P4013coll2 562

A STUDY OF AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

General Studies
by
WILLIAM K. FREEMAN JR., MAJ, USA

B.S., Salisbury State University, Salisbury, Maryland, 1996
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2005
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: Major William K. Freeman Jr.
Thesis Title: A Study of Ammunition Consumption
Approved by:
, Thesis Committee Chair

Associate Professor James B. Martin, Ph.D.
, Member
LTC Timothy McKane, M.S.A.
, Member, Consulting Faculty

Ronald E. Cuny, Ed.D.
Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:
, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing
statement.)
ii
ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION, by Major William K. Freeman Jr., 76

pages.
The purpose of this research was to investigate the United States Army’s ability to
correctly estimate and forecast the amount of ammunition it will use in combat
operations. Enabling technologies of the weapons systems studied have led to a
remarkable reduction in ammunition consumption in all combat operations. These
weapon systems include the M1 Abrams main battle tank, M2 Bradley infantry fighting
vehicle, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, and multiple-launch rocket system. The
technologies have greatly increased accuracy, precision munitions, survivability, and
lethality. Additionally, this study describes how a shaping operation by Air Force, Navy,
and multiple-launch rocket system also reduces the amount of ammunition used in
combat operations. Historical data from World War II, Operation Desert Storm, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom were used as part of the research tool to develop the argument
and disprove the theory. The research proves that Field Manual 101-10-1/2 calculations
for ammunition consumption are very high and not relevant for today’s battlefield.
Additionally, it provides information that historically planners have overestimated the
amount of ammunition that will be used for an operation. Recommendations for future
projects of this nature are made.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to the following people for their assistance in preparing and
completing this project:
- First of all to God as my initial motivation to begin the MMAS program
- Dr. Ronald E. Cuny for his encouragement and direction
- Associate Professor James B. Martin for committing his time as my Committee Chair
- LTC Timothy McKane for his commitment, advice and combat stories
- LTC David Beachum for his faith in my abilities
- LTC Jerry L. Wood for mentorship and motivation to complete this project
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............. ii
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
ACRONYMS.................................................................................................................... vii
ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................... viii
TABLES ............................................................................................................................ ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1

Purpose.............................................................................................................................1
Background ......................................................................................................................1
Importance .......................................................................................................................2
Primary Question .............................................................................................................3
Secondary Questions........................................................................................................3
Assumptions.....................................................................................................................4
Study Limitations.............................................................................................................4
Delimitations....................................................................................................................6
Definitions of Terms ........................................................................................................7
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................13

Introduction....................................................................................................................13
Lethality .........................................................................................................................16
Survivability...................................................................................................................17
Logistical Data Requirements........................................................................................19
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY .....................................................................................23
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS.................................................................................................29
Secondary Questions......................................................................................................29
Analysis..........................................................................................................................31
Operation Iraqi Freedom................................................................................................34
Ammunition Usage for Operation Iraqi Freedom..........................................................36
Battle Command Training Program...............................................................................37
Battle Command Training Program Ammunition Usage ......................................38
Information from National Training Center After-Action Reviews ..............................41
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.......53

Conclusions....................................................................................................................53
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Primary Research Question........................................................................................53
Implications....................................................................................................................54
Recommendations..........................................................................................................55
REFERENCE LIST ...........................................................................................................61
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................64
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .................................65
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ACRONYMS
Acft Aircraft
AHR Attack Helicopter Regiment
DOD Department of Defense
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle
MLRS Multiple-Launch Rocket System
TIS Thermal Imaging Systems
TOW Tube Lunched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided
vii
ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
Figure 1. AH 64 Attack Helicopter ...................................................................................8
Figure 2. M1 Abrams Tank ...............................................................................................9
Figure 3. M2/3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle .........................................................10
Figure 4. Multiple-Launch Rocket System .....................................................................11
viii
TABLES
Page
Table 1. Historical Comparison from World War II and Operation

Desert Storm ....................................................................................................14
Table 2. Ammunition Usage Rates for Defense and Offense from

FM 101-10-1/2 .................................................................................................21
Table 3. Number of Combat Systems That Participate in Test Base in

Each Area of Study (blank table for methodology) .........................................25
Table 4. Ammunition Usage for Operation Desert Storm

(blank table for methodology) .........................................................................25
Table 5. Ammunition Usage for Operation Iraqi Freedom

Table 6. Ammunition Usage for Division Warfighter Exercise

Table 7. Ammunition Usage for National Training Center Brigade

Table 8. Average Number of Targets Presented at the

National Training Center (blank table for methodology) ................................27
Table 9. Average Number of Rounds Fired at the

Table 10. Average Number of Systems Participating at the

Table 11. Basic Combat Load Amounts and Total Ammunition

on Hand (blank table for methodology)...........................................................28
Table 12. Total of All Ammunition Used in Operation Desert Storm.............................29
Table 13. Total of All Ammunition Used in Operation Iraqi Freedom ...........................29
Table 14. Amount of Ammunition Used in Division Warfighter Exercise .....................30
Table 15. Average Amount of 120-millimeter Rounds Fired in Offense

and Defense at the National Training Center During Live Fire.......................30
ix
Table 16. Number of Combat Systems That Participate in
Test Base in Each Area of Study .....................................................................31
Table 17. Ammunition Usage for Operation Desert Storm .............................................32
Table 18. Ammunition Usage for Operation Iraqi Freedom............................................37
Table 19. Ammunition Usage for Division Warfighter Exercise ....................................40
Table 20. Ammunition Usage for National Training Center Brigade..............................42
Table 21. Average Number of Targets Presented at the

National Training Center .................................................................................43
Table 22. Average Number of Rounds Fired at the

Table 23. Average Number of Weapon Systems Participating at the

Table 24. Basic Combat Load Amounts and Total Ammunition on Hand......................45
Table 25. Operation Desert Storm Calculations from

FM 101-10-1/2 and Actual Ammunition Usage ..............................................48
Table 26. Operation Iraqi Freedom Calculations from

Table 27. Operation Iraqi Freedom Calculations from

Logistical Estimate Worksheet and Actual Ammunition Usage .....................49
Table 28. Division Warfighter Exercise Calculations from

Table 29. National Training Center Calculations from

Table 30. Summary of Rounds per System, per Day.......................................................51
Table 31. Ammunition Forecasting Model Comparison--

Rounds per Weapon System, per Day .............................................................52
Table 32. Battle Damage Assessment Chart for Aviation

Units in Operation Desert Storm......................................................................56
Table 33. Battle Damage Assessment Chart for Aviation Units in Iraqi Freedom..........56
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
During the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 3-7

Cavalry Squadron was low on ammunition. One possibility for this
could have been the use of out-dated references to calculate
ammunition consumption. (2003)
3rd Infantry Division
This thesis explored the logistical doctrine of ammunition consumption and
modern warfare. Specifically, the focus was the ammunition consumption rate in a
training environment versus a combat operation and how the calculations for ammunition
consumption relate to the method used by the military to calculate the amount of
ammunition needed for any operation. An assumption can be made that the military uses
the same ammunition calculation method in training that it uses in combat; in essence, the
concept of “train as you fight.” The principal thrust of this thesis question was to
determine whether planners overestimate the amount of ammunition that will be used in
operations, be it training or combat.
Background
The focus of this thesis stemmed from discussion during Command General Staff
Officer Course classes regarding the amount of ammunition used in combat and the
planning process to forecast ammunition consumption. Conversations often developed
into heated debate. The researcher disagreed with the logistician students and argued that
the methods of calculation were antiquated and probably used data from the World War
II era. Logisticians argued that current doctrine regarding wartime ammunition

