WE ALWAYS KNOW MORE THAN WE CAN SAY:

MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGISTS ON
MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY

Christofer Edling

1'ntroduction

It is hard to exaggerate the role of mathematical tools for the advances

of science. 1 Indeed one needs only to pick up a copy of a science journal
such as Nature or Science to realize that a good deal of technical skill
is needed to follow the frontiers of science. The same can hardly be
said about the frontiers of sociology and many other social sciences.
Because of the tension between science and literature, a defining char
acteristic of sociology throughout its history, the role of mathematics
in the advancement of sociology has always been and still is an issue.
In this chapter I once more revisit the question of the possibility of a
mathematical sociology through a set of interviews with
mathematical sociologists.
There are many examples of sociology trying to take advantage of
mathernatics to solve problems (Coleman 1964; Edling 2002; Fararo
1997; Heckathorn 1984). However it is less easy to find examples where
sociological problems, broadly defined, have stimulated mathematical
work. Still we have two powerful examples where it is easy to see
how mathematics has contributed to the development of the social
sciences,
First there is the wellknown example of the development of game
theory by the mathematicians von Neumann (von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1944) and Nash (1951) that effectively redraw the map of

1
1 wish to thank the .cholars who accepted not only to be interviewed by me, but
who al o shared valuable experiences and suggestions; Peter Abell, Philip Bonacich
Kathleen Carley, Patrick Doreian, Thoma Fararo and Harrison White. 1 owe thc
late Aage Sorensen for his enthusiasm in this project and Ior sharing many
thoughts in extended discussions. Part of this work has been presentcd at Utrecht
University and at Swedish CoUegium for Advanced Study (SCAS) and 1 thank
participants in those seminars for useful remarks and suggestions. In addition, l wish
to thank Peter Hcdstrorn Frcdrik Liljcros, Wcrner Raub and Richard S, cdberg
for vcry helpful suggestion ·.
346 WE ALWAYS KNOW CHRISTOFER
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neoclassical economics, and eventually also spilled over to the biologi

caJ sciences (Maynard Smith J 982). Game theory builds on the simple
idea that the action of ego is strategically dependent on the action of
alter; a Weberian idea that sociologists should indeed find attractive.
But however dramatic the effect on economics, game theory has had
very little impact on the other social sciences save perhaps for politi
cal science (but see Swedberg 2001 for a discussion on game theory
in sociology).
Second, and highly relevant for sociology, there is the less wellknown
example of social network analysis. Network analysis has grown tre
mendously during the last 30 years or so into a very vigorous research
tradition spanning so many disciplines (Carrington, Scott and Was
erman 2005; Newman, Barabási and Watts 2006) that by sorne even
referred to as a Kuhnian paradigm. Although social network ideas can
be traced further back, contemporary network analysis was developed
at Harvard in the early l 970s under leadership of Harrison White
(Freeman 2004; Wellman 1988) with a great deal of inspiration and
motivation from development in graph theory (Harary, Norman and
Cartwright 1965 ). Due to the complexity in analyzing even a small
structure of social entities and their interrelations, mathematical tools
are at the core of both theoretical and empirical network analysis.
Indeed, social network analysis is a prime example of sociology "turning
a profit from mathernatics" (Freeman 1984). And the most remarkable
fact is that while the general experience is that use of mathematics
tends to scare sociologists off, network analysis is the home to scholars
whose diverse research interests span from personal identity construc
tion to epidemiology from ethnography to analyzing the structure of
Internet communication.
Befare turning to the interviews, I wish to highlight a few of the
utilities that arise from using mathematics as a tool for social science.
These will be touched upon also in the remainder of the chapter. First
of ali mathematics is a much more exact language than the written
or spoken word which brings clarification and coherence to theoreti
cal arguments and help eliminate ambiguous interpretation. Thus it
is a very powerful tool. Second, mathematics is a unifying language
that prometes communication and problem solving among other
wise conceptually separate scientific communities. In his book on the
transdisciplinary Santa Fe Institute, Waldrop quotes a discussion with
Eugenia Singer claiming that "it was mathematics that provided the
common language' and "if they had gotten a lot of social scientists in
 347 WE ALWAYS KNOW CHRISTOFER
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there with no technical background I'm not sure the gulf could have
been crossed" (Waldrop 1992: 195). Thirdly, because it is a unifying
language, mathematics provides a way to learn from other scientific
domains that struggle with structurally similar properties. Mathematics
can bring our attention both to the isomorphism between sociology and
other sciences and by way of example suggest possible ways to apply
mathematics in sociology (Coleman 1964; White 1997).
From social network analysis we learn that mathematics can serve the
social sciences in just the same way as it serves the natural sciences. In
the development of social network analysis mathematics has provided
a tool to tackle complexity, a language to ease communication, and a
way to bridge theoretical concepts in sociology, mathematics, anthropol
ogy, computer science, physics, etc. So we do know that mathematics
can help us make considerable scientific progress. However the rest
of the chapter takes as a point of departure the fact that by and large
mathematics is rarely put to work in sociology and when it is, it is done
by a small number of sociologists.

