UNIT 11 REGIONAL MOVEMENTS

Structure
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Regional Movement: Meaning and Significance
11.3 Methodological Insights on Regional Movements
11.4 Regional Movements, Regionalism and State Formation: Some Causative
Explanation
11.5 Salient Patterns of Movements for Statehood
11.6 Types of Regionalism
11.7 State’s Response to Regional Movements
11.8 Summary
11.9 Exercises

11.1 INTRODUCTION

As India consists of a large number of regions with diverse social and cultural
compositions and different levels development of economy and infrastructure it has
been facing regional movements since it became independent. The Reorganisation of
the states in India in 1956 did not solve problems related to regional disparities. Even
after the formation of a particular state, a region or more within a state start regional
movements for autonomy, independence or even secession from the union of India. This
units seeks to familiarise the union of India. This units seeks to familiarise the students
with the regional movements and issues related to them.

11.2 REGIONAL MOVEMENT: MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE

Regional movement is an identity movement seeking special privileges, protection, and

concessions from the state. It is a movement for regional self-governance. In other
words, it means a movement for state formation — a movement seeking pluralisation
and federalisation of existing polity and political process. There are two potential and
significant causes of the emergence of regional movement — one is the interregional
or intercommunity conflict, and other is the conflict between region and the state.
Interregional conflict is usually shaped around insider-outsider complex — a complex
that nurtures nativism and son-of-the-soil ideology. This, in other words, means a natural
claim of the insider for better and preferential treatment by the state, particularly in
terms of resource distribution and reservation of jobs for the locals. Anti-migrant
movement in Assam, and tribal-nontribal conflict over domicile issue in Jharkhand are
some of the important examples of son-of-soil ideology. Interregional conflict also
occurs over ‘regional pride’ rooted in culture, language and traditions. Regional pride
is extended further in the event of boarder dispute and sharing of river water. In such
a situation extent and meaning of ‘region’ and regional movement expand to take the
form of state regionalism. This is very much evident from recent conflict between
Karnataka and Tamilnadu over sharing of Cauvery water, or boarder dispute between
Maharashtra and Karnataka, or the most recent conflict between Biharis and Assamese
over the competitive examination for central services, or the ‘Mumbaikar’ call of the

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Shiv Sena restricting and preventing non-Marathis from occupying important positions
in the business, economy and polity of Maharashtra. It is probably the reason that some
scholars consider regional movement as consequence of developmental tension between
society and polity.

On the other hand, region-state conflict usually takes place in the institutional structure
of state system, wherein a region questions the distributive policy of the state as
discriminatory, exploitative and unfavourable to the overall well-being of the concerned
regional community. It is from this perceived sense of deprivation, neglect and ‘internal
colonialism’ that the people of a particular region organise themselves into a movement
seeking in most of the cases separation from the existing state, or in select instances
settling with some autonomy arrangements within the same state. Here, it may be
contextually mentioned that in the federal-plural process of nation and state–building,
it is the high degree of democratisation and competitive political mobilisation, which
generally transform a territorially concentrated sociocultural group into a self-conscious
political community, questioning the hegemony of dominant group (other regional
community) in state apparatuses and policies, particularly those affecting its identity
structure and developmental needs. Viewed in this perspective, regional movement
appears to be non-centralist and self-determining and defining ideology of protest against
hegemony of state power and dominant regional group.

We can now possibly define regional movement as a movement for autonomy of identity
and autonomy of development. Its objectives may be accommodative, protectionist,
welfarist, autonomist, separatist and secessionist. Secessionism, however, seems to be
merely a tactical strategy to pressurise the government. Once their genuine grievances
are redressed they settle down within the constitutionally propounded democratic structure
of Indian nationalism. There are numerous examples to support this submission, ranging
from Tamil separatism to Akali movement (read religious nationalism of Sikhs),
Gorkhaland movement, Bodoland movement, etc. A close scrutiny of their demands
would suggest that they seek a redefinition of state-society relationship in such a manner
that accommodates their identity demands and takes due care of their socio-economic
requirement. And to serve this purpose, they usually aspire for a constitutionally
documented institutional space of their own where their choices are self-determined.
Thus, it is the ‘protectionist self’ around which politics of regional movement revolves.

