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 On ordinal utility, cardinal utility, and random utility

Richard Batley

Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, UK

[email protected]

ABSTRACT

Though the Random Utility Model (RUM) was conceived entirely in terms of

ordinal utility, the apparatus through which it is widely practised exhibits

properties of cardinal utility. The adoption of cardinal utility as a working

operation of ordinal is perfectly valid, provided interpretations drawn from

that operation remain faithful to ordinal utility. The paper considers whether

the latter requirement holds true for several measurements commonly

derived from RUM. In particular it is found that measurements of consumer

surplus change may depart from ordinal utility, and exploit the cardinality

inherent in the practical apparatus.

Keywords: ordinal utility, cardinal utility, Random Utility Model, log sum,

rule of a half

1
JEL Classification: B41 Economic Methodology; D01 Microeconomic

Behaviour, Underlying Principles

1. INTRODUCTION

The Random Utility Model (RUM) was conceived by Marschak (1960) and

Block and Marschak (1960) as a probabilistic representation of the Neo

Classical theory of individual choice, with probability deriving from

variability in the individual’s preferences when faced with repeated choices

from the same finite choice set. Subsequent to its theoretical conception,

Marschak et al. (1963) introduced much of the apparatus by which RUM could

be translated to practice; this exploited an analogy with psychophysical

models of judgement and choice, in particular Fechner’s (1859) model and the

derivative models of Thurstone (1927) and Luce (1959). It was left to

McFadden (1968, but unpublished until 1975) to complete the translation,

which was achieved through a shift in the perspective of the presentation.

McFadden reconstituted RUM from a model of an individual engaged in

repeated choices, to one of the choices of a population of individuals. This

was clearly motivated by pragmatism; the revised presentation was more

amenable to the needs of practising economists, with interests more in

2
markets than individuals, and data to match. McFadden’s adjustment to the

presentation though somewhat innocuous in theoretical terms opened the

floodgates to practical RUM analysis. There began forty years of intensive

application, culminating in McFadden’s awarding of the 2000 Nobel Laureate

in Economics, and with it the securing of RUM’s place in the history of

economic methodology.

Since the unwary might, quite understandably, draw confidence from such

accolade, it would seem timely to illuminate a troublesome and indeed

potentially damning property of RUM that persists. This may be seen as a

problem of compatibility arising from the analogy between Neo Classical

theory and psychophysical models. More specifically, the metric of the latter

carries cardinal properties, in contrast to the ordinality of utility within Neo

Classical theory. Several previous authors have alluded to this property (e.g.

Goodwin and Hensher, 1978; Daly, 1978), and many have considered its

empirical consequences usually under the label of the ‘scale factor problem’

(e.g. Swait and Louviere, 1993). But one might ask: ‘why are RUM

practitioners so preoccupied with matters of utility scale, when utility is

supposedly ordinal, and ordinal utility is robust to a reasonably general class

of transformations?’ The purpose of the present paper is to rationalise the

answer to this question in economic theory.

3
The paper begins by rehearsing the derivation of RUM from the fundamental

axioms of deterministic choice under certainty, thereby revealing the

theoretical origins of RUM in terms of ordinal utility. The paper then

proceeds to demonstrate that, in exploiting the vehicle of the Fechner (1859)

model, the implementation of RUM implies the adoption of cardinal utility.

This is not in itself a problem; cardinal utility can be used quite defensibly as a

working representation of ordinal utility, provided any such representation

does not actually depart from the ordinality on which it is founded. The

paper considers whether practice is adherent to the latter requirement.

2. ORDINAL UTILITY AND DETERMINISTIC CHOICE

This section rehearses the theory of deterministic choice under certainty.

Whilst the general theory will be well known to many readers, the following

attends to a particular interest in finite choice sets, and this may be less

familiar to some. The purpose of the rehearsal is to establish a systematic

basis for section 3, which seeks to illuminate the theoretical origins of RUM in

terms of ordinal utility. The informed reader may however wish to omit this

section, and move directly to section 3.

4
Before proceeding, and following RUM convention, deference is made to

Lancaster’s (1966) representation of goods or in present parlance

‘alternatives’ in terms of their constituent attributes. Formally, define an

alternative to be a vector x = (x1 ,..., x K ) , where x k is the quantity of attribute k

for k = 1,..., K . In words, an alternative represents a point in a finite attribute

space. Again following usual practice, define within this space a finite set T

of alternatives that constitutes the ‘choice set’ of N alternatives available to

an individual: T = {x1 ,..., x N }.

The purpose of the theory of deterministic choice under certainty is to

represent an individual’s preferences in terms of a numerical utility function.

Though there is reasonable agreement as to the means of achieving this,

which is to impose an axiom system on the individual’s preferences, several

alternative presentations have been proposed. As is often the case, this

variety has been motivated, in particular, by an interest in the possible

generality of presentation. The approach employed below follows Block and

Marschak (1960), although the reader is referred to Luce and Suppes (1965)

for discussion of alternative presentations.

5
The theory rests fundamentally on two axioms1, as follows:

Axiom of Completeness:

For every pair x n , x m ∈ T , either x n f x m , or x m f x n , or both x n f x m and

xm f xn .