lntertnetus

My interest in mathematical sociology deals both with the possibility of

applying sorne mathematics in my own work as well as with the tradi
tion in itself and the biographies of mathematical sociologists. The first
admittedly remains an ongoing struggle. But as a consequence of the
latterand by inspiration from Swedberg's ( 1990) book of interviews
with economists and sociologists on the interface between economics
and sociologyI carried out a set of interviews with a small number of
influential contemporary mathematical sociologists. In parallel I stud
ied mathematical sociology, trying to get a grip on what type of work
mathematical sociologists really did. While that effort was published in
a review article sorne years ago (Edling 2002) I would like to take this
opportunity to present sorne more of the interview material.
I conducted six interviews in the late l 990s. Chronologically, the
interviews were done in the following order: Patrick Doreian (May
29 1998), Harrison White (May 29, 1998), Philip Bonacich (August
22, 1998), Kathleen Carley (February 20, 1999), Peter Abell (May 3
1999), and Thomas Fararo (August 9, 1999). The interviews did not
focus primarily on the substancial sociological contributions of these
scholars. Rather I used the interviews in order to find out how they
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turned to mathematical sociology, and from what background they

carne. And my prime interest was to get their view on the role of
mathematics in sociology at large. I also wanted to hear what they
had to say on the evolution status, and future promises of the field
in a broad perspective. I selected my victims on an ad hoc basis
formed by my own readings in mathematical sociology. I wanted to meet
with people who had long experience from mathematical sociology and
who were still contemporary leaders in the field. Obviously there are
severa! biases in my selection and I wish to stress that even given my
selection criteria, the list of people that would have been perfect to
interview is quite long. One striking selection bias is my
preponderance towards sociologists active in the US Another apparent
bias is that there is only one woman in my sample. An obvious
reason is that there are not many women actively pursuing
mathematical sociology. However a few additional women could
easily be included if the set of interviews were to be extended or
revised.
A special characteristic of the mathematical approach to sociological
problems is that it involves many scholars from outside academic sociol
ogy, something that was clearly brought out in sorne of the interviews.
Therefore it might seem awkward that I concentrate only on sociolo
gists. Severa! persons of the past and present that are not sociologists
have made substantial contributions to mathematical sociology. Names
that spring to mind are Herbert Simon, Garry Becker, Dirk Helbing,
and Robert Axelrod. But there are 1nany others. However, I wanted
to make sure that I talked to people who strongly identified both with
ociology in itself and with mathematical sociology.
As it turned out, Peter Abell only hesitantly agreed to the label while
others did with sorne qualifications. This is Abell's frank answer to my
opening question on how he got into mathematical sociology:
Let me say first that I do not regard myself as a mathematical sociologist.
I regard myself as a sociologist who is often led to try and u ·e math
ernatics because it is the only way of really being clear about complex
phenomcna. So I am not a mathematical sociologist, and I do not really
rcgard mysclf a a good enough mathcmatician to so describe myself
(Peter Abell).

While both Patrik Doreian and Harrison White did identify stronger
with the label mathematical sociologist they too did throw in caveats.
Doreian, long term and highly dedicated editor ofJoumal efMathematical
Sociology and since recently the editor of Social Netuiorks said that,
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Givcn that I work in a lot of different substantive areas, and that I always
use some mathematics at sorne point I would havc to say it i
math ematical sociology. When I describe what I do, often I use
mathematical sociology as a description. I have tried using "playing in a
mathcmatical play pen ', but that generates a similar response to saying
mathematical ociology. Maybe the conjunction of play' and
'mathematical' was the problern! (Patrik Doreian)

And White, indeed one of the most prominent mathematical sociolo

gists ever and also a key person in the development of contemporary
network analysis said that,
I would prefer ·ociologist and theoretical sociologi .r. But I am also a
mathematical sociologist, and that is a fine thing to be. But Ido not want
to be just a mathematical sociologist. I think mathematical modeling is
an auxiliary; it i not the driving thing. I am a sociologist and that is the
whole point, you want to understand social phenomena, their political and
economical aspects, and their anthropological aspects (Harrison White).

These quotations do capture sorne of the contradictory essence of math

ematical sociology. On the one hand one is hesitant to name oneself a
mathematical sociologist and even to claim mathematical sociology as a
subfield in its own because it is the sociological issues that are always
at stake, and on the other hand one tends at the same time to value
highly mathematical sociology as such. But the driving force is not to
carve out a niche space on sociology but to contribute to sociology with
a capital s. Rather, one is drawn to applying mathematics out of neces
sity in the strive for precision, as in Abell's case, or as a means to
an end as in White's case, or one is just inclined to do so out of
personal preference, as in Doreian's case just as one might have a
personal preference for sorne method or theory over others. I
proceed now by turning first to the mathematical sociology, second to
the mathematical sociologists, and finally to sorne concluding remarks.

What is Mathematual Sociology?

