxide made from burning sulphur;
or by the roasting of iron pyrite (FeS2). The acidulation precipitates most of the grease as well
as the suspended matter and results in a sludge which gives some promise of commercial
value. In referring to the process R. S. Weston states:[188]
(1) It disinfects the sewage by reducing the numbers of bacteria from millions to hundreds per c.c.
(2) If the drying of the sludge and the extraction of the grease can be accomplished economically,
it is possible that a large part, if not all, of the cost of the acid treatment may be met by the sale of the
grease and fertilizer recovered from the sewage.
(3) The use of so strong a deodorizer and disinfectant as sulphur dioxide would prevent the usual
nuisances of treatment works.
(4) The addition of sulphur dioxide to the sewage also avoids any fly nuisance, which is a handicap
to the operation of Imhoff tanks and trickling filters.
The amount of acid used varies with the quality of the sewage and the desired character
of the effluent. At Bradford, England,[189] 5,500 pounds of sulphuric acid are used per million
gallons, producing about 2,340 pounds of grease or 0.43 pound of grease per pound of
sulphuric acid. At Boston only 0.215 pound of grease were produced per pound of sulphuric
acid. The difference is probably due to the great difference in the amount of grease in the raw
sewage. In the East Street sewer at New Haven, Conn.,[190] only 700 pounds of acid are used
per million gallons of sewage as the alkalinity is only 50 p.p.m. This amount of acid secures
an acidity of 50 p.p.m. whereas in the Boulevard sewer 1,130 pounds of acid had to be added
to produce the same result. The results obtained by the experiments conducted by the
Massachusetts State Board of Health in 1917 are shown in Table 97. The character of the
sludge from the same tests is shown in Table 98. After acidification[191] the sewage contains
bisulphites and some free sulphurous acid, with some lime and magnesium soaps which are
attacked by the acid liberating the free fatty acids. Part of the bisulphites and sulphurous acid
are oxidized to bisulphates and sulphuric acid. It was found as a result of the New Haven[191]
experiments that the presence of sulphur dioxide in the effluent caused an abnormal oxygen
demand from the diluting water and that this difficulty could be partly overcome by the
aëration of the effluent after acidulation and sedimentation, without prohibitory expense.
The effluent and sludge are both stable for appreciable periods of time and are suitable for
disposal by dilution. The character of the sludge as determined by the New Haven tests[192] is
shown in Table 99.
TABLE 97
Average Analysis of Sewage Entering Boston Harbor, before and after Treatment, July
17 to September 27, 1917
(Eng. News-Record, Vol. 80, p. 319)

Sample Parts per Million Bacteria,
Ammonia Kjeldahl Chlorine Oxygen Millions
Free Albuminoid Nitrogen Consumed
Total Total Diss. Total Diss. 20° 37°
Paddock’s Island
Raw sewage 14.0 3.3 1.8 6.8 3.6 134 23.1 1.86 4.15
Settled Sewage 12.2 1.6 1.1 3.5 2.2 15.4
Acidified and 20.9 5.2 3.9 10.0 7.5 units units
settled sewage 94 91
Deer Island
Raw sewage 23.3 8.2 4.8 16.8 8.9 3100 87.3 2.63 1.50
Settled sewage 21.1 5.6 3.9 10.7 7.3 62.2
Calf Pasture
Raw sewage 18.0 4.5 2.0 9.7 4.1 3254 41.2 1.89 0.98
Settled sewage 19.1 2.3 1.4 4.9 3.3 25.8
The success of the Miles Acid Process in comparison with other processes is dependent
on the commercial value of the sludge produced. The New Haven experiments indicate that
16 to 21 per cent of the grease in the sludge is unsaponifiable and seriously impairs the value
of the process.
TABLE 98
Average Amount of Sludge and Fats Obtained from Sewage Entering Boston Harbor
after Eighteen Hours Sedimentation With and Without Acidification

Paddock’s Island Deer Island Calf Pasture
Sedimentation Sedimentation Sedimentation
Plain Acidulated Plain Acidulated Plain Acidulated
Pounds of SO2 used per million 818 1513 1189
gallons of sewage treated
Dry sludge per million gallons 782 959 1709 1939 1208 1427
Per cent Nitrogen in sludge 3.10 3.38 3.57 3.45 3.18 2.83
Per cent fats in sludge 27.30 27.30 24.60 19.40 24.30 26.30
TABLE 99
Character of Miles Acid Sludge at New Haven

