2011 Examining Metaphors in Biopolitical Discourse

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Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59

DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8
Cynthia-Lou Coleman
L. David Ritchie
Portland State University
EXAMINING METAPHORS
IN BIOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
Abstract
This essay argues that common metaphors and metaphoric phrases used in
biopolitical discourse limit how meanings are constructed by framing
messages narrowly: so much so, that alternate readings are delimited,
resulting in less opportunity for cognitive scrutiny of such messages. We
moor our discussion of metaphors in cognitive linguistics, building on three
decades of research by scholars including Sam Glucksberg (2008), George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999), and Ray Gibbs, Jr. (2006, 2008),
demonstrating how research in framing effects bolsters our claims of
limited entailments resulting from message construction. By situating our
discussion of framing in biopolitics we make a case that metaphors
including Frankenfood, designer baby, vegetative state and death tax
address how life and death are ―managed‖ in discourse (Foucault 1980). In
this essay we demonstrate ways in which the framing of some metaphors in
social discourse slip under readers‘ and viewers‘ cognitive radars, and thus
become ―under-the-radar metaphors.‖
Keywords
Biopolitics, death tax, designer baby, framing, Frankenfood, genetic
engineering, metaphor, perceptual simulation theory, vegetative state.
Department of Communication, Portland State University

724 SW Harrison Street, Neuberger Hall, Portland, Oregon 97207-0751
e-mail: [email protected]
Department of Communication, Portland State University
724 SW Harrison Street, Neuberger Hall, Portland, Oregon 97207-0751
e-mail: [email protected]
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Cynthia-Lou Coleman & L. David Ritchie
Examining Metaphors in Biopolitical Discourse
1. Examining metaphors in biopolitical discourse

In this essay we argue that some metaphors and metaphoric phrasings have
become interwoven with message construction in everyday discourse—so much so
that counter-arguments are either neglected wholesale or greatly diminished. For
example, ―designer baby‖ has become the common parlance in designating an
embryo created outside the womb, but no alternate metaphor has taken hold with
the same degree of salience in popular discourse.
While our focus is centered on the framing of metaphors in discourse, we also
argue that some message constructions carry with them presumptions about their
interpretation by audience members, thus invoking preferred readings and limiting
the availability of possible responses. Indeed, some scholars argue that metaphors
can ―guide and direct thought in a comprehensive manner‖ (Condit & Condit 2001:
37), drive cognition (Price, Tewksbury & Powers 1997), impart emotions (Slovic
2007), impact judgments (Tversky & Kahneman 1981), influence public opinion
(Benoit 2001) and shape government policy (Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post &
Victoroff 2008).
We assert that when metaphors become linked inextricably to constructed
messages in discourse—what we call message frames—the availability of
polysemantic audience responses are narrowed. And while we have not embarked
on an empirical study of audience responses, we assert that, when message frames
are narrow, audiences are more likely to embrace the semantic package with little
cognitive scrutiny. Our essay is both a descriptive and interpretive examination of
metaphors that leads to an evaluation and critique of how and why such metaphors
retain their persuasive efficacy.
We situate our discussion of the political aspect of framing in biopolitics,
borrowing from Michel Foucault, who viewed biopolitics as a struggle over truth
claims about issues that impact the construct life. In writing about genetically
modified foods, Peter Andrée made a compelling case for discussing metaphors in
biopolitics, which he described as ―modern relations of power, rooted in specific
expert truth-claims and material practices, that enable the regulation and efficient
production of ‗life‘ by scientists, governments and industries, as well as the forms
of resistance that emerge in this context‖ (2002: 164). We anchor our discussion of
metaphors in cognitive linguistics, building on three decades of research by
scholars including Sam Glucksberg (2008), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson
(1980, 1999), and Ray Gibbs, Jr. (2006, 2008). Biopolitics allows us to address the
political dimensions of how scientific information is communicated and how life is
managed. We turn to discourse as the scaffold that supports our examination of
metaphors in biopolitics. For Foucault, discourse served as a mechanism where
truth claims are produced, reproduced and challenged. We argue that issues that
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engage biopolitics are fraught with claims of truth, objectivity and morality, and
that such claims influence individual judgments, public opinion and policy. Truth,
Foucault asserted, is spun through discourse, and any examination of discourse
requires deconstructing the tactics and techniques used to bolster truth claims. We
argue that metaphors have become effective tactics through which truth claims
unfold. Cognitive linguistics provides an empirical, evidence-based foundation for
our discussion of metaphors and metaphor interpretation.
From the perspective of biopolitics—a particularly salient avenue to discuss
metaphors and frames—we have selected four issues that promote both figurative
and literal interpretations (resulting in entailments) of metaphors: Frankenfood,
designer babies, vegetative state and death tax. We examine the literature that
explicates figurative and literal entailments in metaphors, drawing linkages with
message and cognitive framing in the mass communication arena. We then
demonstrate through the four exemplars how meanings are created in discourse
about biopolitics, attending to mass media coverage in the United States of
genetically modified foods and embryos, the Theresa Schiavo lawsuit and news
coverage, and the inheritance tax. The four issues constitute a case study of
metaphoric language that we explore both figuratively and literally.
We ground our argument in a cognitive and constructionist vein, building on
empirical research on metaphor comprehension (for reviews see Glucksberg 2008;
Gibbs 2006, 2008) and borrowing from the framing insights of William Gamson
and his colleagues within the context of Foucauldian discourse processes in
biopolitics. And because the available research does not support definitive claims
about causal effects on audiences, we instead buttress our claims by examining
public opinion surrounding the four exemplars, offering an exogenous avenue to
help illuminate the mapping of metaphoric message framing to audience framing,
as recommended by Yin (2003). That is, focusing on text alone limits conjectures
about media effects, while public opinion polls offer a glimpse into possible
linkages (Benoit 2001; Stromer-Galley & Schiappa 1989; Yin 2003).
2. Figurative and literal metaphors