11.3 METHODOLOGICAL INSIGHTS ON REGIONAL

MOVEMENTS

Regional movements, especially in a diverse society like India, have contexualised

formations. Therefore, it requires a componential analysis of the complex interplay of
region, people and the state. When we say regional movement, it immediately refers to
the existence of a regional community with political overtone. In more than one sense
regional community is different from other social communities. In fact, region may
consist of many social communities, which through a highly complex process of nation
formation constitute themselves into a distinct regional community. Regional community
is generally formed on the basis of identity of affinity and interests. “It is a community
more in terms of ‘horizontal comradeship’ than the uniformity or homogeneity scaling
vertically (AK Singh, “Sub Regions and State formation in India”). It is complementariness
of interest and identity that help people to constitute and to imagine as a separate

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regional community. But, is how a regional community formed? What are those subjective
and objective factors, which constitute a group into distinct regional political community?
Componential analysis also helps us in analysing the success, failure and sustenance of
a regional movement. It further helps us in examining the nature and potential impact
of regional movement on the process of federal nation–building. It is commonly held
that more subjectively the identity is grounded, more intense is the regional movement.
It is in this context that the theories of nationalism or nation and nationality formation
assume critical significance in understanding the phenomena of regional identity formation
and its transformation into a movement. Here, it is also worthwhile to consider the
similarity and difference between nationalism and regionalism. Regionalism and
nationalism are symbiotically linked. Both undergo similar process of construction and
formation. They tend to serve their respective social constituencies as an ideology. They
share similar analytical concern as to how identity is formed, and when an identity
becomes politically salient. Only difference between them is while the nationalism is
generally centralising; regionalism, on the contrary, is inherently decentralising. It is
possibly the reason that regional movement also emerges as a reaction to nationalism.

In the literatures on nationalism, we find two principally important, but dichotomous

accounts of nation-formation: perennialist-primordialist; and, modernist. Primordialist
considers identity as pre-given entity of distinct races, ethnicity, language, culture,
religion etc. These individual attributes of identity are called the objective markers of
identity. Any one or combination of them constitutes a distinct national or sub-national
community, which when politicised become a distinct nation. Thus for them, nation is
a politicised ethno-cultural community, extended in history and deeply rooted in socio-
cultural traditions. Since such a community is historically embedded, it is territorially
persistent as well. In other words, a community in order to be effective must also have
a cultural homeland. Thus region in this context refers to a socially structured territorial
space whose ecology and economy have deep impact on the making of a distinct and
visible common identity of the people living in that region. Two regions cannot be
culturally similar. Their geo-specifics do vary from each other even though they share
in common many zonal characteristics. It is this fusion of identity and territory that
makes regional community a self-determining community. It is this fusion which also
rationalises their claims to autonomy. Interestingly in India, a regional community may
and may not have pre-given bond of ethnie and culture. As the studies on the construction
of Uttarakhandi and Jharkhandi identities have shown, it is the distinctiveness of regional
economy and ecology that created first an ‘interest community’, which over the years
of cohabitation succeeded in creating a common cultural bond. Social making of India
further suggests that every form of identity and its objective markers have carved out
distinct territory for itself. This we referred to as identity zone(s). In India, culture,
language, religion, ethnicity, social traditions have assumed regional characteristics. It
is probably the reason that we find performative variation in the observance of religious
practices and caste idioms from region to region. Another interesting fact about the
regions in India is that most of them had some form of administrative identity in the
past when people and territory structurally - institutionally enmeshed with each other to
give region a particular cultural trait and easily recognisable patterned behavior of the
people. Historical-cultural region has had evolved communicative signs and symbols
which in some cases led to the growth of an independent language or dialect. What
emerges from this account of region-formation is the fact that regional community may
be constituted on the basis of pre-give identity, or it may be constructed afterwards

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which in the process of modernisation and development gets consolidated further as
community of common material interests and destiny.