So what is this thing called mathernatical sociology? In a sense the

question directly targets the historically ever imminent tension over
what is the core of sociology itself. Is sociology a humanist endeavor
the critica! and reflexive voice in (post)modern society? Or is sociology
a science of the social, similar to the way in which physics is a science
of the natural? Is sociology maybe both? It might very well be the case
350 WE ALWAYS KNOW CHRI
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that this tension in itself is really the core of sociology, as sorne have
clairned (Lepenies 1988). Whatever is the case; with sorne confidence
I would say that a mathernatical sociologist certainly subscribes to
the idea that sociology is a science of the social possibly to the idea
that it can be both. Of course this <loes not help rnuch as sociology
has not decided what it rneans to be a science of the social. But nor,
do I believe have rnathernatical sociologists. Just as sociology at
large mathernatical sociology is a very heterogeneous field (Freese
1980). What <loes constitute its borders is a shared conviction that
rnathernatics can bring leverage to sociological analysis. Even though
this might be debated, most sociologists and including the ones I have
interviewed,
would make a very clear distinction between statistical modeling
and mathernatical sociology. Indeed the literature on mathernatical
sociology and the interviews with mathernatical sociologists suggest
that rnathematical sociology is strictly a theoretical affair. Thus, it is
the application of mathematics to sociological theorizing that defines
mathernatical sociology. And mathernatics is used broadly to include
also logic and cornputer models. Formal theory could therefore be an
alternative label and is often used as such. However, it would be at fault
not to acknowledge that statistical modeling is the area within sociology
in which mathernatics has the strongest irnpact on the field as a whole.
The statistical tools being put to work in network analysis, eventhistory
analysis, and hierarchical rnodeling do bring added sophistication to
quantitative sociology.
Nevertheless, classifications of rnathernatical sociology highlight the
use of mathematics for constructing theoretical rnodels of social phe
nomena. Even though many rnathernatical sociologists are using and
ometirnes even develop quantitative methods they often point out
explicitly that the use of rnathernatics in sociology should not be equated
with statistics. And the people I interviewed all subscribe to the idea
that rnathernatical sociology belongs to theoretical sociology proper. In
g neral there is no agreernent on what is theoretical sociology. Many
things indeed go into that label. In this respect mathernatical sociolo
gists seem to be a bit more united than the discipline at large.
Many including myself take the view that theoretical model building
is an act of balancing realism, generality, and precision. In this act of
balance, one will have to stand back in favor of the other two sirnply
because ali things cannot be achieved (Heckathorn 1984; Levins 1966).
If one accepts this prernise, one can continue discussing the pros and
cons of rnodel building. Mathematical sociology is often accused of
 351 WE ALWAYS KNOW CHRI
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sacrificing realism for precision. To sorne extent this critique is justi

fied, but as was implied by Abell in the opening quotation precision
rnight be what foremost attracts many of the proponents of the field.
Moreover the way to manage this balancing act is not agreed upon.
And to contrast, Fararo ( 1989) argues that realism is the driving force
in model construction because we build the model only when there is
something there to be modeled, and models are deliberately constructed
as representations of the real world.
Obviously model building is about making idealizations of a complex
reality by using simplifying, and sometimes false, assumptions. However,
few sociologists would base their models on obviously false assumptions
if it means distorting the essential feature of the problem. Sorne of
those that I interviewed did express doubts over sorne scientific
endeavors perceived as overtheorized such as mathematical physics
and parts of neoclassical economics. In this respect, mathematical
sociologists appear to safeguard against loosing touch with real
sociological issues and are very reluctant to withdraw into pure
model development. This for instance is Peter Abell's reflection on the
relationship between mathematical sociology and sociology.
If I Iook at contemporary economics, for instance, 1 am sometimes worried
about the extent to which technical facility is so highly rated that people
can spend their time immersed in the technical problems and loose sight
of the fact that we are really trying to understand a complex world. Thcy
have to simplify the world that they want to Iook at to such a degree that
one sometimes wonder whether it is worthwhile. 1 would not like sociology
to take that direction. 1 think the great strength of sociology, if it has any
trength, i that it ha tried to take empirical complexity seriously ancl
ha not clone what sorne parts of economic have done and I think we
should preserve that (Peter Abell).

Still, the issue is delicate, as it is extremely hard to decide how much

complexity and heterogeneity one should account for. I would argue
in favor of a sociological model to be general enough to explain social
phenomena across time and space, whereas sorne would claim that
sociology is a historical science and as such no model can be applied
across time and space. In addition sociological models should be pre
cise, or else they cannot serve as hypothesis generators and consistency
checkers in any substantial way; and those are two important functions
for theoretical models (Carley 1997). Consequently it can be argued
that realism will have to give way to generality and precision. Such
a modeling paradigm is characterized by the expectation "that many
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of the unrealistic assumption will cancel each other that small devia
tions from realism result in mall deviations in the conclusions, and
that in any case, the way in which nature departs from theory will
uggest where future complications will be useful" (Levins 1966: 422).
To illustrate the balance of realism generality and precision I wish to
give two examples of simple mathematical rnodels that successfully walk
the line. Incidentally both model are submitted by non ociologi ts
although Watts later transferred to a sociology department. Schelling's
model of segregation i a classic example and Watts' and Strogatz'
model of the small world is on its way to becoming one.
The motivation for Thomas Schelling's dynamic models of segrega
tion was the observation that people get segregated across many dimen
ions and often by discrimatory individual behavior. "By 'discrimatory'
I mean reflecting an awarcness, conscious, or unconscious, of sex or age
or religion or color or whatever the basis of segregation is, an aware
ness that influences decisions on where to live, whom to sit by what
occupation to join or to avoid whom to play with or whom to talk to"
(Schelling 1971: 144). But ethnic segregation was the prime concern
at the time when Schelling proposed his model, and it is primarily in
uch light that it has been di cus ed. Yet, Schelling is very clear that
the model as such is abstract enough that results can be generalized to
any preference driven segregation process. Thus following Fararo the
model is fueled by concern for a real social issue and in that sense i t is
a realistic model. But it is also a general model claiming to shed
light on a range of segregation phenomena. However Schelling
remark early on that sorne very important factors that explain
egregation are not included such as in titutionalized segregation
(that he calls orga nizational) and economically driven segregation. In
Schelling s models the egregation process i driven by individual
preferences only. In this re pect they are also fairly precise models.
Both initial and boundary conditions are clearly defined but because
the analysis was made by hand agents' movement rules for instance
are only loosely defined (but contemporary computer replications give
exactly the sanie results).
One of Schelling's models is a two dimensional lattice of 13 rows
and 16 columns on which 25 starchips and 18 zerochips are distrib
uted randomly. Assuming that both stars and zeros have a preference
for having at least 50 percent neighbors of their own type Schelling
rearranges the chips so that this condition is met for every chip. The
result is a strikingly segregated pattern in which a star have about
80
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o # # # # o o o o # # o o ### 000 # # oo
o # # # # o o o o # # o # # O O # # # 00
# # o o # # # # # o # # # # # ####### #00
# # # o # # # o o ## ### ###00
o o o # # # # # # o o #O O #####
000
# o # o o # o o # # 0000# #0000## # #
# o o # o o o # # # 00000 # o o o # #
o # o # # # o o o # o o o # o o o o #
o # o # # o # o o## ##o o o #
o o # 0#0000## 00#### ##0000 ##
o # # o o o o o # # o # # 0###000 # # o # #
# o # o # o o # o # o o o o o 00###00 #
o o o # o # o o o # # 00 o 000 o #

