Chapter 5
Chapter 5
10.1 Introduction
This chapter gives a brief general review of the principles of transformer differential
protection (TDP). This is followed by an explanation of the application of digital
techniques and the algorithms that have been developed specifically for the appli-
cation of transformer protection. The algorithms covered include finite-duration
impulse response (FIR) filters, least-squares (LSQ) curve fitting, the digital Fourier
algorithm, and the flux-restrained current differential algorithm.
Finally, the basic hardware arrangement for implementing digital techniques
for the protection of transformers is described. It is, however, important to note that
closely similar techniques can be applied to the protection of generators, although,
in this case, the transformation ratio of currents is the same on each side of the pro-
tected zone.
10.2.1 Basic principles
The most commonly encountered transformer protection arrangement is based
on the differential current principle [1–4]. This can be illustrated by reference to
Figure 10.1, in which the primary and secondary currents (Ip and Is) are compared
after being reduced by their corresponding current transformers (CTs). The primary
and secondary CTs are connected such that ideally, under healthy conditions, only
circulating currents flow and the differential signal ID is zero. If an internal fault
occurs within the transformer, the balance between the primary and secondary cur-
rents is disturbed and a differential current signal (ID = Ip − Is) then causes the relay
to operate.
saturation. It is therefore important that this situation should be taken into account in
the engineering of TDP systems.
A common way of overcoming such problems is to bias the operation of the
relay by deriving a biasing signal equal to the sum of the currents measured on
each side of the transformer. This is illustrated in Figure 10.2(a) together with a
typical operating characteristic (Figure 10.2(b)). It is evident from Figure 10.2(b)
that the differential current required to operate the relay increases with the bias cur-
rent. Thus, the stability of the relay under external fault conditions is ensured. For
example, if a heavy through fault (healthy) condition exists, the differential current
may take a finite value that is nevertheless much smaller than the associated bias
current. The restraining characteristic of Figure 10.2(b) is arranged to allow a sig-
nificant level of differential current to occur without causing tripping under healthy
conditions. Conversely, a faulty condition causes the bias current to be relatively
small, on account of the reversal of the current measurand Is, thus ensuring that trip-
ping occurs.
In some cases, the operating current is expressed as a percentage of the restrain-
ing current, and such relays are commonly known as percentage-biased differential
relays. Many practical designs try to derive differential and bias signals proportional
to the fundamental or power frequency components of measured current, which is
why in Figure 10.2(b) the measurands are subscripted.
In modern microprocessor-based TDP relay, the restraining characteristic can
be generated with different shapes. Figure 10.2(c) shows an example of such shapes,
which basically consists of two straight lines with slops S1 and S2 connected by a
smooth curve section. The characteristic of this shape will be extensively used in the
discussion of section 10.7 related to the enhancement of TDP to improve its security
and dependability.
This problem can be overcome by using the fact that inrush currents usually
contain harmonics [5, 6]. Of these, the second harmonic is usually predominant
under all energization conditions. The protection can therefore be designed so that
it is prevented (restrained) from tripping if the magnitude of the second-harmonic
component of the operating current is greater than a certain prescribed percent-
age of the fundamental component. Fifth harmonics, which are generated under
over-excitation conditions (caused, for example, by temporary overvoltages), are
also used in some equipment to prevent the relay from tripping under energization
conditions.
It will be apparent that harmonic-restrained current differential transformer
protection basically uses signals formed from fundamental (or power frequency)
and harmonic components. The power-frequency components predominate when
an internal fault occurs, and the harmonic and bias signals are used to restrain the
protection during faults, switching operations, and over-excitation conditions.