East Street Sewer Boulevard
Sewer
Length of run in days 25 24 44 70 29
Total sewage treated, thousand gallons 260 239.4 407.8 602.2 145.5
Gallons wet sludge per million gallons 3750 4025 3200 2600 5375
sewage
Specific gravity 1.067 1.048 1.054 1.061
Per cent moisture 86.6 88 86.3 85.7 92.5
Pounds of dry sludge per million gallons 503 483 439 368 403
sewage
Ether extract, per cent dry sludge 23.7 24.0 29 32.6 30.9
Ether extract, pounds per million gallons 119 116 127 120 124
Volatile matter, per cent dry sludge 47.2 51.2 57.3 63.8 78.5
Nitrogen, per cent dry sludge 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.0 3.0
The conclusions reached as a result of the New Haven experiments are:[193]
Our experience with New Haven sewage lends no color to the hope that a net financial profit can
be obtained by the use of the Miles Acid Process, except with sewage of exceptionally high grease
content and low alkalinity. They do, however, suggest that for communities where clarification and
disinfection are desirable—where screening would be insufficient and nitrification unnecessary—the
process of acid treatment comes fairly into competition with the other processes of tank treatment,
and that it is particularly suited to dealing with sewages that contain industrial wastes, and to use in
localities where local nuisances must be avoided at all costs and where sludge disposal could be
provided for only with difficulty.
The conclusions reached as a result of the Chicago experiments are:[194]
The results on hand indicate that treatment of this sewage with acid results in a somewhat greater
retention of fat. An apparent reduction in the oxygen demand over that resulting from plain
sedimentation, while remarkable, is probably not real, being simply due to a retardation of
decomposition by the sterilization of the bacteria present, the organic matter being left in solution....
However, there appears the added cost of acid treatment and the cost of recovery of the grease, as well
as the uncertainty of the price to be received for the grease recovered.
The cost of the treatment is estimated by Dorr to be $18 per million gallons, and the
value of the sludge obtained from the Boston sewage as $24 per million gallons, giving a net
margin of profit of $6 per million gallons. At New Haven, the total return is estimated at
$7.09 per million gallons. Based on the production of sulphur dioxide by burning sulphur
(assumed to cost $36 per long ton) and on drying from 85 per cent to 10 per cent moisture
with coal assumed to cost $7.50 per ton, it appears that the acid treatment of sewage should
be materially cheaper than either the Imhoff treatment or fine screening under the local
conditions. A comparison of the cost of the treatment of the East Street and the Boulevard
sewage at New Haven and the Calf Pasture sewage in Boston is given in Table 100. The cost
of construction was estimated by Dorr and Weston in 1919 as greater than $15,000 per
million gallons of sewage per day capacity.
TABLE 100
Estimated Cost of Sewage Treatment at New Haven and Boston by Three Different
Processes
Cost in Dollars per Million Gallons Treated
(Engineering and Contracting, Vol. 51, p. 510)

Miles Acid Process Imhoff Tank and Fine Screens and
Chlorination Chlorination
East Boulevard Calf East Boulevard Calf East Boulevard
Street Pasture Street Pasture Street
Tanks and 2.47 2.47 2.47 5.28 4.44 4.60 4.60
Buildings Int.
and Dep.
Acid treatment 6.93 10.74 18.65
Drying sludge 2.09 2.04 10.34
Degreasing 1.78 1.91 9.12
sludge
Superintendence 1.06 2.65 1.06 0.46 1.15 0.47 1.15
Labor on tanks 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.42 2.05
and screens
Disposal of 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
sludge or
screenings
Chlorination 4.05 4.05 4.05 4.05
Gross cost 15.50 20.98 42.75 11.99 12.14 11.03 12.35
Revenue 6.57 10.66 47.59
Net cost 8.93 10.32 4.84 11.99 12.14 11.03 12.35
Electrolytic Treatment
276. The Process.—This process has been generally unsuccessful in the treatment of
sewage and has grown into disrepute. In the words of the editor of the Engineering News-
Record:[195]
Thirty years of experiments and demonstrations with only a few small working plants built and
most of them abandoned—such in epitome is the record of the electrolytic process of sewage
treatment.
It is probably true that the process has never received a thorough and exhaustive test on a
large scale, but the small-scale tests have not been promising of good results. Among the
most extensive tests have been those at Elmhurst, Long Island,[196] Decatur, Ill.,[197] and
Easton, Pa.[198]
Whatever degree of popularity the method has possessed has been due possibly to the
mystery and romance of “electricity” and to the personality of its promoters. The process
should, nevertheless, be understood by the engineer in order that it may be explained
satisfactorily to the layman interested in its adoption.
In this process, sometimes called the direct-oxidation process, all grit is removed and
the sewage is passed through fine screens before entering the electrolytic tank. In the
electrolytic tank the sewage passes in thin sheets between electrodes and an electric current
is discharged through it. A recent development has been the addition of lime to the sewage at
some point in its passage through the electrolytic tank. From the electrolytic tank the sewage
flows to a sedimentation tank, where sludge is accumulated, and from which the liquid
effluent is finally disposed of.
It is claimed that the action of the electricity electrolyzes the sewage, releasing chlorine,
which acts as a powerful disinfectant. The constituents of the sewage are oxidized so that the
dissolved oxygen, nitrates, and relative stability are increased and the sludge is rendered
non-putrescible. It is said that the addition of lime increases the efficiency of sedimentation
and enhances the effect of the electric current. The results obtained by tests at Easton, Pa.,
are shown in Table 101. It will be observed from this table that the combination of lime and
electricity does not have a more beneficial effect than either one of them alone. The amount
of sludge produced by the combination is about the same as by chemical precipitation alone,
but the character of the sludge produced with electricity is less putrescible. The cost of the
treatment as estimated at Elmhurst is shown in Table 102.
As a result of the tests at Decatur, comparing lime alone with lime and electricity
together, Dr. Ed. Bartow stated:
The purification by treatment with lime alone was greater than that obtained in several of the
individual samples treated with lime and electricity.
TABLE 101
Comparative Results Obtained from the Treatment of Sewage by Lime Alone, Electricity
Alone, and Lime and Electricity Combined
(Creighton and Franklin, Journal of the Franklin Institute, August, 1919)

