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Earthing System Analysis to Improve Protection System Performance in

Distribution Networks

Conference Paper · January 2014

DOI: 10.1049/cp.2014.0092

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 Earthing System Analysis to Improve Protection System
Performance in Distribution Networks

Velmurugan Mariappan*, ABS Mohamed Rayees †, Maha AlDahmi +

+
Al Ain Distribution Company, United Arab Emirates, * [email protected] , † [email protected], [email protected]

Keywords: HiZ -High Impedance , BCP -Broken Conductor under all required fault conditions, and refrain from operating
Protection , KPI-Key Performance Indicators, SAIFI - when so required. The major requirements on the protection
System Average Interruption Frequency Index , SAIDI - relays are selectivity, stability, speed, sensitivity and
System Average Interruption Duration Index. reliability. Fault current is an important parameter which is
influence of earthing system and shall have an impact on
Abstract protection parameterization and performance in order to
The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive minimise and/or prevent the damage of the power system
analysis of earthing system to enhance protection system equipment under fault conditions. The magnitude of the fault
performance in distribution networks. Al Ain Distribution current depends on system earthing such as operation and
Company (AADC) is one of the subsidiary companies of Abu protective earthing and type of faults that occurs in terms of
Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority (ADWEA) in the short circuit, open circuit or both.
United Arab Emirates (UAE). AADC is responsible to Power system equipment are very expensive, and so a very
operate and maintain the power distribution from voltage large capital investment. To maximize the return on this
level of 0.4 kV up to and including 33 kV in the eastern outlay, the system must be utilised as much as possible within
region of Abu Dhabi emirate. AADC is always keen to the applicable constraints of security and reliability of supply.
provide safe and secure power supply to its customers. It is expected that power system should operate in a safe
Network performance KPI’s such as SAIFI, and SAIDI would manner at all times. No matter how well designed, faults will
be improved, if protection system isolates the fault correctly. always occur on a power system, and these faults may
The protection system can’t operate independently, if the represent a risk to personal and/or property [1]. Many power
network components such as earthing system, equipments, system experts recognize that it is not feasible to design the
OHL/Cable, etc. are not designed properly. AADC initiated a power system to completely prevent the occurrence.
project in the year 2010 to study the existing earthing However, it is possible to minimize the damages, using good
arrangement and standards in liaison with protection system design practices and proper relay settings, applying new
to improve network performance. The study also included protection system technologies, and improving eartihng
live line tests in 11kV system with different types of fault system.
with different vendor in order to analyse performance of HiZ /
BCP relays as HiZ faults are a great challenge in AADC due Under the pressure of continual customer satisfaction and
to nature of soil in eastern region of Abu Dhabi emirate. Trial regulatory controls, utilities are being challenged to improve
earthing was also a part of the study which included different their SAIDI and SAIFI indicators. Network performance
types of earthing grids in variant site conditions at different KPIs would be improved, if protection system isolates the
locations to analyse the nature of soil in order to improve fault correctly. The protection system can’t operate
earthing system in AADC network. AADC was the first independently, if the network components such as earthing
utility company in the region (UAE as well as Gulf countries) system, equipment such as switchgear, transformer,
to conduct the live line tests in 11 kV OHL. The test results OHL/Cable, etc. are not designed properly.
and trial earthing lead to several conclusion in determining Fault calculations are used when checking if the protection
optimum earthing arrangements and selection of right requirements are fulfilled. Selectivity means that only the
protection application in AADC network. Thus, the study faulty part of the network is disconnected when fault occurs.
added additional advantage to improve protection system This can be achieved through absolute selectivity protection.
performance in distribution network. This paper also analyses To be able to make selective setting it is necessary to have a
the performance of multiple protection applications duly good knowledge of the fault current. Stability is usually
considering power transformer neutral earthing arrangement associated with unit protection schemes and refers to the
such as solid, resistor and reactor earthing, for safe and secure ability of the protection system to remain unaffected by
operation in distribution network level. external fault to the protected zone. Speed means that a
1. Introduction limited operating time of the relay is required. For many
relays the operating time is depending on the magnitude of
The design of a protection scheme is of paramount the fault current. Hereby it is possible to predict the operating
importance. This is to ensure that the system should operate time of the relay and thus make sure that maximum fault

