Chapter 8

Security

A note on the use of these ppt slides: Computer

We’re making these slides freely available to all (faculty, students, readers).
They’re in PowerPoint form so you see the animations; and can add, modify, Networking: A
and delete slides (including this one) and slide content to suit your needs.
They obviously represent a lot of work on our part. In return for use, we only Top Down
ask the following:
 If you use these slides (e.g., in a class) that you mention their source Approach
(after all, we’d like people to use our book!)
 If you post any slides on a www site, that you note that they are adapted
6th edition
from (or perhaps identical to) our slides, and note our copyright of this Jim Kurose, Keith Ross
material. Addison-Wesley
Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR March 2012
All material copyright 1996-2012
J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved

8-1
Course Description
 This course will introduce students to
advanced topics in network security. Topics
will include encryption and authentication
techniques, detection and analysis of
intrusions, and the security of electronic mail
and web access.
 Restricted to Computer Science students or
permission of instructor.
 Prerequisite: 60-367.

Introduction
2-2
8-2
Basis for Evaluation -
Requirements
Component Date Location Weight
Midterm Exam Thursday November ER 2137 (regular 20%
#1 12 - in lecture room classroom)
Research Essay Sunday November 22 Email submission 20%
(Individual) (23:59:59ET) to:
[email protected]

Seminar TBD ER 2137 (regular 10%

presentation classroom)
(Individual)

Project I (Group) TBD ER 2137 (regular 25%

classroom) + Email

Project II TBD ER 2137 (regular 25%

(Group) classroom) + Email
Introduction
2-3
8-3
Resources
 Blackboard LMS will be used.
 The following computing resources will be
available for students taking this course:
 A distributed-computing network, accessible
through a graphic interface provided by
workstations located in dedicated laboratories on
the 3rd floor of Lambton Tower and Erie Hall, or
through PCs in an open laboratory in the
Computer Centre, or, for students who have the
necessary equipment, from campus and home
using network connectivity.
 State-of-the-art parallel-processing computer
servers. Introduction
2-4
8-4
Chapter 8: Network Security
Chapter goals:
 understand principles of network security:
 cryptography and its many uses beyond
“confidentiality”
 authentication
 message integrity
 security in practice:
 firewalls and intrusion detection systems
 security in application, transport, network, link layers

Network Security 8-5

Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity, authentication
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-6

What is network security?
confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should
“understand” message contents
 sender encrypts message
 receiver decrypts message
authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm
identity of each other
message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure
message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without
detection
access and availability: services must be accessible
and available to users
Network Security 8-7
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob,
Trudy
 well-known in network security world
 Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely”
 Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages

Alice Bob
channel data, control
messages

data secure secure data

sender s
receiver

Trudy

Network Security 8-8

Who might Bob, Alice be?
 … well, real-life Bobs and Alices!
 Web browser/server for electronic
transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
 on-line banking client/server
 DNS servers
 routers exchanging routing table updates
 other examples?

Network Security 8-9

There are bad guys (and girls) out
there!
Q: What can a “bad guy” do?
A: A lot! See section 1.6
 eavesdrop: intercept messages
 actively insert messages into connection
 impersonation: can fake (spoof) source
address in packet (or any field in packet)
 hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection
by removing sender or receiver, inserting
himself in place
 denial of service: prevent service from being
used by others (e.g., by overloading
resources)
Network Security 8-10
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity, authentication
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-11

 The language of cryptography

Alice’s Bob’s
K encryption K decryption
A
key Bkey

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

algorithm algorithm

m plaintext message
KA(m) ciphertext, encrypted with key KA
m = KB(KA(m))

Network Security 8-12

Breaking an encryption
scheme
 cipher-text only attack:  known-plaintext attack:
Trudy has ciphertext Trudy has plaintext
she can analyze corresponding to
 two approaches: ciphertext
 brute force: search  e.g., in monoalphabetic
through all keys cipher, Trudy
 statistical analysis determines pairings for
a,l,i,c,e,b,o,
 chosen-plaintext attack:
Trudy can get ciphertext
for chosen plaintext

Network Security 8-13

Symmetric key cryptography

KS KS

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm algorithm
K (m) m = KS(KS(m))
S

symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same

(symmetric)
S key: K
 e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono
alphabetic substitution cipher
Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?

