G.R. No.

90482 August 5, 1991 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, and REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1986, Republic Planters Bank (hereafter referred to as RPB), Zosimo Maravilla, Rosendo de la Rama, Bibiano Sabino, Roberto Mascufiana and Ernesto Kramer "for themselves and in representation of other sugar producers" filed a Complaint with RTC "For Sum of Money and/or Delivery of Personal Property with Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" against the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA) and preliminary injunction enjoining and/or prohibiting the Defendants, their officers and/or agents from transferring, releasing or in any manner disposing of all U.S. dollar deposits/accounts held in the name of Defendants, its subsidiaries, conduits agents and/or representatives in the different banks, domestic and foreign, including the physical sugar corresponding to crop year 1984-85 presently remaining in the warehouses of the different sugar mills all over the country In the instant petition petitioners limit their grounds to only two errors allegedly committed by respondent Court of Appeals, namely: (a) it erred in holding that neither the OGCC nor the SRA can represent the Government of the Philippines in the action before it and (b) it deviated from the decision of the Ninth Division of said court in CAGR SP No. 11046 (Kramer, et al. vs. Hon. Doroteo, Caeba, et al. promulgated on 16 March 1987), which declared that there was no valid class suit and the controversial compromise agreement did not extend to the 40,000 unnamed sugar producers. PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA entered into a Compromise Agreement Private respondents assert that the SRA and RPB do not have the legal authority to sue for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines They further argued that petitioners have no legal personality to initiate the instant petition for (a) SRA is not a party in the case before the trial court; the only reason why it became involved was because of the contempt proceedings initiated by private respondents against SRA's Arsenio Yulo, Carlos Ledesma and Bibiano Sabino; RPB was a signatory to the Compromise Agreement as a Trustee and, as such, it regarded itself as only a nominal party and in a series of pleadings it recognized the final and executory nature of the decision approving the compromise agreement. RULING: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in this case. PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as a juridical entity for three (3) years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the functions for which it was established, under the supervision of the SRA. Said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but it does not specifically include the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against it, nor the power to sue and be sued.

'agency' includes any department, independent establishment, commission, administration, authority board or bureau ... 21 The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit by or against it having been withheld from SRA, it following that the latter cannot institute the instant petition and the petition in C.A.-G.R. No. 17188 on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Petition DENIED. In re Manzano; 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent SC a letter request for a resolution containing some conditions before he accepts his post as a member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice

Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position; (2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and (3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge. It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty nonjudicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. Request denied. G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995

It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against the latter. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. The SRA no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation commissions ... and the like. ... The term

SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners, vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City. (1) Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and (2) Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure. RULING Clearly, each Office is an internal department or organizational unit within the Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little differently, these offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission. Resolution re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)."; renamed some of the Offices of the Commission, (OHRD to HRDO, OCPR to MIO, etc); re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from one Office to another. This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Office where the function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred. Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. SC holds that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions. In this case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission. It follows that the reassignment of petitioners (OPIA and OPR to RDO) had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such reassignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of

petitioners to security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office. SC concluded that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure. Petition DISMISSED. G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989 SOLID HOMES, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL INC., petitioner,

a complaint was filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority, motion was denied. RULING: The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 provides that National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A.

Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. This section exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority. The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, etc. This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law. As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in