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consumption was based on a book called “Big Bertha,” Field Manual 101-10-1/2, Staff
Officers’ Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning
Factors. However, the researcher later discovered that FM 101-10-1/2 used World War II
data. This may be significant for two reasons. First, the technological advances in
weapons systems lethality may reduce the rate of ammunition consumed. The second
reason is that the United States has no current “real-world” data on ammunition
consumption in defensive operations, because the military has not been in a defensive
posture since Vietnam or Korea. Further, the United States military is structured for
offensive not defensive operations. Therefore, the research may also show that the
military may only need one table that forecasts ammunition consumption.
Importance
The importance of this research is that it may provide information that impacts
current logistical doctrine. As a result of the research, the Army may want to modify the
way it uses an ammunition calculation schedule which has its origin based on World War
II data. The Army needs to create a new ammunition calculation schedule with current
statistics. The researcher believes that by providing current, accurate data, Field Manual
101-10-1/2, Staff Officers’ Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data
Planning Factors, may be restructured to use current statistics, thus making it more
relevant. The date of the most current copy of this field manual is 1990. The researcher
also compared the tables in the 1990 edition to the tables in a previous edition and did not
find any changes. Additionally, the research provides data that shows the Logistical
Estimate Worksheet also calculates ammunition consumption at a very inflated rate.
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It is important to be accurate in calculating actual ammunition requirements. The
act of moving and storing large amounts of ammunition requires vital logistics assets.
These logistical assets are far more effective and efficient moving critical supplies and
equipment than ammunition that exceeds mission requirements. This also includes
maritime transportation assets. The use of transportation more effectively will act as a
combat multiplier and enable the Army to make more efficient use of limited
transportation assets. Having more flexibility to transport the right amount of the right
class of supply is the multiplier. The second and third order effects of calculating
ammunition consumption at a higher rate than necessary are that other classes of supply
are adversely affected when it is time to move the ammunition. Transportation is a finite
commodity in combat, not only the common user land transportation but also ships at sea.
Primary Question
In modern warfare, utilizing current equipment, does the United States Army
correctly forecast the amount of ammunition it will use in combat operations?
Secondary Questions
1. How much ammunition was consumed by VII Corps and XVIII Corps during
the ground operations of Operation Desert Storm?
2. How much ammunition was forecast in Operation Desert Storm?
3. What method was used to forecast the ammunition in Operation Desert Storm?
4. How much ammunition was consumed by V Corps during the first twenty-one
days of Operation Iraqi Freedom (major combat operations)?
5. How much ammunition was forecast in Operation Iraqi Freedom?
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6. What method was used to forecast the ammunition in Operation Iraqi Freedom?
Assumptions
1. That an offensive unit meets the doctrinal criteria of a one-to-three ratio in
defensive operations and a three-to-one ratio in offensive operations. This assumption
provides a baseline to accurately determine the number of combat systems participating
in each operation.
2. That Battle Command Training Program controllers have not altered
ammunition resupply. In warfighter exercises the system controllers have the ability to
“magic” ammunition resupply.
3. The planners, for ammunition consumption, in Operation Desert Storm used
Field Manual 101-10-1/2, and the VII Corps planners used the G4 battle book. The G4
battle book used data from Field Manual 101-10-1/2. Additionally, planners for
Operation Iraqi Freedom used the Logistics Estimate Worksheet.
Study Limitations
1. Data: Several limitations and biases in the data underlying these assessments
should be considered when reviewing the following analyses. Much of the available data
remains uncompiled and not analyzed.
a. Data compilation and analysis for Operation Iraqi Freedom is likely to take
several more years. This study used only data currently available, a fraction of what may
ultimately be accumulated.
b. Some important data were not collected. Comprehensive battle damage
assessment data do not exist for Operation Desert Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is
4
difficult to assess weapon effectiveness without detailed data on what targets were
damaged, to what extent, and by which systems.
c. Even when battle damage assessment is available, it can be difficult to associate
with a specific weapon. Many targets were hit with several weapons of the same type or
with several different types of weapons or both. In most cases, it is impossible to be sure
which weapons did what damage. Effectiveness of individual weapons cannot be
determined, except that all United States weapons systems are powerful enough to
destroy and or disable most any enemy equipment.
2. Resources
a. Battle Command Training Program
(1) The data from the Battle Command Training Program is from one rotation.
The researcher used information gathered from the 49th Armor Division.
(2) Battle Command Training Program memorandum of agreements with
participating units established constraints on numbers and types of ammunition that can
be used during a five-day training exercise. One of the constraints is the number of Army
Tactical Missile System rounds (60) given to the unit in resupply. Additionally, there is a
constraint put on the number of Hellfire missiles allowed for AH-64 Attack Helicopters.
b. The information from the National Training Center, Commander of Operations
Group, After-Action Review, Live-Fire Stats, is an average for ten rotations from the
live-fire portion of the rotation. Additionally, the National Training Center information
will not cover multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) or AH-64 weapon systems.
MLRS does not participate at the National Training Center because of the operational
echelon and doctrinal distances normally associated with division and corps level
5
operations. Because of safety considerations, AH-64 attack helicopters do not participate
in the combined arms live fire at the National Training Center.
3. New Equipment: The researcher chose to limit the research from Operation
Desert Storm to present. The purpose of this decision was to use all-modern equipment in
the study. It was determined that the use of a broader equipment base that included the
Korean and Vietnam war eras would skew the significance of the research.
4. Shaping by Navy and Air Force: Shaping operations conducted by the Navy
and the Air Force are not factored into this study.
5. Summary: This research covers modern war--post-Vietnam--specifically Desert
Storm to present. The reasoning behind that decision is because information prior to
Desert Storm is not applicable in modern war--due to technological advances.
Delimitations
The researcher has limited this study to the following combat systems:
1. M1 Abrams Tank--The use of 120-millimeter main gun rounds (Sabot and
high- explosive antitank).
2. M2/3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle--The use of tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles and 25-millimeter chain-gun rounds.
3. AH-64 Attack Helicopter--The use of Hellfire missiles, 2.75-inch hydra
rockets, and 30-millimeter chain-gun rounds.
4. Multiple-Launch Rocket System--The use of M77 rockets and Army tactical
missile system.
6
5. The researcher only counted the rounds fired as being consumed. Destroyed,
lost, or redistributed ammunition are not counted as “consumed” for the purpose of this
study.
6. The Battle Command Training Program Corps level data is not reliable;
therefore, it is not used in this study.
Definitions of Terms
AH 64 Attack Helicopter. Figure 1 is a photograph of the Army’s AH64
helicopter, the primary antiarmor attack helicopter. The AH-64 weapons systems include
Hellfire missiles, 2.75-inch Hydra rockets, and 30-millimeter chain gun (Stuttman 1991,
1120). The AH 64 is an airborne weapons system that is designed to destroy, disrupt, or
delay enemy forces in either the close fight or deep attack. The Apache helicopter can
fight and survive during the day, night, and adverse weather throughout the world. The
AH 64 has the primary mission to destroy high-value or payoff targets with the Hellfire
missiles. The Apache helicopter is also capable of using the 30-millimeter chain gun and
2.75-inch Hydra rockets that are lethal against a wide variety of targets.
It is a quick-reacting, airborne weapon system that can fight close and deep to
destroy, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. The Apache is designed to fight and
survive during the day, night, and in adverse weather throughout the world. The
principal mission of the Apache is the destruction of high-value targets with the
Hellfire missile. It is also capable of employing a 30MM M230 chain gun and
Hydra 70 (2.75 inch) rockets that are lethal against a wide variety of targets.
(Military Analysis Network 2005)
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Figure 1. AH 64 Attack Helicopter
Source: AH 64 Attack Helicopter, Redstone Arsenal Aviation History Photo, Redstone
Arsenal, AL, 1984 [The US Army’s Official Aviation History Web Site]; available from
http://www.redstone.army. mil/history/aviation/ah-64/ah-640002.html; Internet; accessed
on 6 September 2004.
Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). A program that conducts simulation
warfighter exercises conducted to train division and corps-sized staffs.
BCTP is composed of four Operations Groups (A, B, C, and D) as well as a

Headquarters, and the World Class Opposition Forces. Each Operations Group is
commanded by a colonel (Commander, Operations Group or COG) and has a
unique mission. Operations Groups A and B focus primarily on division and corps
warfighter exercises. These two Operations Groups have a combined capability to
conduct fourteen division warfighter exercises per year. A corps warfighter
exercise equals two division warfighter exercises, as both Operations Groups are
required. They also conduct seminars, mission rehearsal exercises, and advanced
decision-making exercises for units deploying in support of peacekeeping
operations. Operations Group C focuses on training National Guard brigades and
the Army’s new Initial Brigade; and it conducts fourteen brigade rotations per
year. (Battle Command Training Program 2005)
M1 Abrams Tank. Figure 2 is a full-tracked, armored combat vehicle capable of
sustained offensive and defensive combat. It is designed to close with and destroy enemy
forces using shock action, firepower, and mobility in coordination with supporting
ground and air systems under all battlefield conditions. The M1’s main weapon is the
8
120-millimeter smooth-bore main gun (Stuttman 1991, 149). “The purpose of this vehicle
is to provide mobile firepower for armored formations of sufficient capability to
successfully close with and destroy any opposing armored fighting vehicle in the world,
while providing protection for its crew in any conceivable combat environment. It is
capable of engaging the enemy in any weather, day or night on the multidimensional,
nonlinear battlefield using its firepower, maneuver, and shock effect” (Military Analysis
Network 2005).
Figure 2. M1 Abrams Tank

Source: Military Armor Fotogallery, Fort Irwin, California, 1999. [Military Analysis
Network Web Site]; available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m1.htm;
Internet; accessed on 6 September 2004.
M2/3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Bradley infantry fighting vehicle
(figure 3) provides mechanized infantry, armored cavalry, and scout units with a full-
tracked, lightly armored, fighting vehicle with the mobility, lethality, and survivability to
operate with the M1 Abrams tank as a member of the combined arms team. The
Bradley’s weapons systems are the TOW missile and the 25-millimeter Bushmaster
chaingun. For the purpose of this research, both variants were combined in one group.
The differences between the two variants have no significance to this study (Stuttman
1991, 40).
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Figure 3. M2/3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Source: Department of Defense Land System Photo, Fort Hood, Texas, 2000. [Federation
of American Scientist Web Site]; available from http://fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/land/m2.html; Internet; accessed on 6 September 2004. Internet; accessed on 6
September 2004.
Modern War. For the purpose of this research, modern war is defined as the post-
Vietnam War era.
Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Figure 4 contains photographs of a
long-range, free-flight rocket system that provides general support artillery fires to
division and corps level tactical units. Note: During Operation Desert Storm and
Operation Iraqi Freedom, two different types of MLRS munitions were used, the M77
rocket and Army tactical missile system (Stuttman 1991, 881). The MLRS provides the
Army an all-weather, indirect, area fire weapon system to strike counterfire, air defense,
armored formations, and other high-payoff targets at all depths of the tactical battlefield.
Primary missions of MLRS include the suppression, neutralization, and destruction of
threat fire support and forward-area air defense targets.
The MLRS is a versatile weapon system that supplements traditional cannon
artillery fires by delivering large volumes of firepower in a short time against critical,
time-sensitive targets. These targets often include enemy artillery, air defense systems,
10
mechanized units, and personnel. MLRS units can use their system's "shoot-and-scoot"
capability to survive while providing fire support for attacking maneuver elements.
MLRS is not intended to replace cannon artillery, but has been designed to complement it
(Military Analysis Network 2005).
Figure 4. Multiple-Launch Rocket System