Lime and Electricity Lime Alone Electricity Alone
Change, Change, Change, Change, Change, Change,
Parts per Per Cent Parts per Per Cent Parts per Per Cent
Million Million Million
Chlorine +1.2 +1.9 +12.3 +18.2 +1.6 +2.2
Nitrites +0.014 +58.3 -.005 –10.0 –0.01 –20.0
Nitrates +0.13 +23.6 +.005 +0.8 –0.15 –20.0
Ammonia –3.3 –18.3 +0.2 +1.3 +0.9 +6.6
Albuminoid –3.6 –12.1 –0.4 –1.7 –0.5 –2.3
ammonia
Oxygen demand –13.0 –20.5 –7.7 –8.9 –6.5 –10.0
Dissolved oxygen +1.78 +40.9 –0.93 –19.1 +1.61 +40.1
Total bacteria at –343 –92.7 –373 –82.4 –165 –37.8
37° (Thousands)
Total bacteria at –688 –92.7 –1074 –90.1 –635 –70.0
20° (Thousands)
B. Coli –77.9 –99.85 –96.3 –92.3 –45 –81.8
(Thousands)
Oxygen absorbed –3.40 –81.6 –1.03 –21. +1.24 +31
in 5 days
Disinfection
277. Disinfection of Sewage.—Sewage is disinfected in order to protect public water

supplies, shell fish, and bathing beaches; to prevent the spread of disease; to keep down
odors, and to delay putrefaction. Disinfection is the treatment of sewage by which the
number of bacteria is greatly reduced. Sterilization is the destruction of all bacterial life,
including spores. Ordinarily even the most destructive agents do not accomplish complete
sterilization. Chlorine and its compounds are practically the only substances used for the
disinfection of sewage. The lime used in chemical precipitation, the acid used in the Miles
Acid Process, the aëration in the activated sludge process, all serve to disinfect sewage, but
are not used primarily for that purpose. Copper sulphate has been used as an algaecide but
never on a large scale as a bactericide.[199] Heat has been suggested, but its high cost has
prevented its practical application to the disinfection of sewage.
TABLE 102
Cost of Electrolytic Treatment, Elmhurst, Long Island, and Easton, Pennsylvania
One Million Gallon Three Million Gallon

Item unit at Easton, unit at Elmhurst, unit at Elmhurst,
Dollars Dollars Dollars
Hydrated lime:
Elmhurst, 1300 pounds at
$7.90 ton. 12.56 5.14 15.42
Easton, 3720 pounds at $6.75
ton.
Electric power electrolysis:
Elmhurst, 85 kw-h. at 4 cents
4.19 3.40 9.60
Easton, 6.25 kw-h. at 8.05
cents
Electric power, light and
agitation:
Elmhurst, 60 kw-h. at 4 cents 0.50 2.40 7.20
Easton, 6.25 kw-h at 8.05
cents
Heating 1.25
Labor and supervision 15.00 12.50 15.00
Maintenance, repairs and
1.50 1.00 3.00
supplies
Sludge pressing and removal 5.11 15.33
Total 35.00 29.55 65.55
Cost per million gallons 35.00 29.55 21.85
The action which takes place on the addition to sewage of chlorine or its compounds is
not well understood. The idea that the bacteria are burned up with “nascent” or freshly born
oxygen, has been exploded.[200] Likewise the idea that the toxic properties of chlorine have no
effect has not been borne out by experiments. It has been demonstrated, particularly by tests
on strong tannery wastes, that the action of chlorine gas is more effective than the
application of the same amount of chlorine in the form of hypochlorite. All that we are
certain of at present is that the greater the amount of chlorine added under the same
conditions, the greater the bactericidal effect.
Chlorine is applied either in the form of a bleaching powder or a gas. In ordinary
commercial bleach (calcium hypochlorite) the available chlorine is about 35 to 40 per cent by
weight. In order to add one part per million of available chlorine to sewage it is necessary to
add about 25 pounds of bleaching powder or 8½ pounds of liquid chlorine per million
gallons of sewage. This can be computed as follows:
The molecular weight of calcium hypochlorite is 127.0. This reacts to produce two atoms of
available chlorine with a molecular weight of 70.9. If the bleaching powder were pure the available
chlorine would therefore represent 70.9 ÷ 127, or 56 per cent of its weight. Then to obtain one pound
of chlorine it would be necessary to have 1.79 pounds of pure bleaching powder. Since 1,000,000
gallons of water weigh approximately 8,300,000 pounds, in order to apply one part per million of
chlorine to 1,000,000 gallons of sewage it is necessary to apply 1.79 × 8.3 or 14.9 pounds of pure
bleaching powder. Commercial bleaching powder is only about 60 per cent calcium hypochlorite. It is
therefore necessary to add 14.9 ÷ 0.60 or about 25 pounds of commercial bleach.
Since liquid chlorine is very nearly pure, approximately 8½ pounds of it applied to 1,000,000
gallons of sewage are equivalent to a dose of one part per million.
Commercial bleaching powder is a dry white powder which absorbs moisture slowly, and
which loses its strength rapidly when exposed to the air. It is packed in air-tight sheet iron
containers, which should be opened under water, or emptied into water immediately on
being opened. The strength of the solution should be from ½ to 1 per cent. The rate of the
application of the solution to the sewage may be controlled by automatic feed devices, or by
hand-controlled devices.
Commercial liquid chlorine is sold in heavy cast steel containers, which hold 100 to 140
pounds of liquid chlorine under a pressure of 54 pounds per square inch at zero degrees C. or
121 pounds per square inch at 20 degrees.
The amount of chlorine used is dependent on the character of the sewage to be treated,
the stage of decomposition of the organic matter, the desired degree of disinfection, the
period of contact, and the temperature. The amount of chlorine is expressed in parts per
million of available chlorine, regardless of the form in which the chlorine is applied. In
general about 15 to 20 parts per million of available chlorine with 30 minutes’ contact at a
temperature of about 15° C. will effect an apparent removal of 99 per cent of the bacteria
from the raw sewage. The effect is only apparent because many of the bacteria encased in the
solid matter of the sewage escape the effect of the chlorine, or detection in the bacterial
analysis. Stronger and older sewages, higher temperatures, and shorter periods of contact
will demand more chlorine to produce the same results. A septic effluent will require more
chlorine than a raw sewage because of the greater oxygen demand by the septic sewage. The
results of experiments on disinfection made at different testing stations have shown such
wide variations in the amount of chlorine necessary, as to demonstrate the necessity for
independent studies of any particular sewage which is to be chlorinated. For instance, at
Milwaukee approximately 13 p.p.m. of available chlorine applied to an Imhoff tank effluent
effected a 99 per cent removal of bacteria, whereas the same result was obtained at
Lawrence, Mass., on crude sewage with only 6.6 p.p.m. and at Marion, Ohio, only 9 per cent
removal of bacteria was obtained by the addition of 4,815 p.p.m. to crude sewage. The Ohio
and Massachusetts reports show irrational variations among themselves. For instance, 6.2
p.p.m. applied to a septic effluent effected 88 per cent removal whereas in another case 7.6
p.p.m. effected only 36 per cent removal. At Lawrence in one case it took 8.6 p.p.m. to
remove 99 per cent from a sand filter effluent, but only 6.3 p.p.m. to effect the same result in
the effluent from a septic tank. The most consistent results are those found at Milwaukee
which show a steadily increasing percentage removal with increasing amounts of chlorine.
Some time after sewage has received its dose of chlorine the number of bacteria may be
greater than in the raw sewage. Such bacteria are called aftergrowths. Certain forms of
bacteria, particularly the pathogenic or body temperature types, are most susceptible to
disinfecting agents. These are killed off and leave the sewage in a condition more favorable to
the growth of more resistant forms of bacteria. As the latter are non-pathogenic and are
generally aërobic their presence is usually more beneficial than detrimental, as they hasten
the action of self-purification.
REFERENCES
The following abbreviations will be used: E.C. for Engineering and Contracting, E.N. for
Engineering News, E.R. for Engineering Record, E.N.R. for Engineering News-Record, M.J.
for Municipal Journal, p. for page, and V. for volume.
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p. 319.
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p. 235.
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1034.
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541.
21. Tests of Electrolytic Sewage Treatment Process at Easton, Pa. Journal of the Franklin
Institute, Aug., 1919. E.N.R. V. 83, 1919, p. 569.
22. The Disinfection of Sewage. U. S. Geological Survey, Water Supply Paper, No. 229.
23. Sewage Disinfection in Actual Practice, by Orchard. E.R. V. 70, 1914, p. 164.
24. Water and Sewage Purification in Ohio. Report of the Ohio State Board of Health, 1908,
pp. 738–762.
25. Water Purification, by Ellms. Published in 1917 by McGraw-Hill Book Co.
26. Electrolytic Sewage Treatment, A Half Century of Invention and Promotion. E.N.R. V.
86, 1921, p. 25.
CHAPTER XX
SLUDGE
278. Methods of Disposal.—Sludge is the deposited