We begin with an examination of a type of ambiguous metaphor where the
relationship between figurative and literal interpretations is entwined (Cameron
2007). What defines this type of metaphor is the presentation of a metaphorical
phrase as if it were a literal description of the topic. An example from Lynne
Cameron‘s study of reconciliation talks between Jo Berry, daughter of a British
MP killed by an IRA-planted bomb, and Pat Magee, the former IRA operative who
planted the bomb. Berry described her journey of understanding and healing in
terms that can be understood as simultaneously referring to her literal travels
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through England and Ireland and to her mental and emotional processes; in other
passages Pat refers to coming face-to-face with the effects of his actions in terms
that simultaneously refer to confronting Jo personally and to his own mental acts of
understanding.
An example more relevant to the present discussion is the phrase death tax,
which is both figurative and literal. Death tax carries just enough literal meaning to
seem literal: the tax is paid after the death of a benefactor, although it is paid not by
the benefactor but by the heirs. The phrase seems to suggest that an individual is
taxed at death, hence, death tax. This metaphor is related to pass away, which is
usually regarded as a euphemism for dying, but for those who believe in an
immaterial spirit separate from the body, and identify the person with that spirit,
pass away literally describes what happens at death when the spirit passes away
from the body. Thus, if the person is identified with the spirit that has passed away
from the body but is still alive, it might seem reasonable to claim that the spirit of
the deceased person still has an ownership claim over the estate until after the
estate taxes have been paid, and thus the tax is levied against the spirit / person,
and not against the heirs to the estate. [This ambiguity was exploited in pop culture
in the Beatles‘ song, Taxman (Harrison 1966), ―And my advice to those who die /
declare the pennies on your eyes.‖)]
We argue that the framing of death tax illustrates what Foucault considered a
tactic deployed in biopolitical debates, where a phrase is designed to distract
attention from its metaphorical nature and focus attention instead on the literal
implications. Often, as in the case death tax, the metaphor serves explicitly
persuasive ends. Metaphors of this type are frequently presented by persuasion
professionals as literal descriptions of a topic: if the literal metaphor deployed is
successful, the schemas and simulations activated by the literal expression will be
applied, without critical examination to the topic. Because the effect is to slip by
unexamined assumptions without detection, we refer to these as ―under-the-radar‖
metaphors.
The literal power of metaphors has been examined empirically only recently,
and thus the theoretical discussion of metaphorical language has shifted from a
descriptive view in which metaphors and other tropes are regarded as mere
semantic substitutions to a more cognitive view in which metaphors are regarded
as surface manifestations of underlying thought processes (Gibbs 1994, 2008;
Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999). In other words, metaphors are usually more than
just a figure of speech or ―deft trick of rhetoric‖ (Danforth 2007), and they have
very real effects on cognition and behavior, even when they are not recognized as
metaphorical (Gibbs 2006, 2008).
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued that verbal metaphors instantiate
underlying conceptual metaphors, and as a consequence a metaphor is understood
by experiencing the topic in terms of the vehicle. For example, we may experience
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argument as a war and anger as heat and pressure.1 Lakoff and Johnson noted
that a metaphor consists of a source domain and a topic domain: we understand one
thing (an argument) in terms of another (a war). The metaphor vehicle is often
incongruent with the topic, so that it can only be understood figuratively—an
attorney is not literally a shark and my boss is not truly a block of ice. However,
many other common metaphorical expressions are ambiguous in the sense that they
could be either figurative or literal. A designer baby might refer to an infant
decked out in Prada duds, in which case the phrase is metonymic. Design literally
refers to a process of selecting features during the process of creating an object,
usually a consumer product. Extending this meaning, in everyday speech, designer
as a prefix refers to a consumer product that has been designed to satisfy
consumers‘ sense of taste and fashion. Thus, ―designer baby‖ would literally imply
a baby with features selected or even created by the designer to suit parents‘
fashion tastes—perhaps with brilliant green eyes, precocious language abilities or
curly hair. When United Press International ran a news item in February, 2011,
titled, ―First French designer baby born,‖ the story stated that the embryo was
created in vitro (outside the womb) and ―selected‖ for its ability to provide stem
cell transplants for the baby‘s older brother, who is stricken with an incurable
disease. Selecting one embryo from among several is not quite the same as
designing an embryo, but it is different from the ―natural‖ way embryos come into
existence in a way that the use of ―designer baby‖ highlights. Designer baby is
literal in the sense that the embryo was chosen by design because of its DNA but it
is figurative in the sense that the embryo‘s DNA resulted, not from a design
process, but in the course of laboratory fertilization. (To create a genuinely
designer baby the doctor would select genes associated with the desired traits and
splice them into the embryo‘s DNA.)
In some cases, the context rules out alternative meanings: ―hand him a hot
potato‖ can be interpreted literally if spoken in the kitchen. The telephone excuse
―he‘s tied up right now and can’t come to the phone‖ might be figuratively true,
but is only literally true in a fanciful scenario involving a burglary or slightly
unusual sexual behavior.
In yet another class of ambiguous metaphors, it may be possible for both a
literal and a figurative interpretation to be simultaneously meaningful. A marriage
does not move through space, and hence cannot ―reach a dead-end,‖ but a
honeymoon trip does proceed through space, and could conceivably reach a dead-
end. Whether the relationship itself would simultaneously ―reach a dead-end‖ is
another matter. Given the elevated body temperature that often accompanies sexual
passion, a love affair can at times be both literally and figuratively ―hot‖ and social
1
Gibbs (2006) reports several experiments supporting the claim that people experience and
think about anger in terms of ―pressurized hot liquid in a container.‖
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rejection can cause a person to feel literally as well as figuratively ―cold‖ (Zhong
& Leonardelli 2008).
More recently Gibbs (2006) has shown that metaphors are often understood by
experiencing a schema-generated simulation of the state, object or action described
by the vehicle. Barsalou‘s (2007) perceptual simulation theory of cognition
provides a basis to generalize Gibbs‘s approach, suggesting that metaphors may
activate only a partial and limited simulation of perceptual experience (including
simulations of emotions and thoughts) associated with the vehicle.
3. Metaphors and perceptual simulation

Gibbs proposed an extension of conceptual metaphor theory based on evidence
that metaphors activate schemas associated with the metaphor vehicle, leading
listeners to experience simulations of the perceptual experience. Gibbs cited
extensive experimental results confirming, for example, that phrases such as ―blew
his stack‖ or ―a heated argument,‖ in which anger and other strong emotions are
expressed in terms of physical heat and pressurized fluid or gas, activate schemas
related to ―PRESSURIZED FLUID IN A CONTAINER.‖ Similarly, Zhong and
Leonardelli (2008) reported that an induced experience of social rejection (i.e., ―a
chilly reception‖) increases the probability that a research participant will judge the
physical temperature of the laboratory as uncomfortably cold, supporting the idea
that the emotional and sensory experiences are connected at a fundamental level.
Barsalou‘s (2007) Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) theory extends
and provides a more general theoretical basis for Gibbs‘ model. Barsalou
acknowledged that language is sometimes processed in terms of connections to
other words and phrases, but claimed that deeper processing (and more complex
reasoning) is accomplished by activating partial or complete simulations of
perceptions that are associated with the word or phrase. These simulated
perceptions include proprioceptive and introspective awareness of the body‘s
internal state and thought processes as well as exteroceptive perceptions of the
external environment. Thus, ―blew his stack‖ or ―a chilly reception‖ might activate
complete ―hot fluid in a container‖ or ―immersion in cold water‖ schema, or might
lead the hearer to experience simulations of only one or two related perceptions,
perhaps a loud noise and the emotion of anger in the first instance, and a sensation
of cold and the emotion of rejection in the second instance. In a situation of low
listener involvement, these phrases might activate only a connection to one or two
related words (e.g., anger and not welcome, respectively).
Another example might be ―puppy love‖ in which the interpretation could
include warm and tender feelings interlaced with thoughts of puppies, children or
one‘s first heart-throb. Suppression of the primary or literal meanings leaves the
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secondary schemas and associated simulations in a state of heightened activation

(Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson & Werner 2001; Kintsch 1998). Thus the
context-relevant nuances of perception, feeling and thought associated with the
metaphor vehicle are linked to the topic of the metaphor and constitute the
meaning of the metaphor in that context.
The simulation approach does not necessarily require that the primary meaning
of a metaphor vehicle be activated, or indeed that there even be an interpretable
primary meaning. Thus phrases such as ―attack a position,‖ ―defend a position‖ and
―win an argument,‖ which Lakoff and Johnson (1980) associated with the
conceptual metaphor, ―ARGUMENT IS WAR,‖ may activate a detailed war
schema, or may activate only a handful of perceptual simulations that are
associated with these words in various contexts including sports and games as well
as combat. ―Attack‖ may activate simulations of vigorous activity and opposition,
with or without actual hostility. As in the case of ―empty metaphors‖ (Ritchie &
Dyhouse 2008), merely the nuances of perception, thought and emotion activated
by the word or phrase itself often suffice to provide ―meaning‖ of the expression.
The literature therefore supports the notion of a certain elasticity surrounding
metaphoric constructions and their entailments: the metaphoric structure might be
shallow or deep, and cut a narrow or wide berth, while its impacts may be short-
term or long-term, slim in scope, or rich in response. We argue that metaphorical
elasticity can erode in discourse, limiting its deployment. Moreover, in certain
contexts, entailments may diminish, and the range of complex thoughts typically
associated with metaphors also diminishes.
With this in mind, a metaphor that resonates yet offers fewer entailments is
likely to have greater persuasive potential. In short, some metaphors are able to slip
under the consumer‘s critical-cognitive radar and activate perceptual simulators
associated with literal interpretations of phrases, such as death tax. We argue that
the context of news discourse has the added effect of limiting critical interpretation
of a phrase‘s meaning by casting the range of meaning within the more narrow
bounds of journalistic practices. News discourse, while putatively empowered with
enlarging the parameters for debate, can delimit interpretations, much in the same
way that advertising delimits discourse by abbreviating and truncating meaning
systems and excluding alternate renditions (Goldman & Montagne 1986).
4. Journalism, framing and metaphors