With reference to Figure 10.2(a), the differential current ID is commonly formed
from the fundamental frequency components of the primary and secondary currents
Ilp and I1s, respectively, such that
ID = I1p I1s (10.1)
The restraining signal (IR1), on the other hand, is commonly formed from the funda-
mental components of the primary and secondary components such that
IR1 = I1p + I1s (10.2)
The other restraint signals are the second-harmonic restraint IR2 and fifth-harmonic
restraint current IR5, which are commonly formed from the magnitudes of differential
currents of any second and fifth harmonics detected. A commonly used technique
involves summing any such harmonic components in each phase:
IR2 = |ID2a | + |ID2b | + |ID2c | (10.3)
and
IR5 = |ID5a | + |ID5b | + |ID5c | (10.4)
where ID2a, ID2b, and ID2c are the differential currents due to second-harmonic com-
ponents in phases “a,” “b,” and “c,” respectively, and ID5a, ID5b, and ID5c are the cor-
responding differential currents due to fifth-harmonic components.
Tripping and restraining signals can be derived using analog techniques (as in
the case of electromagnetic relays or solid-state relays), but this chapter deals with
the derivation and use of such signals using digital techniques.
These algorithms are based on using FIR filters to estimate the magnitude of the
fundamental and second-harmonic components [7, 8]. The estimates are then used
to calculate the ratio of the magnitude of the second harmonic to fundamental. If
this ratio is found to be greater than a certain value, an inrush current condition
Digital differential protection of transformers 261
LSQ curve fitting methods have been discussed in detail in Chapter 6. These
methods are basically used to extract the fundamental and/or any other harmonic
components [9, 10]. Since the relative values of second-harmonic and fundamental
components of the differential current play an important role in the TDP, LSQ tech-
niques can be used either to detect the second harmonic in an inrush current (which
is later used to block the differential protection) or to find the ratio between the fun-
damental and second-harmonic components of the differential current, which in turn
is used to differentiate between inrush current and internal faults.
with
a1 = 1 x1 = I0
a 2 = tk x2 = I0 /
) ) .
an+2 = cos n!0 tk xn+2 = In cos n
n = 1, : : : , 5 n = 1, : : : , 5
an+7 = sin n!0 tk xn+7 = In sin n
To solve for the unknowns xn(n = 1, . . ., 12), m equations can be constructed from N
current samples. The resulting equations can be written in matrix form:
A „ƒ‚…
„ƒ‚… X = „ƒ‚…
i
(10.20)
N12 121 N1
or
X = Bi (10.21)
where B = {AT · A}−1 is the pseudo-inverse of A and AT is the transpose of matrix A
(see section 2.5.1.1).
It follows that the real and imaginary parts of the fundamental and second har-
monic can be calculated from (10.21):
PN
I1 cos 1 = x3 = b(3, n)in
n=1
P
N
I2 sin 1 = x8 = b(8, n)in
n=1
PN (10.22)
I2 cos 2 = x4 = b(4, n)in
n=1
P
N
I2 sin 2 = x9 = b(9, n)in
n=1
where xk is the kth element of vector X and b(k, n) is the element of the kth row and
nth column of matrix B.
Using the foregoing equations, the amplitude of the fundamental and the second
harmonic can be calculated as
q 2 2
In = In cos n + In sin n n = 1, 2 (10.23)
Similar techniques can be applied in extracting, where necessary, the fifth-harmonic
components.
x4
� b (4, n)i�
�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� � + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� � I2
x9
� b (9, n)i�
SHR
+
x3
� b (3, n)i� I1
�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� � + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� �
x8
� b (8, n)i�
i�
If the SHR is greater than a set value, an inrush current condition is assumed and
tripping is prevented; otherwise, an internal fault condition is assumed and a tripping
signal is issued to isolate the transformer.
Figure 10.5 shows a diagrammatic representation of the four digital filters used
to derive the real parts, i.e., x3 and x4, and imaginary parts (x8 and x9) of the fun-
damental and second-harmonic components used in calculating the SHR. The fre-
quency characteristics of the four filters are shown in Figure 10.6 where it can be
seen that the unwanted harmonics are filtered out.
10.5 Fourier-based algorithm
10.5.1 Filtering of harmonics
This algorithm is based on the fact that the fundamental, second-, and fifth-harmonic
components contained within an inrush current can be digitally extracted using the
Fourier approach given in detail in section 5.2.1 [11].