But how a regional community translates itself into a sub-national movement? To find
an explainable answer, we have to take into consideration the methodological submission
of the modernisation or mobilisation theory of nation formation. There are two crucial
submissions of this theory: (i) conversion of community into a movement is a process
of mobilisation by elite, intellengstia and leaders; and (ii) in order to provide further
dynamics and cohesion to community consciousness, identity is reinvented and relocated
in the contextual present. This may require contextual reconstruction and reinterpretation
of identity-contents of a regional community. But who does this? It is the elite who
selects symbols (usually from distinctive ethnic and cultural past), and standardises
them for larger group cohesion. The elite in the competitive setting of liberal
constitutionalism politically mobilises the given identity. In other words, it is the state,
which provides a setting in which identity crystallises and movement emerges. The state
itself becomes a critical site of identity contestations and a breeding ground for sub-
national or regional movement to emerge. Writing perceptively about India, Myron
Weiner observes: “The process of identity formation is a complex one with several key
elements. One element is the institutional structure, which shapes the framework within
which group identities are maintained and intensified. The federal system, the structure
of political parties, the educational system, and media serve to reinforce some identities
while undermining others. A second element can be described as reactive mechanisms.
Group identities are often formed or reinforced when challenged by others. The challenge
may come as a consequence of assimilative pressures, migration, economic competition,
or political threats. A third element can be described as policy feedbacks. Government
policies in the form of entitlements and reservations induce groups to organise for
political action, which in turn intensifies group identities. A fourth element is the
underlying cultural conception of the state’s relationship to group identities. Here the
issue is whether society is seen as subordinate to the state…or whether society is viewed
as autonomous.

Regional identity is also formed, what Marxist scholar Hobsbawm writes about nation,
“at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation”. Modern
means of communication and technological advancement create, intentionally or
unintentionally, a collective self of the people, who organise themselves into a movement
for getting fair, if not preferential, deal in the dispersal of national power and resources.
Technology creates, to use Benedict Anderson hypothesis, an ‘imagined community’ -
community which has the affinity of boundary, beyond which other imagined community
exists. Had not the print capitalism arrived, the imagined community of nation would
not have been formed. In other words, identity is facilitated by modernisation and
development. Amidst the above contested account of identity formation, David Miller
probably provides the best possible working definition of community (read regional
community) as “(1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended
in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked
off from other communities by its distinct public culture…”. Thus in any academic
exercise on regional movement, it is the dynamics of ‘self’ and ‘others’ that need to be
examined and analysed. Self-others dichotomy needs to be further situated in the politics
of modernisation and development. If modernisation structurally differentiates pre-given
identity and seeks to supplement it with new structure of secular identity, it also, on the

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other, provides identity the necessary technological gadgets to recreate and reinvent
itself. If post- modernity theory is to be believed, then identity never lapses, it only finds
new medium and new language in the modernisation process. Identity universalises
itself through medium of mass communication. People re-search and re-draw its ethnic
past and situate it contemporarily.

From the above discussion, we may now select some crucial variables, which may help
us in analysing regional identity and regional movements in India. One of them is
federalism. Its working in India has shown some inherent contradiction. As we know,
federalism is essentially decentralising. It is a political programme of institutionalising
autonomy of society and polity. It is expected to accommodate regionalism within the
framework of a federal nationalism. But on the contrary, its working took a centralising
turn where regionalism was not only misplaced but at one point of time was also
characterised as antithetical to Indian nationalism, its unity and integrity. Thus federalism
instead of patterning regionalism served centrally the Union. As a consequence, most
of the regional movements have critically questioned the constitutional scheme of
distribution of federal powers between the region and centre. Dravida movement in
Tamil Nadu, Akali movement in Punjab, N T Rama Rao’s political propagation of
‘Telegu pride’ and other similar movements critically questioned the legitimacy of
central powers and downsizing of their sub-nationalism or regionalism. As mentioned
above, regional movement is organised in reaction to certain state policies, which a
regional community finds disadvantageous to its interests. Thus one has to also take into
consideration the policy framework of the state — both central and regional. Societal
and regional equations of governmental policies have catalytic impact on the formation
and initiation of a regional movement. Initially, the promotion of Hindi nationalism at
the cost of other languages (regional and local dialects) created a fertile base for linguistic
sub-nationalism to emerge.

