SVKM’s Pravin Gandhi College of Law

Semester IV
Political science
Title of topic: Navigating tensions: Understanding the ongoing
conflict between north Korea and south Korea on the Korean
peninsula.
Name of student: Samay Saraf
Year, Division& Roll no :2nd Year A041
Abstract
The Korean Peninsula is a focal point of geopolitical tension and symbolizes the protracted
struggle between North and South Korea. In order to comprehend the complexity of the
dispute, this abstract examines its historical roots, contemporary manifestations, and potential
avenues for resolution. during the division of Korea along ideological lines during World
War II, the 1950s Korean War and the tenuous ceasefire that still holds today occurred.

The continuous conflict between North and South Korea has multiple elements, including
security, political, and economic ones. Differing ideologies combined with military posture
and nuclear ambitions result in a persistent state of hostility. Moreover, regional and global
players influence the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula.

There are indications of hope for peace and reconciliation even though tensions still exist.
Initiatives aimed at promoting confidence, such as international mediation efforts and inter-
Korean summits, serve as platforms for communication. Additional opportunities to foster
understanding and reduce the distance between the two Koreas are provided by cultural and
economic exchanges.
Introduction
The Korean War, also known as the "Forgotten War," was a crucial struggle that influenced
the Korean Peninsula's contemporary history. The Cold War tensions that surrounded the war's
outbreak in 1950–1953 saw communist forces from North Korea, backed by China and the
Soviet Union, clash with democratic forces from South Korea, backed by the US and its allies.
The Korean peninsula was divided after World War II along the 38th parallel, which is where
the war got its start. This transitory partition between the Soviet and American occupation
zones gave rise to two different political entities: the democratic government of South Korea,
headed by President Moon Jae-in, and the communist regime of North Korea, headed by Kim
Il-sung.
When North Korean forces unexpectedly crossed the 38th parallel in June 1950 with the
intention of uniting the peninsula under communist rule, tensions between North and South
Korea reached a new high. South Korea and its allies were unprepared for the invasion, which
prompted prompt international criticism and assistance for South Korea.
The Korean War swiftly descended into a vicious and horrific struggle marked by fierce
fighting, a high death toll, and extensive damage. From the northern mountainous regions to
the southern urban centres, battles raged throughout the Korean peninsula's difficult landscape.
The war saw significant involvement from both conventional and unconventional forces,
including ground troops, naval fleets, and airpower.
Tensions in the Korean War increased as a result of foreign intervention. In late 1950, China
joined the conflict on the side of North Korea because of fear that Western forces would march
closer to its borders. South Korea received assistance and military activities were coordinated
by the United Nations, which was presided over by the US.
An armistice agreement was struck in July 1953, bringing the Korean War to an end after three
years of intense combat and diplomacy. The Korean peninsula is still technically at war since
the conflict did not culminate in a formal peace treaty. One of the lasting effects of the Korean
War is the split of Korea into North and South Korea, which has continued to cause tensions
and a precarious peace on the northern peninsula
The Korean War was a historic conflict that significantly altered the geopolitical environment
of East Asia and the course of the Korean peninsula. Its legacy is still felt in the area, which
emphasizes how crucial it is to comprehend its origins, effects, and implications for the peace
and stability of the northern peninsula.
Historical context
Korean war (1950 -1953)
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. The UN, in accord with its
Charter, engaged in its first collective action by establishing the UN Command (UNC), under
which 16 member nations sent troops and assistance to South Korea. At the request of the
UN Security Council, the United States, contributor of the largest contingent, led this
international effort.

After initially falling back to the southeastern Pusan perimeter, UN forces conducted a
successful surprise landing at Inchon and rapidly advanced up the peninsula. As the main UN
force approached the northern Yalu River, however, large numbers of "Chinese People's
Volunteers" intervened, forcing UN troops to withdraw south of Seoul. The battle line
seesawed back and forth until the late spring of 1951, when a successful offensive by UN
forces was halted to enhance cease-fire negotiation prospects. The battle line thereafter
stabilized north of Seoul near the 38th parallel.
Although armistice negotiations began in July 1951, hostilities continued until 1953 with
heavy losses on both sides. On July 27, 1953 the military commanders of the North Korean
Army, the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the UNC signed an armistice agreement at
Panmunjom. Neither the United States nor South Korea is a signatory of the armistice per se,
though both adhere to it through the UNC. No comprehensive peace agreement has replaced
the 1953 armistice pact; thus, a condition of belligerency still technically exists on the divided
peninsula.

The Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was created in 1953 to oversee and enforce the
terms of the armistice. The Neutral Nation Supervisory Committee (NNSC)--originally made
up of delegations from Poland and Czechoslovakia on the D.P.R.K. side and Sweden and
Switzerland on the UN side--monitors the activities of the MAC. In recent years, North Korea
has sought to undermine the MAC by various means. In April 1994 it declared the MAC void
and withdrew its representatives. Prior to this it had forced the Czechs out of the NNSC by
refusing to accept the Czech Republic as the successor state of Czechoslovakia, an original
member of the NNSC. In September 1994 China recalled the Chinese People's Volunteers
representatives to the MAC, and in early 1995 North Korea forced Poland to remove its
representatives to the NNSC from the North Korean side of the DMZ.1

Division of the Korean Peninsula Along the 38th Parallel

At the last stage of the Pacific War, the United States and the Soviet Union, the temporary
allied powers in the war against Nazi Germany in Europe, became at odds with each other. In
dealing with the establishment of the government of the occupied areas, the Truman
administration adhered to the principle of national self-determination, whereas the Soviet
government under Stalin was mainly concerned about its own security. President Truman, a
staunch supporter of self-determination, was extremely frustrated over the Soviet violation
of the principle and the shrewd Soviet political manipulations in the occupied zone,
conspicuously, in Poland and Rumania. Stalin, an intransigent communist, being obsessed
with fear of being encircled by the capitalist nations. He was determined to establish buffer
states amenable to the Soviet Union around the Soviet border. After Nazi Germany was
destroyed in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union had little in common. As a result,
the main outcome of the Potsdam Conference (July 16-August 2, 1945) was a feeling of
mutual distrust running beneath the ostensibly friendly talks between the United States and
the Soviet delegates. The ambivalent feelings of President Truman were explicitly expressed
when he said “Stalin was a S. O. B.,” and “I guess he thinks I’m one too.”2 Gone indeed was
the temporary allied relationship arranged for the fighting against Nazi Germany between the
United States and the Soviet Union.

After the United States dropped the A-bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9,
1945 respectively and the Soviet Union declared war against Japan on August 9, 1945, the

1
https://1997-2001.state.gov/background_notes/southkorea_0006_bgn.html (Accessed on 19thMarch 2024)
2
Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 243; Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), p. 51. President Truman later expressed his feeling about Stalin in his
letter to Dean Acheson (unsent) by saying that “I liked the little son of a bitch.” See Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off
the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 348-349
Japanese government made its offer of surrender on August 10, 19453. The sudden collapse
of Japan left little time to change the thrust of U.S. military planning from defeating Japan to
dealing with the Japanese surrender. Planners in the Operations Division of the War
Department began to prepare General Order No. 1 to be delivered by General Douglas
MacArthur to the Japanese government. According to later testimony, Colonel Charles H.
Bonesteel, chief of the Policy Section of the Division, and Major Dean Rusk, a reserve officer
on active duty in the division, had “thirty minutes” before midnight on August 10-11, 1945 to
prepare paragraph one that would specify the nations and commands to accept the Japanese
surrender throughout the Far East. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)
was waiting for a draft. Their major concern was to set up the line as far north as would be
acceptable to the Soviets. Another factor to be considered was that the nearest American
troops were on Okinawa, 600 miles from Korea. Bonesteel and Rusk desired to divide Korea
along the local provincial boundary lines north of Seoul. But there was only one available map
in Bonesteel’s office, in which the 38th parallel roughly divided Korea by half. After glancing
over the document, Bonesteel and Rusk decided that this line would be the hypothetical line
for accepting the Japanese surrender.4

