Ten Propositions on Science and Antiscience

Author(s): Richard Levins

Source: Social Text, No. 46/47, Science Wars (Spring - Summer, 1996), pp. 101-111
Published by: Duke University Press
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 Ten Propositions on Science and Antiscience

Since radicalsbeganto look to scienceas a forceforemancipation,Marx- RichardLevins

istsbothas social criticsand as participatingscientistshave grappledwith
its contradictory nature.Because thereis such a richdiversity of Marxist
thought about science,I cannot claim that what followsis "the" Marxist
I
position. only offerin schematic form some propositions about science
thathave guidedtheworkof at leastthisMarxistscientist.
(1) All knowledgecomes fromexperienceand reflection on thatexpe-
riencein thelightof previousknowledge.Science is notuniquelydifferent
fromothermodes of learningin thisregard.
What is special about our science is thatit is a particularmomentin
the divisionof labor in whichresources,people, and institutions are set
aside in a specificwayto organizeexperienceforthepurposeof discovery.
In thistraditiona self-consciousefforthas been made to identify sources
and kindsof errorsand to correctforcapriciousbiases. It has oftenbeen
successful.We have learnedto be alertto thepossiblerolesof confound-
ing factorsand to the need forcontrolledcomparison;we have learned
thatcorrelationdoes not mean causationand thatthe expectationsof the
experimenter can affecttheexperiment; we have also learnedhow to wash
laboratoryglasswareto avoid contaminants and how to extracttrendsand
distinctionsfrommorassesof numbers.Our self-consciousness reduces
certainkindsof errorsbut in no way eliminatesthem,nor does it protect
the scientificenterpriseas a whole fromthe sharedbiases of its practi-
tioners.
On the otherhand, so-called traditionalknowledgeis not staticor
unthinking. Africans(probablymostlywomen) broughtas slaves to the
Americasquicklydeveloped an Afro-American herbalmedicine.It was
put togetherpartly from remembered knowledgeof plantsfoundbothin
Africaand in America,partlyfromborrowedNativeAmericanplantlore,
and partlyfromexperimenting on the basis of Africanrules about what
medicinal plants should be like. The teachingof traditionalmedicine
alwaysinvolvesexperimenting, evenwhenit is presentedas thetransmis-
sion of preexisting knowledge.Finally,the criteriaforprescribingvarious
herbaltherapiesin non-European/North Americanmedicineare probably
bettergroundedthanthosethatguide decisionsabout cesarean sections,

Social Text46/47, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 2, Spring/Summer1996. Copyright? 1996 by

Press.
Duke University

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 pacemakerimplants,or radical mastectomiesin U.S. scientificmedical
practice.
Even whatis describedas intuitive(as againstintellectual)knowledge
comes fromexperience:our nervous/endocrine systemis a marvelous
integrator of our rich, complex histories into a holisticgrasp that is
unawareof its originsor constituents. Scientificand intuitiveknowledge
are not fundamentally differentepistemologically; theydifferinsteadin
thesocial processesoftheirproductionand are notmutuallyexclusive.In
fact,one ofmygoals in teachingmathematics to publichealthscientistsis
to educatetheintuition, so thatthearcanebecomesobviousand eventriv-
ial, and complexityloses itspowerto intimidate.
(2) All modes of discoveryapproach the new by treatingit as if it
werelikethe old. Since it oftenis likethe old, scienceis possible.But the
new is sometimesquite different fromthe old; whensimplereflection on
experienceis not enough,we need a moreself-consciousstrategy fordis-
covery.Then creativescience becomes necessary.In thelong runwe are
bound to encounternoveltystrangerthanwe can imagine,and previous
well-grounded ideas willturnout to be wrong,limited,or irrelevant. This
holds truein all cases, in both modernand traditional, class-ridden,and
nonclass societies.Therefore,both modernEuropean/NorthAmerican
science and the knowledgesof otherculturesare not onlyfalliblebut are
guaranteedto erreventually.
To call something"scientific"does notmeanthatitis true.Withinmy
lifetime,scientificclaims such as the inertnessof the "noble gases," the
waysin whichwe divideup livingthingsintomajorgroupings,viewsas to
the antiquityof our species,modelsof thenervoussystemas a telephone
exchange,expectationsas to thelong-term outcomesof differential equa-
tions,and notionsof ecologicalstabilityhave all been overturned by new
discoveriesor perspectives.And majortechnicalefforts based on science
have been shownto lead to disastrousoutcomes:pesticidesincreasepests;
hospitalsare fociof infection; antibioticsgiveriseto new pathogens;flood
controlincreases flood damage; and economic developmentincreases
poverty.Nor can we assume thaterrorbelongsto the past and thatnow
we've gotitright-a kindof "end ofhistory"doctrineforscience.Erroris
intrinsicto actuallyexistingscience. The presenthas no unique episte-
mologicalstatus-we justhappen to be livingin it.
Therefore,we have to considerthe notionof the "half-life"of a the-
oryas a regulardescriptorofthescientific processand evenbe able to ask
(but not necessarilyanswer), "Under what circumstancesmightthe sec-
ond law of thermodynamics be overthrown?"
(3) All modes of knowing presuppose a point of view. This is as true
of other species as of our own. Each viewpoint defines what is relevant in