Another important variable is the party system and party structure. The key question to
be examined is the coalitional and accommodative capacity of the party system. The
hypothesis that can be put forth here is that less coalitional a national party and party
system, more intense is the possibility of regional parties to be formed and movement
to be organised. In this context of crucial importance is the leadership pattern and
representational structure particularly of the national and state level parties. Many a
times, leaders with considerable public understanding organise a party of his own with
defined enclaves of regional support and core social constituency. Such a party usually
survives on the ideology of regionalism or sub-nationalism. This holds true with most
of the smaller parties of Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Northeastern states. Interestingly
in India regional parties have come into being through a process of division and split
in the national and state level parties. However, there are parties like Assom Gana
Parishad, which came into being through the process of regional movement itself. Regional
parties unleash regionalisation process in the national political order with a view to have
participatory control over such decisions, which affect their identity and development.
In any case, regional parties have two important roles — (i) identity retention, protection
and articulation, and (ii) mobilising people into a movement in the event of conflict
between nation and region, and between regions. However, a caveat here may be added,
party and party system is an important factor, but not a necessary prerequisite for
regional movement to emerge. Regional movement may be autonomous and independent
of parties and party system. Transient small group of intellectuals and elite may shape

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movement. We should also not forget the fact that social and regional movements do
follow the rules of spontaneity and subalterneity. Regional movement is generally self-
processed and shaped in the structural dynamics of ‘self’ and ‘others’. Thus for any
substantive formation of knowledge on regional movements, one has to essentially
understand the complex dynamics of ‘self’ and ‘others’ through a measured analysis
of inter-regional relations (or conflict), state policies, instruments and institutions of
political mobilisation, impact of technology on identity formation, role of mass media,
and the structural analysis of national and regional conflict which generate group conflict.

11.4 REGIONAL MOVEMENTS, REGIONALISM AND STATE

FORMATION: SOME CAUSATIVE EXPLANATION

India has been territorially reorganised into 28 states and 7 union territories. Out of this,
we have today as many as 31 demands for statehood and sub–autonomy arrangements.
They are: Maru Pradesh in Rajasthan; Bundelkhand, Poorvanchal, Bhojpur and Harit
Pradesh or Jatland in the Uttar Pradesh; Vindhya Pradesh, Baghelkhand, Rewanchal,
Madhya Bharat, Mahakosal, Malwa in Madhya Pradesh; Mithila in Bihar; Saurashtra in
Gujarat; Konkan, Vidarbha and Marathwada in Maharashtra; Telengana in Andhra
Pradesh; Coorg, Kodagu and Sagari Prant in Karnataka; Kosal Rajya in Orissa;
Gorkhaland and Kamtapuri in West Bengal; autonomy demands of Jammu and Ladakh
regions in Jammu and Kashmir; Bodoland, Karbi-Anglong, and Poorbanchal in Assam;
Kukiland in Nagaland; Garoland in Meghalaya; and Hmar state in Mizoram. Movements
for these states are in different stages of mobilisation. Some of them are strong and
persistent, others are dormant but occasionally reiterative. What we need to examine
here is why there exist so many demands for separate states? Do the present states lack
requisite homogeneity of population and administration?

From close analysis of the official practice of state formation it appears that these
demands exist because of the non-congruence between cultural boundary and
administrative boundary. In many cases, the present states appear to be invented ones,
which has unsuccessfully attempted to create common linguistic, administrative and
political identity among the people living within the different regions of the state. Even
if the invented state has succeeded in creating new pan-state identity, people have not
relegated their pre-given ethnic-regional ties to the backyards in order to live with this
new identity. In fact, people of India live with many identities, but this never means
the replacement of one identity with other, or the assimilation of many into one. Co-
living with many identities is possible only through inter-connectivity between them.
But when this inter-connectivity is either missing, or attempt is made to supplement the
pre-given ethnic regional identity with invented official (state) identity the problem of
legitimacy begins. This is one among many dimensions of regional movements in India.
Interestingly in the nine states of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh.
Haryana, Punjab, Goa, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, we do not find any dislocation between
cultural boundary and administrative boundary of the state. Therefore, there does not
exist any significant movement for statehood.

