Case - Digests (Til' Rule 98)

Calmerin, Krizza Nadine A.
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CASE DIGESTS:
1. MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO. VS. BAENS DEL ROSARIO, ET. AL. (G.R. No. L-
13130, Oct. 31, 1959) - CASE NOT FOUND
Doctrine:
Art. 391 cannot apply if the vessel was not lost or missing but instead destroyed by
fire and washed ashore and the fact that the missing person had jumped overboard
and since then has not been heard from, the rule on presumption of death cannot
be applied. Instead, the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the
fact of death.
2. VICTORY SHIPPING VS. WORKMEN’S CC (106 Phil. 550)
Facts:
On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of petitioner, was sleeping

on board M/V “Miss Leyte”, when it caught fire. Awakened by the fire, Pedro Icong
jumped overboard. Since then he has not been heard of. The employee was
unmarried and his father, respondent Juan Icong was his partial dependent. On April
30, 1954, Juan Icong filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission a petition
and a notice of claim for death compensation. The Commission rendered an award
in favour of respondent Juan Icong. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for
the review
of the award.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision of Article 391 of the Old Civil Code on
presumptive death apply in this case.
Ruling:
No, the provision of Article 391 of the Old Civil Code on presumptive death
would not be applied in this case.
Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of

death of persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case wherein
the vessel cannot be 126 located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or
there is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to
a vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection
with an airplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being the object of
the rule expressed in the same sentence.
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In the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate
of the petitioner's vessel is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of
fact, it had been definitely destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the
further fact that when the petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped
overboard and since then had not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on
presumption of death does not apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of
evidence applies to establish the fact of death.
3. ENRIQUEZ VS. CHUA MA (47057-R,, May 23, 1980) - (CASE NOT FOUND)
Doctrine: A court proceeding to determine the authenticity of a will, that is, to see
if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirement of law.
4. GUEVARA VS. GUEVARA (74 Phil. 479 & 98 Phil. 249)
Facts:
Ernesto Guevara and Rosario Guevara were children of Victorino Guevara.
Ernesto was a legitimate child while Rosario was not. Victorino died in 1933 but
prior to his death, he executed a will disposing of his vast property to various
people including Ernesto and Rosario. Ernesto was named as the executor of the will
but he never submitted the will to court for probate. Rosario had a copy of the will
but she never submitted the will for probate.
In 1937, Rosario sued Ernesto for recovery of properties as she claimed that
Ernesto appropriated her supposed inheritance. One of the pieces of evidence she
presented against Ernesto was the will executed by their father. The purpose of the
will as evidence was to prove that she was an acknowledged child of Victorino.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with.
Ruling:
No, the probate of a will cannot be dispensed with. Rosario's contention
violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and
testament of the decedent
The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its
allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. The law requires the probate
of the will and public policy also requires it, because unless the will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory.
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In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than
the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had
knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the
will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the
failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.
5. BALUYOT VS. PANIO (G.R. No. L-42088, May 7, 1976)
Facts:
Upon the death of Soltero Baluyut, he left an estate valued at not less than
Php2M. A few weeks later, his nephew Alfredo Baluyut filed before the CFI of
Quezon City a verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his
favor, alleging that Encarnacion Lopez Baluyut, Soltero’s widow, was mentally
incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent’s estate. Believing that Soltero
executed a will, Alfredo prayed that he be appointed as special administrator in the
meantime. The CFI granted Alfredo’s petition. Mrs. Baluyut filed an opposition to the
appointment. She claimed that the allegation as to her mental incapacity was
libelous and that she was unaware that her husband executed a will. Finding that
Mrs. Baluyut was mentally qualified, the CFI canceled Alfredo’s appointment.
However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration, Alfredo’s appointment
was again appointed as special administrator, together with Jose Espino, an
acknowledged natural child of Soltero. Mrs. Baluyut again countered, arguing that
Jose effectively rid Alfredo of any interest in the estate of Soltero by exclusion; he is
a collateral relative. Alfredo naturally opposed, arguing that Jose was not a natural
child of the decedent, at the same time insisting that Mrs. Baluyut was incapable of
becoming an administratrix, as declared by another court in a separate
guardianship proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
Ruling:
Yes, the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her
competency.
It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a

testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy.
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The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in
summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo
G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced
after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He
anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that
Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.
6. ROBERTS VS. LEONIDAS (G.R. No. 55509, April 27, 1984)
Facts:
Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila who died in Nov. 1977

leaving his Wife Maxine Tate Grimm and his two children from a previous marriage,
Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts. The petitioner is Ethel Grimm
Roberts, who filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate. The
respondent is Maxine Tate Grimm, who filed a petition for the probate of the two
wills.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California in Jan. 1959. One for
his Philippine estate and another for his estate outside the Philippines. The will
favored his second wife and two children, while providing for the legitimes of the
first marriage. Ethel Grimm Roberts filed an Intestate Proceeding in the Manila Court
of First Instance on Jan. 1978. Maxine Tate Grimm filed an Motion to Dismiss the
Intestate Proceeding, Maxine then withdrew her motion to dismiss, and were
appointed joint administrators of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the intestate proceeding should be dismissed in favor of the

probate of the wills.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the probate of the wills is mandatory, as stated
in Article 838 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court. It is
anomalous for the estate of a person who died testate to be settled in an intestate
proceeding.
Here, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding,
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing both
cases.
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7. NUFABLE VS. NUFABLE (G.R. No. 126950, July 2, 1999)
Facts:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at Poblacion,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died
on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio,
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed
by said heirs and after due publication and hearing, the then Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order dated March 30, 1966 admitting to
probate the last will and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable.
However, one of the heirs, Angel actually mortgaged the entire property to
DBP two months prior to the settlement which property was eventually foreclosed.
Thereafter, Nelson, son of the mortgagors, purchased said property from DBP. The
other heirs now filed for the annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting one-fourth of the property to
Nelson and the other three-fourths to the other heirs. Petitioners filed this present
petition contending that the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Edras
Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in question as against third
parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its
subsequent probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of
ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in question from,
and as acquired property of the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its subsequent probate do not
affect the title of Nelson.
At the time when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of Edras
had already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so because
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent.
Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter
whether the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted or
that the Settlement of Estate was approved. It is to be noted that the probated will
of the late Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the subject property in stating that
“the land situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be
divided because this must remain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow
anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.”
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8. NUGUID VS. NUGUID (17 SCRA449)
Facts:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her
were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios,
one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed
that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to
her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the
institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in
consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one,
some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854
does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue:
Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole,
universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.
Ruling:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic
will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the
case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”.
Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
In this case, where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole,
universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific
legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And
intestate succession ensues.
9. NEPOMUCENO VS. CA (G.R. No. L-62952, Oct. 9, 1985)
Facts:
In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the
petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly
stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
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whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as
husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of
the Will, but the legal wife and children filed an opposition. The lower court denied
the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting with
Nepomuceno. The will’s admission to probate was deemed an idle exercise since
based on the face of the will, the invalidity of the instrinsic provisions is evident. The
appellate court, however, declared the will to be valid except that the devise in
favour of the petitioner is null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but such was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last will and testament of the testator validly drawn, it went on
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein
petitioner.
Ruling:
No.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is
limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given the exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass
upon certain provisions of the Will.
In this case, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity has been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face, it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
10. MANINANG VS. CA (G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982)
Facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will which states that all her real
properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her
personal properties shall be inherited upon her death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang.
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will
of the decedent. On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the
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adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted
intestate proceedings. On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases
were ordered consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground
that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir,
was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. The lower court dismissed
the Motion filed by Soledad Maninang.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
dismissed the Testate Case.
Ruling:
Yes.
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
In this case, by virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination
of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. From the assailed
Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been
preterited from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
11. FERNANDEZ, ET. AL. VS. DIMAGIBA (G.R. No. L-23638, Oct. 12, 1967)
Facts:
On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the
CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los
Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole
heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time,
Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano,
Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate
of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the
opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the
proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major
portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and
1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by the Supreme Court. The CFI
found that the will genuinely executed but deferred deciding on the issue of
estoppel and revocation until such time that the opportunity is presented.
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial,
insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved but
were denied. The CA later ruled that the case had become final and executor due to
failure to appeal.
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Issue:
Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta Reyes is impliedly revoked and
affects the will itself.
Ruling:
No.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate
from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is
not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become
superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to
revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors appellants is not an
express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute revocation can
preclude probate of the revoked testament.
Here, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent
of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the
circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in
favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba.
12. MA. SUSAN RANOLA, ET. AL. VS. SPS. FERNANDO & MA. CONCEPCION
RANOLA (G.R. No. 185095, July 31, 2009)
Facts:
The case of Rañola v. Spouses Rañola involves a family dispute over property
and legal cases. The parties in the case have executed a Compromise Agreement,
which they submitted to the court for approval. The legal cases pending before
different courts and forums include cases related to the nullity of a contract,
unlawful detainer, settlement of an estate, estafa, and appeals before the
Department of Justice and the Supreme Court. The also includes provisions
regarding the use of the ceded property, the relocation of a hammer mill, the
transfer of monies deposited with the court, the transfer of steel bars, the respect
for four residential lots in Legazpi City, the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance
with Motion to Dismiss Criminal Cases, restrictions on raising other fowl or
conducting poultry business, and the transfer of personal properties or animals
and/or stocks in trade.
Issue:
What is the effect of a compromise agreement in the settlement of the Estate
of the Decedent?
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Ruling:
Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions, as they may
deem convenient, provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the
parties make reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation, or put an end to one already
commenced. It is an accepted, even desirable and encouraged, practice in courts of
law and administrative tribunals.
A compromise agreement intended to resolve a matter already under
litigation is a judicial compromise. Having judicial mandate and entered as its
determination of the controversy, such judicial compromise has the force and effect
of a judgment. It transcends its identity as a mere contract between the parties, as
it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by
the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may
be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the
litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed
13. MCMICKING VS. SY COMBIENG (21 Phil. 219)
Facts:
The case involves the estate of Margarita Jose, who died in 1902 leaving a
personal property in Hongkong and Philippines. Engracio Palanca was appointed as
the administrator of the estate and Mariano Ocampo was one of the sureties of
Palanca,however, Palanca failed to deliver the property to the court or to the
successor, Jose Mcmicking. Ocampo died and Velasco was the appointed
administrator of the estate of Ocampo and Pio de la guardia Barretto is the qualified
surety of Velasco.
Palanca was removed from office of administrator of the estate of Jose and
McMicking was then appointed as the new administrator of the estate. For the
default of Engracio Palanca, Mcmicking filed a claim amounting Php 30,000 to the
estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto as the surety of Velasco who is the
administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo who in turn is the surety of said
Palanca. The court dismissed the case and rendered judgment in favor of the
defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff may claim against the defendant as the surety of
Velasco.
Ruling:
No.
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At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stand
sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These sections provide for the
voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent without proceedings in
court. It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of
private ownership of property that he owns the things shall not be deprived of its
possession or use except for most urgent and imperative reasons. SC further
emphasize, these are the provisions to which the court’s attention is directed in
seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of the property of the
deceased. The purpose of which is to put into one’s hands the property which
belong to him not only on the earliest possible moment and also for the least lost
and substantially all expense and waste are saved.
As the SC indicated, the basis of the liability of surety on an administrator’s
bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of the principal precedes that
of the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then hios surety incurred none.
14. MANG-OY VS. CA (G.R. No. L-27421, Sept. 12, 1986)
Facts:
In 1937, Old Man Tumpao (Tumpao) executed a last will and testament
appointing his son, Bando Tumpao with the power to “see and dispose” of what was
stated in the will exactly as it was stated. Tumpao’s beneficiaries then executed a
deed of confirmation that they have heard and understood the will concerning their
rights to the lands they would inherit. Two days later, Tumpao died.The parties
remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience to the
wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by the other
above quoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty-three
years later, that brought this matter to the courts.On November 4, 1960, the
respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property
of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the
petitioners.Petitioners are suing for reconveyance.The RTC sustained their claim for
reconveyance, but it was reversed by the CA. The CA held that the will executed by
Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated.
Issues:
(1) Was the will of Tumpao valid.
(2) Can the will be sustained.
Ruling:
(1) NO. The will, not having been probated as required by law, was
inoperative as such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions
in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
(2) YES.
On the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at
the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. It reads: Art.
1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos,
or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
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the forced heirs. Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator
to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and that
this partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument
of a special character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante
during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death.
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in
1917, the presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so
cannot be claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and
Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their
exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.
15. BALTAZAR VS. LAXA (G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012)
Facts:
Pacencia Regala was a 78-year old spinster who executed a Will bequeathing
all of her properties to her nephew, Respondent Lorenzo Laxa. The Will was
executed in the house of Judge Ernestino Limpin who read it aloud to Pacencia, in
the presence of witnesses Francisco Garcia, Faustino Garcia and Dr. Maria Lioba
Limpin. Being without children and siblings, Pacencia bequeathed all her properties
to Lorenzo as they had a filial relationship like a mother and a son. Four years later,
Pacencia died.
Lorenzo filed a Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pacencia before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). He presented evidence of their relationship as well as
presented as witness, Dr. Limpin, who attested that the Will was made in their
house, executed by Pacencia and witnessed by her. However, Petitioner Antonio
Baltazar filed an Opposition to the Probate of the Will claiming that Pacencia was
not of unsound mind during the time the Will was executed, aside from claims that
Pacencia was under duress and forced to sign the Will. He presented as witness one
of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo, who testified that Pacencia was magulayan or
forgetful.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate of the will shall be allowed on the basis of
capacity of Pacencia to execute the will.
Ruling:
Yes, it was allowed.
Under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, it is provided that full possession of all
reasoning faculties of the testator is not necessary for a person to be of sound mind,
or that the person’s mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause.
In the present case, the testimony of Rosie that Pacencia was considered
forgetful does not make the latter of unsound mind that would effectively stripped
her of testamentary capacity. Thus, forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind.
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16. CYNTHIA NITTSCHER VS. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (G.R.
No. 160530, Nov. 20, 2007)
Facts:
Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition
for probate of his holographic will, and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
herein respondent Atty Rogelio P Nogales. The probate court issued an order
allowing the said holographic will. On September 26, 1994, Dr Nittscher died.
Hence, Atty Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the admistration of
the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse Cynthia V Nittscher, she
moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court petitioner’s motion
to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of
testamentary. Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merit. On appeal, CA
dismissed the case.
Cynthia contends that Nogales petitio lacked a certification against forum
shopping. she adds, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because Dr
werner was allegedly not resident of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
present suit.
Ruling:
Yes. The lower court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Seztion 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Where the estate of deceased person settled.- If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a resident or an alien,
hiws will shalle be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the court of the first instance (now RTC) in the Province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of foreign country the
court of First instance of the Province in which he had estate.
In this case, the RTC and the CA are one in their finding that DR Nittscher was
a resident of Las Pina, Metrio Manila at the time of his death. Hence, applying
Section1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, Dr Nittscher correctly fileid the RTC of
Makati City, which then covered Las Pinas, Metro Manila, the petitioner for the
probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
17. ENG VS. LEE (G.R. No. 176831, Jan. 15, 2010)
Facts:
Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will, which is now
in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed a
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petition for mandamus with damages before RTC, to compel petitioner to produce
the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the
patriarch's estate and to deliver to the legal heir their respective inheritance, but
petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner posited that the
same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action.
for non-compliance with a condition precedent, and that she was not in the custody
of the holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurer to evidence, however,
it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Upon appeal, the CA
initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Further, according to CA,
respondent failed to prove that his mother was in custody of the will. However,
upon filing of the Motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reversed its prior
decision granting the petition for Mandamus ruling and ordering the production of
the will.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Mandamus is a proper remedy.
Ruling:
NO. Writ of Mandamus is defined and recognized as a remedy with public
character, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose
of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.
The Writ of Mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which his not his duty to do or which his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.
In the instant case, the court witouth unnecessary ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here. The production of the original holographic will is in the
nature of public or private duty, rules that the remedy of Mandamus cannot be
availed of by respondent Lee because there liesa another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that the respondent
has the photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of thr original for
purpose of probate.
18. PASTOR VS. CA (G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983)
Facts:
Pastor Sr. a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966 who was
survived by his wife Sofia Bossio, also a spaniard, together with their two legitimate
children namely Pastor Jr. , A naturalized Filipino, and Sofia, a Spanish subject and
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an illegitimate child named Quemada, a Filipino citizen. Sofia Bossio subsequently
died on October 21, 1966.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate allowance of an alleged holographic
will of Pastor Sr. with CFI Cebu where the will contained a legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation of some mining claims in Pina-
Barot, Cebu, in which the probate court appointed him special administrator of the
entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered covered or affected by the
holographic will. Quemada then instituted an action for reconveyance of alleged
properties of the estate, including properties subject of the legacies, against Pastor
Jr. and his wife who claimed to be the owners of the properties subject of the
legacies by right and not by inheritance.
Pastor Jr. and Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the
order appointing Quemada as special administrator in which the probate court
issued an order allowing the will to probate. petitioners appealed to the CA in which
CA affirmed the decision of the probate court. On petition for review at SC, SC
dismissed the petition and remanded it to the Probate Court.
While reconveyance suit was still being litigated in CFI, the Probate Court
issued an order of Execution and Garnishment in which the court ordered to remit
directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due decedent’s estate and retain 75% of it
for himself and the 25% to be deposited in the bank for the payment of estate taxes
and other obligations of the estate while the 33% share of Pastor Jr. was ordered
garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada from the time of
Pastor Sr’s death amounting to 2 Million pesos.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the probate court in declaring that it resolved the
issues of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, in which the court based its
order of execution and garnishment of the share of Pastor Jr. to answer for the
accumulated legacy of Quemada is proper.
Ruling:
No.
During the issuance of the order of the probate court, no liquidation of the
estate of Pastor Sr. was made and the debts and taxes of the estate of the decedent
was not determined and not paid due to absence of liquidation of the said estate.
The order of the probate court did not resolve the ownership, however it
conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed unless it
is proven by the opposing parties that the legacy to be given and delivered to
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Quemada does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator. Therefore,
the probate court’s orders in its declaration that it resolved the ownership of the
subject estate and its subsequent order of execution and garnishment against the
share of legacy of Pastor Jr. to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada lacks
basis and invalid.
19. PACIOLES VS CHUATOCO-CHING; G.R. Number: 127920, August 9, 2005
Facts:
The petitioner, Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., sought to settle the intestate estate of
his deceased wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles, who left behind real properties, stock
investments, bank deposits, and business interests. The respondent, Miguela
Chuatoco-Ching, opposed the petition on the grounds that the petitioner was unfit
to administer the estate and that a significant portion of the estate consisted of
paraphernal properties. The dispute centered on the administration of the estate
and the appointment of an administrator, which led to a legal battle over the
rightful management and distribution of the assets left by the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, as the surviving spouse, was entitled to be

appointed as the administrator of the estate.
Ruling:
No, petitioner was not entitled to be appointed as the administrator of the

estate.
The petitioner was not granted the administration rights over the estate. The
law applied by the court pertained to the rights and duties of an administrator, as
well as the qualifications required to be deemed fit for such a responsibility. In this
case, the court found that the petitioner did not meet the necessary criteria to fulfill
the role of an administrator effectively.
Here, the respondent had a material interest in the estate due to her
contributions to the paraphernal properties. Consequently, the court denied the
petitioner's motion for partition and distribution of the estate and his motion for
reconsideration. This decision upheld the respondent's opposition to the petitioner's
appointment as administrator, thereby resolving the dispute in favor of the
respondent.
20. YPON vs RICAFORTE, GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013

Facts:
Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon filed a complaint against Gaudioso Ponteras
Ricaforte, claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno. Plaintiffs alleged that
Magdaleno died intestate and childless, leaving behind certain properties. Gaudioso
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executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
transfer certificates of title, transferring the properties in his name. Plaintiffs, who
are collateral relatives and successors-in-interest of Magdaleno, sought the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of title issued in Gaudioso's favor. Gaudioso
alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno and presented documentary
evidence to support his claim.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC's dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of cause
of action was proper.
Ruling:
No.
The determination of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not
in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance.
The Court affirmed the dismissal of the case without prejudice to any
subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of Magdaleno Ypon and their
rights. The RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso's heirship, as it should be determined in
the proper special proceeding and not in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession.
21. SUMILANG VS RAMAGOSA, GR No. L-23135, December 26, 1967
Facts:
The petitioner, Mariano Sumilang, sought the probate of a document

purported to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, who had passed
away on December 1, 1959. The document, written in Tagalog and dated February
26, 1949, named the petitioner as the sole heir. The respondents, consisting of
Saturnina Ramagosa, Santiago Ramagosa, Enrique Pabella, Liceria Pabella, and
Andrea Ravalo, opposed the petition. They challenged the due execution of the will,
alleging it was made under duress and did not reflect the true intent of the
decedent. Additionally, two of the respondents claimed they were entitled to inherit
the estate, while the others, identifying themselves as next of kin, sought only the
disallowance of the will.
Issue:
Whether the will had been duly executed and reflected the true intent of the
testator.
Ruling:
Yes, the will had been duly executed.
The court held that the court's jurisdiction is limited to the extrinsic validity of
the will, focusing on the testator's capacity and adherence to prescribed formalities.
The intrinsic validity and the legality of the will's provisions are not within the scope
of probate proceedings. The court found that the allegations of the respondents
concerning the execution of the will and the testator's intent were matters relating
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to the intrinsic value of the will, which are not grounds for dismissal in probate
proceedings.
The court concluded that the petitioner had legal standing to request the
probate and that the respondents, having failed to demonstrate a legitimate
interest in the estate, lacked the standing to oppose the probate.
22. NGO THE HUA VS CHUNG KIAT HUA, G.R. No. L-17091, September 30,
1963
Facts:
Ngo The Hua, the petitioner, claimed to be the surviving spouse. She
petitioned to be appointed as administratrix. Her petition was opposed by Chung
Kiat Hua and others, asserting they were children of the deceased by a previous
marriage and contending that Ngo The Hua was unfit for the role due to a divorce
and her moral and physical state. The opposition also nominated Chung Kiat Hua as
a more suitable administrator. Another claimant, Chung Kiat Kang, contested both
parties' petitions on the grounds of proving their relationship to the deceased
before appointment.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be appointed as the administratrix of

the estate of the deceased, Chung Liu.
Ruling:
No.
The Rules of Court cited the appointment of administrators, which prioritizes

the surviving spouse, next of kin, or principal creditors.
In the present case, the court determined that since the petitioner was no
longer the surviving spouse due to the valid divorce, she was not the rightful person
to be granted administration of the estate. Consequently, the court concluded by
appointing Chung Kiat Hua as the administrator, acknowledging him and the other
respondents as the legitimate children of the deceased and thus the rightful heirs to
the estate.
23. CUENCO VS COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. L-24742, OCTOBER 26, 1973
Facts:
The petitioner, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, sought to probate the will of the
deceased, while the respondents, being the children from the senator's first
marriage, contested the proceedings initiated in Quezon City, asserting that Cebu
was the senator's place of residence and thus the appropriate venue for the
settlement of his estate. The facts of the case reveal a complex family dynamic and
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competing interests over the senator's will and the location for the settlement of his
estate.
Issue:
Whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings filed with it, despite the respondents' claims of the senator's
residence being in Cebu.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court held that the Quezon City court had not acted without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion. The law centered on the jurisdiction
of courts over probate matters, which is generally determined by the residence of
the decedent at the time of death. However, the Court found that the evidence did
not conclusively establish the senator's domicile in Cebu, thereby upholding the
Quezon City court's jurisdiction.
Thus, the actions of the Quezon City court were within its jurisdictional rights,
and thus, the petition for certiorari was dismissed, affirming the lower court's
decision.
24. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