Fig. 7 Fig. 9

Figure 1. Initial random distribution and final equilibrium distribution in

Schelling's dynarnic twodimensional spatial proximity model of segregation
(Schelling 1971: 155157).

percent of her neighbors being stars and a zero has about 83 percent
zeros in her neighborhood (in the random initial clistribution the cor
responcling numbers was 46 and 53 percent).
Schelling's dynamic model of segregation is in many ways a role
model in mathematical sociology. Not only does it strike the balance
between realism, generality, and precision perfectly but it also generates
surprising, and even counterintuitive results. Recall that in the model
segregation emerges solely from the action of uncoordinated individual
actor and in that respect this model is a beautiful example of the link
between microinteraction and macrodynamics.
The rationale far Duncan Watts' and Steven Strogatz's model of
small world dynamics (Watts and Strogatz 1998) is not motivated by
a pressing social issue such as segregation. Rather it is the answer to a
puzzling question of how to understand a particular network structurc.
Far a long time the ideal type networks that mathematical
sociologists worked with were ei ther random networks or ordered
networks despite the fact that all sociologists knew empirically that
social networks are neither randorn nor ordered. For one, social
networks are clustered that is, people tend to form tight knit groups
that are clistinguishable from other groups. Trying to capture this
intuition mathematically for instance by modeling biased networks is
hard. A particularly interesting and popularized network
communication phenornenon is the socalled smallworld effect. This
effect was illustrated experimentally in the
l 960s with the implication that only six intermecliary steps separate any
two Americans. A question that had deluded sociologists since these
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experiments and that captured Watts' imagination was this: what makes
a network small? In Watts' model actors are put in an ordered circle
and every actor is connected to its four nearest neighbors. One of the
actors is elected and at random one of its connections reconnected
to another randomly elected actor in the ring. As the process of re
connection i repeated the ring transforms from an ordered network
structure into a random network structure as in Figure 2 (Watts and
Strogatz 1998).
Starting from a very simple model of an ordered network structure
Watts could demonstrate that what is characteristic of a smallworld
network is both a high level of clustering and a short average distance
between actors in the network. Thus a smallworld network seems to
capture both the property of random networks, i.e. short path lengths
and ordered network i.e. high clustering. What is really interesting
with Watt's model is that parameter p, the degree of randomness
need only be very small for the ordered structure to transforrn into a
smallworld network.
Watts smallworld model is even simpler than Schelling's model
of segregation but still very elegant. In terms of the balance between
realism generality and precision, the judgment is perhaps not as clear
cu t. The model as such is not particularly realistic in the sense that it
<loes not even abstract from observed social reality. Few sociologists
would feel at home at this level of abstraction. On the other hand,

Regular Smallworld Random

p= o p=l
increasing randomness

Figure 2. Watts' and Strogatz's smallworld model. An ordered network (left)

i transformed into a random network (right) by a process of randomly re
connecting actors. The mallworld is situated in betwcen these extremes
(Watt and Strogatz 1998).
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the model is general and has applications way beyond sociology; the
network properties under analysis are present in many biological and
physical networks, both natural and designed. And it is precise and
welldefined. In contrast to Schelling's model this one needs a fair deal
of interpretation before it can be mapped onto social reality. But it
does highlight important properties in alrnost ali social networks that
are now, because of this model, easier to understand and theoretically
scrutinize.
These two examples do bring out both the attractions and the poten
cial shortcomings of mathematical sociology that I believe are nicely
captured by the balance of realism, generality, and precision. Another
way to phrase this problem is in terms of a conflict between sociological
intuition and formal theorizing, as Fararo does in this quotation.
I alway think about it, as we always know more than we can ay. And
we always can say more than we can really forrnally put clown in more
exacting terrns. So as you go further and further frorn the fundamental
intuitions in the interest of being logical and rnathernatical, you can
potentially loose contact with the governing intuitions. But the main
gain would be to try to bring the rnathernatics back into, and as close
as possible to the basic intuitions of the field. Trying to represent thosc
intuitions in sorne way. lt is what Bourdieu calls a habitus. It is a kind of
a sociological habitus you acquire by exposing yourself to classical ideas
and postclassical idea and so on. You know, you think sociologically and
then you think rnathernatically. But these are often hard to fit together.
The mathernatics enforces a discipline that the other discipline does not
really value in the same way. It has it its own forms of rigor but they are
not the sarne. To bring those two into conjunction has always been the
sort of thing that I thought of as irnportant. I do not think we've been
that successful really, but collectively we are trying (Thornas Fararo).

