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Sport and Development in
Emerging Nations

For the first time, this book examines the strategies of leaders of emerging nations
to use sport as a tool for reaching social, economic, cultural, political, technologi-
cal or environmental goals and gaining international prestige. It assesses whether
sport can really be an effective tool in international development.
The book explores the unique challenges, issues and opportunities offered by
sport for development in emerging nations. Bringing together case studies of sport
and development in countries including Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, Qatar, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey,
the book looks at policies designed to achieve development through, by and for
sport, and whether they have achieved their socio-economic objectives. It con-
siders the way that emerging nations have used major international sports events
as political and developmental projects, as well as the importance of sporting
infrastructure, professional leagues, participation programmes and the influence
of nationalism and ideology.
With a truly global perspective, this book is important reading for any student,
researcher or policy-maker with interest in sport management, sport development,
development studies, international economics, globalisation or political science.

Cem Tinaz is Director of the School of Sports Sciences and Technology at Is-
tanbul Bilgi University, Turkey. He is also an esteemed board member and Vice
President of the Turkish Tennis Federation. Dr. Tinaz’s research interests include
sport policy and development, administration, legacies and impacts of sport mega-­
events – all integrated with his primary area of expertise in sport management.
He was awarded a 2016/2017 Advanced Olympic Research Grant by the IOC
Olympic Studies Centre for the project “Examining Positive Outcomes of Unsuc-
cessful Olympic Bids”.

Brendon Knott is Associate Professor in the Sport Management Department at

the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, South Africa. His primary research
interests include sport marketing, sport tourism and mega-event studies. He serves
as Associate Editor for the Journal of Leisure Research and on the Editorial Board
of the Journal of Destination Marketing and Management. He has a passion for sport
and its impact on society, especially in emerging nations.
Routledge Research in Sport Politics and Policy
Series Editors:
Jonathan Grix, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
Laurence Chalip, University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, USA
Barrie Houlihan, Loughborough University, UK

The Routledge Research in Sport Politics and Policy series aims to give shape to, and
showcase, the burgeoning academic field of ‘sport politics and policy’. Highlight-
ing the political nature of sport, the series shows how sport can illuminate our
understanding of wider political themes such as, issues around governance; sport,
foreign policy and ‘soft power’; gender politics, or the use of sport as a development
tool. The series embraces all areas of sport politics and policy, including domestic,
international and comparative studies, and includes work by world-leading and
emerging scholars.

Available in this series:

Sport Policy in China

Jinming Zheng, Shushu Chen, Tien- Chin Tan and Barrie Houlihan

Sport, Statehood and Transition in Europe

Comparative perspectives from post-Soviet and
post-socialist societies
Edited by Ekain Rojo-Labaien, Álvaro Rodríguez-Díaz and Joel Rookwood

Sport and Development in Emerging Nations

Edited by Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott
Sport and Development in
Emerging Nations

Edited by
Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott

LONDON AND NEW YORK

An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to
the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched (KU).
KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality
books Open Access for the public good. The Open Access ISBN
for this book is 9781003024002. More information about the
initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at
w w w.knowledgeunlatched.org.
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 selection and editorial matter, Cem Tinaz and Brendon
Knott; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott to be identified as
the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their
individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections
77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at
w w w.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a
Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives
4.0 license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be
trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for
identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in- Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data
Names: Tinaz, Cem, editor. | Knott, Brendon, editor.
Title: Sport and development in emerging nations / Edited by
Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott.
Description: First Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2021. |
Series: Routledge research in sport politics and policy | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020048273 | ISBN 9780367903602
(Hardback) | ISBN 9781003024002 (eBook)
Subjects: LCSH: Sports— Developing countries. | Sports and
state — Developing countries. | Nationalism and sports.
Classification: LCC GV689.2 .S74 2021 | DDC 796.09724 — dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020048273

ISBN: 978 - 0 -367-90360 -2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978 -1- 003- 02400 -2 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003024002
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by codeMantra
To our families (Cem – to Pınar, Mehmet, Kerem, Tuvana
and Ege; Brendon – to Kevin, Diane and brothers), thank
you for your continuous support, love and inspiration.
Contents

List of figures ix
List of tables xi
List of contributors xiii
Foreword xvii
Acknowledgements xxi

1 Introduction: defining sport and development in

emerging nations 1
C E M T I NA Z A N D B R E N D ON K NO T T

2 Sport and development in Brazil: lessons from multiple

sport mega-event hosting and sporting programmes in
disadvantaged communities 13
BÁ R BA R A S C H AUS T E C K D E A L M EI DA, BI LLY GR A E F F A N D
NA DY N E V E N T U R I NI T R I N DA D E

3 Sport and development in China: professional football as

wealth generator and national dream bearer 29
H UA N X IONG A N D YA NG M A

4 Sport and development in the Czech Republic: sport as a tool

for social and cultural transformation 44
SI MONA ŠA FA Ř Í KOVÁ A N D A R NO Š T S VOB ODA

5 Sport and development in Hungary and the Central and

Eastern European region: the development of the leisure
sport industry 58
Z S O LT H AV R A N, ÁGN E S S Z A B Ó A N D T Ü N D E M ÁT É
viii Contents

6 Sport and development in India: professional sport

league systems 77
V I PU L LU NAWAT

7 Sport and development in Indonesia: sport policy in the

Reformation era 94
O LE H A M U NG M A’ M U N A N D AGUS M A H E N D R A

8 Sport and development in Mexico: NGOs and community-

based organisations underpinned by
neo-liberal logics using sport as educational tools 108
VA N E S SA GA RC Í A G ONZ Á LE Z

9 Sport and development in Poland: national strategies and

their implementation 125
M IC H A Ł M A RC I N KOBI E R E C K I

10 Sport and development in Qatar: international and regional

dynamics of sport mega-events 141
M A H F OU D A M A R A A N D WA DI H ISH AC

11 Sport and development in South Africa: sport in a changing

society and economy 154
K A M I LL A S WA RT A N D ROB E RTO M A RT Í N- G ONZ Á LE Z

12 Sport and development in South Korea: a critical analysis of

media discourses on the unified Korean women’s ice hockey
team in the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Games 171
Y E OM I C HOI

13 Sport and development in Turkey: community sport

participation, leisure spaces and social inclusion 185
S E L Ç U K AÇ I KG ÖZ , G Ö K B E N D E M I R BA Ş A N D
R EI N H A R D H AU D E N H U YS E

14 Conclusion: lessons learned from the emerging nations 201

B R E N D ON K NO T T A N D C E M T I NA Z

Index 211
Figures

1.1 The diversity and spread of emerging nations covered in this book 7
2.1 The budget of the Brazilian Ministry of Sports 16
5.1 How often do you exercise or play sport? – Never (percentage) 65
5.2 Mean consumption expenditure of private households on
sporting goods and services by COICOP consumption purpose
2010 and 2015 (PPS) 67
5.3 Annual average rate (percentage) of change between 2015 and
2019: Recreational and sporting services 68
5.4 Manufacture of sports goods – turnover – million euro 69
5.5 Number and financial performance of companies providing
fitness services between 2011 and 2017 71
5.6 Net revenue increase (million HUF) of the three largest sport
stores in Hungary 72
7.1 Framework of Indonesia’s sport structure 100
8.1 Geographical location of SDP organisations in Mexico 115
8.2 Primary thematic area of SDP organisations in Mexico 119
9.1 Consistent training pyramid 134
11.1 Multi-dimensional transformation strategic framework 159
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Tables

3.1 The acquisitions of international professional football clubs 35

3.2 Annual sponsorship value of the CSL from 2004 to 2019 37
3.3 Other sponsors of CSL in recent seasons 38
3.4 Attendance of CSL (2004–2018) 39
5.1 Regional data collection (sample, data, source and period) 63
5.2 Leisure sport business trends in Hungary 64
5.3 Percentage of athletes who attend fitness clubs in CEE 66
5.4 Summary table of regional differences 70
6.1 Sports leagues in India 81
7.1 Budget allocation of the Ministry of Youth and Sports (2015–2018) 101
7.2 The comparison between numbers of matches in national
games and other events 105
8.1 Geographical location of SDP organisations in Mexico 114
8.2 Type of sports and physical activities 118
9.1 The number of Olympic medals won by Polish athletes at each
respective Olympic Games 127
10.1 GA initiatives and programmes in football for development 147
10.2 Supreme committee for delivery and legacy programmes 147
11.1 Self-set barometer targets achieved in 2017 and 2018 161
14.1 Emerging nations hosting sport mega-events 205
Contributors