Now assume (as previously) that the current waveform is sampled N times per
period of the fundamental, and let the samples be denoted by ik = i(kΔt). The real
and imaginary parts of the nth harmonic (an and bn) can be found by using (5.5) and
(5.7). In terms of current samples starting at the rth sample, an and bn can then be
expressed as follows:
268 Digital protection for power systems
2 X
r+N1
2k
anr = ik cos n (10.25)
N k=r N
2 X
r+N1
2k
bnr = ik sin n . (10.26)
N k=r N
r r
The magnitude |I n |of the nth harmonic and its phase angle n can thus be calcu-
lated as explained previously. Thus
Digital differential protection of transformers 269
r 2 2
r r
|I | =
n
r
an + bn
. (10.27)
bnr
n
r
= tan 1
r
an
For the transformer protection application, n takes the values of 1, 2, and 5 for fun-
damental, second, and fifth harmonics, respectively. The result can be updated itera-
tively as each new sample becomes available. This is done by dropping the earliest
sample and adding the new sample:
2 2r
anr+1 = anr + iN+r ir cos n (10.28)
N N
2 2r
bnr+1 = bnr + iN+r ir sin n (10.29)
N N
where ir and iN+r are the oldest and newest samples, respectively.
Having determined the fundamental, second-, and fifth-harmonic components,
the transformer protection is then implemented following the principles outlined in
section 10.2.3.
Other techniques have been reported in the literature to extract fundamental
and other harmonic components [11]. These techniques give closely similar perfor-
mance and include the use of rectangular transforms [12], Walsh functions [13], and
the Haar function [14].
This algorithm basically uses the flux-current relation of the transformer to obtain
the restraint function [15, 16]. If the flux could be estimated correctly, it would pro-
vide a sound basis for detecting over excitation as well as magnetizing inrush condi-
tions. An important feature of this technique is that it requires fewer computations
than that based on the Fourier analysis.
t2
ˆ
t2 t1 = vp t dt Lp ip t2 ip t1 (10.31)
t1
Applying the trapezoidal rule to the integral part of (10.31) results in
1
t2 ' t1 + 2 t2 t1 vp t2 vp t1 Lp ip t2 ip t1 . (10.32)
If the voltage and current waveforms are sampled such that the sampling interval is
equal to Δt, then at the kth sample, (10.32) can be expressed using sample notation
as
1
k = k1 + t vp,k vp,k1 Lp ip,k ip,k1 (10.33)
2
where ip,k and vp,k are the kth samples of the primary current and voltage respectively.
Equation (10.33) can therefore be used to calculate the mutual linkage flux ψ of
the transformer. On the other hand, the differential current can be calculated from
the primary and secondary currents. Thus, at time tk, the differential current idk is
given as follows:
idk = ip,k is,k (10.34)
where ip,k is as defined previously and is,k is the kth sample of the secondary current.
However, from transformer theory, the differential current idk is equal to the mag-
netizing current of the transformer. Therefore, if it is assumed that the flux linkage
computed by (10.33) is a true representation of the actual flux in the transformer, the
samples of the differential current and flux linkage (idk, ψk) are expected to fall on the
open-circuit magnetizing curve of the transformer.
In the first phase of the algorithm, the principle of the percentage-biased dif-
ferential relay is used to detect internal faults at every sampling interval. The second
phase of the algorithm involves a simultaneous check on the location of the point
(idk, ψk). If this point does not fall on the id − ψ curve of the transformer, a trip signal
is issued.
The basis of this approach is explained in Figure 10.8(a), which shows an open-
circuit magnetizing characteristic of a transformer and the (idk, ψk) relationship for
an internal fault inside the transformer. For the internal fault condition, the terminal
Digital differential protection of transformers 271
Figure 10.8 Transformer magnetizing curve: (a) fault and non-fault region and
(b) effect of remanent flux
voltage (and hence ψk) is much smaller than is the case under inrush conditions.
Consequently, there are distinct regions in the i—ψ plane that define the fault or
non-fault status of the transformer.
The aforementioned technique works satisfactorily when the residual flux in
the core of the transformer is close to zero. Practically, this is not always the case,
and consequently, the id − ψ characteristic of the transformer may vary, as shown
272 Digital protection for power systems
The value of kr is found to increase almost monotonically for fault conditions while
it never reaches greater than a threshold value kr,max for all non-fault conditions.