suspended matter which accumulates as the result of the
sedimentation of sewage. The methods for the disposal of sludge as
discussed herein will include the disposal of scum. Scum is a floating
mass of sewage solids buoyed up in part by entrained gas or grease,
forming a greasy mat which remains on the surface of the sewage.[201]
The sludges formed by different methods of sewage treatment are
described in the chapter devoted to the particular method. The
disposal of sludge is a problem common to all methods of sewage
treatment involving the use of sedimentation tanks.
Sludge is disposed of by: dilution, burial, lagooning, burning,
filling land, and as a fertilizer or fertilizer base. Certain methods of
disposal, such as burning or as a fertilizer, demand that the sludge be
dried preparatory to disposal. Sludge is dried on drying beds, in a
centrifuge, in a press, in a hot-air dryer, or by acid precipitation.
279. Lagooning.—This is a method of sludge disposal in which

fresh sludge is run on to previously prepared beds to a depth of 12 to
18 inches or more, and allowed to stand without further attention.
The preparation of the lagoons requires leveling the ground, building
of embankments, and, if the ground is not porous, the placing of
underdrains laid in sand or gravel. At Reading, Pa.,[202]
approximately one acre was required for 1,700 cubic yards of wet
sludge. The results of lagooning at Philadelphia are given in Table
103.[202]
TABLE 103
Results of Drying Sludge in Lagoons at Philadelphia
(“Sewage Sludge” by Allen)

Treatment Days Depth, Per Cent, Rainfall, Cubic
Inches Moisture Inches Yards per
Acre
Screened 0 12.20 82.8 0 1600
Screened 26 7.67 57.0 0 1000
Screened 49 3.50 51.6 0.43 470
Screened 0 13.50 90.1 0 1800
Screened 62 7.00 61.0 3.14 950
Crude 0 12.00 88.7 0 1600
Crude 59 4.70 62.8 2.59 640
During the period of standing in the lagoon the moisture drains
out and evaporates and the organic matter putrefies, giving off gases
and foul odors. In the course of three to six months, biological action
ceases and the sludge has become humified and reduced to about 75
per cent moisture. In the utilization of this method of disposal the
lagoons must be removed from settled districts and should occupy
land of little value for other purposes. The odors created at the
lagoons may be intense and offensive. The land so used is rendered
unfit for other purposes for many years.
The digestion of sludge in special tanks is a form of lagooning in
which an attempt is made to maintain septic action as a result of
which a portion of the sludge is gasified or liquefied, leaving less to
be cared for by some of the other methods of treatment or disposal.
The results obtained by digestion tanks have not been entirely
satisfactory. A partial drying and consolidation of the sludge may be
effected, however, by the process of decantation, in which the
supernatant liquid is run off, followed by further sedimentation,
rendering the final product more compact.
280. Dilution.—In the disposal of sludge by dilution, as in the