1
clearance is fulfilled under all circumstances. Sensitivity 2.2 Type of fault in AADC network
means that the relay will detect a fault also under such
Figure-1 shows that majority of trips and shutdowns were
conditions that only a small fault current is achieved. As per
caused by failure on different equipment, of which very often
IEEE standard C37.100–1992, Reliability is related with
are sparking/ fires caused by arcing/ flashovers. This data
dependability (is a measure of the degree of certainty that a
proves very adverse influence of environmental conditions on
protective system will operate correctly when required, and at
the equipment, especially outdoor mounted equipment on the
the designed speed) and security (is a measure of the degree
OHLs, exposed to combination of high humidity, sand and
of certainty that a protection system will not operate
salt laden air and large daily temperature variations. Current
incorrectly or faster than designed).
system of solid earthing philosophy is favourable in this
The first section provides overview of earthing and protection sense, since other types of system earthing increase the
system in AADC network. Second section presents prevailing voltage stress on equipment during the fault and thus making
issues in existing AADC network. Third section analyses higher risk of starting secondary faults.
HiZ/BCP live line test conducted in AADC network and
fourth section present trial earthing grid designs and
recommendation of earthing system to improve network
protection performance in network. Final section is the
conclusions of this paper.
2 Existing earthing and protection system in
AADC network
The first portion of this sections analyse overview of earthing
system in AADC network; the second portion of this section
presents current protection philosophy at all voltage levels
from 0.4 kV up to and including 33kV; the third portion
discusses the influence of grounding resistance and fourth
portion analyse HiZ/BCP fault in AADC network. Figure- 1- Unplanned Trip records in AADC network
2.1 Overview of earthing system in AADC network Transient faults are major constraint of solidly earthed
AADC network is supplied from high voltage Abu Dhabi network. From the Figure-2 show that in year 2008, 410 trips
Transmission and Dispatch Company (TRANSCO) grid on (26%) out of total number of 1574 are recorded as transient
400 kV and 220 kV level with generating source far from Al faults. In year 2009, 776 trips (29%) of total number of 2649
Ain region. However, one small generating station source are recorded as Transient faults. In year 2010, 780 trips (28%)
located in Al Ain and supply AADC at 33 kV level during of total number of 2762 are recorded as Transient faults. In
peak load periods. Interfaces with TRANSCO grid stations year 2011, 498 trips (21%) of total number of 2404 are
are in 20 nos. 220/33 kV substations. 33kV neutrals are recorded as Transient faults.
dominantly solidly earthed except in following grid stations:
a) AAPS – Siemens, AAPS – Calor Emag and AAPS –
Toshiba are older grid station where 33kV neutrals are
earthed via small impedances. This is because these three
grid stations serve to connect Al Ain Power Station to the
network and thus there is a necessity to limit high earth
fault currents due to small fault impedances near the
source in the network.
b) Recently commissioned grids such as Al Ain Industrial
City and Um Al Oush Grid where 33kV neutral of power
transformers are designed to work either as solidly
earthed or earthed via reactors.
c) There are 124 nos. of 33 kV / 11 kV primary substations
Figure- 2- Trip records
in AADC network. They are supplied from 33 kV lines in
the normally open loop configurations. Therefore in
2.3 Protection system in AADC network
practical operation 33 kV primaries are fed radially from
upstream sources. 11 kV neutral points are directly Table-1 below indicates typical protection schemes in AADC
grounded for all 33/11 kV power transformers. network. Types of protection devices in AADC network vary
d) AADC network includes approx. 5500 nos. of 11 / 0.4 from different generations of electromechanical, static and
kV substations which cater the load for the end users. LV numerical relays and it follows historical progress in the field
star points are also directly grounded, which is the most of network protection. The majority of relays are from
typical solution worldwide. different manufacturers.