As noted above, context can influence how metaphors are deployed and
interpreted. We argue that the context of everyday discourse, particularly mass
mediated discourse, influences message construction and reception, both
intentionally and unintentionally. For example, coining the phrase terminator seeds
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as referring to those that have been genetically modified to induce sterility in the
subsequent generation of offspring has helped generate hostility toward such plant
technology. Use of the metaphor terminator seeds abounds in news coverage
beginning in 1998, helping set the frames for debate of genetically modified seeds.
The journalistic practice of providing readers with two dimensions of an issue—the
balance imperative—limits the parameters of discourse to a dialectic of coverage,
thus narrowing the scope of polysemantic interpretations of problems (Coleman,
Hartley & Kennamer 2006). In the case of terminator seeds, even proponents of
genetically modified foods invoked the same trenchant metaphor. In writing for
New Scientist, Michael LePage noted that ―terminator technology…sound[s] like
the work of a James Bond villain intent on world domination. For critics of
multinational biotech corporations, the reality seems hardly less horrifying‖
(LePage 2005, n.p.). Counter-arguments embraced the prevailing metaphoric
jargon, forcing the debate of genetically modified seeds within the framework of
the terminator narrative.
Mass media scholars have argued that metaphors, phrases, tropes, jingles, icons
and even people (Joe the Plumber in the 2008 United States presidential race)
contribute to constructing a cultural and political landscape against which
biopolitical issues unfold. Some writers contend that persistent patterns emerge
from constructed frames, and those that pack the greatest persuasive punch are
those that resonate culturally. Such ―cultural packages‖ are both a creation and a
reflection of well-worn values (some even contradictory) such as Pandora‘s Box,
the Cinderella fairytale, Devil‘s Bargain and David bests Goliath. For example, in
their often-cited study of news coverage of nuclear power, Gamson and Modigliani
(1989) observed that the ―technology-as-progress frame‖ was infused in North
Americans‘ cultural ways-of-knowing, and its appearance in mediated discourse
about nuclear power mirrored this perspective.
A more recent example is an analysis of ―pigeons as rats,‖ where Jerolmack
argued that news discourse was imbued heavily with cultural frames, depicting
pigeons as scavengers and villains, shedding ―light on a cultural logic at work in
discourse‖ (2008: 87). Equating pigeons as unwanted vermin therefore illuminated
cultural narratives invoking homeless deviants, bums and squatters that invaded
human space. Moreover, such metaphoric packages are embedded with the
solutions to their problems: birds depicted as ―rats with wings‖ require a rodent
exterminator. Similarly, metaphors that describe health epidemics as wars invite
solutions in battle terms (e.g., capturing the virus and defeating the enemy). Gozzi
argued that framing society as a machine signals that we need trained engineers to
run it (1999).
Deep metaphors, like society as machine, structure discourses to such an extent
that competing meanings may lie dormant, both in discourse and audience
reception. Such metaphors effectively sweep aside alternative readings, and
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researchers suggest that when metaphors are used over and over in common
discourse, they lose their elasticity and become clichés (Hellsten 2003). We argue
they slip past audience members‘ cognitive scrutiny.
5. Metaphors’ effects
In writing about science communication, Nelkin (1987) observed that
metaphors ―cluster and reinforce one another, creating consistent, coherent and
therefore more powerful images that have strategic policy implications‖ (ibid.: 81).
Metaphors not only allow journalists the tools to explain science more simply, but
they also affect the way we perceive. Benoit took Nelkin‘s assumptions a step
farther, borrowing from Schön‘s ruminations that metaphors establish the
frameworks for solving problems that influence policy (2001: 70). In his
examination of political frames used in the 1996 US Presidential race, Benoit
showed how the Robert Dole and William Clinton campaigns each used the
metaphor of a bridge to illustrate their rhetoric. Dole expressed the view that
traditional values endure, and offered to ―be a bridge to a time of tranquility, faith,
and confidence in action‖ (ibid.: 73). In contrast, Clinton invoked the bridge
metaphor as a link to the future: ―I want to build a bridge to the twenty-first
century‖ (ibid.: 75). Benoit noted that the effectiveness of the bridge metaphor was
recorded empirically in a national poll where the most common phrase
remembered by respondents was the bridge to the twenty-first century and another
poll in which a majority of respondents correctly linked Clinton with the phrase ―a
bridge to the future‖ (ibid.: 80). Benoit asserted that Clinton‘s framing of the
bridge metaphor during the campaign widened his lead, thus influencing policy
(ibid.: 79-81).
Others have tested the effects of message framing on audience cognitions and
beliefs: Tversky and Kahneman‘s ground-breaking work in how positive and
negative message frames affect readers‘ choices demonstrated that framing human
lives as ―saved‖ proved more salient than avoiding lives ―lost.‖ Their work
reinforced the assumption that readers and viewers resort to mental shortcuts,
―generally evaluating acts in terms of a minimal account‖ (1981: 458).
Communication researchers have demonstrated linkages between message
frames and audience frames (cognitions), most notably in a 1997 study by Price,
Tewksbury and Powers that linked message frames to readers‘ frames. Price and
colleagues found compelling evidence that the ways in which news stories were
framed were mapped by readers, who recounted stories with similar frames. In
1999, Valkenburg, Semetko and De Vreese extended the mapping work, again
demonstrating that readers resorted to the same frames that dominated news
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stories, thus providing empirical evidence that audience frames are influenced by
message frames.
In summary, message frames, including those interwoven with metaphoric
descriptions, can be effective in setting the terms of debate, defining problems and
their solutions, and creating audience and policy agendas (Nelkin 1987; Tammpuu
2004; Tankard 2001). Moreover, metaphors reflect cultural narratives and tropes,
ranging from Devil’s Bargain to rats-with-wings, that tacitly influence their
meaning construction and adoption. Some message packages influence cognitions,
ranging from audience preferences for positively worded frames, to audiences
recognizing the same attributions of blame as those expressed in message frames.
We do not mean to suggest that audiences are passive or stupid. Indeed, we
embrace the constructionist lens of Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) who argued
that constructionism ―focuses on the subtle interaction between what the mass
media convey and how people come to understand their world‖ (ibid.: xv).
Moreover, audiences approach information with their own sets of lenses, and
alternative readings of issues are bound to ensue. Some discourses are like a
metaphorical palimpsest, wherein a text possesses more than one script. And like
Foucault, we acknowledge that many social problems are a patchwork of
hegemonic and resistant views.
We do argue, however, that some issues in the biopolitical realm are framed so
narrowly that both discourse and interpretations are truncated. Goldman and
Montagne said the narrowed realm encourages ―preferred readings‖ based on an
overdetermination of the message by ―delimiting the range of possible interpretive
moves‖ (p. 1047). That is, some messages limit their interpretation by excluding
―alternative accounts‖ (p. 1078).
6. Under-the-radar metaphors in biopolitical discourse

