Contract Week 2 - Offer

Contract Week 2: Offer
1. Preston Corp Sdn Bhd v. Edward Leong & Ors (1982):

Federal Court Appeal
Appellant: Company publishing books
Respondent: a firm of printers
Issues: 1. Whether the appellants were bound to pay the disputed sum of $ 500
2. Whether the respondents were entitled for the payment for the extra charge.
Held: Printing orders : offers
Confirmations by respondents: Acceptance; Contract exists.
Film ownership clause contained in quotations was irrelevant and formed no part
of the contract.
The film ownership clause contained in the quotations awas completely irrelevant and as
such formed no part of the contracts at all. The parties must have been taken to enter into
contracts on the terms of the printing orders and not the terms of the quotations submitted
by the respondents.
[Cheong book]
“An offer is an intimation of willingness by an offeror to enter into a legally binding
contract. Its terms either expressly or impliedly must indicate that it is to become binding
on the offeror as soon as it has been accepted by the offeree.”
Bukti: Definition of offer.
2. Boulton v Jones (1857):

Plaintiff: successor of Brocklehurst’s business
Defendant: customer having habit dealing with Brocklehurst
Plaintiff executed the order.
Held: It is a rule of law, that if a person intends to contract with A, B cannot give himself
any right under it. Here the order is given to Brocklehurst. If there was any contract at all,
it was not with the plaintiff. The order was given to the plaintiff’s predecessor in
business. In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must show that there was a contract
with himself.
Bukti: Tawaran ditujukan kepada individu tertentu.
3. Carlil v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893):

Offer: to pay 100 pounds to anybody who will perform these conditions
Acceptance: performance of these conditions
The offer is made to all the world. The contract is made with that limited portion of the
public who come forward and perform the conditions on the faith of the advertisement.
Bukti: Tawaran ditujukan kepada seluruh dunia.
4. R v Clarke (1927):
Clarke gave information to claim reward to clear himself from a false charge of murder.
He was acting with reference to a specific criminal charge against himself and not with
reference to a general request by the community for information against other persons.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Full court of Western Australia. Evan Clarke
proceeded, by petition of right under the "Crown Suits Act 1898," to sue the Crown for
£1000 promised by proclamation for such information as should lead to the arrest and
conviction of the person or persons who committed the murders of two police officers,
Walsh and Pitman.
In Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, (1893) 1 QB 256 at p 262, Lindley, LJ, thus
states what he thinks, and what I respectfully accept as the true view in a case of that
kind, which is in this respect the same as the present case — "The person who makes the
offer shows by his language and from the nature of the transaction that he does not expect
and does not require notice of the acceptance, apart from notice of the performance."
...
These statements of Clarke show clearly that he did not intend to accept the offer of the
Crown, did not give the information on the faith of, or relying on, the proclamation. He
did not mentally assent to the Crown's offer; there was no moment of time at which there
was, till after the information was given, as between Clarke and the Crown, a consensus
of mind.
Lord Westbury, L.C, in Chinnock v Marchioness of Ely, (1865) 4 De G. J & S at p 643 —
"An agreement is the result of the mutual assent of two parties to certain terms, and if it
be clear that there is no consensus, what may have been written or said becomes
immaterial." This pronouncement is cited by Leake on Contracts (7th ed ), p 2; and the
author adds — "A consensus ad idem is a prime essential to the validity of a contract."
Bukti: Komunikasi Tawaran
5. Errington v. Errington & Woods (1952):

Plaintiff: Widow
First Defendant: Daughter in law
Second Defendant: Daughter in law’s sister
Installments are paid.
The father's promise was a unilateral contract—a promise of the house in return for their
act of paying the instalments. It could not be revoked by him once the couple entered on
performance of the act, but it would cease to bind him if they left it incomplete and
unperformed, which they have not done. If that was the position during the father's
lifetime, so it must be after his death. If the daughter-in-law continues to pay all the
building society instalments, the couple will be entitled to have the property transferred to
them as soon as the mortgage is paid off, but if she does not do so, then the building
society will claim the instalments from the father's estate and the estate will have to pay
them.
6. Daulia v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd (1978):

Defendant: Mortgagees
Plaintiff: Buyer of the properties
Plaintiff never succeeded in obtaining an exchange of contracts or any other written
agreement for sales and purchase. but they claim they did obtain a unilateral contract by
the defendants that they would enter into a written contract of sale on certain agreed
terms and the plaintiffs claim damages for breach of that unilateral contract.
The concept of a unilateral or 'if' contract is somewhat anomalous, because it is clear that,
at all events until the offeree starts to perform the condition, there is no contract at all, but
merely an offer which the offeror is free to revoke.
Goff LJ : (There is a valid unilateral contract.)
Whilst I think the true view of a unilateral contract must in general be that the offeror is
entitled to require full performance of the condition which he has imposed and short of
that he is not bound, that must be subject to one important qualification, which stems
from the fact that there must be an implied obligation on the part of the offeror not to
prevent the condition becoming satisfied, which obligation it seems to me must arise as
soon as the offeree starts to perform. Until then the offeror can revoke the whole thing,
but once the offeree has embarked on performance it is too late for the offeror to revoke
his offer.
Bukti: Revocation of offer
7. Abdul Rashid Abdul Majid v. Island Golf Properties Sdn Bhd. (1989):
Defendant: A private limited company operating a social golf club
Held, declaring that the defendants' board was not entitled to levy and collect the fees:
(1) The plaintiff's application for membership was merely a preliminary step. The offer
for membership came from the defendants after they had considered the plaintiff's
application. The contract between the plaintiff and the defendants was formed only when
the plaintiff accepted the offer by making the payment of the entrance fee and the first
subscription. Therefore the declaration in the application form was not part of the
contract. It was just an antecedent communication. The only contract between the
plaintiff and the defendants was the rules of the club
Counsel for the plaintiff says that the plaintiff in submitting the application form was just
making an offer to become a member. The application form which contained the
declaration was merely a preliminary communication before the contract was entered. As
between the plaintiff and the defendants the rules of the club is the contract. The
application form together with other documents attached thereto are not part of the rules
and should not be considered as part of the contract.
Wan Adnan J: “I agree with the above principles of law. In my view the plaintiff's
application for membership was merely a preliminary step. The offer for membership
came from the defendants after the defendants had considered the plaintiff's application.
The contract between the plaintiff and the defendants was formed only when the plaintiff
accepted the offer by making the payment of the entrance fee and the first subscription. It
is therefore my view that the declaration in the application form is not part of the
contract. It was just an antecedent communication. The only contract between the
plaintiff and the defendants is the rules of the club.”
Bukti: Initial Communication
8. Coelho v. The Public Services Commission (1964):