In the six major and large states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, there alone exist 16 major demands for statehood.
Further, in three officially designated Hindi-states of Bihar, Uttar Prdesh and Madhya
Pradesh there are as many as eleven demands or movements for separate statehood. The

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very existence of these demands itself questions the legitimacy of these states being
Hindi-States, and their artificial constructedness, In other words, region and state are
non-congruent. To explain further, in the ethnically homogeneous states like Punjab,
Tamil Nadu etc. it is the culturally constructed ‘We’ that permeates different geographical
divisions of the state. In this type of states, ‘ethnie’ is coterminous with ‘territory’;
therefore, we are having least (or for all practical purposes ‘no’) movement for separate
statehood. While the ethnic states cultivate on the basis of pre-given identity, the
ecologically distinctive states like Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranachal, Jharkhand and other
hill states are having ecologically shaped, constructed and locally ingrained identity. It
is the relative congruence of ‘interests’, ‘destiny’ and ‘folk-affinity’ that makes an
ecologically distinctive state/region a cohesive political and administrative entity within
the Indian federation.

On the other hand, in the composite — plural states such as West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, the similar
congruence of affinity and interests lacks between the state and people of different
regions. Coalescing together many distinct and mutually varying sub-regional identities
within one dominant language like Hindi, Bengali, Rajasthani, Gujarati, Marathi, Telegu
and Kannada have formed these states. It was believed that these languages would, in
due course of time, succeed in creating a broad regional-state identity across the people
and sub-regions of these states. But, these languages have not been able to create a sense
of ‘imagined communities’ among two people living within two different sub-regions
of a state. Bihar for example lacks requisite homogeneity of population, culture, language,
geography, politics and economics. This delegitimises the relevance of state for serving
the identific and development requirements of the people of Mithila region. This holds
true with most of the above listed composite plural states.

What has been stressed above is the fact that though the principle of dominant language
may help to create an ‘imaginary state’, it fails to create an ‘imagined community’.
Therefore, today we have demands and movements for the separate states of Mithila,
Bhojpur, Braj, Bundelkhand, etc. Given their historicity of identity, administration and
exclusivity of development, these sub-regions are potential claimants of separate states.
Similarly, Bengali bhadralok identity has not been able to hold together the ethnic
Nepalese in the Darjeeling hills, and Rajbonshis in north Bengal demanding a separate
state in five districts of Cooch Bihar, Jalpaiguri, parts of Darjeeling and north and south
Denajpur. Another classic example of language not creating an imagined community is
the demand for a separate Telengana state in Andhra Pradesh. The people of Telengana
cherish their history and tradition of cultural synthesis as their identity, instead of
Telegu language.

The sub-regional identity assumes distinct political identity when factor of ‘internal
colonialism’ generates and promotes inter-regional disparities and discrimination. This
phenomenon has two dimensions: one, many of the sub-regions, despite being rich in
natural resources have remained economically underdeveloped either because of the
sheer neglect of their development by the state in which they currently are, or, ill-
conceived top-down approach of development; second, survival of one region at the cost
of other region through resources and earnings transfers. This is what rationalises the
demands for separate states of Vidarbha, Marathwada and Konkan (in Maharashtra),
Telengana (in Andhra Pradesh), Saurashtra (in Gujarat) and Kodagu (in Karnataka),

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There is another dimension of it. If demand for Harit Pradesh in western Uttar Pradesh
is any pointer, then it can safely be argued that an economically well–off region may
seek separate statehood in order to retain its status as developed or developing economy.

11.5 SALIENT PATTERNS OF MOVEMENTS FOR STATEHOOD

From above discussion, following salient patterns of regional movements seeking separate
state may be discerned:

i) In India, territory and community are symbiotically linked. A region is known by

the community, which lives in it, and community is designated and characterised
by the geo-specifics of the given region. The demand for separate statehood arises
from the synthesis between the two – community and geography. A territorial
community seeks separate state in order to be the sole arbiter of its cultural setting,
political making and economic wellbeing of the people and territory, which it
claims as ‘homeland’. For them the state formation means creating an institutional-
political space through which ‘autonomous self’ of the society is not only expressed,
but preserved, protected and promoted.

