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Assignment # o1

Type of Government and the Foreign Policy

Submitted by: - Submitted to:-

Madam Fozia

Komal Ishfaq: 15171515-025

Political Science 8th semester

Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of political science

Sub Campus of UOG

10th , March, 2019

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Contents

1. Democracy and foreign policy process

HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE

The Branches and Foreign Policy

The Senate

The president

The Policymaking Machinery

Department of State

Formation of Foreign Policy

United States foreign policy in the Middle East

 Iran

 Saudi Arabia

2. Formulation of foreign policy in Monarchy Government

Absolutism Monarchy As A System

Government And Religion Under Absolutism

 Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy

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Why is the Kingdom confident?

Saudi Arabia making political in roads in Iraq

Who makes Foreign Policy in Pakistan?

Conclusion

References

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Type of Government and the Foreign policy process

1. Democracy and foreign policy

The Fallacy of Political Realism challenges the belief that liberal democracy is incompatible

with a wise and effective foreign policy. Miroslav Nincic demonstrates that if any such

incompatibility exists, it is rooted in the incentives of professional politicians rather than in the

impulses that drive the public and its legislative representatives. When we look at the

intersection of U.S. domestic political arrangements and the nation's foreign policy, our gaze is

often misdirected by erroneous and often harmful assumptions about the appropriate domestic

setting for the conduct of foreign affairs. First, Nincic focuses on the effect of democratic

practices and institutions on the efficacy and wisdom of international dealings, especially with

rival nations. Nincic next examines the pursuit and consequences on some of the central aspects

of our democracy, including the balance of power between the executive and legislative

branches, civil liberties, and government openness. A challenge to political realists' contention

that democracy impedes the sound conduct of foreign policy, Democracy and Foreign Policy will

be of particular interest to scholars and policymakers in international relations, U.S. foreign

policy, and diplomatic history. A democracy is considered the best form of government for a

country to create for peace and stability. There are two main mechanisms of democratic peace,

which include: institutional constraints, and peaceful norms and values. The various institutional

constraints include the use of elections, a strict rule of law, civilian control over the military,

checks and balances in the governmental structure itself, and public opinion; which is essential.

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1.2 HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE

The Constitution has been described as an “invitation to struggle” between the President and

Congress over the making of foreign policy. Compared to every other liberal democracy, the

U.S. conducts foreign policy in a cumbersome way. Safeguards built into the Constitution

prevent tyranny, yet they frequently pit Congress against the executive branch, make it difficult

to develop and implement a cohesive foreign policy, create uncertainty as to what that policy is,

and give foreign governments and special interests an opportunity to apply pressure at many

points, not just one. As a result, the actors of foreign policy in the U.S. are often difficult to

discern.America’s foreign policy is the expression of its goals in the world and of how it

proposes to achieve them, a reflection of the nation’s interests and a guideline of how to interact

with other countries. Global interdependence and the breakdown of traditional barriers has

increased the complexity of foreign policymaking. The distinction between foreign and domestic

issues is no longer pronounced, and as the global financial crisis of 2008 proved, local decisions

have ripple effects abroad. Understanding how foreign policy is made and conducted in the U.S.

is crucial to participating in this democratic project.

1.3 The Branches and Foreign Policy

The U.S. Constitution divides power between the three branches of government: the legislative,

the executive and the judicial. It also gives each branch some check on the other. The President

can veto legislation; Congress can override the President’s veto; the courts can declare a law of

Congress or an act of the President unconstitutional. Foreign policy is thus split amongst

different governmental structures.

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1.4 The Senate

The framers, suspicious of executive power, regarded Congress as the most “democratic” of the

three branches. The Constitution assigns the Senate a distinctive role in the foreign policy

process—to advise the President in negotiating agreements, to consent to them once they have

been signed, and to approve presidential appointments, including the Secretary of State, other

high officials of the State Department, ambassadors and career foreign service officers. After the

Vietnam War, Congress became more involved in foreign affairs; however, many now question

the branch’s effectiveness as Presidents have found ways to circumvent requirements for

Congress’ approval. President Obama’s military action in Libya, which controversially

sidestepped the War Power’s Resolution, is just one example.