In this section, we offer examples of under-the-radar metaphors from
biopolitical controversies that have engaged metaphorical message constructions.
Recall that by biopolitics we refer to Foucault‘s explication of ―truth claims‖ in
discourse about the regulation of ―life,‖ with the implication that living things can
be ―managed.‖ From the policy perspective, Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson
argued that biopolitics draw from issues including ―genetic engineering, treatment
of the terminally ill, environmental pollution, radiation levels and birth control‖
(1987: 108). Marcy Darnvosky, a bioethicist who writes about ethics and feminist
approaches to biopolitics, added to the list: ―cloning for research and reproduction,
sex selection and ‗designer babies‘; race-specific drugs; ‗personalized genomics‘;
and markets in kidneys, eggs, and wombs‖ (2009: 38). We therefore selected four
topics for our essay to illuminate discourse concerning genetic engineering,
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reproduction, management of life and death, and the political ramifications of

death: Frankenfood, designer babies, vegetative state and the death tax. We will
demonstrate how metaphors invoked by such issues construct narrow frames in the
context of news and other forms of popular discourse. We suggest that such
metaphors may limit complex interpretations on the part of readers and viewers.
Frankenfood. Scientists introduced consumers to genetically modified foods in
the 1990s with the Flavr Savr™ tomato which engendered much discussion in lay
and scientific circles. Disparagers associated genetically altered products with
Frankenstein‘s monster, and the term “Frankenfood” entered public discourse.2
We argue Frankenfood serves as an apt illustration of an under-the-radar metaphor
in that the thoughts and emotions evoked by the monster-out-of-control and
irresponsible scientist scripts allow encoded meanings to confront the reader and
viewer head-on. We also argue that such tropes are stripped of counter-meanings
by their very nature, thus leaving little opportunity for cognitive processing.
Hellsten (2003) concluded that the Frankenfood metaphor is ―emotionally
appealing‖ and evokes ―fear and anxiety.‖ The association of Mary Wollstonecraft
Shelley‘s gothic creature with science has permeated discourse since the
publication of Frankenstein in 1823, and the linking of Frankenfood with
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is inextricable. Political columnist
William Safire called it a ―frightening metaphor‖ that has spawned such terms as
―Frankenscience,‖ ―Frankenfruit‖ and ―Frankenpigs‖ (Safire 2000).
However, the “Franken-” trope also introduces an element of playfulness that
works against the frightening implications. The reference to Frankenstein may also
activate ―monster movie‖ schemas from popular culture, and is likely to activate
memories of other uses of this monster as a metaphor for scientific irresponsibility,
but the word-play is also likely to activate entertaining, if somewhat horrifying,
images of monstrous fruits, vegetables and farm animals, which combine ironic
word-play with shock value, as when the punk rock group Dead Kennedys titled a
controversial album Frankenchrist (Alternative Tentacles 1985). This combination
of playfulness, shock value and horror can have the effect of side-tracking readers
from critical thought.
We found plentiful examples of the Frankenstein monster in public discourse
over genetically engineered foods, beginning with the Flavr Savr tomato. In a guest
editorial for the Ohio Plain Dealer in 1994, Jeffrey S. Riegel praised the tomato
but acknowledged that public response could ―open the floodgates to a host of new
products‖ or ―chill the market to any other genetically engineered foods,‖ noting
that the ―hopes of an entire industry rest upon the humble shoulders of a tomato‖
2
Researcher Iina Hellsten noted that Frankenfood was coined by Paul Lewis in a 16 July
1992 letter to the New York Times on the topic of genetically modified foods (Hellsten
2003).
40
(p. 11b). Riegel invoked the Frankenstein metaphor (―Some groups are calling it
Franken-food‖) and the mad scientist stereotype that ―scientists are tampering with
nature.‖
Following the 2004 decision in Mendocino County (California) to ban farming
of GMO foods, San Francisco Chronicle journalist Ken Garcia wrote that
producers including Monsanto, DuPont and Dow had ―spawned a real monster‖
with ―Franken-foods‖ (―Mendocino sows seeds of dissent,‖ p. 7b). Garcia‘s
metaphors included references to the companies as ―biochemical giants‖ spending
millions to ―stomp out‖ such referendums. Garcia also invoked war metaphors,
noting that the ―giants‖ were ―battling skirmishes on fronts from Oregon to
France.‖ Garcia‘s profligate use of metaphors and puns helps frame his article─and
the debate─in a more playful and less serious tone that distracts readers‘ attention
and discourages critical thought even as it subtly links the monster schema with its
entailments of danger and powerful to GMO foods and the ―giant‖ corporations
that create and market them.
Broadcasters have also helped set the media agenda for the discussion of GMO
foods, with Mark Bittman, Oprah Winfrey and Mehmet Oz weighing in on the
debate, encouraging viewers to attend to, for example, labeling of foods. One post
on Winfrey‘s blog read: ―I personally do not wish to eat any GMO foods‖ and ―I
feel that they are dangerous and that it is unfair that they are not clearly marked as
GMO on the label‖ (―GMO Foods,‖ 2010 February 8).
Recently, news of the creation of a hardier version of the Atlantic salmon
quickly drew the sobriquet of ―Frankenfish.‖ An Associated Press story asked:
―Super Salmon or Frankenfish?‖ (Jalonick 2010), posing the ―issue‖ as a choice
between the pop culture hero, Superman, and the pop culture villain, Frankenstein,
while a wire story from the McClatchy news service reported on legislators‘ efforts
to halt FDA approval of the Frankenfish and stop the arrival of ―alien fish out to
infect our stocks‖ (Hotakainen 2011). Cartoonist Steve Greenberg penned a comic
strip showing a fish with Frankenstein‘s head, strapped to a lab table flanked by a
white-coated scientist and his assistant who asks, ―It‘s alive master! But is it safe
for people to eat?‖ The scientist replies: ―Put it in the markets, and we‘ll find out in
five or ten years‖ (Greenberg 2010).
The coupling of monsters with GMO foods reflects the culturally constructed
fissure between science and nature, popularized in literature (Frankenstein), comic
books (Wolverine), television programs (The Incredible Hulk), movies (Godzilla),
and electronic games (Marvel: Ultimate Alliance). In turn, researchers have
examined contemporary discourse of scientific controversies and then documented
linkages with cultural myths, including the Devil’s Bargain in nuclear power
(Gamson & Modigliani 1989), mad scientists exploiting human organs in the
cloning debate (Hellsten 2000), and science-run-amok in stem cell discourse (Reis
2008).
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The direct effect of Frankenfood metaphors on cognition has received scant