However, the threshold kr,max is found to depend, among other things, on the sam-
pling rate. Therefore, kr,rmax must be determined experimentally.
As discussed in section 10.2.2, one of the causes of the imbalance between the trans-
former’s primary and secondary currents is the saturation of CTs. Such saturation of
CTs can be caused by some external faults with high DC offset and high X/R system
time constant [17]. This in turn can lead to the differential/restraint currents ratio to
be above the preset characteristic driving it into the operating region. Consequently,
the TDP operates and causes unnecessary tripping of the transformer.
However, modern TDP is built-in microprocessor-based relays such as the prac-
tical TDP commercially known as 87T. This makes it possible to perform several
tasks including signal processing, filtering, currents compensation, and computation
of differential and restraint currents. This in turn enables TDP to perform with a cer-
tain level of sensitivity, security, and dependability during faults. Microprocessor-
based relays also make it possible to use algorithms that use simple characteristic
to distinguish between external and internal faults, as well as more complex algo-
rithms, which involve more protection principles. The advantage of having a more
complex algorithm is their ability to provide better security during external faults by
tolerating CT saturation and consequently inhibiting the operation of the protection.
protects. Trajectory No. 3 is due to an internal fault that caused light CT saturation,
while trajectory No. 4, which is a straight line, is due to an internal fault without CT
saturation.
an internal fault is developed during the occurrence of the external fault by checking the
per-phase angle between the primary and secondary windings of the transformer. The
second step is executed if the actual differential/restraint current ratio due to the external
fault falls into the operation region (see Figure 10.10(b)) as explained in (i) below. The
outcome of the second step confirms whether the fault has evolved into an internal fault
or not. In case the fault is an external fault, the TDP 87T is prevented from operation.
When a fault occurs, the detection of external faults is achieved by the follow-
ing steps.
Figure 10.11 Logic flags during internal and external faults (after Reference
[17]). FTY = Fault type (flag), OPE = Operate (flag), RCT =
Restraint current threshold (flag)
276 Digital protection for power systems
around the middle of the smooth intermediate curve connecting sections S1 and
S2 (see Figure 10.11).
4. If IRmax is equal to or greater than IRthr, trigger the RCT flag, i.e., set RCT = 1, and
maintain it in this position for a sufficient time to allow the fault IR-ID trajectory
to be fully developed, i.e., either crosses the characteristic into the operating
region, in which the case trigger operate (OPE) flag, i.e., set OPE = 1, or stay in
the Block non-operation zone, otherwise, if IRmax is less than IRthr set RCT = 0.
5. If RCT = 1 and OPE = 1, initiate fault type (FTY) flag check [see section (ii) ]
The fault type (FTY) flag is set to either 0 or 1 (see Figure 10.11) depending
on whether the fault is external or internal, respectively. In case of external fault,
whereby the angle between the phase voltages of the corresponding primary and
secondary compensated currents windings is usually greater than 90°, FTY = 0. On
the other hand, if the fault is internal, whereby the angle between the phase voltages
of the corresponding primary and secondary compensated currents windings is usu-
ally less than 90°, FTY =1.
It will be noted that IR-ID trajectory due to an external fault always crosses
the RCT (IRthr) value whether such a fault causes severe or light saturation (see
Figure 10.11), which leads to setting RCT=1 [as per (i)]. However, the fault type
flag check is initiated only for the case of external fault that causes severe CT satu-
ration and consequently causes its corresponding R IR-ID trajectory to cross into the
operating region (trajectory No. 2 in Figure 10.10). Finally, the operate (OPE) flag
is triggered, i.e., OPE = 1 as soon as the IR-ID trajectory due to a fault (whether inter-
nal or external) crosses the characteristic into the operating region.
Figure 10.12 shows the security logic that can be applied to transformer differen-
tial protection relay type 87T against external faults.