the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. Challenged decision reversed. Decision of RTC set aside. G.R. No. L-47051 July 29, 1988 BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILIPPINES VS THE HONORABLE FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO he President issued Presidential Decree No. 276 establishing a coconut stabilization fund. Under this decree, the Philippine Coconut Authority, in addition to its powers granted under Presidential Decree No. 232, was authorized to formulate and immediately implement a stabilization scheme for coconut-based consumer goods, Rules and Regulations governing the collection and disposition of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) promulgated by the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Committee provides that the collection of levy in every first sale of copra resecada or its equivalent in terms of whole nuts shall take effect on August 10, 1973. The petitioners are all end-users and as such, are levy-collectors and remitters. the respondent Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit initiated a special audit of coconut end-user companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund levy collections and the subsidies they had received. As a result of the initial findings of the Performance Audit Office with respect only to the petitioners, respondent Acting COA Chairman directed the Chairman, the Administrator, and the Military Supervisor of PCA and the Manager of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, in various letters to them (Annexes G-2 H, I, J, L and N of petition) to collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due. The remaining issues all revolve on the questionAfter the Philippine Coconut Authoritythe authority vested by law to implement the stabilization scheme for the coconut industry under P.D. 276, which includes the collection of the levy to support the Stabilization Fund had acted, can the Commission on Audit say that the rules and decisions of the PCA are erroneous and nullify them, to the prejudice of petitioners who obediently complied with said rules and decisions?" whether or not the respondent COA Chairman was correct in disregarding the two resolutions of the PCA Governing Board for being ultra vires is the main issue in this petition. This issue became academic when the then President of the Philippines informed the Solicitor General that the Governing Board of the PCA would continue to function until the formal organization of the new Governing Board. Following this ruling, the respondent COA Chairman reconsidered his earlier stand and allowed the petitioners to get their subsidy claims which he had earlier refused. In effect, the respondent COA Chairman eventually acknowledged the validity of the two questioned PCA resolutions. The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them. They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations. RULING: his argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis. ... (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or the granting institution to

submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity." (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors. doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the Purposes of the regulatory statute administered." In the case at bar, the petitioners have not shown through the laying down of concrete factual foundations that the respondents' questioned acts were done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petition dismissed. G.R. No. 102976 October 25, 1995 IRON AND STEEL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AUTHORITY, petitioner,

Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9 August 1973 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines for a term of five (5) years counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another ten (10) years via EO 555. The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. certain portions of the public land subject matter were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation ("MCFC"), a letter of instruction directed the NSC to "negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land. If it fails, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC. Negotiations between NSC MCFC failed. petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against private respondent MCFC. During trial, the statutory existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which had ceased to be a juridical person. Granted anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that "only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil case. In this Petition for Review, the Solicitor General argues that since ISA initiated and prosecuted the action for expropriation in its capacity as agent of the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic, as principal of ISA, is entitled to be substituted and to be made a party-plaintiff after the agent ISA's term had expired. ISSUE: whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term. RULING: Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that ISA falls under category (b) above. P.D. No. 272, as

already noted, contains express authorization to ISA to commence expropriation proceedings like those here involved; ISA was expressly authorized it to enter into certain kinds of contracts "for and in behalf of the Government SA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as "legal personality. (1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. The present expropriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of ISA. it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. The powers and functions of ISA have reverted to the Republic of the Philippines upon the termination of the statutory term of ISA, the question should be addressed whether fresh legislative authority is necessary before the Republic of the Philippines may continue the expropriation proceedings initiated by its own delegate or agent. While the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative department of the government, we believe and so hold that no new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings. Since trial was still on going at the time the Regional Trial Court precipitously dismissed the expropriation proceedings. CA reversed and set aside. Remanded to RTC G.R. No. 1051 May 19, 1903

THE UNITED vs. FRED L. DORR,

STATES,

complainant-appellee,

The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts." The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission, which is as follows: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. ISSUE: The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." Does it mean in a general and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom the government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered? Either sense would doubtless be admissible. RULING: We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "dministration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that "government" is often used for "administration." Defamation of the Civil Commission as an aggregation, it being "a body of persons definite and small enough for its individual members to be recognized as such". It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in enacting this section, may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or scurrilous nature upon the existing political system of the United States, or the political system established in these Islands by the authority of the United States, as necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it is not so reasonable to suppose that they conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the government as necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems probable that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of 1798, have expressly and specifically mentioned the various public officials and collegiate governmental bodies defamation of which they meant to punish as sedition. The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the United States is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives,