attention, but we might surmise linkages by examining public opinion polls, policy
decisions and other markers of the debate. For example, Americans are reported to
be somewhat ambivalent in their views of biotechnology, according to a study of
attitudes and knowledge among a sample of adults (Silk, Weiner & Parrott 2005).
The researchers suggested this may be due, in part, to a lack of understanding of
the benefits of GMO foods. In addition, a Gallup poll reported that about one-third
of Americans in 2003 believed GMO foods to be hazardous (Blizzard 2003). But
when it comes to safety, Americans are divided. An ABC News poll asked
Americans in 2003 whether foods are safe to eat when ―scientists can change the
genes in some food crops and farm animals to make them grow faster or bigger and
be more resistant to bugs, weeds and disease.‖ Respondents were divided with 46
percent calling such foods safe and 46 percent considering them unsafe
(―Biotechnology,‖ n.d.). When prompted, most Americans favor labeling foods
when they contain genetically modified products: an ABC news poll in 2001
reported that 93 percent of the random sample of adults said the federal
government should require such labels on food, while 57 percent said they would
be less likely to buy goods labeled as genetically modified (―Poll: Skepticism of
Genetically Modified Foods,‖ n.d.).
We suggest that the combination of fear and ambivalence on the part of publics
may reflect discourse of GMO foods in which the frame Frankenfood has served as
an under-the-radar metaphor, thus allowing publics to equate genetically
engineered foods with Dr. Frankenstein and his monster. Moreover, a playful
phrase such as Frankenfood and related puns and word-play may have the added
effect of diverting critical attention by activating a complex narrative schema that
is wholly irrelevant to the context of a serious discussion of food production
policies, which may explain, in part, Americans‘ ambivalence toward GMO foods.
Designer Babies. News discourse about designer babies primarily illuminates
issues surrounding human fertilization but a portion of the narratives equates
designer babies with high-priced clothing, strollers and other stylish
accoutrements. Readers and viewers learn that parents can now outfit their toddlers
with togs from Juicy Couture, Armani, and Dolce and Gabbana. The ―Franken-‖
trope appears to be a metaphor for dangerous and monstrous creations, but
―designer-‖ has become a widely-used metonym/metaphor for frivolous luxury
products in which design is driven more by fashion than by function.
Discourse about designer babies has grown in tandem with scientific advances
in fertilization outside the womb (in vitro), drawing praise and criticism. Although
the first so-called test tube baby was born in England in 1978, in vitro fertilization
(IVF) was relatively uncommon during the 20 th Century. The US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention began tracking in vitro births in 1996, recording
35,000 births at that time. Over the next ten years, IVF births rose to 56,000, and
42
the CDC estimated in 2006 that about one percent of births is from in vitro
fertilization. This finding belies the cries from some accounts of disturbing and
alarming trends in creating designer babies, although with the success of new
implantation techniques, discourse has kept pace with science.
Over the last decade, news coverage has been punctuated by several events,
(along with strides in genetics, cloning and fecundity) that have captured a range of
mediated attention, from reality TV programs to Pulitzer Prize-winning dailies.
Legislation over stem cell research, construction of new clinics that offer IVF, and
the Vatican‘s stance on embryo manipulation have garnered attention. Some
coverage entwines Hollywood with designer baby discourse, linking fashion with
fertility: movie stars outfit their toddlers in designer attire and opt for IVF
treatments for themselves or their paid surrogates. As one critic put it, ―With
designer baby clothes, designer baby toys, it seemed only a matter of time until
some fertility clinic began offering designer babies to go with them‖ (Bauer, 6
March 2009). Such discourse invoked metaphoric language about designer babies,
doctors playing God, parents shopping for genes, and baby supermarkets.
One watershed moment was the birth of eight children to a woman, Nadya
Suleman, living in Southern California in 2009, which launched a new term,
Octomom, and engendered discussion over the ethics and policies regarding in
vitro fertilization. The word Octomom produced more than 3.6 million hits on
Google at the time of this writing, a testament to the salience of the story. Ethical
arguments were overshadowed, however, by the landslide of television coverage
about Suleman herself, who gave numerous interviews to such notables as Barbara
Walters.
While some of the discourse over designer babies assumes a vapid, celebrity-
hungry tone, ethical issues come to the fore with clinics advertising genetic
screening for parents. During the last several years, clinics in the United States
have begun to offer genetic screenings to women seeking IVF treatments. When a
Los Angeles-based clinic announced on its website that it was offering gender
selection as part of its pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) package, the
director responded to critics that he was not playing God, but rather, ―helping
nature‖ and ―serving the marketplace‖ (Johnson, 15 June 2006).
Critics invoked the metaphor of playing God throughout discourse, with some
critics associating designer babies with Nazi Germany. The New York Post ran a
headline about ―Uber Babies‖ noting that detractors likened the practice of
selecting an embryo for the baby‘s gender to Nazi Germany because unwanted
embryos may be frozen, sold or tossed away (Edelman, 4 October 2009). Selection
of embryos ―goes down a horrible path‖ that one lawyer likened to the Holocaust.
In contrast to references to Hitler and Brave New World, metaphors associated
designer babies with commodities: something produced, procured and purchased.
Clinics were called ―banks‖ where parents ―place an order‖ and ―shop‖ for an
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embryo. One colorful example described a clinic as treating ―children as

commodities‖ that can be ―picked off the shelf‖ (―Babies by design,‖ 13 January
2007). Another writer said selecting an embryo is as easy as ―choosing a Gucci
purse‖ (―Designer babies a disturbing trend,‖ 9 October 2006).
Coverage also invoked metaphors of ―spare parts,‖ not unlike a search for
mechanical pieces to outfit an old automobile, such as an antique headlamp.
Discourse over spare parts appeared particularly in discourse about ―savior
siblings.‖ In some instances, a couple selects a healthy embryo through PGD in
order to assist an ill sibling. Stem cells are harvested from the newborn‘s placenta
to save the life of a brother or sister. A popular novel and subsequent Hollywood
film called My Sister’s Keeper added another dimension when the fictional savior
sibling, who had already donated blood marrow, is slated to relinquish a kidney
and asks the courts to intervene on her behalf.
Few regulations prevent parents from creating such embryos in the United
States, and the discourse is infused with the tropes already noted: God, creator,
nature, Hitler, commodification, etc. Discourse surrounding laws and ethics take
on what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) referred to as a container or building
(construction) metaphor, where fertility choices require a moral framework or
boundaries, where doors are opened for unethical or immoral practices.
The announcement in December 2008 of a ―Doctrine of Faith‖ issued by the
Vatican generated discourse about what one critic called ―the wrong side of
science‖ (―Church does not permit,‖ 12 December 2008). The ―Doctrine of Faith‖
opposed manipulation of embryos, and coverage was paired with metaphors of
designer babies and Brave New World.
In summary, discourse over designer babies is highlighted by true-to-life
accounts of test-tube babies and fictionalized stories of donors and clones. Some of
the most salient examples of IVF were popularized on reality television: for
example, Jon and Kate Gosselin, and their brood, were featured on several
syndicated programs, including Jon & Kate Plus 8. Discourse over the ethical
consideration of IVF gave way to day-to-day challenges of grocery shopping and
folding laundry. Movies, including My Sister’s Keeper and Never Let Me Go,
raised ethical issues but acquiesced to the inevitability of genetic engineering.
News programs such as 60 Minutes asked doctors if they are playing God and then
featured a wholesome family ready to welcome a baby girl, allaying fears of
besting nature (―Choose the sex of your baby,‖ 13 April 2004).
While discourse entertains notions of ethics and morality, and critics warn of
science-run-amok, readers and viewers also see designer babies as a blessing and
hear from both doctors and patients that embryo selection marks a perfectly valid
choice. While designer baby undoubtedly embraces elasticity, we argue that the
phrase also delimits interpretations by focusing attention less on designer (in lower
case) and more on BABY (in upper case). The term designer baby likely invokes
44
entailments of well-dressed toddlers created by scientists, but the term seems to