2
High impedance faults are great challenges due to higher From the figure-1, total number of 2 broken/ slipped
surface soil resistivity in eastern region of Abu Dhabi conductors were recorded in year 2008 which none were
emirates. AADC present network protection system works detected by protection devices. In year 2009 total number of
generally well and reliably .However, some of the issues are 13 broken/ slipped conductors is recorded of which only 3
identified in section-3 considering size and straddling of the were detected by protection devices. In year 2010 total
network. number of 14 broken/slipped conductors is recorded of which
only 2 were detected by protection devices. In year 2011 total
Sl. Feeder Main-1 Main-2 Backup number of 26 broken/ slipped conductors is recorded of which
No. Type Protection Protection Protection only 7 were detected by protection devices. Others were not
1. OHL Distance Directional OC/EF/ detected and had to be de-energized as emergency shutdowns
OC/EF BCP/HiZ
following report by residents.
2. Cable Differential Directional OC/EF
OC/EF AADC have utilised three different vendors to detect
3. Transformer Differential Restricted OC/EF/ HiZ/BCP faults and operating experiences are as follows:
EF SBEF
4. Switchgear Busbar - - Description Vendor-1 Vendor-2 Vendor-3
protection Correct 66% 60% 0%
Tripping
Table- 1-Protection system philosophy in AADC network Incorrect 34% 40% 100%
Tripping
2.4 Influence of grounding resistance/reactance on EF
and distance protection
Table- 2- HiZ/BCP Performance in AADC network
Ground fault current magnitudes depend on the system
It should be noted from the table-2 that incorrect tripping
grounding method. Solidly and low impedance grounded
includes failure to trip as well as false tripping without fault.
systems may have high levels of ground fault currents. These
Detection of high-impedance faults is over 80%,as claimed by
high level fault require to isolate the faulty equipment from
certain vendors in North America, but the majority of
the system. Since grounding resistance, in majority of cases,
undetected HiZ fault is on the dry sand.
is dominant part of equivalent impedance during the fault, it
is obvious that different values will influence different fault 3 Existing AADC network issues
currents and by that the fault duration itself.
AADC present network protection system works generally
Distance protection is that its fault coverage of the protected well and reliably without major constraints. Some number of
circuit is virtually independent of source impedance fatalities and the fires are identified as the biggest problems
variations. During earth-faults impedance of neutral earthing and the study was directed to review, analyze and propose
reactor/resistor will influence the total impedance of fault mitigation to reduce the risk from the same. Following
loop seen by distance relay. Hence, the setting of the relay problems are identified and require further analysis:
must cover an area of the line impedance plus all previous
stated impedances. 1. Majority of feeders does not have HiZ/BCP and often it
is implemented with inverse current principle (only in
2.5 HiZ/BCP faults in AADC network 11kV OHLs).
The IEEE Power System Relay Committee, HiZ Detection 2. I2/I1 detection algorithm - Currently this algorithm is
Technology working group defines HiZ faults as those that implemented only in some 11kV feeders but in 11kV
“do not produce enough fault current to be detectable by network it can be used to protect only some parts of the
conventional overcurrent relays or fuses”. As such, it should feeder. It can be used for detection of broken conductor
be noted that whereas traditional protection is designed to (open circuit fault) in 33kV OHL network.
protect the power system, HiZ protection is primarily focused 3. Arc detection algorithm – AADC specification is updated
on the protection of people, livestock and property. recently to include this algorithm for all 33kV and 11kV
OHL feeders and accordingly it is implemented only in
With more than 6000km of OHL, AADC is especially recently commissioned substations. Sensitive E/F
vulnerable to High-impedance faults (HiZ). HiZs have such protection - It to be implemented in all OHL feeders
small fault currents that they generally do not affect power which is not the case in the practice.
distribution system operation. However, HiZs caused by 4. AADC specification is updated recently to include
downed power conductors are major safety concerns to public Sensitive EF protection and accordingly it is
and camels, as Al Ain region is arid and suited for camel implemented only in recently commissioned substations.
farming. Without timely correction, these faults can be 5. Current leakages causing fires cannot be avoided in
hazardous to human lives and property [2]. practice i.e. this is not the problem with network
HiZs on multigrounded distribution systems are difficult to protection but with the extreme working conditions. SEF
detect at the substation level. Single phase loads and the protection can help in reducing the risk from high
multipath returns of unbalanced currents are several factors leakage currents.
contributing to the difficulty in detecting these faults [3].