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the stormof sensoryinputs,whatto ask about the relevantobjects,and
how to findanswers.
Viewpointis conditionedby the sensorymodalitiesof the species.
For instance,primatesand birdsdepend overwhelmingly on vision.With
visualinformation objects have sharply differentiatedboundaries. But that
is not thecase whenodors are themajortypeof information, as forants.
An anolinelizard sees movingobjects as being the rightsize to eat or as
representing danger.A femalemosquitoperceivesan academic conclave
as gradientsof carbon dioxide, moisture,and ammonia that promise
blood meals, whilea sea anemonetruststhatglutathionein the wateris
enoughreasonto thrustout itstentaclesin expectationof a meal. The fact
thatwe liveon the surfaceof the earthmakesit seem naturalto focusour
astronomyon planets,stars,and otherobjectswhileignoringthe spaces
betweenthem.The timescaleof our lives makes plants seem unmoving
untiltime-lapsephotographymakestheirchangesapparent.We interact
mostcomfortably withobjectson thesame temporaland size scales as our
own and have to inventspecialmethodsfordealingwiththeverysmallor
verylarge,theveryfastor veryslow.
(4) A point of view is absolutelyessentialforsurvivingand making
any sense of a world burstingwith potentialsensoryinputs. Much of
learningis devotedto definingthe relevantand determining whatcan be
the
ignored.Therefore, appropriateresponse to the discoveryof theuni-
of
versality viewpoints in scienceis not the vain attemptto eliminateview-
pointbut theresponsibleacknowledgment of our own viewpointsand the
use of thatknowledgeto look critically at our own and each others'opin-
ions.
(5) Science has a dual nature. On the one hand, it really does
enlightenus about our interactions withthe restof theworld,producing
understanding and guidingour actions.We reallyhavelearneda greatdeal
about thecirculationoftheblood,thegeographyof species,thefoldingof
proteins,and thefoldingof thecontinents.We can read thefossilrecords
of a billionyearsago, reconstruct theanimalsand climatesofthepast and
thechemicalcompositionsofthegalaxies,tracethemolecularpathwaysof
neurotransmitters and the odor trailsof ants. And we can inventtools
thatwillbe usefullong afterthetheoriesthatspawnedthemhave become
quaintfootnotesin the historyof knowledge.
On theotherhand,as a productofhumanactivity, sciencereflectsthe
conditionsof its productionand the viewpointsof its producersor own-
ers. The agenda of science,therecruitment and trainingof some and the
exclusionof othersfrombeing scientists,the strategiesof research,the
physical instrumentsof investigation,the intellectual frameworkin which
problems are formulated and results interpreted,the criteria for a suc-