PALAGANAS vs ERNESTO PALAGANAS, GR No, 169144, January 26, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA
PALAGANAS G.R. Number: 169144, Date of Promulgation: January 26,
2011
Facts:
Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States

citizen, passed away on November 8, 2001, leaving behind a will executed in
California. She appointed her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her
will, which included properties in both the Philippines and the U.S. The respondent,
Ernesto C. Palaganas, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, for the probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. This petition was contested by the petitioners, Manuel
Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of the deceased, on
the grounds that the will should be probated in the U.S. where it was executed, and
that it was invalid due to duress and lack of understanding by the testator. They
also contested Ernesto's qualification to act as administrator.
Issue:
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Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
of its execution.
Ruling:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country. Additionally, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure allows the RTC of the province where the decedent has an estate to take
cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Thus, the RTC properly admitted the will to probate, subject to the
respondent's submission of authenticated copies of the documents specified in the
order and his posting of the required bond.
25. ALABAN V. CA, GR NO. 156021, SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

Facts:
The petitioners claimed that they were the intestate heirs of the decedent
and that the probate proceedings were attended by extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. On November 8, 2000, the respondent filed a petition for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of the decedent. The RTC rendered a decision on May
30, 2001, allowing the probate of the will and directing the issuance of letters
testamentary to the respondent. More than four months later, on October 4, 2001,
the petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings and an
opposition to the allowance of the will. They claimed that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. The RTC denied the motion,
stating that the decision had already become final and executory before the motion
was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the remedy of annulment of
judgment based on their claim of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction in the
probate proceedings.
Ruling:
No.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,
or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.36 Notice of
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the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it
has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that
with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to
all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice, After all, personal
notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite.
26. FERNANDO MANANCOL, JR. V. DBP, GR NO. 204289, NOVEMBER 22,

2017
Facts:
The case revolves around a dispute between Fernando Mancol, Jr. (petitioner)
and DBP regarding a verbal agreement concerning the transfer of a property title. In
2004, DBP scheduled an invitation to bid for the sale of a residential lot with a two-
storey building in Calbayog City. The petitioner, through his father, Fernando
Mancol, Sr. (Mancol, Sr.), executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to represent
and negotiate the sale on his behalf. DBP officials allegedly agreed verbally to
arrange and effect the transfer of title of the lot in the petitioner's name, including
the payment of capital gains tax, and to get rid of the occupants of the subject
property. The petitioner paid the balance of the purchase price and made a deposit
for the payment of CGT and documentary stamp tax. However, DBP later reneged
on its undertaking, returning the deposit and the pertinent documents to the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies of the petitioner's witnesses can be used as
evidence to prove the existence of the verbal agreement, which is not stipulated in
the written SPA.
Ruling:
No. "
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms
of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract." This, however, is merely a general rule.
Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the exceptions in the
second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, a party
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement.
"Moreover, as with all possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party's
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failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be
entertained.”
27. SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON V. SPS. SANTOS AND

ERLINDA TAN, GR NO. 185240, JANUARY 20, 2010
Facts:
The case revolves around a dispute over an easement of right of way
between spouses Manuel and Victoria Salimbangon and spouses Santos and Erlinda
Tan. The dispute originated from a partition agreement among the heirs of
Guillermo Ceniza, who died intestate in 1951. The partition agreement, executed in
1973, divided the land among the heirs, including Benedicta, Guillermo Jr., Victoria,
Eduardo, and Carlos. The agreement established an easement of right of way,
consisting of a 3-meter wide alley, to give access to the interior lots (Lots D and E)
to the city street. The easement was annotated on the individual titles issued to the
heirs. Later, Victoria swapped lots with Benedicta, becoming the owner of Lot A, one
of the three lots adjacent to the city street. The Salimbangons constructed a
residential house on Lot A and built two garages, one of which used the alley or
easement of right of way on Lot B to access the street. The Tans later bought Lots
B, C, D, and E from their respective owners and built improvements on Lot B,
including closing the gate that the Salimbangons had built.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence, contrary to the parol
evidence rule, Eduardo Ceniza's testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in
establishing the easement of right of way as against what they stated in their
written agreement.
Ruling:
No.
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from
introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on
above. The term "agreement" includes wills.
28. BAGUIO TRINITY DEVELOPERS, INC. V. THE HEIRS OF JOSE RAMOS, ET

AL, GR NO. 188381, DECEMBER 14, 2011
Facts:
Spouses Meliton Grabiles and Leona Calderon were the original registered
owners of a 2,933-square-meter lot in Rosario, La Union. The lot was eventually sold
to Baguio Trinity Developers, Inc., resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title T-38340 in its name. However, in 1985, Anastacio Laroco and Leona Javier filed
a reconstitution proceeding before the RTC of Agoo, La Union, covering the Grabiles'
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original title. The RTC's order directed the reconstitution of the title in the name of
Maria Bernal. In 1986, Melicia Silva filed a second petition for the reconstitution of
the title in the name of the Grabiles. The RTC ordered the reconstitution of the title
in the name of the Grabiles, but it also stated that the property had been sold to
Jose Ramos and the Nepas. On September 14, 1995, Baguio Trinity filed a complaint
for recovery and declaration of nullity of title and damages before the MTC of
Rosario, La Union, against the Ramos and Nepa heirs. The MTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Baguio Trinity then filed a second complaint before
the RTC of Agoo, Branch 32, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Baguio
Trinity filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), but it was
dismissed.
Three years later, Baguio Trinity filed a petition for annulment of the
reconstitution orders with the CA, claiming lack of jurisdiction by the RTC. The CA
dismissed the petition. Baguio Trinity filed a motion for reconsideration and
attached the necessary documents, but the CA denied the motion. The CA also held
that the action was barred by laches, as Baguio Trinity had notice of the
reconstitution orders since 1995 but only filed the action for annulment 12 years
later.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Baguio Trinity’s action for
annulment of judgment by reason of its failure to comply with the requirement of
submission of certified true copies of the assailed RTC orders.
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that when the original
document has been lost and its unavailability has been established, a party "may
prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated."
Copies of the challenged reconstitution orders from the LRA or the Register of
Deeds are of course available to petitioner Baguio Trinity. But it could just as validly
submit faithful copies of its challenged reconstitution orders, authenticated by a
verified statement that these are copies of the original orders as the originals were
lost in an earthquake. The Baguio Trinity did. Consequently, the CA had no valid
reason denying its petition for failure to attach a copy of the assailed reconstitution
orders.
29. REPUBLIC V. MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, ET AL., GR NO.

171701, FEBRUARY 8, 2012
Facts:
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The case involves a petition for review filed by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) against the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
December 6, 2005. The PCGG alleged that the respondents, including Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., acquired ill-
gotten wealth through dollar salting and other illegal means. The PCGG submitted
several exhibits, including photocopies of affidavits and documents, to prove its
allegations. However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that these exhibits have no
probative value since they were mere photocopies and were not authenticated by
the persons who executed them.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the demurrer to
evidence filed by respondents.
Ruling:
No.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that ‘when the original
documents has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.’ Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be
proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss,
destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and
good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original.
Here, none of these requirements were complied with by the plaintiff. Thus,
absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to
prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former
President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couple’s alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were
concerned.
30. Ajero vs CA G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
Facts:
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto

and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand,
Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their
children. On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for
allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its
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execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or
undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by
will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner.
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have
satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written
entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix.
Issue:
Whether or not the Will shall be allowed to probate proceedings
Ruling:
No the deceased was not of sound mind.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on

succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over
intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and
proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the
aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate.
Here, the Decision of the RTC Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
37171, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is
reinstated, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property.
31. ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.

MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA,
JR., and RAFAEL TITCO vs. LORENZO LAXA
Facts:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and
testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" (Will) in
the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of
retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After
which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
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document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the
end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof. The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin),
Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested
to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause
and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and
of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa
and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. On September 26,
2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the probate
of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested
to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally
incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to
execute.
Issue:
whether or not the person is of a sound mind during the execution of will
Ruling:
No. In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. He
identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before because
Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him along with
another document on September 16, 1981. Antonio alleged that when the
documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned. According to him,
Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,
and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special power of
attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for
the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family
upon her death.
Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I
never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only
[son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why
should I die already?"Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the
documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know
nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign
them." After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the
unsigned documents and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September
18, 1981.
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32. IN RE: PALAGANAS VS ERNESTO PALAGANAS, GR NO. 169144, JANUARY
26, 2011
Facts:
Ruperta Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, passed
away in 2001, without a spouse or children. Before her death, she executed an LWT
in California, naming Sergio C. Palaganas as the executor of her will. However, the
will was not probated in California. In 2003, Ernesto Palaganas filed a petition with
the RTC for the probate of Ruperta's will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition, arguing that the will should not be probated in the Philippines
but in the U.S. where it was executed. They also claimed that the will was invalid
due to duress and lack of understanding of the testator.
Issue:
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed.
Ruling:
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution.
Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the ROC. Contrary to
petitioners' stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate a will, it cannot be
made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the
matter can be established.
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. In insisting that
Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure
for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication
of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court.
33. DE PEREZ VS TOLETE, GR NO 76714, JUNE 2, 1994

Facts:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, both American citizens,
executed their respective LWT which contained the same provisions such as the
presumption that Dr. Jose predeceased Dr. Evelyn in case of simultaneous death.
The entire family died due to fire, thus Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr as trustee and
executor filed separate proceedings for the probate of the 2 wills in New York. They
were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
Thereafter, Salud Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed a petition for the reprobate
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of the 2 wills in RTC Bulacan, asking that she be appointed as special administratrix
of the estate of the decedents. The lower court ruled that the probate of separate
wills of two persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a
single petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence offered sufficiently proved the laws of New York
on the allowance of wills
Ruling:
Yes.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the
will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate
in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the
laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Here, the evidence submitted by the petitioner, including certificates of
authentication, certifications from the Secretary of State of New York, and decrees
on probate of the two wills, were sufficient to warrant the joint probate of the wills.
34. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK VS ESCOLIN, GR NO.

L-27860 AND L-27896, MARCH 29, 1974
Facts:
Linnie Hodges died, leaving a will which gave her husband, Charles Hodges,
the right to manage, control, and enjoy her estate during his lifetime. The estate will
then be equally divided among her siblings after Charles’ death. Charles was
appointed as executor and filed several motions and manifestations, including a
motion to approve all sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages, which the CFI
granted. After Charles' death, Atty. Leon Gellada, who had been acting as counsel
for Charles, filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the appointment of a Special
Administratrix for the respective estate of Linnie and Charles. The motion was
granted, and Avelina Magno was appointed as the Administratrix of Linnie's estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the Texas Laws were proved.
Ruling:
No.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
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Here, there is inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the
probate court and of the parties' discussion. In other words, there is no clear and
reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are.
35. MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA DE CATALAN VS LAUELLA CATALAN LEE, GR

NO. 183622, FEBRUARY 8, 2012
Facts:
Orlando Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After obtaining a divorce
in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with
Merope Enriquez. Orlando died intestate in the PH. Later, Merope filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate. While this was pending, Louella Catalan, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases
were consolidated and the RTC ruled in favor of Louella finding that Merope was not
an interested party who may file the said petition.
Issue:
Whether the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by the PH courts.
Ruling:
No.
The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Here, Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
36. ANCHETA VS GUERSEY-DALAYGON, GR NO. 139868, JUNE 8, 2006

Facts:
Audrey O’Neill, an American citizen, died leaving a will that bequeathed her
entire estate to her husband Richard Guersey. The will was admitted to probate
before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore which named James Phillips as executor and
Atty. Ancheta as ancillary administrator. Thereafter, Richard married Candelaria
Guersey-Dalaygon with whom he had 2 children. Richard died, leaving a will
wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, save for his rights and
interests over A/G Interiors shares, which he left to his adopted daughter Kyle. Atty.
Ancheta filed a project of partition of Audrey's estate, which was approved by the
trial court, distributing the estate among Richard and Kyle. However, respondent
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opposed the project of partition, arguing that under Maryland law, Richard's entire
estate should be adjudicated to her.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ancheta failed to introduce in evidence the pertinent law
of the State of Maryland.
Ruling:
Yes.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Thus, executors or administrators of
the decedent’s estate are duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of
the foreign court which admitted to probate the will of the decedent.
Here, Atty. Ancheta, as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate, failed to
introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and
merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on
wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and
totally disregarded the terms of Audrey's will.
37. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION VS ECHIN, GR NO. 178551, OCTOBER

11, 2010
Facts:
Echin was hired by the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait as a MedTech
under a 2-year contract. A condition was given that for the first year of
employment, he would be under probationary status. Within a period of 1 year,
Echin was sent home for violation of the T&C of the employment. He then lodged a
suit in the PH for illegal dismissal. The Ministry alleges that the contract clearly
provides for Kuwait Law to apply to any controversy.
Issue:
Whether or not the Kuwait Law is applicable.
Ruling:
No.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
Here, the Ministry submitted mere certifications attesting only to the
correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not
prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from PH laws and that under such
Kuwaiti laws, Echin was validly terminated. Thus, it is clear that proof of foreign law
needs to be expressly made in order to be admitted.
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
38. DAVID NOVERAS VS. LETICIA NOVERAS (G.R. No. 188289, Aug. 20,
2014)
Facts:
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The
California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly
entered on 29 June 2005. With respect to their property relations, the trial court
first classified their property regime as absolute community of property because
they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their
marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their
children the amount of P520,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of CA is proper.
Ruling:
No. The parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts

did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is
entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Here, absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation. In this case however, it appears that there is no
seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
39. B.E. Johannes vs. Harvey (G.R. No. 18600, March 9, 1922)
Facts:
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes née Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in

Singapore, Straits Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there
remained the husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida
and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the
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husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore,
while the brother Alfred was in Manila. The Singapore heirs apparently joined in
asking that letters of administration be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits
Settlements to B. E. Johannes, the lawful husband of the deceased.
Issue:
Who will be the administrator of the estate of the deceased?
Ruling:
Both the husband residing in Singapore and the brother residing in the
Philippines will be the principal and ancillary administrators, respectively.
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.

When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well
as in foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted
in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration,
while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for
the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any
effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the

United States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies,
leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered
in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs.
40. TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH PERKINS VS. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED

(G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968)
Facts:
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary

administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, United States of America, of
the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on
March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines the
stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors.
Issue:
Does the ancillary administrator has the power to settle the estate of the deceased
and satisfy the claims of the local creditors?
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Ruling:
Yes. The power to settle the estate of the deceased and satisfy the claims of
the local creditors is within the scope of authority of the ancillary administrator.
No one could dispute the power of an ancillary administrator to gain control

and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the
claims of local creditors.
It is a general rule universally recognized that administration, whether

principal or ancillary, certainly extends to the assets of a decedent found within the
state or country where it was granted, the corollary being "that an administrator
appointed in one state or country has no power over property la another state or
country"
41. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE (G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994)
Facts:
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan
a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in
New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel,
Bulacan.
Issue:
How these wills should be treated under the Philippine law?
Ruling:
The will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a

will that is presented for probate for the first time.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
“cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to
notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or
a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require

publication and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and
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devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not
the petitioner, are required.
42. ROXAS VS. ROXAS (3973-R, May 19, 1950)
Facts:
An opposition was filed by Maria Roxas and Pedro Roxas (sister and brother
of Pablo Roxas) on the ground that the alleged will was not executed and attested
as required by law, and that, in any event, it was intended as a mere formal request
which was, however, subsequently revoked as shown by the fact that it was
crumpled with intent to destroy.
Issue:
Should the will be probated?
Ruling:
Yes, the will should be probated.
The will in question was written on poor kind of stationery, or that it was not
prepared by a lawyer or notary public, or that no copies were made, is of no
moment. It should be borne in mind that the will was executed in January, 1945,
when everything was practically in confusion due to the impending battles for the
liberation of the Philippines, and when paper supply was almost exhausted. The
contention made by the appellees in their opposition that the will was revoked by
the testator when he crumpled the same, requires no serious consideration, in view
of their failure to show that the crumpling was caused with the intention to revoke.
Appellees' reference to other formal defects of the will (other than that
hereinbefore disposed of) also needs no inquiry, because it is not pressed herein.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the will in question is hereby
declared probated.
43. ALBINO VS. PANO (SP-08820, July 31, 1986) - CASE NOT FOUND
Doctrine: The person designated and charged by the testator in his will to carry out
the provisions thereof and, upon the allowance of the will, said person, unless he is
unfit to discharge the trust as executor, takes over the administration of the estate.
44. MARCELO VS. MARCELO (G.R. No. 209651, Nov. 26, 2014)
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
Facts:
In 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four
compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr.
Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed
a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr.
before the RTC. Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed
Helen and Jose, Jr. as special administrators. However, Edward was the one
appointed as regular administrator.
A project of partition was submitted, Edward manifested that oppositor Jose
T. Marcelo, Jr. had already expressed his conformity to the Liquidation of the
Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by
his signature therein. He therefore prays that the said document which bears the
conformity of all four (4) compulsory heirs of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be approved. RTC
approved the proposed partition. However, the distribution was deferred pending
submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. At this stage, Edward died. Wasting
no time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings involving his father’s
estate, S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448, and moved for his appointment as new regular
administrator thereof, which was approved by the RTC. Petitioners filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and now moved for the appointment instead of George
as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate
Issue:
Whether or not Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator
of Jose, Sr.’s estate bars his present appointment as such even in lieu of Edward
who is now dead.
Ruling:
Yes, it is a bar to his present appointment.
Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general

disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator: Who are incompetent
to serve as executors or administrators.Additionally, no person is competent to
serve as executor or administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the
Philippines; and (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the
trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or
integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
45. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. MARCOS II (G.R. Nos. 130371 & 130855,
Aug. 4, 2009)
Facts:
RTC acting as a probate court a in Special Proceeding, issued an Order
granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Marcos upon filing of bond
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by the Marcos. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in so far as the RTC Order granted letters testamentary to
respondents. This motion was denied by the RTC. Petitioner filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning
the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents. But
this Court referred the petition to the CA since it was the latter who has jurisdiction
concurrent with this Court over the Case. Subseuqently, CA issued a Decision,
dismissing the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal. CA’s
basis was Supreme Court Circular 2-90. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA. Petitioner then files this instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issues:
1) Whether or not it was proper for the petitioner to appeal the case directly to
SC.
2) Whether or not respondents Marcos can act and serve as executors.
Ruling:
1) NO.
Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 provides the instances for a direct appeal to the Supreme court from the RTC
and all those instances provide that the subject matter involved must be a question
of law only and no questions of fact.
In the present case, petitioner Republic seeks to determine of whether or not
respondents should be disqualified to act as executors. This subject matter is a
question of fact. Also, the above-mentioned provision clearly shows that the other
subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters
testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject
of a direct appeal to this Court.
2) YES.
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to
serve as executors and Marcos does not fall in any of those grounds. Respondent
Marcos does not specifically fall in the ground of “want of integrity” and “conviction
of an offense involving moral turpitude” (these are the grounds raised by the
petitioner) since there are no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to
substantiate and support the said allegation that respondent Marcos have been
convicted of a number of cases.
Also, the cases filed against Imelda Marcos has been reversed by this Court.
Hence, the so-called "convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve
as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.
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As to the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos, CA acquitted
respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges. He appealed his conviction
appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC hence
those cases should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an
executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that
his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as
the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
46. VDA. DE CHUA VS. CA (G.R. No. 116835, March 5, 1998)
Facts:
Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua claims to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
Lim Chua. Florita Vallejo, Roberto's former partner, filed a petition for the
declaration of heirship, guardianship over their two illegitimate children, and the
issuance of letters of administration. Antonietta filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground of improper venue, arguing that the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is the proper forum since Roberto was a resident there at the time of his
death. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that Antonietta had no
legal standing to file the motion as she was not related to the deceased and had not
proven her status as his wife. The trial court appointed a special administrator for
the estate and appointed Florita as the guardian of the minor children.
Antonietta filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
but it was denied. The Court of Appeals ruled that the original petition filed by
Florita included both guardianship and administration of the estate, and that
Antonietta's remedy was an ordinary appeal. Antonietta filed a petition with the
Supreme Court, but it was also denied.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner had legal standing to file the motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
No, the petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is
not related to the deceased.
Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his
interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.
In this case, Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife
of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce.
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
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47. MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS (G.R. No. 129505, Jan. 31, 2000)
Facts:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City,
filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in the RTC. He alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were
in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as

the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator‘s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he
was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise
alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent.
Ruling:
No.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an ―heir of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides: “One who has no
compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said
heirs.” Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, does not have any right to intervene in
the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased.
48. SAGUINSIN VS. LINDAYAG (G.R. No. L-17759, Dec. 17, 1962)
Facts:
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On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo,
Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of
First Instance of said province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of
letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other
things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of
Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and
residences of her surviving heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age,
surviving husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V. Saguinsin 54 years
of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan (3) Aurea V. Sacdalan,
46 years of age, sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag, 70 years of age,
sister of the deceased, both residing at Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as
petitioner knew, the decedent left no debts at the time of her death.
On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and
in representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed
Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the
estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The court issued an order of
dismissal finding that the oppositor’s opposition is well taken.
Issue:
Whether or not Isabel Saguinsin is an interested person as to warrant the
granting of her motion.
Ruling:
No, Isabel Saguinsin is not an interested person
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of

administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party has defined
in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. And it is well settled in
this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent.
Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was

disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the
ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted
children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. Upon these facts — which petitioner
does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and,
therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.
49. PILIPINAS SHELL VS. DUMLAO (G.R. No. 44888, Feb. 7, 1992)
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
Facts:
Ricardo Gonzales, District Manager of Shell Philippines for Mindanao, filed a

petition entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino
Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzales, Petitioner” with
the RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying that he be appointed as
judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. Judge Echavez
Jr. issued an order setting the hearing on the petition and directing that said order
be published and copies of the same be sent by registered mail or personal delivery
to each of all known heirs of the deceased. The heirs of Regino Canonoy opposed
the issuance of letters of administration filed by Gonzales alleging that: Gonzales is
a “complete stranger to the intestate estate” of the deceased. He is not even a
creditor of the estate but an employee of the alleged creditor (Shell Philippines
Inc.), and so “he would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of
the estate in case of conflicts.” He is a resident of Davao City , and thus if appointed
as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, “he would
not be able to perform his duties efficiently.” They “propose” and pray that
Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino’s sons, "be appointed administrator of the said
intestate estate and the corresponding letters of administration be issued in his
favor."
The trial court appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the estate of
the deceased. Petitioner Shell filed its claim against the estate of Regino Canonoy
and later amended it but the duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed
a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell and interposed counterclaim. Upon joinder of
the issues on Shell’s claim, the trial court set the pre-trial. The motion filed by the
cousel for the administrator alleges that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez,
is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of
Court. Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on the ground that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest
of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for
letter of administration under Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court include the
specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an “interested person”
Ruling:
No.
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Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that contents of petition of
letters of administration – A petition for letters of administration must be files by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
a) The jurisdictional facts;
b) The names, ages, and residences
of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an

interested person does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. A
Motion to Dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
50. BERNARDO VS. CA (117 Phil. 390)
Facts:
Capili died in 1958, testate in which he disposed his properties in favor of his
wife, cousins all surnamed Capili and Arturo, Deogracias (petitioner) and Eduardo,
all surnamed Bernardo. Reyes (wife) died the following year. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of Capili, she was substituted by her
collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and
Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all
surnamed Isidoro. The executor filed a project of partition in the estate proceedings
in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of Reyes, whose share was allotted to her
collateral relatives. These relatives filed an opposition to the executor’s project of
partition and submitted a counter-projection of their own claiming 1⁄2 of the
properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Capili on the theory that they
belong not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for the reason
that it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code which prohibits donation between
spouses during the marriage. In the same order, the court disapproved both project
of partitions and directed the executor to file another, dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of Capili and the properties mentioned in
the deed of donation, between the instituted heirs of Capili and Reyes, upon the
basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.
Issue:
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Whether or not a probate court in a special proceeding had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned in the will.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative.

The determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance. The probate court has the jurisdiction since there is a necessity to
liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent
which is to be distributed among heirs who are all parties to the proceedings,
including the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have
been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who appeared
voluntarily.
The petitioners, by presenting their project of partition including therein the

disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband)
put in question the issue of ownership of the properties is within the competence of
the probate court.This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is
the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees.
51. DELGADO VS. DAMIAN (G.R. No. 155733, Jan. 27, 2006)
Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants if their
estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
particularly his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
As to Josefa’s family background, her parents were never married so she and
her four siblings were all full-blood natural children of their mother. Also, her mom
gave birth to another child with another man. So that’s a half-blood brother. As to
Guillermo’s family background, Guillermo managed to father an illegitimate child
named, Guillerma Rustia, intervenor-respondent in this case. Josefa and Guillermo
never legally adopted the ampun-ampunan children.
Issue:
Who should be issued letters of administration?

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Ruling:
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the

intestate estate of the decedent.
Under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of

preference in the appointment of an administrator: Sec. 6. When and to whom
letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband
or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent
or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more
of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such
creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.
Here, in the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is

the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does
not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice
and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
52. MARCELO VS. MARCELO (G.R. No. 209651, Nov. 26, 2014)
Facts:
On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his
four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr.
Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed
a Petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr.
before the RTC. Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC appointed
Helen and Jose, Jr. as special administrators. However, Edward was the one
appointed as regular administrator.
A project of partition was submitted, Edward manifested that oppositor Jose

T. Marcelo, Jr. had already expressed his conformity to the Liquidation of the
Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr., as of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by
his signature therein. He therefore prays that the said document which bears the
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conformity of all four (4) compulsory heirs of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be approved. RTC
approved the proposed partition. However, the distribution was deferred pending
submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. At this stage, Edward died.
Wasting no time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings involving his
father’s estate, S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448, and moved for his appointment as new
regular administrator thereof, which was approved by the RTC. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and now moved for the appointment instead of
George as administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate.
Issue:
Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of Jose,

Sr.’s estate bars his present appointment as such even in lieu of Edward who is now
dead.
Ruling:
Yes. Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and
unsuitable to administer his father’s estate.
Sec. 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general disqualification
of those who wish to serve as administrator: Who are incompetent to serve as
executors or administrators. - No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and (c) Is in
the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.”
Here, consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not only is
George the eldest son of Jose, Sr., and therefore, his most immediate kin, he has,
moreover, been chosen by the rest of the heirs of Edward. Helen executed an
affidavit to manifest her opposition to Jose, Sr., and support the appointment of
George and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given to CA.
53. QUIAZON V. MA. LOURDES BELEN, G.R. NO. 189121
Facts:
Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon, represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen,
filed a petition for Letters of Administration before RTC. Elise claims she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. She impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous. To prove her filiation, she
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attached her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. Elise also
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground that pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac. RTC directed the issuance of the Letters of
Administration to Elise upon the posting of the necessary bond and ruled that the
venue was properly laid. This was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Elise is entitled to the letters of administration.
Ruling:
Yes.
An “interested party”, in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited
in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the
distributees.
In this case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. Certainly, the
rights of Elise to be appointed administratrix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds.
54. TAN V. GEDORIO, GR NO. 166520, MARCH 14, 2008
Facts:
Gerardo Tan died leaving no will. Private respondents, claiming to be the
children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. Petitioners, claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the deceased, filed
an Opposition. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take possession and
charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved or until the
appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners contend that
Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience and competence as that
of Vilma Tan who was already acting as a de facto administratrix of his estate since
his death.
Because of Vilma’s failure to comply with the court-appointed commissioner’s
directive, RTC Judge Menchavez issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special
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administrator. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but was
later denied. Petitioners instituted with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition assailing the said Order, again insisting on Vilma’s right to be appointed
as special administratrix. This was denied by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Order of Preference in the Appointment under Sec 6, Rule
78 applicable in the Appointment of Special Administrator.
Ruling:
No.
The preference under Sec 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the
court and is not appealable.
Here, if petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of that
petitioner Vilma as supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over
administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a
regular administrator and put an end the delay which necessitated the appointment
of a special administrator.
55. TAYAG V. TAYAG-GALLOR, GR NO. 174680, MARCH 24, 2008
Facts:
Felicidad Tayag-Gallor filed a petition for the issuance of letter of
administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. Respondent alleged in the petition
that she is one of the 3 illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester
Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner herein, Victoria Tayag, but the two
allegedly did not have any children of their own.
Ismael Tayag died intestate. Respondent averred that petitioner has caused
the annotation of the affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to
be paraphernal properties of petitioner. Petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of
the properties and presented the TCT thereof in her name. She also averred that it
is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael
Tayag as his illegitimate child. This was denied by the court, upheld by CA. The CA
ruled that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause
of action, without need to state that she had been recognized and acknowledged as
such.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may file a petition for letters of administration.
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Ruling:
No.
Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct.
Here, petitioner overlooked the fact that respondent’s successional rights
may be established not just by judicial action to compel recognition but also by
proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged. Respondent was yet to show her
proof of filiation because of petitioner’s opposition. So, there is no way yet to
determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition of whether she has a
material and direct interest to maintain the suit.
56. DELGADO V. DAMIAN, G.R. NO. 155733, JANUARY 27, 2006

Facts:
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia lived together for over 50 years.
However, both died without a will. The claimants to the estate are primarily
categorized into alleged heirs of Josefa and alleged heirs of Guillermo. The legal
controversies arose after Guillermo Rustia self-adjudicated the estate of Josefa and
further complexity was added with the claims made by Guillerma Rustia, the
illegitimate child of Guillermo.
A petition for letters of administration was filed by Luisa Delgado in the RTC
Manila, followed by opposition from heirs of Guillermo. Carlota was appointed as
administratrix of both estates. However, this decision was appealed, leading to a
reversal by the CA, which declared a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa
and thus altered the distribution of the estates.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of preference applies in the appointment of
administrator.
Ruling:
No.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not
rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management
of the estates.
In this case, the SC found it fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons
of Carlota Delgado and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia.
They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa and Guillermo, respectively.
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57. SUNTAY III V. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, GR NO. 183053
Facts:
Cristina died intestate, leaving behind her husband Federico Suntay and
several grandchildren, including Emilio Suntay III and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. The
former is an illegitimate grandchild who was raised by Cristina and Federico since
he was a baby. Isabe filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor. Federico opposed and argued that he should be appointed as the
administrator of the estate.
Federico nominated Emilio III as the administrator in case he would be
appointed. The latter filed an opposition-in-intervention, echoing his grandfather’s
arguments and stating that he is better equipped to administer the estate, which
was granted by the trial court. CA reversed the decision and appointed Isabel
instead.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedent’s estate.
Ruling:
Yes.
The selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court
based on the attending facts and circumstances of the case. The underlying
philosophy of our law in intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and
presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will.
As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as
much as the interest therein of Isabel. Considering that CA even declared that
“under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his
share in the conjugal partnership.
58. EMNACE V. CA AND THE ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, GR NO. 126334
Facts:
Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao, and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in
Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. In 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and
executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties.
Emnace failed to comply with the terms of the agreement and did not turn over
Tabanao’s ⅓ share in the total assets of the partnership to Tabanao’s heirs after his
death. Because of this, Tabanao’s heirs filed a lawsuit against Emnace, seeking
accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
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Issue:
Whether or not the surviving heir can commence an action on the estate of
the decedent.
Ruling:
Yes.
As successors who stepped into the shoes of the decedent upon his death,
the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the
moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of
petitioner’s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted
to respondents.
In this case, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary
shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior settlement of the estate, or
even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not
necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue.
59. OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II V. CA, GR NO. 129505
Facts:
Octavio Maloles II seeks to intervene in the probate proceedings of his uncle’s
will. The will named the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. as the sole legatee and
devisee. Octabio claims to be the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr.
De Santos. He filed a motion for intervention and prayed for the reconsideration of
the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the named executrix of the will filed a motion for
the issues of letters testamentary but later withdrew her motion and refiled it to
RTC Branch 65. The RTC appointed her as the special administrator of the
decedent’s estate. Octavio sought to intervene to set aside the said appointment.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, which set aside the order
of Branch 65. Petitioner then filed petitions for review on certiorari with SC.
Issue:
Whether or not a nephew of the deceased can intervene in the settlement
proceedings.
Ruling:
No, he is not a compulsory heir.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to
give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.
Here, Octavio, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may
have been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene
in the settlement proceedings based on their allegation that he is a creditor of the
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deceased. Since the testator instituted her named executor in the will, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
60. GONZALES VS AGUINALDO GR 74769
Facts:
An intestate proceedings was instituted on the estate of late Doña Ramona

Gonzales.Petitioner herein is appointed as Co-administratix of the estate of the
decedent.Private respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion to remove Beatriz F.
Gonzales as co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to
discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the
interest of the estate and the heirs, Also, as the petitioner oftentimes leave the
country and went to United States to accompany her ailing husband who was
receiving medical treatment in that country. Respondent judge issued an order
canceling the letters of Administration granted to the petitioner. The petitioner filed
a motion on the said order but the said court denied her motion. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is correct in cancelling the Letters of

Administration granted to the Petitioner.
Ruling:
No, the respondent judge erred in canceling the Letters of Administration

granted to the Petitioner.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, If an executor or

administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law,
or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by
these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable
to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit
him to resign.
Here, it was not proved by the private respondent that the petitioner’s act
was among the aforementioned grounds stated provision of the law. Furthermore, it
was held that in the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may appoint one,
two or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at
all times to have different interests represented. Thus, the respondent judge erred
in canceling the Letters of Administration granted to the Petitioner.
61. MATUTE VS CA GR 26751

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Facts:
Petitioner herein is assailing the decision of the respondent court in reversing

the order of the probate court to remove private respondent Matias Matute as co-
administrator of the Matute Estate. Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition praying
for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his appointment in such capacity.
Petitioner avers that Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a true, just and
complete account of his administration and that he is not only incompetent but also
negligent in his management of the estate under his charge consisting of five
haciendas. However, the private respondent opposed the said allegation and
contends that he had made an accounting on the proceeds of the estate and his
competence to act as administrator has been established to the satisfaction of the
court. The respondent court issued its order reversing the decision of the probate
court. Furthermore, respondent court avers that it is in the discretion of the court
that it may appoint two or more administrators in the best interest of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent should be removed as co-

administrator.
Ruling:
No, private respondent should not be removed as co-administrator.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, If an executor or

administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law,
or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by
these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable
to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit
him to resign.
Here, the allegations of the petitioner were rebutted by the private

respondent through presentation of competent evidence. Furthermore, it is upon
the best discretion of the court to appoint two or more administrators for the best
interest of the estate. Therefore, private respondents should not be removed as co-
administrator.
62. TAYAG VS TAYAG- GALLOR
Facts:
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Ismael Tayag died intestate. He was survived by his wife, herein petitioner
and his three illegitimate children as one herein respondent. The respondent filed a
petition of the issuance of letters of administration in favor to him over the estate of
the decedent. However, petitioner contest that the respondent is an illegitimate
child of the decedent and therefore she is not entitled to be an administrator of the
estate. The probate court issued its order granting the letters of administrator to the
respondent.Accordingly, the court held that the respondent’s allegation as an
illegitimate child without providing material and direct evidence would suffice to
institute the said proceedings. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s allegation as an illegitimate child without

material and direct evidence would suffice to institute the said proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes, respondent’s allegation as illegitimate child without material and direct

evidence would suffice to institute the said proceedings.
It was held that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the
decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
Thus, respondent’s allegation as illegitimate child without material and direct
evidence would suffice to institute the said proceedings.
63. HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS GABRIEL
Facts:
The petitioner is contesting the appointment of the respondent as a special

administrator over the estate of the former’s decedent. Accordingly, the probate
court appointed the respondent’s husband as special administrator over the estate,
however, the husband died which prompted the respondent to be appointed as the
special administrator. The petitioner alleges that the respondent’s late husband,
Roberto, was just a nephew of the decedent and not a legally adopted son as he
claimed to be. Even assuming this claim was true, the fact that the respondent is
not naturally related to the decedent by blood in the direct descending line makes it
unfair to appoint her as the special administratrix. The CA dismissed the petition of
the petitioner and affirmed the decision of the probate court on the appointment of
the respondent. Hence, this petition
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Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the probate court on
the appointment of the respondent as a special administratrix.
Ruling:
No, the CA is correct in affirming the decision of the probate court on the
appointment of the respondent as a special administratrix.
It was held that the appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the
discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming the
decision of the probate court on the appointment of the respondent as a special
administratrix.
64. MEDINA VS BEDA GONZALES
Facts:
Petitioner files a petition to exclude herein respondent as a special

administrator over the estate of the decedent Agustin Medina. Accordingly, the
respondent is interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the
property known as "Bitukang Manok" by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom
the said property had been sold, and full payment therefor received, by the estate
through Gonzales' predecessor with the approval of the lower court. However, the
respondent contends that he has interest over the estate on the ground that certain
heirs have already sold their shares and/or interest over the same in his favor.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be excluded as special administrator

over the estate of the decedent.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent should be excluded as special administrator over the

estate of the decedent.
It is an established doctrine that as administrator is deemed unsuitable and

should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by
virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi-trustee,
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disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent
between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration and who should be removed when his interest conflict with such right
and duty.
Respondent, whose appeal of the lower courts order of approval of the sale to
the CA is pending, cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal capacity
opposing the sale of the property and an appellee representing the estate and
upholding the same sale as made by the estate through Gonzales predecessor as
special administrator. Thus, the respondent should be excluded as special
administrator over the estate of the decedent.
65. MANUNGAS VS. PARREO (G.R. No. 193161, Aug. 22, 2011)
Facts:
Spouses Florentino and Engracia Manungas, childless, adopted Samuel David

Avila in 1968. Florentino died intestate in 1977 while Avila predeceased her mother
and was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas. Engracia then filed a
Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino, of
which she was the administratrix, declaring that there are no other legal and
compulsory heirs except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas, natural son of
Florentino. Avila’s widow Sarah renounced her rights over the property of her
husband in favor of Engracia. Thus, the properties of the estate were distributed to
Engracia and Ramon. In 1995, RTC Panabo City appointed Florencia Parreo, niece
of Engracia, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her
incompetent aunt. Through Parreo, Engracia filed a case of illegal detainer and
damages against Spouses Diosdado Manungas and Milagros Pacifico before the
MTC. Spouses Salinas, however, claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of
Florentino. However, their answer was filed beyond the reglementary period;
hence, MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia.
RTC affirmed MTC’s decision. They then appealed to the Supreme Court but
the sdt
petition was also denied by the High court for having been filed out of time.
Diosdado then filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration over the
Estate of Engracia Manungas in his favor alleging that he is an heir of Engracia, for
being an illegitimate son of Florentino. The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila
Loreto and Florencia Parreo averring that Diosdado is not qualified to be an
administrator as he was not an heir or a creditor of Engracia or her estate. In fact,
he was a debtor of the estate. RTC then appointed Parreo as the administrator. But
upon motion for reconsideration filed by Diosdado, RTC, in an order dated
November 4, 2002, reversed itself and ordered the revocation of its earlier
appointment of Parreo and instead appointed Diosdado as the Special
administrator. Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. CA then
reinstated Parreo. Diosdado, however, contested that Parreo should have appealed
the RTC order to the CA through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
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Issue:
Whether or not the RTC order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory
order.
Ruling:
Yes, the RTC order is clearly an interlocutory order.
The proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which
was what the respondents availed of. Generally, a motion for reconsideration is
required before a decision may be appealed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. However, a petition for certiorari will lie without prior filing of motion for
reconsideration where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved. The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule since the
issues raised by respondents in appealing the order dated November 4, 2002 are
only questions of law.
Here, the appointment of a special administrator is an interlocutory or
preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a
testate or intestate proceeding. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an
appeal under Rule 45.
66. TAN VS. GEDORIO (G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008)
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over the appointment of a special administrator

to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan. The petitioners, Vilma C. Tan, Gerardo "Jake"
Tan, and Geraldine Tan, claim to be the legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan. The
respondents, Rogelio Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, claim to be Gerardo's
illegitimate children. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City appointed
Romualdo D. Lim as the special administrator. The decision of the RTC was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator

was proper, considering the petitioners' claim to be the legitimate heirs of Gerardo
Tan.
Ruling:
Yes.
The order of preference for the appointment of a regular administrator, as

provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, does not apply to the selection
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of a special administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in
the discretion of the court and is not appealable.
Here, the court cited the failure of petitioner Vilma Tan to comply with court
directives as a factor in the decision. The court noted that the documented failure of
petitioner Vilma to comply with court directives after a considerable length of time
militate against her appointment as special administratrix.The appointment of a
special administrator is justified only when there is a delay in granting letters of
administration, and in this case, the delay was caused by petitioner Vilma's non-
compliance with court orders.
67. OCAMPO VS. OCAMPO (G. R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010)
Facts:
Dalisay et al. are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo. Leonardo,
together with his siblings Renato and Erlinda (Respondents), jointly controlled,
managed, and administered the estate of their parents, Spouses Ocampo. Under
such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third
(1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. Subsequently,
Leonardo died and he was survived by his wife and the children (Petitioners
Dalisay). When Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners and the petitoners no
longer received the 1/3 portion of Leonardo.
Petitioners then initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in the RTC.

Respondents, in their counter-petition prayed that they be appointed as special joint
administrators of the estate of their parents. RTC granted respondents’ counter-
petition. Petitioners in their Comment prayed that, in order to avoid further delay,
letters of administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be
issued to respondents and Dalisay. RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special
joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses. But RTC later revoked
the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix and substituted her with
Erlinda. Petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special
Administration. RTC granted this and revoked and terminated the appointment of
Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators and appointed Melinda as regular
administratrix. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA. CA ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators, and for appointing
Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine
her competency to assume such role. Hence, this instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
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Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to appointment Melinda as regular
administrator.
Ruling:
No.
Sec. 1 to 6 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court contains the provision for the
determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator. But in this
case, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was
not properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the
decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court
in accordance with the above mentioned Rules. Hence, Melinda’s appointment as a
regular administrator was not proper.
Melinda’s appointment is supposed to be revoked. However, having in mind

the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and
posting of bond by Melinda, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the
heirs, Melinda’s appointment should be converted into one of special
administration.
68. CORONA VS. CA (G.R. No. L-59821, Aug. 30, 1982)
Facts:
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died. She left two Wills:
one, a holographic Will datedOctober 3, 1980, which excluded her husband,
respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will
sworn to on October 24, 1980, which expressly disinherited her husbandRomarico
"for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage. The
will stated that she bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her three (3)
sisters and her two (2) nieces, and that her niece, Rowena F. Corona, herein
petitioner, as her Executrix.
After Dolores’ death, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for
the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administratorbecause she (Rowena) is
presently employed in the United Nations in New York City. Nenita wasappointed
Special Administratrix. This was opposed by the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug
contending that the will should be disallowed because they were procured through
undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time when
the decedent was seriously ill and under medical care. And that the holographic will
has impaired his legitime. On a later date, the Probate Court set aside the order of
Nenita’s appointment as special administratrix and instead appointed the surviving
spouse Romanico.
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Issue:
Whether or not Romanico can be appointed as special administrator despite

being disinherited by the decedent (wife).
Ruling:
Yes.
The appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the Court

and is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical and unsound and as
between the surviving husband, who wasresponsible for the accumulation of the
estate by his acumen and who must be deemed to have abeneficial interest in the
entire estate, and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct choice;
andthat the legality of the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot affect the
appointment of a SpecialAdministrator.
However, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator.

The executrix’s choice ofSpecial Administrator, considering her own inability to
serve and the wide latitude of discretion given herby the testratix in her will, is
entitled to the highest consideration. Objection to Nenita Alonte’sappointment on
grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that
justiceand equality demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the
surviving husband berepresented in the management of the decedent’s
estate.Special Administrators, while they may have respective interests to protect,
are officers of the Courtsubject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court
and are expected to work for the best interestsof the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement.
69. FULE VS. CA (G.R. No. L-40502, Nov. 29, 1976)
Facts:
Virginia G. Fule filed a petition for letters of administration, alleging AmadoG.
Garcia died intestate, leaving real estate and personal properties. Shemoved ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.Judge Malvar
granted the motion. Preciosa B. Garcia filed an MR contending that the order
appointing VirginiaG. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction,
since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all
persons interested, and as the surviving spouse of Amado, she should be preferred
in the appointment of a special administratrix in lieu of Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing, alleging that Fule is a debtor of the estate of
Amado and thus has adverse interest against the estate and that she has shown
herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
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Preciosa moved for reconsideration insofar as they sustained or failed to rule
on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule;
(b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers
and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar PlantersCooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. During the hearing, Preciosa presented the residence certificate of
the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence
was in Quezon City. Fule testified that Amado was residing in Calamba,Laguna at
the time of his death. The CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before
Judge Malvarfor lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
What does the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of
Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
mean?
Ruling:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which here sides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,the CFI of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vitermini
“actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term
“resides,” like, the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
The term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence
or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence asan inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
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make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.
70. CO VS. ROSARIO (G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008)
Facts:
The case involves the revocation of Alvin Milton Co's appointment as special
co-administrator of his father's estate. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
initially appointed Luis L. Co and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of
Co Bun Chun's estate. Luis L. Co's appointment as special co-administrator was set
aside on motion of the other heirs. Alvin Milton Co was then nominated by Luis L. Co
and appointed as special co-administrator on August 31, 1998. Almost four years
later, the RTC revoked and set aside Alvin's appointment as special co-
administrator. The trial court reasoned that Alvin's capacity, ability, or competence
to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of
several criminal cases against him. The court believed that these criminal charges
provided ample reason to doubt Alvin's fitness to handle the estate with utmost
fidelity, trust, and confidence. Luis L. Co moved for reconsideration of the
revocation, but his motion was denied by the RTC. He then brought the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) on petition for certiorari. The CA affirmed the revocation
of Alvin's appointment and dismissed the petition. Luis L. Co then filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Is the removal by the lower court of Alvin to be a special administrator

proper?
Ruling:
Yes.
The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the

rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
Courtsmayappointorremove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This,
however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal
likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of
such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.
Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the
court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The special
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administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control
and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially
with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement.In this case, we
find that the trial court's judgment on the issue of Alvins removal as special co-
administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not
characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and
abuse,arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctable by the writ of certiorari.
71. VALARAO VS. PASCUAL (G.R. No. 150164, Nov. 26, 2002)
Facts:
Felicidad C. Pascual died, leaving a substantial inheritance for her relatives.

