Hume and the God-Hypothesis

C. G. Prado
Hume Studies Volume VII, Number 2 (November, 1981), 154-
163.

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154.
I W M E AND TIIE GOD-BYPOTtlESIS
1

I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume's D i a l o g u e s C o n c e r n i n g
Natural Religion h a s a l w a y s been c o n t e n t i o u s . While 6ome
t h i n k it o b v i o u s t h a t P h i l o is Hume's spokesman, o t h e r s
t h i n k it is C l e a n t h e s . Whether or not P h i l o is Mume's
spokesman, h e c e r t a i n l y p r o d u c e s t h e better argument. None-
t h e l e s s , t h a t argument i a flawed by an a s s u m p t i o n which I
doubt ilume e v e r q u e s t i o n e d . I want t o consider t h a t essump-
t i o n , b u t want t o make it clear t h a t i t is n o t my i n t e n t i o n
t o d e f e n d C l e a n t h e s ' p o s i t i o n . The s e c o n d t h i n g I want t o
do in this p a p e r , whiah X h a v e not: aeon done e l s e w h e r e , f a
t o c o n n e c t Ilume's arguments i n t h e D i a l o g u e s w i t h h i s a n t h r o -
p o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of r e l i g i o s i t y .
Perhaps t h e least c o n t e n t i o u s t h i n g ab o u t t h e
D i a l o g u e s is t h a t Demea's a p r i o r i p o s i t i o n i s n o t t a k e n too
s e r i o u s l y , n o r is much t i m e s p e n t on t h e f i r s t c a u s e argu-
ment, so i m p o r t a n t from Aristotle t o L e i b n i z . What is g i v e n
serious a t t e n t i o n i s what m i g h t be described as t h e
'God-hypothesis', which is more or less t h e Argument from
Design. P h i l o rejects t h e argument for r e a s o n s w e s h a l l
r e v i e w below, b u t makes a concession. The c o n c e s s i o n i s
b a s i c a l l y t h a t it is i n t e l l i g i b l e to c o n t e n d t h a t t h e c a u s e
or c a u s e s of order i n t h e world bear 80me resemblance t o
human i n t e l l i g e n c e . The c a t c h , which is t h e p o i n t d r i v e n
home a g a i n s t C l e a n t h e s , is t h a t , w h i l e i n t e l l i g i b l e , the idea
i s u t t a r l y p o i n t l c s s . Philo says%
...
rf t h e whoEe of Natural T h e o l o g y r e s o l v e 8
i t n n % r fnto one n i m p l n , . . p r o p o o i t i o n , T-ho_t_
b h d cau;Jo O P cauaou 01' o d e r i n t h e u n i v , e r * a s
p p
i n t e l t i g o n o a : I f t h i s p r o p o s i t t o n be no*
c a p a b l e of e x t e n s i o n . . . K f it a f f o r d 8 no
infersnoe t h a t a f f e c t s human life.. . < f t h e
.
o n c l 2 o g g . . ,o a n ba a a r r i s d no f a r t h e r . . (203)
t h e n i t is w i t h o u t p o i n t .
Hum is w i l l i n g t o l e t t h e t h e i s t h a v e h i s vague
a n a l o g y , f o r i t serve8 no point. In fact, t h e t h e i s t c a n n o t
win, for to the extent that tho God-hypothesis might have
explanatory power, it approaches the status of an empirical
hypothesis, and as such loses theological import.
The Dialogues should be devastating, yet seem to
miss the mark.
Suppose we look a bit more closely at what is going
on. The position Cleanthes elaborates i s an hypothesis to
the effect that the world exhibits order and that that order
is best explained by the postulation of an order=. Clewthos'
moves are a bit more complicated, as we shall see in a mom-
ent, but this is the essential point. The hypothesis is
conceived by Hume as either competing with or completing
science. In the Enquirx we read that
The r e l i g i o u e h y p o t h e s i e... must be c o n s i d e r e d
o n l y a s a partioutcar method of a c c o u n t i n g f o r
t h e v i s i b l e phenomena o f t h e u n i v e r s e : b u t
n o . j u a t r e a s o n e r w i l t e v e r presume t o i n f e r
from i t any s i n g l e f a c t , and a l t e r or add t o
t h e phenomena, i n any s i n g l e p a r t i c u l a r . ( 2 3 7 )
The passage is virtually a summary of Philo's thesis.