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 cessfulsolutionto a problem,and the conditionsof applicationof scien-
tificresultsare all verymuch a productof thehistoryof the sciencesand
associatedtechnologiesand of thesocietiesthatformand own them.The
patternof knowledgeand ignorancein science is not dictatedby nature
but is structuredby interestand belief.We easilyimpose our own social
experienceontothe social livesof baboons,our understanding of orderli-
ness in business,implyinga hierarchyof controllers and controlled,onto
theregulationof ecosystemsand nervoussystems.Theories,supportedby
megalibraries of data, oftenare systematicallyand dogmatically obfuscat-
ing.
Most analysesof science fail to take into account this dual nature.
They focuson onlyone or theotheraspect of science.They mayempha-
size the objectivity of scientificknowledgeas representing generichuman
progressin our understanding.Then they dismiss the obvious social
determination and theall-too-familiar antihumanuses of scienceas "mis-
uses," as "bad" science,whilekeepingtheirmodel of scienceas thedisin-
terestedsearchfortruthintact.
Or else theyuse thegrowingawarenessofthesocial determination of
scienceto rejectits claimsto any validity.They imaginethattheoriesare
unrelatedto theirobjectsof studyand are merelyinventedwholeclothto
servethe venal goals of individualcareersor class, gender,and national
domination.
In stressingtheculture-boundedness ofscience,theseanalysesignore
the common features of Babylonian, Mayan, Chinese, and British
astronomiesand theircalendars. Each comes froma different cultural
contextbut looks at (more or less) thesame sky.They recognizeyearsof
the same length,notice the same moon and planets,and calculate the
same astronomicaleventsby verydifferent means.
Social determinists also ignoretheparalleluses ofmedicinalplantsin
Brazil and Vietnam,the namingsof plantsand animalsthatroughlycor-
respond to what we label as distinctspecies. All peoples seek healing
plantsand tendto discoversimilaruses forsimilarherbs.
Othertraditionsthanour own also have theirsocial contexts.Baby-
lonian priestsor Chinese administrators were not bourgeoisliberals,but
for all thattheywere not wiser or freerfromviewpoint.Nor does the
phrase"the ancientssay" tellus anythingabout the validityof whatthey
say.Ancientslikemodernsbelongto genders,sometimesto classes,always
to cultures,and theyexpressthose positionsin theirviewpoints.Those
ancientswhose thoughthas been preservedin writingwere also not a
randomsample of ancients.
But to be sociallydeterminedand conditionalon viewpointdoes not
mean arbitrary.While all theories are eventuallywrong, some are not even
temporarily right. The social determination of science does not imply a

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defenseor tolerationof the patentlyfalse doctrinesof racial or gender The taskofthe
superiority or eventhe categoriesof race themselves,whetherin the con-
ventionalacademicformsor the "Adamic man" and the "mud people" of analystofscience
the ChristianIdentityMovement.Racism is a morereal objectthanrace
and determinestheracialcategories. isto tracethe
Therefore,thetaskoftheanalystof scienceis to tracetheinteractions
interactions
and
and interpenetrations of intellectuallabor and the objects of thatlabor
under different conditionsof labor and under different social arrange-
interpenetrations
ments.The art of researchis the sensitivity to decide when a usefuland
necessarysimplification has become an obfuscatingoversimplification. ofintellectual
(6) Modern European/NorthAmericanscience is a productof the
capitalistrevolution.It shareswithmoderncapitalismtheliberalprogres- laborand the
sivistideologythatinformsits practiceand thatit helped to mold. Like
bourgeoisliberalismin generalit is both liberatedand dehumanized.It objectsofthat
proclaimeduniversalideals thatit did not quite mean, violatedthemin
practice,and sometimesrevealedthoseidealsto be oppressiveevenin the- laborunder
ory.
different
Therefore,thereare severalkindsof criticismsof science.A conserv-
ativecriticisminheritstheprecapitalist critique.It is troubledbythe chal- conditions
of
lenge thatscientificknowledgeposes to traditionalreligiousbeliefsand
social rulesand rulers,does not approveof the independentjudgmentof laborand under
ideas and values,does not demand evidencewhereauthority has already
pronounced,and therefore is disturbedmostlyby the radicalside of sci- different
social
ence. Creationistsquite accuratelyidentify the ideologicalcontentof sci-
ence, whichtheylabel secularhumanism,againsttheliberalformulathat arrangements.
scienceis theneutraloppositeof ideology.But no matterhow much they
searchthescientific journalsforevidenceof conflictsamongevolutionists The artof
and weak spots in modernevolutionarytheory,theirchallengeis not to
make science more "scientific," more democratic,less bound by oppres- researchisthe
sive ideology,and more open. Rathertheypropose to returnto faith,to
to
sensitivity
the more obvious kindsof authority, and to anti-intellectual certainties.
Their gut-levelanti-intellectualismis oftenexpressedin delightat thestu-
decidewhen a
piditiesof scientistsas againstthewisdomof the "simpleman,"a delight
thatat firstseemsappealinglydemocratic.But thisis nottheassertionthat usefuland neces-
everyoneis capable ofrigorousand disciplinedthinking. Instead,it denies
the importanceof serious complex thinkingaltogetherin favorof the sarysimplification
spontaneoussmartsofuneducatedcertainties. They acceptthedichotomy
of knowledgeversusvalues and opt fortheirparticularvalues whenever has becomean
thereis conflict.
At the same time, conservative critics reject the fragmented and over-
obfuscating
reductionist aspects of modern science on behalf of a holistic, "organic"
view of the world. At an aesthetic and emotional level their holism partly simplification.
resonates with that of radical criticism, but their holism is hierarchical