Gloriosa V. Valarao, the sister of Felicidad, filed a petition for the issuance of a letter
of administration in her favor over Felicidad's estate. Conrado C. Pascual and
Manuel C. Diaz, nephews of Felicidad, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged
holographic will of Felicidad. The two proceedings were consolidated, and Valarao
and Diaz were appointed joint administrators of the estate. The probate court
denied probate of the holographic will. Diaz appealed the decision. The probate
court appointed Valarao as the special administratrix and denied Diaz's application
for appointment as special co-administrator. The Court of Appeals set aside the
appointment of Valarao as the lone special administratrix, stating that both factions
of heirs should be represented in the management of the estate. Valarao filed a
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the probate court had jurisdiction to appoint Valarao as the special
administratrix even after an appeal was filed.
Ruling:
Yes.
The probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Gloriosa as

special administratrix even after respondents had filed a notice of appeal from the
Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad since the appeal is
one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required. In this
mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of
the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the
appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of,
including the appointment of a special administrator.
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Moreover, the rejection of Manuel as special co-administrator was justified
since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 clearly stipulate the
grounds for the rejection. The records also show that evidence of the applicants
were weighed before Manuel was rejected because he was found to have been
remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estate. Finally, the
extraordinary writ does not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence was
assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings since perceived errors in the
appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional issues.
72. GONZALES VS. AGUINALDO, GR. NO. 74769, SEPTEMBER 28, 1990
Facts:
An intestate proceeding, concerns the estate of Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda.
de Favis, survived by her four children: Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F.
Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez. In 1983, Beatriz F. Gonzales and Teresa Olbes were
appointed co-administrators of the estate. In 1984, Teresa Olbes filed a motion to
remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, arguing she was incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts detrimental to the estate
and heirs. The court ordered Beatriz F. Gonzales and other parties to file their
opposition. In 1985, the court canceled the letters of administration granted to
Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix. The court
argued that it would be to the best interest of the estate if two children of the
deceased would jointly administer the estate. However, the court denied the motion
for reconsideration, canceling the letters of administration and retaining Teresa
Olbes as the administratrix.
Issue:
Whether there was sufficient cause for the removal of Gonzales as co-
administratrix of the estate.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of Gonzales, granting her petition and stating that
there was no sufficient cause for her removal as co-administratrix. The court
emphasized that removal should be based on evidence of non-conformable acts or
omissions. The court did not determine the validity of the charges against Gonzales
and did not base the removal on any specified causes. Gonzales' temporary
absence from the country did not disqualify her from being an administrator.
73. MATUTE VS. CA, GR. NO. L-26751, JANUARY 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768,
784
Facts:
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The Court of Appeals is facing three petitions challenging its jurisdiction in an
estate settlement, the removal of an administrator without due process, and the
invalid appointment of a new administrator. The case revolves around the removal
of Matias S. Matute as co-administrator of the Amadeo Matute Olave estate and the
appointment of Jose S. Matute as his replacement. The court found this violation of
due process and invalidated the removal order. Additionally, the court ruled that a
default judgment against Jose S. Matute was a patent nullity due to procedural
errors.
Issue:
Whether there is importance of due process in removing an administrator and
the need for proper hearings and notification of interested parties for the
appointment of a new administrator.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the dismissal of civil case 4252 with prejudice on
February 15, 1966, was a nullity due to a void motion to dismiss and/or withdraw
filed by Matias Matute on February 14, 1966. The court set aside the January 31,
1966 order, declaring it void and allowing the dismissal order to be based on Matias
Matute's motion to dismiss and/or withdraw. The defendants-respondents argued
that the order was anchored on their own motion to dismiss and supplementary
motion to dismiss, and both the termination of incidents in civil case 4252 and the
denying of the intervenors' motion for reconsideration affirm that the disputed order
was anchored on the ground of res judicata.
74. MEDINA VS. CA, GR. NO. L-34760, SEPTEMBER 28, 1973
Facts:
Beda Gonzales was appointed as special administrator of the intestate estate

of Agustin Medina. The estate proceedings have been pending for over 13 years
without the appointment of a regular administrator. The lower court approved and
confirmed the sale of the property known as "Bitukang Manok" to Rosalia M. del
Carmen, a daughter-heir of the decedent. Gonzales, who is an assignee of some
heirs of the estate and personally interested in purchasing the property, opposed
the sale. Despite his opposition, the lower court overruled Gonzales' objection and
appointed him as special administrator. Gonzales appealed the lower court's order
of approval of the sale to the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Can Gonzales, as a special administrator, interfere with the possession and

enjoyment of the property sold to Rosalia M. del Carmen, considering his conflicting
interests?
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Ruling:
No. The lower court's order of approval of the sale is affirmed. The lower
court is directed to appoint a suitable person as a regular administrator to expedite
the settlement of the estate.
75. PASCUAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, GR. NO. 120575, DECEMBER 16,
1998
Facts:
Dr. Olivia Pascual seeks to annul a final judgment awarding attorney's fees to
Atty. Jesus Santos. Dr. Pascual claims lack of jurisdiction, denial of due process, and
unreasonableness of the fees. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12,
1973, leaving behind his widow, Doña Adela Soldevilla Pascual, and various heirs.
Doña Adela filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her
husband, and Atty. Jesus Santos was hired as her counsel. After Doña Adela's death
in 1987, Dr. Olivia Pascual, one of the heirs, filed a petition for the probate of her
will. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) awarded attorney's fees to Atty. Santos in its
January 19, 1994 decision. The decision became final and executory, and a writ of
execution was issued.
Issue:
Whether Pascual was entitled to specific performance
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court ordered PVTA to execute a final deed of sale in favor of
Pascual upon the payment of the remaining balance. The Court emphasized that
specific performance is a remedy that can be granted when one party has fulfilled
its contractual obligations, and the other party unjustifiably refuses to perform its
part of the contract.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with
modifications, directing PVTA to comply with the contract to sell and to execute a
final deed of sale in favor of Pascual, subject to Pascual paying the remaining
balance due. This case underscores the principle that a party who has substantially
complied with their contractual obligations should not be penalized by the other
party's unwarranted rescission of the contract.
76. HILADO VS. CA, GR NO. 164102, MAY 08, 2009

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Facts:
Roberto Benedicto, a sugar magnate, died intestate on May 15, 2000. He was
survived by his wife, Julita Campos Benedicto, and his daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino. Two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. Manila RTC appointed her as the administrator of the
estate. Petitioners filed a manifestation/motion to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. Manila RTC denied the motion. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial,
stating that the claims of the petitioners were contingent and expectant.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners have the right to intervene in the intestate

proceedings.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners are recognized as interested parties under the Rules on

Special Proceedings.
Intervention under the Rules on Civil Procedure does not extend to creditors
with contingent claims. Petitioners have viable interests in the estate and are
entitled to certain rights and notices as "interested persons" under the Rules on
Special Proceedings.
Petitioners should be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued
in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator. Petitioners should be given notice in instances where notice is
required for interested parties under the Rules on Special Proceedings.
77. VDA. DE BACALING VS. LAGUNA GR NO. L-26694, DECEMBER 18, 1973
Facts:
Private respondent Hector Laguna is the registered owner of a residential
land known as lot No. 3508 situated at La Paz, Iloilo City3 many years back,
petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the acquiescence of
private respondent Laguda, constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot
fronting Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00.4 Unable to pay the
lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00, an action for
ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by private respondent Laguda against
petitioner in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband,
Dr. Bacaling, in the City Court of Iloilo City.5 The filing of said case spawned various
court suits, but she ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with Laguna.
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The agreement stated that petitioner would vacate the premises and remove
the house by December 31, 1966, and pay monthly rent until that date. If petitioner
failed to comply, Laguna would be entitled to immediate execution and recovery of
unpaid rent. The City Court approved the settlement, but petitioner failed to satisfy
the conditions within the given period. A writ of execution was issued, and a motion
for demolition was filed by Laguna. The Court of First Instance approved the
demolition order. Hence, the Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to annul the
order. The petitioner claims that since she was no longer the judicial administratrix
of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control
of estate funds when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became
due and payable, the special order of demolition could not be enforced.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial administratrix prior to her
discharge or removal are valid and binding upon her successor.
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, petitioner's lawful acts before
the revocation of her letters of administration or before her removal shall have the
same validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that
the effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to terminate
the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the executor or
administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation of the letters, will be
protected, and a similar protection will be extended to rights acquired under a
previous grant of administration
78. ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ VS. CA (G.R. No. 118671, Jan. 29, 1996)
Facts:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes,
and his three granddaughters, On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. On June 29,
1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition
for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz
Issues:
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Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before
payment of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant
possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
Ruling:
1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support

from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to
“widow and children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.
2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations

above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs.
3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and

management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses of administration, He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the
amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination
by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
79. VDA. DE CHUA VS. CA (G.R. No. 116835, March 5, 1998)
Facts:
Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo. The couple had two children. Roberto died intestate in 1992. Respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for declaration of
heirship, guardianship and for issuance of letters of administration. Among other
allegations, she alleged that Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned
minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao City. The trial court issued an
order setting the hearing and directing the publication of a notice. Petitioner
Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on ground of improper venue. This was opposed by
private respondent.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended Petition so as
to “properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material
averments in the body of the pleadings. It included the following amendment: “That
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Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors is a resident of Cotabato
City and died intestate on May 28, 1992 at Davao City”. They ruled that petitioner
had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife
of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant
failed to produce. The trial court issued an order appointing Roberto’s cousin as
special administrator and appointing respondent as guardian over the two minor
children. Petitioner filed a motion praying for the recall of the issuance of the letters
of administration. She also filed a motion to declare the proceedings a mistrial The
court denied her motions. Petitioner contends that the trial court acted beyond its
jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over the estate, thereby
converting the petition into an intestate proceeding, without the amended petition
being published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by Section 3, Rule
79.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s petition included the issuance of letters of
administration .
Ruling:
Yes.
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court.
(1) the death of the testator;
(2) residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court
is located
(3) if the decedent was a nonresident, the fact of being a resident of a
foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province
where the court is sitting
The title of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which
includes the issuance of letters of administration. This is also true regarding the
prayer.
79. MANAGGUIL VS. ATTY. VILLEGA (A.M. No. 2430, Aug. 30, 1990)
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Villegas. It turns out that Villegas was
counsel of record of one Felix Leong, the administrator for the testate estate of one
Felomina Zerna. In 1963, Leong, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a
lease contract with the partnership of Hijos De Villegas over several lots included in
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Zerna’s estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth. It is
important to note at this point that Villegas was both counsel of Leong and a
partner in the partnership of Hijos De Villegas. When Leong died, this disbarment
suit was filed by Mananquil , the appointed administrator for Leong’s estate.
Mananquil alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and
conditions. Also, Mananquil alleged that Villegas should have first notified and
secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts
were renewed, Villegas being counsel of that estate’s administrator.
Issue:
Whether or not Villegas should have first secured the probate court’s
approval regarding the lease.
Ruling:
No.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial
executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and the expenses of administration.
He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority
from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been
settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving
the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.
80. QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN
BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE v. LCN
CONS, GR No. 174873, August 26, 2008
Facts:
Raymond Triviere passed away in December 1987. Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the
decedent were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988.
As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment
of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of
the estate, as well as litigation expenses. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses.
Issue:
What is the rule if the executor or administrator is an attorney.
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Ruling:
Section 7 of Rule 85 provides that when the executor or administrator is an
attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
services rendered by him.
Here, in attempting to exempt from the coverage of Section 7, Rule 85 of the
ROC, Quasha Law Office presents conflicting claims to justify its claim for Attorney’s
Fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the award for such was
payment for its administration of the estate of the decedent, yet, it would later
renounce that it was an administrator.
81. SUI LING s liquidators of The Yek Tong Lim Fire, Marine, and Insurance
Co., Ltd & CO V. TAYSAN, FRANCISCA JOSE GR NO. L-4777, NOVEMBER 11,
1908
Facts:
Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of
land. She borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener, money, and turned over
her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan. When
Caballero died, Silvina Chio-Taysan was declared as the only and exclusive heir of
the decedent, hence, became the new owner of the land. Later, Chio-Taysan
borrowed money from petitioner and mortgaged the land. Upon default, and during
the estate proceedings, petitioner prayed for the foreclosure of the land in favor of
them. Jose intervened and alleged that she has remaining claims against the estate
of Avelina Caballero.
Issue:
Whether the contention of F. Jose is correct
Ruling:
Yes.
Upon the death of a person, all his property is burdened with all his debts, his
death creating and equitable lien thereon for the benefit of the creditors. Such lien
will continue until all debts are extinguished either by the payment , prescription, or
satisfaction in one of the modes recognized by law.
If the plaintiffs here were permitted to foreclose the mortgaged land and to
recover their debt from its sale, it might well be that there would not be sufficient
property in the estate to pay the amount of the claim of the intervener against the
estate.
82. HEIRS OF PIZZARO VS. CONSOLACION (G.R. No. L-51278, May 9, 1988)
Facts:
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Heirs of Pizarro, Sr. filed a petition seeking the reversal of an order dismissing
their claim against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia. Petitioners are the
oppositors in Special Proceeding No. 2116 in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Davao City Branch II, for the settlement of the estate of Dominga Garcia, filed by
the private respondent, Luis Tan alias Chen Yeh-An. Petitioners claim to be heirs of
Ramon Pizarro, who died intestate, and that the deceased was the vendee of a
parcel of land in Davao City. The trial court set the period for filing claims within six
months months from the date of the first publication of the notice, which the
petitioners argue is shorter than the minimum limit of six months provided by the
law.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court violated Rule 86 of ROC by shortening the period
for filing claims.
Ruling:
Yes.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an
estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the
same.
Here, the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6)
months from the date of the first publication of the notice. It was obviously short of
the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly
observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law.
83. ESTATE OF OLAVE VS REYES, G.R. NO. L-29407, JULY 29, 1983
Facts:
Petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee
simple of a parcel of land. Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO,
filed a civil case for the collection of an alleged indebtedness against respondents.
Parties entered into an amicable settlement whereby the property of the estate was
conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim and that the said Amicable
Settlement was not submitted to and approved by the CFI. The petitioner argues
that the Amicable Settlement should have been filed in the administration
proceedings of the estate and approved by the probate court.
Issue:
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Whether or not amicable settlement should be presented in probate
proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator; ..." The purpose of presentation of claims against
decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased
persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim
and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
Here, it is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing
Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a
money judgment against the estate.
84. STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC , GR NO. 147561, JUNE 22, 2006
Facts:
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) issued a performance bond to guarantee

the faithful and satisfactory performance of a construction contract between
Republic-Asahi and JDS. Republic-Asahi paid JDS a downpayment and two progress
billings for the construction project. Republic-Asahi rescinded the contract with JDS
due to dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the work. Republic-Asahi hired
another contractor to complete the project, incurring additional expenses. Republic-
Asahi filed a complaint against JDS and SICI, seeking payment for the additional
expenses incurred and damages under the performance bond. JDS had already
ceased operations and Santos had passed away. SICI argued that its liability under
the bond was extinguished by Santos' death and that it was released from its
obligations due to the lack of liquidation and procedural due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his
liability under the surety bond.
Ruling:
No.
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Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of
money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor.
Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only
the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a
probate court.
Here, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his

contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation,
or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of
those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.
85. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY VS. ABSOLUTE

MANAGEMENT CORP. (G.R. No. 170498, Jan. 9, 2013)
Facts:
The case originated from a complaint filed by Sherwood Holdings

Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC) for a sum
of money. SHCI alleged that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of
plywood and plyboards, but AMC failed to deliver the items. AMC filed a third-party
complaint against Metrobank, claiming that Metrobank should be held liable for the
checks issued by SHCI to AMC. These checks were all crossed, and were all made
payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General Manager, in 1998. Chua
died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was
commenced before the RTC of Pasay City.
Issue:
Whether or not claims based on quasi-contract and contingent claims be

made against the estate of the decedent.
Ruling:
Yes.
Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be

filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent

nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged
liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic
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unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the
claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
86. PASDA INC. VS. DIMAYACYAC, G.R. NO. 220479, AUGUST 17, 2016
Facts:
In March 1999, PASDA and Dimayacyac entered into a lease contract for a
property in Quezon City. Dimayacyac failed to pay his monthly rentals, VAT, and
utility costs, resulting in an outstanding arrearage of P340,071.00. PASDA filed a
complaint for sum of money before the MeTC to collect the outstanding obligation .
Metc found Dimaycyac liable. RTC and the CA affirmed the decision. In the course of
the proceedings before the CA, Dimayacyac died and he was substituted by his
heirs as respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the case shall continue.
Ruling:
Yes.
It is clear that in the event that the respondent-debtor dies during the
pendency of the case, the same is not dismissed but is allowed to continue. If,
eventually, the court rules against the deceased respondent, the same shall be
enforced as a claim against his estate, and not against the individual heirs.
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case
was pending before the Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to
pay the loan, the debt subsists against his estate. No property or portion of the
inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been satisfied.
87. BONILLA VS. BARCENA (71 SCRA 491, 1976)
Facts:
Fortunata Barcena instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra for quieting of
title over a parcel of land located in Abra. However, during the pendency of the
action, Barcena died and her death was used by the respondents as ground for the
dismissal of Barcena’s action as a dead person cannot be a real party in interest
and has no legal personality to sue. Counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
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Barcena and asked for the substitution by her minor children and her husband but
the court dismissed and denied the succeeding motions for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil action filed by Barcena survived after her death.
Ruling:
Yes.
Duty of Attorney upon which death, incapacity or incompetency of party.
Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it
shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and to give the names and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
In the present case, the records show that the death of Barcena occured after
her filing of complaint and the court acquired jurisdiction over her person. After her
death, the rules prescribed the procedure, specifically Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court which was complied by her counsel and asked for proper
substitution. It is also provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code that the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent
which makes the heirs become the absolute owners of the decedent’s property. The
provisions were not followed by the court and dismissed outright the motions made
by the plaintiff’s counsel.
88. GOV. OF THE PHILS. VS. PAMINTUAN (55 Phil. 13)
Facts:
Florentino died intestate thereafter, intestate proceedings were instituted

where the court appointed commissioners for the appraisal of the value of the
property left by the decedent. The court then ordered the delivery to the heirs of
their respective shares of the inheritance after paying the inheritance taxes which
were duly paid, however, it was discovered that Florentino had not paid the tax due
for the income he made from the sale of his house. As a result, the government
demanded payment of the income tax, however, the heirs refused to pay.
Issue:
Can the claim for taxes be enforced against the estate of the decedent?
Ruling:
Yes, claims for taxes survive the death of the decedent and can be enforced
against the estate.
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Under the laws of succession, even after partition of an estate, heirs and
distributees are liable individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims
such as taxes against the estate in proportion to the amount of value of the
property they have respectively received from the estate.
89. VERA VS. HON. FERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. L-31364, MARCH 30, 1979
Facts:
On June 3, 1969 a Motion for Allowance of Claim and for Payment of Taxes
was filed against the estate of the late Luis Tongoy. The claim represents the
indebtedness to the Government of the late Luis D. Tongoy for deficiency income
taxes in the total sum of P3,254.80. The Administrator opposed the motion solely on
the ground that the claim was barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever xxx”. Relying on Secs. 2 and 5 of Rule 86, the
respondent Judge dismissed the motion for allowance of claim filed by herein
petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes by
the government against the estate of Luis D. Tongoy was already barred by
Sections 2 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
As to Section 5, Rule 86: The aforequoted provisions shows that it makes no
mention of claims for monetary obligation of the decedent created by law, such as
taxes which is entirely of different character from the claims expressly enumerated
therein. Under the familiar rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not
mentioned.
In the instant case, petitioners filed the Motion for Allowance of Claim and for
an Order of Payment of Taxes before an order of the distribution is entered. The
same should have been granted by the respondent court, in the absence of any
valid ground especially considering that it a claim for taxes which in effect
represents a claim of the people at large.
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90. MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 170498, JANUARY
9, 2013
Facts:
Metrobank deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s
account; because of Chua’s control over AMC’s operations, Metrobank assumed that
the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s
account. Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and receive the
checks that were deposited to its account; despite Chua’s control over AMC and
Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are distinct, and checks exclusively
and expressly payable to one cannot be deposited in the account of the other. In its
fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate should reimburse it if it
becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s
account.
Issue:
Whether or not Ayala Lumber must return the amount of said checks to
Metrobank.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 2154 embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when
something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it.
It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake. Solutio
indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two indispensable
requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and
second, that something was received when there was no right to demand it.
Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC

checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account because it assumed that the
checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s
account. This disjunct created an obligation on the part of Ayala Lumber and
Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of these checks to
Metrobank. This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. Metro bank’s fourth-party
complaint falls under the quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil
Code.
91. GUTIERREZ VS. BARETTO-DATU (G.R. No. L-17175, July 31, 1962)
Facts:
In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto, owner of hectares of fishpond lands
in Pampanga, leased the same to appellant Gutierrez for a term to expire on May 1.
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1947. On November 1, 1941, pursuant to a decision of Department of Public Works
rendered after due investigation the dikes of the fishponds were opened at several
points, resulting in their destruction and in the loss great quantities of fish inside, to
the damage and prejudice of the lessee. In 1956, the lessor having died. Gutierrez
filed a claim therein for two items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00 representing
advance rentals he had to the decedent (the possession of the leased property is
alleged, having been returned to her after the open of the dikes ordered by the
government); and second, the sum of P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of
earned profits, that is. profits which the claimant failed to realize because of the
breach of the lease contract allegedly committed by the lessor. On June 7, 1957
appellant commenced the instant ordinary civil action in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Quezon City branch) against the executrix of the testate for the recovery of
the same amount of P60,000 referred to as the second item claimed in the
administration proceeding. In July 1957 appellant amended his claim in the testate
proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the of P60,000.00, leaving only the one for
refund rentals in the sum of P32,000.00. item of advance
Issue:
Can his claim for damages based on unrealized profits is a money claim
against the estate of the deceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto within the
purview of Rule 87, Section 5?
Ruling:
The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims
against a decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his
lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments, and among
these are those founded upon contract. The claim in this case is based on contract
specifically, on a breach thereof. The only actions that may be instituted against the
executor or administrator are those to recover real or personal property from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal. Rule 88, section 1. The instant suit is not one of
them. The denial of the claim was affirmed by this Court on the grounds that it was
not a money claim and that it arose after the decedent's demise, placing it outside
the scope of Rüle 87, Section 5. The orders appealed from are affirmed.
92. DE BORJA VS. DE BORJAM (G.R. No. L-14851, Aug. 31, 1961)
Facts:
The case involves the intestate estate of Marcelo De Borja, with Dr. Crisanto
De Borja serving as the administrator. Oppositors-appellees, Juan De Borja, et al.,
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filed a case against Crisanto De Borja, seeking payment of a reduced amount of
P46,210.78 plus legal interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Rizal
Court of first instance, and a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff then levied on
the rights, interest, or participation of Crisanto De Borja as a prospective heir of
Josefa Tangco and Francisco De Borja in certain real estate in Rizal.
Issue:
Can the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person be attached for
execution, even if the estate is under judicial administration?
Ruling:
Yes. The attachment is subject to the administration of the estate.
The court cited the case of Cook vs. Escobar, which stated that during the
pendency of judicial administration, the right, title, and interest of heirs, devisees,
or legatees in the properties may be attached subject to the administration of the
estate.
The court also referred to the case of Gotauco & Co. vs. Register of Deeds of
Tayabas, which held that the right of participation in the estate and the lands
thereof may be attached and sold, even if the value of the participation is
indeterminable before the first liquidation of the estate.
93. REGANON VS. IMPERLIA (G.R. No. L-24437, Jan. 17, 1968 (22 SCRA 80)
Facts:
The heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land against Rufino Imperial. After trial, the court awarded
the subject property to the plaintiffs and sentenced defendant Rufino to pay
damages in the amount of Php1,929.20. Subsequently, plaintiffs discovered that the
residuary estate of one Eulogio Imperial was deposited with the Philippine National
Bank, and one of the heirs of Eulogio, herein defendant Rufino's share in said estate
was in the amount of Php1,471.97. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for a writ of
execution and of an order directing the manager of the Bank to hold the share of
defendant Rufino in order that the same could be applied to the satisfaction of the
earlier favorable decision plaintiffs obtained against Rufino. Defendant Rufino
opposed the garnishment of his share in the residuary estate of Eulogio on the
ground that the same was under custodial legis and therefore cannot be attached
Issue:
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Can the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person be attached for
purposes of execution even if the estate in still in the process of settlement?
Ruling:
The new Rules of Court now specifically provides for the procedure to be
followed in case what is attached in in custodia legis. The clear import of this new
provision is that property under custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the
mode set forth in said rule. (Rule 57, Sec.7) That the interest of an heir in the estate
of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of execution, even if the estate
is in the process of settlement before the courts, is already a settled matter in this
jurisdiction.
94. DE BORJA VS. MENCIAS (G.R. No. L-20609, Nov. 19, 1967 (G.R. No. L-
20609, Nov. 19, 1967)
Facts:
Petitioners of the case are Juan de Borja, Marcela de Borja, Saturnina de