There can be no move from an inferred cause to anything
further in terms of either facts or properties. Cleanthes
may be grudgingly granted his causal supposition, but he is
not allowed to use it. Againz
And what can you s a y mom, a l l o w i n g a t 1 your
...
s u p p o s i t i o n s and r e a s o n i n g s ? f O ) u r conduct
and d e p o r t m e n t i n l i f e is atilt t h e same...
You p e r o t o t i n Cmagdning, t h a t , i f we g r a n t
t h a t d i v i n e e x i s t e n o e , . . . y ou may s a f e l y i n f e r
consequenoes f r o m it... IOU aeem n o t t o
ranromlcr, t h a t a l l y o u r r e a e o n i n g o . . .can o n l y
b e drawn from e f f e c t s t o o a u a e s . , . (238)
The crucial failure is that
A l l t h e philosophy ... ...
and a l l t h e r e l i g i o n
w i l l n e v e r b e a b l e t o c a r r y us beyond t h e
usual c a u s e o f e x p e r i e n u e , or g i v e u s measures
of conduot and b e h a v i o u r d i f f e r e n t from tiaose
whioh a r e f u r n i e h e d b y r e f l e a t i o n e on commorr
life. (244)
God, as putative cause simply makes no difference, so long as
we conform to the standards of rational thought.
 156.
I t is i m p o r t a n t t o be clear t h a t what is b e i n g re-
jected is God as "a f r u i t f u l r i v a l t o s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t o r y
n o t i o n s , s u c h a s gravity". 3
The r e j e c t i o n o f God as e x p l a n a t o r y p r i n c i p l e t u r n s
o n t h e i l l e g i t i m a c y o f C l e o n t h o o ' moves. A s Peter J o n e s
puta it,
C l e a n t h e s makes two i n f e r e n c e s : f i r s t l y , t o
d e s i g n a s a cause, and s e c o n d l y , from d e s i g n
t o a d e s i g n e r i n whom t h e cause re9ides.)
Hume's a t t e n t i o n i n e f f e c t focuses on t h e second
move. P h i l o ' s c o n c e s s i o n shows a c e r t a i n w i l l i n g n e s s t o
accept something l i k e t h e f i r s t move, s i n c e c o n c e s s i o n of
t h o possible s i m i l a r i t y t o i n t e l l i g e n c e r e q u i r e s c o n c e s s i o n
of a b a s i s for t h e p o s t u l a t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e . I t is
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e e n t i t y * i n whom t h e c a u s e r e s i d e s "
t h a t is most b i t t e r l y c o n t e s t e d .
F o r my p u r p o s e s what is i m p o r t a n t i s t h e b a s i s f o r
t h e h y p o t h e s i s , f o r C l e a n t h e s ' p o s t u l a t i o n , namely t h e p e r -
c e p t i o n of h o l i s t i c and c o h e s i v e o r d e r . I t is t h a t p e r c e p -
t i o n t h a t makes i t p o s s i b l e t o consider t h e world as (pos-
s i b l y ) an a r t i f a c t and h e n c e i n need of an a r t i f i c e r . I t i s
c r u c i a l t h a t t h e way C l e a n t h e a i s shown t o go wrong makes
s e n s e o n l y i f h i s i n f e r e n c e is d i s t i n c t and separable from
i t s basis.
Hume seems t o accept C l e a n t h e s ' basis, b u t b a l k s a t
u s i n g t h e w o r l d as an o c c a s i o n €or t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of a
r a d i c a l l y g e n e r a l e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t which is i n f a c t o t i o s e
because of its v e r y g e n e r a l i t y and t h e lack of specific sup-
p o r t f o r i t s p o s t u l a t i o n and €or i t s p u t a t i v e powers.