Sources: Photos from left to right: Aeronautics Ballistics Archive, Redstone Arsenal
History Photo; Redstone Arsenal History Photo; Redstone Arsenal Public Affairs Photo;
and Department of Defense Land Systems Photo, Whitesands Missile Range, New
Mexico, 2000. [Defense Industry Daily Web Site]; available from
http://images.search.yahoo.com; Internet; accessed on 6 September 2004.
National Training Center (NTC). A site where brigade-sized units conduct
maneuver and live-fire training exercises. NTC trains the transformed Army by
conducting force-on-force and live-fire training for ground and aviation brigades in a
joint scenario across the spectrum of conflict, using a live-virtual-constructive training
model, as portrayed by a highly lethal and capable opposing force and controlled by an
expert and experienced Operations Group (Global Security 2005).
The background, purpose, importance, assumptions, and terminology of this
thesis set the stage for arguably the most critical sections of this research, the references
and data used to support analysis, arrive at findings, draw conclusions, and make
11
recommendations. Chapter 2 of this thesis contains the author’s endeavors to review the
literature associated with ammunition forecasting and consumption.
12
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
A soldier in combat can go a year without pay; months without

mail; days without food, water, and sleep; but he cannot survive a
minute without ammunition. (Helfast XVII Conference fall 1986)
LTG Joseph M. Heiser
Introduction
This study used after-action reports and historical data from Operation Desert
Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Battle Command Training Program, and the
National Training Center. This chapter reviews data and literature that surrounds the
topic of the secondary questions, in order to answer the primary research question about
the ammunition calculation located within Army doctrine. This chapter also examined
other factors found, such as survivability, shaping operations conducted by the Air Force
and Navy, the use of MLRS, and the Army’s AH-64 attack helicopters, in shaping
operations prior to ground combat in Operation Desert Storm.
The battle space that a division occupied in World War II was10 kilometers wide
and 40 kilometers deep. This has been greatly expanded in today’s Army. Today, a
division can occupy a width of 100 kilometers and a depth of 240 kilometers. The
modern division today can occupy a front ten times what a division in World War II
could cover. Additionally, the depth is six times greater today than in World War II.
The percentage of kill ratio in World War II is compared with today’s Army. In
World War II it was a ratio of 14 to 1. It took fourteen rounds of ammunition to kill an
armored vehicle. The historical data table (table 1) illustrates that the average range of
13
those hits would have had to be closer than 800 meters. The percentage of kill ratio in
Operation Desert Storm was 1.2 to 1. It took a little more than one round of ammunition
to kill an armored vehicle and the average range was 2,200 meters.
Table 1. Historical Comparison from World War II and Operation Desert Storm
World War II Operation Desert Storm

Width Division 10KM Division 100KM
Depth Division 40KM Division 240KM
Percentage Kill 14:1 @ 800m 1.2:1 @ 2200m
Source: Scales 1999, 3.
The comparison indicates that it would take 12 more rounds of ammunition in
World War II to kill an armored vehicle than in Operation Desert Storm. Also, the
vehicles would have to be 1,400 meters closer than in Operation Desert Storm. The battle
space is almost two times closer than the distance modern weapons need to kill an enemy
vehicle. The comparison is unprecedented. This suggests the modern Army needs only 8
percent of the tank ammunition that the Army of World War II used.
Field Manual (FM) 4-30.1, Munitions Distribution in the Theater of Operations,
states, “A review of United States Army involvement in recent operations clearly
indicates the need to improve logistical planning. Plans must be developed to support all
levels of combat operations and stability and support operations. It is critical that Class V
support planning be detailed and threat-based” (Department of the Army 2003, 4-1).
“The objective of the ammunition distribution system is to provide ammunition at
the right time, place and quantity to ensure the success of an operation. They must
complement combat plans and operation, and improve the ability of the supported unit to
14
accomplish its mission. The supported commander’s concept of operations, priorities and
allocations dictate the actions of the ammunition planner” (Department of the Army
2003, 4-1).
Ammunition consists of bullets, rockets, demolitions, mines, missiles, artillery,
tank, and associated munitions. Ammunitions supply is based on a required supply rate
and controlled supply rate. The required supply rate is the estimated amount of
ammunition required to sustain operations, without restrictions, for a specific period. The
rate is determined by forecasting ammunition requirements based on the mission, enemy,
troops, terrain, and time available. The required supply rate is based upon weapon density
for a given unit. Required supply rates can be developed by several methods, but the
accuracy of the calculations varies from method to method. The controlled supply rate is
the rate of ammunition that can be supported for a given period based on ammunition
availability. If a support unit cannot supply a specific type of ammunition based on the
forecasted required supply rate, then it imposes a controlled supply rate to limit the
distribution of that type of ammunition. The controlled supply rate may be less than the
required supply rate: the optimum situation is when the required supply rate equals or is
less than the controlled supply rate (Department of the Army 2001, 1-4).
A combat load is the ammunition required by each combat system and the
individuals assigned to that system. Also called the minimum initial issue quantity, a
combat load is a standard measure used throughout the Army and provides the baseline
upon which units develop their basic loads. Class V loads can be calculated per system,
per individual, or per unit (Department of the Army 2001, 1-4).
15
Basic load is the command-determined quantity and type of munitions carried by
an individual, unit, or combat system. A unit basic load is the amount of ammunition
needed to initiate combat operations and can be moved in a single load by a designated
unit for a particular mission (Department of the Army 2001, 1-4).
Lethality
The lethality of modern United States weapon systems may also reduce the need
for large stockpiles of ammunition.
The M2 Bradley was upgraded after Desert Storm to increase its lethality. The
laser range finder was one of the enhancements to increase effectiveness. “The addition
of PGS/POSNAV enhances the Bradley’s ability to maneuver with the rest of the
combined arms team. The integration of Global Positioning System with the laser range
finder allows rapid, accurate calls for fire” (22nd Support Command 1992, 225). Finally,
the addition of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below command and control
capability provided a near real-time integrated data link between the Bradley fighting
vehicle and other combat vehicles. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
capability, integrated with the laser range finder of the Bradley and the crew’s ability to
identify and hand off targets to other Bradley fighting vehicles, tanks, or helicopters, has
also increased the weapon system’s lethality.
The capability of the TOW missile is good with the exception that it is wire
guided and has a long flight time. However, the lethality of the TOW missile is excellent.
The lethality of the TOW missile was proven beyond doubt during Desert Storm
when one of the TOW missiles fired by US troops went right through the tank it
was aimed at and penetrated another tank parked next to it. Another TOW went
through a six-foot dirt berm and knocked out an Iraqi armored personnel carrier
16
on the other side. In both instances, the TOW performed a feat which it
supposedly was incapable of accomplishing. (22nd Support Command 1992, 225)
The M1 Abrams tank is even more lethal than the Bradley.
The capability of the M1 tank equipment, coupled with crew skill and training,
enabled the M1 crews to ‘see first, shoot first’ resulting in many one-round kills
on Iraqi armored vehicles. Thermal imaging systems (TIS) allowed detection of
Iraqi targets day and night in smoke and haze at great distance. The Iraqi systems
lacked this capability. Targets were routinely identified out to 1,500 meters and
detected at much greater ranges with the median detection range of 2,600 meters.
M1 crews were able to engage Iraqi tanks well beyond the range of Iraqi T-72s.
(General Accounting Office 1992, 225)
Reports from enemy prisoners of war indicated they could only return fire at
muzzle flashes. M1 units firing 120-millimeter, fin-stabilized, armor-piercing
ammunition reported engaging and killing targets out to 3,500 meters (longest reported
kill was 3,800 meters) with most engagements in the 2,000 to 2,500 meter range (General
Accounting Office 1992). An Armor school report stated, “120-millimeter ammunition
consistently achieved catastrophic kills against T-72 tanks, even when behind thick
berms.” An example of agility, mobility, and lethality of the M1 tank was demonstrated
by the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, at the Battle of Medina Ridge. In a 45-minute
battle, the unit achieved tactical surprise by moving quickly and silently and destroyed
100 Iraqi tanks and more than 30 BMPs. Finally, interviews with crews indicated many
engagements occurred “on the move,” 15 to 25 miles per hour, and involved
engagements at all angles (22nd Support Command 1992, 225). After-action reports also
indicated the M1 often outran all other United States battlefield systems.
Survivability
Studies of survivability conducted on Operation Desert Storm are available;
however, Operation Iraqi Freedom studies are ongoing and are still classified.
17
One of the most interesting modifications of the M1A1 series was the new
armor composite including depleted uranium plate. This armor greatly increased
resistance against kinetic energy rounds. During the Gulf War, M1A1 tanks could
directly engage enemy tanks while in the enemy's line-of-sight with little risk
from any eventual damage from incoming retaliatory fire. This means that M1A1
tanks could hit their targets, while Iraqi tanks couldn't hit, or, if they hit, couldn't
damage M1A1 tanks. Also, due to depleted uranium armor, not a single US tank
was penetrated from enemy fire. US tanks took many close direct hits from Iraqi
Soviet-made T-72 and T-72M tanks, but enemy rounds were simply not able to
penetrate the M1A1 tank's armor. (Department of Defense 1992)
Using the M1 Abrams survivability data from Operation Desert Storm, the
research showed that survivability of this weapon system is significant in ammunition
usage calculations. There was a low loss rate of M1 Abrams tanks in both Operation
Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. A low loss rate is a direct reflection of the
survivability of the M1 Abrams tank. The ability to keep combat power in the fight
allows momentum to remain at a high speed. Also, it gives the ability to expend the basic
load, instead of re-arming the surviving tanks. Vehicle speed, agility, identification,
engagement of enemy targets at very long distances, thermal imagery, armor protection,
and employment all contribute to M1 survivability. Several sources reported impacts of
enemy 125-millimeter armor-piercing ammunition on M1 Abrams without a single
penetration in Operation Desert Storm. Additionally, there are six documented incidents
of unidentified armor-piercing rounds striking, but failing to penetrate M1 Abrams tanks.
Of eighteen combat incidents reported in Operation Desert Storm, nine of those were
permanent losses (due to friendly fire). Damage on the other nine M1 Abrams was mostly
from mines, and they were repairable at the organizational maintenance level (General
Accounting Office 1992).
In Operation Iraqi Freedom there was a penetration of the M1 Abrams with an
unknown weapon (the crew survived and the tank remained operational). Additionally,
18
there was one M1 Abrams destroyed by three antitank mines stacked on one another
(notes taken by the researcher while serving as the V Corps LNO to Coalition Forces
Land Component Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom).
The survivability described above is not consistent with the statistics routinely
found in simulation at the Battle Command Training Program or with the Multi
Integrated Laser Engagement System at the National Training Center (notes taken by the
researcher while stationed at the National Training Center 1999-2002). Most battles
conducted at the National Training Center are won by the opposing force. It is not
uncommon for the opposing force to destroy over 70 percent of the Blue Forces
equipment. This is not consistent with the statistics from Operation Desert Storm and
Operation Iraqi Freedom, where less than 1 percent of the United States equipment was
destroyed.
Logistical Data Requirements
The Field Manual 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers’ Field Manual Organizational,
Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors, lays out tables to calculate ammunition
consumption for purposes of planning. The tables are broken down in the following
manner: ammunition per type, per weapon, per day. Additionally, the tables go into more
detail by illustrating the ammunition usage in Defense of Position and Attack of Position
(deliberately organized). The planning factor in the defense is significantly higher than
the planning factor in the offense.
The book Moving Mountain: “Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf
War” does not describe what the planners used to estimate the ammunition consumption
for Operation Desert Storm. Therefore, the researcher is assuming that the planners used
19
Field Manual 101-10-1/2 and the G4 battle book that VII Corps used. The book does
reference that the Army had sixty-five days worth of ammunition and that one days worth
of ammunition weighed 9,000 tons. Another piece of valuable information that is
described in the book is that the initial calculation of ammunition on hand was forty-five
days worth of supply. After the combat was over, the Army recalculated the ammunition
that was left, and the recalculated amount was sixty-five days worth of supply. What this
is telling the researcher is that the method of the initial calculation was not correct. The
equation would look like this: 45 – 4 = 65.
In preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, ammunition consumption was
calculated by using the Logistical Estimate Worksheet. This worksheet has embedded
formulas that determine the amount of ammunition consumed for a particular type of
operation. The Logistical Estimate Worksheet was used as the starting point and then
should have been staffed by the logistical planners and put to the common sense test,
where experience, history, and the enemy was factored into the process.
Table 2 illustrates the difference between calculations for offense and defense
using the methods from Field Manual 101-10-1/2. It also shows a percentage difference.
20
Table 2. Ammunition Usage Rates for Defense and Offense
from FM 101-10-1/2
Ammo Type Rounds in Defense Rounds in Offense