3
6. PMT/GMT faults causing fires - Often fires from e) High-impedance earth-fault (Test E): Test Conductor
PMT/GMT failure could be indirect consequence of (70mm2) attached to wooden pole with and without
impossibility of HV fuses to isolate the fault timely. The additional water.
main cause for this could be high resistance of protective f) Metallic earth-fault (Test F): Test Conductor connected to
and/ or operational earthing. the protective grounding system of nearby pole mounted
7. Sympathetic tripping - Since source of supply is far away transformer .
from the AADC, extreme voltage dips during short- g) Metallic earth-fault with disconnected neutral point in
circuits in the transmission network influence massive source (primary station) (Test G).
tripping of AADC with current surge under shortage of
dynamic VAR conditions. 4.3 Results of live line test
The following are the summary of live line test conducted in
4 HiZ/BCP live line test and observations AADC network.
4.1 Purpose of live line test

Actual grounding
There were 40 tests performed in wooden pole OHL feeder ,

(200Ω protective
Calculated fault

Calculated fault
(25Ω protective
resistance ( Ω )

Fault clearance
Measured fault
supplied from New Ummgafa (NMGF) primary and 12 tests
were performed in metallic pole OHL feeder , supplied from

current (A)
grounding)

grounding)
current(A)
Abu Dhabi Defence - A (ADD-A) primary. It should be noted

current
that there is no standard to perform these types of test. Hence,

(sec)
time
preparation for the same, in order to have safe and the most
comprehensive tests with no or smallest impacts to the
36.7 284 A 37A 173.6 1.475
customers, was extremely difficult. The purpose of live line
tests are as follows: 58.9 272 A 37A 107.8 7.379
52.38 - - 121.3 2.303
 To confirm values of earth-fault currents in the network
and reduction factors of earthing elements. Table 2: Comparison of metallic earth-fault currents at
 To measure capacitive currents during faults with NMGF Primary
disconnected Neutral point and evaluate performance of
system earthing. It should be noted that voltage of affected phase decreases but
 To evaluate how earth-fault current establishes on not significantly since the pertinent grounding system used
different surface soils in AADC. for the test was not effectively earthed. On the other hand,
 To evaluate dangerous voltages during earth-fault. voltages of healthy phases increase but also not significantly,
 To record waveforms and measure parameters such as which is expected since system earthing at supplying NMGF
Earth-fault Overcurrent, I2 (inverse) Overcurrent, substation is solidly grounded and this presents inherited
Sensitive EF current, Current and Voltage unbalance. characteristics of this type of system earthing, i.e. minimizes
 Higher harmonics – distortion of current and voltage. voltage stress on the equipment. Figure-4 shows earth-fault
 Arcing – energy burst. current at site location during test F.
 Particularly to address problem of HiZ (broken
conductor) as one of the most severe hazards.
 To evaluate performance of different detection
algorithms from multiple vendors relays.
 To evaluate establishing of leakage current on wet
wooden pole.
4.2 Types of live line test:

a) Open circuit fault (Test A): Broken conductor with and

without touching the ground from load side
b) High-impedance earth-fault (Test B): Test Conductor
(70mm2) touching the ground 2m, 4m and 6m length and
test Conductor (70mm2) buried 0.2m and 0.5m Figure 4 – Current Wave form – Test F
c) Metallic earth-fault (Test C): Test Conductor (70mm2)
connected to the OHGW and protective grounding system. Test G was mainly to verify level of capacitive currents of
d) High-impedance earth-fault( Test D): Thin test Conductor OHL which is one of the criteria for selection of system
(2.5mm2) touching the ground 2m, 4m and 6m length with earthing of MV networks. Measured earth-fault currents
and without additional water and thin test Conductor actually was capacitive currents of the OHL since neutral
(2.5mm2) buried 0.2m and 0.5m with and without point of supplying 33/11kV transformer was disconnected
additional water. from the ground.From continuous recordings before the tests,
it is noted that levels of “normal” Voltage and Current