But t h e t r o u b l e i s t h a t , as s h o u l d by now be e v i d e n t ,
Hume is t h r o u g h o u t c o n c e i v i n g o f C l e a n t h e s as r e p r e s e n t i n g
t h o core o f t h e t h e i s t ' s i n i t i a l a c c e p t a n c e of r e l i g i o s i t y
e n h y p o t h e s i s b a s e d on e v i d e n c e . T h i s is t h e assumption
w i t h which I am c o n c e r n e d , t h a t t h e i s m is e s s e n t i a l l y i n f e r -
e n t i a l . C l e a n t h e s ' p o o i t i o n i s s o m e t h i n g of an i d e a l : t h e
t h e i l s t i c hypothesis c a r e f u l l y and r e f l e c t i v e l y a r t i c u l a t e d ,
a t its b e s t . - and s t i l l found w a n t i n g . But t h a t is 80 o n l y
 157.
i f t h e i s m is i n f e r e n t i a l and as s u c h y i e l d s t o P h i l o ' s
arguments. Let u s b r i e f l y l o o k a t Ifume9s p o s i t i o n on t h e
point.
Hume n e v e r q u i t e a l l o w s Demea t h e p o s i t i o n h e s h o u l d .
Demea c l e a r l y r e p r e s e n t s t h e view t h a t r e l i g i o s i t y is n o t
i n f e r e n t i a l : No man...ever e n t e r t a i n e d a s e r i o u s doubt w i t h
regard t o a t r u t h , so c e r t a i n and s e l f - e v i d e n t . (113) But
P h i l o immediat e l y recasts t h e p o s i t i o n : T h e , . . t r u t h , as you
W t t o b n ~ t * t * c , i n unqurobionohlo nnrl no1 f - c v i d a n t . Mothinz
e x i s t 8 w i t h o u t a cau86... (114, my emphasis) Demea's is a n
a p r i o r i p o s i t i o n , b u t P h f l o (iiume) h e r e recasts i t as a n
a posteriori one, a p p e a l i n g a s h e does t o t h e n o t i o n o f ade-
quate cause. Demea tries a g a i n ;
.. .
.each man f e e l s . . t h e t r u t h o f r e l i g i o n
w i t h i n h i e own b r e a s t ; and from a con-
e o i o u e n e e e of h i e i m b e c i l i t g and m i s e r y ,
r a t h e r t h a n from any r e a s o n i n g , is led t o
eeek p r o t e c t i o n from t h a t Being, on whom
he and a l l n a t u r e i e dependent. (165)
Rudolf O t t o c o u l d h a v e s a i d t h a t . But t o t h e e x t e n t t o
which Hume t o o k s e r i o u s l y s u c h a p o s i t i o n i t is j u s t t h a t of
God as " t h e name o f a p r i v a t e s e n t i m e n t " , as J o n e s s u g g e s t s .
I n terms of what h e c o n s i d e r s s e r i o u s l y a t i s s u e , God i s an
e x p l a n a t o r y n o t i o n . I n The Natural H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n w e
read t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f God , . . o p r i n g a n o t from un o r i g i n a z
i n e t i n c t o r primary i m p r e e s i o n of n a t u r e (311, which is as
close a s Hume w i l l come t o a n i n n a t e or a p r i o r i n o t i o n o r
p u t a t i v e aware n e s s o f m a n i f e s t divine p r e s e n c e . The
i m p o r t a n t n o t i o n o f God is e x p l a n a t o r y , one a r r i v e d a t
through i n f e r e n c e and p o s t u l a t i o n i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e :
. . t h o i g n o r a n t m u l t i t u d c m o t f i r e t e n t o r t c i i n uoinc Urovcting
and f a m i l i a r n o t i o n of 8uperCor powers, b e f o r s t h e y s t r e t c h
t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n t o t h a t p e r f e c t Being... (34) First there
is p r i m i t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms of e l u s i v e b u t powerful
agency, t h e a t t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which is poly-
t h e i s m . Only l a t e r d o e s a u n i f i e d c o n c e p t i o n of an a l m i g h t y
God enter t h e p i c t u r e . But w h a t i s c r u c i a l h e r e i s liuma's
c o n c e p t i o n of r e l i g i o s i t y as b e g i n n i n g i n a t t r i b u t i o n of
158.