Network Security 8-14

Simple encryption scheme
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another
 monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

e.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26

letters
to set of 26 letters Network Security 8-15
A more sophisticated encryption approach

 n substitution ciphers, M1,M2,…,Mn

 cycling pattern:
 e.g., n=4: M1,M3,M4,M3,M2; M1,M3,M4,M3,M2; ..
 for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent
subsitution pattern in cyclic pattern
 dog: d from M1, o from M3, g from M4

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and

cyclic pattern
 key need not be just n-bit pattern

Network Security 8-16

Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard
 US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
 block cipher with cipher block chaining
 how secure is DES?
 DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase
decrypted (brute force) in less than a day
 no known good analytic attack
 making DES more secure:
 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

Network Security 8-17

Symmetric key
crypto: DES

DES operation
initial permutation
16 identical “rounds” of
function application,
each using different
48 bits of key
final permutation

Network Security 8-18

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

 symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES

(Nov 2001)
 processes data in 128 bit blocks
 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
 brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1
sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES

Network Security 8-19

Public Key Cryptography
symmetric key crypto public key crypto
 requires sender,  radically different
receiver know shared approach [Diffie-
secret key Hellman76, RSA78]
 Q: how to agree on key  sender, receiver do not
in first place share secret key
(particularly if never  public encryption key
“met”)? known to all
 private decryption key
known only to receiver

Network Security 8-20

Public key cryptography
+ Bob’s public
K
B key

- Bob’s private
K
B key

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm + algorithm message
K (m) - +
B m = KB (K (m))
B

Network Security 8-21

Public key encryption
algorithms
requirements:

1 need KB
(
+
) .
and K -
( ).such that
B
- +
K (K (m)) = m
B B

2 given public key K +, it should be

B
impossible to compute private
-
key K
B

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

Network Security 8-22
Prerequisite: modular
arithmetic
 x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n
 facts:
[(a mod n) + (b mod n)] mod n = (a+b) mod n
[(a mod n) - (b mod n)] mod n = (a-b) mod n
[(a mod n) * (b mod n)] mod n = (a*b) mod n
 thus
(a mod n)d mod n = ad mod n
 example: x=14, n=10, d=2:
(x mod n)d mod n = 42 mod 10 = 6
xd = 142 = 196 xd mod 10 = 6

Network Security 8-23

RSA: getting ready
 message: just a bit pattern
 bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer
number
 thus, encrypting a message is equivalent to
encrypting a number.
example:
 m= 10010001 . This message is uniquely
represented by the decimal number 145.
 to encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number,
which gives a new number (the ciphertext).

Network Security 8-24

RSA: Creating public/private key pair

1. choose two large prime numbers p, q.

(e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)
3. choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors
with z (e, z are “relatively prime”).
4. choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.
(in other words: ed mod z = 1 ).
5. public key is (n,e). private key is (n,d).
+ -
KB KB
Network Security 8-25
RSA: encryption, decryption
0. given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above
1. to encrypt message m (<n), compute
c = me mod
n
2. to decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute
m = cd mod
n
magic m = (me mod n) d mod n
happens!
c

Network Security 8-26

RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z).
encrypting 8-bit messages.

bit pattern m me c = me mod n

encrypt:
0000l000 12 24832 17

d
c c m = cd mod n
decrypt:
17 481968572106750915091411825223071697 12

Network Security 8-27

Why does RSA work?
 must show that cd mod n = m
where c = me mod n
 fact: for any x and y: xy mod n = x(y mod z) mod n
 where n= pq and z = (p-1)(q-1)
 thus,
cd mod n = (me mod n)d mod n
= med mod n
= m(ed mod z) mod n
= m1 mod n
=m

Network Security 8-28

RSA: another important property
The following property will be very useful later:

- + + -
K (K (m)) = m = K (K (m))
B B B B

use public key use private key

first, followed by first, followed by
private key public key

result is the
same!
Network Security 8-29
 - + + -
Why K (K (m)) = m = K (K (m))
B B B B
?

follows directly from modular arithmetic:

(me mod n)d mod n = med mod n

= mde mod n
= (md mod n)e mod n

Network Security 8-30

Why is RSA secure?
 suppose you know Bob’s public key (n,e).
How hard is it to determine d?
 essentially need to find factors of n without
knowing the two factors p and q
 fact: factoring a big number is hard

Network Security 8-31

RSA in practice: session keys
 exponentiation in RSA is computationally
intensive
 DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA
 use public key cryto to establish secure
connection, then establish second key –
symmetric session key – for encrypting data
session key, KS
 Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key
KS
 once both have KS, they use symmetric key
cryptography
Network Security 8-32
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity, authentication
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-33

 Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to
him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

“I am Alice”
Failure scenario??

Network Security 8-34

 Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to
him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

in a network,
Bob can not “see” Alice,
so Trudy simply declares
“I am Alice” herself to be Alice

Network Security 8-35

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Alice’s
IP address “I am Alice”

Failure scenario??

Network Security 8-36

Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address

Trudy can create

a packet
Alice’s
“spoofing”
IP address “I am Alice” Alice’s address

Network Security 8-37

 Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr

Network Security 8-38

 Authentication: another try
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
playback attack: Trudy
Alice’s records Alice’s packet
OK
IP addr and later
plays it back to Bob

Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Network Security 8-39

 Authentication: yet another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr

Network Security 8-40

 Authentication: yet another try
Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice” record
IP addr password
and
Alice’s
OK playback
IP addr
still works!

Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password

Network Security 8-41

 Authentication: yet another try
Goal: avoid playback attack
nonce: number (R) used only once-in-a-lifetime
ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce,
R. Alice
must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”

R
KA-B(R) Alice is live, and
only Alice knows
key to encrypt
nonce, so it must
Failures, drawbacks? be Alice!
Network Security 8-42
Authentication: ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
 can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography

“I am Alice”
Bob computes
R + -
- K A(K A(R)) = R
K A (R)
and knows only Alice
“send me your public key” could have the private
+ key, that encrypted R
KA such that
+ -
K (K (R)) = R
A A

Network Security 8-43

 ap5.0: security
hole
man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R -
K (R)
T
R - Send me your public key
K (R) +
A K
T
Send me your public key
+
K
A +
K (m)
Trudy gets T
- +
+ m = K (K (m))
K (m) T T
A sends m to Alice
- +
m = K (K (m)) encrypted with
A A Alice’s public key
Network Security 8-44
ap5.0: security
hole
man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

difficult to detect:
 Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice
versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later
and recall conversation!)
 problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

Network Security 8-45

Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity, authentication
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-46

Digital signatures
cryptographic technique analogous to hand-
written signatures:
 sender (Bob) digitally signs document,
establishing he is document owner/creator.
 verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can
prove to someone that Bob, and no one else
(including Alice), must have signed document

Network Security 8-47

Digital signatures
simple digital signature for message m:
-
 Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key KB,
-
creating “signed” message, KB(m)

- Bob’s private -
Bob’s message, m KB m,K B(m)
key
Dear Alice
Bob’s message,
Oh, how I have missed Public key
you. I think of you all the
m, signed
time! …(blah blah blah) encryption (encrypted) with
algorithm his private key
Bob

Network Security 8-48

Digital signatures
-
 suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, KB(m)
 Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s public
+ - + -
key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m.
+ -
 If KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used
Bob’s private key.

Alice thus verifies that:

 Bob signed m
 no one else signed m
 Bob signed m and not m‘
non-repudiation:
-
 Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court
and prove that Bob signed m
Network Security 8-49
Message digests large H: Hash
message Function
m
computationally expensive
to public-key-encrypt
H(m)
long messages
goal: fixed-length, easy- Hash function properties:
to-compute digital  many-to-1
“fingerprint”  produces fixed-size msg
 apply hash function H to digest (fingerprint)
m, get fixed size  given message digest x,
message digest, H(m). computationally infeasible
to find m such that x =
H(m)
Network Security 8-50
Internet checksum: poor crypto hash
function
Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:
 produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message

 is many-to-one

But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find

another message with same hash value:

message ASCII format message ASCII format

IOU1 49 4F 55 31 IOU9 49 4F 55 39
00.9 30 30 2E 39 00.1 30 30 2E 31
9BOB 39 42 D2 42 9BOB 39 42 D2 42
B2 C1 D2 AC different messages B2 C1 D2 AC
but identical checksums!

Network Security 8-51

Digital signature = signed message
digest
Bob sends digitally signed Alice verifies signature,
message: integrity of digitally signed
large message:
message H: Hash
H(m) encrypted
m function
msg digest
-
KB(H(m))
Bob’s digital large
private signature message
- m Bob’s digital
key KB (encrypt)
public
+ signature
key KB
encrypted H: Hash (decrypt)
msg digest function
-
+ KB(H(m))
H(m) H(m)

equal
?
Network Security 8-52
Hash function algorithms
 MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
 computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
 arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct
msg m whose MD5 hash is equal to x
 SHA-1 is also used
 US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
 160-bit message digest

Network Security 8-53

 Recall: ap5.0 security
hole
man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R -
K (R)
T
R - Send me your public key
K (R) +
A K
T
Send me your public key
+
K
A +
K (m)
Trudy gets T
- +
+ m = K (K (m))
K (m) T T
A sends m to Alice
- +
m = K (K (m)) encrypted with
A A Alice’s public key
Network Security 8-54
Public-key certification
 motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob
 Trudy creates e-mail order:
Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four
pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
 Trudy signs order with her private key
 Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
 Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but
says it’s Bob’s public key
 Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four
pepperoni pizzas to Bob
 Bob doesn’t even like pepperoni

Network Security 8-55

Certification authorities
 certification authority (CA): binds public key to
particular entity, E.
 E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
 E provides “proof of identity” to CA.
 CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
 certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA –
CA says “this is E’s public key”

Bob’s digital
+
public signature KB
+
key KB (encrypt)
CA
private - certificate for
Bob’s K
identifying key CA Bob’s public key,
information signed by CA
Network Security 8-56
Certification authorities
 when Alice wants Bob’s public key:
 gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
 apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get
Bob’s public key

+ digital Bob’s
KB signature public
+
(decrypt) K B key

CA
public K+
CA
key

Network Security 8-57

Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity, authentication
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-58

Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K ( .)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m

+ Internet
- KS

KS
+
KB( ). + +
-
KB( ) .
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
K+
B K-B