Axiom of Transitivity:

For every triad x n , x m , x l ∈ T , if x n f x m and x m f x l , then x n f x l

These two axioms, when taken together, establish a complete (weak)

preference ordering on T . Since T is finite, each alternative x n ∈ T can be

assigned a ‘rank’ on the basis of preference, where a rank is an integer rn ,

1 ≤ rn ≤ N , such that for every pair within the ranking:

rn ≤ rm if x n f x m

Now define the vector r = (r1 ,..., rN ) , which is an integer valued function

representing the complete ordering of T . Any strictly decreasing monotone

1
Noting that relaxation of the assumption of a finite choice set necessitates an additional
axiom imposing continuity of preference. Continuity is discussed further in section 7.1, albeit
in a different regard.

6
function on r will induce a real valued function U on T that preserves the

preference ordering, specifically:

U n ≥ U m iff x n f x m (1)

Hence we arrive at the ‘ordinal’ utility function U , wherein values are

assigned to the function simply on the basis that the U value of a preferable

alternative will be greater than that of an inferior alternative. Otherwise the

scale of U is arbitrary, and any transformation that preserves the ordering

(i.e. the class of strictly monotonic transformations) is, in these terms, entirely

equivalent. Thus (1) may be re written equivalently:

Uˆ n ≥ Uˆ m iff x n f x m (2)

where Uˆ = f (U ) , and f is a strict monotone of U

It is important to be clear that the above theory provides no basis for drawing

inferences in terms of cardinal utility; i.e. in terms of differences in utility (or

any ratio thereof) across alternatives. The ordinal utility function simply

ensures that an individual prefers alternatives with greater utility to those

with less; i.e. that the individual acts so as to maximise utility.

7
3. ORDINAL UTILITY AND PROBABILISTIC CHOICE

Let us now generalise the analysis to accommodate a probabilistic

representation of choice, again under certainty. This representation is

motivated by the conjecture, emanating principally from the discipline of

psychology, that the choices of an individual may not necessarily be

‘consistent’. Inconsistency is, in this sense, usually defined in terms of either

(or both) of two phenomena; first, violations of the Axiom of Transitivity; and

second, the observation that an individual, when faced with a repeated choice

task, may not always make the same decisions. Having introduced the theory

of probabilistic choice, attention now focuses on RUM, which constitutes one

particular formalisation of the theory; interested readers may wish to refer to

Luce and Suppes (1965), who summarise a fuller range of formalisations.

With reference to the aforementioned phenomena, RUM is motivated by an

aspiration to accommodate the latter, i.e. variations in individual preferences

across repetitions; this will become apparent in the subsequent analysis.

Following in particular the definition given in Block and Marschak (1960),

RUM offers statement of the probability of choosing an alternative x n from

the set T , thus:

8
 There is a random vector U = (U 1 ,...,U N ) , unique up to an increasing monotone

transformation, such that:

P(x n T ) = Pr (U n ≥ U m ) for all x n ∈ T , x m ∈ T , m ≠ n (3)

where 0 ≤ P(x n T ) ≤ 1 and ∑ P(x T ) = 1

N

n
n =1

It is crucial to make clear that RUM, in common with the theory of

deterministic choice in section 2, refers to the behaviour of a single individual.

Note for example Marschak’s (1960) assertion: ‘Unless specified to the contrary,

all concepts in this paper are associated with a single given person, the ‘subject’ of

experiments’ (p219). It thus emerges that randomness in RUM derives from

the repetition, in particular the facility for variability on these repetitions, of

an individual’s preference ordering. On any given repetition for a given

individual, a complete preference ordering is established (and U defined) in

the manner of the deterministic theory outlined earlier. RUM, however,

permits variability in the preference ordering on successive repetitions. Block

and Marschak (1960) make clear this proposition by re couching the analysis

in terms of rankings. Thus define Rn to be the set of rankings on T within

which the alternative x n is ranked first:

Rn = {r rn ≤ rm } for all x n ∈ T , x m ∈ T , m ≠ n (4)

9
Remembering from section 2 that the first ranked alternative can be

represented as that maximising ordinal utility, define Pn (r ) to be the

probability of x n being first ranked according to a given ordering:

( )
Pn (r ) = Pr U nr ≥ U mr ≥ ... ≥ U Nr ≥ 0 (5)

Then summing across all orderings where x n is ranked first, the probability

statement (3) can be re stated equivalently:

P (x n T ) = ∑r∈R Pn (r ) (6)
n

Worked example of ordinal RUM

Since the above interpretation of RUM may be unfamiliar to some readers, let

us offer illustration by means of worked example. Consider in particular an

individual choosing an alternative from the set T = {x n , x m , x l } on five

repeated occasions, such that these five observations constitute the entire

sample space. With reference to (4), the possible rankings under which each

alternative can be chosen are as follows:

10
 Rn = {U n ≥ U m ≥ U l ;U n ≥ U l ≥ U m }

Rm = {U m ≥ U n ≥ U l ;U m ≥ U l ≥ U n }

Rl = {U l ≥ U n ≥ U m ;U l ≥ U m ≥ U n }

Let us now introduce some data, by assuming that the utilities and choices

actually arising on the five repetitions are as given in Table 1 (and

remembering of course that these utilities are defined arbitrarily, save for

their ordering).