The Malay Mail advertisement was an invitation to qualified persons to apply. The
resulting applications were offers. Information conveyed to the applicant was an
unqualified acceptance.
Bukti: Advertisement is invitation to treat. Application is an offer.
9. Partridge v. Crittenden (1968):

Appellant: Putting the advertisement “ Bramblefinch hens 25s each”.
Protection of Birds Act 1954
Bukti: The advertisement constituted in law an invitation to treat, not an offer for sale.
10. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd.
(1953):
The defendants carried on business as retail chemists at their shop premises known as 73,
Burnt Oak Broadway, Edgware, which were entered in the register of premises kept
under s 12(1) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. The shop comprised one room so
arranged that customers might serve themselves. The main part of the room contained
shelves round the walls and on an “island fixture” in the centre, one part being described
by a printed notice as “Chemist's Department”. On the shelves in the chemist's
department were drugs and proprietary medicines displayed in packages and other
containers and marked with the retail prices. One section of the department contained
exclusively drugs, including proprietary medicines, which were included in or contained
substances specified in Part I of the Poisons List referred to in s 17(1) of the Act of 1933.
No such drugs were displayed for sale in any other part of the shop. When the shop was
open for the sale of goods, there was present in the room, among other persons, a
registered pharmacist in personal control of the chemist's department subject to the
directions of a superintendent in accordance with s 9(1)(b) of the Act. A customer
entering the shop premises would take an empty wire basket at a barrier, select any article
he required from among those on the shelves, place them in the basket, and take them to
one of the two exits. At each exit there was a cashier who would examine the articles
taken and accept payment of the total price. The pharmacist superintended that part of the
transaction involving the sale of a drug which took place at the cash desk, and was
authorised by the defendants at that stage, if he thought fit, to prevent any customer from
removing any drugs from the premises. On 13 April 1951, two customers purchased
articles included in Part I of the Poisons List, following the procedure outlined.
Held: The taking of the articles from the shelves constituted an offer by the customer to
buy and not the acceptance of an offer by the chemist to sell; the sale was not completed
until the customer’s offer to buy had been accepted by the defendants by their acceptance
of the purchase price;...
...the mere fact that a customer picks up a bottle of medicine from the shelves in this case
does not amount to an acceptance of an offer to sell. This is an offer by the customer to
buy...There is no sale until the buyer’s offer to buy is accepted by the acceptance of the
money, and that takes place under the supervision of a pharmacist….
Bukti: Pameran kedai is invitation to treat. Customer taking the article is an offer to buy
and it is up to the shop whether to accept the offer or not.
11. Fisher v Bell (1961):
A shopkeeper displayed in his shop window a knife with a price ticket “Ejector
knife--4s”. He was charged with offering for sale a flick knife, contrary yo s.1(1) of the
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
s 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959. Section 1(1) of the Act provides:
“Any person who manufactures, sells of hires or offers for sale or hire, or lends or gives to any
other person—(a) any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure
applied to a button, spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes
known as a 'flick knife' … shall be guilty of an offence … “
Held: The shopkeeper was not guilty of the offence with which he was charged because
the displaying of the knife in the shop window was merely an invitation to treat and the
shopkeeper had not thereby offered the knife for sale.
Bukti: Pameran kedai is invitation to treat.

12. Spencer v Harding (1870)
The defendants advertised a sale by tender of the stock in trade belonging Eilbeck & co.
The advertisement specified where the goods could be viewed, the time of opening for
tenders and that the goods must be paid for in cash. No reserve was stated. The claimant
submitted the highest tender but the defendant refused to sell to him.
Held:
Unless the advertisement specifies that the highest tender would be accepted there was no
obligation to sell to the person submitting the highest tender. The advert amounted to an
invitation to treat, the tender was an offer, the defendant could choose whether to accept
the offer or not.

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Contract Week 2: Offer

1. Preston Corp Sdn Bhd v. Edward Leong & Ors (1982):

2. Boulton v Jones (1857):

3. Carlil v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893):

5. Errington v. Errington & Woods (1952):

6. Daulia v Four Millbank Nominees Ltd (1978):

8. Coelho v. The Public Services Commission (1964):

9. Partridge v. Crittenden (1968):

11. Fisher v Bell (1961):

known as a 'flick knife' … shall be guilty of an offence … “

Bukti: Pameran kedai is invitation to treat.

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