M1 Abrams 1st 120mm 37 per Tank 16 per Tank
Day
M1 Abrams 120mm 22 per Tank 9 per Tank
Succeeding
Days
M2 Bradley 1st TOW 6 per ITV 5 per ITV
Day
M2 Bradley TOW 7 per ITV 6 per ITV
Succeeding
Days
M2 Bradley 1st 25mm 214 per ITV 174 per ITV
Day
M2 Bradley 25mm 167 per ITV 129 per ITV
Succeeding
Days
MLRS 1st Day Rocket 99 per MLRS 75 per MLRS
MLRS Rocket 98 per MLRS 76 per MLRS
Succeeding
Days
AH 64 Apache Hellfire 16 per Acft 12 per Acft
1st Day Missile
AH 64 Apache Hellfire 17 per Acft 13 per Acft
Succeeding Missile
Days
AH 64 Apache 2.75 Inch 26 per Acft 21 per Acft
1st Day Rockets
AH 64 Apache 2.75 Inch 15 per Acft 12 per Acft
Succeeding Rockets
Days
AH 64 Apache 30mm 770 per Acft 628 per Acft
1st Day
AH 64 Apache 30mm 602 per Acft 463 per Acft
Succeeding
Days
Source: Department of the Army, FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers’ Field Manual
Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army Headquarters, 1990), 2-129-136.
21
It is very important that the Army considers the amount of ammunition really
needed to conduct effective combat operations. The literature data illustrates that the
amount of ammunition needed for today’s battlefield appears to be much less than
previous wars. The reports suggest lethality and survivability are factors influencing the
amount of ammunition needed for combat. The amount of combat power lost reduces the
ability to kill the enemy. Therefore, survivability of weapon systems keeps weapon
systems on the battlefield and gives the unit more ability to kill. Additionally, the
lethality of a weapon system reduces the ammunition needed especially for one-shot, one
catastrophic kills. If modern combat uses less ammunition, then this may influence the
number of transportation assets used to move ammunition around the battlefield, which
would free transportation assets to move other classes of supply, such as water, food, and
materials.
22
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The primary research question was: In modern warfare, utilizing current
equipment, does the United States Army correctly forecast the amount of ammunition it
will use in combat operations?
In this methodology, tables of ammunition usage were created to compare and
analyze usage for Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Battle
Command Training Program, and the National Training Center. The types of ammunition
included in the tables were for the M1 tank, M2 Infantry fighting vehicle, MLRS, and
AH64 attack helicopter.
Tables were created to show how many weapons systems participated in
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, a table showed how
many weapons participated in simulations at the Battle Command Training Program and
the number of weapons systems that participate at the National Training Center.
The first step was to record in the tables (see sample tables 2 through 11) the
amount of ammunitions used in actual combat. Then the same information was gathered
and recorded from simulations. Finally, the data from the National Training Center live-
fire results were incorporated into the appropriate table to bridge the gap from offense
combat operations to a controlled live-fire defensive operation for any future study.
The final step was to calculate the percentage of ammunition used from the
amount of ammunition on hand. These calculations could then be used to determine the
amount of ammunition available to continue combat operations.
23
The mathematical equation is C divided by H equals U, where C is equal to the
amount of ammunition consumed, H is equal to the amount of ammunition on hand at the
beginning of the exercise or operation, and U is equal to the percentage of ammunition
used.
Once the percentage of ammunition has been determined, it can be used to
compare to the test data from the National Training Center. Additionally, when all the
calculations are completed the data can be compared from actual usage on the ground as
rounds per weapon system, per day to the references that are used to forecast
ammunition. This last calculation will be the total number of rounds fired from each
particular weapon system divided by the number of weapon system in that operation and
then divided by the number of days of the operation. This will enable one to answer the
primary research question: in modern warfare, utilizing current equipment, does the
United States Army correctly forecast the amount of ammunition it will use in combat
operations?
The National Training Center provides additional data and serves as the link
between offensive and defensive operations for any future studies. Also, any anomalies
are explained to make the data useful. These results were then applied to Operation
Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. By using the percentage of combat systems
conducting operations and the amount of ammunition used in maneuver, a generalization
will be reached that will address the primary research question.
24
Table 3. Number of Combat Systems That Participate in Test Base
in Each Area of Study (blank table for methodology)
Weapon System M1 Abrams M2/3 Bradley AH-64 MLRS
Desert Storm
OIF (V Corps)
BCTP Corps
BCTP Division
NTC BDE

(blank table for methodology)
Weapon System Ammo on Hand Ammo Consumed % Used Rounds per

Tube, per Day
MLRS
120-millimeter
Rounds
TOW Missiles
25-millimeter
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles
2.75-inch Rockets
30-millimeter
Rounds
25

Tube, per Day
MLRS
120-millimeter
Rounds
TOW Missiles
25-millimeter
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles
2.75-inch Rockets
30-millimeter
Rounds


Tube, per Day
MLRS
120-millimeter
Rounds
TOW Missiles
25-millimeter
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles
2.75-inch Rockets
30-millimeter
Rounds
26

Tube, per Day
MLRS
120-millimeter
Rounds
TOW Missiles
25-millimeter
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles
2.75-inch Rockets
30-millimeter
Rounds
Table 8. Average Number of Targets Presented at the National Training Center

Target Type Offense Defense Remarks
T80 Tanks
BMPs
Dismounts
Table 9. Average Number of Rounds Fired at the National Training Center

Ammunition Offense Defense Remarks
120-millimeter
Rounds
25-millimeter
Rounds
TOW Missiles
27
Table 10. Average Number of Systems Participating at the National Training
Center (blank table for methodology)
Type of System Offense Defense Remarks
M1 Abrams Tank
M2 Bradley IFV
Table 11. Basic Combat Load Amounts and Total Ammunition on Hand
M1 Basic M2 Basic Load AH-64 Basic Load MLRS
Load / Total / Total in / Total in Theater Basic Load
in Theater Theater / Total in
Theater
Operation Desert
Storm
Operation Iraqi
Freedom
BCTP Division
Exercise
NTC BDE Live-
Fire Exercise
28
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS
This chapter takes the data gathered in the literature review to answer the primary
research question: In modern warfare, utilizing current equipment, does the United States
Army correctly forecast the amount of ammunition it will use in combat operations?
Secondary Questions
1. How much ammunition was consumed by VII Corps and XVIII Corps during
the ground operations of Operation Desert Storm? This answer is illustrated in table 12.
Table 12. Total of All Ammunition Used in Operation Desert Storm

M1 M2 M2 MLRS AH-64 AH-64 AH-64
120mm 25mm TOW Hellfire Rockets 30mm
14,061 165,295 964 6,604 843 2,035 28,621
2. How much ammunition was consumed by V Corps during the first 21 days of
Operation Iraqi Freedom? (Major Combat Operations) This answer is illustrated in table
13.
Table 13. Total of All Ammunition Used in Operation Iraqi Freedom

1,576 16,026 375 548 462 1,338 12,057
3. How much ammunition was consumed during a Division Warfighter Exercise?
29
This answer is illustrated in table 14.
Table 14. Amount of Ammunition Used in Division Warfighter Exercise

N/A N/A N/A 125 1,102 2,480 6,174
4. Is more ammunition consumed during live-fire operations at the National
Training Center during offense or during defense? No, the same amount of ammunition is
used in the offense and the defense for all weapon systems, as illustrated in table 15.
Table 15. Average Amount of 120-millimeter Rounds Fired in Offense and

Defense at the National Training Center During Live Fire
M1 Abrams Tank Offense Defense Remarks
Number of rounds 11 10 The difference of one is not
fired per Tank statistically significant
Table 16 describes the number and type of weapon systems used in the following
areas: Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Battle Command Training
Program Corps warfighter exercises, Battle Command Training Program Division
warfighter exercises, and the National Training Center Brigade live-fire exercises.
Additionally, the researcher must calculate the number of basic combat loads needed to
outfit all the weapon systems studied, then compare that number with the amount of basic
combat loads of ammunition on hand for the operation. The table lists all combat systems
studied in each operation or exercise. This data determined the average amount of
ammunition used by each system and how near that number was to the basic combat load
of that particular weapon system.