Borja, Eufracia de Borja, Cora de Borja, and Olimpia de Borja. The respondents: Hon.
Eulogio Mencias, the Judge of the First Instance of Rizal, the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, the Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja, and Jose de Borja, the Administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco A
case filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal involves the validity of selling an
heir's share in an estate under judicial administration.
Issue:
Can the rights, interest, and participation of Crisanto de Borja in the estates
under judicial administration be sold at public auction to satisfy a money judgment
rendered against him?
Ruling:
Yes.
Cited the case of Gotuaco and Co. vs. Register of Deeds of Tayabas, where it
was held that the participation of an heir in an estate under judicial administration,
although indeterminable before the final liquidation of the estate, may be attached
and sold.
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However, the sale is only effective for the portion that will be adjudicated to
Crisanto de Borja upon the final liquidation of the estates.
95. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE VS. REPUBLIC-ASAHI (G.R. No. 147561, June

22, 2006)
Facts:
On May 24, 1989, Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation entered into a contract

with Jose D. Santos. the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of
roadways and a drainage system in Republic-Asahi's compound in Barrio
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City, Republic- Asahi was to pay JDS. JDS posted a performance
bond which executed, jointly and severally with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc (SICI),
Due to allege slow pace of construction, Republic-Asahi extra judicially rescinded
the contract without prejudice for recovery of damages from JDS and its sureties.
Through the filing of the complaint, Republic-Asahi sought to recover the amount
expended to complete the project using another contractor. SICI filed its answer and
interposed the defense that the money claims against it and JDS have been
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. The lower court dismissed the
complaint of Republic-Asahl, but it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
SICI filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can the death of the party extinguishes the liability of a solidary obligor?
Ruling:
No, as a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when
the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the
persons themselves are extinguished by death. Death is not a defence that he or his
estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
96. RAMOS VS. BIDIN (G.R. No. L-53650, May 28, 1988)
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over attorney's fees in the judicial settlement of
an estate. The case was brought before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City, presided by Judge Abdulwahid Bidin. The petitioner, Virginia M. Ramos,
became the new counsel for the administratrix, Rosaura P. Jaldon, after the
termination of the services of Attorney Abelardo S. Fernandez. Attorney Fernandez
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filed a claim for attorney's fees, which was opposed by the administratrix. Virginia
Ramos also claimed attorney's fees based on a written contract with the
administratrix, fixing her fees at 5% of the value of the estate. Rosemarie Jaldon, an
adopted daughter of the administratrix, opposed both claims for attorney's fees and
requested that half of the fees be charged to the administratrix personally. The
respondent Judge, on the basis of quantum meruit, awarded attorney's fees to both
Fernandez and Ramos. Ramos filed a motion to reconsider the order, presenting a
copy of the contract entitled "Retainer of Attorney" as the basis for her fees. The
respondent Judge increased the award of attorney's fees to Ramos but refused to
enforce the contract, stating that it was too late to consider it and that it would be
unfair to Fernandez. The estate was then ordered to be settled and partitioned, with
the proceeds of the sale to be used to pay the attorney's fees.
Petitioner Ramos filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
alleging that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in fixing her
fees based on quantum meruit and disregarding the contract. The administratrix,
Rosaura Jaldon, also filed a Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the respondent court
acted without jurisdiction and denied her due process.
Issue:
What are the remedies of a creditor on a contract entered into by the lawyers
of the Estate?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that "There are decisions, which are numerous, are
practically unanimous between the administrator and the lawyer does not bind the
estate to such an extent that the lawyer can maintain an action against it and
recover a judgment which is binding upon it. In such a case the creditor has two
remedies: He can prosecute an action against the administrator as an individual. If
judgment is rendered against the administrator and it is paid by him, when he
presents his final account to the Court of First Instance as such administrator he can
include the amounts so paid as an expense of administration. The creditor can also
present a petition in the proceeding relating to the settlement of the estate, asking
that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the
administrator to pay it as an expense of administration. Whichever course is
adopted the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will have a right to
inquire into the necessity for making the contract and the value of the work
performed by the attorney."
In this case, Petitioner Ramos failed to resort to either procedure in pressing
for her attorney's fees before the respondent Court. The services of Virginia Ramos,
it appears, were terminated due to loss of confidence on 19 December 1980 or
during the pendency of the herein petitions. As a practical matter, she may find it
more expeditious to file a claim for her attorney's fees in the estate proceedings,
with proper notice to the administratrix and heirs.
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97. QUIRINO VS. GOROSPE, G.R. Number: L-58797, January 31, 1989
Facts:
The petitioner, Antonio Quirino, as the Special Administrator of the Testate

Estate of Natividad C. Raquiza, and Intestate Estate of Carmen M. Castellvi, sought
to challenge the orders of the Honorable Nathanael M. Gorospe, Presiding Judge of
Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District. The
respondent in this case was Wilfredo M. Goingco, Administrator of the Testate
Estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi. The facts revolve around the settlement of the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi, where claims for attorney's fees and representation
expenses were made by Juan F. Gomez for services rendered to the heirs of Don
Juan Castellvi. These claims were contested as not being properly chargeable to the
estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi.
Issue:
Whether the claims for attorney's fees and representation expenses by Juan
F. Gomez were chargeable to the estate of Don Alfonso Castellvi.
Ruling:
No.
In Gabin v. Malleja, the court defines "claims" against an estate as debts or

demands of a pecuniary nature that could have been enforced against the deceased
in his lifetime or liabilities contracted before death.
The court found that the services rendered by Gomez did not benefit Don
Alfonso Castellvi or his estate, thus they were not chargeable to it. Thus, the court
protected the estate from disbursements based on claims not chargeable to it,
thereby upholding the principle that the settlement of an estate should be guarded
against undue claims.
98. BRIONES VS. HENSON-CRUZ, G.R. Number: G.R. No. 159130, August 22,
2008
Facts:
Ruby filed a petition for the allowance of the will of Luz however, Lilia
opposed it. The trial court designated Atty. Briones as Special Administrator of the
estate. The heirs of Luz filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the order as to the
payment of Briones’ commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal.
The trial court denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on the
ground of forum shopping. The heirs filed with CA a Petition for certiorari. CA
reversed the decision of the trial court for the latter had no power or authority to
deny the appeal on the ground of forum shopping. CA also refused to resolve the
issue of forum shopping
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Issue:
Whether or not multi- appeals are allowed in the same case.
Ruling:
Yes.
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to
enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In this multi-appeal mode, the
probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but
retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for
purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of. Where multi-appeals are
allowed, we see no reason why a separate petition for certiorari cannot be allowed
on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is separate and distinct as an issue from
the aspect of the case that has been adjudged with finality by the lower court.
The matter appealed was the special administrator's commission, a charge

that is effectively a claim against the estate under administration, while the matter
covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an auditor who would
pass upon the special administrator's final account. By their respective natures,
these matters can exist independently of one another and can proceed separately
as envisioned by the Rules under Rule 109.
99. GENEROSO SALIGUMBA VS. MONICA PALANOG G.R. No.: 143365,

December 4, 2008
Facts:
The petitioners sought review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan, which was an action for the revival of a judgment in a
previous case concerning the quieting of title with damages. The facts of the case
began with the respondents filing a complaint in 1977 for quieting of title with
damages against the petitioners' predecessors, alleging ownership and possession
of a parcel of land for over 50 years. The petitioners contested the claim, leading to
a series of legal proceedings that spanned decades, including the appointment of a
commissioner to delimit the land, the death of the original defendants, and the
eventual ruling in favor of the respondents, which declared them the lawful owners
of the land.
Issue:
Whether the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 (Quieting of Title) should be
revived despite the elapsed time was the central issue in this case.
Ruling:
No, the petitioners' contention was incorrect.

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The court states the doctrine of revival of judgment in the decision, which
allows for the execution of a dormant judgment after five years, assuming the
decision is final and executory.
In the present case, the oversight in substituting the deceased defendants

did not invalidate the proceedings nor the judgment, as the action involving real
property survived the death of the parties. An action for quieting of title with
damages which is an action involving real property, is an action that survives
pursuant to Sec 1 Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party.
And when a party dies in an action that survives, Sec 17 of Rule 3 provides for the
procedure.
100. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DEMOCRITO PARAS G.R. Number:

G.R. No. 192912, October 22, 2014
Facts:
The facts revolve around the grievous charge of rape committed against a
minor. The accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, was charged with the crime of rape
allegedly perpetrated in March 1996 against 'AAA', a 17-year-old girl at the time of
the incident. In a letter filed by the officer-in-charge of the New Bilibid Prison, the
Court was informed that the accused-appellant had died at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital in Muntinlupa City on January 24, 2013.
Issue:
Whether the death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil liability
Ruling:
The criminal liability is extinguished. Where the civil liability survives, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based.
The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together there with the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Thus, upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
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101. DR. ANTONIO CABUGAO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 163879, ,July 30, 2014
Facts:
On June 17, 2000, a ten-year-old boy, Rodolfo Palma Jr., suffered from acute
appendicitis. The petitioner, Dr. Cabugao, along with Dr. Clenio Ynzon, failed to
perform the necessary immediate operation, which led to the boy's death due to
cardiorespiratory arrest, metabolic encephalopathy, septicemia, and possible
cerebral aneurysm rupture.
The RTC and the CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, the accused elevated the case before the Supreme Court for review.
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the
Court that the latter died on December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as
evidenced by a copy of his death certificate.
Issue:
Whether the death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil liability
Ruling:
The death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability.
However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on
delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. For this reason, a separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based, and in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
102. HILADO VS. CA AZARCON (G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009)
Facts:
The petitioners in this case are the creditors of the decedent in which the
nature of the credit is of tort. Benedicto, the decedent, a well known sugar magnate
died intestate and survived by his wife and daughter. At the time of his death, there
were two pending civil cases against him filed by the petitioners before the RTC of
Bacolod. Julieta, the decedent’s wife, filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
issuance of letter of administration in her favor which was issued by the said court.
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The petitioners then filed before RTC Manila a manifestation/motion ex
abudante cautela praying for the, to be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings which the Manila RTC denied on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the
Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC Manila committed grave abuse of discretion by
refusing to allow the petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the
decedent debtor.
Ruling:
No.
The creditors may intervene in the intestestate proceedings however the
nature of the liabilities that the petitioners claim against the estate of the decedent
is not within the Rules of Special Proceeding but one of Civil Procedure. it is required
for the intervenor to have an actual and material, direct and immediate and not
simply contingent and expectant. Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim.
The claim of the petitioner may institute the claim however not in special
proceeding but of a regular proceeding.
103. DELA CRUZ VS. CAMON (G.R. No. L-21034, April 30, 1966)
Facts:
This case involves the estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy who
were owners of 2/4 share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Roasario in Negros Occidental.
The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon long before the present
intestate proceedings commenced. On October 23, 1962, the administrator of the
estate (Fallon) moved the court to order Emilio Camon to pay the estates 2/4 share
of therentals on Hacienda for crop year 1948-1949 through 1960-1961 as well as
the sugar land in the amount of 62,065PHP and the rice land 2,100 PHP. On
December 3, 1962 challenged the jurisdiction of the court over him stating that the
demand for rentals cannot be made by mere motion by the administrator but by
independent action.
Issue:
Whether or not the court may order Camon through a mere motion by an
administrator.
Ruling:
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No, it shall be by an independent action.
Pursuant to the case of Paula v. Escay, when the demand is in favor of the
administrator and the party to whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the
court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator but
by an independent action.
In this case, the administrator, as attorney-in-fact (as well) had sold the
estates 2/4 share in Hacienda Rosario together with all the rights, title and interest
(including all accrued rents that the heir had inherited from the deceased. In the
administrator's answer, he admitted the sale but not the rentals due. Such that the
right to collect the rentals is in a fluid state. The administrator may not pull him
against his will by motion into the administration proceedings. Matters affecting
property under judicial administration may not be taken cognizance of by the court
in the course of intestate proceedings if the interests of third persons are
prejudiced.
104. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. VS. DELA RAMA (G.R. No. L-21108, Nov. 29,
1966)
Facts:
The estate of the late Esteban de la Rama was the subject of Special
Proceedings No. 401 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The executor-
administrator, Eliseo Hervas, filed income tax returns of the estate corresponding to
the taxable year 1950. The Bureau of Internal Revenue later claimed that it had
found out that it had been received by the estate in 1950 from the De la Rama
Steamship Company, Inc. cash dividends amounting to P86,800.00, which amount
was not declared in the income tax return of the estate for the year 1950. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue then made an assessment as deficiency income tax
against the estate. The Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue then sent a letter to
Leonor de la Rama as administratrix of the estate, asking for payment. The tax, as
assessed, not having been paid, the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
wrote another letter to Lourdes demanding the payment of the deficiency income
tax within the period of thirty days from receipt thereof. The deficiency income tax
not having been paid, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against the
heirs of Esteban de la Rama. The Trial court, however, dismissed the complaint on
the ground that it was Eliseo Hervas, and neither Leonor nor Lourdes, who was the
proper administrator at the time, and to whom the assessment should have been
sent. The appellant contended that the assessment had become final, because the
decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue was sent in a letter and addressed to
the heirs of the late Esteban de la Rama, through Leonor de la Rama as
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administratrix of the estate, and was not disputed or contested by way of appeal
within thirty days from receipt thereof to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not there was proper notice of the tax assessment.
Ruling:
None.
Republic Act 1125 provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive
jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, and the disputed assessment must be
appealed by the person adversely affected by the decision within thirty days after
the receipt of the decision.
In this case, the time the tax assessment was sent, Special Proceedings No.
401 were still open with respect to the controverted matter regarding the cash
dividends upon which the deficiency assessment was levied. It is clear that at the
time these special proceedings were taking place, Eliseo Hervas was the duly
appointed administrator of the estate. Plaintiff-appellant also contends that the
lower court could not take cognizance of the defense that the assessment was
erroneous, this being a matter that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Tax Appeals. Accordingly, the person adversely affected should have been the
administrator of the estate, and the notice of the assessment should have been
sent to him. The administrator had not received the notice of assessment, and he
could not appeal the assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days from
notice. Hence the assessment did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
105. CHUA VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP. (G.R. No. 144881, Oct. 16,
2003)
Facts:
Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the

deceased Jose L. Chua.Thereafter, she submitted to the trial court an inventory of
all the real and personal properties of the deceased.
One of the creditors of the deceased, [herein respondent] Absolute

Management Corporation, filed a claim on [sic] the estate. In the interim, Absolute
Management Corporation noticed that the deceased's shares of stocks with Ayala
Sales Corporation and Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. were not included in the
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inventory of assets. As a consequence, it filed a motion to requireBetty T. Chua to
explain why she did not report these shares of stocks in the inventory. Absolute
Management Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T.
Chua’s reply was spurious and simulated, filed a motion for the examination of the
supposed transferees.
It premised its motion on Section 6, Rule 87, Revised Rules of Court, infra,
which states that when a person is suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the properties of the deceased, a creditor may file a
complaint with the trial court and the trial court may cite the suspected person to
appear before it and be examined under oath on the matter of such complaint.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the Trial Court To give due
course to Absolutes Motion for Examination
Ruling:
Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the Trial Court To give due course
to Absolutes Motion for Examination.
Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected of

having possession or knowledge of the properties left by a deceased person, or of
having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the properties of the deceased.
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person
through the filing of the corresponding proceedings has supervision and control
over these properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the
inventory of the administrator lists all the properties,rights and credits which the
law requires the administrator to include in his inventory.
However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide

whether the properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons
examined.If after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person
examined is keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator
should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain
shares of stock by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically deprive
the assignees of their shares. They have a right to be heard on the question of
ownership, when that property is properly presented to the court.
106. GRUENBERG VS. CA. (G.R. No. L-45948, Sept. 10, 1985)
Facts:
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Flores alleged that the house and lot in question, which were sold to Albert
Gruenberg, were part of the conjugal partnership of the Gruenberg spouses and
should be held liable for the obligations incurred by William Gruenberg as the
manager and administrator of the conjugal partnership. He also claimed that the
sale of the property was fraudulent and that the petitioners had an outstanding
debt of P13,000.00 to her. Thereafter, Flores filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against the properties of the petitioners to secure her
claim. The petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that the case was for the
annulment of the sale and recovery of the property, not for the recovery of a sum of
money. They contended that a writ of preliminary attachment was not the proper
remedy to protect the rights of the estate.
Despite the petitioners' opposition, the trial court granted Flores' motion and
issued a writ of preliminary attachment. The petitioners later discovered that their
opposition was not attached to the record due to a clerical error. They filed a motion
for reconsideration and a motion to recall the writ of attachment, but both motions
were denied by the trial court. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, seeking to reverse the order for the issuance of the writ of
attachment. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ for preliminary attachment was properly issued.
Ruling:
No, the writ for preliminary attachment was not properly issued.
National Coconut Corporation V. Pecson, et al. states that when the facts, or
some of them, stated in the plaintiff's affidavit are shown by the defendant to be
untrue, the writ may be considered as improperly or irregularly issued.
In this case, the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the
affidavit of preliminary attachment are misleading. The facts in the motion and the
affidavit are deceptively framed. The obligation which the respondent seeks to
secure by an attachment was between her and the late William Gruenberg, Sr. What
she seeks to establish as fraudulent was the sale between the late Mr. Gruenberg
and his son. These are two entirely distinct transactions. The order which directed
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment merely recited the grounds alleged
in the private respondent's motion without any specific details as to the supposed
fraud committed by the petitioners when they contracted the debt and the alleged
disposition or concealment by the petitioners of their properties.
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107. LICHAUCO VS. ATLANTIC & PACIFIC CO. (84 Phi. 341)
Facts:
Richard Fitzsimmons, the president of Atlantic Gulf, a foreign corporation
registered and licensed to do business in the Philippines, held 1,000 shares of stock
of which had not been fully paid for but were covered by promissory notes in favor
of Atlantic Gulf. In 1941, P64,500.00 was credited in his favor on account of the
purchase price of the said stocks out of bonuses and dividends to which he was
entitled from the company. Under an agreement with Atlantic, should he die leaving
the shares unpaid, Atlantic, at his option, may either acquire said shares by
returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate
the corresponding shares equivalent to the amount paid thereon. Fitzsimmons died
and a proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted. Atlantic then filed a
claim against the estate and offered to reacquire the shares sold to Fitzsimmons
upon return to the estate of the P64,500 paid thereon. The administrator, Marcial
Lichauco, however, denied the alleged indebtedness. During the trial, Atlantic
presented the testimonies of the chief accountant and assistant accountant, and of
the president and vice-president-treasurer of the corporation. The trial court
however refused to admit said testimonies on the ground of incompetency under
the Dead Man’s State, as the witnesses were not only stockholders and members of
the Board of Directors, but officers as well.
Issue:
Are the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an

administrator disqualified from testifying under the Dead Man’s Statute?
Ruling:
No, the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an
administrator is not disqualified from testifying under the Dead Man’s Statute.
The Dead Man’s Stature is a rule of evidence that prohibits an interested

party from testifying about conversations or transactions with a deceased person in
a civil case.
In this case, to hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying
who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to materially
amending the statute by judicial legislation. The Dead Man’s Statute disqualifies
only parties or assignors of parties; officers and/or stockholders of a corporations,
therefore, are not disqualified from testifying,
108. ARCADIO MAXILOM VS. GAUDENCIO TABOTABO, EXECUTOR OF THE