disposal of sewage by dilution, there must be sufficient oxygen
available in the diluting water to prevent putrefaction, and a swift
current to prevent sedimentation. Such conditions exist in localities
along the sea coast, and in communities situated near rivers, when
the rivers are in flood. In some seacoast towns, for example at
London and Glasgow, the sludge is taken out to sea in boats, and
dumped. Since it is not necessary to discharge sludge continuously, it
can be stored to advantage in the digestion chamber of a tank, until
the conditions in the body of diluting water are suitable to receive it.
The amount of diluting water to receive sewage sludge has not
been sufficiently well determined to draw reliable general
conclusions. A dilution of 1,500 to 2,000 volumes may be considered
sufficiently safe to avoid a nuisance provided there is a sufficient
velocity to prevent sedimentation. Johnson’s Report on Sewage
Purification at Columbus, Ohio (1905), states that a dilution of 1 to
800 is sufficient to avoid a nuisance. The character of the sludge has
a marked effect on the proper ratio of dilution, the sludge from septic
and sedimentation tanks requiring a greater dilution than that from
Imhoff tanks.
281. Burial.—Sludge can be disposed of by burial in trenches

about 24 inches deep with at least 12 inches of earth cover, without
causing a nuisance. The ground used for this purpose should be well
drained. This method of disposal is generally used as a makeshift and
has not been practiced extensively because of the large amount of
land required. Insufficient information is available to generalize on
the amount of land required or the time before the land can be used
for further sludge burial, or for other purposes. Indications are that
the sludge may remain moist and malodorous for years and that the
land may be rendered permanently unfit for further sludge burial.
Under some conditions the land may be used again for the same or
other purposes. For example, Kinnicutt, Winslow and Pratt[203] state
that 500 tons of wet sludge can be applied per acre and:
The same land, it is claimed, can be used again after a period of a year
and a half to two years, if in two months or so after covering the sludge with
earth, the ground is broken up, planted, and, when the crop is removed,
again plowed and allowed to remain fallow for about a year.
282. Drying.—Before sludge can be disposed of to fill land, by

burning, or for use as a fertilizer filler it must be dried to a suitable
degree of moisture. The removal of moisture from the sludge
decreases its volume and changes its characteristics so that sludge
containing 75 per cent moisture has lost all the characteristics of a
liquid. It can be moved with a shovel or fork, and can be transported
in non-watertight containers. A reduction in moisture from 95 to 90
per cent will cut the volume in half.
The change in volume on the removal of moisture can be
represented as:
V(100 − P)
V1 = (100 − P1) ,
in which P = the original percentage of moisture;

P1 = the final percentage of moisture;
V = the original volume;
V1 = the final volume.
The drying of sludge on coarse sand filter beds is more
particularly suited to sludge from Imhoff tanks. This sludge does not
decompose during drying, and is sufficiently light and porous in
texture to permit of thorough draining. The sludge from plain
sedimentation or chemical precipitation tanks is high in moisture,
putrescible, and when placed on a filter bed it settles into a heavy,
compact, impervious mass which dries slowly. In order to avoid this
condition the sludge is run on to the beds as quickly as possible, to a
depth of not more than 6 to 10 inches. Lime is sometimes added to
the sludge at this time as it aids drying by assisting in the
maintenance of the porosity of the sludge, and it is advantageous in
keeping down odors and insects.
Sludge filter beds are made up of 12 to 24 inches of coarse sand,
well-screened cinders, or other gritty material, underlaid by 6 inches
of coarse gravel and 6 or 8–inch open-joint tile underdrains, laid 4 to
10 feet apart on centers, dependent on the porosity of the subsoil.
The side walls of the filters are made of planks or of low earth
embankments. The sludge filters at Hamilton, Ontario, are shown in
Fig. 179.
Fig. 179.—Sludge drying
Beds at Hamilton,
Ontario.
Eng. News, Vol. 73, p.