Alice:
 generates random symmetric private key, KS
 encrypts message with KS (for efficiency)
 also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key
 sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob
Network Security 8-59
Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K ( .)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m

+ Internet
- KS

KS
+
KB( ). + +
-
KB( ) .
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
K+
B K-B

Bob:
 uses his private key to decrypt and recover
KS
 uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m
Network Security 8-60
Secure e-mail (continued)
 Alice wants to provide sender authentication message
integrity
KA- K+
A
- -
m .
H( )
-
KA( ) . KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) +
KA( ). H(m )

+ Internet
- compare

m H( ). H(m )
m

 Alice digitally signs message

 sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature

Network Security 8-61

Secure e-mail (continued)
 Alice
wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication,
message integrity.
-
KA
-
m .
H( )
-
KA( ). KA(H(m))
KS

+ KS( ) .
m + Internet

KS
+
KB( ) . +
KB(KS )
K+
B

Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public

key, newly created symmetric key
Network Security 8-62
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-63

SSL: Secure Sockets Layer
 widelydeployed security  original goals:
protocol  Web e-commerce
 supported by almost all transactions
browsers, web servers
 encryption (especially
 https credit-card numbers)
 billions $/year over SSL
 Web-server
 mechanisms: [Woo 1994], authentication
implementation: Netscape  optional client
 variation -TLS: transport authentication
layer security, RFC 2246  minimum hassle in doing
business with new
 provides
merchant
 confidentiality
 available to all TCP
 integrity applications
 authentication
 secure socket interface
Network Security 8-64
SSL and TCP/IP

Application Application

SSL
TCP
TCP
IP IP

normal application application with SSL

 SSL provides application programming

interface (API) to applications
 C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily
available
Network Security 8-65
Could do something like PGP:
-
KA
-
m .
H( )
-
KA( ). KA(H(m))
KS

+ .
KS ( )

m + Internet

KS
+
KB( ). +
KB(KS )
+
KB

 but want to send byte streams & interactive data

 want set of secret keys for entire connection
 want certificate exchange as part of protocol: handshake
phase
Network Security 8-66
Toy SSL: a simple secure
channel
 handshake: Alice and Bob use their
certificates, private keys to authenticate each
other and exchange shared secret
 key derivation: Alice and Bob use shared
secret to derive set of keys
 data transfer: data to be transferred is broken
up into series of records
 connection closure: special messages to
securely close connection

Network Security 8-67

Toy: a simple handshake

MS: master secret

EMS: encrypted master secret

Network Security 8-68

Toy: key derivation
 considered bad to use same key for more than one
cryptographic operation
 use different keys for message authentication code (MAC)
and encryption
 four keys:
 Kc = encryption key for data sent from client to
server
 Mc = MAC key for data sent from client to server
 Ks = encryption key for data sent from server to
client
 Ms = MAC key for data sent from server to client
 keys derived from key derivation function (KDF)
 takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random
Network Security 8-69
Toy: data records
 why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write it
to TCP?
 where would we put the MAC? If at end, no message
integrity until all data processed.
 e.g., with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check
over all bytes sent before displaying?
 instead, break stream in series of records
 each record carries a MAC
 receiver can act on each record as it arrives
 issue: in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC
from data
 want to use variable-length records

length data MAC

Network Security 8-70

Toy: sequence numbers
 problem: attacker can capture and replay
record or re-order records
 solution: put sequence number into MAC:
 MAC = MAC(Mx, sequence||data)
 note: no sequence number field

 problem: attacker could replay all records

 solution: use nonce

Network Security 8-71

Toy: control information
 problem: truncation attack:
 attacker forges TCP connection close segment
 one or both sides thinks there is less data than
there actually is.
 solution: record types, with one type for
closure
 type 0 for data; type 1 for closure
 MAC = MAC(Mx, sequence||type||data)

length type data MAC

Network Security 8-72

Toy SSL: summary

bob.com
encrypted

Network Security 8-73

Toy SSL isn’t complete
 how long are fields?
 which encryption protocols?
 want negotiation?
 allow client and server to support different
encryption algorithms
 allow client and server to choose together
specific algorithm before data transfer

Network Security 8-74

SSL cipher suite
 cipher suite common SSL symmetric
 public-key algorithm ciphers
 symmetric encryption algorithm  DES – Data Encryption
 MAC algorithm Standard: block
 SSL supports several  3DES – Triple strength: block
 RC2 – Rivest Cipher 2: block
cipher suites
 RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4:
 negotiation: client, server stream
agree on cipher suite SSL Public key encryption
 client offers choice  RSA
 server picks one

Network Security 8-75

Real SSL: handshake (1)
Purpose
1. server authentication

2. negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms

3. establish keys

4. client authentication (optional)