The decision with regard to the surrender zones followed the same channel as for all
important military ones in 1945. Drafts usually passed in turn through the Joint Planners, the
SWNCC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the secretaries of State, War, and Navy, before
they finally reached the President for final approval. The Joint Staff Planners received
Bonesteel’s draft at the predawn hours of August 11, 1945, and began to discuss it. The Navy
representative (Admiral M. B. Gardner) immediately suggested the 39th parallel for the line
so that Dairen would be in the American zone. But the Chief of Strategy and Policy Group
(General George A. Lincoln) pointed out that the Russians might not accept the line and that
American troops were too far away to reach that part of the Liaodong peninsula in time. He
then called Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn and asked for the State Department’s
view. Dunn said that Korea was more important to the United States than Dairen, and
believed this to be the view of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.5 The JCS approved the
proposed draft with their comment: “.this gives to the United States forces port and
communications area of Seoul and a sufficient portion of Korea so that parts of it might be
apportioned to the Chinese and the British in case of quadripartite administration
eventuates.”6 After the JCS approved the proposed “General Order No. 1,” the Secretary of
State sent the document to the President with the remarks that the Secretaries of State, War,
Navy, and JCS approved the draft of “General Order No. 1.” President Truman sanctioned this
order, and the JCS sent the order to General MacArthur. Stalin tacitly endorsed the order by
raising no objection regarding the 38th parallel and Korea. Thus was set the line to accept the
Japanese surrender in Northeast Asia and the boundary of the military operations between
the United States and Soviet troops in the area. The 38th parallel was thus given a military
and political meaning in addition to its geographical one, because it was chosen to facilitate

3
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 13, p. 205.
4
SWNCC Meeting Minutes, August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter, FRUS], 1945,
vol. 6, p. 645; Memo by Dean Rusk, July 12, 1950, FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, p. 1039; James F. Schnabel, Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 8-9.
5
Ibid.
6
Memo from the Secretary of the JCS to the SWNCC, August 14, 1945, SWNCC 21-Series, Record Group (RG)
319, ABC 014 Japan (13 April 1944), sec., 1-A, National Archives (NA), Washington, D. C.
the Japanese surrender and foster conditions for a possible multi-national trusteeship in
Korea. Physically, it divided the Korean peninsula, cutting more than 75 streams, 12 rivers,
181 small cart roads, 104 country roads, 15 provincial all-weather roads, 8 good highways, 6
north-south rail lines, and even a single house.7 Economically, since the northern and
southern parts of Korea were largely complementary to each other both agriculturally and
industrially, the division itself was not acceptable for the daily lives of the Koreans. Politically,
because of the subsequent American and Soviet military occupations in the two parts of the
peninsula, the line also divided the Korean people into the two different blocs of the
ideological, political, economic values and systems. All in all, the 38th parallel, the artificial
line, only promised to exacerbate the situation in the Korean peninsula.

Comparison of forces
Throughout 1949 and 1950, the Soviets continued arming North Korea. After the communist
victory in the Chinese Civil War, ethnic Korean units in the PLA were sent to North
Korea.8 Chinese involvement was extensive from the beginning, building on previous
collaboration between the Chinese and Korean communists during the Chinese Civil War. In
the fall of 1949, two PLA divisions composed mainly of Korean-Chinese troops
(the 164th and 166th) entered North Korea, followed by smaller units throughout the rest of
1949; these troops brought with them not only their experience and training, but also their
weapons and other equipment, changing little but their uniforms. The reinforcement of the
KPA with PLA veterans continued into 1950, with the 156th Division and several other units
of the former Fourth Field Army arriving (also with their equipment) in February; the PLA
156th Division was reorganized as the KPA 7th Division. By mid-1950, between 50,000 and
70,000 former PLA troops had entered North Korea, forming a significant part of the KPA's
strength on the eve of the war's beginning.9 Several generals, such as Lee Kwon-mu, were PLA
veterans born to ethnic Koreans in China. The combat veterans and equipment from China,
the tanks, artillery and aircraft supplied by the Soviets, and rigorous training increased North
Korea's military superiority over the South, armed by the U.S. military with mostly small arms,
but no heavy weaponry such as tanks.10 While older histories of the conflict often referred to
these ethnic Korean PLA veterans as being sent from northern Korea to fight in the Chinese
Civil War before being sent back, recent Chinese archival sources studied by Kim Dong gill
indicate that this was not the case. Rather, the soldiers were indigenous to China (part of
China's longstanding ethnic Korean community) and were recruited to the PLA in the same
way as any other Chinese citizen.11

7
Stalin to Truman, telegram, August 16, 1945, enclosed in Memo, From Admiral Leahy to General Marshall,
April 29, 1947, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4-2947, NA. President Truman sent this approved General
Order No. 1 to the British Prime Minister on August 15, 1945. See Byrnes to Winant, August 16, 1945, RG 59,
740.00119 Pacific War/8-1645, NA.