426.
The size of the bed is dependent mainly upon the characteristics

of the sludge. For Imhoff tank sludge which comes from the tank
with about 85 per cent moisture, the practice is to allow about
350[204] square feet of filter surface per 1,000 population
contributing sludge. For other types of sludge the area varies from
900 to 9,000 square foot per 1,000 population contributing sludge,
and only experiments with the sludge in hand can determine the
proper allowance. Imhoff recommends 1,080 square feet per 1,000
population for septic tank sludge, and 6,480 square feet for sludge
from plain sedimentation tanks.[205] Kinnicutt, Winslow, and Pratt in
their book on Sewage Disposal state:
With an average depth of 10 inches per dose of sludge of 87 per cent
water content, one square foot of covered (glass) bed should dry to a
spadable condition one cubic yard of sludge per year.
The sludge is run on the bed in small quantities at periods from two
weeks to a month apart. In favorable weather Imhoff sludge will dry
in two weeks or less to approximately 50 to 60 per cent moisture. It
is then suitable for use as a filling material on waste land, for
burning, or for further drying by heat. Glass roofs, similar to those
used on green-houses, have been used to speed the drying process by
preventing the moistening of partly dried sludge during rainy
weather. In some instances sludge has dried to 10 per cent moisture
on such beds. Imhoff sludge can be removed from the drying beds
with a manure or hay fork. It has an odor similar to well-fertilized
garden soil. It is stable, dark brownish-gray in color, is of light coarse
material, and is granular in texture.
Sludge presses are suitable for removing moisture from the
bulky wet sludge obtained from plain sedimentation, chemical
precipitation, and the activated sludge process. The details of a
typical sludge press are shown in Fig. 180. The press shown is made
up of a number of corrugated metal plates about 30 inches in
diameter with a hole in the center about 8 inches in diameter. The
corrugations run vertically except for a distance about 3 inches wide
around the outer rim, which is smooth. To this smooth portion is
fastened, on each side of the plate, an annular ring about an inch
thick and 2 to 3 inches wide, of the same outside diameter as the
plate. A circular piece of burlap, canvas, or other heavy cloth is
fastened to this ring, covering the plate completely. A hole is cut in
the center of the cloth slightly smaller in diameter than the center
hole in the plate, and the edges of the cloth on opposite sides of the
plate are sewed together. The plates are then pressed tightly together
by means of the screw motion at the left end of the machine, thus
making a water-tight joint at the outer rim. Sludge is then forced
under pressure into the space between the plates, passing through
the machine by means of the central hole. The pressure on the sludge
may be from 50 to 100 pounds per square inch. This pressure forces
the water out of the sludge through the porous cloth from which it
escapes to the bottom of the press along the corrugations of the
separating plate. After a period of 10 to 30 minutes the pressure is
released, the cells are opened, and the moist sludge cake is removed.
The liquid pressed from the sludge is highly putrescible and should
be returned to the influent of the treatment plant. The pressing of
wet greasy sludges is facilitated by the addition of from 8 to 10
pounds of lime per cubic yard of sludge. The cake thus formed is
more cohesive and easy to handle. The output of the press depends
so much on the character of the sludge that a definite guarantee of
capacity is seldom given by the manufacturer.
Fig. 180.—Filter Press.
The simplest form of centrifugal sludge dryer is a machine which

consists of a perforated metal bowl lined with porous cloth in which
the sludge is placed. Surrounding this bowl is a second water-tight
metal bowl so arranged as to intercept the water thrown from the
sides of the inner bowl as it revolves. The peripheral velocity of the
inner bowl is about 6,000 feet per minute, which makes the effective
weight of each particle about 250 times its normal weight when at
rest. Very few data are available on the operation of such machines,
and their use has not been extensive because of the difficulty of
starting and stopping the machine at each filling, and the difficulty of
removing the partially dried sludge from the inner basket. The
Besco-ter-Meer centrifuge, manufactured by the Barth Engineering
and Sanitation Co., can be operated continuously and the difficulties
of removing the dried sludge from the machine have been overcome.
According to the manufacturers the centrifuge has been operated
very successfully in Germany on plain septic tank sludge. A removal
of 70 per cent of suspended solids in the raw sludge and a production
of 3,600 pounds of sludge per hour, containing 60 to 70 per cent of
moisture, can be obtained at less than 900 r.p.m. with a
consumption of 15 horse-power. Extensive tests of the machine were
made at Milwaukee from October, 1920, to September, 1921, on
activated sludge, but results of these tests are not as yet available.
Indications are that the centrifuge has acted as a classifier. The
coarser particles of sludge have been removed but the finer particles
have been continuously returned with the liquid to the
sedimentation tank, ultimately filling this tank with fine particles of
sludge. An illustration of the unit tested at Milwaukee is shown on
this page.
Besco-ter-Meer Sludge
Drying Centrifuge at
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Courtesy, Barth
Engineering and
Sanitation Co.
Experiments on the drying of sludge by acid flotation have not

progressed sufficiently to allow the installation of a working unit.
The method, which has been applied principally to activated sludge,
consists in adding a small amount of sulphuric acid to the sludge as it
leaves the storage tank. The sludge is coagulated by this action, the
coagulated material rising to the surface as a scum containing about
86 per cent moisture. The consistency is such that it can be removed
with a shovel. The liquid can be withdrawn continuously from below
the scum.
Fig. 181.—Direct-Indirect Sludge Dryer.
Courtesy, the Buckeye Dryer Co.
The moisture content of sludge to be used in the manufacture of

fertilizer must be reduced to 10 per cent or less. None of the methods
of drying described so far can be relied upon for such a product and
it becomes necessary to use direct or indirect heat dryers. There are
various types of dryers on the market. The details of a Buckeye dryer
are shown in Fig. 181. In the operation of this machine moist sludge
is fed in at the left end at the point marked “feed.” The hot gases pass
from the fire box up and around the cylinder which revolves at about
eight r.p.m. The gases are drawn into the inner cylinder through the
openings marked A which revolve with the two cylinders. The gases
escape from the inner cylinder through the openings to the right and
flow towards the left in the outer cylinder. They come in contact with
the sludge at this point. The gases then pass off through the fan at
the left. The sludge is lifted by the small longitudinal baffles fastened
to the outer cylinder, as the drying cylinders revolve. The right end of
the cylinder is placed lower than the left so that the drying sludge is
lifted and dropped through the cylinder at the same time that it
moves slowly toward the right hand end of the cylinder. These dryers
require about one pound of fuel for 10 pounds of water evaporated.
The odors from the dryer can be suppressed by passing the gases
through a dust chamber and washer.
A summary of the results from methods of sludge drying at
Milwaukee[206] follows:
Excess sludge produced, 12,100 gallons, having 97.5 per cent moisture,
per million gallons of sewage treated.
Sludge cake produced (by presses), 10,083 pounds having 80.3 per cent
moisture, per million gallons of sewage treated.
Dried sludge (from heat driers) produced, 2,521 pounds having 10 per
cent moisture, per million gallons of sewage treated.
Press will produce 3 pounds of cake per square foot of filter cloth in
four and a half hours, or five operations per twenty-four hours.
Dryers will reduce 6,700 pounds of sludge cake at 80 per cent moisture
to 10 per cent moisture, and will evaporate 8 pounds of water per pound of
combustible.
Thickening devices known as Dorr thickeners, patented and
manufactured by the Dorr Co. and originally intended for
metallurgical purposes, have been adapted to the thickening of
sewage sludge. These thickeners are circular sedimentation tanks,
from 8 to 12 feet deep, more or less, and are made in any diameter up
to 200 feet or more. An arm, pivoted in the center and extending to
the circumference, is provided at the bottom with a number of baffles
or squeegees set at an angle with the arm. The arm revolves at from
one to fifteen revolutions per hour, and the squeegees, in contact
with the bottom of the tank, scrape the deposited sludge towards a
central sump, from which it is removed by a pump or by gravity,
without interrupting the operation of the thickener. The sludge so
thickened may be reduced to 95 or 96 per cent moisture. These
devices are ordinarily used only in the activated sludge process in
which they have been a pronounced success.
CHAPTER XXI
AUTOMATIC DOSING DEVICES
283. Types.—Automatic dosing devices are used to apply