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a g e n t s and t h e n p r o g r e s s i n g t o a s t a t e
where a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is a t t r i b u t e d t o a s i n g l e omni-
p o t e n t a g e n t . I n d i s c u s s i n g polytheism, which he t a k e s as
t h e i n i t i a l move t o r e l i g i o s i t y , h e s a y s :
We may c o n c l u d e , t h e r e f o r e , that.. . t h e f i r s t
i d e a s of r e l i g i o n a r o s e not from a oontsm-
p l a t i o n of the worke of n a t u w , b u t from a
eoncern oith r e g a r d t o t h e e v e n t s of life,
and from t h e inoesc~ant hopso and fears, tohioh
a o t u a t s the human mgnd. (38)
Here C l e a n t h c s ' h o l i s t i c p e r c e p t i o n of order i s rele-
g a t e d t o a very s o p h i s t i c a t e d and later s t a g e o f s p e c u l a t i o n ,
and t h e God-hypothesis is anchored i n mundane e x p l a n a t i o n ,
i n answers t o q u e s t i o n s such as why 'a c h i l d d i e d , why t h e
c r o p f a i l e d , why a b a t t l e w a s lost. The p r i m i t i v e question
is never "What happened?", it is 'Who d i d i t ? " , and t h e
answer is polytheism. Much l a t e r t h e God-hypothesis is re-
f i n e d u n t i l it is adequate t o = q u e s t i o n , and hence t o
none.
Now t h i s is an eminently s e n s i b l e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l
account of t h e g e n e s i s and development of r e l i g i o n , b u t i t
would be e i t h e r a l i e n t o some t h e i s t s or r e j e c t e d a s a t most
t h e c a u s a l p r o c e s s by which men came t o a c q u i r e r e l i g i o u s
concepts and know God. C l e a n t h e s is n o t , to some t h e i s t s ,
t h e i n h e r i t o r of r e l i g i o n . The c r u c i a l f l a w is, as i n d i c a t e d ,
the c o n c e p t i o n o f r e l i g i o s i t y as i n f e r e n t i a l .
Hum seems t o have been f a s c i n a t e d by r e l i g i o n €or
most of h i s l i f e . As an a t h e i s t , l a c k i n g what Kai N i e l s e n
once c a l l e d " p a r t i c i p a n t ' s undorstnnding", ha worked out
t h a t f a s c i n a t i o n i n terms o f t r y i n g to understand how r e l i g i -
o s i t y is a consequence of d i s c u r s i v e thought. C l e m t h e a i s
supposed t o embody t h e b e s t r e l i g i o u s thought, t h e most c a r e -
f u l l y and consciotlsly worked o u t v e r s i o n o f t h e God-hypothesis. ,
Vemea is a c o u n t e r p o i n t : t h e t h e i s t who f a i l s t o understand
t h e nature o f his own h y p o t h e s i s , who h a s confused i n f e r e n c e
w i t h s e l f - e v i d a n t t r u t h . Deraea see8 normative content as
p a r t of t h a t t r u t h ; C l e a n t h e s recognizea i t must be h a r d
won. And P h i l o , of course, is o u t t o ehov t h a t neitner
 159.
e x p l a n a t o r y n o r n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t a r e t o be had.
But h a v i n g s a i d a l l t h i s , and a s s u n i n g t h a t t h e
a s s u m p t i o n I c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o is o p e r a n t , why i s P h i l o ' s
argument less t h a n d e v a s t a t i n g i f d i r e c t e d o n l y a t t h o s e
t h e i s t s f o r whom t h o God-hypothesis & i n f e r e n t i a l ?
The c o n c e p t i o n of God i n q u e s t i o n i n t h e D i a l o g u e s
i s t a k e n as restricted by t h e basis f o r his p o s t u l a t i o n :
p e r c e i v e d o r d e r . B u t P h i l o a c t u a l l y e x c e e d s t h o s e restric-
t i o n s i n making h i s c o n c e s s i o n . What Itume seems t o miss i s
what L e i b n i z was a t p a i n s to a r g u e : t h a t t h e c r u c i a l p o i n t
i s t h a t t h e w o r l d , or i t s o r d e r , i s e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f
a g e n c y a s opposed t o c a u s a l f o r c e s . I f w e t a k e P h i l o ' s con-
cession s e r i o u s l y , i t amounts t o a c o n c e s s i o n o f t h e i n t e l -
ligibility - -
on t h e basis of p e r c e i v e d o r d e r or p o s t u l a t i n g
a n act as t h e c a u s e of t h e world or i t s order. S e c o n d l y ,
t h e r e is t h e a t l e a s t t a c i t a s s e n t t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
b a s i s f o r t h e p o s t u l a t i o n r t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f o r d e r a s some-
t h i n g d i s t i n c t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t may s e r v e , w h e t h e r or
n o t a d e q u a t e l y , as a r e a s o n t o p o s t u l a t e a c r e a t i v e act.