This challenge might be especially tricky for sociology, a subject that

attracts students from a wide population, not seldom driven by strong
political and social interests rather than analytical.
The problern is that rnany people come into sociology not really seeing it
as a hard science. They see it as a sort of spiritual adventure of knowing
about society in a qualitative, grounded way, to be able to reflect upon
the big political and social policy issues. In a sen e, I carne to sociology
a bit like that, and I have respect for that. I think that if we would loose
that, we would loose sornething irnportant. What we need to do is to
add to that the idea that technical grounding is important if you really
want to make a contribution. By and large, my generation of sociologists
has failed. There are a few pimples on the top that look good: James
Colernan, and probably Harrison White. But it is not a story of great
success (Peter Abell).
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As far as I am aware no extensive piece on the history of mathematical

sociology is available. Sorne notes are spread around in reviews and
books (e.g. Fararo 1997) and there seem to be agreement that math
ematical sociology as we apply the term today is a child of the l 950s.
I believe that the recent reviva! and interest in mathematical sociology
is mainly due to the enormous interest in structural and relation sociol
ogy as it is approached by social network analysis. Admittedly network
analysis is both methodology and theory, but its theoretical components
have always been mathematically charged (Freeman 2004). Network
analysis has been constantly growing within sociology since the late
l 970s and with the advent of the "new science of networks" in the early
2000s (Watts 2004) interest has skyrocketed. Other developments also
spur the revitalization of mathematical sociology such as the growing
use of computer simulation models across the social sciences (Macy and
Willer 2002) and current theoretical debates in European sociology on
social mechanisms (Barbera 2004) and analytical sociology
(Hedstrórn
2005). In the mid 2000s, mathematical sociology is visible in state of
the art journals, and the range of problems approached and the level
of sophistication are striking.
In my review of mathematical sociology, following Serensen (1978)
I classified mathematical sociology along three broad strainsprocess
structure and actionbased partly but not entirely on the different
types of mathernatics involved (Edling 2002). With models of processes
one typically study social change over longer or shorter timeperiods
using various types of discrete and continuous mathematical models.
Mathernatically, these models have a lot in common with various
ystemanalyses in other fields, ranging from physics to ecology and
usually they do not allow for much in terms of structural or individual
heterogeneity. Diffusion models, such as James Coleman's famous
analysis of medica! innovation (Coleman, Katz and Menzel 1966), and
models of organizational change as developed within organizational
ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1989), are typical examples of process
models,
If Coleman can be said to be the father of the mathematical sociol
ogy of process, then Harrison White would undoubtedly be named
the father of mathernatical sociology of structure. Models of structure
tie directly into social network analysis, their most important field of
application in which graph theory and matrix algebra are primar
ily used. However, as more and more attention is directed towards
understanding system dynamics and structural change it makes little
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sense to uphold a clear cut distinction between process and structure

as research enterprises. Describing a structure without accounting for
its emergence and stability is simply not satisfactory. Patrik Doreian
expressed this clearly in our interview.
It i intercsting that you havc this history ofJames Coleman coming in
from onc side with his kind of dynamics model and Harrison White
coming in from another side with hi kind of structural models. It
would be great if we could synthesize those two traclitions and really
rnodel social structure and ocial process in an integrated and coherent
fashion.
I · .. J My ense about mathernarical :ocial :cience is this: let us do it. Ir
we are successful great if we are not succe ful then we admi t that wc
failed. I think that if we model successfully the dynamics of structured
systcmsnetworks with social objects and relations between them with
levels and multiple populationswe will havc done very well. Structures
evolve through time and we need to be attentivc to both the tructural
characteristics and thc ocial actor characteristics. If we ucceed, that i
when I think we will really have successful mathcmatical social sciencc
and successful social science. It sounds very methodological and program
matic but I think that is what we should be aspiring to. And that would
be a synthe ·is of the White and Coleman traclition . The physicists at
the lnstitute for Theoretical Physics in Stuttgart that have contributed to
the Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Helbing 1994; Weidlich 1994),
for instance, use partial clifferential equation models that moves us into
the whole debate of complexity and chaos. At the moment they seem
more like buzzwords. I think that if we can succe sfully use that kind
of modcling and be gcnuincly conccrned with tructure, and gcnuinely
conccrncd with process, then wc are going somewhcrc. Lct me add that
I am skeptical that thc modcls from physics are uscful for sociology in an
unmodified form. But I think they need to pursue their programjust as
mathematical :ociologist need to use mathematics. If they succeed
then we will have leamed much (Patrik Doreian).

Doreian also draws our attention to the third type of models, models
of action. Prototypical examples of such models would be those of util
ity maximizing individuals, lndeed James Coleman proposed that the
simple and well defined assumptions about individual racional choice
should provide the foundation for social theory (Coleman 1990). This is
not yet the case, neither in sociology at large (but see Goldthorpe 2007)
nor in mathematical sociology. On the contrary, if there is one thing
that n1y earlier review (Edling 2002) clearly shows it is that mathernati
cal sociology spans across a broad range of phenomena and applies an
equally broad set of mathernatical tools to try and understand those
phenomena.
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Who is the Mathematical Sociologist?