4
unbalance varies in range 0.1%-0.7% and 2%-7% system. The following eleven different type of grounding
respectively. Except Tests A and F, other tests did not show system installed in all five location.
any particular (additional) unbalance in phase voltages and
a) Type A: Grounding system with Copper rods 19mm
currents. Tests A has confirmed extremely high value of
diameter; 3.6m long; placed into the GEM 1 of 320mm
current unbalance during open circuit test – for all six tests it
diameter.
was around 99% i.e. inverse current almost reaches the value
b) Type B: Grounding system with Copper rods 19mm
of direct phase current. Figure-5 shows the effects of broken
diameter; 3.6m long; placed into the GEM 1 of 160mm
conductors touch the ground when the test was conducted.
diameter.
c) Type C: Grounding system with Copper rods 19mm
diameter; 10.8m long; placed into the GEM 1 of 160mm
diameter.
d) Type D: Grounding loop 5 m x 5m with copper tape of
cross-section 40 mm x 4 mm; tape buried 0.6m below the
ground level.
e) Type E: Grounding loop 5 m x 5m with copper tape of
cross-section 40 mm x 4 mm and with 4 Copper rods at
each corner; 19mm in diameter; 3.6m long; tape buried
0.6m below the ground level.
f) Type F: Grounding loop 5 m x 5m with copper tape of
cross-section 40 mm x 4 mm placed into the bentonite
block of width 300 mm and height 100 mm; tape buried
Figure-5- Effect of broken conductor in contact with ground
0.6m below the ground level.
g) Type G: Grounding loop 5 m x 5m with copper tape of
Any distortion of sinusoidal current can be represented by
cross-section 40 mm x 4 mm placed into the GEM 1 of
level of odd and even harmonics. Main reason for distortion
width 300 mm and height 100 mm; tape buried 0.6m
of sinusoidal current when the voltage is sinusoidal is due to
below the ground level.
arcing. Even though main purpose of Test D (thin conductor
h) Type H: Grounding loop 5 m x 5m with copper tape of
2.5mm2) was to provoke the Arcing and to record any energy
cross-section 40 mm x 4 mm placed into the GEM 2 of
burst and harmonics (distortion) in currents and voltages,
width 300 mm and height 100 mm; tape buried 0.6m
from 15 tests with conductor laid on surface without
below the ground level.
additional water, only one obvious Arcing was recorded.
i) Type I: Sample of Cooper tape 2m long of cross-section
From the other 13 tests with buried conductor, based on the
40 mm x 4 mm; tape buried 0.1 m below the ground level;
recorded wave forms (THD - Total Harmonic Disorder and
j) Type J: Grounding system with Copper rods 19mm
high-frequency flickering of fault current) it could be
diameter; 3.6m long; placed into the MARCONITE
concluded that arcing was present in 6 cases.
material of 320mm diameter.
k) Type K: Grounding system with Copper rods 19mm
diameter; 10.8m long; placed into the MARCONITE
material of 160mm diameter.
It is not possible to analyse the earthing system without
trial earthing as the results were useful to compare with
calculated value and measured value in AADC network in
order understand the nature of soil and accordingly
specify the earthing system ADWEA /AADC standard
specification. The trial grids were also useful to assess the
impact of ground enhancement material (GEM), however,
the measurements are required for an extended period to
Figure-5 Current Wave form – Test G analyse the real impact of GEM & their durability over the
years across the variant climatic conditions.
5 Trial earthing in AADC network to improve
earthing design 6 Recommendation to improve network
protection system performance
Prior to trial earthing, site investigation was done to analyze
the behaviour of soil as soil resistivity is differ from area to Placing the power system underground is the most effective
area in AADC network. Five different areas in City, North, solution to reduce faults. AADC is relying on the progressive
West and South region in AADC network were selected for undergrounding of the network but OHL will still be the most
trial earthing. In each of the location, different grounding part of the rural areas network. It is evident from the ongoing
systems are implemented and the measurements were incidence of broken conductors and pole top fires that
performed periodically to observe the behaviour of earthing AADC’s asset replacement program and its level of