With r e s p e c t t o t h e f o r m e r , i f God is i n i t i a l l y c o n c e i v e d of
as a n a g e n t , t h e r e is more b e i n g p o s t u l a t e d t h a n a mere
i n t e l l i g e n t c a u s e , for t h e c o n c e s s i o n o f s i m i l a r i t y t o i n t e l -
l i g e n c e is empty i f i t is n o t a c o n c e s s i o n o f agency.
I t may be t h o u g h t t h a t t h e c o n c e s s i o n s i m p l y s h o u l d
n o t be t a k e n s e r i o u s l y , t h a t Hume ha8 p r e c i s e l y e m p t i e d i t
of c o n t e n t b y p r e c l u d i n g t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,
p u r p o s e s , etc. t o t h e God o f t h e C l e a n t h e a n h y p o t h e s i s . But
t h e matter is n o t so s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d as t h a t . The c o n c e s s i o n
c a n n o t b e s i m p l y a p i e c e o f i r o n y or a nod i n t h e d i r e c t i o n
o f p o p u l a r p i e t y . The r e a s o n is, a g a i n , Hume's a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t t h e i s m is i n f e r e n t i a l : s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e basis f o r
Cleanthes' postulation. I n a l l o w i n g t h e basis, Hnme commits
h i m s e l f t o t h e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of t h e minimal a n a l o g y .
H u m c o n c e i v e s of r e l i g i o s i t y a s i n f e r e n t i a l and o f
C l e a n t h e s ' p o s i t i o n as a l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n t o a l e n g t h y
h i s t o r i c a l i n f e r e n t i a l p r o c e s s : as crowning what began i n
160.
simple polytheism a s t h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f otherwise inexplic-
a b l e e v e n t s t o h i d d e n a g e n t s . A s noted above, as an a n t h r o -
p o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t Hume's p r o g r e s s i o n is of g r e a t interest,
b u t i t d o e s n o t do j u s t i c e to a l l t h e i s t s . The consequence
is t h a t P h i l o ' s p o s i t i o n is i n n o c u o u s w i t h respect t o m-
i n f e r e n t i a l t h e i s t s , and undermined w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n f e r -
e n t i a l t h e i s t s b e c a u s e of t h e conceded a n a l o g y .
I f w e d i s t i n g u i s h between a p r i o r i n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l
t h e i s t s , s u c h as Domea, what emerges is t h a t t h e l a t t e r
would a r g u e t h a t w e c a n n o t d r i v e a wedge, a s liume d o e s ,
between t h e p e r c e p t i o n o n which C l e a n t h e s bases h i s
s p e c u l a t i o n and t h a t s p e c u l a t i o n . .
A t t h i s p o i n t w e m i g h t recall a remark J o h n Hick
makes i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s The P h i l o s o p h y of R e l i g i o n
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e a posteriori a r g u m e n t s are a l l cir-
c u l a r b e c a u s e t h e y r e l y on t a k i n g u p an a t t i t u d e toward t h e
w o r l d which e n t a i l s what t h e a r g u m e n t s seek to e s t a b l i s h .