their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8. Conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the CSC passed Resolution No. 93459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board (CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission (OCES) via Resolution 93-4359. The resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 934359. The petition is anchored on the following arguments: IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359; ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359. ISSUE: W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and transferring its budget to OCES HELD: CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the power to reorganize under Sec. 17, Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such offices. respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control. CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. This essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination. The petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 annulled and set aside. MARCELINO A. BUSACAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ANTONIO F. BUENAVENTURA, Provincial Treasurer of Pangasinan, The plaintiff was a duly appointed and qualified pre-war toll collector in the office of the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan with station at the Bued toll bridge in Sison, Pangasinan. His appointment was classified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as permanent. after liberation, he was reappointed to that position. In 1946, he resigned but he was reappointed, and had continuously served until 1947. The bridge was destroyed by flood, they were not paid salaries for they have not worked but when the bridge was repaired they continued to work without new appointments until the bridge was washed off by flood in 1947. It was reconstructed and reopened to traffic about the end of November, 1950. The plaintiff notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties as toll

collector but said respondent refused to reinstate or reappoint him. Murao, also a civil service eligible, was appointed instead of him. ISSUE: whether or not by the total destruction of the bridge in 1947 the positions of toll collectors provided therefor were abolished. To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently, as the word "abolish" denotes. Here there was never any thought, avowed or apparent, of not rebuilding the aforementioned bridge. The collapse of said bridge did not work to destroy but only to suspend the plaintiff's position, and that upon the bridge's rehabilitation and its reoperation as a toll bridge, his right to the position was similarly and automatically restored. This position is temporary, transitory or precarious only in the sense that its life is co-extensive with that of the bridge as a toll bridge. For that matter, all offices created by statute are more or less temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause. that the appellant should be reinstated to the position he held before the destruction of the Bued river bridge. Decision of the trial court is reversed in so far as it denies the petitioner's reinstatement, which is hereby decreed, and affirmed with respect to the suit for back salary and damages DE LA LLANA vs MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not respondent, was entitled to he office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936, 43 a year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction known as the Courts of First Instance Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District, under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position This Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel. ISSUE: constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." the assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

RULING: that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. ... And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. Well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith."

The test remains whether the abolition is in good faith. Justice Laurel - Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, 49 regional trial courts, 50 metropolitan trial courts of the national capital region, 51 and other metropolitan trial courts, 52municipal trial courts in cities, 53 as well as in municipalities, 54 and municipal circuit trial courts. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134 Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines. 2 administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty, filed with the Office of the President and referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. Three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed. The informations alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction materials worth P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the College as his personal and family driver. He was preventively suspended from office. . Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge in his place. PCC was converted to PUP, with Mateo continuing post. He was appointed Acting President and then President with a 6-years term. Petitioner was acquitted from the charges. He was ordered reinstated to the position of President of PUP (former PCC) and he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have

been filed against him. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for execution of the judgment. Granted. However, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees considered by the President of the Philippines for the position. Dr. Gellor did not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP. Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision to set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the trial court and disallow payment of salaries. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC, and Crisostomo could be reinstated to his former position as president. RULING: P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization. P.D. No. 1341, provides - The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a university to be known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, hereinafter referred to in this Decree as the University. PUP and the PCC are not one and the same institution but two different entities and that since petitioner Crisostomos term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC, petitioners term expired upon the abolition of the PCC. The manner of selection and appointment of the university head is substantially different from that provided by the PCC Charter. The PUP President shall be appointed by the President of the Philippinesupon recommendation of the Secretary of Education and Culture after consultation with the University Board of Regents (section 4, P.D. 1341). The President of PCC, on the other hand, was appointed by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees (Section 4, R.A. 778). the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. petitioner became entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must have recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then President Aquino to consider him for appointment to the same position after it had become vacant in consequence of the retirement of Dr. Prudente. decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE the questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court directing the reinstatement of the petitioner Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines and the payment to him of salaries NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. CSC petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under