8
Millett 2007, p. 14

9
Stuecker, William (2004). Korean War: World History. University Press of Kentucky. pp. 102–103.

10
Millett 2007, p. 15.
11
Zhihua Shen. "A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino–North Korean Relations,
1949–1976". Columbia University Press, September 2018.
According to the first official census in 1949, the population of North Korea numbered
9,620,000,12 and by mid-1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000
troops, organized into 10 infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with
210 fighter planes and 280 tanks, who captured scheduled objectives and territory, among
them Kaesong, Chungcheong, Uijeongbu and Ongjin. Their forces included 274 T-34-85 tanks,
200 artillery pieces, 110 attack bombers, and some 150 Yak fighter planes, and 35
reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the invasion force, the North had 114 fighters, 78
bombers, 105 T-34-85 tanks, and some 30,000 soldiers stationed in reserve in North
Korea. Although each navy consisted of only several small warships, the North and South
Korean navies fought in the war as seaborne artillery for their armies.
In contrast, the South Korean population was estimated at 20 million,13 but its army was
unprepared and ill-equipped. As of 25 June 1950, the ROK had 98,000 soldiers (65,000
combat, 33,000 support), no tanks (they had been requested from the U.S. military, but
requests were denied), and a 22-plane air force comprising 12 liaison-type and 10 AT-
6 advanced-trainer airplanes. Large U.S. garrisons and air forces were in Japan,14 but only
200–300 U.S. troops were in Korea. 15

Economic impact
Destruction in North Korea was more severe. In addition to the terrible human casualties, 25
million death toll of North Koreans and Chinese combined, the total damage was estimated
as high as 420 billion won, which was a lot higher than the damage in South Korea and
equivalent to roughly four times of the North Korea's 1953 GNP.16 To be specific, 8,700
factories and state enterprises, 600,000 housing units, and over 5,000 schools, disappeared
in smoke. Additionally, 370,000 hectares of rice paddies and fields were put into a state of
devastation.17
Two major economic reforms, however, successfully were carried out long before the Korean
War and thus were not affected at all by the war. In North Korea, the land reform was enacted

12 Nick Eberstadt (27 September 2017). Policy and Economic Performance in Divided Korea During the
Cold War Era: 1945–91. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780844742748 – via Google Books.
13
Armstrong, Charles K. (20 December 2010). "The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950–
1960

14
Appleman 1998, p. 17.
15
James, Jack (25 June 1950). "North Koreans invade South Korea". United Press. Retrieved 29
July 2017.
16
Since the estimate was made based on the different sources, direct comparison with that of South Korea may
not be meaningful, though. In any case, industrial production in 1953 was estimated 64% smaller than its 1949
level, and agricultural production was down to 24% lower than its 1949 level.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2024)
17
Ko, 1993, pp. 104-106. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf (accessed
on 20 March 2024)
on March 5, 1946 and its execution was completed in 20 days.18 North Korean government
confiscated all the enemy-owned farmlands, tenant-based farmlands and the excess of five
Chongo of all farmlands, and distributed them for free to tenants or farmers with small land,
according to the "Confiscation without Redemption and Redistribution without Payments"
principle (The North Korean Land Reform Law, Article 5). The land reform law, however,
stated that distributed land could not be sold or used for mortgage or for tenant farming
(same law, Article 10) and that distribution of land should be carried out by decisions made
by the People's Council (same law, Article 6). Although it was declared as free redistribution,
it turned out to be a disguised nationalization of land that discouraged farming and caused a
decrease in productivity in later years. In the case of firms and production facilities that were
owned by the Japanese or the pro-Japanese businessmen, they were all confiscated without
redemption. They were put temporarily under the control of USSR military government, and
then officially nationalized by the North Korean government on August 10,1946. Following
this reform, the socialistic production system accounted for nearly 90% of all production
facilities.