steer clear of the horror of the Frankenstein imagery. We argue that designer baby
assumes the resonance of an under-the-radar metaphor in the sense that it limits a
range of interpretations. Clearly the term refers to clothing created by fashion
moguls, and it is also likely that its meanings get melded with special babies
created through advanced fertilization techniques. For example, the in vitro twins
of movie stars Matthew Broderick and Sarah Jessica Parker are designer babies in
both senses of the term: they were engineered in a petri dish and Parker is the
darling of the fashion world, a flesh-and-blood billboard for Jimmy Choo and
Christian Dior.
How such discourse impacts public opinion is difficult to track, since designer
baby discourse straddles multiple meaning systems, ranging from church doctrine
to movie matinées. However, publics have been asked to weigh in about their
feelings of stem cell research and genetic engineering. Americans approve of
scientific studies of stem cells but not cloning. The Gallup organization found that
Americans favor government funding for research involving stem cells used from
embryos, and that such research is ―morally acceptable.‖ For example, in 2009,
about 62 percent agreed that stem cell research was acceptable (Saad, 20 May
2009).
In contrast, most Americans find human cloning morally undesirable: nine out
of ten adults considered cloning ―wrong,‖ according to a 2009 Gallup poll, where
88 percent said human cloning is ―morally wrong‖ (Saad, 20 May 2009).
When researchers asked potential parents about genetic testing, most adults
were interested in testing for health and disease rather than intelligence and height.
The New York University Human Genetics Program gave a questionnaire to 2,246
individuals who sought their services in 2006 and 2007. About 44 percent
responded to the survey and said that, given the opportunity, they would screen for
mental retardation (75 percent), deafness (54 percent), blindness (56 percent), heart
disease (52 percent), and cancer (51 percent). Fewer said they would favor tests for
athletic ability (10 percent), superior intelligence (12.6 percent), height (10.4
percent) and longevity (9.2 percent) (Smith, 28 January 2009).
Few women and men said they would choose the baby‘s gender, according to a
study of 1,197 North American respondents. Eight percent said they would use sex
selection technology, 74 percent were opposed, and 18 percent were undecided
(Dahl, Gupta, Beutel, Stroebel-Richter, Brosig, Tinneberg & Jain 2006). But,
looking at data supplied by US fertility clinics, about 42 percent of clinics
responding to questions about PGD services provide non-medical sex selection to
parents (Baruch, Kaufman & Hudson 2008).
In summary, Americans seem resigned to the idea of designer babies but much
less sanguine about human cloning. While the linkage between discourse and
opinion is difficult to demonstrate, the term designer baby embraces both fashion
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and science in outfitting offspring, and has become commonplace in the vernacular
surrounding fertilization techniques. We propose that the entailments of designer
baby are more gentle than brutal, much in the same way that puppy love endears
listeners. And while Frankenfood may invoke entailments of mad scientists and
monsters, we argue that designer baby slips under the cognitive radar by
summoning the benign: swaddled infants adored by their parents (and perhaps
sporting Gucci birthmarks).
Vegetative state. Another example of an under-the-radar metaphor occurs when
politicians, political commentators and moralists use ―vegetative state‖ to discuss
the status of people who have severe cognitive impairment. Vegetative state and
the closely-related metaphor “brain-dead” work together in particularly salient
ways. While ―vegetative‖ in this sense refers to ―an organic body capable of
growth and development but devoid of sensation and thought‖ (Groopman 2007),
vegetable is a biological category that cannot be accurately applied to a human
being or any other animal (vegetables lack central nervous systems) and therefore
is unavoidably metaphorical, as most people who use or encounter this metaphor
are likely to recognize. When the phrase ―vegetative state‖ is used, as in the legal
battles surrounding Theresa Schiavo, the implications of vegetable as a life-form
lacking a central nervous system or any ordinary animate responses are applied to
the patient as if they were literal descriptors, and vegetative state becomes an
under-the-radar metaphor.
A revealing exemplar emerged in the Schiavo case. Terri‘s husband, Michael,
sought to have life support withdrawn in 1998 (Kollas & Boyer-Kollas 2006).
Terri, who had been diagnosed in a ―persistent vegetative state‖ (PVS) after
suffering oxygen loss from cardiac arrest in 1990, became the centerpiece for
―unprecedented involvement of the state and federal legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government‖ (p. 1146). The issue captured tremendous media
attention and brought issues surrounding life, death, morality and politics to the
populist front, and has been called ―the most extensively litigated [case] in
American judicial history‖ (p. 1146). Thousands of news and magazine articles,
broadcast stories and editorials were generated surrounding the legal battles that
culminated in a federal district judge‘s decision to uphold Michael Schiavo‘s
request to remove the feeding tube.3 Philosopher Slavoj Žižek readily equated the
case with biopolitics, noting that discourse ―focused on a single case of prolonging
the run of NAKED LIFE, of a persistent vegetative state reduced of all specifically
human characteristics‖ while ―tens of millions [are] dying of AIDS and hunger all
around the world‖ (2005).
3
Terri Schiavo died on March 31, 2005.
46
The term vegetable, as a metaphor for symptoms of a permanent coma, crept