Selçuk Açıkgöz is a doctoral researcher in the Faculty of Sport Sciences, Trakya

University, Turkey. He is also part of the (anti)racism pedagogy and critical
sport study groups at the BoMoVu (Network of Sports and Body Movement for
Vulnerable Groups) in Istanbul, Turkey. His research interests include differ-
ent aspects of the sociology of sport with particular focus on social inclusion,
youth studies, critical pedagogy and (anti)racism.
Bárbara Schausteck de Almeida is an independent scholar and entrepreneur.
Prior to her current work, she was a lecturer at Centro Universitário Internac-
ional (Uninter) and State University of Londrina (UEL) both in Brazil. She
contributed as editor for the Journal of Latin American Socio-cultural Studies of
Sport. Her main research interests include the Sociology of Sport, Mega-events
and Funding in Sport.
Mahfoud Amara is Associate Professor in Sport Policy and Management and the
Director of the Sport Science programme at the College of Arts and Sciences,
Qatar University, Qatar. Previously he was Assistant Professor in Sport Policy
and Management and Deputy Director of the Centre for Olympic Studies and
Research in the School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough
University, UK. He is most renowned for his work on sport in the Middle East
and North African region and sport and multiculturalism debates in Europe.
Yeomi Choi is an academic intellectual in the field of socio-historical studies of
sport and physical activity. Theoretically informed by post-colonial feminist
scholarship, transnational studies and critical race studies, Dr. Choi’s research
interests are situated at the cultural and political intersections of race, gender,
sexuality and nationalism in the mediated construction of sporting subjectiv-
ities. She is currently teaching at Korea National Sport University and also at
Catholic Kwandong University in South Korea.
Gökben Demirbaş works in the Political Science and Public Administration De-
partment at Trakya University (Turkey). Her thesis, entitled “Women’s Lei-
sure in Urban Turkey: A Comparative Neighbourhood Study”, focuses on the
relationship between gender, class, leisure and space, everyday lives in urban
xiv Contributors

neighbourhoods and social in/exclusion practices, which also form her broader
academic interests.
Vanessa García González is Professor at the Universidad Autónoma Chapingo,
Mexico. Her research focuses on the social and cultural aspects of grassroots
sports in Mexico, the intersection between physical activity, sport and health,
and the relationship between sports, development and peace building. She is
a member of the Editorial Board of the International Review for the Sociology
of Sport and a member of the Executive Board of the International Society of
Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise.
Billy Graeff is Senior Lecturer in the sociology of sport at the Federal University
of Rio Grande, Brazil. Billy has focused on topics such as sport mega-events,
sport and development and Olympic studies. He recently launched the book
Capitalism, Sport Mega-events and the Global South, by Routledge, and is cur-
rently developing the research project “South American Sport for Develop-
ment voices and the Sustainable Development Goals”, with funding from the
Advanced Olympic Research Grant of the Center for Olympic Studies.
Reinhard Haudenhuyse is Postdoctoral Researcher in Sports Policy and Manage-
ment at the Brussels Centre for Urban Studies, Belgium. His research focuses
on youth, community sports, social in/exclusion, programme monitoring and
evaluation, poverty and leisure.
Zsolt Havran is Senior Assistant Professor at the Department of Business Studies
at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. His research topics are human
resource management in professional sport, the transfer market of professional
football and leisure sport activities. He is a member of the Sport Business Re-
search Centre at the Corvinus University of Budapest, the European Associa-
tion for Sport Management and the Hungarian Society of Sport Science.
Wadih Ishac is Assistant Professor in Sport Management at Qatar Univer-
sity, Qatar. His research focuses on the social and political impacts of sport
mega-events and foreign investment in the sport industry.
Michał Marcin Kobierecki is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Theory and Thought, Faculty of International and Political Studies, Univer-
sity of Lodz, Poland. His research interests include sports diplomacy, politics
and sport, and nation branding and public diplomacy with a specific focus on
the use of sport. He is a principal investigator of the research project “Consen-
sual and branding role of sport in diplomatic activities of states and non-state
actors” funded by the National Science Center, Poland.
Vipul Lunawat is Founder and Director of the Institute of Sports Science and
Technology, Pune, India. He is a Level 2 Short Track Speed Ice Skating Coach,
certified by the Australian Ice Racing and the Olympic Solidarity programme.
He is the Head Coach at India’s biggest short track ice skating club, the Snovit
 Contributors xv

International Ice-Skating Club, Pune, India. His research interests include

sport technology, business development and innovation in sport.
Yang Ma is Lecturer in the School of Physical Education at Shanghai University,
People’s Republic of China. His research interests reside in sport governance in
China in general and Chinese football governance in particular.
Agus Mahendra is Associate Professor in the Department of Sport Education
at Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia. His research topic is physical education
pedagogy in elementary schools and motor learning practicality in gymnas-
tics. He is the Head of PETE for Elementary Schools, member of Interna-
tional Physical Literacy Association (ISPA) and the Country Leader of Active
Healthy Kids-Indonesia as part of Active Healthy Kids Global Alliance
(AHKGA).
Amung Ma’mun is Professor in the Department of Sport Education, Faculty
of Sport and Health Education at Universitas Pendidikan, Indonesia. His
research topics are sport leadership and policy and sport history. He is the
Head of Sport Education for Master’s and Doctoral degrees at the School of
Postgraduate Studies, UPI. He is a member of the Executive Board of APASS
(Asia-Pacific Association of Sport Studies), Indonesian Sport Scholars Associ-
ation and former Expert Staff to the Minister of Youth and Sport, the Republic
of Indonesia.
Roberto Martín-González is a doctoral candidate and member of the Depart-
ment of Geography in the Faculty of Tourism, University of Málaga, Spain.
His research deals with sport tourism, surf tourism and smart tourism in urban
destinations. He spent two years at the Department of Tourism and Events
Management, Cape Peninsula University of Technology (Cape Town, South
Africa) as a member of the research unit Centre for Tourism Research in
Africa (CETRA) in the framework of the Erasmus Mundus EUROSA+ pro-
gramme from 2014 to 2016.
Tünde Máté is Senior Assistant Professor at the Department of Business Stud-
ies at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. Her research focuses on the
impacts of international sport events and programmes on the residents of the
host city. She is a member of the Sport Business Research Centre at Corvinus
University of Budapest and the Hungarian Society of Sport Science.
Simona Šafaříková is Assistant Professor in the Department of Development and
Environmental Studies (Faculty of Science) at Palacky University Olomouc
in the Czech Republic. She teaches the use of sport in solving development
problems at the Faculty of Physical Culture. She focuses her research on the
topic of sport for development and has been involved in projects all around the
world. She is a member of the Advisory Board of International Sociology of
Sport Association.
xvi Contributors

Arnošt Svoboda is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacký

University Olomouc, Czech Republic. He is a sociologist with a research inter-
est in the cultural role of sport in society, sport for development and sporting
subcultures. He teaches general sociology, sociology of sport and methodology
of social research.
Kamilla Swart is Associate Professor in the Masters of Science in Sport and
Entertainment (MSEM), Division of Engineering Management and Decision
Sciences, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University,
Qatar. Kamilla was instrumental in developing the 2010 FIFA World Cup Re-
search Agenda and served as the City of Cape Town’s Research Coordinator
for 2010. Her work has been focused on contributing to sport, tourism and
event knowledge in the developing context and in the global South in par-
ticular. Kamilla also serves as a Senior Research Associate in the School of
Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
Ágnes Szabó is Senior Assistant Professor at the Department of Business Stud-
ies at Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. Her research interests cover
workplace health, sport consumption, economic effects of leisure sports. She
is a member of the Sport Business Research Centre at Corvinus University of
Budapest and the Hungarian Society of Sport Science.
Nadyne Venturini Trindade is Associate Lecturer at the University of North-
ampton, UK where she teaches sport management and sociology of sport, lei-
sure and tourism modules. She has an interdisciplinary background and her
research reflects an interest in the relationship between sport and leisure par-
ticipation, social justice and well-being. Currently, Nadyne is a PhD candidate
at Loughborough University, UK and her research focuses on the emergence
of equitable and inclusive policies and practices for gender diverse (intersex,
trans, gender nonconforming and non-binary) participants in competitive
sport and physical activity.
Huan Xiong is Professor in the School of Physical Education and Sports Sci-
ence at South China Normal University, People’s Republic of China. Prior to
working at South China Normal University, she was a lecturer at the School
of Asian Studies at University College Cork, Ireland. She is a member of the
Editorial Board of Asian Journal of Sport History & Culture. Her main research
interests include the Sociology of Sport, Urban Studies and Gender Issues in
Sport.
Foreword