Hume is wrong i n t a k i n g i t t h a t t h e God-hypothesis always
i n v o l v e s a ' n e u t r a l ' f i r s t s t e p w h e r e i n e v e n t s are a t t e n d e d
t o as e x h i b i t i n g a n order t h a t c a n be c o n s i d e r e d as p o s s i b l y
t h e consequence of c a u s a l p r o c e s s e s on t h e o n e hand or pos-
s i b l y t h e consequence o f agency OK d e s i g n o n t h e o t h e r . Ad-
m i t t e d l y H u m e does n o t t h i n k t h a t s t e p is a simple o n e o f
l o o k i n g around: h e sees it as t h e c u l m i n a t i o n of a l e n g t h y
p r o c e s s of e v e r more g r a n d a t t r i b u t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
But t h a t f i r s t s t e p is n o n e t h e l e s s r e q u i r e d , else C l e a n t h e s
h a s no p o s i t i o n . The a postariori n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l t h e i s t
would p r e c i s e l y a r g u e t h a t C l e a n t h e s h a s n o p o s i t i o n , t h a t
p e r c e p t i o n is n o t of a n e u t r a l order b u t of m a n i f e s t ( d i v i n e )
agencx. The p e r c e p t i o n i n q u e s t i o n is of t h e world an
a r t i f a c t , n o t o f a n order of a magnitude t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e
p o s t u l a t i o n t h a t t h e world m i g h t be a n a r t i f a c t .
Hun0 m a k e s i t a p p e a r t h a t t h e t h e i s t employs God as
a n e x p l a n a t o r y p r i n c i p l e or p r i n c i p l e of c o h e s i o n i l l e g i t i -
m a t e l y i n t h a t t h e t h e i s t is u s i n g a h y p o t h e s i s which s i m p l y
f a i l s t o s u p p o r t t h e w e i g h t p u t on i t . Given t h e scmario
 161.
i n q u e s t i o n , t h e i s m would be u n d e r s t o o d a s a p r o g r e s s i o n of
evermore dubioils a t t r i b u t i o n s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l e a d i n g up
t o t h e most g r a n d a t t r i b u t i o n t o a n e n t i t y masquerading as
t h e v i a b l e p o s t u l a t e o f an i n f e r e n t i a l p r o c e s s t h a t i s
grounded o n s o m c t h i n q t h a t is s i m p l y i n o d c q u a t c . The compli-
. c a t i o n i s t h a t a t l e a s t f o r many t h e r e is n o i n d e p e n d e n t
basis - a d e q u a t e or i n a d e q u a t e . The a t t r i b u t i o n in q u e s t i o n
i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e p e r c e p t i o n on which it a l l e g e d l y
rests: C l e a n t h e s ' move t o d e s i g n is t h e same a s h i s percep-
t i o n of t h e o r d e r which a l l e g e d l y w a r r a n t s t h a t move. I t
s u f f i c e s , t o undermine P h i l o ' s argument, i f some m a i n t a i n
t h a t t h e r e is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o u s a d i s c e r n i b l e independent
basis f o r Cleanthes' p o s t u l a t i o n .
A s for t h e i n f e r e n t i a l t h e i s t , l i k e C l e a n t h e s , who
would a c c e p t t h e independence o f t h e b a s i s f o r t h e
God-hypothesis, t h e t r o u b l e is t h a t as Hume acknowledges
t h r o u g h P h i l o ' s c o n c e s s i o n , t h a t basis does seem t o s u p p o r t
t h e minimal a n a l o g y , and s i n c e t h a t a n a l o g y i n v o l v e s agency,
a s I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , C l e a n t h e s is l e f t o n l y b e n t , b u t n o t
b r o k e n , by P h i l o ' s a r g u m e n t s .
I t w i l l n o d o u b t be a r g u e d t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e
a p o s t e r i o r i n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l t h e i s t is i n c o h e r e n t . Examples
of e s p o u s a l s of t h i s view are r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e . F o r i n s t a n c e ,
John Hick, t o whom I referred e a r l i e r , d e s c r i b e d t h e man of
f a i t h a s c o n s c i o u s of God as a d i v i n e p r e s e n c e , n o t a s be-
l i e v i n g i n God on t h e basis of e v i d e n c e . P e r h a p s h i s best
known s t a t e m e n t of t h i s view is t o be found i n h i s " R o l i g i o u s
F a i t h a s Experiencing-As", an a r t i c l e w i d e l y a n t h o l o g i z e d .