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 and static,stressingharmony,balance, law and order,the ontological
rightnessof theway thingsare,were,or are imaginedto have been.
The mostconsistentliberalcriticsof scienceaccept theclaimsof sci-
ence as valid goals but criticizethe practicesthat violate them. They
approveof scienceas public knowledgeand deplorethesecrecyimposed
by military and commercialownershipofit. They wantdemocraticaccess
to sciencedetermined onlybycapacity,and theydeploretheclass,gender,
and racialbarriersto scientific training,employment, and credibility.They
agree thatideas should be judged only on their merits and on the evi-
dence, regardless of where the ideas come but
from, they see hierarchies
of credibility reinforcedby a richvocabularyfordismissingunorthodox
ideas and theiradvocates as "far out," "quackish," "ideological,""not
mainstream,""discredited,""anecdotal," or "unproven."They may be
horrifiedbytheuses of sciencein theproductionof harmfulcommodities
or viciousweaponsor thejustas viciousjustifications of oppression,with-
out howeverrelinquishing the beliefthatthinkingand feelingshould be
keptseparate.
Because oftheincreasingly obviousblindnesses,narrowness,dogma-
tism,intolerance,and vestedinterestin officialscience,alternative move-
mentshave sprungup, especiallyin healthand agriculture. They mustbe
examinedwiththesame toolsthatwe use to lookat "official"science:who
owns them,wheredo theycome from,whatviewpointsdo theyexpress,
how are theyvalidated,whattheoretical biases do theymanifest?Embed-
ded as theyare in a capitalistcontext,thesealternatives too are a fieldfor
exploitation,produce commodities, and often are clothed in shameless
commercialhype. They too have class roots thatlead some of themto
separate individualfromsocial causation (for instance,criticizingthe
magic bullets of the pharmaceuticalindustrybut peddling theirown
miraculous"natural"cures,or promotingholisticcancer treatments but
ignoring the industrial of
origins manycancers). The alternative commu-
nitiesare domainswhereinsightful radicalcritiquemixeswithpettyand
medium-scaleentrepreneurship.
Marxist critiqueattemptsto see science in both its liberatingand
oppressingaspects,itspowerfulinsightsand itsmilitantblindnesses,as a
commoditizedexpressionof liberalEuropean capitalistmasculinistinter-
ests and ideologies organizedto cope withreal naturaland social phe-
nomena.Its ideologyis botha productof Europeanliberalismand a self-
generatedcontribution to thatideology,nota merepassivereflection of it.
Particularradical critiquesof agriculture,medicine,genetics,eco-
nomicdevelopment, and otherareas of applied sciencepointout boththe
external and internal aspectsthatlimitscience'sabilityto reachits stated
goals. The external refers to its social position as a knowledge industry,
owned and directed for purposes of profitand power as guided by shared