In the opening chapter of this collection, Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott discuss
the variety of interpretations of development in relation to sport. Their discus-
sion captures the multiple interpretations of ‘sport development’ particularly the
extent to which sport development is both an activity of those working in the
sports sector and a resource for non-sport businesses, not-for-profit organisations
and governments. The plasticity of the concept of sport development is demon-
strated to powerful effect in the chapters of this collection. Almost 20 years ago
I wrote a book with Anita White which had the sub-title Development of Sport
or Development through Sport (Houlihan and White, 2002). Over the intervening
years the implied tension between the two interpretations of sport development
has remained and has arguably intensified. The range of developmental objectives
to which sport has been attached has remained broad with sport being utilised
by governments in a wide variety of ways including as a diplomatic resource, a
tool of social control, a health strategy, a resource for community integration and
a strategy for sanitising corrupt political regimes. Similar examples of the use of
sport for non-sport objectives can be found in relation to business involvement in
sport. In the last 40 years or so sport development as a business sector has become
an important part of many national economies. While the growth of the business
of sport development (whether the development of young elite athletes or the
provision of community sport opportunities) has widened the opportunities for
participation it has also been used by some businesses to project a more positive
brand image – a strategy particularly notable among the manufacturers of un-
healthy junk food.
One of the principal virtues of this collection is the way in which it demon-
strates the variation in the motives of governments, the extent and methods of
intervention and the impact of governmental intervention. Furthermore, two im-
portant tensions are amply illustrated: the first is between market freedom and
government control (Chapters 3, China, and 5, Hungary, are particularly valu-
able in this regard) and the second is between investing in elite sport (often for
­nation-branding/promotion purposes) and investing in community sport/sport for
all (Chapters 4, Czech Republic, and 7, Indonesia, being good illustrations of this
tension). Perhaps the most interesting exploration of the motives of governments
xviii Foreword

is in Chapter 3 which examines the professional football in the People’s Republic

of China (PRC). As the authors make clear achieving international success in
football remains a political priority despite the PRC having clearly demonstrated
its ‘sports power’ status at successive recent Olympic Games. Sporting success as
an indicator of international status and as a measure of national self-confidence
needs no clearer illustration.
The increased involvement of governments and large corporations in sport
development requires the analysis of not only the motives for involvement but
also the distribution and exercise of power in the sport development field. The
theme of power was a thread that ran through a collection of studies that I edited
in 2011 with Mick Green (Houlihan and Green, 2011). The particular focus was
on the attraction of sport development to governments and the ways in which
they sought to utilise sport not only for socially beneficial, but also for deeply cyn-
ical, ends. The collection demonstrated inter alia that major attractions of sport
to government included its relatively low cost, its high visibility and its low risk.
Whether the issue concerned youth unemployment, low educational standards,
poor health indicators or urban unrest sport was often presented as a panacea.
Politicians would regularly refer to the ‘power of sport’ as though it had magical
properties. The mythologising of the potential of sport development to address
complex social and personal problems has deep cultural roots in many countries
making the objective analysis of the impact of sport development a challenge for
researchers. As Fred Coalter persuasively argued, ‘such myths contain elements
of truth, but elements which have become reified and distorted and “represent”
rather than reflect reality, standing for supposed, but largely unexamined, im-
pacts and processes’ (Coalter, 2007, p. 9). The collection of studies in this volume
reinforces Coalter’s emphasis on the need to challenge the mythologising that
surrounds sport development and to examine evidence from a disinterested and
sceptical standpoint.
Apart from the critical examination of the claims made on behalf of sport
development the other strength of this collection is the focus on a range of coun-
tries that are often on the margin of Western academic research. As an aca-
demic community we know far too little about the policy and politics of sport and
sport development in the majority of the 207 countries that attended the 2016
Olympic Games, the 61 national members of the International Council of Sports
Science and Physical Education, the 53 member states of the Commonwealth
who subscribe to the organisation’s strategy for development and peace through
sport (Dudfield, 2014) or many of the states who contributed to the UN report
the role of sport in peace and development (United Nations, 2020). The focus of
this volume on analysing the interpretation and implementation of sport devel-
opment policies in countries from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, South America
and Eastern Europe greatly enriches our understanding of sport development as a
global phenomenon. Furthermore, the collection of studies in this volume will be
of particular interest to scholars whose research focuses on the tension between
 Foreword xix

attempts to maintain a set of national policy objectives and the priorities of global
sports organisations, broadcast media and sports businesses. Understanding how,
and the extent to which, emerging nations are able to develop strategies singly or
collectively to protect their interests is an important direction for research that
this volume indicates.

by Barrie Houlihan

References
Coalter, F. (2007) A wider social role for sport: Who’s keeping the score. London: Routledge.
Dudfield, O. (ed.) (2014) Strengthening sport for development and peace: National policies and
strategies. London: Commonwealth Secretariat.
Houlihan, B. and White, A. (2002) The politics of sort development: Development of sport or
development through sport. London: Routledge.
Houlihan, B. and Green, M. (eds.) (2011) Routledge handbook of sports development.
London: Routledge.
United Nations (2020) Sport: A global accelerator of peace and sustainable development. New
York: United Nations.
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Acknowledgements

The editors wish to thank the following individuals for their support and assis-
tance in this project:
Katy Herrera: Thank you for your assistance with proofreading the chapters.
Your gift for writing excellence helped us greatly.
Simon Whitmore and Rebecca Connor (Routledge Publishing): Thank you for
encouraging us in this project, being flexible and helpful in all that we needed.
Thank you to the series editors: Barrie Houlihan – Thank you for your en-
couragement of our project proposal and for writing the foreword. We respect
your contribution to the global sport development academia. Thank you also to
Jonathan Grix and Laurence Chalip for your contributions and support.
Each of the contributing authors: We thank you colleagues for your participa-
tion in this project. We believe that you have made a significant contribution to
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Defining sport and development in
emerging nations
Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott

The sport industry has been enjoying increased benefits and expanded opportu-
nities through the process of globalisation. As Jarvie (2006) has stated, the global
era of sport has presented fundamental challenges for sport organisations. Still, it
has also created the opportunity for sport to be a social force for internationalism,
reconciliation and international development.
Sport is currently linked to a wide variety of development initiatives as it is
often posited as a tool to assist in economic and social development. With great
optimism, many countries facing acute demographic shifts towards youth tend
to see sport as a means to suppress delinquency, unemployment and drug use.
Each month multiple new organisations using sport to achieve specific results
have been established (Hayhurst and Frisby, 2010).
At the same time, sport can provide physical, mental and social benefits to
improve the well-being of an ageing population. It can be used to promote social
inclusion of otherwise marginalised people. As Kay and Bradbury (2009) have
suggested, involvement in sport is understood to confer life skills, leadership qual-
ities, social knowledge and values. However, it would be very naive to say that
such positive outcomes happen naturally or organically through participation.
In other words, solely playing sport does not lead to developmental outcomes;
in order to have a productive effect on development, sport programmes should
be organised and structured in purposive, systematic ways. According to Coalter
(2009), although participation in sport can be a useful mechanism for develop-
ment, it is not sufficient alone to engender social change. Hartmann (2003) em-
phasised that the non-sport components of any sport-based social interventionist
programme are what define its strength.
Houlihan and White (2002) argued that the area of sport development is not
static; the objectives, practises, primary agents and recourses change over time as
does the definition of sport development. Hartmann and Kwauk (2011) stated that
one of the most critical initial challenges for understanding and theorising the
field of sport and development is the ambiguity and multiplicity around concep-
tions of development. Furthermore, the interpretation and definition of sport de-
velopment has different meanings to different agencies, such as sports governing
bodies, clubs, corporations and NGOs. In its most comprehensive meaning, sport
development refers to participating in sport itself and promoting the opportunities

DOI: 10.4324/9781003024002-1
2 Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott

and benefits of such participation, and as Kidd (2008) argues, it is a project of sport
organisations. The potential outcomes of sport development may include better-
ments of the sport itself, plus individuals who are involved in sport for various
benefits and experiences, and in a wider sense nations and communities. From a
practitioner’s perspective, Astle (2014, p. 15) defined sport development as:

The sustainable provision of, and access to, integrated pathways of relevant,
appealing and affordable sporting opportunities for individuals, irrespective of
age, ability, interest or gender, to participate, enjoy and progress in a support-
ive environment that has the infrastructure and services, capable of offering
high-quality experiences, that satisfy their diverse and changing needs, mo-
tivations and expectations, and ensure their continued involvement in sport.