Network Security 8-76

Real SSL: handshake (2)
1. client sends list of algorithms it supports, along
with client nonce
2. server chooses algorithms from list; sends back:
choice + certificate + server nonce
3. client verifies certificate, extracts server’s public
key, generates pre_master_secret, encrypts with
server’s public key, sends to server
4. client and server independently compute
encryption and MAC keys from
pre_master_secret and nonces
5. client sends a MAC of all the handshake
messages
Network Security 8-77
Real SSL: handshaking (3)
last 2 steps protect handshake from tampering
 client typically offers range of algorithms, some
strong, some weak
 man-in-the middle could delete stronger
algorithms from list
 last 2 steps prevent this
 last two messages are encrypted

Network Security 8-78

Real SSL: handshaking (4)
 why two random nonces?
 suppose Trudy sniffs all messages between
Alice & Bob
 next day, Trudy sets up TCP connection with
Bob, sends exact same sequence of records
 Bob (Amazon) thinks Alice made two separate
orders for the same thing
 solution: Bob sends different random nonce for
each connection. This causes encryption keys to
be different on the two days
 Trudy’s messages will fail Bob’s integrity check

Network Security 8-79

SSL record protocol
data

data data
MAC MAC
fragment fragment

record encrypted record encrypted

header data and MAC header data and MAC

record header: content type; version; length

MAC: includes sequence number, MAC key Mx
fragment: each SSL fragment 214 bytes (~16 Kbytes)
Network Security 8-80
SSL record format
1 byte 2 bytes 3 bytes
content
type SSL version length

data

MAC

data and MAC encrypted (symmetric algorithm)

Network Security 8-81

Real SSL
connection

everything
henceforth
is encrypted

TCP FIN follows

Network Security 8-82
Key derivation
 client nonce, server nonce, and pre-master secret
input into pseudo random-number generator.
 produces master secret
 master secret and new nonces input into another
random-number generator: “key block”
 because of resumption: TBD
 key block sliced and diced:
 client MAC key
 server MAC key
 client encryption key
 server encryption key
 client initialization vector (IV)
 server initialization vector (IV)

Network Security 8-83

Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-84

What is network-layer confidentiality
?
between two network entities:
 sending entity encrypts datagram payload,
payload could be:
 TCP or UDP segment, ICMP message, OSPF
message ….
 all data sent from one entity to other would be
hidden:
 web pages, e-mail, P2P file transfers, TCP SYN
packets …
 “blanket coverage”

Network Security 8-85

Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs)
motivation:
institutions often want private networks for
security.
 costly: separate routers, links, DNS infrastructure.
VPN: institution’s inter-office traffic is sent over
public Internet instead
 encrypted before entering public Internet
 logically separate from other traffic

Network Security 8-86

Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
public laptop
Internet w/ IPsec

salesperson
in hotel

router w/ router w/
IPv4 and IPsec IPv4 and IPsec

branch office
headquarters Network Security 8-87
IPsec services
 data integrity
 origin authentication
 replay attack prevention
 confidentiality

 two protocols providing different service

models:
 AH - Authentication Header
 ESP - Encapsulation Security Protocol

Network Security 8-88

IPsec transport mode

IPsec IPsec

 IPsec datagram emitted and received by end-

system
 protects upper level protocols

Network Security 8-89

IPsec – tunneling mode

IPsec IPsec
IPsec IPsec

 edge routers IPsec-  hosts IPsec-aware

aware

Network Security 8-90

Two IPsec protocols
 Authentication Header (AH) protocol
 provides source authentication & data integrity but
not confidentiality
 Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP)
 provides source authentication, data integrity, and
confidentiality
 more widely used than AH

Network Security 8-91

Four combinations are
possible!
Host mode Host mode
with AH with ESP

Tunnel mode Tunnel mode

with AH with ESP

most common and

most important

Network Security 8-92

Security associations (SAs)
 before sending data, “security association
(SA)” established from sending to receiving
entity
 SAs are simplex: for only one direction
 sending, receiving entitles maintain state
information about SA
 recall: TCP endpoints also maintain state info
 IP is connectionless; IPsec is connection-oriented!
 how many SAs in VPN w/ headquarters,
branch office, and n traveling salespeople?
Network Security 8-93
Example SA from R1 to R2
headquarters Internet
branch office

200.168.1.100 193.68.2.23

R1 security association
172.16.1/24
R2
172.16.2/24

R1 stores for SA:

 32-bit SA identifier: Security Parameter Index (SPI)
 origin SA interface (200.168.1.100)
 destination SA interface (193.68.2.23)
 type of encryption used (e.g., 3DES with CBC)
 encryption key
 type of integrity check used (e.g., HMAC with MD5)
 authentication key
Network Security 8-94
Security Association Database
(SAD)
 endpoint holds SA state in security
association database (SAD), where it can
locate them during processing.
 with n salespersons, 2 + 2n SAs in R1’s SAD
 when sending IPsec datagram, R1 accesses
SAD to determine how to process datagram.
 when IPsec datagram arrives to R2, R2
examines SPI in IPsec datagram, indexes
SAD with SPI, and processes datagram
accordingly.
Network Security 8-95
IPsec datagram
focus for now on tunnel mode with ESP