1.5 The President

Under the Constitution, the President serves as head of state and head of government. As head of

government, he formulates foreign policy, supervises its implementation and attempts to obtain

the resources to support it. He also organizes and directs the departments and agencies that play a

part in the foreign policy process. Along with the Vice President, he is the only government

official elected nationally. This places him in a unique position to identify, express and pursue

the “national interests” of the U.S. The President’s specific foreign policy powers under the

Constitution are actually few and restricted. He serves as Commander in Chief of the Army and

Navy; nominates and appoints ambassadors and other public ministers, subject to the advice and

consent of the Senate; and makes treaties, by and with the advice of the Senate, provided two

thirds of the senators present concur. Though the President’s specific powers may be few, his

role in foreign policy, many believe, is crucial.

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1.6 The Policymaking Machinery

Making foreign policy requires the participation of the President, the executive branch, Congress

and the public. Conducting foreign policy, on the other hand, is the exclusive prerogative of the

President and his subordinates in the executive branch. The distinction is fuzzy but important:

you make policy when you decide to protect the security of the Persian Gulf; you conduct policy

when you send the Navy to do it.

1.7 Department of State

Until World War II, one agency, the Department of State, established in 1789 and the highest-

ranking Cabinet department, and one individual, the Secretary of State, who is directly

responsible to the President, managed foreign affairs. The traditional functions of the State

Department and its professional diplomatic corps, the Foreign Service, include: negotiating on

behalf of the U.S. government with foreign governments and in international organizations;

defending U.S. position in the world; reporting on and analyzing conditions in foreign countries

and institutions such as the UN; representing the American people and current U.S. policies to

the world; promoting relations with decision makers abroad; advancing U.S. trade and

investment; and protecting U.S. nationals overseas from discriminatory and/or inhumane

treatment.

1.8 Formation of Foreign Policy

George Washington once remarked that the U.S. ought to have the most successful foreign

policy of any country in the world because it had so many self-styled secretaries of state. Since

his day, the difficulty of developing a cohesive, relevant and feasible foreign policy has

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increased enormously. Theoretically, the process of formulation should begin with a clear

definition of the national interests, followed by a delineation of the policies that would promote

those interests and the course of action by the various departments and agencies that would

further those policies, as well as the allocation of the resources needed to carry them out. In

practice, no system is likely to produce a cohesive, viable and supportable foreign policy. The

national interest is a cluster of particular interests, and the agencies and staffs involved may have

very different views as to what it should be. The government’s uneven response to the so-called

“Arab Spring” is just one example of the U.S.’s ever-shifting foreign policy.

It is clear that foreign policy is not the prerogative of a few members of government; in fact

public opinion is key in affecting policy. It was Woodrow Wilson, a tireless champion of

democracy, who was determined to “democratize” diplomacy—to do away with “secret deals”

arrived at “behind the backs of the people” in favor of “open covenants openly arrived at.” His

ideas had a profound impact on the U.S. conduct of international relations long after his era.

During World War II and throughout the Cold War, when public support for America’s foreign

policy was critical, the role of public opinion rose to new eminence. The same should be true

today.

1.9 United States foreign policy in the Middle East

United States foreign policy in the Middle East has its roots as early as the Barbary Wars in the

first years of the U.S.'s existence, but became much more expansive after World War II.

American policy during the Cold War tried to prevent Soviet Union influence by supporting anti-

communist regimes and backing Israel against Soviet-sponsored Arab countries. The U.S. also

came to replace the United Kingdom as the main security patron of the Persian Gulf states in the

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1960s and 1970s, working to ensure a stable flow of Gulf oil. Since the 9/11 attacks of 2001,

U.S. policy has included an emphasis on counter-terrorism. The U.S. has diplomatic relations

with all countries in the Middle East except for Iran, whose 1979 revolution brought to power a

staunchly anti-American regime.

 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and the United States are strategic allies, but relations with the U.S. became

strained following September 11 attacks. In March 2015, President Barack Obama declared that

he had authorized U.S. forces to provide logistical and intelligence support to the Saudis in their

military intervention in Yemen, establishing a "Joint Planning Cell" with Saudi Arabia. The

report by Human Rights Watch stated that US-made bombs were being used in attacks

indiscriminately targeting civilians and violating the laws of war.

 Iran

Iran and the United States have had no formal diplomatic relations since 1980. Iranian Supreme

leader Ali Khamenei banned direct talks with the United States in 2018. Several claims have

been made that the US has violated Iranian territorial sovereignty since 2003, including drones,

soldiers, and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK). An American RQ-7 Shadow and a

Hermes UAV have crashed in Iran. Seymour Hersh stated that the United States has also been

penetrating eastern Iran from Afghanistan in a hunt for underground installations developing

nuclear weapons.