Table 1: Worked example of ordinal RUM

Repetition Un Um Ul Choice

1 1 2 3 xl

2 4 2 3 xn

3 1 2 3 xl

4 4 2 3 xn

5 1 2 3 xl

Two initial observations may be drawn. First, x m is dominated by x l and

therefore never chosen. Second, whilst the utilities of both x m and x l are

constant across repetitions, the utility of x n is variable; this engenders

fluctuating preferences for x n and x l . Now applying the data of Table 1, let

11
us calculate, for each alternative, the probability of being first ranked by each

possible ordering (5) and the probability of being chosen (6), thus:

Pr (U n ≥ U m ≥ U l ) = 0 , Pr (U n ≥ U l ≥ U m ) = 2 , hence P(x n ) = 2
5 5

Pr (U m ≥ U n ≥ U l ) = 0 , Pr (U m ≥ U l ≥ U n ) = 0 , hence P(x m ) = 0

Pr (U l ≥ U n ≥ U m ) = 0 , Pr (U l ≥ U m ≥ U n ) = 3 , hence P(x l ) = 3
5 5

The worked example serves to reiterate that RUM is defined entirely in terms

of ordinal utility2. Indeed, this can be shown by applying the data of Table 1

to the order preserving (but non linear) transformation Uˆ n = U n2 for all x n ∈ T ,

and confirming that the choices remain unchanged (Table 2).

2
Should the sample space be extended from five repetitions to ‘arbitrarily many’ repetitions,
then the above interpretations of ordinal utility and choice probability would apply in exactly
the same manner.

12
Table 2: Worked example of ordinal RUM, after transformation

Repetition Û n Û m Û l Choice

1 1 4 9 xl

2 16 4 9 xn

3 1 4 9 xl

4 16 4 9 xn

5 1 4 9 xl

More generally, and analogous to (2), the probability of being first ranked

according to a given ordering (and therefore also the probability of choice) is

robust to any strictly monotonic transformation f applied to utility. Hence

(5) may be rewritten:

( ( ) ( ) ( ))
Pn (r ) = Pr f U nr ≥ f U mr ≥ ... ≥ f U Nr ≥ 0

Before moving on, it might be remarked that whilst deterministic transitivity

continues to hold in relation to the underlying preference orderings, the

probability statement of RUM can itself be characterised in terms of a

stochastic representation of transitivity. The relevant property is one of

‘strong stochastic transitivity’ (SST), which applies to various subsets of the

choice set T as follows:

13
 If min[P(x n x n , x m ), P(x m x m , x l )] ≥ 1 , then the binary choice probabilities
2

satisfy strong stochastic transitivity provided:

P(x n x n , x l ) ≥ max[P(x n x n , x m ), P(x m x m , x l )]

Discussion of other properties will be avoided here, since these are dealt with

comprehensively in previous contributions, notably those of Block and

Marschak (1960) and Luce and Suppes (1965).

4. CARDINAL UTILITY AND PROBABILISTIC CHOICE

Though, as section 3 has demonstrated, the theoretical definition of RUM

relies entirely on ordinal utility, such metrics are not particularly amenable to

the usual parametric methods of econometric modelling. Any aspiration to

implement RUM in practice provokes, therefore, an inclination towards

adopting cardinal utility as a working representation of ordinal. Credit for

translating RUM from theory to practice is often accorded to McFadden

(1968), which was indeed path breaking in demonstrating the potential of

14
RUM to inform public policy3. It is rarely acknowledged, however, that a

fundamental tenet of the practical apparatus exploited by McFadden was

conceived in the earlier work of Marschak et al. (1963), as follows.

Marschak et al. considered the relationship between the binary RUM and

Fechner (also referred to as ‘Strong Utility’) models (Fechner, 1859), where

they define the latter, thus:

A binary probabilistic model is called a Fechner model if there exist constants

v1 ,..., v N and a non-decreasing real-valued function φ (q ) defined for all real

numbers q , such that for every binary offered set S = {x n , x m } ⊆ T ,

P(x n S ) = φ (vn − v m )

As Marschak et al. note, if the usual conditions P(x n S ) + P(x m S ) = 1 apply,

then φ (q ) is restricted at a finite number of values. In particular, φ (q ) can be

specified as a continuous non decreasing function such that:

lim φ (q ) = 0 , lim φ (q ) = 1 , and φ (q ) + φ (− q ) = 1 for all (q )

q → −∞ q →∞

3 McFadden’s (1968) contribution is discussed further in section 6.

15
Marschak et al. prove that every Fechner model such that φ (q ) is the

distribution function of the difference between two independent and

identically distributed (IID) random variables is binary RUM:

Define the random vector U = (U 1 ,...,U N ) by:

U n = v n + ε n for all x n ∈ T (7)

where ε 1 ,..., ε N are independent and identically-distributed random variables

such that φ (q ) is the distribution function of ε n − ε m for all x m ∈ T , m ≠ n ,

and v1 ,..., v N are the constants appearing in the Fechner model. Then for any

S = {x n , x m } ⊆ T :

P(x n S ) = Pr{U n ≥ U m } = Pr{vn + ε n ≥ v m + ε m } (8)

= Pr{v n − v m ≥ ε m − ε n } = φ (v n − v m )

A few comments are appropriate. First, the above analysis relates specifically

to binary choice. This reflects the origins of the Fechner model in

psychophysical discrimination, e.g. ‘is stimulus a stronger or weaker than

stimulus b?’. This is not unduly restrictive, however, since the model can be

extended to multinomial choice simply by specifying φ (q ) as a multivariate

joint distribution pertaining to each and every pair in the choice set. Second,

16
ε 1 ,..., ε N must be defined independently of v1 ,..., v N ; subsequent presentations

of RUM such as Daly and Zachary (1978) are more explicit about this. Third,

the IID assumption is not essential to the definition since any distribution

function φ (q ) will yield binary RUM; the IID assumption is however relevant

to other properties of the model. A fourth, and associated, point is that U is

characterised by two redundant degrees of freedom. The remainder of this

section expands upon the latter point, whilst the penultimate point is

developed further in section 7.1.

As is widely understood, the Fechner implementation of RUM carries two

redundant degrees of freedom, as follows. First, a common constant may be

added to the utility of each and every alternative without changing

probability. This property, which is referred to as ‘translational invariance’,

implies that (8) can be re written equivalently:

P(x n S ) = Pr{U n + K ≥ U m + K } = Pr{vn + ε n + K ≥ v m + ε m + K } (9)

= Pr{v n − v m ≥ ε m − ε n }

Second, the utility of each and every alternative may similarly be multiplied

by a common positive factor without affecting probability; thus (8) can be

again expressed equivalently:

17
 P(x n S ) = Pr{λU n ≥ λU m } = Pr{λvn + λε n ≥ λv m + λε m } (10)

= Pr{v n − v m ≥ ε m − ε n }

where λ > 0

Moreover, the probability statement (8) is robust only to the utility

transformations (9) and (10), where the latter constitute the class of increasing

linear transformations. Contrast this with the probability statement (6), which

is robust to the more general class of strictly monotonic transformations of

utility. The important implication follows that differences in utility now

matter; whilst increasing linear transformations would leave the quantity

(vn − vm ) in (8) unchanged, any other transformation would not. In other

words, if the Fechner model is adopted as a working representation of RUM

then the above analysis shows that the probability statement now exhibits

properties of cardinal utility.

5. ORDINALITY AND CARDINALITY THUS FAR

Let us summarise the story thus far, and consider the implications that follow.

The theory of deterministic choice under certainty is explicit about the ordinal

basis of utility (section 2). This basis is preserved in the translation from

18
deterministic to probabilistic choice under certainty, and indeed to RUM

(section 3). Such a representation of RUM is not particularly amenable to

implementation, however, precluding conventional parametric methods of

econometric modelling. The Fechner model is, by contrast, readily amenable

to implementation, hence Marschak et al.’s (1963) interest in establishing

analogy between the RUM and Fechner models (section 4). An implication of

this analogy is that utility, though fundamentally ordinal, adopts working

properties of cardinal utility. The latter does not in itself constitute a problem;

provided utility is interpreted only in ordinal terms, it is perfectly reasonable

to employ cardinal utility as a working operation of ordinal. Finally, it might

be remarked that although a Fechner model with particular distributional

assumptions is RUM, RUM is never a Fechner model. That the relation is

unidirectional is perfectly intuitive; cardinal utility can always be interpreted

in ordinal terms, but ordinal utility can never be interpreted as cardinal.

6. McFADDEN AND THE PRACTICE OF RUM

Let us now digress slightly by reconciling the above discussion with the

presentation of RUM more commonly applied in practice. The alternative

presentation can be attributed to Daniel McFadden, initially in his 1968 paper

(published in 1975), and elaborated further in his many subsequent works. To

19
understand the nub of his approach, however, a brief excerpt from McFadden

(1976) suffices:

‘… the assumption that a single subject will draw independent utility functions

in repeated choice settings and then proceed to maximize them is formally

equivalent to a model in which the experimenter draws individuals randomly

from a population with differing, but fixed, utility functions, and offers each a

single choice; the latter model is consistent with the classical postulates of

economic rationality’ (McFadden, 1976 p365).