sewage to contact beds, trickling filters, and intermittent sand filters.
These devices can be separated into two classes; those with moving
parts and those without moving parts. The latter are better known as
air-locked dosing devices. Simple devices without moving parts are
less liable to disorders and are nearer “fool-proof” than any device
depending on moving parts for its operation.
No one type of moving part device has been used extensively in
different sewage treatment plants. Designing engineers have
exercised their ingenuity at different plants, resulting in the
production of different types.[207] Among the best known forms is the
apparatus designed by J. W. Alvord for the intermittent sand filters
at Lake Forest, Illinois.[208] In its operation....
A float in the dosing chamber lifts an iron ball in one of a series of
wooden columns, and at a certain height the ball rolls through a trough
from one column to the next, in its passage striking a catch, which opens an
air valve attached to one of ten bell-siphons in the dosing chamber. Each of
the siphons discharges on one of the ten sand beds, which are thus dosed in
rotation.
Since air-locked dosing devices are in more general use their
operation will be explained in greater detail.
284. Operation.—The simplest form of these devices is the

automatic siphon used for flush-tanks, the operation of which is
described in Art. 61.
In the operation of sand filters, sprinkling filters, or other forms
of treatment where there are two or more units to be dosed it is
desirable that the dosing of the beds be done alternately. A simple
arrangement for two siphons operating alternately is shown in Fig.
182. They operate as follows: with the dosing tank empty at the start
water will stand at bb′ in siphon No. 2 and at aa′ in siphon No. 1. As
the water enters through the inlet on the left the tank fills. When the
water rises sufficiently, air is trapped in the bells, and as the water
continues to rise in the tank, surfaces a and b are depressed an equal
amount. When b has been depressed to d, a has been depressed to c.
Air is released from siphon No. 2 through the short leg, and siphon
No. 2 goes into operation. Surface c rises in siphon No. 1 as the tank
empties and when the action of Siphon No. 2 is broken by the
admission of air when the bottom of the bell is uncovered the water
in siphon No. 1 has assumed the position of bb′ and that in No. 2 is at
aa′. The conditions of the two siphons are now reversed from that at
the beginning of the operation and as the tank refills siphon No. 1
will go into operation. It is to be noted that these siphons are made to
alternate by weakening the seal of the next one to discharge and by
strengthening the seal of the one which has just discharged.
Fig. 182.—Diagram Showing the Operation of

Two Alternating Siphons.
Fig. 183.—Diagram Showing the Operation of
Three Alternating Siphons.
285. Three Alternating Siphons.—This principle can be

extended to the operation of three alternating siphons as shown in
Fig. No. 183. These operate as follows: with the dosing tank empty at
the start and water at aa′ in siphons 1 and 2, and at bb′ in siphon No.
3, the dosing tank will be allowed to fill. As the water rises in the tank
air is trapped in all the bells and surfaces a and b are depressed.
When surface b has been depressed to d, a has been depressed to c.
Air is released from siphon No. 3 and this siphon goes into action.
Surface c rises in siphons 1 and 2 to the position b, as the dosing tank
is emptied. At the same time a small amount of water is passed from
siphon No. 3 to the short leg of siphon No. 1, through the small pipes
shown, thus filling this leg so that when siphon No. 3 ceases to
operate the water in siphons 1 and 3 stands at aa′ and that in No. 2
stands at bb′. Siphon No. 2, having the weaker seal, will be the next
to operate. During its operation it will fill siphon No. 3, leaving No. 1
weak. When No. 1 operates it will refill No. 2, leaving No. 3 weak,
thus completing a cycle for the three siphons. This principle has not
been applied to the operation of more than three alternating siphons
and is seldom used on recent installations.
Fig. 184.—Miller Plural Alternating Siphons.
Courtesy, Pacific Flush Tank Co.
286. Four or More Alternating Siphons.—An arrangement

for the alternation of four or more siphons is illustrated in Fig. 184.
At the commencement of the cycle it will be assumed that all starting
wells are filled with water except well No. 1, and that all main and all
blow-off traps are filled with water. The following description of the
operation of the siphons is taken from the catalog of the Pacific Flush
Tank Company:
The liquid in the tank gradually rises and finally overflows into the
starting well No. 1 and the starting bell being filled with air, pressure is
developed which is transmitted, as shown by the arrows, to the blow-off
trap connected with siphon No. 2. When the discharge line is reached,
sufficient head is obtained on the starting bell to force the seal in blow-off
trap No. 2, thus releasing the air confined in siphon No. 2 and bringing it
into full operation.
During the time that siphon No. 2 is operating, siphonic action is
developed in the draining siphon connected with starting well No. 2 and as
soon as the level in the tank is below the top of the well it is drained down to
a point below the bottom of starting well No. 2. It can now be seen that after
the first discharge starting well No. 2 is empty, whereas the other three are
full.... Therefore when the tank is filled the second time, pressure is
developed in starting bell No. 2, which forces the seal of blow-off trap No. 3,
thus starting siphon No. 3....
This alternation can be continued for any number of siphons. Other
arrangements have been devised for the automatic control of
alternating siphons, but these principles of the air-locked devices are
fundamental.
287. Timed Siphons.—In the operation of a number of

