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M. S. Dhakad
Associate Professor Department of History Rajdhani
College, University of Delhi Raja Garden Ring road
New Delhi 110015.
Topic: Rise of Fascism.
Mussolini set up a political party (the PFI or Partito Nazionale Fascista) and appealed to
as wide a cross-section of society as he could by narrowing down the enemies to
socialism and the threat of 'red' revolution. For reasons which are examined in the next
section, this strategy was more successful, and in 1921 the Fascist Party won 35
parliamentary seats.
But broadening the appeal and abandoning open revolution did not mean less violence.
On the contrary, black-shirted Fascist squads launched numerous attacks on the left. They
were given their opportunity by a wave of strikes organized in the cities by the trade
unions and the PSI, as well as by action taken in rural areas by peasant leagues against
land owners. Throughout 1920 and 1921 militant workers and peasants were intimidated
into submission, through beatings and being forced to consume castor oil and live toads.
The Socialists responded in August with an appeal for a general strike as a protest against
Fascist violence, but this played further into Mussolini's hands. It took the Fascists only
one day to smash the threat and thus to emerge as the main safeguard against industrial
disruption.
Meanwhile, the post-war Italian governments had become increasingly unstable and
unpopular. A succession of Prime Ministers sought to contain what they saw as a threat
from the left and, in the process, came to depend on the parliamentary support of the
Fascist Party. Yet 1922 saw a spectacular political development: the replacement of Facta
by Mussolini.
This occurred as the result of a threat of force from Mussolini and a reaction of near
panic from the government. On his way to the Fascist Party Congress in Naples in
October 1922, Mussolini stopped off in Rome to demand at least five cabinet ministries.
In Naples he made preparations for a Fascist 'March on Rome' to seize power if his
conditions were not met. Facta (Army general) urged King Victor Emanuel III to declare
An explanation of Mussolini's rise martial law so that the threat could be countered by
force. The King refused and, mindful of the Fascist contingent gathering outside Rome,
invited Mussolini to join a coalition government. Sensing the possibility of total
capitulation, Mussolini declined (refused). On 29 October Mussolini, then in Milan,
received a request from the King to form his own government.
Three reasons can be given for Mussolini's success by the end of 1922. First, Italy had
undergone a prolonged crisis before 1914 which was so aggravated by the First World
War that conventional political and economic solutions no longer worked. Second, this
situation favoured the emergence of a new movement able to attract the support of a
cross-section of a society thoroughly disillusioned with the existing establishment. Third,
Mussolini's leadership and strategy gave to this movement a versatility and vitality which
contrasted all too obviously with a tired and dull government. Italy had been united as a
liberal-parliamentary regime but, in the era between Cavour and Mussolini, lacked
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political stability. There was a rapid succession of ministries: 22 between 1860 and 1900
(an average of 1.8 years each), 9 between 1900 and 1914 (1.6 years each), and 7 between
1914 and 1922 (1.1 years each). At first, parties were not clearly defined and government
depended on a consensus reached between the different political groups, a process known
as trasformismo. The total cost of the war was 148,000 million lire, over twice the total
expenditure of all Italian governments between 1861 and 1913.4 The economic base was
weakened by huge budget deficits and by unbalanced trade and industrial production. It
has been estimated that, by 1919, exports covered only 36 per cent of Italy's imports.
Furthermore, the growth of industrial production between 1915 and 1918 had been
geared so directly to the war effort that it could not be maintained by the requirements of
the post-war home market. Unemployment soared, with demobilization mainly
responsible for the total of 2 million by the end of 1919.5 Inflation had also become a fact
of life, with the cost of living in 1919 about four times that of 1913. The only real hope
for stability was a coalition which included Italy's two largest parties, the Socialists and
the PPI. However, the gap between them was unbridgeable. Giolitti and his successors,
Bonomi (1921-2) and Facta (1922) therefore operated in a political vacuum. Increasingly,
they came to depend on the Fascists - but in a way which was underhand,
unparliamentary and ultimately suicidal. Unable to resolve the growing crisis between
labour and capital, and ever conscious of the threat of revolution, the governments tacitly
allowed the Fascists to take direct and often brutal action against unions and peasant
leagues. This was the resort of a government which seemed to have lost the will to
govern. The original support for Fascism came from war veterans -young, aggressive
and, according to A.J. The Italian army was generally sympathetic towards the Fascists,
although two attitudes tended to prevail. The lower levels participated enthusiastically in
Fascist rallies and diverted a considerable amount of military equipment and arms, while
the officer corps tried to keep discipline within the army without actually attacking
Fascism.