Initial attempts to define sport development considered two aspects: the devel-
opment of sport and development through sport (Houlihan and White, 2002).
Intending to build sport capacity, development of sport refers to the development
of the sport itself or, in other words, the creation of opportunities for partici-
pants and the enhancement of the sport. Mainly, these are the activities designed
both to excel in performance and increase participation. On the other hand,
development through sport focuses on the role sport can play in enhancing the
well-being of individuals, communities and societies (Ha, Lee and Ok, 2015). Ac-
cording to this approach, sport constitutes a powerful tool for social integration,
promotion of health and disease prevention, creating physical and psychological
benefits for individuals, development of the community and social capital and
empowerment of minorities, girls and women (Levermore, 2008a). As a result
of this approach, recently sport has gained increased importance as a tool to
promote health, education and peace. Nevertheless, as Levermore and Beacom
(2009) have expressed, we should bear in mind that these socio-economic aspects
and sport are not mutually exclusive. As they state, different social aspects such
as leadership, inclusion and capacity building are linked to sport aspects such as
coaching, performance and physical skills.
In his conceptual framework, Coalter (2009) defined two ends of sport and
development: sport plus and plus sport. In this conceptualisation, sport plus pro-
grammes focus on the development of sport-oriented initiatives such as sustaina-
ble sport organisations, programmes and development pathways, while plus sport
programmes focus on achieving non-sport goals, such as social or economic devel-
opment. The main concern of plus sport programmes is how sport can aid social
and economic development.
Astle (2014) reworked these definitions by providing the following six sub-­
categories of sport development:

• Development IN sport: the extent to which authorities adapt sport to make

them more attractive to audiences.
• Development OF sport: breaking down barriers to participation.
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invents, is occasioned by a ‘similitude which it observes among
things.’ The general idea having been thus invented, ‘things are
found to agree with it’—as is natural since they suggested it.
Hereupon we are forced to ask how, if all relation is superinduced
upon real existence by the understanding, an observed relation of
similitude among things can occasion the superinduction; and again
how it happens, if all generality of ideas is a fiction of the mind, that
‘things are found to agree with general ideas.’ How can the real
existence called ‘this’ or ‘that,’ which only really exists so far as
nothing can be said of it but that it is ‘this’ or ‘that,’ agree with
anything whatever? Agreement implies some content, some
determination by properties, i.e. by relations, in the things agreeing,
whereas the really existent excludes relation. How then can it agree
with the abstract general idea, the import of which, according to
Locke’s own showing, depends solely on relation?

The ‘particular’ was to him the individual qualified by general

relations.

47. Such questions did not occur to Locke, because while asserting
the mere individuality of things existent, and the simplicity of all
ideas as given, i.e. as real, he never fully recognised the meaning of
his own assertion. Under the shelter of the ambiguous ‘particular’ he
could at any time substitute for the mere individual the determinate
individual, or individual qualified by community with other things;
just as, again, under covering of the ‘simple idea’ he could substitute
for the mere momentary consciousness the perception of a definite
thing. Thus when he speaks of the judgment ‘this is gold’ as
expressing the agreement of a real (i.e. individual) thing with a
general idea, he thinks of ‘this’ a& already having, apart from the
judgment, the determination which it first receives in the judgment.
He thinks of it, in other words, not as the mere ‘perishing’ sensation
[1] or individual void of relation, but as a sensation symbolical of
other possibilities of sensation which, as so many relations of a thing
to us or to other things, are connoted by the common noun ‘gold.’ It
thus ‘agrees’ with the abstract idea or conception of qualities, i.e.
because it is already the ‘creature of the understanding,’ determined
by relations which constitute a generality and community between it
and other things. Such a notion of the really existent thing—wholly
inconsistent with his doctrine of relation and of the general—Locke
has before him when he speaks of general ideas as formed by
abstraction of certain qualities from real things, or of certain ideas
from other ideas that accompany them in real existence. ‘When
some one first lit on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by
the word gold, … its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight were the
first he abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species
… another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and
fixedness … another its ductility and solubility in aqua regia. These,
or part of these, put together, usually make the complex idea in
men’s minds of that sort of body we call gold.’ (Book II. chap. xxxi.
sec. 9.) Here the supposition is that a thing, multitudinously
qualified, is given apart from any action of the understanding, which
then proceeds to act in the way of successively detaching
(‘abstracting’) these qualities and recombining them as the idea of a
species. Such a recombination, indeed, would seem but wasted
labour. The qualities are assumed to be already found by the
understanding and found as in a thing; otherwise the understanding
could not abstract them from it. Why should it then painfully put
together in imperfect combination what has been previously given to
it complete? Of the complex idea which results from the work of
abstraction, nothing can be said but a small part of what is
predicable of the known thing which the possibility of such
abstraction presupposes.

[1] ‘All impressions are perishing existences.’—Hume. See below,

paragraph 208.

This is the real thing from which abstraction is supposed to start.

48. ‘The complex idea of a species,’ spoken of in the passage last

quoted, corresponds to what, in Locke’s theory of substance, is
called the ‘idea of a particular sort of substance.’ In considering that
theory we saw that, according to his account, the beginning of the
process by which the ‘abstract idea of substance’ was formed, was
either that abstract idea itself, the mere ‘something,’ or by a double
contradiction the ‘complex idea of a particular sort of substance’
which yet we only come to have after the abstract idea has been
formed. In the passage now before us there is no direct mention of
the abstraction of the ‘substratum,’ as such, but only of the quality,
and hence there is no ambiguity about the paralogism. It is not a
mere ‘something’ that the man ‘lights upon,’ and thus it is not this
that holds the place at once of the given and the derived but a
something having manifold qualities to be abstracted. In other
words, it is the ‘idea of a particular sort of substance’ that he starts
from, and it is just this again to which as a ‘complex idea of a
species,’ his understanding is supposed gradually to lead him. The
understanding, indeed, according to Locke, is never adequate to
nature, and accordingly the qualities abstracted and recombined in
the complex idea always fall vastly short of the fulness of those
given in the real thing; or as he states it in terms of the
multiplication table (Book II. chap. xxxi. sec. 10), ‘some who have
examined this species more accurately could, I believe, enumerate
ten times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from
its internal constitution, as its colour or weight; and it is probable if
any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this
metal, there would an hundred times as many ideas go to the
complex idea of gold, as any one man has yet in his; and yet
perhaps that would not be the thousandth part of what is to be
discovered in it.’ These two million properties, and upwards, which
await abstraction in gold, are all, it must be noted, according to
Locke’s statement elsewhere (Book II. chap xxiii. sec. 37), ‘nothing
but so many relations to other substances.’ It is just on account of
these multitudinous relations of the real thing that the
understanding is inadequate to its comprehension. Yet according to
Locke’s doctrine of relation these must all be themselves
‘superinductions of the mind,’ and the greater the fulness which they
constitute, the further is the distance from the mere individuality
which elsewhere, in contrast with the fictitiousness of ‘generals,’
appears as the equivalent of real existence.

Yet, according to the doctrine of relation, a creation of thought.

49. The real thing and the creation of the understanding thus
change places. That which is given to the understanding as the real,
which it finds and does not make, is not now the bare atom upon
which relations have to be artificially superinduced. Nor is it the
mere present feeling, which has ‘by the mind of man’ to be made
‘significant,’ or representative of past experience. It is itself an
inexhaustible complex of relations, whether they are considered as
subsisting between it and other things, or between the sensations
which it is ‘fitted to produce in us.’ These are the real, which is thus
a system, a community; and if the ‘general,’ as Locke says, is that
which ‘has the capacity of representing many particulars,’ the real
thing itself is general, for it represents—nay, is constituted by—the
manifold particular feelings which, mediately or immediately, it
excites in us. On the other hand, the invention of the understanding,
instead of giving ‘significance’ or content to the mere individuality of
the real, as it does according to Locke’s theory of ‘generals,’ now
appears as detaching fragments from the fulness of the real to
recombine them in an ‘abstract essence’ of its own. Instead of
adding complexity to the simple, it subtracts from the complex.

Summary of the above contradictions.

50. To gather up, then, the lines of contradiction which traverse

Locke’s doctrine of real existence as it appears in his account of
general and complex ideas:—The idea of substance is an abstract
general idea, not given directly in sensation or reflection, but
‘invented by the understanding,’ as by consequence must be ideas of
particular sorts of substances which presuppose the abstract idea.
On the other hand, the ideas of sensation and reflection, from which
the idea of substance is abstracted, and to which as real it as an
invention is opposed, are ideas of ‘something,’ and are only real as
representative of something. But this idea of something = the idea
of substance. Therefore the idea of substance is the presupposition,
and the condition of the reality, of the very ideas from which it is
said to be derived. Again, if the general idea of substance is got by
abstraction, it must be originally given in conjunction with the ideas
of sensation or reflection from which it is afterwards abstracted, i.e.
separated. But in such conjunction it constitutes the ideas of
particular sorts of substances. Therefore these latter ideas, which
yet we ‘come to have’ after the general idea of substance, form the
prior experience from which this general idea is abstracted. Further,
this original experience, from which abstraction starts, being of ‘sorts
of substances,’ and these sorts being constituted by relations, it
follows that relation is given in the original experience. But that
which is so given is ‘real existence’ in opposition to the invention of
the understanding. Therefore these relations, and the community
which they constitute, really exist. On the other hand, mere
individuals alone really exist, while relations between them are
superinduced by the mind. Once more, the simple idea given in
sensation or reflection, as it is made for not by us, has or results
from real existence, whereas general and complex ideas are the
workmanship of the mind. But this workmanship consists in the
abstraction of ideas from each other, and from that to which they
are related as qualities. It thus presupposes at once the general idea
of ‘something’ or substance, and the complex idea of qualities of the
something. Therefore it must be general and complex ideas that are
real, as made for and not by us, and that afford the inventive
understanding its material. Yet if so—if they are given—why make
them over again by abstraction and recomplication?