ESTATE OF DIEGO TABOTABO, GR NO. L-3505 (9 PHIL.390)
Facts:
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In year 1901 one Fausto Tabotabo died, leaving certain assets and liabilities.
His father, Diego Tabotabo, upon petition, was declared the universal heir of the
said Fausto. Then Diego accepted and took possession of the inheritance. However,
Diego died. Later, the court appointed commissioners in the estate of Diego
Tabotabo organized for the purpose of considering claims against the estate of
Diego T. Plaintiff made claim of indebtedness before the commission for the sum of
1,062 pesos (Mexican currency), which the commission allowed. The Executor then
appealed to the CFI. Then CFI affirmed the decision of the said commission.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff Arcadio Maxilom, is allowed to testify as witness
during the trial.
Ruling:
Yes. Judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed.
The court held that the plaintiff was prohibted by law from testifying about
any matter that occured before the death of Fausto Tabotabo, as the action was
against the executor of Fausto’s estate. Therefore the plaintiff’s testimony was
inadmissible. The court also concluded that the lower court erred in rendering a
judgment based on the plaintiff’s testimony, which was in violation of the law.
The court based its decision on Section 383 of the Code of Civil procedure
which provides that these persons cannot be witnesses; parties or assignors of
parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or
proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person.
If testimony of the character offered by the plaintiff should be allowed, then
all sorts of fictitious claims might be presented and allowed by designing persons,
without any protection whatever on the part of the estate of the deceased person.
As said by a chief justice in a US case, “If the death has closed the lips of one party,
the policy of the law is to close the lips of the other.”
109. MARALIT VS. LARDIZABAL (54 Phil. 252)
Facts:
In February of 1920, contract was entered between Germana Solis
(deceased) and plaintiffs Mariano Maralit and Emeterio Lota for the repair of a
house, for a total sum of P14k. Plaintiff claim that they have completed the work,
however they only received P11,550, thus leaving a balance of P2,450. In addition,
plaintiffs also allege that they performed additional work which are not included in
the contract. Defendant Reynaldo Lardixabal, being the judicial administrator of
Germana Solis’ estate, filed a counterclaim for foreclosure of the mortgage given by
Mariano Maralit and damages caused by the delay in the completion of the works.
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Issue:
Whether or not the court is erred to refuse the testimony of Mariano Maralit
in proving that Germana Solid ordered additional repairs but not included in the
contract.
Ruling:
NO. The court only ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P2,450, and disregard plaintiffs claim for additional works.
As to the court refusing to admit the testimony of plaintiff Mariano Maralit to
prove that the deceased Germana Solid, in the couse of the work, ordered some
additional repairs, but not included in the contract. The court didn’t find error in this
decision which is based upon Section 383, paragraph 7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The law does not state that it only refers to cases where the deceased
dies before the action was instituted. Moreover, the purpose of the prohibition,
which is to discourage perjury may be applied where the deceased died either
before or after the filing of the suit against her, it, when the testimony is given, she
is already dead and cannot disprove it.
Plaintiffs are entitled to payment for the unpaid balance and additional work
based on the terms of the contract. While additional work may come within the
general terms of the contract, but evidence does not support the allegation.
110. GO CHAN VS. YOUNG (G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001)
Facts:
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, registered with the SEC in 1951,
was sued by Cecilia Gochan Uy and Miguel Uy in 1994 for wrongful acts and
damages. The petitioners argued the SEC had no jurisdiction over the action, but
the SEC granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens. The respondents appealed to the SEC en banc, arguing the SEC had
jurisdiction over the case, but the SEC en banc ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the Spouses Uy have the personality to file an action before
the SEC against Gochan Realty Corporation.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners argue that spouses Cecilia and Miguel Uy had no legal
standing to bring a suit before the SEC on February 8, 1994, as they were no longer
stockholders at the time. They claim that the purchase of Cecilia Gochan Uy's 210
shares by Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation was void ab initio, and therefore,
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the controversy is no longer cognizable by the SEC. The jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
The statute of limitations already bars the Uy spouses' action, but the complaint
contains respondents' allegation that the sale of the shares was void ab initio,
violating the trust fund doctrine and contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, and policy.
111. RIOFERIO VS. CA (G.R. No. 129008, Jan. 13, 2004)
Facts:
In 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City, leaving
several properties. He married Esperanza P. Orfinada and had seven children. In
1995, petitioners discovered Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim, involving properties in Dagupan City. In
December 1995, respondent Orfinada III filed a petition for Letters of
Administration, but respondents filed a complaint for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights
belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration
proceedings.
Ruling:
The petitioners argue that the lower court denied their motion for a
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the
action is the decedent's estate. The court cannot be blamed for not hearing the
petitioners' defense or recognizing the respondents' legal standing as heirs. The
appellate court upheld the lower court's order without an error of law, and the
petition for review is denied.
112. VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGE (G.R. No. 203949, April 6, 2016)
Facts:
George A. Gallent, Sr., the registered owner of a residential property in

Muntinlupa City, failed to pay their loan and the property was foreclosed. Allied
Banking Corporation was the highest bidder, and in 2003, they agreed to sell the
property back to the Spouses for P4 Million. In October 2003, the Spouses sought
help from their close family friend, Juan Velasquez, to settle their remaining monthly
amortizations. Velasquez paid the remaining balance and executed a Deed of
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Assignment of Rights. In 2010, the RTC granted a petition for a writ of possession to
Velasquez, stating that the redemption period had expired without the property
being redeemed. The CA Special 4th Division ruled that an ex parte writ of
possession cannot issue against the Spouses Gallent since they are adverse
claimants of the property who are in actual possession.
Issue:
Whether extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is that after the consolidation

of the title over the foreclosed property in the buyer, it is the ministerial duty of the
court to issue a writ of possession upon an ex parte petition by the new owner as a
matter of right.
Ruling:
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the purchaser becomes the

absolute owner if no redemption is made within one year. They are entitled to all
rights of ownership recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, including
possession. After consolidation, the purchaser can demand possession as a matter
of right. The RTC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession upon an ex
parte motion, which is non-litigious and does not require bonding.
113. ROMERO VS. CA (G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012)
Facts:
The petitioners filed a complaint against Aurora and Vittorio Romero, alleging
fraud, misrepresentation, and duress in registering properties in their name. They
claimed that the properties were acquired long after their father's death and cannot
be considered conjugal. The RTC dismissed the complaint, stating the case remains
pending due to no distribution of assets among his heirs. The petitioners filed for
certiorari with the CA, but the CA dismissed the petition, stating the properties are
part of Judge Romero's estate. The petitioners now argue that the probate court can
only rule provisionally on property titles and should file a separate civil action to
protect their interests.
Issue:
whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
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Ruling:
The petitioners argue that the RTC is not responsible for ownership disputes
and only deals with estates or executor designations. They cite cases like
Ongsingco v. Tan and Baybayan v. Aquino, which suggest the intestate court lacks
authority to decide these issues. They argue that a separate civil action must be
filed to settle title and identify who owns properties in respondent Aurora Romero's
inventory. The court in Coca v. Borromeo allowed the probate court to make a
preliminary decision regarding title, but this decision is not final or conclusive. The
petitioners claim properties were part of their parents' marital estate and unlawfully
sold to the respondent. The Supreme Court ruled that the probate court has the
authority to decide property ownership and division. However, there is no evidence
to support their claims that Aurora violated her trust or disobeyed probate court
instructions. The petitioners are found guilty of forum-shopping in the given
situation, as they need to demonstrate their entitlement to inherit from Mariano
Peñaverde's estate.
114. PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB AND THE HEIRS OF ARTURO ARGUNA (G.R. No.
156403, March 31, 2005)
Facts:
Melitona Pahamotang passed away in 1972, and her husband Agustin

Pahamotang filed for letters administration over her estate. In 1973, the Philippine
National Bank and Agustin executed an amendment of mortgages, securing an
obligation of ₱570,000.00. In 1980, Agustin filed a petition for judicial authority to
sell certain properties. Petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, along with their sister
Susana Pahamatong-Zamora, filed motions to set aside the intestate court's orders.
In 1998, the trial court declared the mortgage contracts and foreclosure
proceedings void.
Issue:
whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of contracts of
sale and mortgage entered into by Agustin without first initiating a direct action
against the orders of the intestate court authorizing the challenged contracts.
Ruling:
The petitioners filed a civil case against Agustin for the estate of Melitona,
seeking to annul several contracts entered into by him. The trial court found that
the petitioners were not notified of Agustin's petitions for permission to
mortgage/sell the estate properties. The challenged orders of the intestate court
granting Agustin's petitions were null and void due to lack of compliance with Rule
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89 of the Rules of Court. The court held that without compliance with Sections 2, 4,
and 7 of Rule 89, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it
would be null and void ab initio. The appellate court erred in appreciating laches
against the petitioners, as they were unaware of Agustin's plan to mortgage and sell
the estate properties.
115. RIVERA VS. RAMIREZ (G.R. No. 189697, June 27, 2012)
Facts:
In 1995, Eleuterio P. Rivera filed for the issuance of letters of administration

for Rosita Rivera's estate. She claimed to be her nephew and submitted a list of her
other nephews and nieces. Eleuterio filed a motion to compel the examination of
documents related to her estate, particularly Sta. Teresita General Hospital. The
RTC suspended proceedings. In 2005, Eleuterio moved for a joint settlement, but
Robert argued grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Eleuterio and his relatives were not
Rosita’s heirs and, therefore, had no right to institute the petition for the settlement
of her estate or to seek the production and examination of the hospital’s
documents.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the late Rosita, a physician, had adopted
Raymond as her child, preventing Eleuterio and Rosita's other relatives from
inheriting intestate from her. The CA also ruled that they did not have the right to
seek the production and examination of documents in Robert's possession. The RTC
did not consider the question of whether the late Rosita had judicially adopted
Raymond. The CA criticized the RTC for ignoring the issues related to the late
Rosita's judicial adoption and the lack of Eleuterio's right to file a petition for the
estate settlement.
116. ALREDO HILADO, ET. AL. VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.
(G.R. No. 164102, May 8, 2009)
Facts:
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Well-known sugar magnate Benedicto died intestate. He was survived by his
wife and only daughter. At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases
against Benedicto involving the petitioners. Benedicto’s wife filed with the RTC a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. RTC issued an
order appointing her as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband and
issuing letters of administration in her favor. Petitioners filed with the RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed disputing that the petitioners do not have the legal personality
to do so. RTC and CA denied such manifestation/motion. CA dismissed the petition
citing that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were contingent or
expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before
other courts. Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto.
Ruling:
NO.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court.
Case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor
"must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant.”
The claims of petitioners against the decedent are contingent or expectant,
as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence petitioners cannot to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
117. DE BAUTISTA VS. DE GUZMAN (G.R. No. L-28298, Nov. 25, 1983)
Facts:
Numeriano Bautista was killed in a vehicular accident while being a
passenger in a jeepney owned and operated by Rosendo De Guzman, who died on
May 12, 1952. The driver of the jeepney, Eugenio Medrano, was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence and ordered to pay the plaintiffs-appellees
P3,000 in damages. Plaintiffs-appellees were unable to collect the amount from
Medrano. Plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint against the defendants-appellants,
alleging that they were liable for the payment as the heirs of Rosendo De Guzman.
Issue:
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Should the claim for damages have been filed in the probate proceedings for
the estate of Rosendo De Guzman?
Ruling:
Yes. The requirement to file claims in the probate proceedings is mandatory
and serves to protect the estate of the deceased. The plaintiffs-appellees allowed
the intestate proceedings to terminate and the estate to be distributed to the heirs.
118. Pastor , Jr. vs CA (G.R. No, L-56340, June 24, 1983)
Facts:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two
legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an
illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained
only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30%
of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the probate court
appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr.
whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada
instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged
properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which were
in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in
their own rights, and not by inheritance.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. Not long after,
the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon
objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance
suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in
another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in
effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. The oppositors sought
reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension
of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution
of oppositor’s motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife
filed with the CA a petition for certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the
probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of
ownership and intrinsic validity.
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Ruling:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the
Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining
properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that
ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity
of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator.
Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law.” It declared that the intestate estate administration
aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of
ownership and possession of real and personal properties.
119. SPS. LEBIN VS. MIRASOL (G.R. No. 164255, Sept. 7, 2011)
Facts:
The case involves the dismissal of an appeal by the petitioners, Sps. Elbe
Lebin and Erlinda Lebin, due to their failure to timely file a record on appeal. The
case also deals with the allocation of a property in equal portions to the petitioners
and the respondent, Vilma S. Mirasol, in the settlement of an estate. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, in Iloilo City, issued an order on May 3, 1995, ruling
that a property of the estate sold to the petitioners be divided in two equal portions
between the petitioners and the respondent. The RTC affirmed this order on March
2, 1998. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal, but the
respondent moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000, citing the tardiness of
the record on appeal. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002.
The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, but the RTC
denied the motion on May 21, 2004. The petitioners directly appealed to the Court
on June 23, 2004, challenging the orders of February 1, 2002, and May 21, 2004.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners' appeal for their
failure to timely file a record on appeal.
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Ruling:
No.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by
law is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The Court found that the petitioners did not comply with the requirements for
perfecting their appeal. They filed their record on appeal 22 days beyond the end of
their reglementary period. The Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege and should be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
The Court held that the failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed period
caused the judgment or final order to become final and unappealable.
120. ALDAMIZ VS. CFI (G.R. No. L-2360) Dec. 29, 1949)
Facts:
Gavino Aldamiz was the administrator of the estate of Santiago Rementeria y
Aldamizcogeascoa. Respondent Juan L. Luna was the attorney for the petitioner. The
case originated from a probate proceeding filed in 1937 by the petitioner to settle
the estate of the deceased. After ten years, the petitioner submitted his accounts
and a project of partition to close the proceedings. The court refused to approve the
project of partition unless all debts, including attorney's fees, were first paid. The
respondent attorney submitted evidence of his services to the court for the fixing of
his compensation without filing a written claim or notifying the interested parties.
The court issued an order awarding the respondent attorney an aggregate sum of
P28,000 for his services. The petitioner was unable to pay the full amount, leading
to the filing of an ex-parte motion for execution by the respondent attorney. The
court granted the motion, resulting in the sale of two parcels of land belonging to a
commercial partnership instead of the testate estate.
Issue:
Whether the order fixing the attorney's fees and subsequent orders were
valid.
Ruling:
No.
The correct procedure for the collection of attorney's fees in administration
proceedings is for the counsel to request the administrator to make payment and
file an action against him in his personal capacity if he fails to pay. If judgment is
rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees in his
account to the court. Alternatively, the attorney may file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceeding, asking the court to allow his claim and direct the
administrator to pay it as an expense of administration.
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In this case, the respondent attorney failed to follow these procedures,
resulting in the nullity of the order fixing his fees.
121. LIU VS. LOY (G.R. No. 145982, July 3, 2003)
Facts:
Teodoro Vaño, acting as attorney-in-fact for Jose Vaño, sold several lots to
Benito Liu, through Frank Liu, and to Cirilo Pangalo. Specifically, Benito Liu bought
Lot Nos. 5, 6, 13, 14, and 15, while Cirilo Pangalo bought Lot Nos. 14 and 15. After
Jose Vaño's death, Benito Liu stopped payments, but when the Supreme Court
validated Jose's will, Teodoro informed Frank Liu that he could transfer the titles to
the buyers upon payment of the remaining balance.
Nine years later, Frank Liu offered to pay the balance for the seven lots and
requested the execution of a deed of sale and delivery of the titles. Despite
repeated demands, Teodoro sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy. Frank then filed a
complaint against Teodoro for specific performance, issuance of titles, and
construction of subdivision roads. A year later, Teodoro sold Lot No. 5 to Alfredo
Loy. Frank's initial complaint was dismissed, but he successfully claimed the lots in
probate court. Milagros Vaño, the administratrix of Jose Vaño’s estate, executed a
deed conveying the seven lots to Frank. However, the probate court also approved
the sales to Teresita and Alfredo Loy, and new titles were issued in their names.
Frank filed a complaint for reconveyance or annulment of the titles for Lot Nos. 5
and 6. The trial court confirmed the rescission of the contract by Teodoro Vaño, and
the Court of Appeals later affirmed this decision.
Issue:
Whether or not prior approval of the probate court is necessary to validate

the sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Loys.
Ruling:
Yes, the prior approval of the probate court is necessary to validate the sale
of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Loys.
Section 8. Rule 89 specifically requires notice to all interested parties in any

application for court approval to convey property contracted by the decedent in his
lifetime. The failure to notify the administratix and other interested person renders
the sale void.
Here, the contracts of the Loys did not convey ownership of the lots to them
as against third persons because there was no approval of the sale by the probate
court and registration with the Register of Deeds. The Court ruled that registration
of the contracts without court approval would be ineffective to bind third persons,
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especially creditors of the estate. Otherwise, this will open the door to fraud on
creditors of the estate.
122. HEIRS OF SANDEJAS VS. LINA (G.R. No. 141634, Feb. 5, 2001)
Facts:
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition, in the lower
court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement
of the estate of his wife, Remedios Sandejas, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1,
1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas. Likewise
on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator. On
November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the
records burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. As a result, he filed a Motion for Reconstitution of the records of the case on
February 9, 1983. On February 16, 1983, the lower court in its Order granted the
said motion.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-
in-intervention was filed by Movant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June
7, 1982, movant and administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller,
bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever
and absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part
of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas. It showed that there was receipt of
money with promise to sell and to buy with the sum of P100,000.00
Issue:
Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to

the property referred to in the subject document which was found to be in the
nature of a contract to sell where court approval was not complied with.
Ruling:
A contract of sale is not validated by the fact that it is subject to probate

court approval. The Transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the
other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the estate of the
deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to
the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court deals with the conveyance of real
property contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Secs. 2 and 4
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of the same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or administrator
the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue such course of action
before the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
Here, the Motion for approval was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation
to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the
settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action - on whether
petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.’s share of the disputed realty - will
unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased
spouses.
123. AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP (G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011)
Facts:
Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City. During his
lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), and
second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and
Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by
three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926. They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile Agtarap Dagoro). At the time of his death, Joaquin
left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City. Joseph, a grandson of
Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself ₱26,000.00 per month since April 1994. Son, Eduardo, of
second marriage filed petition for settlement of Joaquin’s intestate estate and the
RTC issued resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator.
Gloria Agtarap de Santos, one of the children of compulsory heir Jose(second

marriage) in the estate of Joaquin, died on May 4, 1995, was later substituted in the
proceedings above by her husband Walter de Santos. On September 16, 1995,
Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene, alleging that he is
the surviving spouse of the compulsory heir Mercedes Agtarap and the father of
Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and in his answer in intervention. Sebastian, one of the
compulsory heirs of the second marriage, filed a motion to exclude Abelardo Dagoro
and Walter de Santos as heirs, but was denied by the lower court. He points out that
his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA acquired jurisdiction over the estate of Milagros G.

Agtarap and erred in distributing her inheritance from the estate of Joaquin Agtarap
notwithstanding the existence of her last will and testament.
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Ruling:
Yes. As to Sebastian’s and Eduardo’s common issue on the ownership of the

subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction
to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.
Here, the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the
parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by
the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of
whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s
jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
124. CAPISTRANO VS. NADURATA (49 Phil. , 726)
Facts:
The lower court had appointed Justo Buera special administrator; and after a
hearing, it decided the controversy, declaring Leon Nadurata not to be the surviving
spouse of Petra de los Santos and that the latter's nearest relatives are not the
opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos who allege themselves to be,
but are not, brothers of the deceased, but the applicants Capistrano, who are her
true brothers by the same mother. Upon these findings, the lower court confirmed
the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of the estate. From this judgment
Leon Nadurata, Pedro de los Santos, and Juan de los Santos appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the overruling of their opposition to the confirmation of the

appointment of Justo Buera as administrator was correct.
Ruling:
Yes.
The selection of an administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the

discretion of the court (sec. 642, subsec. 1, Code of Civil Procedure). And the record
does not contain anything tending to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower court. On the contrary, the act of the lower court in overruling the objection of
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the opponents and confirming the appointment as administrator of the person
proposed by the applicants is not only indicative of sound discretion, but is right and
just.
125. JIMOGA-ON VS. BELMONTE (G.R. No. L-1605, Sept. 13, 1949)
Facts:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros

Occidental dated June 23, 1947, in relation to the order of July 12, 1947, appointing
the herein petitioner-appellee, Apolonia Jimoga-on, as judicial administratrix of the
estate of Marcelino Belmonte, who died intestate, and failing (a) to adjudge the
herein movants-appellants, Julita and Ulpiano Belmonte, to be acknowledged
natural children of Marcelino Belmonte and (b) to appoint Julita Belmonte as
administratrix of the properties acquired by the deceased Marcelino Belmonte
before his marriage to Apolonia Jimoga-on. Even assuming that the properties
acquired before the marriage are more than those amassed during the period of the
conjugal partnership, the appealed judgment is still tenable, because the six
legitimate children are agreeable to the appointment of the appellee, as against
only the two appellants who claim to be acknowledged natural children. The interest
of the legitimate children is undoubtedly far greater than the participation that may
accrue to the alleged natural children.
Issue:
Whether or not that the lower court erred not making an adjudication to the
effect that the appellants are acknowledged natural children of the deceased
Marcelino Belmonte.
Ruling:
No. In the first place, as pointed out in the appealed order of July 12, 1947,
the matter so far taken up by the lower court was limited to the appointment of the
judicial administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Belmonte. In other words, while no
adjudication was made on the status of the appellants, this fact does riot preclude
future action on the point. In the second place, while the jurisdiction of the probate
court includes the power to entertain the question of whether or not a person is a
natural child acknowledged by the decedent (Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249;
Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091), it is only
after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been
effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are
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entitled by law to the residue. The adjudication sought to be obtained by the
appellants is therefore premature.
126. VDA. DE KILAYKO VS. TENGCO (G.R. No. 45425, March 27, 1992)
Facts:
Maria Lizares y Alunan died on January 28, 1968, leaving a last will and
testament. In her will, Maria bequeathed certain properties to her niece, Eustaquia
Lizares, with a provision that if Eustaquia dies without legitimate descendants, the
properties will be inherited by Maria's siblings. Eustaquia filed a petition for the
settlement of Maria's estate, which was granted by the probate court. A project of
partition was approved, and the properties were distributed to the heirs mentioned
in the project of partition. After Eustaquia's death, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko,
Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (collectively referred to
as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion to reopen the testate estate
proceedings of Maria Lizares, claiming to be conditional substitute heirs of
Eustaquia. They sought to be declared as heirs to certain properties and requested
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens filed by the joint administrators of
Eustaquia's estate. The probate court denied the motion to reopen the proceedings
and granted the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko,
et al. filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the probate court.
They then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the
properties against the joint administrators of Eustaquia's estate. The joint
administrators filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction
over the case and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment. They also
filed a motion for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The probate court
granted the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens and held in abeyance the
resolution of the motion to dismiss. Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a petition for
review on certiorari, challenging the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The
joint administrators filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus,
arguing that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the case and that the cause
of action was barred by res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to settle the claims and
distribute the estate of a deceased person.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the joint administrators. The Court
held that the probate court has jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and
distribute the estate.
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127. SOLIVIO VS. CA (G.R. No. 83484, Feb. 12, 1990)
Facts:
Esteban Javellana, Jr died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving
relatives are his maternal aunt, Celedonia Solivio, and his paternal aunt, Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva. Esteban inherited his properties from his mother, Salustia
Solivio. Before his death, Esteban expressed his desire to place his estate in a
foundation to honor his mother and help indigent students.
After his death, Celedonia and Concordia agreed to carry out this plan.
Celedonia filed a petition for the settlement of the estate and was declared the sole
heir of Esteban. She sold properties of the estate to pay taxes and obligations and
established the “Salustia Solivio Vda. De Javellana Foundation”to fulfill Esteban”s
wishes. Concordia filed a motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole
heir and to be declared a co-heir. When her motion was denied, Concordia filed a
separate action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain an action for
partition while probate proceedings were still pending.
Ruling:
No.
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts
an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties
(Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's

contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there
being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's
inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings.
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128. ANCHETA VS. GUERSAY-DALAYGON (G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006)
Facts:
Audrey O'Neill Guersey, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, had a
will that bequeathed her entire estate to her husband, Richard Guersey, who was
also designated as the executor. The will was admitted to probate in the United
States. Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta was appointed as the ancillary administrator of
Audrey's estate in the Philippines. Richard later married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon and had two children with her. When Richard died, his will bequeathed his
entire estate to Candelaria, except for his rights and interests over certain shares of
stock. The will was also admitted to probate in the United States. Atty. William
Quasha was appointed as the ancillary administrator of Richard's estate in the
Philippines. Atty. Ancheta filed a motion in Special Proceeding No. 9625 to declare
Richard and Kyle Guersey (Audrey's adopted daughter) as heirs of Audrey. Atty.
Ancheta filed a project of partition, which was approved by the trial court. The court
ordered the transfer of the Makati property and other assets to Richard and Kyle.
Candelaria opposed the project of partition, arguing that under the law of the State
of Maryland (where Audrey was domiciled), Richard should receive the entire estate.
The trial court agreed with Candelaria and adjudicated Richard's entire 3/4
undivided interest in the Makati property to her. Candelaria filed a complaint for the
annulment of the trial court's orders, alleging that Atty. Ancheta committed
extrinsic fraud by disregarding the laws of Maryland and distributing the estate
contrary to Audrey's will. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of Candelaria,
annulling the trial court's orders and ordering the adjudication of the entire estate in
favor of Richard's estate. Atty. Ancheta filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's orders had become final
and executory and could no longer be annulled. Atty. Ancheta claimed that he acted
in good faith and did not commit fraud in the performance of his duties as ancillary
administrator.
Issue:
Whether the trial court's orders can be annulled due to extrinsic fraud committed by
Atty. Ancheta in distributing the estate contrary to Audrey's will and the laws of
Maryland.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision to annul the trial court's
orders and ordered the adjudication of the entire estate in favor of Richard's estate.
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Atty. Ancheta's failure to distribute Audrey's estate according to her will and the
laws of Maryland amounted to extrinsic fraud.
129. MARI VS. BONILIA (G.R. No. L-852, March 19, 1949)
Facts:
Plaintiffs sought to recover their combined 3/4 share in a parcel of land sold
to defendants by Deogracias Evangelista, a co-owner of the land with the plaintiffs.
Land originally registered in the name of Casimiro Evangelista, married to Leonida
Mari and had two children with her, Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista. Casimiro
Evangelista died intestate in 1938. Deogracias Evangelista claimed to be the sole
heir of Casimiro Evangelista and sold the property to the defendants in 1944.
Defendants assumed possession of the land and obtained a new title in their names.
Issue:
Can the defendants claim to be innocent purchasers for value and be

protected by the principle of good faith?
Ruling:
No.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting the defendants' claim of
being innocent purchasers for value. The defendants could not rely on the theory of
indefeasibility of Torrens title.
The defendants were not protected by the partition order and could still be
held liable for depriving the plaintiffs of their lawful share. Good faith only protects
purchasers for value from the registered owner. The defendants' grantor was not a
registered owner, and the certificate of title did not indicate that he owned the land.
130. MONTEMAYOR VS. GUTIERREZ (114 Phil. 95)
Facts:
The case involves the intestate estate of Clodualdo Vitug. Donata