“enchilada” authenticated
encrypted
new IP ESP original Original IP ESP ESP
header hdr IP hdr datagram payload trl auth

Seq pad next

SPI padding
# length header

Network Security 8-96

What happens?
headquarters Internet
branch office

200.168.1.100 193.68.2.23

R1 security association
172.16.1/24
R2
172.16.2/24

“enchilada” authenticated
encrypted
new IP ESP original Original IP ESP ESP
header hdr IP hdr datagram payload trl auth

Seq pad next

SPI padding
# length header
Network Security 8-97
R1: convert original datagram to IPsec datagram

 appends to back of original datagram (which includes

original header fields!) an “ESP trailer” field.
 encrypts result using algorithm & key specified by SA.
 appends to front of this encrypted quantity the “ESP
header, creating “enchilada”.
 creates authentication MAC over the whole enchilada,
using algorithm and key specified in SA;
 appends MAC to back of enchilada, forming payload;
 creates brand new IP header, with all the classic IPv4
header fields, which it appends before payload.

Network Security 8-98

Inside the enchilada:
“enchilada” authenticated
encrypted
new IP ESP original Original IP ESP ESP
header hdr IP hdr datagram payload trl auth

Seq pad next

SPI padding
# length header

 ESP trailer: Padding for block ciphers

 ESP header:
 SPI, so receiving entity knows what to do
 Sequence number, to thwart replay attacks
 MAC in ESP auth field is created with shared secret
key
Network Security 8-99
IPsec sequence numbers
 for new SA, sender initializes seq. # to 0
 each time datagram is sent on SA:
 sender increments seq # counter
 places value in seq # field
 goal:
 prevent attacker from sniffing and replaying a
packet
 receipt of duplicate, authenticated IP packets may
disrupt service
 method:
 destination checks for duplicates
 doesn’t keep track of all received packets; instead
Network Security 8-100
Security Policy Database
(SPD)
 policy: For a given datagram, sending entity
needs to know if it should use IPsec
 needs also to know which SA to use
 may use: source and destination IP address;
protocol number
 info in SPD indicates “what” to do with
arriving datagram
 info in SAD indicates “how” to do it

Network Security 8-101

Summary: IPsec services

 suppose Trudy sits somewhere between R1

and R2. she doesn’t know the keys.
 will Trudy be able to see original contents of
datagram? How about source, dest IP address,
transport protocol, application port?
 flip bits without detection?
 masquerade as R1 using R1’s IP address?
 replay a datagram?

Network Security 8-102

IKE: Internet Key Exchange
 previous examples: manual establishment of IPsec
SAs in IPsec endpoints:
Example SA
SPI: 12345
Source IP: 200.168.1.100
Dest IP: 193.68.2.23
Protocol: ESP
Encryption algorithm: 3DES-cbc
HMAC algorithm: MD5
Encryption key: 0x7aeaca…
HMAC key:0xc0291f…
 manual keying is impractical for VPN with 100s of
endpoints
 instead use IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange)

Network Security 8-103

IKE: PSK and PKI
 authentication (prove who you are) with either
 pre-shared secret (PSK) or
 with PKI (pubic/private keys and certificates).
 PSK: both sides start with secret
 run IKE to authenticate each other and to generate
IPsec SAs (one in each direction), including
encryption, authentication keys
 PKI: both sides start with public/private key pair,
certificate
 run IKE to authenticate each other, obtain IPsec SAs
(one in each direction).
 similar with handshake in SSL.

Network Security 8-104

IKE phases
 IKE has two phases
 phase 1: establish bi-directional IKE SA
• note: IKE SA different from IPsec SA
• aka ISAKMP security association
 phase 2: ISAKMP is used to securely negotiate
IPsec pair of SAs
 phase 1 has two modes: aggressive mode
and main mode
 aggressive mode uses fewer messages
 main mode provides identity protection and is
more flexible

Network Security 8-105

IPsec summary
 IKE message exchange for algorithms, secret
keys, SPI numbers
 either AH or ESP protocol (or both)
 AH provides integrity, source
authentication
 ESP protocol (with AH) additionally
provides encryption
 IPsec peers can be two end systems, two
routers/firewalls, or a router/firewall and an
end system
Network Security 8-106
Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-107

WEP design goals
Wired Equivalent Privacy

 symmetric key crypto

 confidentiality
 end host authorization
 data integrity
 self-synchronizing: each packet separately
encrypted
 given encrypted packet and key, can decrypt; can
continue to decrypt packets when preceding packet
was lost (unlike Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in
block ciphers)
 Efficient
 implementable in hardware or software Network Security 8-108
Review: symmetric stream
ciphers
keystream
key keystream
generator

 combine each byte of keystream with byte of plaintext

to get ciphertext:
 m(i) = ith unit of message
 ks(i) = ith unit of keystream
 c(i) = ith unit of ciphertext
 c(i) = ks(i)  m(i) ( = exclusive or)
 m(i) = ks(i)  c(i)
 WEP uses RC4