They cannot be overcome without violence to Locke’s fundamental

principles.

51. We may get over the last difficulty, indeed, by distinguishing

between the complex and confused, between abstraction and
analysis. We may say that what is originally given in experience is
the confused, which to us is simple, or in other words has no definite
content, because, till it has been analysed, nothing can be said of it,
though in itself it is infinitely complex; that thus the process, which
Locke roughly calls abstraction, and which, as he describes it,
consists merely in taking grains from the big heap that is given in
order to make a little heap of one’s own, is yet, rightly understood,
the true process of knowledge—a process which may be said at once
to begin with the complex and to end with it, to take from the
concrete and to constitute it, because it begins with that which is in
itself the fulness of reality, but which only becomes so for us as it is
gradually spelt out by our analysis. To put the case thus, however, is
not to correct Locke’s statement, but wholly to change his doctrine.
It renders futile his easy method of ‘sending a man to his senses’ for
the discovery of reality, and destroys the supposition that the
elements of knowledge can be ascertained by the interrogation of
the individual consciousness. Such consciousness can tell nothing of
its own beginning, if of this beginning, as of the purely indefinite,
nothing can be said; if it only becomes defined through relations,
which in its state of primitive potentiality are not actually in it. The
senses again, so far from being, in that mere passivity which Locke
ascribes to them, organs of ready-made reality, can have nothing to
tell, if it is only through the active processes of ‘discerning,
comparing, and compounding,’ that they acquire a definite content.
But to admit this is nothing else than, in order to avoid a
contradiction of which Locke was not aware, to efface just that
characteristic of his doctrine which commends it to ‘common
sense’—the supposition, namely, that the simple datum of sense, as
it is for sense or in its mere individuality, is the real, in opposition to
the ‘invention of the mind.’ That this supposition is to make the real
the unmeaning, the empty, of which nothing can be said, he did not
see because, under an unconscious delusion of words, even while
asserting that the names of simple ideas are undefinable (Book III.
chap. iv. sec. 4), which means that nothing can be said of such
ideas, and while admitting that the processes of discerning,
comparing, and compounding ideas, which mean nothing else than
the bringing them into relation [1] or the superinduction upon them
of fictions of the mind, are necessary to constitute even the
beginnings of knowledge, he yet allows himself to invest the simple
idea, as the real, with those definite qualities which can only accrue
to it, according to his showing, from the ‘inventive’ action of the
understanding.

[1] Locke only states this explicitly of comparison, ‘an operation of

the mind about its ideas, upon which depends all that large tribe of
ideas, comprehended under relation.’ (Book II. chap. xi. sec. 4.) It is
clear, however, that the same remark must apply to the ‘discernment
of ideas,’ which is strictly correlative to comparison, and to their
composition, which means that they are brought into relation as
constituents of a whole.

That these three processes are necessary to constitute the

beginnings of knowledge, according to Locke, appears from Book II.
chap. xi. sec. 15, taken in connection with what precedes in that
chapter.

As real existence, the simple idea carries with it ‘invented’ relation

of cause.

52. Thus invested, it is already substance or symbolical of

substance, not a mere feeling but a felt thing, recognised either
under that minimum of qualification which enables us merely to say
that it is ‘something,’ or (in Locke’s language) abstract substance, or
under the greater complication of qualities which constitutes a
‘particular sort of substance’—gold, horse, water, &c. Real existence
thus means substance. It is not the simple idea or sensation by itself
that is real, but this idea as caused by a thing. It is the thing that is
primarily the real; the idea only secondarily so, because it results
from a power in the thing. As we have seen, Locke’s doctrine of the
necessary adequacy, reality, and truth of the simple idea turns upon
the supposition that it is, and announces itself as, an ‘ectype’ of an
‘archetype.’ But there is not a different archetype to each sensation;
if there were, in ‘reporting’ it the sensation would do no more than
report itself. It is the supposed single cause of manifold different
sensations or simple ideas, to which a single name is applied. ‘If
sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and
sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those
ideas in our minds. … And so each sensation answering the power
that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real
idea (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce
any single idea), and cannot but be adequate … and so all simple
ideas are adequate.’ (Book II. chap. xxxi. sec. 2.) The sugar, which is
here the ‘archetype’ and the source of reality in the idea, is just what
Locke elsewhere calls ‘a particular sort of substance,’ as the
‘something’ from which a certain set of sensations result, and in
which, as sensible qualities, they inhere. Strictly speaking, however,
according to Locke, that which inheres in the thing is not the quality,
as it is to us, but a power to produce it. (Book II. chap. viii. sec. 28,
and c. xxiii. 37.)

Correlativity of cause and substance.

53. In calling a sensation or idea the product of a power,

substance is presupposed just as much as in calling it a sensible
quality; only that with Locke ‘quality’ conveyed the notion of
inherence in the substance, power that of relation to an effect not in
the substance itself. ‘Secondary qualities are nothing but the powers
which substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses,
which ideas are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as
anything is in its cause.’ (Book II. chap, xxiii. sec. 9.) ‘Most of the
simple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of substances, are
only powers … or relations to other substances (or, as he explains
elsewhere, ‘relations to our perceptions,’ [1]), and are not really in
the substance considered barely in itself.’ (Book II. chap, xxiii. sec.
37, and xxxi. 8.) That this implies the inclusion of the idea of cause
in that of substance, appears from Locke’s statement that ‘whatever
is considered by us to operate to the producing any particular simple
idea which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the
relation of a cause.’ (Book II. chap. xxvi. sec. 1.) Thus to be
conscious of the reality of a simple idea, as that which is not made
by the subject of the idea, but results from a power in a thing, is to
have the idea of substance as cause. This latter idea must be the
condition of the consciousness of reality. If the consciousness of
reality is implied in the beginning of knowledge, so must the
correlative ideas be of cause and substance.

[1] Book II. chap. xxi. sec. 3.

How do we know that ideas correspond to reality of things?

Locke’s answer.

54. On examining Locke’s second rehearsal of his theory in the

fourth book of the Essay—that ‘On Knowledge’—we are led to this
result quite as inevitably as in the book ‘On Ideas.’ He has a special
chapter on the ‘reality of human knowledge,’ where he puts the
problem thus:—‘It is evident the mind knows not things immediately,
but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our
knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity
between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here
the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its
own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?’ (Book IV.
chap. iv. sec. 3.) It knows this, he proceeds to show, in the case of
simple ideas, because ‘since the mind can by no means make them
to itself, they must be the product of things operating on the mind in
a natural way. … Simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the
natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating
upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which is
intended, or which our state requires, for they represent to us things
under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us;
whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular
substances,’ &c. &c. (Book IV. chap. iv. sec. 4.) The whole force of
this passage depends on the notion that simple ideas are already to
the subject of them not his own making, but the product of a thing,
which in its relation to these ideas is a ‘particular sort of substance.’
It is the reception of such ideas, so related, that Locke calls
‘sensitive knowledge of particular existence,’ or a ‘perception of the
mind, employed about the particular existence of finite beings
without us.’ (Book IV. chap. ii. sec. 14.) This, however, he
distinguishes from two other ‘degrees of knowledge or certainty,’
‘intuition’ and ‘demonstration,’ of which the former is attained when
the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is perceived
immediately, the latter when it is perceived mediately through the
intervention of certain other agreements or disagreements (less or
more), each of which must in turn be perceived immediately.
Demonstration, being thus really but a series of intuitions, carries
the same certainty as intuition, only it is a certainty which it requires
more or less pains and attention to apprehend. (Book IV. chap. ii.
sec. 4.) Of the ‘other perception of the mind, employed about the
particular existence of finite beings without us,’ which ‘passes under
the name of knowledge,’ he explains that although ‘going beyond
bare probability, it reaches not perfectly to either of the foregoing
degrees of certainty.’ ‘There can be nothing more certain,’ he
proceeds, ‘than that the idea we receive from an external object is in
our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be
anything more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can
thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us which
corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may
be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their
minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their
senses.’ (Book IV. chap. ii. sec. 14.)

It assumes that simple ideas are consciously referred to things

that cause them.