contact beds not only must the dosing of the tanks be alternated, but
some method is needed by which the beds shall be automatically
emptied after the proper period of standing full. To fulfill this need
the principle of the timed siphon must be employed in conjunction
with the alternating siphons. Fig. 185 illustrates the operation of the
Miller timed siphon. Its operation is as follows: water is admitted to
the contact bed and transmitted to the main siphon chamber through
the “opening into bed.” Water flows from the main siphon chamber
into the timing chamber at a rate determined by the timing valve.
The contact bed is held full during this period. As the timing
chamber fills with water air is caught in the starting bell and the
pressure is increased until the seal in the main blow-off trap is blown
and the main siphon is put into operation. As the water level in the
main siphon chamber descends, water flows from the timing
chamber into the main siphon through the draining siphon and the
timing chamber is emptied, ready to commence another cycle.
288. Multiple Alternating and Timed Siphons.[209]—The

alternating and timing of a number of beds is more complicated. The
arrangement necessary for this is shown in Fig. 186. It will be
assumed at the start that all beds are empty and that all feeds are air
locked as shown in Section AB except that to bed No. 4 into which
sewage is running. As bed No. 4 fills, sewage is transmitted through
the opening in the wall into the timed siphon chamber No. 4. When
the level of the water in the bed and therefore in this chamber has
reached the top of the withdraw siphon leading to the compression
dome chamber No. 4, this latter chamber is quickly filled. The air
pressure in starting bell No. 4a is transmitted to blow-off trap No. 1a.
The seal of this trap is blown, releasing the air lock in feed No. 1 and
the flow into bed No. 1 is commenced. At the same time the air
pressure in compression dome No. 4 is transmitted to feed No. 4, air
locking this feed and stopping the flow into bed No. 4. The
alternation of the feed into the different beds is continued in this
manner.
Fig. 185.—Miller Timed

Siphon.
Courtesy, Pacific Flush

Tank Co.
Bed No. 4 is now standing full and No. 1 is filling. When

compression dome chamber No. 4 was filled, water started flowing
through timing siphon valve No. 4 into timing chamber No. 4 at a
rate determined by the amount of the opening of the timing valve. As
this chamber fills compression is transmitted to blow-off trap 4b and
when sufficiently great this trap is blown and timed siphon No. 4 is
put into operation. Bed No. 4 is emptied by it, and compression
dome chamber No. 4 is emptied through the withdraw siphon at the
same time. This completes a cycle for the filling and emptying of one
bed and the method of passing the dose on to another bed has been
explained. The principle can be extended to the operation of any
number of beds.
Fig. 186.—Plural Timed
and Alternating Siphons
for Contact Bed Control.
Courtesy, Pacific Flush

Tank Co.

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I thank the following for permission to reprint the essays in this

'Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy' was originally published

'Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues' was originally published in

Abbreviations for Kant's Works x

PART L Some Basic Kantian Themes u

i, Kantian Analysis; From Duty to Autonomy j?

PART II, Human Welfare: Self-interest and Regard for Others 97

4, Beneficence and Self-Love 99

PART III, Moral Worth: Self-Assessment and Desert 275

9. Four Conceptions of Conscience 2.77

A Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Mary Gregor

Ci Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York:

Cz Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:

C3 Critique of judgment, tr. Warner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett

G Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr. H. J, Paton (New

Cig Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Mary Gregor

MM The Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Mary Gregor (Cambridge:

PP Perpetual Peace, tr. H. B. Nesbit, in Kant; Political Writings, ed.

R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, tr. Allen Wood

RL 'On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns',

Numbers in square brackets refer to the relevant volume and page

In a recent collection of essays, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian

Some Basic Kantian Themes

Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy

Kant repeatedly emphasizes in the Groundwork, and elsewhere, that we

II. CATEGORICAL AND

The vocabulary and tone of Kant's writing about morality is disturbing

(Eng. News-Record, Vol. 80, p. 319)

(Eng. News-Record, Vol. 80, p. 319)

Character of Miles Acid Sludge at New Haven

(Eng. News-Record, Vol. 81, p. 1034)

Cost in Dollars per Million Gallons Treated

(Engineering and Contracting, Vol. 51, p. 510)

(Creighton and Franklin, Journal of the Franklin Institute, August, 1919)

277. Disinfection of Sewage.—Sewage is disinfected in order to protect public water

Cost of Electrolytic Treatment, Elmhurst, Long Island, and Easton, Pennsylvania

One Million Gallon Three Million Gallon

278. Methods of Disposal.—Sludge is the deposited

279. Lagooning.—This is a method of sludge disposal in which

Results of Drying Sludge in Lagoons at Philadelphia

(“Sewage Sludge” by Allen)

280. Dilution.—In the disposal of sludge by dilution, as in the

281. Burial.—Sludge can be disposed of by burial in trenches

282. Drying.—Before sludge can be disposed of to fill land, by

in which P = the original percentage of moisture;

Eng. News, Vol. 73, p.

The size of the bed is dependent mainly upon the characteristics