30
The number of weapon systems used in Operation Desert Storm is significantly
higher than the number used in the recent Operation Iraqi Freedom. One of the reasons
for this is that in 1990 the Iraqi Army was the fourth largest army in the world.
Additionally, the Army had not used the new generation of weapon systems in major
combat operations and did not know what type of results it would obtain would obtain.
Table 16. Number of Combat Systems That Participate in Test Base

in Each Area of Study
Weapon System M1 Abrams M2/3 Bradley AH-64 MLRS
Desert Storm 1178 2200 274 189
OIF (V Corps) 222 312 153 99
BCTP Division 178 224 18 18
NTC BDE 44 90 18 N/A
Analysis
Table 17 describes how much ammunition was on hand at the beginning of
Operation Desert Storm, for each system studied. The table also shows the amount of
ammunition consumed during the 100-hour ground attack. The final part of the table is
the percentage of ammunition that was used of the total on hand.
Ammunition Usage for Operation Desert Storm
How much ammunition did VII Corps and XVIII Corps consume during the
ground operations of Operation Desert Storm?
31

Tube, per Day
MLRS 17,145 6,604 39% 1.4
120-millimeter 206,075 14,061 7% 2.98
Rounds
TOW Missiles 18,564 964 5% .11
25-millimeter 3,694,255 165,295 4% 18.74
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles 11,516 843 7% .77
2.75-inch Rockets 52,319 2035 4% 1.86
30-millimeter 586,652 28,621 5% 26.11
Rounds
NOTE: Calculations were typically 60 percent up to 90 percent higher. The researcher
has the understanding that there should be a reserve of ammunition for continued
operations.
This research shows that the ammunition consumption rate was much lower than
anticipated. Additionally, the transportation assets required to move the daily ammunition
was reported as 450 trucks in the 22nd Support Command After-Action Report. If the
ammunition usage rate was lower than expected, then transportation assets required to
move that ammunition could be lowered as well. Therefore it is imperative that the
correct method is used to calculate ammunition consumption rates. For example, using
the median percentage of the ammunition used for all the weapon systems studied--that
number is 22 percent, it can be deduced that it would have only taken as few as 22
percent of the trucks to move the required ammunition. Therefore, the 450 trucks used to
transport ammunition could have been reduced by 78 percent or 349 trucks. Those
transportation assets would then have been available to transport other classes of supply
and critical items, such as water and mission oriented protective posture suits.
32
The example above is only valid if all ammunition was equally distributed among
the transportation assets and if all the types of ammunition in this study were the same
weight and required the same cubic space per unit of ammunition. Therefore, the example
above is a dramatic leap to illustrate the point. But, the data clearly supports that there
would be a waste of transportation assets. The data just cannot narrow down the exact
amount of transportation assets without more extensive research.
There is an extensive report that covers supplies during the Desert Shield and
Desert Storm operations. The 22nd Support Command After-Action Report covers the
buildup and use of all classes of supply for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. An after-
action review suggests that the logisticians grossly overestimated the amount of
ammunition needed to conduct operations. “On G-Day there were approximately 45 days
of Class V on hand (much was stocked over the 100 percent required). By the cease-fire,
28 February, there was approximately 66 days of supply in Class V based on the usage
level during the 100 hours ground war” (22 Support Command After-Action Report
1992, 2:4). This is stating that the calculation began with forty-five days of supply--then
they fought the ground war for four days and consumed ammunition for those four days.
Finally, they recalculated the amount of ammunition left over using the usage rates from
the 100 hours of the war. After the recalculation was completed, there was enough
ammunition on hand to conduct the war for sixty-six more days at that rate. This
information led the researcher to believe that the original factor used to compute the
calculation was very high.
The phenomenon of the increase in number of days of supply is caused by the
forecast of the amount of ammunition. The root of the issue is the number of rounds
33
forecast as per round, per tube, per day. For instance, if the number that should be
forecast should be .33 and the forecaster rounds up to one, the result will be two-thirds
too much. This is not a real problem if the forecast is for one tube. However, if the
forecaster rounds up as methodology for all ammunition and weapon systems in theater,
the results are tremendous. That “hand wave” within the logistics system will overstress
the transportation system needed to move the ammunition.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Research discovered comparisons between Operation Desert Storm and Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Some of the topics included number of allied troops, enemy troops,
friendly vehicles, enemy vehicles destroyed, and distance traveled during combat.
Additionally, the amount of ammunition consumed in major combat operations was very
interesting: four days as compared to twenty-one days. The phenomenon of using less
ammunition over a longer duration may be attributed to precision munitions, lethality of
the rounds and fewer combat systems to consume ammunition. Of course, there is no way
to guess how long a conflict will last; there are just too many factors involved (will to
fight, how will the enemy fight, luck, etc.). Reports also show that during Operation
Desert Storm the Army had more combat equipment than during Operation Iraqi
Freedom (Tame 2004).
In Desert Storm there were over 950,000 coalition forces serving, whereas there
were only 350,000 coalition forces serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom during major
combat operations. The size of the Republican Guard was significantly reduced from
150,000 in Desert Storm to 80,000 in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, the
numbers for coalition tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces for Desert
34
Storm were: 5,000 tanks, 5,000 armored personnel carriers, and 3,000 artillery pieces--
compared to 2,200 tanks, 2,400 armored personnel carriers, and only 400 artillery pieces
in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Finally, in the four days of ground combat in Operation
Desert Storm the coalition forces traveled 250 miles and destroyed 3,800 tanks and 1,450
armored personnel carriers. While in the twenty-one days of major combat operations of
Operation Iraqi Freedom the coalition forces destroyed 847 tanks and 777 armored
personnel carriers (Tame 2004).
Lethality during Operation Iraqi Freedom was greatly improved in comparison to
the lethality in Operation Desert Storm. Over the past twelve years, technological
advances in training, equipment, and the integration of new systems have improved
lethality. The ability to integrate all combat systems has been accomplished by using the
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below command and control system.
Additionally, during Operation Iraqi Freedom the Army began using C2PC (command
and control personal computer) in conjunction with Blue Force tracker. This allows the
full integration of combat systems, which in turn makes the military more lethal. The
individual systems may have improved in lethality, but the ability to synchronize the
systems on the battlefield improved the lethality even more.
The significance of table 17 is twofold--first and most obvious is that the
percentage of ammunition used is incredibly low. Additionally, the amount of
ammunition on hand was less than it was in Operation Desert Storm for MLRS: 120-
millimeter rounds, TOW missiles, and 25-millimeter rounds. That should be the case,
because there were more weapon systems involved in Operation Desert Storm. However,
the amount of ammunition is significantly higher for the AH-64 attack helicopter in
35
Operation Iraqi Freedom--with almost one-half the number of attack helicopters. The
reason behind this could be that the Army’s training centers concentrated very heavily on
the deep attack using attack aviation.
If it took 450 trucks to move an estimated day’s supply of ammunition, it is a fact
that it would take less trucks to move ammunition in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It could be
up to one-half as many trucks during Operation Iraqi Freedom or 225 trucks. It also can
be calculated that if the Army only used about 6 percent of the estimated ammunition in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, then the Army would have only needed to use a lower amount
of transportation assets to conduct ammunition resupply, maybe even as low as fifteen
trucks to move that ammunition. Therefore the other 210 trucks a day could have moved
other important sustainment items or could have been used in preparation for stability
operations. Two things that the researcher knows that could have been moved--one is
small arms ammunition, while the second is potable water. This would support the
statement made by LTG William S. Wallace, who said, “This is not the enemy we war
gamed against.” (Freeman 2003)
Ammunition Usage for Operation Iraqi Freedom
1. How much ammunition was consumed by V Corps during the first 21 days of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (first twenty-one days--major combat operations) (see table 18)?
36