In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president. On 8 May 2006, he sent a

personal letter to President Bush to propose "new ways" to end Iran's nuclear dispute. US

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Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley both

dismissed it as a negotiating ploy and publicity stunt that did not address American concerns

about Iran's nuclear program. Bush insisted in August 2006 that "there must be consequences"

for Iran's continued enrichment of uranium. He said that "the world now faces a grave threat

from the radical regime in Iran." Ahmadinejad invited Bush to a debate at the UN General

Assembly, which was to take place on September 18, 2006. The debate was to be about Iran's

right to enrich uranium. The invitation was promptly rejected by White House spokesman Tony

Snow, who said "There's not going to be a steel-cage grudge match between the President and

Ahmadinejad"

 Who makes foreign policy in Pakistan?

Pakistan’s foreign policy, which is often conflated with defence policy, is very unique in nature

and character. The making and implementation of foreign and security policies in a

parliamentary democratic system is the prerogative of the executive. There is a complex process

in the executive for policy making involving institutional and organisational networks,

campaigning by the advocates of different perspectives and mutual accommodation. In Pakistan,

foreign and security policies are made jointly by civilian and military authorities with a strong

input from the intelligence agencies, especially the ISI. There are three important instruments

that the parliament can use to influence foreign policy making.

First, as the prime minister and the cabinet are responsible to the parliament, the latter can exert

pressure to change their policies. If the foreign policy is completely unacceptable, the parliament

can change the prime minister and bring forward a person who will carry out their wishes and

desires.

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Second, the members of parliament must develop professional capacity to deal with foreign

policy and security issues. Most of them make either simplified statements or follow the party

line, making statements with the objective of getting space in the media or condemning whatever

the government is doing. The members should make mature statements on security and foreign

policy issues that reflect deep thinking and an understanding of dynamics of international

politics. Each party represented in the parliament should arrange briefings by specialists and

professionals for its members so that they are better prepared to deal with complex foreign policy

and security issues.

Third, the committees of two houses dealing with foreign policy and security matters should be

strengthened. These must have research staff to provide them basic data and short overview-

papers on the relevant security and foreign policy issues. The role of the committee depends to a

great extent on the seriousness of the members and their capacity to address the issues within its

domain. This is not possible without professional support to their work. The committee should

also invite professional and experts for their comments and analysis of foreign policy and

security issues.

Geo-strategists believe that Pakistan’s geostrategic location was such that it assumed a

significant military role since independence in 1947. In the Cold War period, the US sought

military alliances with Pakistan to contain its communist enemies in South and Southeast Asia.

This literature magnifies Kashmir as a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Unless

resolved, Pakistan geo-strategically remains vulnerable to ‘Hindu’ India. However, this literature

has failed to look at the domestic variables and the way they influence the making of foreign

policy. Moreover, it makes no clear distinction between defence and foreign policy. Almost

similarly, legitimist literature attempts to make us believe that Pakistan faced a grave security

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threat from India from day one. Therefore, for the (physical) survival of the state, Pakistan was

compelled to enter into military pacts with the US in the 1950s during the Cold War. Moreover,

this literature believes that the civilian leadership acted immaturely, thus paving the way for

military intervention. It has also focused on the centrality of the Kashmir issue at the expense of

many other important bilateral issues between India and Pakistan.

The structuralists have highlighted the importance of structural factors in the making and

operationalisation of foreign policy. They assume that it is the structure of the Pakistani state that

determines the course of its international relations. The state of Pakistan inherited structural

constraints such as low-performing parliamentary institutions, a well-organised (civil-military)

bureaucracy, socio-economic ‘classes’ and security threats. Therefore, Pakistan’s foreign policy

was influenced by such structural variables. In the same vein, this literature claims that the

military was drawn into politics due to the structural imbalance between parliamentary

institutions and non-elective forces. Despite the above, this literature has, by and large, ignored

agency, rationality and the context of actors, their strategies and events respectively.

The systemists view the determination and implementation of Pakistan’s foreign policy from the

prism of the country’s political system and its being ensconced in the international political

order. In so doing, empirical realities of Pakistan’s domestic politics are grossly ignored. The

Islamist literature, on the other hand, solely relies on the Islam factor in the making not only of

Pakistan but also its foreign policy. Therefore, in the post-independence period, examples are

provided whereby the country not only established bilateral relations with Islamic Iran, Turkey,

Saudi Arabia and Indonesia but also supported the cause of Palestine. However, If Islam were

the main factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy, why did Pakistan fail to maintain good ties, for

example, with Afghanistan in 1947, the 1970s and currently?