ii) People having distinct socio-cultural identity, concentrated in few contiguous districts
within the existing state-systems seek a separate state in order to preserve, protect
and promote their identity. It is argued that a separate state would provide them a
political identity and a constitutionally documented institutional space for interest
articulation and protection within the Indian nation. It is being contested that this
would enhance their capacity to bargain with the central authority (union government)
as well as with other states in the overall distribution of political power and economic
resources. This, in other words, means capacity endowment, which otherwise is not
possible within the existing state in which they currently are. The cases of
Uttarakhand and Jharkhand movements are important pointers in this regard. There
is (was) a perceived threat to their identity due to the existence of ‘internal
colonialism’, expansionism and hegemony of certain other regional or cultural
groups. This also holds specifically true with most of the sub-regional movements
in the north–eastern parts of India. They further argue that a separate state would
ensure them of a self-assuring mode of economic development through better
application and exploitation of local resources, talents and skills.
iii) Some of the above mentioned regional movements seek constitutional recognition,
protection and legitimisation of their respective socio-cultural varieties by the state.
It is at this level that the demand for functional elevation of mother tongue to the
level of education and administration is made. This also includes inclusion of some
languages in the eighth schedule of the Constitution of India. Linguistic purism is
another facet of socio-cultural regionalism. This in other words means preservation
of cultural identity. Identity factor is extended to delimit state’s encroachment upon
the cultural space of a particular regional community. Cultural homogenisation by
the state on the pretext of having a uniform national cultural identity is opposed.
Therefore, most of the regional movements emphasise autonomy especially in the
socio-cultural realm. And for exercising autonomy of identity, a separate state is
legitimately demanded. A separate state, in this context, is perceived as congenial
political space through which ‘self’ of identity is preserved, protected and promoted.

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 This further means delimiting the areas of influence and interference by the state
(central and regional states) in the exclusive ‘self’ of the society. This requires
periodic restructuring of state-society relationships, especially in terms of the cultural
rights of the people and their subsequent obligation to a broader territorial state.
Arguably, state’s role is perceived in promotional terms, and not those of interference.
And such a state-society relationship is sought to be provided a statutory basis in
order to avoid encroachment by any other structures of governance.
iv) Located within the realms of identity and development, regionalism for sub-regional
groups serves as an ideology through which they seek to define their own
administrative and political identity; and, their relationships with broader territorial
state, regional state, and inter-community relationships. Regionalism provides them
a bargaining space in the overall process of nationalism and federalism. It acts as
countervailing force to centralisation, and allows polity and society to federal. It
stresses for a decentralist framework of national unity, nation and state–building,
and governance. Being an autonomist ideology, its two fold objectives are (i)
maintenance of (sub) regional identity; and, (ii) self-devised and sustained mode of
economic growth. These two objectives are best achieved, as regionalists claim,
when they are granted the separate statehood or other structural-institutional
mechanism of self-rule. In India, as Akhtar Majeed observes, “despite occasional
and remote indications of potential secessionism, regional movements do not usually
go beyond claiming resource sharing within the broader national context.
Regionalism, in this sense, can politically be understood as a” search for an
intermediate control system between the centre and periphery for the competitive
advantage in the national arena”.

11.6 TYPES OF REGIONALISM

Iqbal Narain has identified three major types of regionalism (or regional movements) in
India (i) Supra–State regionalism; (ii) Inter-State regionalism; (iii) Intra-State regionalism.
Supra–state regionalism is built around the issues of common interest in which group
of states form a common political alliance, directed against either the similar alliance
of other states or the Union. Supra state regionalism is issue specific and is, as Narain
writes, “confined to certain matter on which the group would like to take a common and
joint stand. It is not at all a case of a total and permanent merger of state identities in
the group identity; in fact, rivalries, tensions and even conflicts continue to take place
at times even simultaneously with group postures south vs. north in India on such issues
as language or the location of steel plants illustrate the point”. Compared to this, inter-
state regionalism, as he further observes, “is coterminous with state boundaries and
involves juxtaposing of one or more state identities against another on specific issues,
which threaten their interest. River water in general and…boarder dispute in particular
can be cited as example.” On the other hand, a regional community against the state
in which they are situated spearheads intra–state regionalism. Intra–state regionalism is
aimed at assuring oneself of self-identity and self-development. This ‘self’ gradually
becomes weak when we move onto other two forms of regionalism. In the case of intra–
state regionalism, it is identity around which group’s political and economic interests
are defined. But in other two cases, it is conflict of interests either between two states
or between the centre and the state which temporarily give the people a sense of
togetherness, and a common political outlook. But, the essence of regionalism always