Tube, per Day
MLRS 9000 548 6% .14
120-millimeter 65,000 1,576 2% .26
Rounds
TOW Missiles 8,500 375 4% .06
25-millimeter 702,000 16,026 2% 2.44
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles 25,000 462 2% .14
2.75-inch Rockets 155,480 1,338 Less than .41
1%
30-millimeter 750,000 35,057 5% 10.91
Rounds
Battle Command Training Program
During an interview conducted with a systems analyst, the researcher learned that
the simulation system does not capture the number of rounds fired for an M1 Abrams
tank or an M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. Therefore, the Battle Command Training
Program table (table 19) for those two weapons systems will not reflect ammunition
consumed. However, there was a recent Battle Command Training warfighter exercise
conducted that did capture accurate data on the use of MLRS, 2.75-inch hydra rockets,
30-millimeter rounds, and Hellfire missiles (Dempsey 2004).
There are too many variables that can be interjected into the system that create
artificiality that may skew the study. Most information from warfighter exercises is not
focused on logistics. So that type of data is not normally gathered in a controlled manner.
However, the United States Army’s Battle Command Training Program sometimes
conducts focused rotations in which controls are in place to gather specific data. One
37
warfighter exercise focused on collecting information on MLRS and AH-64 attack
helicopter ammunition usage (Dempsey 2004), which provided the data for this study.
Lethality within simulation systems is not relevant in this study. The reason is
because the simulation can be adjusted for lethality and survivability. The simulation is
adjusted so that the opposing force weapon systems and United States weapon systems
have similar lethality and survivability characteristics. The Battle Command Training
Program is designed to train commanders in decision making during combat, not to
capture ammunition usage. If the simulation were adjusted for realistic lethality and
survivability, then the United States weapon systems would make commander decisions
less evident. A bad decision would be more forgiving with superior equipment. The
opposing force would not be able to compete with the United States weapon systems.
Therefore, a commander could make any battle plan work.
Battle Command Training Program Ammunition Usage
1. How much 120-millimeter M1 Abrams tank ammunition was used?
Not applicable. The ammunition rate for the M1 Abrams tank in simulation is
calculated by several factors that are not realistic enough to use in this study. The factors
are distance from target, what types of target, and hit-kill ratio of the target versus the hit-
kill ratio of the M1. The computer in simulation uses an algorithm to determine if the
target is killed or not. Additionally, that same algorithm is used from the target back to
the M1 to determine if the M1 is damaged or killed. Additionally, in the simulation the
target and the M1 will continue to engage one another until the criteria are met for a kill.
However, the one factor not included in the algorithm is the 90 percent hit-kill ratio of the
M1 Abrams tank at any distance (Dempsey 2004). This is not realistic because the M1
38
accuracy at 3,500 to 4,000 meters is also given to the opposing force’s equipment. There
is a great difference in the range that the United States equipment can engage targets. The
enemy tanks do not have the same capabilities that United States tanks do.
During Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom the enemy tanks
were easily defeated by the M1 tanks. The enemy tanks did not have the survivability and
had very minimal lethality against United States equipment. The enemy tank had zero
lethality against the M1 tank.
The ammunition rate for the M2/3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle in simulation
is calculated by several factors that are not realistic enough to use in this study. The
factors are distance from target, what types of target, and hit-kill ratio of the target versus
the hit-kill ratio of the M2. The computer in simulation uses an algorithm to determine if
the target is killed or not. Additionally, that same algorithm is used from the target back
to the M2 to determine if the M2 is damaged or killed (Dempsey 2004).
The next data in table 19 is from a focused rotation, where the data was saved on
the AH-64 attack helicopter and MLRS. The data in table 19 was not tampered with by
any means of “magic resupply.” Therefore, this data was accepted as accurately
portraying what would be necessary to obtain the same battlefield effects outside of
simulation.
The Battle Command Training Program conducts these focused exercises at the
direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army. This is done normally to answer a question in
regard to strategic planning.
39
Rounds per
Weapon System Ammo on Hand Ammo Consumed % Used Tube, per Day
MLRS 276 125 45 % 1.74
120-millimeter N/A N/A N/A
Rounds
TOW Missiles N/A N/A N/A
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles 1,344 1,102 82 % 15.31
2.75-inch Rockets 6,048 2,480 41 % 34.44
30-millimeter 29,400 6,174 21 % 85.75
Rounds
Additional information and factors that need to be considered are:
1. Hit-kill factors at the Battle Command Training Program are almost equal for
the M1 Abrams tank and the opposing force’s weapons system. This gives the opposing
force an unrealistic advantage.
2. The range at which the opposing force’s weapons systems can kill Army
vehicles also gives an unrealistic advantage. There have been exercises where the hit-kill
factors have been adjusted to more accurately portray the enemy’s realistic capabilities.
Those exercises are usually mission rehearsals. During training the opposing force’s hit-
kill factors are increased in order for the simulation to be more challenging to force good
maneuver and excellent combat decisions.
3. The reality is that the M1 Abrams tank has a very distinct advantage over
enemy vehicles. As stated in chapter 2, the lethality and survivability are not accurately
portrayed in simulation at the Battle Command Training Program or at the National
Training Center.
40
The multi integrated laser engagement system equipment gives the opposing force
an equal survivability and kill capability as the United States military. The multi
integrated laser engagement system equipment also makes the ranges equal for the
opposing force and the United States Army. This is another unrealistic ability of an
opposing force that faces United States forces. The hit-kill percentage of the M1 Abrams
tank is 90 percent. Additionally, “on average an M1 Abrams out-ranged an Iraqi tank by
more than 1000 meters” (22nd Support Command 1992). To train in mission rehearsal
exercises, the training centers should use the real capabilities of the enemy’s equipment.
As the enemy’s equipment advances, the training devices can also be upgraded to show
the true capabilities.
Information from National Training Center After-Action Reviews
The National Training Center keeps extensive data on every rotation. The
researcher used the live-fire data from the offense and defense. The live-fire data is even
more closely monitored at the National Training Center. There is a dedicated live-fire
team that accounts for every round fired at the National Training Center including 120-
millimeter tank rounds, 25-millimeter Bradley rounds, and TOW missiles. Additionally,
the team tracks the number of targets presented and whether the target was a T80 tank, a
BMP armored vehicle, or dismounted troops (National Training Center 2004).
This researcher analyzed the average of ten National Training Center rotations.
The number of targets exposed was averaged from the ten rotations. The ten rotations
were composed of the last two rotations of fiscal year 2002 and eight rotations for fiscal
year 2003. The definition of exposed is the number of targets that pop up to be engaged
or fired upon. The number of rounds to kill each target was averaged.
41
The live fire is normally two offensive days and a defense day. For the purpose of
this research the two days of offense was combined to determine the average rounds
fired.
Lethality at the National Training Center is very similar to the lethality at the
Battle Command Training Program. The multi integrated laser engagement system ranges
are set the same for opposing force and the United States equipment. The setting for
survivability is also set very close to equal. These factors force maneuver commanders to
make better plans and decisions during combat.
Table 20 shows the ammunition used for a brigade live-fire exercise at the
National Training Center. The table also illustrates the amount of ammunition on hand
and the percentage of ammunition that was consumed.

Tube, per Day
MLRS N/A N/A N/A
120-millimeter 880 582 66 % 3.31
Rounds
TOW Missiles 47 47 100 % .13
25-millimeter 10,800 4,038 37 % 11.22
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles N/A N/A N/A
2.75-inch Rockets N/A N/A N/A
Rounds
NOTE: Two reasons for the TOW missile number to be so low are: (1) The cost of the missile
does not allow for a large amount of them to be expended in training, (2) The wire left behind, as
residue must be cleaned up in order to restore the training area. Additionally, during offensive
operation the vehicles can tangle up the wire and create safety hazards in the environment. So
they use a reduced amount of TOW missiles on the offensive operation at the National Training
Center.
42
In the examination of tables 21, 22, and 23, the percentage of usage is equal to or
less than the amount of targets exposed and the number of weapon systems participating.
Additionally, there are trends developing--one is that the military uses a much lower
amount of ammunition on hand in actual combat operations than it uses in training
exercises. The second is the military begins training exercises with a lot less ammunition
on hand than it has at the beginning of actual combat operations. There are two reasons
that the military begins training exercises with less ammunition than in combat
operations. The first is that when using live ammunition in training the turn in process for
unused ammunition is very difficult, so there is an analysis of how many targets will
actually be engaged. Also, training is set up not to use more than one basic load of
ammunition. The reason in simulation to start with less ammunition is to exercise the
logistic system for the supply planners.
Table 21. Average Number of Targets Presented at the National Training Center
Target Type Offense Defense Remarks
T80 Tanks 22 50 54 % less in the offense than in
the defense
BMPs 50 95 47 % less in the offense than in
the defense
Dismounts 150 50 300 % more in the offense than
in the defense
Note: The difference in the number of dismounts is because of the order of battle in the
scenario. The scenario is that the enemy is dismounted in the defense in dug in positions
in order to create realistic environment. However, the number of dismounts does not
affect the outcome of this study, because the weapon systems studied are not primarily
used to destroy dismounted troops.
43
Table 22. Average Number of Rounds Fired at the National Training Center
Ammunition Offense Defense Remarks
120-millimeter 159 423 63 % less in the offense than in
Rounds the defense
25-millimeter 1592 2446 45 % less in the offense than in
Rounds the defense
TOW Missiles 2 45 96 % less in the offense than in
the defense
Table 23. Average Number of Weapon Systems Participating

at the National Training Center
Type of System Offense Defense Remarks
M1 Abrams Tank 14 44 68 % less in the offense than
in the defense
M2 Bradley IFV 28 90 69 % less in the offense than
in the defense
In order to create a feasible test the researcher had to look at two additional pieces
of information: what percentage of a basic load was consumed in operations and
exercises and how many basic loads were available at the outset of the operations or
exercises?
In table 23 takes the basic combat load for each weapon system involved in each
operation or exercise is multiplied it by the number of systems in order to get the total
amount of ammunition for one basic load for the entire theater. That total is the amount
of ammunition required to have every weapon system at the full basic combat load at the
beginning of the operation or exercise. The next step is to divide that number into the
total amount of ammunition on hand in theater. From that information it can be
determined how many times all systems could have been fully reloaded (if it had
completely expended all ammunition) with a full basic combat load. Once the calculation
44
is complete, the basic load is then compared with the actual amount of ammunition used
during the operation or exercise.
With the new Brigade Combat Team concept of basic loads, the amount of
ammunition on hand would be about three combat loads: one combat load on the weapon
system, one in the forward support company, and one in the brigade support battalion.
Table 24. Basic Combat Load Amounts and Total Ammunition on Hand
M1 Basic load / M2 Basic load / Total AH-64 Basic load / MLRS Basic
Total in theater in theater Total in theater load / Total in
theater
Operation Desert 47,120 / 206,075 330,000 / 3,694,255 328,800 / 586,652 4536 / 17,145
Storm 120-millimeter 25-millimeter 30-millimeter Rockets/
Missiles
11,000 / 18,564 2192 / 11,516
TOW Missiles Hellfire Missiles
11,508 / 52,319
2.75 Rockets
Operation Iraqi 8,880/ 65,000 468,000 / 702,000 183,600 / 750,000 2,376 / 9,000
Freedom 120-millimeter 25-millimeter 30-millimeter Rockets/
Missiles
1,560 / 8,500 1,224 / 25,000
TOW Missiles Hellfire Missiles
6,426 / 155,480
2.75 Rockets
BCTP Division N/A N/A 21,600 / 29,400 432 / 276
Exercise 30mm Rockets/
Missiles
144 / 1,344
Hellfire Missiles
756 / 6,048
2.75 Rockets
NTC BDE Live- 1,760 / 2,320 135,000 / 106,200 N/A N/A
Fire Exercise 120-millimeter 25-millimeter
450 / 47
TOW Missiles
There are additional ways to look at ammunition consumption that may help more
accurately predict the future. The Army could use historical data by taking the percentage
45
of a basic load that was used in Operation Desert Storm and what percentage of a basic
load was used in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This analysis compared the data from table 24
and table 17 in order to illustrate the percentage usage of one basic load for Operation
Desert Storm of the four-day period of ground combat. The researcher used table 17 to
show the same comparisons for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The most significant piece of data in this part of the research was that the MLRS
was the only system that used more than one basic load. The basic load for all MLRS
systems equals 4,536 rockets, and during the operation the MLRS used a total of 6,604
rockets. Another factor for the large use of MLRS during Operation Desert Storm was
that it was used extensively for counterfire missions. Also, the directive to reduce
collateral damage during Operation Iraqi Freedom put additional restraints on the use of
MLRS. The usage on MLRS rockets in Operation Iraqi Freedom was 23 percent of a
basic load over the twenty-one day period. There was never a time when any launcher
was critically low on ammunition in either operation.
The M1 Abrams ammunition used in Operation Desert Storm was 30 percent of a
basic load over a four-day period compared to 18 percent of a basic load over a twenty-
one-day period. This comparison shows two things that can be used in future planning.
The first is that the Army does not use up a basic load during either combat operation.
The second is that planners can depend on this data in most any scenario--heavy armor-
on-armor or light-armor resistance.
The same conclusion can be made for the M2 Bradley in both conflicts. In
Operation Desert Storm the M2 used only 9 percent of a basic load of TOW missiles, but
did use 50 percent of a basic load of 25-millimeter ammunition over the four-day combat
46
operation. Comparing this to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the M2 used 24 percent of a basic
load of TOW missiles and only 4 percent of a basic load of 25-millimeter ammunition
over a twenty-one-day combat operation. This information is important for planners to
use in the future. The most important thing that a planner needs to take away from this
research is that the Army has never used up the basic load in the entire span of the
operation. So the need for large amounts of ammunition resupply is not that great.
The final comparison is with the AH-64 attack helicopter. The expectation of the
attack helicopter is that it will be able to expend several basic loads in one day. The
helicopter has the capability to fly back to a rearming and refueling area as needed.
However, that expectation has several factors that need to be taken into consideration.
One is that the helicopter will have enough targets to engage to expend all of its
ammunition, and the second is that the weather will allow the helicopter to be used.
The number of Hellfire missiles used in both Operation Desert Storm and
Operation Iraqi Freedom was 38 percent of one basic load with the only difference being
the duration of the operation. However, the amount of 30-millimeter ammunition used in
the two operations is quite different--9 percent of one basic load in Operation Desert
Storm in comparison to 19 percent of one basic load in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This
can possibly be attributed to the type of enemy the Army fought in the two different
operations. Finally, the amount of 2.75-inch rockets was 18 percent of one basic load
consumed during Operation Desert Storm and 21 percent of one basic load consumed
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
In comparing the usage of ammunition in both operations there is a great deal of
information that can be used in future planning. The planners need to know that in the
47
past two major conflicts the Army has not come close to using one basic load worth of
ammunition for the weapons systems studied in this thesis. Therefore, the transportation
assets could be used more effectively elsewhere, for more critical items.
Tables 25 and 26 contain the calculations of what ammunition should have been
consumed in each operation and exercise using the tables from FM101-10-1/2, Staff
Officers’ Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning
Factors. These tables are created by taking the operation or exercise and determining
how many of what type of weapon system participated. Then it was determined whether
the operation was offensive or defensive, and the length of the exercise was also
determined. From those factors used in table 2, a column was created to show what
ammunition should have been consumed. Finally, the actual amount of ammunition
consumed was compared to actual versus predicted usage to identify differences.
Table 25. Operation Desert Storm Calculations from FM 101-10-1/2