The interviews can be summarized along four themes: the scholarly

background of the interviewees their attraction to mathematical
ociology their thoughts on the strengths and weaknesses of math
ernatical sociology and their thoughts on institutional problems and
limitations.
With respect to their background the six scholars fall nicely into
two categories. I realize it is dubious to classify this small a number of
observations, but nevertheless I will do so as it serves the purpose of my
presentation. Three of the interviewees immigrated to sociology from
a relatively speaking mathematically strong background. Peter Abell
carne to ociology at Essex University vía philosophy with a PhD in
physical science, and he was hired to do philosophy of sciences. Patrick
Doreian earned a Bachelors degree in mathematics before deciding
to enter a crossdisciplinary program in mathematical social science,
and Harrison White switched to sociology after completing a PhD in
physics. The other three carne into sociology much earlier in their
academic career and mathematical and computacional modeling was
brought into their thinking parallel to or even after their maturation
as social cientists. Philip Bonacich says he was heavily influenced by
a strong role model at Harvard, namely Harrison White, Kathleen
Carley was early on seduced by the possibility of modeling man, and
Thomas Fararo was philosophically committed to axiomatic science.
One of the nicest stories about the attraction of mathematical sociology
is indeed that of Kathleen Carley:
[My] intere ·t in modeling tarted [...] when I wa in high school when
I read I aac A imov the Foundation Trilogy. I thought thi i what I want
to do: Build models of people! So then I went to college and tried to
take every course I could to make that happen. [...] Actually I was very
interested in artificial intelligence; but they did not have a degree in it
yet in that point in time. And I did not realize that you could get what
would bccome thc degree by going through engineering so I did not do
that. So I do not have a degrce in Al and I wa activcly di couraged
from going into mathematic · because I was female. I was told: "You'll
never make it because you re a woman". And I thought Ok they must
know what they are saying (Kathleen Carley).

Incidentally, Carley shares her fascination with Asimov's novels with

Duncan Watts, who used Asimov's Robot series as an inspiration far
one of his models of emergent system behavior (Watts 2003: 74). But
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Carley's account is of course also a sad reminder of the kind of gen

der stereotyping that helped and still helps pushing male and female
students into different college programs.
The difference between a science and a social science background
becomes somewhat visible in the view on mathematics in sociology. For
example, the three persons with a science/mathematics background are
quite pragmatic and nonprogrammatic in arguing that mathematics
has its place but that it is notan end in itself. The three persons with a
social science background much more strongly believe that mathematics
is intrinsically good and something to generally strive for. One
reason the first group has a more relaxed attitude could be that they
had an early training in mathematics which they can both easier
and more naturally call upon when it seems fit. The other group, on the
contrary, had a less thorough and sometimes more shallow training and
therefore they had to, and have to, fight harder for the mathematical
leverage.
One should of course be cautious with personal accounts of ones
own career. It is all too easy to find a pattern in ones personal history,
and perhaps even easier to paint this pattern in selfflattering strokes.
For instance, how come Abell, Doreian and White left the hard sci
ences to go into sociology? Is not the most probable answer that they
had failed in these areas, or that they where sensing failure coming?
Assuming they wished to pursue an academic career, both physics and
mathematics holds much more status and resources than do sociology,
so the sensible thing would be not to transfer. Only if failure is certain
would it pay off to switch a career in physics for one in sociology. On
the other hand, is it so strange that people actually hold a strong inter
est in the subject matter? Being a sociologist myself, I actually find that
quite easy to believe. Sociology is a rich and fascinating discipline and
it relates to everyday experiences and intuitions in a myriad of ways.
Still it is probably safe to assume that none of the three immigrants
were doing remarkably well in their original fields. If they were, they
would not have been allowed to repel but would have been sucked
deeper into the attraction of disciplinary, departmental and collegial
structures. But, picking up on the rationality once again, the fact that
among ali alternatives they chose sociology actually strengthens the
interesthypothesis, because if they wanted a tradeoff from their train
ing, engineering, business administration, or economics would have
been a much more reasonable pick.
In sorne sense, the social science group is more interesting. People
migrating from science and mathematics into sociology do formal theory
360 WE ALWAYS KNOW CHRISTOFER
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because this is how their training wired them to think. But people that
start out in social science and decide to bring in mathematics and other
formal tools actually turn away from the highway and pick the straight
and narrow road. I think Abell is right in his analysis that the racional
choice in contemporary sociology is to not do formal theory.
I think at sorne stage ·ociology just has to fa.ce up to that. Sociology is
so cliverse and because it shades of into history, there will always be this
other end of things. But it has to change. 1 am not optimistic about it
changing in the foreseeable future, because I think the present "social
construction" of sociology is such that there is a mutual interest between
teachers tudents, publishers, cte. to maintain the present paracligm. In
my vicw it is intellcctually ub optimal. Neverthclcs it is cquilibrium.
Everybody wants it and everybody in it would be worsc off by moving
away from it. So you find it vcry clifficult to break that. Human history
is littercd with failed intellectual tradition. Not empirical sociology, but
social theory is a failed intellectual tradition, and future generations will
necessarily see it as such. At the moment, though, it is relatively stable
(Peter Abell).

If Abell is right, one might wonder why mathematical sociologists con

tinue to pursue mathematical sociology. One possible route to answer
ing that question is to look at what these persons see as the strength of
mathematical sociology. Philip Bonacich admits to hold what he calls
a mystical belief saying:
Well, part of it is kind of a mystical belief It is a nonrational belief
that if there is a deep structure in sociology, and deep truths, they will
only be discovered through mathematics. But then apart from that in
a more mundane kind of way, 1 think that mathematics leads to precise
though ts and precise thinking. The concepts, as opposed to English are
complctely unambiguous. There is tremcndously powerful machinery
devcloped over hundreds of years to draw implications from. 1 person
ally think that the finest things about western civilization are music and
mathematics. So I think therc is this powerful logical apparatus that wc
should avail oursclves in. [...] 1 think that if we are going to become a
sciencc we have got to use mathcmatics (Philip Bonacich).