Network Security 8-109

Stream cipher and packet
independence
 recall design goal: each packet separately encrypted
 if for frame n+1, use keystream from where we left off
for frame n, then each frame is not separately encrypted
 need to know where we left off for packet n
 WEP approach: initialize keystream with key + new IV
for each packet:

keystream
Key+IVpacket keystreampacket
generator

Network Security 8-110

WEP encryption (1)
 sender calculates Integrity Check Value (ICV) over data
 four-byte hash/CRC for data integrity
 each side has 104-bit shared key
 sender creates 24-bit initialization vector (IV), appends to key:
gives 128-bit key
 sender also appends keyID (in 8-bit field)
 128-bit key inputted into pseudo random number generator to
get keystream
 data in frame + ICV is encrypted with RC4:
 B\bytes of keystream are XORed with bytes of data & ICV
 IV & keyID are appended to encrypted data to create payload
 payload inserted into 802.11 frame
encrypted

Key
IV data ICV
ID

MAC payload
Network Security 8-111
 WEP encryption (2)
IV
(per frame)
KS: 104-bit key sequence generator
secret ( for given KS, IV)
symmetric
k1IV k2IV k3IV … kNIV kN+1IV… kN+1IV 802.11 WEP-encrypted data
key IV
header plus ICV
plaintext &
frame data d1 d2 d3 … dN CRC1 … CRC4
plus CRC
c1 c2 c3 … cN cN+1 … cN+4

new IV for each

Figure 7.8-new1: 802.11 WEP protocol

frame

Network Security 8-112

WEP decryption overview
encrypted

Key
IV data ICV
ID

MAC payload

 receiver extracts IV
 inputs IV, shared secret key into pseudo random
generator, gets keystream
 XORs keystream with encrypted data to decrypt data
+ ICV
 verifies integrity of data with ICV
 note: message integrity approach used here is
different from MAC (message authentication code)
and signatures (using PKI).
Network Security 8-113
End-point authentication w/
nonce
Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime
How to prove Alice “live”: Bob sends Alice nonce, R.
Alice
must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”

R
KA-B (R) Alice is live, and
only Alice knows
key to encrypt
nonce, so it must
be Alice!
Network Security 8-114
WEP authentication
authentication request

nonce (128 bytes)

nonce encrypted shared key

success if decrypted value equals nonce

Notes:
 not all APs do it, even if WEP is being used
 AP indicates if authentication is necessary in beacon
frame
 done before association Network Security 8-115
Breaking 802.11 WEP
encryption
security hole:
 24-bit IV, one IV per frame, -> IV’s eventually reused
 IV transmitted in plaintext -> IV reuse detected
attack:
 Trudy causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext d1 d2 d3
d4 …
 Trudy sees: ci = di XOR kiIV
 Trudy knows ci di, so can compute kiIV
 Trudy knows encrypting key sequence k1IV k2IV k3IV …
 Next time IV is used, Trudy can decrypt!

Network Security 8-116

802.11i: improved security
 numerous (stronger) forms of encryption
possible
 provides key distribution
 uses authentication server separate from
access point

Network Security 8-117

802.11i: four phases of
operation
AP: access point
STA: AS:
wired
client station Authentication
network
server

1 Discovery of
security capabilities

2 STA and AS mutually authenticate, together

generate Master Key (MK). AP serves as “pass through”

3 STA derives
Pairwise Master 3 AS derives
same PMK,
Key (PMK)
sends to AP

4 STA, AP use PMK to derive

Temporal Key (TK) used for message
encryption, integrity
Network Security 8-118
EAP: extensible authentication protocol
 EAP: end-end client (mobile) to authentication
server protocol
 EAP sent over separate “links”
 mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN)
 AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP)

wired
network

EAP TLS
EAP
EAP over LAN (EAPoL) RADIUS
IEEE 802.11 UDP/IP
Network Security 8-119
WEP's Major Weakness
 Static encryption keys.
 When you set up a router with a WEP encryption key, that
one key is used by every device on your network to encrypt
every packet that's transmitted.
 But the fact that packets are encrypted doesn't prevent them
from being intercepted, and due to technical flaws it's
entirely possible for an eavesdropper to intercept enough
WEP-encrypted packets to eventually deduce what the key
is.
 Can mitigate by periodically changing the WEP key
 Routers generally allow you to store up to four keys.
 But few bother to do this because changing WEP keys is
inconvenient and time-consuming because it has to be done
not just on the router, but on every device that connects to it.
 As a result, most people just set up a single key and then
continue using it ad infinitum.
Network Security 8-120
Wi-Fi Protected Access
(WPA)
 WPA aims to provide stronger wireless data
encryption than WEP.
 In order to use WPA all devices on the network must be
configured for WPA. Can mitigate by periodically changing
the WEP key
 Improved data encryption through the temporal key integrity
protocol (TKIP). TKIP scrambles the keys using a hashing
algorithm and, by adding an integrity-checking feature,
ensures that the keys haven't been tampered with.
 User authentication, which is generally missing in WEP,
through the extensible authentication protocol (EAP). WEP
regulates access to a wireless network based on a
computer's hardware-specific MAC address, which is
relatively simple to be sniffed out and stolen.