Mishaps of the Korean Government Economic Policies

The serious consequence of the Korean government's "real-demand principle" was that it
gave a windfall gain to those who could acquire aid materials, since the WPI rose four times
during the 1953-61 period. On the other hand, even when the official exchange rate
approached market rate in 1955, the immediate discrepancy between sales price of aid
materials and their market price ranged from 7 to73% on the spot. Thus, the Korean
government was actually more responsible than the US for fostering consumer goods industry
and later on paving the way for the rise of big-business oriented Chaebol structure. In addition
to the advantage given to those who had operational production facilities, especially in
relation to "three-white" industry, the Korean government provided them with special
benefits such as the application of much lower interest rates for their loans, mostly 10% or
lower, which was lower than general bank loan rate, 18.25%, and much lower than the curb
rate of 48% (4% per-month). Even the inflation rate was higher than the nominal bank loan
rate at that time. Further, various tax credits and benefits were added. Also, loans were
allocated in Favor of big firms. This in turn made the owned capital ratio of big firms lower
than that of small and medium firms. The former was 28%, and the latter, 46% in 1960.
Such a practice finally contributed to the establishment of special government-business nexus
and corruption. The usual kickback rate of bank loans was reported to be about 20% (Shin,
2000, p.277). Such procedure helped those big businesses to form cartels such as the Korea
Textile Association, through which they could monopolize raw material aid such as cotton
(100%), molasses (100%), wheat (81 %), and sugar (27%). These associations also practiced
sales cartelization. For example, 19% of textile industries took 89% of the market, while 2% of
sugar industries took 92% of the market. The Che-il Woolen Textile Co. controlled 60% of the
market, and three leading flour milling companies took up 50% of the market in the 1950s.

18
According to the North Korean publication, 53% of the farmland was confiscated (equivalent to 90% of all
tenant-based farmland), and was distributed for free to 70% of farmers.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2024)
Since such monopoly was not built up based on economic productivity, but on special benefits
from government, they could establish neither optimum level of production scale, nor
competitiveness in international markets. In addition, the labour productivity was estimated
as low as the one third or one-half level of the Japanese counterpart in the textile industry
(cotton). What made those industries either flourish or survive was special favor in aid
material allocation, special benefits in tax and financing, monopolistic business operation, and
most of all, utilization of labour of long working hours for very low wages. People worked 11-
12 hours a day for a monthly salary of 13-26 thousand hwan, when the minimum living
expenses of labourers of 8 hours working was set at 23 thousand hwan. This was possible
because there was infinite number of an unemployed labour force. The unemployment rate
was estimated to be 45%, if 20%o level of disguised employment was included.
All these facts helped big businesses grow with high profits. The gains only from the difference
between different exchange rates were estimated to be as big as US$1.3 billion during the
1953-1960 period. Nine of the biggest ten Korean Chaebols established their core sectors
during this period. Unfortunately, their products were centred around aid raw material related
products such as cotton, wool, sugar and food. Consumer goods industries such as fertilizer,
cement, flat glasses, which could generate bigger forward and backward linkage effects, were
not yet being produced any for markets. Another major mishap of the Korean government
occurred in relation to its policy on the agricultural sector. The Korean government transferred
inflationary pressure onto the agricultural sector through low grain price policy based on aid
grains and heavy tax. Aid by grains between 1945-1960 consisted of 33% of all aid offered in
Korea. The size of inflow of aid grains was 400-500 thousand tons per year, which was
equivalent to 15% of domestic production, and which was obviously a lot higher than grain
import in the pre-war year 1949 (2% of the domestic production). The grain price index fell by
35% during the 1956-59 period, while prices of consumer goods rose by 72% during the 1953-
54 period, and it rose by only 20% while those of other consumer goods rose by 64% during
the 1955-59 period.

WPI in the 1950s (1955 =100)

WPI WPI for gains WPI for non-gains

1956, 10 - 1957, 1 142.1 174.4 131.4

1957, 10 - 1958, 1 143.3 144.9 143.4
1958, 10 - 1959, 1 140.3 133.1 142.7
1959, 10 - 1960, 1 153.8 120.4 163.6
Source: Sung Yoo Hong. Capital Accumulation Process the Korean Economy. 1965.19