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beliefs,carriedout mostlyby men. The modes of recruitment into and
exclusionfromscience,thevarioussubdivisionsintodisciplines,thehid-
den boundaryconditionsrestraining itsinquirybecome intelligible when
we examineits social context.We can approachthe dominantmodalities
of chemicaltherapyin medicineand farmingas expressionsof the com-
moditizationof knowledgeby the chemicalindustry.But the relianceon
molecularmagic bulletsis also congenialto the reductionistphilosophy
thathas dominatedEuropean/North Americansciencesinceitsformation
in the seventeenth century,and thatin turnis supportedby theatomistic
experienceof bourgeoissocial life. (As we tracethe connections,we see
that"internal"and "external"are in factnot rigidlyalternative explana-
tions,anotherexampleof thegeneralprinciplethatthereare no nontriv-
ial, complete, and disjunct subdivisionsof reality.Yet science is still
plagued by the false dichotomiesof organism/environment, nature/nur-
ture,deterministic/random, social/individual,
psychological/physiological,
hard/soft science,dependent/independent variables,and so on.)
The internalrefersto thereductionist, fragmented, decontextualized,
mechanistic(as againstholisticor dialectical)ideologiesand liberal-con-
servativepoliticsof science.Marxistand otherradicalcriticshave always
called forbroadeningthe scope of investigations, placingthemin histori-
cal context,recognizingthe interconnectedness of phenomena,and the
priority of processesoverthings,whileconservative ideologyusuallyadvo-
cates elegantprecisionabout narrowlycircumscribedobjectsand accept-
ing boundaryconditionswithouteven acknowledging them.
(7) A radical critiqueof science extends also to theinnerworkingsof
the research process. In approaching a new problem, my Marxism
encouragesme to ask twobasic questions:whyare thingsthewaytheyare
insteadof a littlebitdifferent,and whyare thingsthewaytheyare instead
of verydifferent? Here "things"has a double meaning,referring bothto
the objectsof studyand to the stateof the science studyingthem.
The Newtoniananswerto thefirstquestionis thatthingsare theway
theyare because nothingmuchis happeningto them.
But our answeris thatthingsare the way theyare because of the
actionsof opposingprocesses.This firstquestionis thatof theself-regu-
lation of systems,of homeostasis.In the face of constantlydisplacing
influences, how do thingsremainrecognizably whattheyare? Once posed,
it entersthe domain of systemstheoryin the narrowsense, the mathe-
maticalmodelingof complexsystems.That disciplinestartswitha set of
variablesand theirconnectionsand appliesequationsto ask,is thesystem
stable? How quickly does it restore itself after perturbation? How much
does it respond to permanent changes in its surroundings? How much
change can it tolerate? It asks, when external events impinge on the sys-
tem, how do they percolate through the whole network,being amplified

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 along some pathwaysand diminishedalongothers?We workwithnotions
such as positiveand negativefeedbackloops, pathways,connectivity,
sinks,delays, reflectingand absorbingbarriers.In its own terms,this
analysisis "objective."But the variablesthemselvesare social products.
For instance,the apparentlyunproblematicnotionof populationdensity
has at least fourdifferentdefinitionsthatlead to different
formulasfor
measurementand different resultswhenthemeasurements are compared
across countriesor classes. We could simplydividethe totalnumberof
people by thetotalarea (or resource):

D = Xpeople/Xarea.

We could ask,whatis the averagedensityat whichpeople live?Then we

would use

D = Y(people/area)
(peopleinthatarea)/Xpeople;

the unevennessof access to resourcesor land is then included. Or we

could do the same but fromthe perspectiveof the resource.The total
resourceper personis

D = Yarea/Xpeople,

of exploitationof a resourceis givenby

the averageintensity

D = Y(area/people)
(area)/Xarea.

Thus even what seems to be an objectivelygivenmeasureis laden with

viewpoint,and thisis eithertakenintoaccountor hidden.Nancy Kreiger
(1994) has used the metaphorof fractalself-similarity to stressthatthe
inseparability of the social and biological occurs at all levels,fromthe
mostmacroto thefinedetailsof themicroin epidemiology.
The second questionis the questionof evolution,history,and devel-
opment.Its basic answeris, thingsare theway theyare because theygot
thatway,notbecause theyhaveto be thatway,or alwayswerethatway,or
because it's the onlyway to be. From thisperspectivewe reexaminethe
firstquestionand ask, whatvariablesbelong in the systemanyway,and
how did theygetthere?Whatdo we reallywantto findout about thesys-
tem?What do you mean "we"? Who says? Do new connectionsappear
and old ones decline?Do variablesmergeor subdivide?Do theequations
themselveschange?Should we use equationsor othermeans of descrip-
tion?And sincewe knowthatthemodelswe use are notphotographically
accurate pictures of reality,how would departures from the assumptions
affectthe outcomes? When does this matter?