The backbone of Fascism, however, was the lower middle class, especially small
shopkeepers, artisans and clerical workers. This normally moderate sector of society had
been destabilized by the process of industrialization and by the economic difficulties
caused by the war. They were the casualties of changes occurring all over central Europe,
and the sociologist Seymour Lipset has called them the 'displaced masses'. At first most
of the support came from the landlords and estate owners who were greatly assisted by
the Fascist attacks on peasant strikers in 1920. During the first half of 1921 Fascist
squads destroyed 119 labour chambers, 107 co-operatives and 83 peasant league offices.
the industrialists were willing to provide large donations; two examples were Alberto
Pirelli, the tyre magnate, and Giovanni Agnelli of Fiat. Then, during the course of 1921, a
number of workers joined the Fascist movement. The main reason for this was the
growing crisis of socialism.
The PSI split in 1921 and a separate Communist Party was established under the
influence of Gramsci. The organization of the socialist movement became even more
decentralized and provincial, which meant that the attacks of the Fascists rarely met co-
ordinated resistance. A third sector was the Catholic Church, taking its cue from Pope
Pius XI who, from the time of his election in 1922, remained on good terms with
Mussolini. The Church undoubtedly considered a Communist revolution to be the main
threat. Mussolini, by contrast, had abandoned atheism and had come to accept
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Catholicism as one of the sources of 'the imperial and Latin tradition of Rome'. Mussolini
was also able to establish links between local activist groups, so that Fascism could claim
to be a national movement as well as a national party. Secondly, Mussolini showed the
importance of opportunism and action rather than a fixed ideology. When he was
appointed Prime Minister in October 1922 Mussolini presided over a cabinet in which
there were four Fascists and 10 non-Fascists. Since his Party had only 7 per cent of the
seats in the lower chamber of Parliament, Mussolini had, at first, to be cautious and
conciliatory. He lull the other deputies into a sense of security by promising that he
would defend, not destroy, the constitution.
The former governing parties seemed to have given up completely. Nitti, an ex-Prime
Minister, was convinced that 'The Fascist experiment must be carried out without
interference: there should be no opposition from our side. Mussolini managed to persuade
the Chamber that his intention was constructive, not revolutionary. In a mood of
revulsion against Italy's habit of producing brief and unstable ministries, the Chamber
passed the Acerbo electoral law in 1923. This stated that the party, or bloc, with a 25 per
cent poll would automatically have a two-thirds majority in the Parliament and would
therefore form the government. The Italian electorate confirmed Mussolini's power in the
election of April 1924 by giving the Fascists 4.5 million votes (64 per cent of the total)
and control over 404 seats. combined vote for the opposition was about 2.5 million. From
this time onwards Mussolini could claim a genuine electoral mandate and therefore
pursue more radical policies with fewer inhibitions.
In June 1924 an outspoken Socialist deputy, Matteotti, was seized outside his house,
bundled into a Lancia and stabbed to death. His body was discovered two months later in
a shallow grave on the outskirts of Rome. It soon became evident that the crime had been
committed by over-zealous Fascists, and Mussolini feared that their activities could
permanently taint his Party in Parliament. The one-party state was formalized in May
1928 by the introduction of a new electoral law; this ensured that all parliamentary
candidates would be selected by the Fascist Grand Council from lists submitted by
confederations of employers and employees. A fundamental law, passed in 1925, altered
the constitution to make Mussolini responsible to the King rather than the legislature. In
1929, for example, he was personally responsible for eight key ministries: foreign affairs,
the interior, war, navy, aviation, colonies, corporations and public works. As far as
Mussolini was concerned, however, it was the whole point of his rule; after all, he had
once said, 'If Fascism does not follow me, no one can make me follow Fascism.
Mussolini's short stature and partial baldness were disguised by a ramrod straight stance
and shaven head, both of which were intended to give him a 'Roman' appearance. His
demagoguery remained impressive, based on the unsubtle belief that 'The crowd loves
strong men'. He was also portrayed as an expert rider, fencer, racing driver and violinist.
The public were constantly assailed by slogans like 'Mussolini is always right!' and
'Believe! Obey! Fight!'.
In 1923 the Education Minister, Gentile, introduced a new structure specifically intended
to create a new elite; technical education was separated from the classical courses which
became the passport to university education, and a rigid examination system was applied.
This, however, came under universal criticism from parents and was so difficult to
operate that Fedele, Gentile's successor, had to modify it from 1925 onwards. The most
important attempt to 'Fascistize' education was initiated by Bottai in 1936. Textbooks
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became a state monopoly; the number of approved history texts, for instance, was
reduced from 317 to one, while a junior Italian reader informed solemn eight-year-olds
that 'the eyes of the Duce are on every one of you'.