19
Sung Yoo Hong. Capital Accumulation Process the Korean Economy. 1965.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf (accessed on 20th March 2024)
It is true that the low price of grains was related to heavy inflow of aid grains. But the Korean
government policy was responsible for this low grain price. During the war, the government
tried to acquire grains for war supplies through government purchasing policies within one
third of the annual product. The government tried to maintain a government purchasing price
that was as low as possible. It was estimated as low as 74% of the average production costs
and much lower than market prices. This policy was carried out until 1961. The government
also tried to keep grain prices low so that it could lessen the burden of redemption for the
landlords who sold their land to the government. The government was supposed to pay for
them based on the monetary value of the specified quantify of grain on the voucher (farmland
securities).
There was another reason for the low grain price policy. The government needed to keep
grain prices low, because they were a leading factor of the WPI. If the WPI rose more than
25% per year, Korea had to devalue Korean currency against US dollars, which was not what
the Korean government wanted. One last additional reason for the low grain price was that it
could help poor urban dwellers. The temporary land tax was created and levied on deprived
farmers in order to finance war expenses. Farmers had to pay this tax with real farm products.
This started in 1951 and continued even after the war until April, 19 1960 when the tax was
allowed to be paid in money. This temporary land tax was 5.5 times higher in its money value
in terms of official grain price (10 times in market price). Tax revenue from this alone
accounted for 30% of the total tax revenue in terms of official grain prices (70-90% in market
prices) during the war, and 12- 24%, even after the war. Faced with such heavy burden, farmers
could depend only upon borrowing in order to continue farming. According to Dae Keun Lee's
study (1987), farm family debt rose by 4.4 times during the 1953-56 period, and 1.7 times.
Nearly 80-90% of all farm families had some debts. Unfortunately, 70-80% of them were high
interest curb loans. This situation drove many small new independent farmers to sell their
farmland. About 58% of those who bought farmland of 0.3 Chongo or smaller, and 32% of those
who bought farmland of 0.3-0.5 Chongo sold their farmland (Jindo Park, 1994). Consequently 26% of
all farmland returned to tenant farming again in reality. In the meantime, those who sold their land
had to stay in rural areas, working as farmers on leased land, because at that time the urban sector
could not absorb any bankrupted farmers.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PEACE, DIVISION, AND

REUNIFICATION
The relationships between Korean peace, division, and reunification have been in tension
since 1945. Both Koreas were unhappy with the division and actively sought to reunify the
Peninsula by force. Kim Il Sung attacked South Korea in 1950 with the aim of reunification.
Three years later, South Korean President Syngman Rhee refused to sign the armistice because
he wanted the war to continue until reunification was achieved. The notion of peaceful
coexistence was unthinkable to both leaders.20 By the early 1970s, as Washington signalled a

20
“The idea that Korea could be separated into Northern and Southern parts and that the parts should coexist
is very dangerous,” Kim said in November 1954. “It is a view obstructing our efforts for unification” (Chong-Sik
Lee, “Korean Partition and Unification,” Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 2 (1964): 230–31.
desire to reduce tensions with China and the Soviet Union and to decrease its defence burden
in the region, the two Koreas took steps toward rapprochement. North Korea viewed North-
South dialogue as a way to decouple Seoul from Washington and Tokyo and hasten the
withdrawal of US troops; South Korea saw engagement with the North as a hedge against US
abandonment.21 In 1972, the two countries signed a joint statement to promote the
unification of the Peninsula through nonviolent means and independent Korean efforts. Later,
the 1991 Basic Agreement signalled an implicit understanding that peaceful coexistence was
a precursor to reunification.
Since 2000, the two Koreas have recognized that their respective approaches to reunification
have elements in common.22 The North Korean proposal for a Democratic Confederal Republic
of Koryo envisions reunification under a one-state, two-system approach in which the two
governments maintain autonomy in managing diplomatic, military, and economic affairs. This
system would be a transitional phase for the ultimate end state of a single-system country.
Similarly, South Korea’s National Community Unification Formula uses a three stage approach
that would begin with a period of reconciliation and cooperation, followed by the formation
of an economic and social commonwealth (like the European Union), and then the final
realization of a unified state.23 These positions are not static, however, and have evolved with
changes in the security environment and each country’s security interests. Fundamental
differences in the two plans will make a unified state difficult to operationalize. South Korea’s
constitution calls for a unified Korea based on a “free and basic democratic order.” North
Korea’s approach seeks to preserve its socialist system and requires the removal of US forces,
which it believes contributed to the division in the first place.
Analysts generally view the prospect of a democratic South Korea and an authoritarian North
Korea living in peace as a waypoint to eventual unification. Nevertheless, whether a peace
regime would extend or shorten the timeline for unification is not agreed. The Moon
administration and other engagement advocates believe that a peace process, by encouraging
cooperation and the exchange of ideas, goods, and people, can build mutual trust and
facilitate the path to not only denuclearization but also a mutually agreeable, soft-landing
unification. Other experts argue that a peace regime process would prematurely relieve