Based on the aforementioned discussion, the two trajectories of Figure 10.10
related to internal faults do not trigger the RCT flag, and the protection does not need
to initiate FTY check in order to produce operation and trip action.
Figure 10.13 shows a flow chart for the implementation of securing the trans-
former differential protection against external faults using the various logic flags
discussed above.
Figure 10.12 Security logic that can be applied to relay type 87T (after
Reference [17])
that the window for internal fault currents is narrow, while that for inrush currents
is very wide [18].
It has been shown in Chapter 2 that discrete WT can be used to decompose a
transient signal into its frequency components using the “Quadrature mirror filters,”
i.e., convolving the signal with filter coefficients, called low-pass filter decomposi-
tion (LFD) and high-pass filter decomposition (HFD) coefficients. This technique
has been used in discriminating between transformer inrush magnetizing currents
and fault currents [19].
Thus, the process of discriminating between the transformer’s inrush currents
and internal faults using wavelet analysis involves the decomposition of transformer
three-phase currents signals ia, ib, and ic, simply by passing each of these currents
through two quadrature mirror filters, i.e., convolving the signal with filter coef-
ficients, namely, LFD and HFD coefficients, and by down-sampling the result, they
emerge as two components called low-frequency and high-frequency coefficients.
In multilevel wavelet analysis, the decomposition process is iterated, with
successive low-frequency components being decomposed in turn, so that the sig-
nal under consideration is broken down into many lower-resolution components.
Figure 10.14 shows the four-level wavelet decomposition of the line currents ia, ib,
and ic suggested in Reference [19]. The figure shows the application of the four-level
decomposition process using wavelet analysis to the line current ia. Obviously, the
same process using the same figure can be applied to line currents ib and ic by simply
replacing ia by ib and then by ic.
This technique has been tested on a power system modeled as a two-source
power system interconnected by a circuit consisting of a three-phase transformer
278 Digital protection for power systems
and a transmission line, as shown in Figure 10.15. The conducted tests included
(i) magnetizing inrush currents without a fault, (ii) phases BC to ground fault at
bus 2, (iii) simultaneous magnetizing inrush current and phase A to ground fault at
the transmission line middle point (TLMP), (iv) simultaneous magnetizing inrush
Digital differential protection of transformers 279
ia(t) Details =
Coefficients Coefficients
vector x ia(t) vector length
LD1ia(t) HD1ia(t)
HF Level 1
HD1ia L(ia)
LD2ia(t) HD2ia(t)
HF Level 2 L(HD1ia)
LD3ia(t) HD3ia(t) HD2ia
L(HD2ia)
HD4ia(t) HF Level 3
LD4ia(t) HD3ia
L(HD3ia)
HF Level 4
HD4ia
L(HD4ia)
LF Level 4
LD4ia
L(LD4ia)
current and a fault between phases B–C at TLMP with 10 Ω and 100 Ω fault resis-
tances, and (v) simultaneous magnetizing inrush current and phases BC to ground
fault at TLMP.
This technique proved to be successful in differentiating between magnetizing
inrush and fault conditions in less than half power frequency cycle.
It is important to note that the mother wavelet used in the investigation is
Daubechies (db4). It has been reported that Daubechies (db) wavelet is one of
280 Digital protection for power systems
the most widely applied mother wavelets suitable for a wide range of power sys-
tem applications [20]. However, it has been reported in the literature that other
mother wavelets have also been used in investigating the application of wavelet
analysis to the protection of power transformers. For example, the investigators in
Reference [21] have employed Coiflets 6 (Coif 6). Wavelet packet transform has
also been applied to the protection of power transformer [22].
10.10 Summary
References
[1] Kennedy L.F., Hayword C.D. ‘Harmonic-current restrained relays for differ-
ential protection’. AIEE. 1938;57:262–66.
[2] Harder E.L., Marter W.E. ‘Principles and practices of relaying in the unit-
ed states’. Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers.
1948;67(2):1005–23.
[3] Matthews C.A. ‘An improved transformer differential relay’. AIEE. 1954;73:
645–50.
[4] Rockefeller G. ‘Fault protection with a digital computer’. IEEE Transactions
on Power Apparatus and Systems. 1969;PAS-88(4):438–64.