permanent status. The officewas restructured and he was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar. the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". the Civil Service Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under said Executive Order, would not apply to her (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took effect." 3 A fortiori, since private respondent Garcia had been holding the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she should not be affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive Order No. 649. Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil Service Commission ISSUE: whether or not membership in the bar, which is the qualification requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the above said Executive Order. RULING: Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. A closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 reveals that said law in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions. It provoded, All structural units in the Land Registration Commission and in the registries of deeds, and all Positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in the implementing order to be issued by the President pursuant to the preceding paragraph. Their pertinent functions, applicable appropriations, records, equipment and property shall be transferred to the appropriate staff or offices therein created. (Emphasis Supplied.) This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely separated therefrom. 5 After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times. 11 Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure A final word, on the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service Commission. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards

salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. We hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the questioned Resolution of CSC Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the nonviolent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. ISSUE: In the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. RULING: It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated, It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.] To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people as protector of peace.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. Petition dismissed. CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled by the then Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the "National Police" under the Department of National Defense, as a major service component of the AFP. 4 Later, the Integration Act of 1975 5 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under the Office of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent DirectorGeneral of the INP, exercised command functions over the INP. The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) 7 exercised administrative control and supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over the INP units assigned within their respective localities Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES ISSUE: WON RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed RULING: The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government. Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level, there is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." 29 It is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) 30 to be recommended by PNP officials.

the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control petition is hereby DISMISSED EMMANUEL PELAEZ, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted this action against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power When Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. ISSUE: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" RULING: It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given. Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular

municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5 Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no morethan the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio

grabbing cases in the province of Rizal and the decision not to prosecute him may be said to be those of the Secretary already, not of Fiscal Aquino anymore, , the prosecution of crimes is part of the President's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" (Id.) and the Secretary of Justice is, by the nature of his office, the principal alter ego of the President in the performance of such duty. the power of control therein contemplated "means the power (of the department head) to alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." Secretary only "general supervision and control" may not construed as limiting or in any way deminishing the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control under Sec. 79 (c) which is constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of the President." petitioner's motion to quash must be granted upon the ground that respondent fiscals had no authority to file the impugned amended information insofar as it includes petitioner as one of the accused therein pettion granted.

ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., vs GATMAITAN

-------NOBLEJAS, petitioner, vs. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS, as Judge of Pasig Various land titles (Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were amended on the basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by increasing the respective areas covered by said titles. Certifications of the verifications of these resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office, headed then by petitioner Noblejas. However, it turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far in excess of the respective corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so that even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not capable of appropriation by any private person or entity have been included within the expanded titles. Noblejas, as already stated earlier, appeared before Fiscal Aquino and presented an affidavit explaining in detail his participation as Commissioner of Land Registration in the verification and certification of the resurveys in question. He protested he acted in good faith and with due diligence in approving said verifications and in affixing his signature on the certifications and denied there was any anomalous motive in his actuations. the specific instructions of the President to submit to the Secretary of Justice for review any case contemplated to be filed against anyone of the officials mentioned in his memorandum before the case is actually filed in court, Noblejas was left out in all the "land grabbing" cases that reached the Court of First Instance of Rizal. For instance, when respondent Fiscal de Guzman filed the original information in the herein subject case of People vs. Carlos, Noblejas was not included among the accused, albeit he was listed therein among the prosecution witnesses. Fiscal de Guzman, without conducting a new preliminary investigation and without prior notice to petitioner Noblejas, amended the information in the aforementioned Carlos case by including the petitioner as a codefendant therein and striking out his name in the list of prosecution witnesses." ISSUE: whether or not Fiscals Castillo and de Guzman had authority to sign and file the amended information adding petitioner as one of the accused in the abovementioned case ofPeople vs. Carlos inasmuch as this exculpatory memorandum was approved by the Secretary of Justice, the finding that no criminal liability may be attached to petitioner Noblejas for any of the land