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-
pw_0.pdf (accessed 20 March 2024)

21
Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 25–
26https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/pw_157-a_peace_regime_for_the_korean_peninsula-
pw_0.pdf (accessed 20 March 2024)

22
Dae-Jung Kim, “North and South Korea Find Common Ground,” New York Times, November 28, 2000,
www.nytimes.com/2000/11/28/opinion /IHT-north-and-south-korea-find-common-ground.html. (accessed 20
March 2024)

23
South Korean Ministry of Unification, "National Community Unification Plan" [in Korean],
www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/policy/plan. The American Interest, July 27, 2014,
pressure on the Kim regime to denuclearize and conduct reforms, thereby extending it. From
this perspective, a peace regime creates a strategic dilemma with no clear resolution.
Assuming reunification is possible, what a unified Korea might mean for regional stability is
also a matter of concern. Washington supports the peaceful reunification of Korea based on
the principles of free democracy and a market economy. Yet some Washington analysts
believe that South Korea, in its pursuit of reunification, may be willing to abandon the US-ROK
Alliance and assume neutrality or, even worse, accommodate China’s foreign policy
preferences under a Finlandization model.24 Such concerns are even greater in Tokyo, which
worries that a neutral unified Korea would be anti-Japan, tilt toward China, reduce US
influence and presence in the region, and degrade Japan’s security vis-àvis China. For its part,
Beijing could accept a peacefully reunified Korea but would oppose the continuation of the
Alliance and any effort to draw Korea into a US containment strategy against China. Mitigating
these concerns about the future orientation of a reunified Korea will be an important aspect
of the peace process.

Success and Failures in diplomatic negotiations

December 1985
North Korea joins non-proliferation regime
North Korea becomes a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a multilateral
pact whose signatories pledged to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
technology and to foster peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. In the early 1980s, North Korea
constructed its first nuclear power plants.
September 1991
United States removes nukes from South Korea
As stipulated in the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States declares that
it will remove around one hundred nuclear weapons from South Korea. The START accord,
which was signed by President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,
restricts the use of offensive nuclear weapons overseas.
January 1992
Korean Peninsula denuclearization agreed upon
In addition to forbidding nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, the
governments of North and South Korea also commit to "not test, manufacture, produce,
receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons." The two Koreas agree in the deal to
limit their use of nuclear energy to peaceful uses solely.
March 1993
North Korea threatens NPT withdrawal
Pyongyang rejects inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
announces its intent to leave the NPT. However, the country suspends its withdrawal

24
The American Interest, July 27, 2014, www.the-american-interest.com/2014/07/27/finlandization-is-not-a-
solution-for-ukraine. (Accessed on 20 March 2024)
following talks with U.S. diplomats in New York. Pyongyang agrees to comply with IAEA
safeguards, including inspections at seven declared nuclear sites. The first inspections take
place in March 1994.
June 1994
Carter visits North Korea
Amid escalating tensions on the peninsula, Jimmy Carter becomes the first former U.S.
president to visit North Korea, where he meets with Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder.
Carter’s trip paves the way for a bilateral deal between the United States and North Korea.
Kim dies weeks later and is succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il.

March 1995

Carter visits North Korea

Amid escalating tensions on the peninsula, Jimmy Carter becomes the first former U.S.
president to visit North Korea, where he meets with Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder.
Carter’s trip paves the way for a bilateral deal between the United States and North Korea.
Kim dies weeks later and is succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-il.

September 1999
North Korea declares a moratorium on missiles.
After talks with the US, North Korea consents to stop testing long-range missiles; in return,
the US lifts economic restrictions for the first time since the Korean War started in 1950.

June 2000
First Summit Between Koreas
In Pyongyang, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il hold
their first summit since the Korean Peninsula was divided fifty years ago. Many cooperative
business and cultural initiatives are the outcome of the rapprochement, including the building
of an industrial complex and the reunion of families that were split up during the conflict. The
US further relaxes sanctions after the summit, enabling limited commerce and investment.