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Finally, from a truly legal perspective, a couple of studies have viewed Pakistan’s foreign policy

from an international law perspective, therefore underestimating domestic factors. Similarly,

ethnicity literature has attempted to oversimplify the complexity of domestic political variables.

For example, Punjabis are held responsible for the making of Pakistan’s foreign policy. There is

no mention of political parties, politicians, civil bureaucracy and the military separately. In the

light of the foregoing, it is argued that the existing literature on Pakistan’s foreign policy and

Pakistan’s politics is limited with regards to its analytical capacity to explain the impact of

domestic politics on the country’s foreign policy. In this respect, epistemological debate of the

difference between the proponents of comparative politics and its deterministic impact on

international relations, and the exponents of international politics and its overwhelming influence

on internal politics is now well established within the domains of political science. Therefore, the

author prefers to epistemologically posit himself within the school of comparative politics, and

thus domestic political variables are preferred to the international system, structure or any

conspiracy in foreign policy conception and production, and not vice versa. Conceptually,

rational choice in which neo-institutionalist perspective is applied to Pakistan’s case wherein the

military, political parties, civil bureaucracy etc. are assumed rational actors in the sense of

having a clear conception of costs and benefits. The reason behind the choice of this combination

is not subjectivity but the underlying assumptions of these perspectives i.e. cost-benefit analysis

and ‘agency’ (to make things happen). Now, reverting to the core question, who makes foreign

policy in Pakistan, it is argued it was the civil government that determined the course of

Pakistan’s foreign policy in strategic understanding with civil-military bureaucracy from 1947 to

1951. From October 1951 to 1958, civil bureaucracy led Pakistan’s politics and foreign policy in

close alliance with the Ayub-led army. And, during the Ayub and Yahya years, the military

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directly determined our foreign policy. During the 1970s, Zulfikar Bhutto re-asserted our foreign

policy though in strategic partnership with the army. More importantly, however, since 1977,

Pakistan’s foreign policy has been made and implemented by its military. The civilian and

bureaucratic input and impact is barely traceable.

2. Formulation of foreign policy in Monarchy Government

2.1 Absolutism Monarchy As A System

Unlimited royal authority, as advocated by Bossuet and Hobbes, was the main characteristic of

absolutism. It was demonstrated most obviously in political organization but also served to

integrate into government most economic, religious, and social institutions. In this section, we

will preview this general pattern of absolutism before assessing its development within specific

European states.

Government And Religion Under Absolutism

Theoretically, the ruler made all major decisions in a typical absolute state. Although this was

not actually possible, chief ministers were responsible directly to the monarch, and all of their

actions were taken in the sovereign's name. The monarch was officially the supreme lawgiver,

the chief judge, the commander of all military forces, and the head of all administration. Central

councils and committees discussed policy, but these bodies were strictly advisory and concerned

primarily with administrative matter. All authority originated in orders coming down from the

top and going out to the provinces from the royal capital. In conducting foreign policy,

monarchs identified their personal dynastic interests with those of their countries. They usually

considered the acquisition of foreign territory to be legitimate and pursued their objectivesin a

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competitive game of power politics with other monarchs. This competition required a large

military establishment, sometimes involving naval forces. Rulers sought to form alliances against

the most dominant foreign state, giving little consideration to moral or religious principles. A

concern for the "balance of power" exemplified the new secular spirit in foreign relations.

Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy

Saudi Arabia, with its stability and influence, plays an important regional and international role.

Working diligently to address many of its major international and domestic concerns, the

Kingdom is a confident participant in world affairs and keeps an ever-vigilant eye toward its own

internal safeguarding.

Why is the Kingdom confident?

For a number of reasons. Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam, a religion that today has an

estimated 1.2 billion adherents. Saudi Arabia represents over 20 percent of the combined GDP of

the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region (and an estimated quarter of the Arab World's

GDP, according to the latest IMF numbers), making it the economic engine of the region and an

effective partner and member of the G-20. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the

Kingdom's central bank, is the world's third-largest holder of foreign-exchange reserves,

managing just about $850 billion; holdings of $500 billion are in private hands. Last but not

least, Saudi Aramco, the Kingdom's national oil company, is the world's largest producer and

exporter of petroleum and has by far the world's largest sustained production capacity

infrastructure at about 12.5 million barrels per day. It also has the world's largest spare capacity,

currently estimated at about 2.5 million barrels per day, or about 70 percent of unused global

capacity.