Network Security 8-121

Chapter 8 roadmap
8.1 What is network security?
8.2 Principles of cryptography
8.3 Message integrity
8.4 Securing e-mail
8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL
8.6 Network layer security: IPsec
8.7 Securing wireless LANs
8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-122

Firewalls
firewall
isolates organization’s internal net from larger
Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking
others

administered public
network Internet
trusted “good guys” untrusted “bad guys”
firewall
Network Security 8-123
Firewalls: why
prevent denial of service attacks:
 SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP
connections, no resources left for “real” connections
prevent illegal modification/access of internal data
 e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with
something else
allow only authorized access to inside network
 set of authenticated users/hosts
three types of firewalls:
 stateless packet filters
 stateful packet filters
 application gateways
Network Security 8-124
Stateless packet filtering
Should arriving
packet be allowed in?
Departing packet let
out?

 internal network connected to Internet via router

firewall
 router filters packet-by-packet, decision to
forward/drop packet based on:
 source IP address, destination IP address
 TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers
 ICMP message type
 TCP SYN and ACK bits Network Security 8-125
Stateless packet filtering:
example
 example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams
with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or
dest port = 23
 result: all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and
telnet connections are blocked
 example 2: block inbound TCP segments with
ACK=0.
 result: prevents external clients from making
TCP connections with internal clients, but allows
internal clients to connect to outside.

Network Security 8-126

Stateless packet filtering: more
examples
Policy Firewall Setting
No outside Web access. Drop all outgoing packets to any IP
address, port 80
No incoming TCP connections, Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets
except those for institution’s to any IP except 130.207.244.203,
public Web server only. port 80

Prevent Web-radios from eating Drop all incoming UDP packets -

up the available bandwidth. except DNS and router broadcasts.

Prevent your network from being Drop all ICMP packets going to a
used for a smurf DoS attack. “broadcast” address (e.g.
130.207.255.255).
Prevent your network from being Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired
tracerouted traffic

Network Security 8-127

Access Control Lists
 ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to
incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16
allow outside of 222.22/16
TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16
outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16
allow outside of 222.22/16
UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/16
deny all all all all all all
Network Security 8-128
Stateful packet filtering
 stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool
 admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port
= 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection
established:
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit
allow outside of 222.22/16
TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16

 stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP

connection
 track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN):
determine whether incoming, outgoing packets
“makes sense”
 timeout inactive connections at firewall: no Network
longer Security 8-129
Stateful packet filtering
 ACL augmented to indicate need to check
connection state table before admitting packet
source dest source dest flag check
action proto
address address port port bit conxion
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16

TCP 80 > 1023 ACK x
222.22/16

outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16 x

UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/16

deny all all all all all all

Network Security 8-130

 Application gateways gateway-to-remote
host telnet session
host-to-gateway
telnet session

 filters packets on application router and filter

application data as well as gateway

on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
 example: allow select
internal users to telnet
outside.
1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet
connection to dest host. Gateway relays data
between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not
originating from gateway.
Network Security 8-131
 Application gateways
 filter packets on host-to-gateway
application
telnet session
application data as well gateway
router and filter
as on IP/TCP/UDP
fields.
 example: allow select gateway-to-remote
internal users to telnet host telnet session

outside
1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet
connection to dest host. Gateway relays data
between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not
originating from gateway. Network Security 8-132
Limitations of firewalls,
gateways
 IP spoofing: router can’t  filters often use all or
know if data “really” nothing policy for UDP
comes from claimed  tradeoff: degree of
source communication with
 if multiple app’s. need outside world, level of
special treatment, each security
has own app. gateway  many highly protected
 client software must sites still suffer from
know how to contact attacks
gateway.
 e.g., must set IP
address of proxy in
Web browser
Network Security 8-133
Intrusion detection systems
 packet filtering:
 operates on TCP/IP headers only
 no correlation check among sessions
 IDS: intrusion detection system
 deep packet inspection: look at packet contents
(e.g., check character strings in packet against
database of known virus, attack strings)
 examine correlation among multiple packets
• port scanning
• network mapping
• DoS attack
Network Security 8-134
Intrusion detection systems
 multiple IDSs: different types of checking at
different locations

firewall

internal
network
Internet

IDS Web DNS

server FTP server
sensors server
demilitarized
zone
Network Security 8-135
Network Security (summary)
basic techniques…...
 cryptography (symmetric and public)
 message integrity
 end-point authentication
…. used in many different security scenarios
 secure email
 secure transport (SSL)
 IP sec
 802.11
operational security: firewalls and IDS

Network Security 8-136