into popular news discourse. The following example, taken from the MSNBC
program ―Hardball,‖ illustrates how the host equated vegetative state with
vegetable. Chris Matthews noted: ―I want to get some facts here. I want to end this
discussion on a point. There‘s a great discrepancy in the assessment as to this
woman‘s vitality. Some people say she‘s a vegetable. Some say she‘s capable of
emotional responses. Vegetables don‘t have emotional responses. I‘m still trying to
get to that fact‖ (Hardball 2005). In another example, a National Public Radio
reporter asked a neurologist to define vegetative state and said, ―Do you regret at
all the word vegetative? The idea of wakefulness and motion just seems to be in
conflict with being a vegetable. It perhaps might be a misleading misnomer.‖ The
neurologist called vegetative state an ―unfortunate term‖ that is derogatory because
―it sounds like vegetable‖ (Siegel, 22 March 2005).
Although the two terms are often stitched together, it is difficult to trace a direct
relationship between public discourse about the Schiavo case and whether
American publics equate ―vegetable‖ with vegetative state. Numerous polls were
conducted during the years of the Schiavo legal skirmishes, and pollsters found
that Americans favor ending life support when a partner is in a vegetative state. For
example, a CNN-USA Today-Gallup Poll in 2003 reported that 80 percent of
Americans endorsed the right to die for a terminally ill patient. The question was
worded as follows: ―When a patient is in a persistent vegetative state caused by
irreversible brain damage, do you think his or her spouse should or should not be
allowed by law to make a final decision to end the patient‘s life by some painless
means?‖ (Newport, 30 October 2003).
Other polls incorporated the word ―vegetable‖ in question wording. About 73
percent of Americans polled in 2005 said they worried a great deal or somewhat
about the ―possibility of being vegetable-like‖ (Saad, 2005 March 29). In a study
of four different 2005 polls, ―Hotline,‖ a publication of the National Journal Group
(a nonpartisan organization that reports on policy), noted that Americans were
more likely to favor the right to die (between 74 and 87 percent agreed) if the
question wording included removal of ―life support‖ (rather than ―feeding tube‖)
(―Schiavo surveys,‖ 29 March 2005).
Pundits also presented the metaphors in visual space. For example, Daryl Cagle
drew a cartoon for MSNBC that mocked Senator Bill Frist, who argued that Terri
Schiavo did not appear to be in a vegetative state. The cartoon depicts Frist facing
an audience, his arms extended, asking ―What do I know about vegetables?‖ Frist
is surrounded by flying radishes, melons and bananas, some smashed against a wall
behind him. The caption underneath the cartoon repeats Frist‘s public statement:
―That footage, to me, depicted something different than persistent vegetative state‖
(Cagle, 21 June 2005).
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In our view, vegetative and vegetable are easily conflated, judging from
discourse and opinion polls. The term vegetative state might serve as an under-the-
radar metaphor in generating thoughts and feelings associated with ―human-as-
vegetable.‖ Vegetative state may very well activate schemas and associated
simulations of thoughts, emotions and other perceptions that contradict being
human: vegetables lack brains, feelings and emotions. In that respect, we argue that
vegetative state delimits rich entailments. It is not surprising, therefore, that when
asked their feelings about being in a ―vegetable-like state‖ three-quarters of those
polled prefer death.
Death tax. Our final exemplar brings to bear what Negri called ―the extension
of the economic and political contradiction over the entire social fabric‖ wrapped
within the biopolitical debate over the so-called death tax (2008: 18). Death tax
was coined to replace the terms estate and inheritance tax, which are paid after the
death of a benefactor by the heirs where the inheritance of estates is larger than one
million US dollars, affecting only the richest two percent of the American
population (Birney, Graetz & Shapiro 2006). As such, death tax becomes a
dysphemism for estate tax favored by conservative politicians and commentators.
Cartoonist Nick Anderson of The Houston Chronicle extended the discourse
visually by linking death tax with burgeoning debt. Anderson‘s cartoon shows two
images side-by-side. The first, labeled ―The Death Tax,‖ depicts a princess atop a
stack of mattresses with a pea sandwiched between the bedding. An arrow points to
the pea as the visual representation of death tax: a small item that causes her great
discomfort. The caption reads: ―Children of the Rich.‖ The second image shows a
diapered infant shouldering a blubbery animal with the word ―deficit‖ on the
beast‘s flesh. Here the caption reads ―The Birth Tax‖ (Anderson, 15 April 2005).
The cartoon infuses discourse with a touch of humor, and some of the pundits
have taken a similar approach, noting that the death tax simply favors ―trust
babies‖ and should be known as the ―Paris Hilton Relief Program‖ (―In the mail,‖
25 July 2006). More than one critic used the metaphor of a ―silver spoon‖ to
describe beneficiaries of the death tax, and several offered posthumous
congratulations to New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, who died in
2010: the year in which the tax was suspended (the estate tax resumed in 2011).
Trenchant metaphors referred to Steinbrenner as a ―world champion‖ because he
―beat‖ the Internal Revenue Service and his heirs ―hit the jackpot,‖ (Marr, 17 July
2010: 4c). Slate Magazine ran an irreverent take on the death tax, declaring that
taxes actually increase life expectancy: countries with the highest taxes have the
highest life expectancies, such as the United States (Steinbrenner died at age 80)
while countries with low taxes, such as India, have a lower life expectancy (Plotz,
19 July 1999).
Despite the satiric asides, discourse on the estate tax rarely detracted from
references to death. In the sense that death is part of a larger complex narrative
48
with myriad entailments, when linked with tax the term invokes probate,
inheritance, and, if the estate is quite large, payment of inheritance taxes: the
phrase can then be considered metonymic. The word death activates a set of
particularly gloomy perceptions and emotions, while tax is truly hated by
Americans (Birney et al.). Thus, the combined phrase, death tax pairs these
perceptions and emotions, and can be considered metaphorical. However, the
phrase is often presented in political discourse as a literal description, implying
that the misfortune of dying is compounded by having to pay a tax rather than
being allowed simply to ―rest in peace.‖ When polled, Americans incorrectly
believe that ―death tax‖ means you are taxed when you die (Birney et al.).
We argue the phrase creeps under the cognitive radar. Context-Limited
Simulation Theory suggests that primary portions of the phrase are activated—
most likely feelings associated with ―death‖—thus preparing the reader for an
emotional reaction that will color additional thoughts of death tax by associating
the tax not with the joyous occasion of abruptly acquiring a large amount of
unearned money but rather with the sad occasion of dying.
Conservative political advisor Frank Luntz claimed that reframing ―estate tax‖
to ―death tax‖ better serves the public, and explained his case in terms of rhetorical
framing:
Look, for years, political people and lawyers─who, by the way, are the worst
communicators─used the phrase ―estate tax.‖ And for years they couldn‘t eliminate
it. The public wouldn't support it because the word ―estate‖ sounds wealthy.
Someone like me comes around and realizes that it‘s not an estate tax, it‘s a death
tax, because you're taxed at death. And suddenly something that isn‘t viable
achieves the support of 75 percent of the American people. It‘s the same tax, but
nobody really knows what an estate is. But they certainly know what it means to be
taxed when you die. I argue that is a clarification; that's not obfuscation (Frontline
2004).
To justify the metaphorical re-framing, Luntz added: ―I don't argue with you
that words can sometimes be used to confuse, but it‘s up to the practitioners of the
study of language to apply them for good and not for evil. It is just like fire; fire
can heat your house or burn it down.‖ This view assumes a moral stance of ―good‖
and ―evil‖ on the part of the language framers, while our view is that the language
framing packs meaning that invokes predictable responses on the part of reading
and listening publics. From the perspective of biopolitics, Luntz has laid claim to
the ―truth‖ (―It‘s not an estate tax, it‘s a death tax‖) which Foucault would argue is
created by the shifting of the substrates of meaning produced in the processes of
discourse. ―Death tax‖ has overshadowed estate tax and inheritance tax, claiming
its ―rightful‖ place as a truism.
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As Luntz pointed out, people associate estate with great wealth (an association
that seems accurate, given the rather high threshold for applying the tax) but death
is something everyone faces. Thus, by implying that it applies to everyone, and not
merely the wealthiest two percent, simply reframing it as a death tax swung public
opinion radically against the inheritance tax. In a review of public opinion polls on
the estate tax from 1997 to 2003, Birney, Graetz and Shapiro (2006) noted that all
polls that asked respondents about taxes engendered negative valence, and that the
word ―taxes‖ summons poignant and negative feelings. The combination of
―death‖ with ―tax‖ invokes additional thoughts of fairness and justice, and,
according to Birney and colleagues, ―many people seem to guess that nearly
everyone is taxed at death─a misperception‖ (n.p.).
Death tax also invokes a narrative: the commonplace but terrifying narrative of
dying and the related narratives of a ―troubled‖ death, which are negatively
indexed by the common wish, ―Rest in Peace.‖ The narrative of a death that is
hindered and troubled by the taxman is counterposed by Luntz‘s justification
against the competing narrative of sudden and unearned wealth that is activated by
the alternative phrase, estate tax. As with Frankenfood, these competing
metaphors, and the narratives they invoke, are likely to have powerful effects on
what people believe (and believe they know) about inheritance taxes.
As an under-the-radar metaphor, Death Tax invoked a narrative that may
interact in complicated ways with the actual events to which the metaphors are
applied and almost certainly influence what is remembered about news accounts of
these events and the surrounding debates. But we also find the phrase is much
more limiting than estate tax, particularly in light that the word estate or
inheritance is substituted by death. The deft metaphor blunts discourse and, in
turn, entailments, in part because the metaphor is literal.
7. Cognitive framing theory and under-the-radar metaphors