[5] Einvall C.-H., Linders J.R. ‘A three-phase differential relay for transform-
er protection’. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems. 1975;
94(6):1971–80.
[6] Hermanto I., Murty Y.V.V., Rahman M.A. ‘A stand-alone digital protective
relay for power transformers’. IEEE Trans. 1991;PWRD-6:85–95.
[7] Schweitzer E.O., Larson R.R., Flechsig A.J. ‘An efficient inrush current
detection for digital computer relay protection of transformers’. IEEE PES
Winter Meeting, Paper A77510-1; 1977.
Digital differential protection of transformers 283
[8] Larson R., Flechsig A., Schweitzer E. ‘The design and test of a digital re-
lay for transformer protection’. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
Systems. 1979;PAS-98(3):795–804.
[9] Degens A.J. ‘Algorithm for a digital transformer differential protection based
on a least-squares curve-fitting’. IEE Proceedings C Generation, Transmission
and Distribution. 1981;128(3):155–61.
[10] Degens A.J. ‘Microprocessor-implemented digital filters for inrush current
detection’. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems.
1982;4(3):196–205.
[11] Rahman M.A., Jeyasurya B. ‘A state-of-the-art review of transformer pro-
tection algorithms’. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery. 1988;3(2):
534–44.
[12] Rahman M.A., Dash P.K. ‘Fast algorithm for digital protection of power trans-
formers’. IEE Proceedings C Generation, Transmission and Distribution.
1982;129(2):79–85.
[13] Rahman M.A., Jeyasurya B., Gangopadhyay A. ‘Digital differential protection
of power transformers based on walsh functions’. Trans. CEA Engineering &
Operating Div. 24, Paper 85-SP-149; 1985.
[14] Jeyasurya B., Rahman M. ‘Application of walsh functions for microprocessor-
based transformer protection’. IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic
Compatibility. 1985;EMC-27(4):221–25.
[15] Thorp J.S., Phadke A.G. ‘A microprocessor based three phase transformer
differential relay’. IEE Transactions. 1982;PAS-94:426–32.
[16] Phadke A.G., Thorp J.S. ‘A new computer relay flux-restrained current
differential relay for power transformer protection’. IEEE Transactions.
1983;PAS-102:3624–29.
[17] Sevov L., Khan U., Zhang Z. ‘Enhancing power transformer differential
protection to improve security and dependability’. IEEE Transactions on
Industry Applications. 2017;53(3):2642–49.
[18] Sendilkumar S., Mathur B.L., Henry J. Differential protection for power
transformer using wavelet transform and PNN [online]. World Academy
of Science, Engineering and Technology; 2010. Available from http://cit-
eseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.309.6497&rep=rep1&type
=pdf
[19] Youssef O.A.S. ‘A wavelet-based technique for discrimination between faults
and magnetizing inrush currents in transformers’. IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery. 2003;18(1):170–76.
[20] Kim C.H., Aggarwal R. ‘Wavelet transforms in power systems – part 1. gen-
eral introduction to the wavelet transforms’. Power Engineering Journal.
2000;14(2):81–87.
[21] Ozgnenel O., Onbilgin G., Kocaman C. Transformer protection using the wave-
let transform [online]. Ondokuz Mayis University Turkey; 2016. Available from
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/055e/ac2c85b2b32eb9bb6551eb5cb0b64d-
9303ab.pdf
284 Digital protection for power systems
[22] Saleh S.A., Rahman M.A. ‘Modeling and protection of a three-phase power
transformer using wavelet packet transform’. IEEE Transactions on Power
Delivery. 2005;20(2):1273–82.
[23] Degens A.J., Langedijk J.J.M. ‘Integral approach to the protection of power
transformers by means of a microprocessor’. International Journal of Electrical
Power & Energy Systems. 1985;7(1):37–47.