55. It is clear that here in his very statement of the question Locke
begs the answer. If the intuitive certainty is that ‘the idea we receive
from an external object is in our minds,’ [1] how is it possible to
doubt whether such an object exists and affects our senses? This
impossibility of speaking of the simple idea, except as received from
an object, may account for Locke’s apparent inconsistency in finding
the assurance of the reality of knowledge (under the phrase
‘evidence of the senses’) just in that ‘perception’ which reaches not
to intuitive or demonstrative certainty, and only ‘passes under the
name of knowledge.’ In the passage just quoted he shows that he is
cognizant of the distinction between the simple idea and the
perception of an existence corresponding to it, and in consequence
distinguishes this perception from proper intuition, but in the very
statement of the distinction it eludes him. The simple idea, as he
speaks of it, becomes itself, as consciously ‘received from an
external object,’ the perception of existence; just as we have
previously seen it become the judgment of identity or perception of
the ‘agreement of an idea with itself,’ which is his first kind of
knowledge.
 [1] I do not now raise the question, What are here the ideas,
which must be immediately perceived to agree or disagree in order
to make it a case of ‘intuitive certainty’ or knowledge according to
Locke’s definition. See below, paragraphs 59, 101, and 147.

Lively ideas real, because they must be effects of things.

56. In short, with Locke the simple idea, the perception of

existence corresponding to the idea, and the judgment of identity,
are absolutely merged, and in mutual involution, sometimes under
one designation, sometimes under another, are alike presented as
the beginning of knowledge. As occasion requires, each does duty
for the other. Thus, if the ‘reality of knowledge’ be in question, the
simple idea, which is given, is treated as involving the perception of
existence, and the reality is established. If in turn this perception is
distinguished from the simple idea, and it is asked whether the
correspondence between idea and existence is properly matter of
knowledge, the simple idea has only to be treated as involving the
judgment of identity, which again involves that of existence, and the
question is answered. So in the context under consideration (Book
IV. chap. ii. sec. 14), after raising the question as to the existence of
a thing corresponding to the idea, he answers it by the counter
question, ‘whether anyone is not invincibly conscious to himself of a
different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on
it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or
only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainly find the difference
there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory,
and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do
between any two distinct ideas.’ The force of the above lies in its
appeal to the perception of identity, or—to apply the language in
which Locke describes this perception—the knowledge that the idea
which a man calls the smell of a rose is the very idea it is. [1] The
mere difference in liveliness between the present and the recalled
idea, which, as Berkeley and Hume rightly maintained, is the only
difference between them as mere ideas, cannot by itself constitute
the difference between the knowledge of the presence of a thing
answering to the idea and the knowledge of its absence. It can only
do this if the more lively idea is identified with past lively ideas as a
representation of one and the same thing which ‘agrees with itself’
in contrast to the multiplicity of the sensations, its signs. Only in
virtue of this identification can either the liveliness of the idea show
that the thing—the sun or the rose—is there, or the want of
liveliness that it is not, for without it there would be no thing to be
there or not to be there. It is because this identification is what
Locke understands by the first sort of perception of agreement
between ideas, and because he virtually finds this perception again
in the simple idea, that the simple idea is to him the index of reality.
But if so, the idea in its primitive simplicity is the sign of a thing that
is ever the same in the same relations, and we find the
‘workmanship of the mind,’ its inventions of substance, cause, and
relation, in the very rudiments of knowledge.

[1] See above, paragraph 25.

Present sensation gives knowledge of existence.

57. With that curious tendency to reduplication, which is one of his

characteristics, Locke, after devoting a chapter to the ‘reality of
human knowledge,’ of which the salient passage as to simple ideas
has been already quoted, has another upon our ‘knowledge of
existence.’ Here again it is the sensitive knowledge of things actually
present to our senses, which with him is merely a synonym for the
simple idea, that is the prime criterion. (Book IV. chap. iii. secs. 5
and 2, and chap. ii. sec. 2.) After speaking of the knowledge of our
own being and of the existence of a God (about which more will be
said below), he proceeds, ‘No particular man can know the existence
of any other being, but only when, by actually operating upon him, it
makes itself perceived by him. For the having the idea of anything in
our mind no more proves the existence of that thing, than the
picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a
dream make thereby a true history. It is therefore the actual
receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence
of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at
that time without us, which causes that idea in us, though perhaps
we neither know nor consider how it does it; for it takes not from
the certainty of our senses and the ideas we receive by them, that
we know not the manner wherein they are produced; e.g. whilst I
write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea
produced in my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call white;
by which I know that the quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance
before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath
a being without me. And of this the greatest assurance. I can
possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony
of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing,
whose testimony I have reason to rely on, as so certain, that I can
no more doubt whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and
that something really exists that causes that sensation in me, than
that I write and move my hand.’ (Book IV. chap. xi. secs. 1, 2.)

Reasons why its testimony must be trusted.

58. Reasons are afterwards given for the assurance that the
‘perceptions’ in question are produced in us by ‘exterior causes
affecting our senses.’ The first (a) is, that ‘those that want the
organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that
sense produced in their mind.’ The next (b), that whereas ‘if I turn
my eyes at noon toward the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the
light or the sun then produces in me;’ on the other hand, ‘when my
eyes are shut or windows fast, as I can at pleasure recall to my mind
the ideas of light or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in
my memory, so I can at pleasure lay them by.’ Again (c), ‘many of
those ideas are produced in us with pain which afterwards we
remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of heat or cold,
when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance;
which, when felt, was very troublesome, and is again, when actually
repeated; which is occasioned by the disorder the external object
causes in our body, when applied to it.’ Finally (d), ‘our senses in
many cases bear witness to the truth of each other’s report,
concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He that sees
a fire may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare
fancy, feel it too.’ Then comes the conclusion, dangerously qualified:
‘When our senses do actually convey into our understandings any
idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that
time really exist without us, which doth affect our senses, and by
them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually
produce that idea which we then perceive; and we cannot so far
distrust their testimony as to doubt that such collections of simple
ideas, as we have observed by our senses to be united together,
actually exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the
present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects,
that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a
collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man, existing
together one minute since, and am now alone; I cannot be certain
that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary
connexion of his existence a minute since with his existence now. By
a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had the testimony of
my senses for his existence.’ (Book IV. chap. xi. sec. 9.)

How does this account fit Locke’s definition of knowledge?

59. Upon the ‘knowledge of the existence of things,’ thus

established, it has to be remarked in the first place that, after all,
according to Locke’s explicit statement, it is not properly knowledge.
It is ‘an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge’ (Book IV.
chap. ii. sec. 14, and xi. sec. 3), yet being neither itself an intuition
of agreement between ideas, nor resoluble into a series of such
intuitions, the definition of knowledge excludes it. Only if existence
were itself an ‘idea,’ would the consciousness of the agreement of
the idea with it be a case of knowledge; but to make existence an
idea is to make the whole question about the agreement of ideas, as
such, with existence, as such, unmeaning. To seek escape from this
dilemma by calling the consciousness of the agreement in question
an ‘assurance’ instead of knowledge is a mere verbal subterfuge.
There can be no assurance of agreement between an idea and that
which is no object of consciousness at all. If, however, existence is
an object of consciousness, it can, according to Locke, be nothing
but an idea, and the question as to the assurance of agreement is
no less unmeaning than the question as to the knowledge of it. The
raising of the question in fact, as Locke puts it, implies the
impossibility of answering it. It cannot be raised with any
significance, unless existence is external to and other than an idea.
It cannot be answered unless existence is, or is given in, an object
of consciousness, i.e. an idea.
 Locke’s account of the testimony of sense renders his question as
to its veracity superfluous.

60. As usual, Locke disguises this difficulty from himself, because

in answering the question he alters it. The question, as he asks it, is
whether, given the idea, we can have posterior assurance of
something else corresponding to it. The question, as he answers it,
is whether the idea includes the consciousness of a real thing as a
constituent; and the answer consists in the simple assertion,
variously repeated, that it does. It is clear, however, that this answer
to the latter question does not answer, but renders unmeaning, the
question as it is originally asked. If, according to Locke’s own
showing, there is nowhere for anything to be found by us but in our
‘ideas’ or our consciousness—if the thing is given in and with the
idea, so that the idea is merely the thing ex parte nostrâ—then to
ask if the idea agrees with the thing is as futile as to ask whether
hearing agrees with sound, or the voice with the words it utters.
That the thing is so given is implied throughout Locke’s statement of
the ‘assurance we have of the existence of material beings,’ as well
as of the confirmations of this assurance. If the ‘idea which I call
white’ means the knowledge that ‘the property or accident (i.e.
whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth
really exist and hath a being without me,’ then consciousness of
existence—outward, permanent, substantive, and causative
existence—is involved in the idea, and no ulterior question of
agreement between idea and existence can properly arise. But
unless the simple idea is so interpreted, the senses have no
testimony to give. If it is so interpreted, no extraneous ‘reason to
rely upon the testimony’ can be discovered, for such reason can only
be a repetition of the testimony itself.
 Confirmations of the testimony turn upon the distinction between
‘impression’ and ‘idea’.