Montemayor is the administratrix-appellant responsible for settling the estate. The
attorney's fees for the estate were supposed to be paid by the administratrix from
the estate. However, the estate had already been distributed to the heirs of
Clodualdo Vitug.
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Issue:
Should the administratrix be held personally liable for the attorney's fees, or
should the heirs be responsible for paying the fees in proportion to their shares
received?
Ruling:
Yes. The administratrix is held responsible for paying the attorney's fees from
the estate to the heirs in proportion to their shares received.The court reasoned
that since the administratrix had contracted the services of the deceased counsel,
she was indirectly responsible for the payment of his fees. Therefore, the
administratrix, Donata Montemayor, was declared responsible for paying the fees to
the heirs in proportion to their shares received.
131. LUZON SURETY VS. QUEBRAR (G.R. No. L-40517, Jan. 31, 1984)
Facts:
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar
as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and
Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after executing an indemnity agreement where
both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55,
the defendants paid the premiums and the documnetary stamps. In 1957, the Court
approved the project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments
of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year when the court
granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff
file a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since the bonds
were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court on questions of law.
Issue:
Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962?
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of COurt, the administrator is required to
put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the
estate. It is conditioned uponthe faithful performance of the administrator's trust.
Hence, the surety is then liable udner the administrator's bond.
Even after the approved project of partitio, Quebrar as administrator still had
something to do. The administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate
and the distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
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the determination of all the assets of the estate and the payment of all debts and
expenses. it appears that there are still deblts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
132. PALICTE VS. RAMOLETE (G.R. No. L-55076, Sept. 21, 1987)
Facts:
The case involved a sale at public auction held on July 5, 1979, pursuant to a
writ of execution issued by the respondent judge in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. v.
Marcelo Sotto, Administrator. Several properties belonging to the late Don Filemon
Sotto were levied upon and sold. Within the redemption period, Matilde S. Palicte,
as one of the heirs, redeemed four lots for the sum of P60,000.00. Palicte filed a
motion with the respondent judge to transfer the titles of the redeemed properties
to her name, but this motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in the case.
The lower court declared the deed of redemption null and void and denied Palicte's
motion.
Issue:
Whether Palicte, as a declared heir, could validly exercise the right of
redemption under Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
Yes. Paclite has a right to redeem the properties.
The interest of the heirs in preserving the estate and recovering its properties
is greater than that of the administrator.
In this case, Palicte qualified as a successor-in-interest under the law as a
legitimate heir, and therefore had an inchoate interest in the property from the
moment of the decedent's death.
133. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN (G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896, March 29, 1974)
Facts:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made
a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she
died. In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die,
said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister. In December 1962,
Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer
of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on
the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will
but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d
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like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the
motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for
the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition. Eventually, the probate
of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually also, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. Magno refused to turn over the
estate. Magno contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien
testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed
by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected
regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).
Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties
failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what
the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence
that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however
emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and
not said law at any other time).
134. VDA. DE ALBERTO VS. CA (G.R. No. L-29759, May 18, 1989)
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate
of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto had already been terminated in November 1953
by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also declared who
are the heirs of the deceased. Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already
barred by prior judgment despite respondent's insistence that he had no knowledge
or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father.
Issue:
Whether or not the final liquidation can be set aside.
Ruling:
Yes.
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have
a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond
his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
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Hence, being the case, Antonio J. Alberto Jr. is entitled to his share of
decedent’s estate, setting aside the liquidation, in the process.
135. RALLA VS. JUDGE UNTALAN, LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND
MARINELLA RALLA
Facts:
The properties involved in this case were the subject of the project of
partition signed by both the petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla;; the lower court
approved the said project of partition on December 19, 1967; subsequently, Pablo
and Pedro Ralla jointly manifested that they had already received "the ownership
and possession of the respective parcels of land adjudicated to them in the said
project of partition," and upon their motion, the lower court Judge declared the
partition case closed and terminated on December 29, 1967; there was no appeal
made from this decision within the reglementary period to do so, consequently, it
attained finality.
Issue:
Can the validity of the approval of the partition and distribution be attacked
after receipt of share?
Ruling:
No, as the distribution and receipt of share forecloses attack on its validity.
Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment
of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully
been carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they
are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it.
Hence, partition and distribution in this case is deemed to have attained
finality.
136. GUY VS. CA (G.R. No. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006)
Facts:
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and
children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private
respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. In his Comment/Opposition petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that
his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents
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should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of
Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Can the probate court determine the issue of filiation of claimant?
Ruling:
Yes.
Case law provides that there is no absolute necessity requiring that the
action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases.
Here, the court is not precluded from receiving evidence to determine the
filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters
administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the
settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included.
137. QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN
BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE, VS. LCN
CONSTRUCTION CORP. (G.R. No. 174873, Aug. 26, 2008)
Facts:
Raymond Triviere passed away. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha of the Quasha
Law Office, represented the widow and children of the deceased as they were
appointed by the court as administrators. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation expenses. LCN
Construction Corp., the only remaining claimant opposed, arguing that its claims are
still outstanding and chargeable against the estate; thus, no distribution should be
allowed until they have been paid; especially considering that as of date of filing,
the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to
PHP6M as against the remaining assets of the estate of PHP 4M, rendering the latter
insolvent.
Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in permitting advance distribution of estate.
Ruling:
Yes.
The RTC may permit the advance distribution of the estate, if the following
are complied: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending
controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule
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109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate ( Section 1, Rule 90).
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and
widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations,
complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. The RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance
distribution of the same.
138. PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 133000,
Oct. 2, 2001
Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners
of a parcel of land located in Manila (TCT No. 11889). Upon the death of Graciana,
Graciano, together with his 6 children, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate. TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and 6
children.
Further, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision

of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then
donated to his children leaving only 447.60 square meters registered his name
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, it was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the registered under TCT No. 107442, which was sold to a 3rd
person and the second under TCT No. 107443.
Graciano married petitioner Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
2nd land to his wife Natcher. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his
six childre, as heirs. Private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death,
petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery
by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein. Thus, as
a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired. Natcher
averred that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, under the law, she was
likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. RTC of Manila held in favor of
Natcher stating that although, the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of
Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased. CA reversed and set aside the
lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs.
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Ruling:
No. The Court concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the
instant petition.
An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term “special proceeding” may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion.”
The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction,
is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of
advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not,
to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted
as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
139. TABUADA VS. RUIZ FACTS (G.R. No. 168799, June 27, 2008)
Facts:
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate, trial court
issued the following Order: In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein
and their respective counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable
settlement, finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be
setting the pending incidents for hearing as the parties and their counsel have
assured this Court that they are going to submit a “Motion for Judgment Based On
An Amicable Settlement” on or before 25 December 2004. The RTC, invoking
Section 3,[5] Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the proceedings on account
of the parties’ failure to submit the amicable settlement and to comply with its
Order.
Issue:
Was the termination of the case premature?
Ruling:
Yes.
While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural
sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. The case
should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the
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mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the
Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement.
The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio
dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the
court, cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination
of the proceedings herein. The RTC, in its Order, neither required the submission of
the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the
parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their
case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring
compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the
rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced
to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not
obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an
amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on
an erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.
140. PASTOR, JR. VS. CA. (G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983)
Facts:
Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish subject, passed away in Cebu City on June 5,
1966. He was survived by his Spanish wife, Sofia Bossio (who died later that year),
their two legitimate children, Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (a naturalized Filipino citizen) and
Sofia Pastor de Midgely (a Spanish subject), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn
Barlito Quemada (a Filipino citizen). On November 13, 1970, Quemada filed a
petition for the probate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr.'s holographic will, which was contested
by Pastor, Jr. and Sofia Pastor de Midgely.
Issue:
Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the formalities
required by law.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court held that the primary issue in a probate proceeding is the
extrinsic validity of the will. The probate court's role is to determine if the testator,
Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed the will freely and in compliance with legal formalities,
rather than resolving questions of ownership of the estate's properties. The court
ruled that questions of ownership are extraneous to probate proceedings and must
be resolved in separate proceedings.
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The court approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity
but clarified that the determination of property ownership was provisional. The
probate court could pass upon title only to decide whether certain properties should
be included in the inventory, but such determination is not final and is subject to a
separate action to resolve title disputes conclusively.
141.RCBC VS. HI-TRI DEV. CORP., ET. AL. (G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012)
Facts:
Luz Bakunawa and her husband, Manuel Bakunawa, were the registered
owners of six parcels of land sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). In 1990, Teresita Millan, through her representative Jerry
Montemayor, offered to purchase these lots for ₱6,724,085.71. The Bakunawas
provided the owner’s copies of the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and received
a down payment of ₱1,019,514.29. However, Millan failed to clear the preliminary
obstacles to complete the sale, leading the Bakunawas to rescind the agreement
and offer a refund of the down payment, which Millan refused.
Consequently, Hi-Tri Development Corporation (Hi-Tri), through which the

Bakunawas managed their assets, obtained a manager’s check from RCBC-Ermita
for the amount of ₱1,019,514.29, payable to Millan's company, Rosmil Realty and
Development Corporation. This check was part of the basis for a complaint filed by
the Bakunawas against Millan and Montemayor in the RTC of Quezon City. On
January 31, 2003, without the knowledge of Hi-Tri or the Bakunawas, RCBC reported
the amount as unclaimed to the Bureau of Treasury. This led to escheat
proceedings, declaring the funds as property of the Republic.
Issue:
Whether or not the escheat of the account in RCBC is proper.
Ruling:
No, the escheat of the account in RCBC is not proper.
Manager’s checks are special types of bills of exchange drawn by the bank
itself and accepted in advance. However, the mere issuance of such a check does
not automatically transfer funds to the payee’s account. Effective delivery of the
check is necessary. Moreover, under Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
a contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until the
instrument is delivered with the intent to give effect to it. Since the manager’s
check was never delivered or presented for payment, no transfer of funds occurred.
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RCBC confirmed that the manager’s check was never negotiated or
presented for payment, and the allocated funds remained with the bank. Hence, the
funds were still part of Hi-Tri’s account. The bank should have informed Hi-Tri about
the inactivity of the account for over ten years and that it might be subjected to
escheat proceedings if left unclaimed. The failure to notify deprived Hi-Tri of due
process.
142. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. CA, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 143483, Jan. 31,
2002
Facts:
Elizabeth Hankins died intestate in 1985, leaving two parcels of land without
any apparent heirs. Consequently, the Republic of the Philippines filed for escheat
of the estate, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City granted the petition
in 1989, ordering the estate escheated in favor of the state. In 1997, Amada Solano
filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming
that she had newly discovered deeds of donation from Hankins. These deeds
purportedly transferred the properties to Solano before Hankins's death, but they
were not presented during the initial escheat proceedings
Issue:
Whether or not Solano’s petition to annul the escheat judgment based on the
discovery of the deeds of donation should prosper.
Ruling:
No, the petition should not prosper.
Escheat is a sovereign act allowing the state to claim property left by an

intestate decedent without heirs to prevent unlawful appropriation by others. The
law sets specific conditions and time limits for challenging such claims to ensure
stability and finality in property matters. A judgment in escheat proceedings, once
rendered by a competent court with proper notice, is conclusive against all parties.
Solano's delayed assertion of her rights, based on newly discovered evidence, did
not justify nullifying a long-final judgment.
The deeds of donation presented by Solano were insufficient to overturn the

escheat judgment. The properties were part of Hankins's estate at her death, and
the earlier court decision remained firm due to the lack of valid claims or convincing
proof of prior transfer.
143. TAN VS. CITY OF DAVAO (G.R. No. L-44347, Sept. 29, 1988)
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Facts:
In 1923, Dominga Garcia left for China with her three children and remained
there until her death in 1955. She left behind a titled property in Davao City. None
of her children returned to claim the property, which was managed by Ramon
Pizarro. In 1962, the City of Davao filed a petition to escheat Garcia's estate. Pizarro
opposed this petition, claiming to be the attorney-in-fact for Vicenta Tan, one of
Garcia's children. He stated that Vicenta had instructed him to take care of the
property as she intended to return to claim it. The trial court declared Garcia and
her children presumptively dead and ordered the escheat of the property to the City
of Davao. Pizarro appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal, passed away.
Subsequently, Luis Tan, claiming to be Garcia’s son, filed a motion to intervene,
stating that he had been living in China and was now able to return to the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not an escheat court may validly declare the presumptive death
of a person in the course of escheat proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes, the escheat court can declare the presumptive death of a person as an
incident of escheat proceedings.
The Supreme Court affirmed that while a petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death cannot be entertained if it is the sole issue, courts can declare
an absentee presumptively dead in connection with the settlement of their estate,
including escheat proceedings. The Court found the testimonies presented by
Pizarro and his witnesses not credible, and the deeds of donation insufficient to
overturn the escheat judgment. The Court emphasized that claims against an
escheated estate must be filed within a five-year prescriptive period. Solano’s claim,
filed more than seven years after the escheat judgment, was barred.
Here, the deeds of donation presented by Solano were insufficient to overturn

the escheat judgment. The properties were part of Hankins’s estate at her death,
and the earlier court decision remained firm due to the lack of valid claims or
convincing proof of prior transfer.
144. LUIS MANESE VS. SPS. DIOSCORO VELASCO, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 164024,
Jan. 29, 2009)
Facts:
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On August 31, 1999, Luis B. Manese and others filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents before the RTC of Lucena
City. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that petitioners lacked
legal personality to file the complaint as the property in question belonged to the
public domain. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss, stating that only the Solicitor
General could bring an action for the cancellation of a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on its basis. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC's decision. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners had the legal standing to file a complaint for the
annulment of title of foreshore land.
Ruling:
No.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real party in
interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the one entitled to the avails of the suit.
The subject property, being foreshore land, is part of the public domain,
making the Republic of the Philippines the real party in interest, as stipulated in
Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Actions for the reversion of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon must be instituted by the Solicitor General
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Prescription and laches do not bar
actions filed by the State to recover its property acquired through fraud by private
individuals. The petitioners are not the real parties in interest, and thus, the
dismissal of the complaint by the trial court and the ruling of the Court of Appeals
were affirmed. The petitioners were advised to lodge their complaint with the
Bureau of Lands for administrative investigation under Section 91 of The Public
Land Act.
145. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. CFI OF MANILA (G.R. No. L-30381, Aug.
30, 1988)
Facts:
President Roxas Rural Bank (PRRB) and some other 30 banks, forwarded to
the Treasurer of the Philippines separate statements under oath all deposits and
credits held by the said bank in favor, or in the names of such depositors or
creditors known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have not
made further deposits or withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more
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pursuant to the provision under Section 2 of RA 3936 known as the Unclaimed
Balance law.
Upon receipt of the sworn statements, the Treasurer of the Philippines

caused its publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The
RP then instituted before the CFI Manila a complaint for escheat against the 31
banks including the PRRB and including the creditor and depositors were named
defendants that were included in the reported sworn statements. The PRRB then
filed a motion to dismiss before the CFI on the ground of improper venue and was
granted by the said court. Petitioner opposed and appealed the order on pure
question of law.
Issue :
Whether or not PRRB is a real party in interest in the escheat proceedings.
Ruling:
No.
A real party in interest has been defined as the party who would benefit or be
injured by the judgment of the suit of the party entitled to avail of the suit.
The said bank will be deprived of the use of such deposits whenever the
deposits shall be escheated in favor of the government. It is also provided under the
Act No. 3936 Section 3 that the bank shall be joined as parties together with the
depositors and creditors and therefore the PRRB is a real party in interest.
146. MUNICIPALITY OF MAGALLON NEGROS OCC. VS. BEZORE (G.R. No. L-

14157, Oct. 26, 1960)
Facts:
Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy, siblings, Americans, and residents of
California, USA, both died in 1936. They have properties in Magallon, Isabela and La
Castellana, Negros Occidental. In 1957, the two municipalities petitioned for the
properties of the Fallon siblings to be escheated in their favor. The petition was
admitted and the order for hearing was published. Ignatius Bezore and several
others filed an opposition claiming that they are heirs of the Fallon siblings. They
even presented evidence that Anne left a will which was admitted to probate in
1937. The trial court then dismissed the escheat proceedings but also denied
Bezore’s prayer to distribute the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court is correct in refusing to distribute the estate.
Ruling:
Yes.
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
These proceedings were instituted as escheat proceedings and not for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. The court acquired jurisdiction to
hear the petition for escheat by virtue of the publication of the petition for escheat.
The jurisdiction acquired cannot be converted into one for the distribution of the
properties of the said decedents. For such proceedings (for the distribution of the
estate of the decedents) to be instituted, the proper parties must be presented and
the proceedings should comply with the requirements of the Rule.
147. GO POCO GROCERY VS. PACIFIC BISCUIT CO. (G.R. No. L-43697 & L-
442200, March 31, 1938
Facts:
The case involves the liquidation of the Mercantile Bank of China.
The Bank Commissioner petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to declare
the bank in liquidation due to the risk of suffering losses and prejudicing its
depositors and customers. The court approved the liquidation and appointed a
commissioner and referee to receive the claims of the creditors. The claimants,
including Gopoco Grocery, Tiong Chui Gion, Tan Locko, Woo & Lo & Co., Sy Guan
Huat, and La Bella Tonde a, presented their claims for current account and savings
deposits.
Issue:
Whether or not the claimants' deposits should be considered preferred
credits or ordinary credits.
Ruling:
The claimants' deposits are considered ordinary credits.The deposits have
lost their character as deposits and are converted into simple commercial loans.
The claimants themselves admitted that the bank had been paying them interest,
which is only done in the case of loans. Therefore, the court held that the deposits
should be considered ordinary credits.
148. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ET.
AL. (G.R. No. 158230, July 16, 2008)
Facts:
The case involves the Republic of the Philippines seeking to revert ownership
of Lot No. 398, which was sold to a Chinese citizen named Lee Liong in March 1936.
After Lee Liong's death, the lot was transferred by succession to his widow and
sons, who eventually transferred it to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee and
Pacita Yu-Lee, who are Filipino citizens. The Republic of the Philippines filed a
complaint for reversion of title against the private respondents and the Register of
Deeds of Roxas City, seeking to set aside the sale of Lot No. 398 and revert it to the
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public domain. The trial court ordered the reversion of the lot to the State, but the
Court of Appeals reversed this decision and declared the private respondents as the
absolute and lawful owners of the lot.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents, as Filipino citizens, have acquired a
valid title over Lot No. 398 despite the initial sale to a Chinese citizen.
Ruling:
Yes. The private respondents acquired the lot through succession from Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen who initially purchased the lot. The Court denied the
petition for reversion and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
149. FRANCISCO VS. CA (G.R. No. L-57438, Jan. 31, 1984)
Facts:
Feliciano Francisco, initially the guardian of incompetent Estefania San Pedro,
was challenged for his guardianship by Pelagio Francisco and two others, claiming
closer familial ties to the ward. They alleged Feliciano’s failure to submit an
accurate estate inventory and to provide regular accounting. Despite submitting an
accounted inventory, Feliciano was accused of misrepresenting the sale proceeds of
a real property, leading to a court order for his replacement. The trial court
transitioned from removing Feliciano due to financial discrepancies to citing his
“advanced age” as the primary reason. Feliciano’s appeal was ignored, and Pelagio
was appointed as the new guardian amidst the ongoing appeal process. The Court
of Appeals (CA) dismissed Feliciano’s certiorari petition, underscoring the trial
court’s discretion on execution pending appeal and the necessity of Feliciano’s
immediate replacement due to his age and previous conduct.
Issue:
Whether the removal of Feliciano Francisco as guardian based on his
“advanced age” justifies the immediate execution of the guardian replacement
decision pending appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. A guardian may be removed for reasons including, but not limited to,
incapacity, unsuitability, wastage or mismanagement of the estate, and failure to
account or return.
150. IBANEZ DE ALDECOA VS. HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORP.