In Bonacich s case it is a firm conviction that sociology will make

progress from the power of mathematics. Thomas Fararo gives a rather
thorough account of how he got into mathematical sociology and what
he sees as the attraction. Mainly it is the power of axiomatic theory
construction and the possibility of theoretical unification. Fararo have
presented arguments far unification both with and without formaliza
tion, but really strong axiomatization cannot be achieved without formal
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arguments and so, in Fararo's case, mathematics becomes a necessity

out of the preferred style of scientific explanation.
In the summer of 1960 when I was a graduate student, 1 needed sorne
funding, and I was recommended for a sociological research project that
was just beginning. That was the study of community power structure in
Syracusc under the direction of Linton Frceman. That forme was really
a transformativo experience because it was knowledge as a problem of
something to be constructed rather than something read in the library. It
really put me in touch with the constructive research process. So sociology
then became a place for me whcre knowlcdge is constructed rathcr than
just read about. (...] But in the context of the community powcr structure
research we were confronted with kind of a structural problcm. We hada
massive sociogram, as it were, of claims about who was involved in what.
We were looking for sorne kind of mathematical apparatu .. we did not
even know the name of it, but something to analyze this kind of thing. We
<lid not know of anything, so I undertook that as a direction of my thesi
research. I spent a summer reading the Bulletin ofMathematical
Biophysics, which was a place where people like Anatol Rapaport were
writing. In my thesis I really just practice and apply the idea of
mathematics and mathematical model building to this community
power structure data. BasicaUy, that whole idea of constructing and
testing a mathcmatical modcl, which was totaUy new as I did not havc
any classroom training in it at all. [ .. .] Rcmcmbcr I carne to
mathcmatics from philosophy so I was very intercstcd in things likc;
what is a mathematical entity, what is the relationship between
mathematics and logic? So I read a lot about the philosophy of
mathernatics too. I taught Patrick Suppes' book, Introduction to logic
(Suppes 195 7). A fabulous book, and I was very attracted to this idea
of ax.iomatization within set theory. So actually the first two years of
my postdoctoral I worked fonnally under the sponsor hip of Patrik
Suppes at Stanford (Tomas Fararo).

Indirectly Kathleen Carley who went to MIT inspired by the vision

of modeling man in society argues that the greatest utility from math
ematical sociology arise from the fact that the substantial research
funding goes to projects with sorne mathematical and computational
sophistication, and therefore a formal approach increases the survival
chances of sociological research (having spent a great <leal of her career
at CarnegieMellon University, Carley is probably affectively colored by
this engineering heavy environment). Bonacich, Carley and Fararo are
all convinced, but not at all by the same arguments, that mathematics
is necessary.
Neither Patrick Doreian nor Harrison White would go as far as to argue
that mathematical sociology is necessary. White admits that he finds
it hard to believe that progress will be achieved without mathematics
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but Doreian sirnply rests his case, <loes his thing, and leaves it for oth
ers to decide on the utility of what he is doing. Peter Abell, who also
carne from science to sociology hares with the social science group
a strong belief in the value of rnathematics. He actually argues that
ocia! scientists are rnorally obliged to be "clear and precise" in their
thinking, and that mathematics is needed to guarantee this.
Sorne of the interviewees also cornrnented specifically on weaknesses
and potencial risks of mathernatical sociology. Peter Abell for instance
compares sociology to economics and warns that in economics the rnath
ernatics is sornetimes valued so highly that it overshadows the substancial
issues. He argues in effect that our curiosity of empirical cornplexity
always should have the upper hand over technical proficiency in defin
ing what problerns to study. In the same line of reasoning, Harrison
White points out that even if the rnathematical approach by itself is
praiseworthy we rnust be aware that the mathematics we need might
not actually be the mathematics we have access to at the moment. As
a result, sociologists must have a flexible attitude towards mathemat
ics and, which is of course rnuch, rnuch harder, sociologists rnust keep
a constant eye on developrnent in mathematics. Looking at the sarne
issue frorn another angle, Thornas Fararo sees a problem in bringing
rnathematics and sociology together. To his rnind they represent two
diflerent rnodes of thinking, two intuitions, which are not always easy
to link. The risk arises when one continues to construct rnathernatical
rnodels even when the mathernatical and the sociological intuitions are
not in touch with each other. This leads to the sarne problern that Abell
identified in economics the problern which arises when the models no
longer represent the sociological intuitions.