On this basis, (3) is re written:

P(x ni T ) = Pr{U ni ≥ U mi } for all x ni ∈ T , x mi ∈ T , m ≠ n (11)

where an additional subscript is introduced to denote individual i in the

population. The probability statement (11) is thus distinct from (3) in that

randomness derives from inter (as opposed to intra ) individual variation in

the preference ordering. McFadden’s assertion is perhaps made with the

pragmatism of the practising economist; given the usual dearth of data on

20
repeated choices by an individual he might well have asked just how useful

is the Marschak (1960) and Block and Marschak (1960) presentation?4

In common with Marschak et al. (1963), McFadden dissects U into two

components, albeit with different interpretation. McFadden (1974) describes

v ni as ‘…non stochastic and reflects the “representative” tastes of the

population…’ and ε ni as ‘…stochastic and reflects the idiosyncracies of this

individual in tastes…’ (p108). His subsequent works show a gradual

evolution in the interpretation of these terms; by the time of his retrospective

of RUM in McFadden (2000), v ni is referred to as ‘…systematic or expected

utility’, and ε ni simply as ‘unobserved factors’ (p16). The latter interpretation

would seem to imply that, within McFadden’s RUM, ε ni could be a catch all

for a number of possible sources of randomness5. A further, but related,

distinction concerns the perspective of observation, since the latter

interpretation is couched more in terms of the viewpoint of the analyst. That

is, v ni is deemed to be ‘observable’ to the analyst, and ε ni ‘unobservable’ (or at

least latent).

4
Whilst the distinction between inter and intra individual variation is a pertinent one, it
might be noted that the popular data collection technique of Stated Preference (SP) offers a
facility for pursuing both interests. That is to say, SP data is typically collected from a sample
of individuals, and each individual typically responds to several repetitions of a given choice
task.
5
Manski (1977) develops this proposition, postulating several specific sources of randomness.

21
The Fechnerian properties of RUM outlined in section 4 enter McFadden’s

analysis via the elegant vehicle of his Generalised Extreme Value (GEV)

theory (McFadden, 1978). In paying due credit to McFadden, it is important

to acknowledge that GEV offers considerable generality over Marschak et al.

(1963); in particular, it considers choice sets larger than binary, and

accommodates covariance between the random variables of different

partitions of the choice set. Those observations notwithstanding, McFadden’s

RUM carries the same implication as Marschak et al.’s for the cardinality of

utility.

7. THE PRACTICE OF RUM, AND ITS FAITHFULNESS TO ORDINAL

UTILITY

The practice of RUM has evolved through the adoption of the Fechner model

as a means of establishing a parametric relationship between the observed

(ordinal) choices of the individual and ‘observable’ utility differences

(vn − vm ) . It remains to consider whether practice adheres to the requirement

that utility be interpreted only in ordinal terms. We can develop this interest

by applying order preserving transformation to utility, and considering

whether this results in any substantive change to the inferences deriving from

22
the Fechner model. In particular, let us consider three measurements that are

pertinent to practice: the marginal utility of an attribute, the marginal

valuation of an attribute, and the change in consumer surplus arising from a

change in the price of an alternative. For present purposes, it suffices to

consider the choices of a single individual, though it might be noted that the

reported implications readily transfer to McFadden’s RUM.

7.1 Marginal utility of an attribute

In developing the first two measurements, those of marginal utility and

marginal valuation, let us represent utility (7) as indirect, functional on the

attributes of the alternatives and money budget, thus:

U n = v n (x n ; y − p n ) + ε n for all x n ∈ T (12)

where y is money budget, and p n is the price of alternative x n

The derivation of marginal utility depends of course on (12) being

differentiable. This is not guaranteed by the axioms of completeness and

transitivity alone, hence the need for an additional axiom, that of continuity

(e.g. Debreu, 1954):

23
 Axiom of Continuity

For any pair of alternatives x n , x m ∈ T where x n f x m ; a neighbourhood z (x n )

exists such that for any alternative x l ∈ z (x n ) , x l f x m ; and a neighbourhood

′ ′
z (x m ) exists such that for any bundle x l ∈ z (x m ) , x n f x l

Moreover, conventional practice is to specify the constant vn of the indirect

utility function (12) as a continuous and differentiable function g of the

attributes x n that embody the alternative, with the money budget entering

additively6. This yields the so called Additive Income RUM (or ‘AIRUM’)

popularised by McFadden (1981), thus:

U n = α ( y − p n ) + g (x n ) + ε n

Then explicating the redundant degrees of freedom (9) and (10), we arrive at

the following:

U n = λ [α ( y − p n ) + g (x n ) + ε n + K ] (13)

6 It might be noted that recent contributors have considered the possibility of non linearity,
for example McFadden (1999), Karlström (1998, 2001), Dagsvik (2001), Dagsvik and Karlström
(2005).

24
Equation (13) reveals K to be confounded with y , such that choice

probability is in AIRUM at least invariant to money budget. Now pursuing

our interest in the marginal utility of an attribute, let us differentiate (13) with

respect to an attribute x k ∈ x , thus:

∂U n ∂U n ∂g ∂g
= =λ for all x n ∈ T , x kn ∈ x n (14)
∂x kn ∂g ∂x kn ∂x kn

Equation (14) demonstrates that marginal utility derived from the Fechner

representation of RUM is scaled in terms of the λ transformation of utility.

Developing ideas further, let us apply an order preserving and differentiable

transformation f to the utility function (13) remembering from (6) that

probability in the ordinal representation of RUM would be robust to such

transformation and repeat the derivation of marginal utility:

Uˆ n = f {λ [α ( y − pn ) + g (x n ) + ε n + K ]}

∂Uˆ n ∂Uˆ n ∂f ∂g ∂Uˆ n ∂g

= = λ (15)
∂x kn ∂f ∂g ∂x kn ∂f ∂x kn

25
Comparison of (14) and (15) reveals that the former is subject to the cardinal

scale λ , whereas the latter is subject to both the same cardinal scale and the

ordinal scale f .