October 2000
Goodwill tours are held in Pyongyang and Washington.
General Jo Myong-rok of North Korea becomes the highest-ranking North Korean official to
visit the United States when he talks with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Washington. A few
weeks later, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits North Korea to talk about
exports of missile technology and the nation's ballistic missile development. Although
November saw missile negotiations as a result of the diplomatic attempts, Clinton's term
closes without any more nuclear or missile agreements.

January 2001 – April 2002

Bush questions North's resolve to make a deal
After assuming office in 2001, President George W. Bush adopts a tougher stance toward
Pyongyang, labeling the country as part of a "axis of evil" that also includes Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea, and he imposes additional sanctions. Due to a rocket launch and transfers of
missiles to Iran, Bush said in a document dated April 2002 that the United States will not
certify North Korea's compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework.
October 2002 – January 2003
North Korea leaves the NPT
According to Pyongyang, there is a covert uranium enrichment program that is being used to
develop nuclear weapons, in defiance of the NPT, the Agreed Framework, and agreements
between North and South Korea. The nation promises to restart its Yongbyon nuclear reactor
by December. Following the disruption of IAEA monitoring equipment and the expulsion of
inspectors, North Korea withdraws from the NPT the following month.

August 2003
Open six-party talks
A diplomatic effort known as the Six Party Talks is started by South and North Korea, China,
Japan, Russia, and the United States in the midst of a dangerous situation. During the first
round of talks in Beijing, where North Korea denies having a uranium-enrichment program,
there are no breakthroughs.
October 9 2006
North Korea's nuclear test shakes the world.
A nuclear test conducted underground by North Korea is predicted to have a yield of one to
two kilotons. North Korea conducted seven ballistic missile tests in July, spanning short,
medium, and long ranges. The UN Security Council unanimously condemns these tests and
imposes trade sanctions as a result.
January 2009 – December 2009
Obama tries to rekindle diplomacy
After taking office, President Barack Obama signals his readiness to resume the Six Party Talks.
However, North Korea first thwarts his efforts by launching a rocket that is thought to be a
modified version of its long-range ballistic missile. Additionally, in April, it kicks out
international monitors from its nuclear facilities and tests a second nuclear bomb with a yield
of two to eight kilotons the following month. Obama administration representatives met with
their North Korean colleagues for the first time in person in December.

Summary
The Korean Peninsula's division along the 38th parallel, the Korean War (1950–1953), and the
effects these events had on the military and economy are all covered in this document. The
devastating economic effects of the war on North Korea are highlighted in the text, along with
the loss of farmland and rice paddies as well as homes, factories, and schools. The devastating
economic effects of the war on North Korea are highlighted in the text, along with the loss of
farmland and rice paddies as well as homes, factories, and schools. The low grain price
strategy and high taxes on the agricultural sector are specifically criticized in the document as
being examples of the Korean government's economic policies.

Conclusion
Korean War and Divide along the 38th Parallel: The Korean War (1950–1953) resulted in the
partition of the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel, with South Korea receiving help from
the United Nations, mainly the United States, and North Korea receiving support from China
and the Soviet Union. As a result of this split, two ideologically different states were formed,
resulting in continuous tensions and sporadic violent outbursts. While South Korea has
modernized its military with assistance from the United States, North Korea has retained a
sizable military force and frequently emphasizes a militaristic culture. The unstable balance
of power and increased tensions are results of both sides' military expansion.
Since the partition, North and South Korea's economic trajectories have greatly differed.
While North Korea has battled with economic stagnation, isolation, and dependency on
foreign aid, South Korea has enjoyed significant industrialization and economic growth,
emerging as one of the world's leading economies. The economic policies of North and South
Korea have presented difficulties. The centrally planned economy of North Korea has
resulted in food shortages, inefficiencies, and slow economic growth. Despite its general
success, South Korea has had problems with excessive household debt, business corruption,
and income disparity.
Peace and ultimate reunion are still difficult and elusive objectives to pursue. There have
been sporadic attempts to reduce hostilities and promote diplomatic relations, with successes
often followed by disappointments. Reunification is hampered by factors like disparate
political systems, security worries, and outside pressures. The Korean Peninsula conflict,
which originated from the Korean War's divide along the 38th parallel, still has an effect on
the politics, economy, and security of the area. It will take persistent work, diplomatic
discussions, and resolving the fundamental problems that have fuelled hostility and division
between North and South Korea to bring about long-lasting peace and eventual reunification.
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