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 What werethe givensin the firstformulation now become the ques-
tions.It is herethatthepowerfulinsightsofMarxistsdialectic,whencom-
bined with substantiveknowledge of the objects of interestand the
manipulativeskillsof the craft,have been most productive.Here the
familiarpropositionsof the unityand interpenetration of opposites,uni-
versalconnection,developmentthroughcontradiction, integrative levels,
and so on, so dryin the listingsof the formalmanuals,burstwithrich
implicationsand scintillate withcreativepotential.
Finally,these same methods are used reflexivelyto examinethe his-
toricalconstraintsthathave acted on Marxismitselfas a consequence of
its own historicalcircumstancesand the compositionof Marxistmove-
ments.But thesemethodsshouldnotbe used in a mechanistic,essential-
istway,rejectingnotionsbecause theyare Europeanand therefore foreign
in Latin America,or male and therefore irrelevantto women,or of nine-
teenth-century originand therefore inapplicableto thetwenty-first. After
all, everyidea is foreignin mostplaces whereitis held,and in all places in
theworldmostof thecurrentideas are of foreignorigin.Rather,thehis-
toricalcontextcan be used to evaluatetheideas critically, to discoverthe
insightsand limitationsand the needed transformations. The insightsof
feminismand the ecology movement,particularlythose branches that
have alreadyoverlappedwithMarxism,are especiallyhelpfulin gaining
the distanceneeded forthisexamination.Themes whichhad been rele-
gated to the peripheryof most Marxist vision can now be restoredto
theirrightful places in historicalmaterialism, and societiesstudiedmore
as
richly social/ecological modes of productionand reproduction.
(8) Although differenttheories use differentterms,look at different
objects,and have different goals,theyare notmutuallyunintelligible. Lin-
naeus saw species as fixedat the time of creation,witheach particular
examplebeinga corruptedversionofthearchetypaldesign.Evolutionary
biologistssee species as populationsthatare intrinsically heterogeneous
and subjectto forcesof change.The descriptionofthetypicalis thenseen
as an abstractionfromthe arrayof real animalsor plants.Nevertheless,I
stilluse Linnaean Latin namesforgenusand species,manyofwhichLin-
naeus himselfwould recognize,and I could talk with Linnaeus about
plants,argue about theiranatomyor geographicdistributions. He would
be delightedto learnthatour technologieshave givenus new waysof dis-
tinguishingamong similarplants.We would disagreeabout the signifi-
cance of variationwithina species,and I don't knowhow he would react
to theshockingidea thatsimilarity oftenimpliesa commonorigin.But we
could talk.
This is even true across largerculturaldivides. All peoples name
plants and animals.Most peoples assign different names to plants that
correspond to differentLinnaean species, and divide up the botanical