From 1938 racism was openly practised and taught in the classroom, while 1939 saw the
introduction of the Fascist School Charter. There were too many loopholes and evasions
and, in the universities, underground resistance to and contempt for Fascist values. Hence
the regime came to place more emphasis on the organization of youth groups outside the
school sector. At the age of four, boys became 'Sons of the She-Wolf; at eight they joined
the Balilla, before moving to the Avanguardisti at 14 and finally the Fascist Levy at 18.
The creed of the Balilla blatantly superimposed a doctored version of Italian history on a
twisted religious format: I believe in Rome the Eternal, the mother of my country, and in
Italy, her eldest daughter, who was born in her virginal bosom by the grace of God; who
suffered through Dictatorship in Italy the barbarian invasions, was crucified and buried,
who descended to the grave, and was raised from the dead in the nineteenth century, who
ascended into heaven in her glory in 1918 and 1922 and who is seated on the right hand
of her mother Rome; who for this reason shall come to judge the living and the dead. I
believe in the genius of Mussolini, in our Holy Father Fascism, in the communion of the
martyrs, in the conversion of Italians and in the resurrection of the Empire.
Torture was used more sparingly and the death sentence was rarely imposed for political
offences. As A. Cassels observes, 'The Fascist regime used terror, but was not in any real
sense based on terror. In July 1938 a Manifesto on Race was drawn up by Mussolini and
10 'professors' as a 'scientific exposition' of Fascist racial doctrine. It proclaimed that 'the
population of Italy is of Aryan origins and its civilization is Aryan', that 'there now exists
a pure Italian race' and that 'Jews do not belong to the Italian race'. It was followed by
decrees banning intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews and removing Jews from
prominent positions in finance, education and politics. Property restrictions were also
imposed and any Jews who had entered Italy since 1919 were to be repatriated. Italy had
always been less affected than other parts of Europe by antisemitism, largely because
Jews had never amounted to more than one in a thousand of the total population. Also,
Mussolini had originally denounced Nazi racism as 'unscientific' and 'absurd'25 and
several prominent Fascists were of Jewish origin.
By 1939, however, it was evident that any real benefits had accrued only to a small
minority - the great industrialists, the estate owners and those members of the middle
class serving in the Fascist bureaucracy. The industrialists were able to depend on a
permanent alliance with the government. The landed gentry also maintained their status
despite the Depression. They were helped by government policies which were intended to
maintain a large rural labour pool. By 1930, for example, the movement of rural workers
to cities was allowed only by permission of local prefects. By 1930 the large landowners,
who accounted for 0.5 per cent of the population, owned nearly 42 per cent of the land;
the small landholders, 87 per cent of the rural population, owned a mere 13 per cent. On
the whole, wages were reasonably high and the fringe benefits considerable. The rest of
Italian society suffered severely, mainly for the same reasons that the upper classes
benefited. The urban workers were tied down by the regulations introduced by the
industrialists with government approval, and were also intimidated by the fact of high
unemployment (about 2 million by 1932).
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The peasantry were so badly affected that many defied government edicts and moved to
the cities (particularly Rome, Milan and Turin) to swell the slum population. They were
driven to this by a reduction in agricultural wages of up to 40 per cent during the 1930s.
Hence, a whole range of essentials like meat, fruit, vegetables, butter, sugar, wine and
coffee became too expensive for many urban and rural workers. At first Mussolini had
anticipated that women would take part in 'every sector of human activity'. Then his
'Battle for Births' placed women firmly in the roles of childbearing, family management
and the 'homemaking sciences'. During the 1930s a spate of edicts restricted the
participation of women in most branches of employment. By 1938 women were
permitted to take up no more than 10 per cent of the total jobs available. Mussolini used
this trend to control the levels of unemployment among men, but his justification was
offensive and contemptuous: naturally a woman 'must not be a slave, but. In our state
women must not count'.
On the contrary, it has been argued that the Fascist state did provide positive benefits.
According to Gregor,35 'Fascist social welfare legislation compared favourably with the
more advanced European nations and in some respects was more progressive.' To take
some examples, old-age pensions and unemployment benefits were both increased;
medical care improved to the point that there was an appreciable decline in infant
mortality and tuberculosis; and the state spent 400 million lire on school building
between 1922 and 1942, compared with a mere 60 million spent between 1862 and 1922.
MUSSOLINI'S FOREIGN POLICY 1922-39
The period 1922-9
In his first speech as Prime Minister to the Chamber of Deputies (1922), Mussolini
proclaimed that 'Foreign policy is the area which especially preoccupies us.' His
intention, he said on another occasion, was simple: 'I want to make Italy great, respected
and feared. He aimed to be pragmatic and opportunist but sometimes became irrational,
unable to resist the chance of swift glory cheaply bought.