As section 3 has demonstrated, the derivation of RUM relies entirely on

ordinal utility, and thus establishes the basis for admitting order preserving

transformations of utility. RUM practice has tended to overlook the latter

requirement, adopting for working purposes the marginal utility (14), which

may be seen as a restricted case of (15). Indeed somewhat ironically, RUM

practice has, whilst overlooking the f scale, invested considerable effort in

managing the λ scale, usually under the banner of the ‘scale factor problem’

(e.g. Swait and Louviere, 1993). With reference to (10), the scale factor

problem acknowledges the relation between the λ scale and the variance of

the random variables that is engendered through the identity:

var[λ (ε m − ε n )] = λ2 var (ε m − ε n )

Rearranging:

s.d.[λ (ε m − ε n )] = λ s.d.(ε m − ε n ) ,

s.d.[ ]
λ= (16)
s.d.( )

26
Whilst IID within any dataset, the random variables may not be identically

distributed across datasets, and (16) therefore provokes the ‘problem’ that the

utilities (and marginal utilities) deriving from those datasets may be of

different λ scale. RUM practice has shown considerable support for this

proposition, particularly when merging Revealed Preference (RP) data with

Stated Preference (SP) data, where the latter invariably carry the lower

variance. In seeking to resolve the scale factor problem, several contributors

(e.g. Morikawa, 1989, 1994; Bradley and Daly, 1997) have proposed methods

that combine one or more datasets within the same RUM, explicitly

accommodating the different scale factor of each. These methods essentially

amount to setting the cardinal scale of one dataset as the base, and the scales

of other datasets as relative to the base (e.g. λ SP = θλ RP , where θ is the

difference in scale between RP and SP, and one would expect a priori that

θ > 1 ). Whilst this serves to establish a unique λ scale across the various

datasets, it should be noted importantly that λ does not however disappear.

Thus utility continues to embody a cardinal scale pertaining to the λ

transformation.

7.2. Marginal valuation of an attribute

27
It is well established in microeconomic theory that the ratio between the

marginal utilities of two attributes represents the marginal rate of substitution

between those attributes. If in particular the denominator of the ratio is the

marginal utility of income net of price then the marginal rate of substitution

can be further interpreted as the marginal valuation of the attribute

represented in the numerator. To illustrate, and irrespective of whether the

marginal utilities are of the form (14) or (15), the marginal valuation of an

attribute x kn ∈ x n is given by:

∂U n ∂U n ∂g
Vo( x kn ) = = α for all x n ∈ T , x kn ∈ x n
∂x kn ∂( y − p n ) ∂x kn

Moreover, marginal valuations are free of any scale, whether ordinal or

cardinal, such that the distinction between ordinal utility and cardinal utility

is in this context rendered immaterial.

7.3 Consumer surplus change

Having considered the marginal utility and marginal valuation of an

attribute, a further practical interest is in forecasting the change in consumer

surplus arising from a change in price. Note that such a relation exists only if

the change in price induces a change in the probability of choice. Reconciling

28
this with the ordinal basis of RUM, a change in attributes may impact upon

an individual’s preference orderings; if the preference orderings do indeed

change, then a new set of choice probabilities could feasibly result. Two

methods of measuring the change in consumer surplus are prevalent in RUM

practice, referred to as the ‘rule of half’ and ‘log sum’ methods.

The rule of a half method (Lane, Powell and Prestwood Smith, 1971;

Neuburger, 1971) offers a first order approximation to the change in

consumer surplus deriving from a Marshallian demand function. Let us

apply this to RUM, considering in particular an increase in the price of a

specific alternative x m ∈ T , such that p m → p m + ∆p m where ∆p m > 0 , holding

all else constant. Now introducing the subscripts 0 and 1 to represent the

states before and after the price increase, define Q0 and Q1 to be the number

of repetitions of the choice task faced by the individual in the respective

states7, and P0 (x m T ) and P1 (x m T ) to be the associated choice probabilities8.

Having equipped ourselves with the necessary notation, we can now write a

statement in accordance with the rule of a half method of the change in

7
Or in other words, total units consumed in each state; i.e. in the example of Table 1, Q = 5 .
8
( ) ( )
Note in passing that if P1 x m T ≠ P0 x m T , such that the price increase ∆p m results in a
change in the probability of choosing x m ∈ T , then the requirement from (3) that all
probabilities sum to one implies the following: ∑l∈T
P1 (x l T ) ≠ ∑l∈T P0 (x l T ), l ≠ m . That
(
is to say, any change in P x m T ) must be compensated by changes in one or more of the
other probabilities.