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We have to call worldmuch as we do. They also tend to distinguishmore finelyamong
organismsthathaveto be dealtwithdifferently. And likeour owntheories,
foropening theirsalso "work."They guide actionsthatoftenenoughlead to accept-
able results.Whetheryou are a moderntaxonomistwho recognizesthat
scienceup to halfthe snakesin Darien are poisonous or a Choco who willtellyou that
all snakesare poisonousbut onlykillyou halfthetime,thepracticalcon-
thosewho have
clusionis similar:whenwalkingin theforest,bewareof snakes.
Furthermore, thetoolsof investigation showa greatercontinuity than
been excluded,
the theories.Galileo would be impressedby our more sophisticatedtele-
democratizing scopes butwouldnotbe completelylostin a modernobservatory. Whilea
Marxisteconomistmightnotbe interested in theinput-output equilibrium
whatisa very modelsof theneoclassicalschool or thetechniquesof cost-benefits analy-
sis so dear to thecorporatemind,thesewould be perfectly comprehensi-
authoritarian ble to her. The claim thatdifferent outlooksare incommensurate, speak
different languages,and findno pointsof contactis a grossdistortionof
structure the understanding of social viewpoint.Theoreticalbarriersdo not mean
theexistentialalonenessimaginedby distantobservers.
modeledon the
(9) The diversityof natureand societydoes not precludescientific
and understanding. Everyplace is clearlydifferent and everyecosystemhas its
corporation,
unique features.Therefore,ecologydoes notlook foruniversalrulessuch
insiston thegoal as "plantdiversity is determinedby herbivores"or attemptto predictthe
floraof a regionbyknowingitsrainfall.Whatit can do is look forthepat-
ofa science ternsof difference, theprocessesthatproducetheuniqueness.Thus, the
numberof species on an islanddepends on theprocessesof colonization
aimedat the and speciationincreasingnumbersand theprocessesof extinction reduc-
ing numbers. We can go further and relate colonization to distance froma
creationofa just source of migrants,extinctionto habitatdiversity and area and commu-
nitystructure, tryto explainwhythemigrantsare ofa particulartype,and
society so on. The outcomeswillbe verydifferent on tinyislandswherepopula-
tionsdo not last long enough to give new species or are so close to the
compatiblewitha source of migrantsas to swamp any local differentiation, fromislands
thatare veryremote,withhighhabitatdiversity.
richand diverse
Thus theuse of sitespecificity to rejectbroad generalizations is mis-
nature. placed. What we look for is the identificationof the opposingprocesses
thatdrivethedynamicsof a kindof system(e.g., rainforest,or island,or
capitalisteconomy)ratherthanproposea unique and universaloutcome.
(10) Radical defendersof science cannot defend science as it is.
Instead,we have to come forwardas criticsbothof liberalscienceand of
its reactionaryenemies.The presentright-wing attackon science is part
on
of a more generalassault liberalism, now that the demise of a world-
wide socialist challenge makes liberalismunnecessary and intensifiedcom-
petition during a period of long-term stagnation makes liberalism seem

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too costly.Althoughits oppositionto liberalismis oppositionto theliber-
atingaspects of thatdoctrine,the reactionaryattackon liberalismoften
emphasizestheoppressiveor ineffectual sides of liberalism.
We have to call for opening science up to those who have been
excluded,democratizing whatis a veryauthoritarian structure modeledon
thecorporation, and insiston thegoal ofa scienceaimed at thecreationof
a just societycompatiblewitha rich and diversenature.We should not
hide behind but ratherunderminethe cult of expertise in favor of
approachesthatcombineprofessionaland nonprofessional participation.
The optimalconditionforscience is withone footin the university and
one in thecommunitiesin struggle,so thatwe have boththerichnessand
complexityof theorycoming fromthe particularand the comparative
view and generalizations thatonlysome distancefromtheparticularcan
provide. It also allows us to see the combinationof cooperativeand con-
flictingrelationswe have withour colleaguesand waysin whichpolitical
commitmentchallengesthe shared common sense of professionalcom-
munities.
We shouldnotpretendor aspireto a bland neutrality but proclaimas
our workinghypothesis:all theoriesare wrongwhichpromote,justify, or
tolerateinjustice.
We should not coverup or onlylamentin privatethe triviality of so
muchpublishedresearchbut denouncethattriviality as comingfromthe
commoditization of careersin scholarshipand fromthe agendas of dom-
inationthatrule out of ordermanyof thereallyinteresting questions.
We shouldchallengethecompetitive individualism of sciencein favor
of a cooperativeeffortto solve thereal problems.
We should reject the reductionistmagic bullet strategythat serves
commoditizedsciencein favorof respectforthe complexity, connected-
ness, dynamism,historicity, and contradictoriness of theworld.
We shouldrepudiatetheaestheticsof technocratic controlin favorof
rejoicing in the spontaneity of the world,delighting the incapacityof
in
indexesto capturelife,savoringtheunexpectedand anomalous,and seek-
ing our success not in dominatingwhatis reallyindominablebut in far-
sighted,humane,and gentleresponsesto inevitablesuprise.
The best defenseof scienceunderreactionaryattackis to insiston a
scienceforthepeople.

Reference

NancyKreiger.1994.Epidemiology
andthewebofcausation:Has anyoneseen
the spider?Social ScienceofMedicine30, no. 7: 887-903.

TenPropositions
on Science& Antisciencei

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