and Actual Ammunition Usage
FM 101-10-1/2 Actual Usage Difference in
Percentage
120-millimeter 93,062 14,061 15 Percent
Rounds
TOW 50,600 964 2 Percent
25-millimeter Rounds 1,234,200 165,295 13 Percent
Hellfire Missiles 13,974 843 6 Percent
2.75-inch Rockets 15,618 2,035 13 Percent
30-millimeter Rounds 552,658 28,621 5 Percent
MLRS Rockets 52,353 6,604 13 Percent
Note: The calculation is for four days of combat in Operation Desert Storm.
48
Table 26. Operation Iraqi Freedom Calculations from FM 101-10-1/2
Percentage
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles 41,616 462 1 Percent
30-millimeter Rounds 1,512,864 12,057 Less than 1
Percent
MLRS Rockets 158,004 548 Less than 1
Percent
Note: The calculation is for twenty-one days of combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Logistical Estimate Worksheet was used to create table 26. The formulas in
the Log Estimate Worksheet were used to calculate the ammunition consumption rate for
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Table 27. Operation Iraqi Freedom Calculations from Logistical Estimate

Worksheet and Actual Ammunition Usage
Logistical Estimate Actual Usage Difference in
Worksheet Percentage
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles 1050 462 44 Percent
MLRS Rockets 16,107 548 3 Percent
Note: The calculation is for the 21 days of major combat operations of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
Tables 28 and 29 illustrate the forecast from FM 101-10-1/2 and actual
ammunition usage in a division warfighter exercise at the National Training Center.

49
Table 28. Division Warfighter Exercise Calculations from FM 101-10-1/2
Percentage
120-millimeter 14,062 N/A N/A
Rounds
TOW 5,152 N/A N/A
25-millimeter Rounds 125,664 N/A N/A
Hellfire Missiles 918 1,102 102 Percent
2.75-inch Rockets 1026 2,480 17 Percent
MLRS Rockets 4,986 125 3 Percent
Note: The calculation is for the four days of a division warfighter exercise.
Table 29. National Training Center Calculations from FM 101-10-1/2

FM 101-10-1/2 Actual Usage Difference
expressed in
Percentage
120-millimeter 2,068 582 28 Percent
Rounds
TOW 990 47 5 Percent
Hellfire Missiles 450 N/A N/A
2.75-inch Rockets 594 N/A N/A
30-millimeter Rounds 19,638 N/A N/A
MLRS Rockets N/A N/A N/A
Note: The calculation is for the two days of a National Training Center rotation.
After analyzing tables 25-29, research shows that FM 101-10-1/2 grossly
overestimates the ammunition consumption. This could cause a great misuse of
transportation assets during combat operations.
Table 30 is a summary of rounds per system, per day. The significance of this
table is the ability to compare the planning figure from the Logistical Estimate Worksheet
to the actual usage in combat and training.
50
Table 30. Summary of Rounds per System, per Day
Weapon Planning Figure Desert Storm Iraqi BCTP NTC

System Freedom
120-millimeter 1.19 2.98 .26 3.31
Rounds
TOW .19 .11 .06 .13
25-millimeter 20.53 18.74 2.44 11.22
Rounds
Hellfire .55 .77 .14 15.31
Missiles
2.75-inch .87 1.86 .41 34.44
Rockets
30-millimeter 4.44 26.11 10.91 85.75
Rounds
MLRS Rockets 4.91 1.4 .14 1.74
In summary, all calculation of ammunition usage is extremely high. The good
aspect of the high calculation is that the military will not run out of ammunition. The bad
aspect of being grossly overcalculated is that the transportation assets that are required to
move such ammunition are more than likely needed to do something else.
There are several facts that can be identified from table 31. The first fact
illustrates that using FM 101-10-1/2 to forecast ammunition results in numbers that are
too high and should not be used to forecast ammunition in the future. The second
observation is that the Logistical Estimate Worksheet that was developed after Operation
Desert Storm and that used the data from Operation Desert Storm is more accurate at
forecasting ammunition. The Logistical Estimate Worksheet is a good tool. But, it could
still use some refinement. The final fact is that the ammunition usage in Operation Iraqi
Freedom was still overforecast. However, part of that overestimation can be attributed to
the fact that the original war plan called for more weapon systems to be in theater. The
51
ammunition was available to support that original plan and therefore would be seen as an
overcalculation with the reduced number of weapon systems used in this study.
Table 31. Ammunition Forecasting Model Comparison--

Rounds per Weapon System, per Day
Weapon System FM 101-10-1/2 LEW Desert Storm Iraqi Freedom

MLRS 75 4.91 1.4 .14
120-millimeter 16 .75 2.98 .26
Rounds
TOW Missiles 5 .08 .11 .06
25-millimeter 174 20.53 18.74 2.44
Rounds
Hellfire Missiles 12 .55 .77 .14
2.75-inch Rockets 21 .13 1.86 .41
30-millimeter 628 4.44 26.11 10.91
Rounds
52
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Modern weapons systems and technology, in the hands of well-

trained and well-led forces, provide a decisive edge in modern
combat. United States ground forces had equipment that enabled
them to defeat the Iraqi forces decisively in Operation Desert
Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moreover, United States
forces were trained to maximize this equipment’s effectiveness.
Tough training, a technological edge, and continued modernization
are crucial to ensuring the lethality of the smaller future force.
(2004, 55)
Department of Defense
Conclusions
Primary Research Question
In modern warfare, utilizing current equipment, does the United States Army
correctly forecast the amount of ammunition it will use in combat operations? The
answer to this question is no. In fact, the Army has realized that the FM 101-10-1/2 has
no more use in forecasting ammunition. Also, FM 4-30.1, Munitions Distribution in the
Theater of Operations, states: “A review of United States Army involvement in recent
operations clearly indicates the need to improve logistical planning. It is critical that
Class V support planning be detailed and threat-based” (Department of the Army 2003,
4-2).
This research from the Log Estimate Worksheet also shows the same amount of
ammunition would be used defending against or attacking the same amount of enemy
forces by the same amount of United States Army forces. Therefore, the Army needs only
one formula for calculating ammunition for combat operations. The research suggests
that the current formula in the Logistical Estimate Worksheet with some adjustments
53
would still be valid. A closer look at the Logistical Estimate Worksheet shows that the
attack, delay, and prepared defense use the same number to forecast ammunition.
Military professional development schools may want to teach that is does not require any
more ammunition in the defense than it does in the offense.
Implications
The implications of this study are that the range, accuracy, and lethality of the
United States weapons system appear to reduce the ammunition requirements of modern
warfare.
The implications of second- and third-order effects would be that many of the
transportation assets used to move the overabundance of ammunition is wasted. For
example, in the book Moving Mountains the ammunition forecast is 9,000 tons daily. The
amount of common-user, land transport assets that are needed to move that much materiel
is 450 transporters daily. The issue that the researcher had with this information was that
in the book it appears to be a huge success. The equation that was shown in the literature
review (45-4=65) should bring to someone’s attention that the Army does not do well in
the calculation of the forecast of ammunition during logistical planning. Taking a closer
look at the mathematical equation, it has a value of sixty-five days worth of supply which
equals to an overestimate or forecast of 62 percent of the forty-five days originally
planned. Additionally, historical data shows a surge of ammunition consumption in the
beginning of a conflict and then tapers off to low level of consumption. This disconnect
in the numbers could be one of two things. The first may be a command directive to have
60 days worth of supplies on hand. The other, and the belief of the researcher, is that the
54
amount of ammunition forecast per round, per weapon system, per day was high and with
throughput of supply the stockpile would naturally increase.
Another potentially fatal flaw in the logistical view might be failure to identify
that the military has overestimated that ammunition consumption rate. The reason it is a
flaw is because it will be continued. Instead of getting a more accurate method, the Army
may have an attitude of “that is the way it has always done it” or “it worked before.”
Additionally, the use of fewer ships for moving ammunition stocks would free those
assets to move more combat power or combat enablers. The research does not deal with
how much cargo space these large quantities of ammunition actually occupy on ships or
in warehouses.
Recommendations
The research discovered myriad other areas that are recommended for further
study.
1. One recommendation is to conduct a study of small-caliber weapons--
especially for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
2. Table 32 describes battle damage by unit and types of targets destroyed. This
data was gathered through the use of the gun camera systems in the helicopters.
Additionally, further research should be done to discover if the success of attack aviation
in Operation Desert Storm had any significant impact on planning for Operation Iraqi
Freedom. A recommendation that a battle damage assessment table (see table 33) be
developed for the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley as done for AH-64 attack
helicopter as seen in table 33.
55
Table 32. Battle Damage Assessment Chart for Aviation Units
in Operation Desert Storm
UNIT Tanks Armored Artillery Wheeled Bunkers/ Other Total