Chapter 11
Digital line differential protection
11.1 Introduction
As power systems grow both in size and complexity, it becomes common to use
long and heavily loaded two-terminal lines as well as multi-terminal and tapped
lines [1–4]. This, in turn, has created difficult problems for their protection. Such
problems include:
This problem arises when an external fault is fed from a number of ter-
minals. This causes overreach, in which the distance relay measures a
lower impedance than that of the fault loop. This can again cause false
tripping and difficulty in determining appropriately the time selectivity
between the protected and adjacent lines.
5. Pilot-wire limitation:
Under healthy conditions, ideally, the magnitude of the differential quantity D(t)
should be zero. In practice, it has a small value both under normal operating con-
ditions and external faults, due to line charging current and other errors such as a
mismatch of current transformers. However, once an internal fault occurs, the dif-
ferential quantity D(t) approximates to the fault current iF(t), i.e., the current flowing
out of the fault point.
The second modal component-based signals D2(t) and B2(t) are commonly found
from the difference between ‘a’ and ‘b’ phase currents:
290 Digital protection for power systems
D2 t = iax t ibx t + iay t iby t + iaz t ibz t
(11.6)
B2 t = iax t ibx t + iay t iby t iaz t ibz t
where iax, ibx, icx are the ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ phase currents at end X, iay, iby, icy are the phase
currents at end Y, and iaz, ibz, icz are the corresponding currents at end Z.
Since in practice there are no fault conditions that can simultaneously give rise
to zero-valued modal current signals, tripping is initiated for internal faults by at
least one modal channel. This form of signal compression reduces the communi-
cation channel requirement from three (for separate phase-by-phase comparison)
to two.
Figure 11.4 Typical extended digital decision logic process [5]. (a) Decision
logic algorithm; (b) typical waveforms.
current because of their total dependence on current. This arises from the standard
practice of providing a bias signal proportional to through current to ensure security
under conditions where a significant differential signal is generated under healthy
conditions, e.g., due to shunt capacitance charging currents or current transformer
errors. A second problem is that certain system operating conditions may result in
the difference between the differential and restraint signals being small for internal
faults, which means a reduction in dependability of the protection.
To overcome these problems, an approach has recently been adopted that
involves deriving differential signals that are functions of both the voltages and cur-
rents measured at each end of either plain or teed lines [6, 7]. Consequently, a bias
signal to compensate for capacitance spill currents is no longer required. This, in
turn, increases the relay sensitivity to a much lower level of fault currents than pro-
vided by schemes that are totally dependent on current measurement.
components, each possessing itsown
modal propagation constant k (!)and asso-
k
ciated modal surge impedance Z0 (!), where k = 0, 1, and 2.
The solutions of the voltage and current differential equations shown in 11.9
take the form:
k x k x
V k
! = K 1 e + K2 e (11.10)
and
h
k
i
k
k
I k ! = K1 e x K2 e x /Z0
where K1 and K2 are arbitrary constants and x is an arbitrary length of line.
In the above equation, the frequency variable ω has been dropped from the
propagation constant γ(k) in order to simplify the notation.
The arbitrary constants K1 and K2 can be determined from a knowledge of the
boundary conditions for a particular system. Consider the two-terminal line shown
in Figure 11.5, which has the following boundary conditions [6]:
(
0 at end X
x= (11.11)
l at end Y
where l is the length of the line.
By substituting (11.11) into (11.10), we obtain the voltage and current at end X:
k
VX ! = K1 + K2
k k = 0, 1, 2 (11.12)
k
I X ! = K 1 K 2 /Z0 !
and those relating to end Y will be
k k k
VY ! = K1 e l + K2 e l
k = 0, 1, 2 (11.13)
k k k k
IY ! = K1 e l + K2 e l /Z0
By substituting the values of K1 and K2 obtained from (11.12) into (11.13), we finally
obtain:
h i
k k k k k
VY ! + Z0 ! IY ! = e l Vxk ! + Z0 ! Ixk ! k = 0, 1, 2
(11.14)
By using the current and voltage reference directions shown in Figure 11.5, i.e. by
reversing the direction of the current IY at end Y, (11.14) becomes:
294 Digital protection for power systems
h
k i
k k k k
VY ! Z0 ! IY ! = el VX ! + Z0 ! IY ! k = 0, 1, 2
(11.15)
or
k k
SX + SY = 0 k = 0, 1, 2 (11.16)
k
where SX(k) is equal to the right-hand side of (11.15) and SY is
equal to the left-hand
side negated.