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remains the same in all the category of regionalism. As a political idiom regionalism
seeks federalisation-pluralisation of national identity and resources. In other words, it is
an ideology of territorialising the process of federal nation–building. It is probably the
reason that regionalism has been described as ‘in-built’ tendency of nationalism and
federalism. It is a “complex amalgam of geographical, historico-cultural, economic,
politico-administrative and psychic factors”. What factors will assume ascendancy in
the making of a regional movement is difficult to say. However, regional movement in
any case will always seek a redefinition of the relationship between a regional and
national on a more substantive basis.

11.7 STATE’S RESPONSE TO REGIONAL MOVEMENTS

State’s response to regional movements has been varying. We do not find any consistent
policy in this regard. However, certain patterns and principles can be discerned in this
regard. They are: (i) secessionist demand could not be conceded, rather, secessionism
would be suppressed by all necessary means; (ii) central government would not concede
those regional demands based exclusively upon religious differences; and (iii) the demands
for the creation of separate linguistic would not be conceded unless such a demand is
socially wide and economically viable. To illustrate, there could not be any singular
construct or formation of the units of Indian federation. Units should be composite
ones. Such a composite unit could be formed only by mutual balancing of four principles
which the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) underlined as: “(i) preservation and
strengthening of the unity and security of India; (ii) linguistic and cultural homogeneity;
(iii) financial, economic and administrative considerations; and (iv) successful working
of the national plan.” Other factors like `peoples’ wishes’, ‘historicity of the region’,
and ‘geographical contiguity’ could have only limited, but qualificatory application
while (re) drawing the boundary of the units of the Indian Union. Thus, wishes of the
people can be acceptable as one of the yardsticks of territorial readjustment only when
it is objectively ascertainable, and is subjected to the overall considerations of other
important factors like “human and material resources of the areas claiming statehood,
the wishes of substantial minorities, the essential requirements of the Indian Constitution
and the larger national interests.” Similarly, historicity of a region can be invoked only
to the extent of determining the connectedness of the people with claimed territory, but
it could not be stretched to an extent as to convert them into a separate nation. Though
geographical contiguity is of high value in determining and devising the boundary of a
state, “it [however] does not necessarily imply or involve the need for a geographical
frontier….”. Thus, while drawing the lines between two units, the primary concern as
the SRC underlined should be of ensuring compactness of the units.

Within the above totalistic approach to reorganisation, the Commission strongly

recommended for the creation of large states. “This, however”, as Commission writes,
“does not mean that units should be so unwieldy as to be without any intrinsic life of
their own or to defeat the very purpose for which larger units are suggested, i.e.,
administrative efficiency and coordination of economic development and welfare activity.”
Thus, in the opinion of the Commission, the size principle must be balanced with
viability principle. This, in other words, means that the region seeking separate statehood
must have “adequate financial resources to maintain itself and to develop its economy”.
Though, Commission upheld the principle of internal homogeneity purely from the
viewpoints of smooth functioning of administration, it, nonetheless, rejected the
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monolingual and uni-cultural construction of state. It is precisely the reason that it
rejected the ‘homeland concept’ and ‘one language one state’ formula for the
reorganisation of the units of Indian federation. However, within the general principle
of sizeable — composite state, a cultural group can have its own state when they do
qualify the following two fold criteria: “(a) the people claiming a distinctive culture
must constitute a recognisable group; that is to say, it should include a number of
persons sufficient by themselves to claim, conserve and develop stable traditions or the
characteristics of their culture; and (b) such cultural individuality should be capable of
being expressed in terms of a defined and sizeable geographical entity.” However, such
a cultural basis of states’ reorganisation should not impede the inter-mingling of two
cultures and overall growth of composite national culture. What appears from above is,
that every recognisable and dominant basis of states’ reorganisation must be subjected
to the test of maintenance of national unity and integrity, and national security.