Vehicles Vehicles Buildings
1/24th 33 50 38 54 5 8 188
1/101st 0 6 3 18 5 22 54
1/82nd 3 7 3 5 5 0 23
5/6th 0 0 5 35 0 2 42
3/227 0 0 7 3 24 6 40
2/227 25 0 0 0 0 92 117
2/6th 57 41 15 48 24 0 185
2/1st 35 54 41 23 10 0 163
4/229th 33 39 2 18 3 1 96
3/1st 77 31 6 71 30 0 215
1/1st 15 7 1 27 0 0 50
Total 278 235 121 302 106 131 1173
Source: General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs
Division, Apache’s Performance in Desert Storm (Washington, DC: General
Accounting Office 20 April 1992), 39.
3. It would be beneficial to have these same types of tables created for Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Important trends may be identified and may be gathered from the creation
of these types of tables in weapons effects areas (see table 33).
Table 33. Battle Damage Assessment Chart for Aviation Units in Iraqi Freedom
Tanks Armored Artillery Wheeled Bunkers/ Other Total
UNIT Vehicles Vehicles Buildings
11th
AHR
101st
AA
3rd ID
56
4. Another interesting study would be in the aviation field comparing details from
the General Accounting Office to similar data gathered for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The
researcher believes that possible lessons learned in Desert Storm may have been
implemented in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The areas studied should be chain gun
malfunction and Hellfire missile accuracy. The researcher believes that the 76 percent hit
rate achieved in Operation Desert Storm will be higher for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
5. Using the Battle Command Training Program as a test base is not
recommended for future studies, unless the area to be studied is simulation related.
Additionally, the logistical data collected at the Battle Command Training Program
should never be used to validate any method of forecasting ammunition requirements.
6. The researcher recommends that the Army needs a major change in the way it
forecasts ammunition for operations. There are three courses of actions that could be
studied. The first is a history-based forecast. The second is a target threat-based forecast
and the final course of action is a combination of the two.
The first of those courses of action is that the Army needs to make up a recent
history-based forecasting formula. That can be done from data from this research and
possibly exploring other operations, such as Panama and Somalia. The data can be
collected from any operation that has consumed ammunition over a period of one day or
more. From the data gathered in this thesis, the ammunition consumption rates can be
determined for four weapon systems. The Army should rewrite the calculation formula
for ammunition consumption using modern data.
57
The second course of action should begin with a target-based enemy threat
analysis in order to predict ammunition usage. The ammunition usage estimate would be
more accurate if the enemy array is taken into account.
The capabilities exists that would assist in forecasting ammunition requirements
as the military develops the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. During the
intelligence preparation it is known how many possible heavy-armored, light-armored,
artillery, and other vehicles the enemy has at its disposal. It is possible that the military
could develop a total number of targets from that list. Also, during the logistical
preparation of the battlefield, all these details should be incorporated into the plan to
mutually support each other.
The final course of action, the preferred method recommended by the researcher,
is a combination of both historical data and enemy target-based threat analysis, along
with the experience of the individuals planning the operation. An additional factor that
could be taken into account in developing an ammunition consumption rate could be the
fact that during the last two major conflicts, in most cases, the weapon systems did not
use one basic load worth of ammunition. So another possibility could be the basic load is
where the table begins. The Army could plan on carrying two basic loads--one would be
carried by the system and the field logistical train will carry and supply the second basic
load as needed. This method would have worked in both conflicts. The only issue would
have been with MLRS in Operation Desert Storm where 1.5 basic loads were consumed.
Again, with the birth of the Brigade Combat Team concept there is a plan to have three
basic combat loads available: the first is on the weapon system; the second is located at
the forward support company; and the final is stored at the brigade support battalion.
58
Additionally, a further study could be conducted on the sizes and weights of each the
ammunition and the cubic space by pallet. Then the research could take the findings of
this study and figure out how much cargo space was wasted in order to prove the
possibility of moving more combat equipment vice unneeded ammunition. In addition,
the forecast would have to take into account other factors of mission, enemy, troops,
terrain, time, and civilians. This method could be combined with the logistical estimate
worksheet after the formulas within the worksheet have been updated or validated using
history. The logistical planner, in conjunction with the operational planner, would need to
use all means to justify ammunition consumption rates (experience, historical data,
enemy target array).
The Field Manual, 4-30.1, Munitions Distribution in the Theater of Operations,
states, “The automated operational logistics planner is the authorized method for
determining munitions planning data at all levels. FM 101-10-1/2 is no longer an
authorized tool for determining operational ammunition planning factors” (Department of
the Army 2003, 4-1). Ammunition consumption rates for all operations, including
stability and support operations, are determined using the operational logistics planner
(Department of the Army 2003, 4-1). The Army should continue to use the Logistical
Estimate Worksheet and constantly update the formulas as new data is collected.
While there have been numerous recommendations and courses of action that will
contribute to better ammunition planning, systemic success must come from within the
Army staff structure. Staffs at all levels are only as effective as their ability to integrate
their actions and capabilities into a single, synchronized entity.
59
The case has been made that failure to pay attention to the past does, in fact,
causes repetition of these failures in the future. Logisticians can update expenditure
tables, estimate ammunition usage based on threat, gather more representative data, and
rely more on the “on-the-ground” operational planners. All is folly without a staff that
plans, prepares, executes, and assesses operations in a harmony that meets the
commander’s desired intent.
The brigade combat team fighting units are a dominating force projection
capability that demands logistical efficiency more than at any period in history. The
Army is no longer threat based. The Army is, in fact, capabilities based and has proven a
dynamic force projection across the full spectrum of conflict in the contemporary
operational environment.
The Army will not be able to maintain the agility, speed, and firepower designed
into the brigade combat team concept if it fails to find a logistics tempo that mirrors it. As
the Army gains this capability and mind-set, combat service support will be noted at
every echelon; and intelligence, operations, and logistics operations must plan and
execute as one.
60
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63
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64
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
1. Certification Date: 17 June 2005
2. Thesis Author: Major William K. Freeman Jr.
3. Thesis Title: A Study of Ammunition Consumption
4. Thesis Committee Members:

Signatures:
5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate
distribution statement letter code below:
A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE
If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate
with the classified section at CARL.
6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution
Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification
statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis
and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:
EXAMPLE
Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12

Critical Technology (3) / Section 4 / 31
Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32
Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:
Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
/ /
/ /
/ /
/ /
/ /
7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:
65
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may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).
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REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:
1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S.

Government.
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potential military application.
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evaluation.
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premature dissemination.
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administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance

with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military
significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a
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STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON
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enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25;
(date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).
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A STUDY OF AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

WILLIAM K. FREEMAN JR., MAJ, USA

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major William K. Freeman Jr.

Thesis Title: A Study of Ammunition Consumption

, Thesis Committee Chair

, Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

A STUDY OF AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION, by Major William K. Freeman Jr., 76

completing this project:

- First of all to God as my initial motivation to begin the MMAS program

- Dr. Ronald E. Cuny for his encouragement and direction

- LTC David Beachum for his faith in my abilities

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............. ii

ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................13

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY .....................................................................................23

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.......53

REFERENCE LIST ...........................................................................................................61

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................64

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .................................65

AHR Attack Helicopter Regiment

DOD Department of Defense

IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle

MLRS Multiple-Launch Rocket System

TIS Thermal Imaging Systems

TOW Tube Lunched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided

Figure 1. AH 64 Attack Helicopter ...................................................................................8

Figure 2. M1 Abrams Tank ...............................................................................................9

Figure 3. M2/3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle .........................................................10

Figure 4. Multiple-Launch Rocket System .....................................................................11

Table 1. Historical Comparison from World War II and Operation

Table 2. Ammunition Usage Rates for Defense and Offense from

Table 3. Number of Combat Systems That Participate in Test Base in

Table 4. Ammunition Usage for Operation Desert Storm

Table 5. Ammunition Usage for Operation Iraqi Freedom

Table 6. Ammunition Usage for Division Warfighter Exercise

Table 7. Ammunition Usage for National Training Center Brigade

Table 8. Average Number of Targets Presented at the

Table 9. Average Number of Rounds Fired at the

Table 10. Average Number of Systems Participating at the

Table 11. Basic Combat Load Amounts and Total Ammunition

Table 12. Total of All Ammunition Used in Operation Desert Storm.............................29

Table 14. Amount of Ammunition Used in Division Warfighter Exercise .....................30

Table 15. Average Amount of 120-millimeter Rounds Fired in Offense

Table 17. Ammunition Usage for Operation Desert Storm .............................................32

Table 18. Ammunition Usage for Operation Iraqi Freedom............................................37

Table 19. Ammunition Usage for Division Warfighter Exercise ....................................40

Table 20. Ammunition Usage for National Training Center Brigade..............................42

Table 21. Average Number of Targets Presented at the

Table 22. Average Number of Rounds Fired at the