61. This becomes clearer upon a view of the confirmations of the

testimony, as Locke gives them. They all, we may remark by the
way, presuppose a distinction between the simple idea as originally
represented and the same as recalled or revived. This distinction,
fixed by the verbal one between ‘impression’ and ‘idea,’ we shall find
constantly maintained and all-important in Hume’s system; but in
Locke, though upon it (as we shall see) rests his distinction between
real and nominal essence and his confinement of general knowledge
to the latter, it seems only to turn up as an afterthought. In the
account of the reality and adequacy of ideas it does not appear at
all. There the distinction is merely between the simple idea, as such,
and the complex, as such, without any further discrimination of the
simple idea as originally produced from the same as recalled. So,
too, in the opening account of the reception of simple ideas (Book
II. chap. xii. sec. 1), ‘Perception,’ ‘Retention,’ and ‘Discerning’ are all
reckoned together as alike forms of the passivity of the mind, in
contrast with its activity in combination and abstraction, though
retention and discerning have been previously described in terms
which imply activity. In the ‘confirmations’ before us, however, the
distinction between the originally produced and the revived is
essential.

They depend on language which presupposes the ascription of

sensation to an outward cause.

62. The first turns upon the impossibility of producing an idea de

novo without the action of sensitive organs; the two next upon the
difference between the idea as produced through these organs and
the like idea as revived at the will of the individual. It is hence
inferred that the idea as originally produced is the work of a thing,
which must exist in rerum naturâ, and by way of a fourth
‘confirmation’ the man who doubts this in the case of one sensation
is invited to try it in another. If, on seeing a fire, he thinks it ‘bare
fancy,’ i.e. doubts whether his idea is caused by a thing, let him put
his hand into it. This last ‘confirmation’ need not be further noticed
here, since the operation of a producing thing is as certain or as
doubtful for one sensation as for another. [1] Two certainties are not
more sure than one, nor can two doubts make a certainty. The other
‘confirmations’ alike lie in the words ‘product’ and ‘organ.’ A man has
a certain ‘idea:’ afterwards he has another like it, but differing in
liveliness and in the accompanying pleasure or pain. If he already
has, or if the ideas severally bring with them, the idea of a
producing outward thing to which parts of his body are organs, on
the one hand, and of a self ‘having power’ on the other, then the
liveliness, and the accompanying pleasure or pain, may become
indications of the action of the thing, as their absence may be so of
the action of the man’s self; but not otherwise. Locke throughout, in
speaking of the simple ideas as produced or recalled, implies that
they carry with them the consciousness of a cause, either an
outward thing or the self, and only by so doing can he find in them
the needful ‘confirmations’ of the ‘testimony of the senses.’ This
testimony is confirmed just because it distinguishes of itself between
the work of ‘nature,’ which is real, and the work of the man, which is
a fiction. In other words, the confirmation is nothing else than the
testimony itself—a testimony which, as we have seen, since it
supposes consciousness, as such, to be consciousness of a thing,
eliminates by anticipation the question as to the agreement of
consciousness with things, as with the extraneous.
 [1] To feel the object, in the sense of touching it, had a special
significance for Locke, since touch with him was the primary
‘revelation’ of body, as the solid. More will be said of this when we
come to consider his doctrine of ‘real essence,’ as constituted by
primary qualities of body. See below, paragraph 101.

This ascription means the clothing of sensation with invented

relations.

63. The distinction between the real and the fantastic, according
to the passages under consideration, thus depends upon that
between the work of nature and the work of man. It is the confusion
between the two works that renders the fantastic possible, while it is
the consciousness of the distinction that sets us upon correcting it.
Where all is the work of man and professes to be no more, as in the
case of ‘mixed modes,’ there is no room for the fantastic (Book II.
chap. xxx. sec. 4, and Book IV. chap. iv. sec. 7); and where there is
ever so much of the fantastic, it would not be so for us, unless we
were conscious of a ‘work of nature,’ to which to oppose it. But on
looking a little closer we find that to be conscious of an idea as the
work of nature, in opposition to the work of man, is to be conscious
of it under relations which, according to Locke, are the inventions of
man. It is nothing else than to be conscious of it as the result of
‘something having power to produce it’ (Book II. chap. xxxi. sec. 2),
i.e. of a substance, to which it is related as a quality. ‘Nature’ is just
the ‘something we know not what,’ which is substance according to
the ‘abstract idea’ thereof. Producing ideas, it exercises powers, as it
essentially belongs to substance to do, according to our complex
idea of it. (Book II. chap, xxiii. secs. 9, 10.) But substance, according
to Locke, whether as abstract or complex idea, is the ‘workmanship
of the mind,’ and power, as a relation (Book II. chap. xxi. sec. 3, and
chap. xxv. sec. 8), ‘is not contained in the real existence of things.’
Again, the idea of substance, as a source of power, is the same as
the idea of cause. ‘Whatever is considered by us to operate to the
producing any particular simple idea, which did not before exist,
hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause.’ (Book II. chap.
xxvi. sec. 1.) But the idea of cause is not one ‘that the mind has of
things as they are in themselves,’ but one that it gets by its own act
in ‘bringing things to, and setting them by, one another.’ (Book II.
chap. xxv. sec. 1.) Thus it is with the very ideas, which are the
workmanship of man, that the simple idea has to be clothed upon, in
order to ‘testify’ to its being real, i.e. (in Locke’s sense) not the work
of man.

What is meant by restricting the testimony of sense to present

existence?

64. Thus invested, the simple idea has clearly lost its simplicity. It
is not the momentary, isolated consciousness, but the representation
of a thing determined by relations to other things in an order of
nature, and causing an infinite series of resembling sensations to
which a common name is applied. Thus in all the instances of
sensuous testimony mentioned in the chapter before us, it is not
really a simple sensation that is spoken of, but a sensation referred
to a thing—not a mere smell, or taste, or sight, or feeling, but the
smell of a rose, the taste of a pine-apple, the sight of the sun, the
feeling of fire. (Book IV. chap. xi. secs. 4-7.) Immediately afterwards,
however, reverting or attempting to revert to his strict doctrine of
the mere individuality of the simple idea, he says that the testimony
of the senses is a ‘present testimony employed about particular
objects, that do then affect them,’ and that sensitive knowledge
extends no farther than such testimony. This statement, taken by
itself, is ambiguous. Does it mean that sensation testifies to the
momentary presence to the individual of a continuous existence, or
is the existence itself as momentary as its presence to sense? The
instance that follows does not remove the doubt. ‘If I saw such a
collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man, existing
together one minute since, and am now alone; I cannot be certain
that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary
connection of his existence a minute since with his existence now.’
(Book IV. chap. xi. sec. 9.) At first sight, these words might seem to
decide that the existence is merely coincident with the presence of
the sensation—a decision fatal to the distinction between the real
and fantastic, since, if the thing is only present with the sensation,
there can be no combination of qualities in reality other than the
momentary coincidence of sensations in us. Memory or imagination,
indeed, might recall these in a different order from that in which
they originally occurred; but, if this original order had no being after
the occurrence, there could be no ground for contrasting it with the
order of reproduction as the real with the merely apparent.

Such restriction, if maintained, would render the testimony

unmeaning.

65. In the very sentence, however, where Locke restricts the

testimony of sensation to existence present along with it, he uses
language inconsistent with this restriction. The particular existence
which he instances as ‘testified to’ is that of ‘such a collection of
simple ideas as is wont to be called man.’ But these ideas can only
be present in succession. (See Book II. chap. vii. sec. 9, and chap.
xiv. sec. 3.) Even the surface of the man’s body can only be taken in
by successive acts of vision; and, more obviously, the states of
consciousness in which his qualities of motion and action are
presented occupy separate times. If then sensation only testifies to
an existence present along with it, how can it testify to the co-
existence (say) of an erect attitude, of which I have a present sight,
with the risibility which I saw a minute ago? How can the ‘collection
of ideas wont to be called man,’ as co-existing, be formed at all?
and, if it cannot, how can the present existence of an object so-
called be testified to by sense any more than the past? The same
doctrine, which is fatal to the supposition of ‘a necessary connexion
between the man’s existence a minute since and his existence now,’
is in fact fatal to the supposition of his existence as a complex of
qualities at all. It does not merely mean that, for anything we know,
the man may have died. Of course he may, and yet there may be
continuity of existence according to natural laws, though not one for
which we have the testimony of present sense, between the living
body and the dead. What Locke had in his mind was the notion that,
as existence is testified to only by present sensation, and each
sensation is merely individual and momentary, there could be no
testimony to the continued existence of anything. He could not,
however, do such violence to the actual fabric of knowledge as
would have been implied in the logical development of this doctrine,
and thus he allowed himself to speak of sense as testifying to the
co-existence of sensible qualities in a thing, though the individual
sensation could only testify to the presence of one at a time, and
could never testify to their nexus in a common cause at all. This
testimony to co-existence in a present thing once admitted, he
naturally allowed himself in the further assumption that the
testimony, on its recurrence, is a testimony to the same co-existence
and the same thing. The existence of the same man (he evidently
supposes), to which sensation testified an hour ago, may be testified
to by a like sensation now. This means that resemblance of
sensation becomes identity of a thing—that like sensations occurring
at different times are interpreted as representing the same thing,
which continuously exists, though not testified to by sense, between
the times.