29
consumer surplus ∆CS m (in this instance a loss) arising from the price

increase ∆p m , thus:

∆CS m = 1 [Q1 P1 (x m T ) + Q0 P0 (x m T )]∆p m for all x m ∈ T (17)

2

If the probabilities P0 (x m T ) and P1 (x m T ) are directly observable then, with

reference to (6), they can be interpreted in ordinal terms. Accepting that, and

noting that the quantities Q0 and Q1 simply represent the number of

orderings that give rise to these probabilities, it becomes clear that (17) can be

supported entirely by ordinal utility.

In many practical situations, however, the after state exists only

hypothetically, and there may instead be interest in forecasting the effect of

the price increase. The procedure of forecasting exploits, somewhat

inevitably, the cardinal properties of the Fechner model. That is to say, the

redundant degrees of freedom (9) and (10) become relevant, and the forecast

of P1 (x m T ) will, with reference to (8), arise specifically from extrapolation of

the quantity (vn − vm ) estimated on data for P0 (x m T ) in the before case.

Moreover, the rule of a half remains faithful to ordinal utility only if the

probabilities before and after the price change are observed, and therefore

reconcilable with (6), rather than forecasted by means of (8).

30
Now consider the second method of measuring the change in consumer

surplus the ‘log sum’ method. Although the origins of this method are

evident in Williams (1977), Small and Rosen (1981) were first to offer a full

and definitive treatment, with McFadden (1981) applying this treatment

specifically to AIRUM. The log sum method captures, in the context of RUM,

the Hicksian compensating variation of a price change, i.e. the

minimum/maximum quantity of money that must be given to/taken from an

individual in order leave him or her on the same indifference curve as before

the price increase/reduction. If RUM carries no income effect, as would apply

to AIRUM given the translational invariance of income, then the Hicksian

compensating variation may be interpreted entirely equivalently as the

change in consumer surplus pertaining to a Marshallian demand (i.e.

analogous to the rule of a half).

More formally, and with particular reference to the presentation of Dagsvik

and Karlström (2005), the log sum method derives from an equality

established between the maximal utilities that arise before and after a price

change, wherein the utilities are of the form (12). To illustrate, let us consider

the same price increase as before, that is an increase in the price of alternative

x m ∈ T , such that p m → p m + ∆p m where ∆p m > 0 , holding all else constant. In

this case, the aforementioned equality may be written:

max [v n (x n ; y + c − ( p n + δ mn ∆p m )) + ε n ] = max [v n (x n ; y − p n ) + ε n ]
n =1,..., N n =1,..., N

31
 where c represents the compensating variation, p n is price in the

⎧0 m ≠ n
before state, and δ mn = ⎨
⎩1 m = n

(18)

For the price increase ∆p m , any compensating variation must be given to the

individual, such that c ≥ 0 . It is of course conceivable that the same

alternative may not be utility maximising in both states. Indeed, let us denote

the utility maximising alternatives in states 0 and 1 to be x n 0 ∈ T and x n1 ∈ T ,

where these alternatives may or may not be one and the same. Furthermore

let the prices of these alternatives in the before state be denoted p n 0 and p n1

respectively. Then re stating the equality (18) specifically in terms of the

Fechner model, once again explicating the redundant degrees of freedom:

λ [α ( y + c − ( p n + δ mn ∆p m )) + g (x n ) + ε n + K ]
1 1 1 1

[
= λ α ( y − p n o ) + g (x n 0 ) + ε n 0 + K ]
⎧0 m ≠ n1
where δ mn = ⎨
⎩1 m = n
1
1

(19)

It is conventionally assumed that the random variables ε n 0 and ε n1 of the

maximal utilities are distributed identically; with reference to the earlier

discussion of section 7.1, this has the effect of imposing a common cardinal

32
scale across the two states. This assumption of identical distributions is rather

strong, perhaps, but let us accept it nonetheless, particularly as it facilitates

considerable simplification of (19). Indeed, accepting this assumption we

arrive at a reasonably succinct statement according to the log sum method

of the consumer surplus loss ∆CS m associated with the price increase ∆p m ,

thus:

∆CS m = c =
[g (x ) − αp ] − [g (x ) − α ( p
n0 n0 n1 n1
]
+ δ mn1 ∆p m )
for all x m ∈ T
α

(20)

It is important to acknowledge that whilst the subtraction acknowledging

that this is in itself a cardinal operation between the maximal utilities in

states 0 and 1 serves to remove K (together with money budget y ) and λ ,

this does not mean that cardinality is absent from (20). Rather the cardinal

scale has been standardised across the two states. We can demonstrate this

property by applying an order preserving but non linear transformation h to

the maximal utilities within (20), noting that h is a member of the class of

order preserving transformations f introduced earlier, but disjoint from the

class of increasing linear transformations embodied by K and λ . Clearly,

identification of the utility maximising alternatives x n 0 ∈ T and x n1 ∈ T is

unaffected by the h transformation, since the transformation is order

33
preserving. By contrast, the difference between the maximal utilities in those

states is not preserved under the same transformation. Hence with reference

to (20), the following inequality applies:

∆CS m = c ≠
[ ] [ ]
h g (x n0 ) − αp n 0 − h g (x n1 ) − α ( p n1 + δ mn1 ∆p m )
α

Moreover, the compensating variation derived by means of the log sum

method is robust only to cardinal transformations of utility, and not to other

order preserving transformations. Indeed, in order to interpret (20) even in

ordinal terms (i.e. to say whether maximal utility in the after state is greater

than or less than the maximal utility in the before state), it has been necessary

to impose a common cardinal scale across the two states.