Concluding Remarks

Obviously a very positive impression of applying mathematical rnodels

to sociology emerges frorn these interviews. All six scholars I talked
to share the view that perhaps the rnost prime benefit of a formal
approach is to achieve coherence and logical consistency in theory
construction. Also, there are severa! signs that mathematical sociology
in the beginning of the new rnillennium is stronger than it has been
since the late l 960s. New publication outlets, a section in the American
Sociological Association, and an increased exposure of rnathernatical
and cornputational rnodels in general sociology journals serve to prove
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this point. My interviews bear witness that there are positive adherents
of mathematical sociology, and my literature review (Edling 2002)
provides references to impressing work on many timely problems. At
the same time, it is obvious that mathematics has not established itself
as a general tool in the discipline.
Several people interested in mathematical sociology testify to the
institutional fragility of mathematical sociology, evident in many ways,
and most likely derived from the small number of adherents of this sub
discipline. For example, both Peter Abell and Patrick Doreian got into
mathematical sociology through a program at U niversity of Essex. This
led me to believe that there was actually something exciting going on
in mathematical sociology in England in the late l 960s. Apparently, this
was not the case. Apart from these two, no lasting contribution to the
field evolved out of Essex. Doreian's unconcerned and laconic observa
tion that the program "died" leads me to conclude that although there
where certainly an interpersonal xenogamy of ideas going on (Abell
1971; Doreian 1970) the program in itself is not much to be spoken of.
Indeed, Doreian left for a position in US in the early l 970s and Abell,
who remained in England, become devoutly disillusioned of the future
of any version of mathematical application in sociology.
Patrick Doriean was the editor of the Joumal of Mathematical Sociology
between 1982 and 2005. lt is beyond doubt that the journal has sur
vived until this day much through his hard work. While this has saved
the journal from going under, it is possible that, by attaching survival
chances to the energy and professional contact network of one single
individual, its vulnerability has also increased. Again, this is the problem
of a small field. A parallel case is the Internacional Network for Social
Network Analysts (INSNA). With the growing popularity of network
analysis, INSNA has become a firmly established organization and is
no longer dependent on one dedicated person, but for a long time it
almost was. But, according to Doreian's account, even after over 30
years since its inception the Journal of Mathematical Sociology struggles
to
stay alive. A small field simply cannot support a specialist journal, and
especially so at times when institucional subscription rates are skyhigh
and academic libraries experience budget shrinkages year after year.
It is not the case that there are no outlets for mathematical sociology,
severa! papers in general sociology journals draw on mathernatical
or computational modeling. Indeed, this is a very positive thing for
mathematical sociology.
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Another example of institutional fragility surfaces most clearly in

the interview with Phi) Bonacich in the discussion about the section
for mathematical sociology in the American Sociological Association
(ASA). This might sound as if a national assemblage, but as severa) of
the other ASA sections, this section is truly international and thus it
can be regarded as the international forum for mathematical sociolo
gists. The ASA only saw the formation of this dedicated section for
Mathematical Sociology in 1996. The section is still one of the smallest
in the ASA and in 2003 the section had just over 160 members (to
be compared to the mean of all sections, which is approximately 4 70
members). However, the bylaws of ASA stipulate that the mínimum
requirement for holding section status is 300 members, so there is an
actual risk that the section will have to shut clown. Although in practice,
according to Bonacich's experience, this will be highly dependent on
section activity. In recent years sessions at the annual ASA meetings
have been quite successful, so if this is true perhaps there is no real
reason to worry. But still, small is weak when it comes to making last
ing contributions in an organizational environment with competition
for members.
It might be interesting to compare with other small sections in the
ASA. Like most sections of the association many of the small ones define
pretty narrow interests. In 2003, the following sections had less than
300 members: Animals and Society, Communication and lnformation
Technology, Ethnomethodology/Conversational Analysis, History of
Sociology, Latino/a Sociology, Mathematical Sociology, Peace, War
and Social Conflict, Rationality and Society, Sociological Practice, and
Sociology of Emotions. Among these, the sections for Ethnomethodology
and Animals and Society are new, instituted in the 2lst century. The
oldest is Peace and War that goes back to the mid l 970s followed by
Sociological Practice that got started in the late l 970s. Sorne of these
sections have to be considered to be of minar interest, given the nature
of sociology. The interest for Latino Sociology, Ethnomethodology or
Animals and Society for example simply isn't that widespread among
sociologists. However, all three of these sections had more members
that the section for Mathematical Sociology, whose mernbers would
claim that they represent broad and general sociological interests. In
fact, among the small sections, only Rationality and Society had fewer
members than Mathematical Sociology in 2003. Really large sections,
with over 900 members are few. Here we find Organizations, Occupa
tions and Work, Sociology of Culture, and Medical Sociology. Largest,
with over 1000 members, is the section for Sex and Gender.
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But the biggest obstacle to any substantial expansion of mathemati

cal sociology within sociology is firstly the fact that sociology
students have very little technical training when they enter sociology,
and are given very little further training once they are in. Secondly,
and per haps more surprisingly in most universities sociology
students have no expo ure to formal theory construction. And for
students with low technical rnotivation and no training in theory
construction mathernati cal models in sociology are perceived to be
so esoteric that nobody needs to care. But the proper use of
mathematics is not a question of choice. When the problem is
forrnulated precisely enough the use of mathematics is unavoidable.
One should not simply take the math ematics and apply them to a
sociological problem. The problem has to be thoroughly worked
through and if necessary, then be given a mathematical formulation.
The reason we do not see (and perhaps do not need) much
mathematical sociology is simply a reflection of the nature of
contemporary sociology. A reasonable expectation is that
mathematical sociology will be taken care of by other disciplines, and
as a consequence it will be difficult to find people in the future who
like the ones I have interviewed, are dedicated both to sociology and
to mathematical sociology.
On the other hand, as we have learned from the example of social
network analysis, given a dedication to solve a set of real world prob
lems the turn towards mathematical tools will be unavoidable and
come natural if needed. It seems appropriate to end this chapter with
the following advisory note from James Colernan's lntroduction to Mat/z
ematical Sociology ( 1964: 54)· "the necessarily difficult task of
developing mathematical sociology can best be performed when our
concentration remain upon the sociologicaJ problem, and the
mathematical tooJs remain means to an end."

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