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Saudi Arabia making political in roads in Iraq

Reports emerged recently suggesting that Bin Salman has asked Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-

Abadi to lead mediation with Iran. Saudi Arabia, however, has denied this. Additionally, the

influential Iraqi Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, recently visited Saudi Arabia for the first time in

over a decade. This is yet another sign of growing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Iraq

has enjoyed a close relationship with Iran since the downfall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. On his

second visit to the Gulf, al-Sadr met and held discussions with bin Zayed. The former flew to the

UAE on a charter flight sent from Abu Dhabi, just two weeks after visiting Saudi Arabia. The

formation of friendly relations with the Iraqi scholar by Saudi Arabia and the UAE will most

likely polarise the internal political relations in Iraq. Just over two months ago, AlAbadi came to

the defence of Qatar when it was accused of having paid a huge ransom for the release of Qatari

hostages held in Iraq. The prime minister’s statement indicated a close relationship between the

two governments. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s courting of al-Sadr can be interpreted as a means

of increasing Saudi influence in Iraq against Iran. To that end, the kingdom and its Gulf ally have

been using the ethnic-sectarian card in Iraq. Al-Sadr himself is an Arab Shiite who has a difficult

relationship with Iran. By empowering him, the Saudi-Emirati coalition may be able to infiltrate

Iraq and further polarise the country politically. However, it may also try to set the Iraqi

government against al-Sadr and his support base. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is currently

experiencing a Shia insurgency. Perhaps it hopes that al-Sadr, a Shia Arab, might assist in

dealing with that and be used as a propaganda tool. Senior fellow at the Middle East Institute at

the University of Singapore, Fanar Haddad, maintains that al-Sadr is assertive about his Arab

identity, which corresponds to “the Saudi policy toward the non-Iranian Shiite entities in the

region.”Propaganda against the internal Shia insurgency has already spread in the kingdom. The

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government has insisted that its involvement in the Shia-dominated al-Qatif region has nothing

to do with sectarianism but with maintaining law and order, and that it is Shia Iran is meddling in

Saudi affairs and creating instability. This type of propaganda will not achieve much within the

Shia community in Saudi Arabia. The killing of popular Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in January

2016 has rallied most Shiites in the country against the government; and that will be very

difficult to undo. Before his death, al-Nimr was presented as an Iranian-backed agent of

destabilisation in the country. 4 Al-Sadr is, for all intents and purposes, meant to “replace” al-

Nimr in light of the absence of a strong political and spiritual authority. In the pre-revolution era

of Iran, Arabs rather than Persian Iranians dominated the Shia sect. Arab-dominated Iraq remains

a bastion of Shiism, and the most important Shia shrines are in Iraq including the Imam Ali

Mosque in Najaf and Imam Hussein Shrine in Karbala.

Conclusion

.A challenge to political realists' contention that democracy impedes the sound conduct of

foreign policy, Democracy and Foreign Policy will be of particular interest to scholars and

policymakers in international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and diplomatic history. A democracy

is considered the best form of government for a country to create for peace and stability. There

are two main mechanisms of democratic peace, which include: institutional constraints, and

peaceful norms and values. The various institutional constraints include the use of elections, a

strict rule of law, civilian control over the military, checks and balances in the governmental

structure itself, and public opinion; which is essential.

17
References

http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2017/8/29/

f930984407c449d8945fb75aac3c036b_100.pdf

https://www.amazon.com/Democracy-Foreign-Policy-Miroslav-Nincic/dp/

023107669X

UKForeignSecurityWorkingGroupReport.pdf 8_1_02.pdf

Democracy%20and%20the%20Making%20of%20Foreign%20Policy%20–

%20Other%20News.html

American%20Foreign%20Policy%20and%20the%20Arab%20World%20_

%20Middle%20East%20Policy%20Council.html

Foreign%20Policy%20Association.html

/Foreign%20relations%20of%20Saudi%20Arabia%20-%20Wikipedia.html

United%20States%20foreign%20policy%20in%20the%20Middle%20East%20-

%20Wikipedia.html

Saudi%20Arabia's%20Foreign%20Policy%20_%20Middle%20East%20Policy

%20Council.html

Monarchy%20-%20Wikipedia.html

https://dailytimes.com.pk/97964/who-makes-foreign-policy-in-pakistan/

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