On the basis of SRC’s recommendation, the Government of India passed in November

1956, the State Reorganisation Act. The Act endorsed the bulk of the recommendations
of SRC, except the merger of Hyderabad state into Andhra Pradesh, and Vidarbha was
made part of the Bombay state. Thus, the number of states was reduced from 16 to 14
in this Act. However, the number of centrally administered territories was enhanced
from 3 to 6. The major inclusion was the Himachal Pradesh and Tripura. Since then,
the numbers of states have been increased to 28 and union territories to 7. States formed
since 1956 include: Gujarat (1960), Nagaland (1963), Haryana (1966), Punjab (1966)
Himachal Pradesh (1971), Manipur (1972), Meghalaya (1972), Tripura (1972), Sikkim
(1975), Arunachal Pradesh (1987), Mizoram (1987) and Goa (1987). Jharkhand (2000),
Uttaranchal (2000) and Chattisgarh (2000).

With the formation of three new states of Uttranchal, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh,
reorganisations have been effected for the first time in the Hindi-heartland of Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. As stated above, the reorganisation was first effected
in 1956 in the south. It moved down to north-west in 1966 and north-east in 1971 and
1987. In all these reorganisations, the basis of reorganisation also differs. The first
reorganisation was done predominantly on the basis of language. In north-west in 1966,
linguistic principle was combined with religious identity. Initially, this seemed to be a
perilous combination having stronger tendency of drifting towards separatism. However,
democracy has its own way to prevent separatism and promote integration. In the third
major reorganisation affecting mostly the north-eastern region, tribal affiliations and
distinctive ethnic features became the major basis of reorganisation. The formation of
three new states, in all probabilities, may have ‘domino affect’ on the Hindi- heartland
and other composite-plural and large sized states. Reorganisation in these states may not
be purely ethnic or cultural, but it may be on the basis of ‘economic specificity’ and
‘ecological-cultural distinctiveness’. Cultural specificity may in some case, as in the
movement for Mithilanchal state, owe to language or dialect, but in no case it would
owe exclusively to religion or ethnicity. In fact, most of the sub-regions of composite-
plural states have developed and articulated a composite-cultural identity.

With initial reluctance, the Government of India is now applying the provisions of the
Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Indian Constitution with intended objective of containing
ethnic separatism and tribal alienation in different regions, particularly in the northeast.
Institutionally, the government seems to be receptive to the creation of autonomous

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regional council or district councils for the people of ethnic enclaves, which otherwise
may not qualify for separate state. Regional council is an experiment in the community
governance, wherein the concerned regional community has powers to regulate its identity
and developmental. Similarly, the state language policy is now being fine-tuned to
accommodate the claims of various dialect or language groups. The government has
embarked on two fold policies — one, to include the major languages in Eighth Schedule,
and two, granting official recognition to culturally significant languages of the state as
language of education and official transaction. All these policies have significant impact
on integrating diverse regional community within the mould and measures of Indian
nationalism. We find a positive change in the official attitude towards regionalism and
regional movement. Government can concede ethnic claims of self-governance within
the permissible autonomy framework of Indian Constitution. Now regionalism is very
much integral to the process of nationalism and federalism. In fact the constitution of
India itself recognises the notion of an autonomous region. It is with the extension of
cultural autonomy, and initiation of democratic process with officially earmarked
economic package of development that India has been able to contain ethnic separatism,
and making regionalism ultimately the part and parcel of national life.

11.8 SUMMARY

To sum up, regional movements are indicative of the identity movements of people in
a particular region or state, which seek special privileges, protection and concessions
from the state. There are both imaginary and real reasons for the rise and growth of
these movements. Ever since India became independent, regional movements have taken
in different parts of the country on one or the other basis – territorial, ethnicity or
economic backwardness of the agitating areas. The response of the state to regional
movements has not been uniform. Depending on the situation the state has been
indifferent, accommodative or coercive to such movements. Since regional movements
are related to the socio-cultural and political processes, these are an ongoing phenomenon
in a democratic country like India.

11.9 EXERCISES

1) Explain the meaning and significance of regional movements.

2) Discuss the methodology to study regional movements.
3) Explain the reasons for the rise and growth of regional movements in India.
4) Write a note on the response of the state to the regional movements.

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