Finally, note that where the random variables ε 1 ,..., ε N of (8) are specifically

IID Gumbel, the Fechner model adopts the logit form. Then adhering to the

analysis outlined above, but taking expectations of the maximal utilities over

repetitions and/or individuals9, (20) may be re written as follows, the form of

which provokes the terminology ‘log sum’:

9
It might in passing be remarked that the act of taking expectations would in itself seem to
carry a strong inference of cardinality.

34
 ⎧N ⎫ ⎧N ⎫
ln ⎨∑ [g (x n ) − αp n ]⎬ − ln ⎨∑ [g (x n ) − α ( p n + δ mn ∆p m )]⎬
∆E (CS m ) = E (c ) = ⎩ n =1 ⎭ ⎩ n =1 ⎭
α

⎧0 m ≠ n
where p n is price in the before state, and δ mn = ⎨
⎩1 m = n

7.4 Prescriptive advice

Let us complete this discussion of RUM practice by synthesising its findings,

and offering prescription to practitioners. Whilst marginal utility derived

from the Fechner model (as with any marginal utility, it might be added)

exhibits cardinal properties, it is usually applied only for purposes of

inferring marginal valuation, and the latter is free of either cardinal or ordinal

scale. The cardinality of utility within the Fechner model does however

manifest when deriving measurement of consumer surplus change, whether

implemented through the log sum method, or through the application of

probability forecasts to the rule of a half method. Hence, to the extent that

practice exploits such methods, which would indeed seem considerable, it

may stand accused of transgressing the theoretical tenets on which RUM is

founded. There is however a convenient resolution: this is to apply the rule

of a half using the ordinal interpretation of RUM originally proposed by

Marschak (1960) and Block and Marschak (1960).

35
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The paper began by revisiting the theoretical origins of RUM, distinguishing

the original presentation by Marschak (1960) and Block and Marschak (1960)

from the popular McFadden (e.g. 1968, 1975) presentation. Consistent with

Neo Classical theory, the original presentation is couched at the individual

level, and relies on an ordinal notion of utility. Randomness then derives

from the repetition, in particular the facility for variability on these

repetitions, of an individual’s preference ordering. The paper proceeded to

consider the implementation of RUM, which is achieved through a relation

with Fechner’s (1859) model of psychophysical discrimination. This served to

illuminate the fundamental point of the paper; that the implementation of

RUM yields a model that carries the properties of cardinal utility. Though

this is not in itself a problem cardinal utility can be used quite defensibly as

a representation of ordinal utility it is essential that the manner in which the

representation is interpreted and applied does not depart from ordinality.

The paper considered whether RUM practice is adherent to the latter

requirement, particularly in relation to three measurements routinely derived

from the Fechner model, namely the marginal utility of an attribute, the

marginal valuation of an attribute, and the change in consumer surplus

arising from a change in the price of an alternative.

36
As would seem inherent in the very notion of marginal utility, marginal

utility derived from the Fechner model carries a cardinal scale. RUM

practitioners have invested considerable effort in seeking to resolve the so

called ‘scale factor problem’, and this may be rationalised as an attempt to

establish a unique cardinal scale across data pooled from different sources. If

however the ratio of two marginal utilities is taken, thereby yielding the

marginal rate of substitution (or in the particular case of the price attribute,

marginal valuation), then the cardinal scale is removed and the resultant

metric is defensible in ordinal terms. The cardinal properties of the Fechner

model become rather more pertinent when measuring consumer surplus

change, as follows. If the Fechner model is applied to the rule of a half

method for measuring consumer surplus change, then this would seem to be

associated with the forecasting of choice probability by extrapolation, where

the latter itself exploits cardinality. The log sum method for measuring

consumer surplus change is defined entirely in terms of the Fechner model,

and unambiguously departs from ordinal interpretation. RUM practice

routinely exploits these two methods of measuring consumer surplus change,

and may therefore stand accused of operating outside of the bounds for

which theory offers legitimacy. There is however a convenient means of

realigning theory and practice; this is to apply the rule of a half method using

the original presentation of RUM (Marschak, 1960; Block and Marschak,

37
1960). The original presentation is defined entirely in terms of ordinal utility,

and therefore faithful to theory.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author was supported by a Departmental Research Fellowship at the

Institute for Transport Studies (ITS), University of Leeds, and by the Platform

Grant GR/S46291/01 ‘Towards a unified theoretical framework for transport

network and choice modelling’, which is funded by the UK Engineering and

Physical Sciences Research Council and also held at ITS.

The author acknowledges grateful thanks to several colleagues Andrew

Daly, Tony Fowkes, Nicolás Ibáñez, Jeremy Toner, Chris Nash, David Watling

and Richard Connors for comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.

Any errors and misunderstandings that remain are of course the sole

responsibility of the author.

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