5
 preventative maintenance need to be intensified and actually does not exist. One grounding system which is not
increased. This requires a significant continuous maintenance safe could work years without any accident but it is still just a
effort, which became costly and more difficult to manage as matter of time to become actual hazard.
the age of AADC’s wood pole network increases. Particular
Practically, it is impossible to detect 100% of HIZs and
intervals and maintenance activities of earthing system is
achieve a high degree of security against false outputs as HiZ
required.
fault is difficult to detect on dry sand due to it nature. Earth-
fault tests have showed that I2/I1 algorithm can not be used for
It must be noted that the specified resistance values for
reliable detection of HiZ faults in 11kV OHL network but it
protective earthings recommended in this study allows higher
should be retained as protection of open-circuit faults which
values than previously used in AADC (20Ω instead 5Ω for
are located before concentration of consumers. Particularly,
33kV towers, 20/40Ω instead 10Ω for 11kV towers). New
this algorithm can be used for detection of open-circuit faults
recommended values will be applied for all new projects. It
in 33kV OHL networks since in 33kV line load is not
would be necessary to re-calculate the ground fault currents
distributed along the line (it is concentrated at the ends of the
for reconstruction of existing distribution substations.
line) and any breaking of conductor will result in high
Type of insulators play significant role to reduce the risk of asymmetry which can be easily detected from the remote
pole fires since silicone type insulators conduct much less ends.
leakage current than pin or porcelain type. One of the most
The trend in AADC network is to progressively replace /
effective solutions to minimize pole and cross arm fires
refurbish old substations and equipment with new one.
caused by leakage currents is proper bonding of the pole
Additional cost for preventing/ minimizing the pole fires
hardware. Leakage currents tend to cancel at the common
mainly represents maintenance and/or replacement of
point of the bonding. Bond wires present a shunting to the
equipment (e.g. cost of additional bonding wires is
wooden pole and re-direct leakage current away from the
negligible). Major portion of these additional costs are
surface of a wood.
operative and needs to be estimated by Distribution
To reduce the ground fault current level for systems with Companies prior to implementation.
small zero-sequence source impedance, low-impedance
reactor or resistor to ground the neutral point of station Acknowledgements
transformer can be used and thus to increase the value of The authors would like to thank for the support provided by
zero-sequence impedance of the system. Any usage of neutral AADC higher management in particular Executive Operation
reactor/ resistor will increase the zero-sequence impedance, Director Eng. Bader Nasser Al Thehli , Electricity
reduce the ground fault current and thus the safety criterion Operation and Maintenance Director Eng. Fatima Al
will still be satisfied for all pertinent cases. Dhaheri, all the project team members and the consultant
The only remaining criterion for this implementation is proper M/s. Energo Consult for the successful completion of the
sensitivity and selectivity of protection, and this must be project.
evaluated considering new recommended values of protective
earthings along the line which is supplied from 220/33kV grid References
station or 33/11kV primary/package unit station. In AADC
technical specification, there is a sensitive E/F relay as part of [1] “Network Protection and Automation Guide", ALSTOM
the 11kV OHL protection scheme, but it is not installed in all GRID, p- 7.
existing OHL feeders and AADC is currently introducing this [2] Daqing Hou, “Detection of High –Impedance Faults in
protection for the same. Power Distribution Systems" IEEE PSC, pp. 85 – 95,
(2007)
Regardless of many available advanced detection algorithms, [3] D. Hou and N. Fischer, “Deterministic High-Impedance
the detection of HiZ remains a challenging problem and this Fault Detection and Phase Selection on Ungrounded
is an actual research and developing problem in electrical distribution Systems”, IEEE PSC, pp.112-122, (2006).
power engineering. Only levels of total harmonic disorder
(THD) were prominent parameter during different tests. Other
parameters like level of particular harmonics (even or odd),
arcing and energy burst were not detected to be prominent
and therefore it is concluded that any signature recognition
techniques would not be useful in AADC network.
7 Conclusion
Fault duration directly influence the intensity of maximum
allowable dangerous voltages in the affected part of the
system. This is the main criterion for optimization of
grounding resistances. By optimization mean minimum cost
of the grounding system which is still safe. It is very
important to understand that “semi safe” grounding system

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