11.3.2.2 Three-terminal lines
The basic theory laid down above for the two-terminal lines can be easily extended
to include teed (or three-terminal) feeders. Consider again Figure 11.1, which shows
that a three-terminal line basically consists of three separate line sections. These are
sections XT, YT and ZT. For each of these sections an equation similar to (11.14)
can be derived in terms of the current and voltage at the line ends. When the result-
ing equations are combined together (and applying the fact that the sum of currents
at the tee point T is zero), we obtain:
k k k
SX + SY + SZ = 0 k = 0, 1, 2 (11.17)
where
k k k k
SX = AX VX ! + BX Z0 ! IX !
k
k k k
SY = AY BY VY ! + AY + BY Z0 ! IY !
k k
k k
SZ = AZ BZ VZ ! + AZ + BZ Z0 ! IZ !
k l k l
AX = e X 1, BX = e2
X +1
k lX +lY k lX lY
AY = e
, BY = e
k lX +lZ k lX lZ
AZ = e , BZ = e
lX, lY, lZ are the lengths of sections XT, YT and ZT, respectively.
11.3.2.3 Trip-decision logic
It is seen from the foregoing that, in theory, the signals at the ends of a line (whether
of the two- or three-terminals type) should sum to zero under all healthy conditions.
However, because of quantisation, transducer errors, etc., it becomes necessary to
apply a small threshold Th to the sum signal of (11.17). Thus in practice the simplest
relay tripping decision would be
k k k
|SX + SY + SZ | > Th k = 0, 1, 2 (11.18)
The above equation
applies to a three-terminal application. In the case of a two-
k
terminal line SZ becomes zero.
Digital line differential protection 295
It will be noted that the tripping decision described by (11.18) is fairly simple
compared with that used in the previously described current differential schemes. In
consequence, a relatively simple trip-decision logic process can be used to provide
the necessary degree of dependability and sensitivity. The simplest criterion that
provides an adequate performance for most protective applications involves the ini-
tiation of a trip signal if two consecutive samples of the signal summation of (11.18)
exceed the fixed threshold setting Th.
where a, b, and c refer to the three phases. X, Y, and Z are the three buses of the line.
j represents the most recent sample. n is the number of samples in the window and
m is element number of the third level.
The fault is considered as an internal fault, if the SUM IBus exceeds a certain
value of local threshold (Lthr), otherwise, it is an external fault. Confirmation of
this condition important to prevent mal-operation due to wide variations of system
configuration and operating conditions. The value of Lthr is set to 150 to prevent the
mal-operation during normal switching operation.
The performance of the protection algorithm is further reenforced by the adding
the values of all SUM IBus of each bus of the corresponding phase as follows:
A communication facility is needed (as shown in Figure 11.2) so that the three buses
can communicate with each other. The protection relay establishes its final decision
whether to trip or not based on the received SUM IBus signal from the remote ends.
The relay is set to initiate a trip command only when the ADD signal exceeds a posi-
tive threshold (Pthr) value. Figure 11.6 shows the flow diagram of the WPT-based
protection scheme for tapped transmission line.
Digital line differential protection 297
11.5 Summary
This chapter is devoted to discuss the digital line differential protection, which
include two-terminal lines as well as multi-terminal and tapped lines.
Current-based differential schemes are discussed in section 11.2, which include
the basic principles of line current differential protection for two-terminal and multi-
terminal lines, FM current differential protective scheme, and modal current-based
protection scheme.
To overcome the problems associated with differential schemes, the composite
voltage- and current-based scheme is introduced in section 11.3. This included the
basic operating principles and the formation of terminal signals.
Application of WPT to protection of tapped transmission line is covered in sec-
tion 11.4. The selection of mother wavelet and scale that suits this application is
highlighted. This is followed by covering the basic description of the developed
protection scheme.
References