(30, Phil. 233)
Facts:
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Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation filed a lawsuit against Aldecoa &
Co., Joaquin Ibañez de Aldecoa y Palet, Zoilo Ibañez de Aldecoa y Palet, Cecilia
Ibañez de Aldecoa y Palet, and Isabel Palet de Gabarro. The purpose of the lawsuit
was to recover an amount due from Aldecoa & Co. and enforce the liability of the
other defendants as partners of the firm. The court entered a judgment in favor of
the bank, ordering the defendants to pay the amount owed and foreclosing the
mortgages. The defendants and an intervener appealed the decision.
Issue:
Is another action pending for the annulment of a mortgage a bar to an action

for foreclosure?
Ruling:
No. Another action pending for the annulment of a mortgage is not a bar to
an action for foreclosure. Mortgagors, in an action to foreclose, unsuccessfully
pleaded in abatement their pending action to annul the mortgage, which had been
submitted. Held that the ruling, even if erroneous, became harmless in view of a
judgment in the earlier action by which the validity of the mortgage was correctly
sustained.
151. OROPESA VS. OROPESA (G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012
Facts:
Nilo Oropesa filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of his father
on the ground that his father, due to his advanced age, is not sane enough or is
incompetent to manage his properties. Nilo alleged that Cirilo has been sickly for
ten years, had took out an unneeded loan, had failed to manage and maintain his
house, failed to pay realty taxes, sold his car for no reason, withdrew a substantial
amount from a joint account without the consent of the joint account owner (a
sibling of Nilo), tried to stab himself once, and has been allowing his girlfriend to
ransack his house. Cirilo opposed the petition. Nilo presented evidence but he failed
to make a formal offer of evidence. Eventually, Cirilo filed a demurrer to evidence
which was granted. Nilo is now appealing on the ground that the dismissal is wrong
because he has overwhelming evidence against Cirilo.
Issue:
Whether Nilo was able to prove the incompetence of Cirilo.
Ruling:
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3A
No, Nilo wasn’t able to prove the incompetence of Cirilo.
A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive

and definite evidence.Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice. In this case, the court found Cirilo to
be sharp, alert, and able.
Here, Nilo’s evidence was not admitted because he failed to offer them. Even
if admitted, those documentary evidence (ownership documents) are not material in
proving the alleged incompetence of Cirilo. So his only evidences against Cirilo was
testimonial evidence which failed to convince the court.
152. ALAMAYRI VS. PABALE (G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008)
Facts:
Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision. Cesnando
Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific
Performance with Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of
land which the former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'.
However, Nave allegedly reneged on their agreement when she refused to accept
the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale
siblings. Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a
guardianship proceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be
incompetent. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the
grounds that Nave was found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings
intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the
Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave
dated February 20, 1984. Hence this petition. Petitioner alleged that since Nave
was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that she subsequently
entered into should be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata.
Ruling:
No, the declaration of incompetency does not constitute res judicata.
The Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res
judicata, namely; 1)bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgment.
Bar by previous judgment means that the judgment in the first case will bar the
second case due to the identity of parties, subject-matter, and cause of action.
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
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Here, there was no identity of parties and issues between the special
proceeding on the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision on the
former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of
judgment the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and
had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor
of the Pabale siblings.
153. NILO OROPESA VS. CIRILO OROPOSA (G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012)
- CASE NOT FOUND
Doctrine: The finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear,

positive, and definite evidence. With the failure of the petitioner to formally offer his
documentary evidence, his proof consisted purely of testimonies. These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient
to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant
the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
154. NELSON CABALES, ET. AL. VS. CA, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 162421, Aug. 31,
2007)
Facts:
Rufino Cabales originally owned a parcel of land. Rufino passed away, leaving
the property to his wife Saturnina and their six children, including petitioners Nelson
Cabales and Rito Cabales. In 1971, three of the siblings (Bonifacio, Albino, and
Alberto) sold the land to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido with the right to repurchase
within eight years. The proceeds of the sale were divided among the siblings, and
Alberto secured a note from Dr. Corrompido for a separate amount. In 1972, Alberto
died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson. On December 18, 1975, within the
eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of
P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of
sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son,
Alberto, including his "vale" of P300.00. On the same day, Saturnina and her four
children sold the land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano.
The Register of Deeds then issued a title in the name of the respondents. In
1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that
petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-
spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelson's late father Alberto, i.e.,
P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his
"vale" of P300.00. And in 1986, petitioner Rito acknowledged receipt of his share of
the proceeds from the sale. In 1933, petitioner Nelson expressed his intention to
redeem the land during a barangay conciliation process. Thereafter, he filed a
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complaint for redemption and damages. The trial court ruled against petitioners.
The Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, recognizing petitioner
Nelson as a co-owner but denying him the right of legal redemption. The court also
recognized petitioner Rito as a co-owner but held that he had already received his
share of the proceeds. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian in behalf of the minors
were binding upon them.
Ruling:
Yes.
However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides that: Section 1. To what guardianship shall
extend. A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his
ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as
the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the
management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other
than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the
minor's property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the
latter's pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do
so.
155. PARCO & BAUTISTA VS. CA (G.R. No. L-33152, Jan. 30, 1982)
Facts:
The case originated from Special Proceedings No. 2641, a guardianship

proceeding for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez. The case was initially filed
before Branch I-Lucena, CFI of Quezon but was later transferred to Branch IV-
Calauag of the same court and province. The presiding judge of Branch I, Lucena
issued orders for the transfer of the case back to its court and the submission of an
inventory and accounting of the ward's properties. The respondent judge of Branch
IV continued to take further action on the case, ordering the petitioners to reconvey
the three parcels of land to the private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge had the authority to take further action on the
case after the presiding judge of Branch I-Lucena had asserted its jurisdiction over
it.
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Ruling:
No. The respondent judge had no power or authority to retain jurisdiction

over the case after the presiding judge of Branch I-Lucena had resumed its
jurisdiction. A guardianship court cannot order the delivery of embezzled or
concealed property to the ward. The determination of ownership should be
determined in a separate ordinary action.
156. EDUARDO ABAD VS. LEONARDO BIASON, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 191993,
Dec. 5, 2012)
Facts:
Petition for guardianship filed by Eduardo Abad over his elderly aunt, Maura
Abad. Filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dagupan City. Alleged that Maura,
over 90 years old and residing in Mangaldan, Pangasinan, needs a guardian due to
her advanced age and declining health. RTC denied Eduardo Abad's petition and
appointed Leonardo Biason as Maura's guardian instead. Eduardo Abad appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Argued that he had all the qualifications
to be Maura's guardian and that the RTC erred in disqualifying him based on his
residence.
CA affirmed the RTC's decision, stating that Biason, who is also a nephew of
Maura, had no disqualifications and that Eduardo Abad's appointment was not
necessary. Eduardo Abad filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
the CA. Filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. Before the
Supreme Court could resolve the petition, Biason passed away, rendering the issues
raised in the case moot and academic. Maura filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
which Eduardo Abad supported. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss,
stating that the death of Biason made it impractical and futile to proceed with
resolving the merits of the case. The petition was dismissed, and the relationship of
guardian and ward between Biason and Maura was terminated.
Issue:
Whether pr notthe death of Biason rendered the issues raised in the case
moot and academic.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition.
The death of Biason, who was appointed as Maura's guardian by the RTC, rendered
the issues raised in the case moot and academic.
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157. IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF CARMEN VDA. DE BENGSON VS.

PNB (G.R. No. L-17066, Dec. 28, 1961)
Facts:
Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson is entitled to insurance benefits as the

mother of a deceased veteran. The Veterans Administration filed a petition to
declare Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson was incompetent and appointed the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as her guardian. The court granted the petition and
appointed PNB as the guardian of her estate. Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson filed
a petition to terminate the guardianship, claiming that she had regained her
competence. The Veterans Administration opposed the petition, arguing that she
was still incompetent due to her advanced age and physical and mental debility.
Francisco Bengson, the son of Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson, filed a
manifestation stating that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent and
requested to be appointed as the guardian of her estate. The lower court granted
the petition and appointed Francisco Bengson as the guardian, removing PNB as the
guardian.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court had legal grounds to remove PNB as the
guardian of Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson's estate.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PNB and reversed the lower court's
decision. A guardian cannot be legally removed from office except for the causes
enumerated in the Rules of Court.
The grounds for removal include the guardian becoming insane, incapable of
discharging their trust, unsuitable for the trust, wasting or mismanaging the estate,
or failing to render an account or make a return for thirty days after it is due.
Conflict of interest has also been recognized as a sufficient ground for removal.
The court's discretion in removing a guardian is limited to determining

whether any of the grounds for removal exist. In this case, there was no legal
ground for the removal of PNB as the guardian.
158. DIOSDADO MANUNGAS VS. MARGARITA LORETO, ET. AL. (G.R. No.
193161, Aug. 22, 2011)
Facts:
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Engracia Manungas, wife of Florentino Manungas, filed a Motion for Partition
of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino. Engracia stated that
there were no other legal heirs except for herself, Samuel David Avila (adopted
son), and Ramon Manungas. Avila's widow executed a Waiver of Rights and
Participation, renouncing her rights over her husband's separate property in favor of
Engracia. A Decree of Final Distribution was issued, distributing the properties to
Engracia and Ramon. Parre o, the niece of Engracia, was appointed as the Judicial
Guardian of Engracia's properties and person. Engracia filed a case against the
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and
damages. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of Engracia, and the
decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on appeal.
Diosdado, claiming to be the illegitimate son of Florentino, filed a petition for

the issuance of letters of administration over Engracia's estate. Parre o and Loreto
opposed the petition, arguing that Diosdado was not qualified to be the
administrator and that he was a debtor of the estate. The RTC initially appointed
Parre o as the special administrator, but later reversed its decision and appointed
Diosdado instead. The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the RTC erred in revoking
Parre o's appointment and appointing Diosdado as the special administrator. The CA
declared the RTC's order null and void and reinstated Parre o as the special
administrator.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Diosdado as the special administrator was

valid.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals' decision to set aside the RTC's order and reinstate
Parre o as the special administrator is affirmed. The appointment of a special
administrator is within the discretion of the court and should be based on reason,
and equity.
159. DE LEON VS. LORENZO (G.R. No. L-23096, April 27, 1972)
Facts:
Parcel of land in Malaking Kahoy, Paranaque Rizal was sold by the widow of
the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo who is Bienvenida de la Isla, to the spouses Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. The children of Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la
Isla - challenged the validity of the sale. The children argued that they were not
informed of the transaction and that the guardianship proceeding, which authorized
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the sale, was conducted without notifying the two elder children who were over 14
years of age.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the property belonging to the minors is null and
void due to the failure to notify the two elder children.
Ruling:
Yes. The sale of the property belonging to the minors is null and void due to
the failure to notify the two elder children.
The supreme Court emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of
minors and the role of the State as parens patriae in safeguarding their welfare. The
Coourt held the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon accountable for their
knowledge that the vendor could not sell more than she rightfully could dispose of.
The failure to notify the two elder children in the guardianship proceeding
was a jurisdictional infirmity that rendered the sale null and void.
160. NAPOLEON NERI, ET. AL. VS. HEIRS OF HADJI UY, ET. AL. (G.R. No.
194366, Oct. 10, 2012)
Facts:
Anunciacion Neri had seven children from her two marriages. After her death,
her second husband and their five children executed an extrajudicial settlement of
her estate, including the homestead properties. These properties were then sold to
the heirs of spouses Hadju Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy. In this extrajudicial
settlement, two of Anunciacion’s children from her first marriage were excluded
from the settlement and sale. The excluded heirs then filed a complaint for
annulment of the sale claiming a deprivation of their inheritance.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement and sale is valid.
Ruling:
No, the extrajudicial settlement and sale is not valid.
The extrajudicial settlement was declared null and void because it excluded
certain heirs and violated the provisions of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Legitimate
children and their descendants inherit from their parents in equal shares.
A person can only sell what they own or are authorized to sell. The
subsequent sale is only valid with respect to the shares of the heirs who
participated in the settlement. The excluded heirs are still entitled to their legitimes
and their shares in the properties should be returned to them.
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161. LINDAIN VS. ILA (G.R. No. 95305, Aug. 20, 1992)
Facts:
In November 1966, the mother Dolores Luluquisin, acting as guardian of her
minor children, sold the land to Spouses Apolinia Valiente and Federico Ila for P2k
under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered land. The sale was made without
judicial approval. Respondents admitted that they bought the property from the
petitioner’s mother, knowing that she did not have the authority to sell the property
without the court approval.
RTC declared the sale null and void, and ordered the respondents to
surrender the title and the issuance of new title in the petitioner’s name. CA
reversed the decision and upheld the validity of sale.
Issue:
Whether or not judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minor’s
property by their mother
Ruling:
YES, SC granted the petition for review and reinstated the decision of RTC.
Court held that a parent, acting merely as the legal administrator of the
property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of or alienate
the property without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the parents as legal
administrators are only limited to possession and management.
The court rejected respondents’ claim of being purchasers in good faith, as
they knew from the beginning that the petitioner’s mother did not have judicial
authority to sell the property. Court ruled that the minor’s action for reconveyance
had not yet prescribed, as real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
162. GUY VS. CA (G.R. No. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006)
Facts:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima
Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that
they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate.
The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner
who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may
be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint
motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have
been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason
of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and
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educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities. The lower court
denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that
the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not
have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the
certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards.
Ruling:
No.
Repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the
court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been
authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void.
Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed
right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent.
It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to
the petitioner, the latter do not have.
163. CHUA VS. MAPALO (CV-61647, May 13, 1985)
Facts:
Spouses Miguel Mapalo and Candida Quiba were registered owners of a

residential land in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They donated the eastern half of the land
to Miguel's brother, Maximo Mapalo, out of love and affection. However, they were
deceived into signing a deed of absolute sale over the entire land in Maximo's favor,
believing it to be a deed of donation. The deed stated a consideration of Five
Hundred Pesos, but the spouses did not receive anything of value for the land.
Maximo Mapalo registered the deed of sale and obtained a Transfer Certificate of
Title over the entire land. Thirteen years later, he sold the land to the Narciso
family, who took possession of the eastern portion of the land.
Issue:
Is the deed of sale null and void as to the western portion of the land due to
the absence of consideration?
Ruling:
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
Yes. Contracts without a cause or consideration produce no effect under the
Civil Code. The deed of sale stated a consideration of Five Hundred Pesos, but there
was no actual payment made by the purchaser to the vendor.
164. O'LACO and HUCO LUNA vs. CO CHO CHIT, G.R. No. 58010. March 31,
1993
Facts:
This case involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land.
Philippine Sugar Estate sold a parcel of land to petitioner-spouse a subsequent TCT
was issued in the latter’s favor in 1943. In May 1960, Respondents herein
discovered that petitioner sold the subject property to the Archbishop of Manila.
Respondents filed a case to recover the purchase price, they argued that petitioner
merely held the property in trust, and that she had no right to sell such property
because such property was only placed under her name. To be resolved therefore is
the issue of whether a resulting trust was intended by them in the acquisition of the
property. The trial court declared that there was no trust relation of any sort
between the sisters. The CA ruled otherwise. Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the CA together with its resolution denying
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a trust relation between petitioner-spouses and

respondent.
Ruling:
Yes.
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of
having the beneficial interest of the property. Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust.
Here, after a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court held that a
resulting trust was indeed intended by the parties. As stipulated by the parties, the
document of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance
policies, receipt of initial premium of insurance coverage and real estate tax
receipts were all in the possession of respondent-spouses which they offered in
evidence. As emphatically asserted by respondent, the reason why these
documents of ownership remained with her is that the land in question belonged to
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
her. Indeed, there can be no persuasive rationalization for the possession of these
documents of ownership by respondent-spouses for seventeen (17) years after the
property was purchased in 1943 than that of precluding its possible sale, alienation
or conveyance by petitioner, absent any machination or fraud. This continued
possession of the documents, together with other corroborating evidence spread on
record, strongly suggests that petitioner merely held the property in trust for
respondent-spouses.
165. HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R.
NO. 133047 AUGUST 17, 1999
Facts:
The heirs of Lorenzo Yap seek to enforce the alleged trust agreement
between Lorenzo Yap, now deceased and his brother Ramon and Benjamin covering
a piece of land and its improvement. They alleged that the said property was held in
trust by Ramon and that it was their father Lorenzo who purchased the said land
and constructed the apartment building on it. However, alleging that since at that
time, Lorenzo was still a Chinese citizen, hence prohibited from owning land, he
caused it to be registered in the name of respondent Ramon until such time as
Lorenzo would have acquired Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo
predecease, the lot would then be transferred to Lorenzo's heirs upon the latter's
naturalization. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents or the ownership of
Ramon. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a trust was constituted between Lorenzo and Ramon.
Ruling:
No.
A trust may either be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those
which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent or, independently of the particular intention of the parties, as
being superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of
equity. The SC applied the doctrine of clean hands that does not allow the creation
or the use of a juridical relation, a trust whether express or implied included, to
perpetrate fraud or tolerate bad faith nor to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law.
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
Here, the trust agreement between Ramon and Lorenzo, if indeed extant,
would have been in contravention of the fundamental law on the prohibition of
foreign ownership of land specifically Section 7, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be invalid if the enforcement of
the trust or provision is against the law even though its performance does not
involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act. It likewise must follow that
what the parties are not allowed to do expressly is one that they also may not do
impliedly as, for instance, in the guise of a resulting trust.
166. SOLEDAD CAÑEZO VS. CONCEPCION ROJAS, G.R. NO. 148788,

NOVEMBER 23, 2007
Facts:
The petitioner alleged that she bought the parcel of land in 1939 from
Crisogono Limpiado, although the transaction was not reduced into writing.
Thereafter, she immediately took possession of the property. Later, she left for
Mindanao and entrusted the said land to her father, Crispulo, who took possession
of the property. In 1980, she found out that the respondent, her stepmother, was in
possession of the property and was cultivating the same. She also discovered that
the tax declaration over the property was already in the name of father. The
respondent asserted that, contrary to the petitioner’s claim, it was her husband who
bought the property, which accounts for the tax declaration being in Crispulo’s
name. Upon Crispulo’s death, the property was included in his estate. The
petitioner, as heir, even received her share in the produce of the estate. The
respondent further contended that the petitioner ought to have impleaded all of the
heirs as defendants. She also argued that the fact that petitioner filed the complaint
only in 1997 means that she had already abandoned her right over the property.
Issue:
Whether or not there is existence of a trust over the property -express or

implied - between the petitioner and her father
Ruling:
No.
The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the
trust and its elements. The presence of the following elements must be proved: (1)
a trustor or settlor who executes the instrument creating the trust; (2) a trustee,
who is the person expressly designated to carry out the trust; (3) the trust res,
consisting of duly identified and definite real properties; and (4) the cestui que
trust, or beneficiaries whose identity must be clear. On the other hand, the rule of
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply
to resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
Here, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the existence of the trust
relationship. And the petitioner sadly failed to discharge that burden. The existence
of express trusts concerning real property may not be established by parol
evidence. It must be proven by some writing or deed. In this case, the only evidence
to support the claim that an express trust existed between the petitioner and her
father was the self-serving testimony of the petitioner. Indeed, if no trust relations
existed, the possession of the property by the respondent, through her predecessor,
which dates back to 1948, would already have given rise to acquisitive prescription
in accordance with Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure). Under Section 40 of Act
No. 190, an action for recovery of real property, or of an interest therein, can be
brought only within ten years after the cause of action accrues.
167. MARIA TORBELA, ET AL VS. SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO, G.R. NO.

140528, DECEMBER 7, 2011
Facts:
Upon the deaths of spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A, which was originally part
of a larger parcel of land covered by OCT No. 16676, in the name of Valeriano, was
adjudicated in equal shares among their children by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. In 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over
said lot in favor of Dr. Rosario. Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim was
subsequently executed, this time by Dr. Rosario, acknowledging that he only
borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the
same to the latter. The afore-quoted Deed was notarized, but was not immediately
annotated on TCT No. 52751.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained a series of
loans, secured by a mortgage constituted on Lot No. 356-A. The spouses Rosario
failed to pay their loan from Banco Filipino. The later extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgages and later Banco Filipino was the lone bidder for the three foreclosed
properties. The Torbela siblings filed before the RTC their Amended Complaint,
impleading Banco Filipino and praying that the spouses Rosario be ordered to
redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino. The RTC issued an Order dismissing
without prejudice due to the spouses Rosario’s failure to prosecute. The Torbela
siblings thereafter filed before the RTC a Complaint for annulment of the Certificate
of Final Sale against Banco Filipino. Both RTC and CA sided with the Banco Filipino.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
SPECIAL PROCEDURE
3A
Whether or not there was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and
Dr. Rosario.
Ruling:
Yes.
In Tamayo v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust may have a

constructive or implied nature in the beginning, but the registered owner’s
subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale of
the property to another party, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned
trust the nature of an express trust.
When Dr. Rosario was able to register said lot in his name under TCT No.
52751, an implied trust was initially established between him and the Torbela
siblings. In addition, Dr. Rosario’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim,
containing his express admission that he only borrowed the subject lot from the
Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of the trust to an express one.
The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim that he was already returning the lot to the Torbela siblings as it
remained registered in Dr. Rosario’s name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr. Rosario
kept possession of said property, together with the improvements thereon.

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Calmerin, Krizza Nadine A.

2. VICTORY SHIPPING VS. WORKMEN’S CC (106 Phil. 550)

On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of petitioner, was sleeping

Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of

4. GUEVARA VS. GUEVARA (74 Phil. 479 & 98 Phil. 249)

5. BALUYOT VS. PANIO (G.R. No. L-42088, May 7, 1976)

It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a

6. ROBERTS VS. LEONIDAS (G.R. No. 55509, April 27, 1984)

Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila who died in Nov. 1977

Whether or not the intestate proceeding should be dismissed in favor of the

7. NUFABLE VS. NUFABLE (G.R. No. 126950, July 2, 1999)

9. NEPOMUCENO VS. CA (G.R. No. L-62952, Oct. 9, 1985)

10. MANINANG VS. CA (G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982)

13. MCMICKING VS. SY COMBIENG (21 Phil. 219)

14. MANG-OY VS. CA (G.R. No. L-27421, Sept. 12, 1986)

18. PASTOR VS. CA (G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983)

19. PACIOLES VS CHUATOCO-CHING; G.R. Number: 127920, August 9, 2005

Whether or not the petitioner, as the surviving spouse, was entitled to be

No, petitioner was not entitled to be appointed as the administrator of the

20. YPON vs RICAFORTE, GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013

21. SUMILANG VS RAMAGOSA, GR No. L-23135, December 26, 1967

The petitioner, Mariano Sumilang, sought the probate of a document

Yes, the will had been duly executed.

Whether or not the petitioner should be appointed as the administratrix of

The Rules of Court cited the appointment of administrators, which prioritizes

23. CUENCO VS COURT OF APPEALS, GR NO. L-24742, OCTOBER 26, 1973

24. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States

Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines.

25. ALABAN V. CA, GR NO. 156021, SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

26. FERNANDO MANANCOL, JR. V. DBP, GR NO. 204289, NOVEMBER 22,

27. SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON V. SPS. SANTOS AND

28. BAGUIO TRINITY DEVELOPERS, INC. V. THE HEIRS OF JOSE RAMOS, ET

29. REPUBLIC V. MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, ET AL., GR NO.

30. Ajero vs CA G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto

Whether or not the Will shall be allowed to probate proceedings

No the deceased was not of sound mind.

Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on

31. ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L.

33. DE PEREZ VS TOLETE, GR NO 76714, JUNE 2, 1994

34. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK VS ESCOLIN, GR NO.

35. MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA DE CATALAN VS LAUELLA CATALAN LEE, GR

36. ANCHETA VS GUERSEY-DALAYGON, GR NO. 139868, JUNE 8, 2006

37. ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION VS ECHIN, GR NO. 178551, OCTOBER

Whether or not the decision of CA is proper.

No. The parties are still legally married in the Philippines.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts

Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes née Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in

Who will be the administrator of the estate of the deceased?

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.

Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the

40. TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH PERKINS VS. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED

Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary

No one could dispute the power of an ancillary administrator to gain control

It is a general rule universally recognized that administration, whether

41. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE (G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994)

How these wills should be treated under the Philippine law?

The will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a