But it is not maintained: the testimony is to operation of

permanent identical things.

66. In short, as we have seen the simple idea of sensation emerge

from Locke’s inquiry as to the beginning of knowledge transformed
into the judgment, ‘I have an idea different from other ideas which I
did not make for myself,’ so now from the inquiry as to the
correspondence between knowledge and reality it emerges as the
consciousness of a thing now acting upon me, which has continued
to exist since it acted on me before, and in which, as in a common
cause, have existed together powers to affect me which have never
affected me together. If in the one form the operation of thought in
sense, the ‘creation of the understanding’ within the simple idea, is
only latent or potential, in the other it is actual and explicit. The
relations of substance and quality, of cause and effect, and of
identity—all ‘inventions of the mind’—are necessarily involved in the
immediate, spontaneous testimony of passive sense.

Locke’s treatment of relations of cause and identity.

67. It will be noticed that it is upon the first of these, the relation
of substance and quality, that our examination of Locke’s Essay has
so far chiefly gathered. In this it follows the course taken by Locke
himself. Of the idea of substance, eo nomine, he treats at large: of
cause and identity (apart from the special question of personal
identity) he says little. So, too, the ‘report of the senses’ is
commonly exhibited as announcing the sensible qualities of a thing
rather than the agency of a cause or continuity of existence. The
difference, of course, is mainly verbal. Sensible qualities being, as
Locke constantly insists, nothing but ‘powers to operate on our
senses’ directly or indirectly, the substance or thing, as the source of
these, takes the character of a cause. Again, as the sensible quality
is supposed to be one and the same in manifold separate cases of
being felt, it has identity in contrast with the variety of these cases,
even as the thing has, on its part, in contrast with the variety of its
qualities. Something, however, remains to be said of Locke’s
treatment of the ideas of cause and identity in the short passages
where he treats of them expressly. Here, too, we shall find the same
contrast between the given and the invented, tacitly contradicted by
an account of the given in terms of the invented.

That from which he derives idea of cause pre-supposes it.

68. The relation of cause and effect, according to Locke’s general

statement as to relation, must be something ‘not contained in the
real existence of things, but extraneous and superinduced.’ (Book II.
chap. xxv. sec. 8.) It is a ‘complex idea,’ not belonging to things as
they are in themselves, which the mind makes by its own act. (Book
II. chap xii. secs. 1, 7, and chap. xxv. sec. 1.) Its origin, however, is
thus described:—‘In the notice that our senses take of the constant
vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular,
both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive
this their existence from the due application and operation of some
other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and
effect. That which produces any simple or complex idea we denote
by the general name cause; and that which is produced, effect.
Thus, finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity,
which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly
produced by the application of a certain degree of heat, we call the
simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and
fluidity the effect. So, also, finding that the substance, wood, which
is a certain collection of simple ideas so-called, by the application of
fire is turned into another substance called ashes, i.e. another
complex idea, consisting of a collection of simple ideas, quite
different from that complex idea which we call wood; we consider
fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes as effect.’ Here we
find that the ‘given,’ upon which the relation of cause and effect is
‘superinduced’ or from which the ‘idea of it is got’ (to give Locke the
benefit of both expressions), professedly, according to the first
sentence of the passage quoted, involves the complex or derived
idea of substance. The sentence, indeed, is a remarkable instance of
the double refraction which arises from redundant phraseology. Our
senses are supposed to ‘take notice of a constant vicissitude of
things,’ or substances. Thereupon we observe, what is necessarily
implied in this vicissitude, a beginning of existence in substances or
their qualities, ‘received from the due application or operation of
some other being.’ Thereupon we infer, what is simply another name
for existence thus given and received, a relation of cause and effect.
Thus not only does the datum of the process of ‘invention’ in
question, i.e. the observation of change in a thing, involve a derived
idea, but a derived idea which presupposes just this process of
invention.

Rationale of this ‘petitio principii’.

69. Here again it is necessary to guard against the notion that

Locke’s obvious petitio principii might be avoided by a better
statement without essential change in his doctrine of ideas. It is true
that ‘a notice of the vicissitude of things’ includes that ‘invention of
the understanding’ which it is supposed to suggest, but state the
primary knowledge otherwise—reduce the vicissitude of things, as it
ought to be reduced, in order to make Locke consistent, to the mere
multiplicity of sensations—and the appearance of suggestion ceases.
Change or ‘vicissitude’ is quite other than mere diversity. It is
diversity relative to something which maintains an identity. This
identity, which ulterior analysis may find in a ‘law of nature,’ Locke
found in ‘things’ or ‘substances.’ By the same unconscious
subreption, by which with him a sensible thing takes the place of
sensation, ‘vicissitude of things’ takes the place of multiplicity of
sensations, carrying with it the observation that the changed state of
the thing is due to something else. The mere multiplicity of
sensations could convey no such ‘observation,’ any more than the
sight of counters in a row would convey the notion that one
‘received its existence’ from the other. Only so far as the manifold
appearances are referred, as its vicissitudes, to something which
remains one, does any need of accounting for their diverse
existence, or in consequence any observation of its derivation ‘from
some other being,’ arise. Locke, it is true, after stating that it is upon
a notice of the vicissitude of things that the observation in question
rests, goes on to speak as if an origination of substances, which is
just the opposite of their vicissitude, might be observed; and the
second instance of production which he gives—that of ashes upon
the burning of wood—seems intended for an instance of the
production of a substance, as distinct from the production of a
quality. He is here, however, as he often does, using the term
‘substance’ loosely, for ‘a certain collection of simple ideas,’ without
reference to the ‘substratum wherein they do subsist,’ which he
would have admitted to be ultimately the same for the wood and for
the ashes. The conception, indeed, of such a substratum, whether
vaguely as ‘nature,’ or more precisely as a ‘real constitution of
insensible parts’ (Book III. chap. iii. secs. 18, &c.), governed all his
speculation, and rendered to him what he here calls substance
virtually a mode, and its production properly a ‘vicissitude.’

Relation of cause has to be put into sensitive experience in order

to be got from it.

70. We thus find that it is only so far as simple ideas are referred
to things—only so far as each in turn, to use Locke’s instance, is
regarded as an appearance ‘in a substance which was not in it
before’—that our sensitive experience, the supposed datum of
knowledge, is an experience of the vicissitudes of things; and again,
that only as an experience of such vicissitude does it furnish the
‘observation from which we get our ideas of cause and effect.’ But
the reference of a sensation to a sensible thing means its reference
to a cause. In other words, the invented relation of cause and effect
must be found in the primary experience in order that it may be got
from it. [1]

[1] Locke’s contradiction of himself in regard to this relation might

be exhibited in a still more striking light by putting side by side with
his account of it his account of the idea of power. The two are
precisely similar, the idea of power being represented as got by a
notice of the alteration of simple ideas in things without (Book II.
chap. xxi. sec. 1), just as the idea of cause and effect is. Power, too,
he expressly says, is a relation. Yet, although the idea of it, both as
derived and as of a relation, ought to be complex, he reckons it a
simple and original one, and by using it interchangeably with
‘sensible quality’ makes it a primary datum of sense.

Origin of the idea of identity according to Locke.

 71. The same holds of that other ‘product of the mind,’ the
relation of identity. This ‘idea’ according to Locke, is formed when,
‘considering anything as existing at any determined time and place,
we compare it with itself existing at another time.’ ‘In this consists
identity,’ he adds, ‘when the ideas it is attributed to, vary not at all
from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former
existence, and to which we compare the present; for we never
finding nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same kind
should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude
that whatever exists anywhere, at any time, excludes all of the same
kind, and is there itself alone. When, therefore, we demand whether
anything be the same or no? it refers always to something that
existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that
instant was the same with itself, and no other; from whence it
follows that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor
two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the
same kind to be or exist in the same instant in the very same place,
or one and the same thing in different places. That, therefore, that
had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different
beginning in time and place from that is not the same, but diverse.’
He goes on to inquire about the principium individuationis, which he
decides is ‘existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a
particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same
kind … for being at that instant what it is and nothing else, it is the
same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued; for
so long it will be the same, and no other.’ (Book II. chap, xxvii. secs.
1-3).

Relation of identity not to be distinguished from idea of it.