The first instance of aggression was the Corfu incident. On 21 August 1923 General
Tellini and four other Italians were assassinated by terrorists while working for a
boundary commission which was marking the border between Greece and Albania.
Mussolini seized the opportunity to browbeat Greece, demanding compensation of 50
million lire and an official apology. When these did not materialize, he ordered the
occupation of the Greek island of Corfu, clearly his original intention. Greece, however,
appealed to the League of Nations which, in turn, referred the whole matter to arbitration
by the Conference of Ambassadors. The outcome was a compromise which Mussolini
accepted, with extreme reluctance, under strong British diplomatic pressure. Italian
marines were pulled out of Corfu on 27 September and the Greek government paid 50
million lire, but without the apology.
Within two weeks Mussolini installed an Italian commandant in Fiume, a city whose
status was in dispute as it was claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia. In this instance,
Yugoslavia had no alternative but to agree to the Italian occupation as her main ally,
France, was militarily involved in the Ruhr. Mussolini's 'victory' was formalized in 1924
by the Pact of Rome. By 1925, however, Mussolini was showing a more reasonable face -
this time to the European powers.
Stresemann, Briand and Austen Chamberlain, Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and
Britain, were committed to international co-operation and the construction of a system of
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'collective security'. Mussolini was at first reluctant to involve Italy in any specific
scheme, as it would limit his chances of a future diplomatic coup. Increasingly, however,
he came under pressure from two directions. Externally, he was persuaded by French and
British diplomats and was courted by Chamberlain, who particularly wanted Mussolini's
participation. Internally, the more traditional and non-Fascist career diplomats of the
Italian Foreign Ministry brought all their persuasiveness to bear. The result was
Mussolini's signature on the Locarno Pact. Partly as a result of this concession, British
opinion of Mussolini became more favourable.
How successful had Mussolini been by 1929? On the one hand, he was being seen by
British leaders in an increasingly positive light. Churchill called him 'Roman genius in
person' and Austen Chamberlain said: ‘I trust his word when given and think we might
easily go far before finding an Italian with whom it would be as easy for the British
Government to work. On the other hand, Italy had not benefited materially from
Mussolini's diplomacy.
A crisis occurred in 1934, when the Austrian Nazi Party was involved in the assassination
of the Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss. Fearing that Hitler would use the chaos within
Austria as an excuse to annex it, Mussolini sent Italian troops to the frontier. Meanwhile,
he was forced to swallow his previous prejudices and seek closer ties with France - who
also dreaded the prospect of an enlarged Germany. Could this be the answer?
Mussolini therefore dropped his designs on the Balkans, and in January 1935 formed an
Accord with France. This was followed, in April, by the Stresa Front in which Mussolini
joined Britain and France in condemning German rearmament. The first step was the
Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1935-6). The motives were partly internal; as is shown in
the next section, the cult of the Duce required a boost which only a successful war could
provide. But there was also a powerful ideological impetus: a Fascist yearning for
expansion and conquest which accentuated the traditional Italian commitment to
colonies. The Ethiopian War was sparked by the Wal Wal incident. In December 1934 a
party of Italians was fired upon at an oasis on the Ethiopian side of the border with Italian
Somaliland. An immediate apology was demanded from Ethiopia, since Italy claimed the
right to use Wal Wal. The matter was, however, referred to the League of Nations, while
Italy prepared, over the next 10 months, for a full-scale invasion of Ethiopia. All seemed
well for Mussolini, particularly since Britain and France were unwilling to condemn his
attitude.
By 1937 50,000 Italian troops were active in Spain and the total death-toll had reached
6000. Mussolini also provided 763 aircraft and 1672 tons of bombs, 950 tanks and 7663
motor vehicles, 1930 cannon and 240,747 small arms, and the use of 91 warships - all at a
total cost of 14 billion lire. Admittedly, other governments became involved; Hitler also
supplied Franco, and Stalin assisted the Republic. There is no doubt, however, that Italy's
sacrifices were by far the largest.
To what effect? Italy's involvement can be seen as a serious blunder. Certainly Mussolini
was unable to make up the loss of equipment before the outbreak of the Second World
War. More than ever, Mussolini had to depend on Germany. Unfortunately for Mussolini,
Germany's seniority in the Rome-Berlin Axis soon became obvious. In March 1938, for
example, he gave Rome only a few hours' notice before sending German troops into
Austria. Mack Smith agrees that the purpose of Mussolini's foreign policy was to bolster
Mussolini's prestige, which by the mid-19305 had been affected by economic strain.
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After all, Italians had been led to believe, it was better to 'live one day as a lion than a
thousand years as a lamb'. Italy's neutrality, announced by Mussolini on 3 September
1939, came to an end with his declaration of war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940.
During the intervening months the situation in Europe had been transformed.