Much of the apparent ambiguity in framing theory stems from the use of the
same term within different disciplines to describe overlapping but distinct
phenomena (D‘Angelo 2002; Entman 1993). Thus, we distinguish message-level
frames from cognitive-level frames or schemas. Price, Tewksbury and Powers
(1997) showed that message-level frames can prime particular cognitive schemas,
with a consequent effect on how readers process the message: what thoughts they
have and their subsequent self-reported attitudes and beliefs about the topic. A
message frame can also influence subsequent discourse on the same topic by
influencing how individual readers process and respond to a message and thus alter
readers‘ perceptions of what themes are relevant in future messages. We argue that
the context of news discourse limits cognitive interpretations in the sense that
50
readers and viewers receive and process information within the parameters of
journalistic frameworks. That is, the presentation of news—whether seen in print
or broadcast channels—contextualizes information in a narrow field, as breaking
news, human interest features, opinion-editorials, etc. Such contexts frame
messages in ways that carry over to cognitive processing. Thus, we argue,
metaphors can have powerful framing effects by activating frame-relevant schemas
(Coleman, Ritchie & Hartley 2008; Schön 1993). Moreover, such metaphors play
out in entertainment media, including books, movies, soap operas, cartoons and the
Internet.
When an under-the-radar metaphor is presented as literal, the framing effects
are likely to be even more powerful, because they present the connections they
assert as factual, and create a constructed ―reality‖ that future messages must either
fit within or overcome by establishing a different reality. Thus, once the death tax
frame is accepted as a literal description of the process of taxing large inheritances,
critical messages that are deployed must either accept the frame and argue that
taxing an extremely rich person upon death is reasonable, or dispute the frame
itself by establishing the point that it is, in fact, the heirs (who did not earn the
money) and not the deceased (who presumably did but may have inherited much of
it in the first place) who are taxed. (It seems likely that this may be rendered even
more difficult by the seeming triviality of the distinction.) Once the vegetative state
frame is accepted, the very concept of vegetative is changed, just as the concept of
designer is changed by designer baby, so that future messages must struggle not
merely to change the frame itself, but re-establish a more complex and accurate
understanding of the base concepts, vegetative and designer. In order for GMO
foods to be embraced as real measures to curb world hunger, audiences must
grapple with the spectre of Frankenstein‘s monster.
The exemplars used here illustrate an important point about under-the-radar
metaphors used in biopolitical discourse: They can have a powerful ideological
effect that compounds their cognitive impact. Because the figurative expressions
are taken as literal, the connections they establish between certain perceptual
simulators and the presumed conditions that produce the perceptions are taken as
real and true, hence beyond reasonable dispute. Thus, an expression of this type
can have the effect of ―naturalizing‖ the frame it establishes, rendering it as
apparently factual and descriptive, hence not subject to critical examination and
dispute.
8. Implications for framing theory and persuasion

The contribution of metaphorical languages to message framing has long been
recognized and discussed. What the concept of under-the-radar metaphors adds to
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this discussion is the recognition that certain metaphors, if presented in a way that
seems literal rather than figurative, can have an even more powerful framing effect,
establishing the implicit frame as an aspect of reality that is beyond challenge. As
the discourse surrounding death tax illustrates, a trope of this sort can present an
opponent with the unpalatable choice between accepting the frame (with its
underlying narrative) and attempting to construct a contrary argument within it, or
taking on the difficult task of challenging the frame itself─that is to say,
challenging the already-accepted ―reality.‖
Equally important, Frankenfood changes our understanding of genetic
engineering, while vegetative state alters our perceptions of life and death, so that
the rhetorical and ideological effects of these unchallenged, under-the-radar
metaphors extend well beyond the narrow topics of GMO foods and irreversible
comas.
How audiences actually process and respond to metaphors such as the ones
discussed in this essay require more research. That Americans have heard about
death taxes or Frankenfood is documented by pollsters, but it is for future research
to establish what happens once an under-the-radar metaphor takes hold, and if
readers‘ critical responses are held in check by a metaphor that comes disguised as
a statement of literal fact.
9. Implications for metaphor theory

Along with the idiosyncratic and uninterpretable metaphors discussed by
Keysar and Bly (1999) and the ―empty‖ metaphors discussed by Ritchie and
Dyhouse (2008), the phenomenon of under-the-radar metaphors and their wide-
spread use in biopolitical discourse raise serious questions about the customary
practice of seeking a singular interpretation of a metaphorical phrase, even if it
does seem to fit within a systematic or conceptual metaphor (Cameron 2003;
Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Rather, as Gibbs (2006) argues, it is necessary to
examine the perceptual simulations activated by a figurative expression, in the
particular context in which it is used.
The suggestion that these under-the-radar expressions have an ideological as
well as a cognitive and rhetorical effect leads to the further implication that
metaphor theorists might usefully examine metaphors, in particular uninterpretable
metaphors and ―naturalized‖ metaphors that are presented as literal, for their
possible ideological effects. Metaphor theorists might further look for
systematicity, not just among the vehicles used to form metaphorical expressions,
but also among the contextual effects─the perceptual simulations they activate
when used in particular contexts. This approach likely will pay dividends in
understanding the role of metaphors in mediating between individual, cognitive
52
processes, and social, interactive and cultural processes, as well as in

understanding the ideological and political uses of metaphors.
―Under-the-radar‖ is itself not a clearly defined category; many metaphors
may fit our description. Some of the metaphors we have discussed are certain to be
disputed. Opponents of taxation may claim that the relevant feature of the tax is its
association with death, whereas proponents claim that the relevant feature is its
association with inheriting a large fortune. Other metaphors we have discussed,
including such emotionally-charged examples as Frankenfood, are unambiguously
metaphorical, but may still be claimed to be in some important sense ―literally
true.‖ Advocates for opposing positions on the underlying moral and political
controversies are likely to take opposing positions on the metaphorical status of
these phrases, a fact that is entirely consistent with the approach we have
suggested.
10. Conclusion
We have identified a class of expressions presented in a way that can be taken
easily as literal (and in many cases are regarded as literal by the people who use
these expressions) even though, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that
they can also be taken as metaphorical. In some cases (Tony Blair‘s use of “I’m
back”) a phrase is used in a way that is simultaneously literal and metaphorical
(Ritchie 2008). We have suggested that the ambiguous status of these phrases
enables them to bring implicit assumptions under our radar of ordinary critical
scrutiny, and that this can greatly strengthen their framing effects.
Along with the phenomenon of ―empty‖ and ―ambiguous‖ metaphors (Ritchie
& Dyhouse 2008), the phenomenon of under-the-radar metaphors supports the
claim that metaphors do not necessarily have a single interpretation based on a
single underlying systematic or conceptual metaphor (Vervaeke & Kennedy, 1996)
and that the meaning of a metaphor is often best represented by the schemas and
perceptual simulations it activates in a particular communicative context (Gibbs
2006; Ritchie 2009).
Thus, metaphor analysts and theorists need to consider not merely the linguistic
context (the preceding words and phrases) but also the social, cultural and
relational contexts, and examine the perceptual simulators that the phrase is likely
to activate for particular users, as well as for hearers, readers and viewers, in a
particular context. Additionally, metaphors should be classified not merely
according to semantic relationships among their vehicles, but also according to the
fields of meaning constituted by relationships among the context-relevant schemas
and perceptual simulations they activate.
53
DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0003-8
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About the Authors

Cynthia-Lou Coleman chairs the Department of Communication at Portland
State University and studies science communication. Coleman writes about
the intersections of western science and indigenous epistemologies, and is
an associate editor for the journal Science Communication.
L. David Ritchie, Professor of Communication, writes extensively about
metaphor and is author of the book, Context and Communication in
Metaphor (Palgrave). Ritchie's interests include the use of language to
create social structure and shared understandings, with a focus on language
play, metaphor, stories and humor in conversation.

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29

Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1 (2011): 29-59

Department of Communication, Portland State University

1. Examining metaphors in biopolitical discourse

2. Figurative and literal metaphors

3. Metaphors and perceptual simulation

secondary schemas and associated simulations in a state of heightened activation

4. Journalism, framing and metaphors

6. Under-the-radar metaphors in biopolitical discourse

reproduction, management of life and death, and the political ramifications of

The direct effect of Frankenfood metaphors on cognition has received scant

embryo. One colorful example described a clinic as treating ―children as

entailments of well-dressed toddlers created by scientists, but the term seems to

The term vegetable, as a metaphor for symptoms of a permanent coma, crept

7. Cognitive framing theory and under-the-radar metaphors

8. Implications for framing theory and persuasion

9. Implications for metaphor theory

processes, and social, interactive and cultural processes, as well as in

Coleman, Cynthia-Lou, Heather Hartley and J. David Kennamer. 2006. Examining

Poll: Skepticism of Genetically Modified Foods. n.d.. ABC News technology.

Žižek, Slavoj. 2005 December. Biopolitics: Between Terri Schiavo and

About the Authors

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