B u t t h e r e is no need t o a p p e a l t o s p e c i f i c a u t h o r s . Evcn
though Bume's n o t i o n of an e x p l a n a t o r y h y p o t h e s i s is e s s e n t i -
a l l y t h a t o f a p r e d i c t i v e h y p o t h e s i s , t h e r e is a n o t h e r long
t r a d i t i o n , namely t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l , w h e r e i n an e x p l a n a t o r y
h y p o t h e s i s is o n e which l e n d s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i n t h e s e n s e of
b r i n g i n g o u t t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s s i b i l i t y , g i v e n c e r t a i n
phenomena. F o r many - -
p r o b a b l y most t h e i s t s God i s a n
e x p l a n a t o r y h y p o t h e s i s i n j u s t t h i s s e n s e , and d i v i n e agency
162.
is manifest in the world, not something postulated on the
basis of neutral order. I am not endorsing this view as
coherent, only pointing out that it is held and that Hume's
Dialogues miss it entirely.
llume, then, through Philo, seems to be conceiving of
theism as inferential, and his concession to Cleanthes comes
to something like: even if the inference in question is
taken as plausible, that is, even if we grant that there
ara grounds to infer something analogous to intelligence as
the source of the world, nothing else follows. What I am
further arguing is that Philo's arguments ate directed only
at inferential theism and that the concession gives too much
to =-inferential theism.' I think that Hum fails to see
that the concession, couched in terms of intelligence, be-
cause it involves agency, results in the unwanted consequence
just mentioned..
In closing I want to say just a word or two about
three points raised by readers of an earlier version of this
paper. One was that Hume is not really conceding anything
about intelligence in particular, since intelligence, along
with generation, etc., is just one possible principle. I
think, though, that here I can say sirnply that the crucial
concession (203) is precisely articulated in terms of human
intelligence. There is no qualification and, though perhaps
arguable, my interpretation is that Hurne meant what he said.
Second, it was suggested that Nelson Pike's view was that
tlume accepts a direct and =-inferential deism. I do not
agree with this, as my point is that H u m err8 in precisely
concciving of thoism as inforontial. This sccms to me to be
an issue, though, that I need not deal with here, as Pike's
interpretation is by no means generally accepted. It was
also suggested that Hume thinks a "vague deism" to be a
natural belief. I am sympathetic to this suggestion and
think it compatible with my interpretations as the latter
deals with the "working out" of such a belief. Finally, an
objection very like the first h e l d that I must explain
 163.
P h i l o ' s a p p a r e n t change o f h e a r t ; t h a t is, h i s apparent
g o i n g back on nuch o f what h e a r g u e s i n P a r t s 11-XI i f i n the
c o n c e s s i o n what i s conceded i s i n t e l l i g e n c e . Here a g a i n I
c a n o n l y s a y t h a t my p o i n t is t h a t Hume e r r e d i n not
a p p r e c i a t i n g t h o i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e c o n c e s s i o n as s t a t e d .
f n it way t h e c o n c e s s i o n is i n t e r e s t i n g , d r a m a t i c a l l y , o n l y
i f it g i v e s C l e a n t h o s what h e wonts and s t i l l p o i n t s to
f u t i l i t y . The trouble is t h a t t h e u n r e c o g n i z e d p o s s i b i l i t y
of n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l t h e i s m e x t r a c t s a h i g h cost f o r t h e
dramatic victory. I do n o t t h i n k P h i l o g o e s back on any-
t h i n g . Rather he v o i c e s an i l l - a d v i s e d concession designed
t o w r i n g t h e l a s t d r o p of f u t i l i t y from t h e God-hypothesis,
b u t one which i n f a c t s u p p o r t s an a l t e r n a t i v e t h e i s t i c
p o s i t ion.

C. G. Prado
Queen's U n i v e r s i t y

1. A version of t h i s p a p e r was read a t t h e IXth Hume

C o n f e r e n c e , O c t . 1980, and h e l p f u l l y commented on by
P r o f e s s o r James Noxon.
2. A l l r e f e r e n c e s a r e t o Hume on R e l i q i o n , R i c h a r d Wollheim,
ed., F o n t a n a , 1966.

3. P e t e r Jones, "nume's Two Concepts o f God", P h i l o s o p h y ,

O c t . 1972.
4.